

Department of History and Civilisation

**DENMARK AND THE GAULLIST VISION: GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY
REACTIONS TO THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND ITS EUROPEAN POLICIES,
1958-1969**

By

POUL NOER

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of
Doctor in History and Civilisation
from the European University Institute


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
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List of Abbreviations

ALN	<i>Armée de libération nationale</i>
CCF	Conference for Cultural Freedom
COSEC	Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students
DC	<i>Democrazia Cristiana</i>
DR	<i>Danmarks Radio</i> (Danish Broadcasting Corporation)
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Community
ERP	European Recovery Programme
EU	European Union
GPRA	<i>Gouvernement provisoire de la république algérienne</i>
FLN	<i>Front de libération nationale</i>
FTA	Free Trade Area
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IR	International Relations
IUS	International Union of Students
LO	<i>Landsorganisationen</i> (Danish Confederation of Trade Unions)
MRP	<i>Mouvement républicain populaire</i>
MSI	<i>Movimento sociale italiano</i>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAS	<i>Organisation armée secrète</i>
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PCI	<i>Partito comunista italiano</i>
UGEMA	<i>L'Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens</i>
UN	United Nations
UNR	<i>L'Union pour la nouvelle république</i>
WEU	Western European Union

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Introduction

What follows is a study of the reactions in Denmark to the creation of the Fifth French Republic and its European projects under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle in the period 1958 to 1969. Despised and admired, only a few statesmen have been as central as de Gaulle in the construction of the present French Republic and the working out of the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of today's European Union (EU). The Fifth Republic builds largely upon his constitutional visions, and the major non-socialist political family in France, the neo-Gaullists, consider itself his heir. General de Gaulle had the political responsibility for completing the transformation of France from a colonial empire into a leading EEC actor in the early 1960s; for ending the Algerian War (1954-1962); for turning France into a nuclear power (1960); and for provoking at least a couple of crises within the EEC and NATO (1963 and 1965-66). Politics and culture in post-war Europe were strongly permeated by the Cold War and the cleavage between the Soviet Union and the United States. In virtue of France's pivotal role in the emerging Western collaboration, however, political observers took a considerable interest in French politics and society. Particularly the Gaullist visions and politics provoked interesting debates and deliberations about Western identities and internal conflicts - about Western solidarity and the pursuit of national interests.

The thesis attempts to portray some Danish perspectives on the peculiar French developments between 1958 and 1969. It investigates the deliberation of government policies as well as the introspection of national values that the Gaullist phenomenon catalysed. Whereas a considerable part of the literature about the reception of de Gaulle abroad focuses upon intergovernmental relations, the present thesis endeavours to combine that level with an analysis of wider political debates and the contributions of non-state actors, i.e. of what often is termed the 'civil society.' After studying the Danish government's policies towards Gaullist France in some detail, it occurred that the governmental perspective was rather uninteresting considered in isolation. Combining the analysis of government policy with a wider political and a civil society perspective yielded a better portray of the tension and dilemmas that de Gaulle's policies created in Denmark.

Some of the new political movements of the late 1950s, particularly on the left, attempted to create public awareness of de Gaulle's great power policies and to question Denmark's alliance and her upcoming EEC partnership with France. In order to enquire into the nature and depth of the Danish scepticism regarding the Gaullist Republic, the thesis looks into Danish images of Gaullist France and the way in which Danish actors mirrored themselves in the French events. Particularly the French breakdown in 1958 spurred some reflection about 'Danish' political standards and values, but also the French warfare in Algeria, the nuclear project and de Gaulle's European visions were points of reference in debates about politics and society in the period. Looking into these debates brings to the fore the tension between the Danish government's new *rapprochement* policy vis-à-vis France and the widespread scepticism towards the Gaullist venture within political and social movements in Denmark.

Although the thesis analytically distinguishes between the spheres of government and of civil society, it does by no means argue that the qualms about Gaullist France were restricted to the latter. The internationally minded Social Democratic prime minister, Jens Otto Krag, considered General de Gaulle a 'troublesome' partner, and leading officials agonized over the fact that Gaullist France was driving a wedge into the Western collaboration.¹ Government reports about de Gaulle's 'dictatorship' and 'national egoism' often transcended the expectedly reserved, impartial nature of bureaucratic considerations. But when appearing in the role as government actors, the involved politicians and bureaucrats modified their statements in order to facilitate the cooperation with France. They recognized that Denmark was dependent upon French goodwill concerning the expected EEC enlargement, and they acknowledged that France was wanted as a core member of the Atlantic Alliance.

From political groups and civil society associations, the Danish government faced distinct demands of taking a clear stance against the Gaullist 'regime', the Algerian War, the French nuclear tests, France's obstruction of the EEC enlargement and the French withdrawal from NATO. There was, in some cases, a relatively obvious or identifiable 'causal relationships' between political campaigns and specific changes in government policies. However, it is an equally important ambition of the thesis to examine the indirect impact of the Gaullist phenomenon upon the political action and the worldviews of Danish opposition groups and non-governmental actors. *A key assumption is that the relevance of studying their activities is not merely a function of their ability to change government policies.* I consider it as legitimate to

¹ ABA JOK, box 4 A3. Letter from Prime Minister Krag to Ambassador Bartels, 19 October 1962; RA UM ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A: "Notat" (secret) of April 13, 1961, by Erik Schram-Nielsen; RA UM 3.E.92/60

study the impact of international events upon political movements' self-understandings, internal coherences and structures. While acknowledging the relevance of studying the rationales of governmental decision-making, I see no reasons why the historical discipline should not take an interest in the inverse relationship, i.e. the impact of government policies and international politics upon social movements on a micro or grassroots level.

Concepts, Methodology and Literature: Traditions and New Departures

The thesis thus operates at the intersection of various research traditions, ranging from the *diplomatic history* of international relations (IR) over national *political history* and *history of social movements* to *transnational approaches* looking at the collective action of non-state actors across national contexts. However, there are different emphases on these perspectives in the distinct chapters of the thesis. For instance, the transnational, civil society aspect is more relevant in the investigation of the political agenda setting dynamics during the Algerian War than it is in the case of the Danish reactions to the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated structures in 1966. In the latter case, the Danish political initiatives and actions emanated primarily from government circles in collaboration with other governments. Due to this variation of emphasis, some of the methodological considerations will be presented in connection with the specific chapters and their individual problems.

This said, an overall objective of the thesis is that of bringing the wider political background and the 'civil society' into the historical analysis, contextualising and supplementing the analysis of 'cabinet politics' and the so-called 'reason of state' - a main focus of much traditional diplomatic history and of the influential 'realist paradigm' of IR theory. Below, we shall briefly look at the 'state' and 'civil society' distinction, then at some prevailing positions of the IR theory field, and finally at some developments in the relevant historiography. Rather than testing or developing IR or other theories, the thesis ventures a contextualised historical narrative, interpreting a unique field of political history, i.e. the Danish reactions to the creation of the Gaullist Republic and its policies from 1958 to 1969. From this point of departure, the role of theory is chiefly heuristic, i.e. informing or guiding the choices of perspective, level of analysis and source material.

The concept of 'civil society' has roots within the classical liberal tradition associated with John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith, for whom it referred to any organized activity distinct from government and state, for instance businesses, unions (guilds), media and

(MIK 02:2), box 1. Foreign Minister Krag's briefing and comments regarding the nationalisation of the French army at the Board on Foreign Policy on September, 14, 1960: "... en alvorlig svækkelse af NATO."

charities. The classical liberalists considered the state a means - or a necessary evil - to secure individual rights and provide for basic rule of law, thus enabling a flourishing society.² In recent debates, the 'civil society' concept has had a revival, for instance in the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas' works on deliberative democracy, where it features as the informally organized 'public sphere', which is to be distinguished from the formalised political system associated with the state.³ In the present examination, we shall look at both aspects of civil society, i.e. contention and deliberation in the 'public sphere' as well as the involvement of non-governmental associations. Some scholars exclude economic interest organisations from the sphere of civil society since such bodies are considered instrumental exponents of 'capital interests'. In line with the classical tradition, however, the thesis takes an interest in all kinds of organisations that contributed to the political processes and societal debates pertaining to Gaullist France, irrespective of the scale and nature of their activities.⁴

Whereas the classical versions identified 'civil society' in terms of its non-governmental nature, a recent articulation distinguishes between "the pluralism and particularism of civil society in opposition to the inclusive and overarching norms of government."⁵ Irrespective of the political conviction of a government, it has to consider a public matter in its entirety, whereas civil society actors deal with a matter in its particularity. In practice, however, state and civil society are highly entangled. The state enables the unenforced activities of civil society in terms of guaranteeing the rule of law, while civil society actors often look after societal functions in coordination with the state. Trade unions, industrial organisations and peace associations are typically affiliated to political parties and sometimes to governing elites. The distinction is mainly an analytical instrument that sharpens the focus upon the extra parliamentary input of politics and societal activities.

Of particular interest for the present thesis, moreover, a state has to take the relations to other states into consideration. One of the founding fathers of the so-called realist school in the IR field, Hans J. Morgenthau, reinvigorated the traditional 'balance of power' studies with a rational choice perspective:

² Steven Scalet and David Schmidtz, "State, Civil Society, and Classical Liberalism", in Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post (eds.), *Civil Society and Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 26-47.

³ Kenneth Baynes, "A Critical Theory Perspective on Civil Society and the State", in Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post (eds.), *Civil Society ... op.cit.*, pp. 123-145.

⁴ This is discussed in the definition of civil society offered by the London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society (www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm (seen April 2006)).

⁵ Robert C. Post and Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Introduction", in Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post (eds.), *Civil Society ... op.cit.*, pp. 10-11.

In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose [...], and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.⁶

For Morgenthau, the basic aim of rational state action was 'national interest' or 'national power'. He conceded, however, a government's deviation from the 'pure reason of state' is particularly pronounced under conditions of democratic control of foreign policies.

The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. *Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.*⁷

Consequently, political deliberation in the public sphere and civil society actors features rather secondarily for the understanding of the rationales of 'balance of power politics'. The same counts for the influential *neorealist* tradition, which focuses on the structuring effects of basic types of power constellations within the international system (hegemony, bipolarity and multipolarity).⁸

Different versions of *liberalism*, associated with prominent IR scholars as Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Andrew Moravcsik, have attempted to loosen this state-centric focus. In short, *liberalism* has criticised the tendency of the *realist* tradition to ignore various societal groups, international organisations and transnational actors. For Keohane and Nye, the patterns of interdependence between nations as well as the existence of international organisations and transnational actors contribute to remoulding what the realists regarded the *a priori* given *national interest* of self-reliant states under the condition of international anarchy. In

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 4-15. For a criticism of Morgenthau, see Rodney Bruce Hall, *National collective identity: social constructs and international systems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 15.

⁷ *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

⁸ Neorealism is particularly associated with Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Imprint New York: Random House, 1979).

Moravcsik's influential 'liberal intergovernmental' approach, there is a particular interest in the impact of commercial interest organisations upon government policies.⁹ Although the *realist* and the *liberal* schools disagree about the sources and formation of state interests, both insist on studying international politics under the assumption that states perform as rational actors.¹⁰ For our purpose, however, the most important feature of *liberalism* is its pluralistic dimension, encouraging the study of non-state actors.

Inspired by Professors Keohane and Nye's pioneering work from the 1970s, the German political scientist Thomas Risse has promoted the concept of *transnational relations*. He defines it as "*regular interaction across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.*"¹¹ Risse argues that *neorealists* tended to be hypnotized by the role of the state and the state system, whereas the *liberal* challengers were too eager in proving that transnational non-state actors or structures matter and have an independent impact upon the state based international system. Instead of studying transnational relations in terms of the relative weight of states and the civil society, respectively, Risse urges to study the *interaction* and *interpenetration* of state actors and transnational, non-governmental actors.¹² Scholars of transnational relations widely recognise the prominence of the states, but they emphasise that the presence of international organisations and the multiplicity of transnational ties have provided a new resource for coalition building, enabling or facilitating 'transnational collective action.'¹³

Finally, a wave of *constructivist* or *reflectionist* literature, criticising the basic categories of *realism* and *liberalism*, has emerged within the last decades. Alexander Wendt's attempt of bringing constitutive 'ideas', 'norms', 'cultures' and 'identities' of nations and the interna-

⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977); Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998).

¹⁰ Ole Wæver, "The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 149-185.

¹¹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Bringing transnational relations back in: introduction", in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing transnational relations back in. Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 3-33.

¹² Thomas Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics", in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage publications, 2002), pp. 255-274; Robert O. Keohane and J.S Nye (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

¹³ Sidney Tarrow and Donatella della Porta, "Conclusion: "Globalisation," Complex Internationalism, and Transnational Contention", in Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), *Transnational Protest and Global Activism* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), pp. 227-246.

tional society into the IR field is often mentioned as a point of reference of *constructivism*.¹⁴ A highly relevant contribution that considers itself *reflectionist* is the 2002 anthology, *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states*, edited by the political scientists Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver of the University of Copenhagen.¹⁵ They venture an IR theory based on a framework of *discourse analysis* in the post-structural, French tradition inspired by Michel Foucault. It is radically displacing the focus from state-centric 'rational choices' to the discursive restraints of the *public universe of meaning* upon the viability of European projects in specific national contexts. Rather than studying particular 'motives' or 'ideas' of the involved actors, it deals with the capacity of dominant discourses of basic concepts like 'state', 'nation' and 'people' in order to generate *legitimacy* or *resistance* with respect to particular European projects. A tight conceptual identity of these political concepts tends to render far-reaching European projects politically unacceptable, as exemplified in the Danish case, Hansen and Wæver argue.¹⁶ While being almost silent about the reasons of the European nation-states to engage into integration, the merit of Hansen and Wæver's approach is that of acknowledging the 'public sphere' as an arena of political contention pertaining to IR studies and particularly so with respect to questions of legitimacy and national identity.

Historians have traditionally studied international relations in line with the realist school, i.e. a *Realpolitik* perspective applied in studies of particularly diplomatic sources. An example of a major Danish work predominantly operating within this framework is the six-volume *Dansk Udenrigspolitik's Historie*, published between 2001 and 2005, which I have used intensively. One of the editors, Carsten Due-Nielsen, writes in his personal contribution that, "the main objective with the account is to describe and understand the images of the reality, the aims and the strategies of the Danish foreign policy actors."¹⁷ The governments and foreign ministries are cast as the protagonists of history, whereas terms such as 'the Danes', 'the Germans' and 'the British' basically designate the political decision-makers in these

¹⁴ Stated in Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics* (Imprint New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁵ Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002).

¹⁶ Lene Hansen, "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 50-87.

¹⁷ Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, *Fra helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914. Dansk Udenrigspolitik's Historie 3* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003), pp. 275-276: "Det er et hovedformål for fremstillingen at beskrive og forstå de danske udenrigspolitiske aktørers virkelighedsbillede, mål og strategier."

countries. In general, however, the work aims at a wider foreign policy concept and many of the contributions in the series actually analyse the interplay with political-societal developments.¹⁸ Bo Lidegaard, for instance, connects the Danish survival strategy for the neutral and rather defenceless nation-state from 1914 to 1945 with a so-called 'cultural defence', i.e. the ambition of fostering a strong loyalty and adherence in the population to the democratic system and the national welfare state.¹⁹

From the French historiography, Georges-Henri Soutou's 1996 book, *L'alliance incertaine*, on post-war Franco-German relations, which is in many ways excellent, deserves a mention as an example of a strongly state-leader focussed approach.²⁰ The book describes the strategic deliberations and dilemmas regarding the Franco-German attempts from the mid-1950s of gaining military independence from the United States, while maintaining a credible defence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. What one gains in clarity by focussing on state leaders' strategies, however, is obviously lost in the understanding of, say, the transformation of the German and the French nationalisms towards a more reconciliatory profile under impression of the recent war experience and the Cold War cleavage. In a sense, Soutou's book analyses what took place in the minds of leaders such as de Gaulle and Adenauer, while the wider society figures on the sideline or even outside the arena.

Another giant in French diplomatic history, Maurice Vaïsse - author of the 1998 book *La grandeur* about General de Gaulle's foreign policies - combines an analysis of de Gaulle's vision of national *grandeur* with a thorough examination of the international restraints of that ambition, particularly with respect to the Franco-American controversies. Professor Vaïsse emphasises the ideational roots of the Gaullists' ambitions of national *grandeur*, and he portrays the French population's largely favourable reception of de Gaulle's foreign policies.²¹ From a *liberal intergovernmentalist* point of view, the political scientist Andrew Moravcsik has criticised Vaïsse's *grandeur* perspective on de Gaulle's EEC policies. Moravcsik argues that Gaullist France performed as any other rational state actor, maximising commercial advantages in the intergovernmental bargaining that ultimately was the 'motor' of the EEC. While maintaining the focus on governments in the 'external' dimension, Moravcsik locates the decisive trait of national preference formation at the level of dominant, domestic

¹⁸ Introduction by Carsten Due-Nielsen, Ole Feldbæk and Nikolaj Petersen in Esben Albrechtsen, Karl-Erik Frandsen and Gunnar Lind, *Konger og krige. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 1* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 8-9.

¹⁹ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004).

²⁰ Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard, 1996).

commercial interest organisations.²² Although many scholars have welcomed the idea of analysing government politics in the light of interest groups' input, most historians have criticised Moravcsik for underestimating the *grandeur* dimension of Gaullist France's European policies.²³

The historiography pertaining to the creation of the EEC was partially inspired by the British economic historian, Alan Milward. He advocated an analysis of "the post-war economic and social forces" that shaped the European nation-states, and he has taken a special interest in the governments' strategies of finding European solutions to meet domestic demands of economic welfare. In his path breaking 1992 book, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Professor Milward argued that the success of the West European integration process was linked to cooperation in specific fields that underpinned the nation-states' ability to maintain domestic political coalitions. European federalists, self-organising bureaucratic processes or the geopolitical aim of binding West Germany to the Western world did *not* 'drive' the European integration.²⁴ A somewhat wider range of 'social forces' is thus acknowledged in Milward's approach than that of Moravcsik's commercial interest group perspective. Both positions are *liberal* in the sense that they pay attention to the importance of what happens in the society; it is, however, mainly the political processes relating to *material* interests that they acknowledge as significant.

Within the Danish archival-based research, the historians Thorsten B. Olesen and Johnny N. Laursen have been pioneers in terms of applying Milward's framework to the Danish case. In various books and articles, they have investigated the impact of Danish social structures and trade patterns upon the European policies of the predominantly Social Democratic governments, as well as the impact of the highly popular vision of Nordic cooperation, i.e. between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.²⁵ Moreover, Morten Rasmussen's doctoral

²¹ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998).

²² Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998), pp. 18–87; Andrew Moravcsik, "De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958 – 1970 (Part 1)", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2.2, 2000: 3–43.

²³ Marc Trachtenberg, "De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe", in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2.3, 2000: 101 – 116; Alan Milward, "A Comment on the Article by Andrew Moravcsik", in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2.3, 2000: 77–80.

²⁴ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 2000 (first edition 1992)).

²⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Choosing or Refuting Europe? The Nordic Countries and European Integration, 1945 – 2000", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 – 2, 2000: 147 – 168; Thorsten B. Olesen, "The Dilemmas of Interdependence: Danish Foreign Policy 1945–1972", in *Journal of European Integration History*, Volume 7, Number 2, 2001 (*Small and Neutral States*): 37–63; Flemming Just and Thorsten B. Olesen, "Danish Agriculture and the European Market Schism, 1945–1960", in Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945–1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 129–146; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945–1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005); Johnny Laursen, "Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Chal-

thesis from 2004 applies a political economy perspective, showing how the Danish exports were put under pressure, as the EEC implemented a common external tariff. In Denmark, the commercial peak organisations were split over the membership question as the influential Agricultural Council favoured access to the continental markets and agricultural arrangements, whereas the Industrial Council initially was an outright opponent of a Danish EEC membership. Rasmussen combines his analysis of commercial interests with an investigation of party politics, particularly of the Social Democratic Party, where the younger generation and some trade unionists regarded the EEC a threat to the Danish labour market model and state financed welfare system.²⁶

Specifically, the historian Uffe Østergaard has dealt with issue of national identity and Danish scepticism towards European integration.²⁷ The works of Østergaard has inspired Hansen and Wæver's abovementioned book, but the latter adds some links to the wider IR theory debates.²⁸ While precisely pinpointing some prominent semantic features of the national identity debates, pertaining to Danish EEC/EU scepticism, these analyses barely touch upon the governmental or diplomatic levels of analysis. In other words, we are facing the inverse methodological dilemma than that of, for instance, Professor Soutou's abovementioned analysis of French and German state leader's strategies in *L'alliance incertaine*, in which the public or the society played a marginal role.

Only a few studies have focussed directly upon Danish relations with Gaullist France. An exception is a 1992 article about *De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark* by the Danish professor and former Paris correspondent, Erling Bjøl, which focuses on the repercussions in Denmark of de Gaulle's 1963 veto against British EEC membership.²⁹ Another exception is the histo-

lenge", in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961 – 1963* (London, 1996), pp. 111-216; Johnny Laursen, "Det danske tilfælde. En studie i dansk Europapolitikens begrebsdannelse 1956-57", in Johnny Laursen (Ed.), *I Tradition og kaos: festskrift til Henning Poulsen* (Aarhus, 2000), pp. 238 – 276; Johnny Laursen, "Mellem fællesmarkedet og frihandelszonen. Dansk markedspolitik 1956-1958", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (Ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948 – 1992* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1993), pp. 65-87.

²⁶ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004).

²⁷ Uffe Østergaard, "The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation-States", in Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth (eds.), *The Cultural Construction of Norden* (Scandinavian University Press, 1999), pp. 25-71; Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 139 – 184.

²⁸ Lene Hansen, "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 50-87.

²⁹ Erling Bjøl, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 239 - 246.

rian Jakob Thomsen's article, *Le général de Gaulle vu par les hommes politiques danois*, featuring some interviews with former Danish ministers about their initial concerns and later relief regarding the Gaullist experiment.³⁰ More recently, some relevant archival studies have been carried out; especially in Bo Lidegaard's biography of the Social Democratic leader, Jens Otto Krag, and in Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villume's *I Blokpedelings Tegn. 1945-1972*.³¹ These contributions focus predominantly on the governmental dimension of the Danish relationship to France. In that quality, the present thesis owes a lot to them.

Instead of assuming a hierarchy of importance between the various levels of analysis outlined above, the thesis proceeds in an 'open' manner. It takes an interest in the levels where the act of defining Danish policies or values in the light of General de Gaulle's political return and the Gaullists' European ambitions took place. All actors operating in the Danish society, ranging from young activists painting anti-Gaullist graffiti over interest organisations to French diplomats and the Danish government, are pertinent as a point of departure. *The capacity of the Gaullist initiatives to generate political action, debate and contention in Denmark is the guiding criterion of relevance.* Therefore, the approach includes both rather futile anti-Gaullist manifestations and effective adjustments of government policies to, say, the French EEC vetoes and withdrawal from NATO's integrated structures. It includes the debates about the viability of Western democracy in the light of the French collapse, although the left-wing demand of a Danish withdrawal from NATO on that account was in vain. Often, however, the reactions appeared in hybrid forms, as we shall see in the case of the Algerian War, where the French diplomats protested minor Danish grassroots groups' activities in approaches to the Danish government. The thesis takes a special interest in political groups and civil society actors' struggle for calling attention to particular French policies, and, at times, the Danish government's attempts of avoiding the involvement of the public. Constitutionally, the foreign policy conduct was the domain of the government, under parliamentary control, but, characteristically for the period, the new political and social movements chal-

³⁰ Jakob Thomsen, "Le général de Gaulle vu par les hommes politiques danois", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Plon, 1992), pp. 278-290.

³¹ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001) and *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002); Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokpedelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005).

lenged the traditionally secretive nature of that policy area.³² Human agency, i.e. the ability of actors to make decisions and enact them on the world, was at play in that respect.

Recent historiography has taken some interest in the concept of 'reception theory', originally developed in the field of literary theory. The literary theories stress the readers' role in creating meaning in a text, as different readers will understand the 'same' text differently. Released from its author, one can consider the text separated from the original intentions of the author. The literary reception theories has, among other things, inspired studies of "memory" of historical events *in different times* and their usage or function in shaping collective memories and identities, independently of their original meaning or significance.³³ Instead of pursuing the memory approach, the present thesis studies the reception and effects of the Gaullist phenomenon *in a different place*. It investigates how the Gaullist policies were interpreted and used in the context of Danish politics and society - how it contributed to defining operational policies and political-societal values. In order to pinpoint the peculiarities of the Danish case, the thesis put some effort into comparisons with the contexts and reactions of other Western countries.

Historical studies of memory and reception is largely a branch of cultural history, focussing on concepts and practices of everyday life. We must admit that the thesis predominantly looks into reactions of political and societal elites.³⁴ Mainly the elites in Denmark took an interest in the events in France, contrary to an experience like the Vietnam War, which spurred a wider mass movement. This said, the aim is to widen the range of actors and organisational levels taken into account.

Source Materials

Reflecting the multiple levels of analysis, the thesis draws on sources from a wide range of archives and material groups. In order to analyse the Danish government's reception of the Gaullist Republic and its direct contacts with its French counterpart, I have consulted the then Foreign and Prime Minister Krag's papers and his personal diary, most kindly made available by the Danish Labour Movement's Library and Archives in Copenhagen (ABA JOK).³⁵ In addition, I have used the Danish Foreign Ministry's Archives at the National Archives in

³² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 268-275.

³³ Martyn P. Thompson, "Reception Theory and the Interpretation of Historical Meaning", in *History and Theory*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Oct., 1993): 248-272.

³⁴ Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method", in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 102, No. 5. (Dec., 1997): 1386-1403.

³⁵ There is a list of the archives in the bibliography.

Copenhagen (RA UM) intensively. A few relevant remarks also appeared in the minutes of the Danish Cabinet meetings (RA MM) as well as in the minutes of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group, located at the Parliament's Library (FB SDGP). There were also a few documents about European foreign policy cooperation in the Radical Liberal Party's archive (RA Rad.). Unfortunately, I did not manage to get access to the archives of the Conservative Party or of the Liberal Party.

I have also pursued the bilateral perspective in the files relating to Denmark in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry in Paris (MAE AD) and Nantes (MAE CADN) as well as in some French minutes of Franco-Danish government meetings located in the collection of the Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU MAEF SG). There were barely any politically relevant documents in the available fonds of Charles de Gaulle in the French National Archives in Paris (AN 5 AG 1), whereas those of President Georges Pompidou (AN 5 AG 2) contained some interesting documents. Unfortunately, de Gaulle's personal papers are not accessible. Whereas the initial aim was to find materials about the bilateral relationship, it turned out that particularly the files of the French Copenhagen Embassy (MAE CADN CPH) included many documents pertaining to Danish social and political movements such as original letters of protest and comments about their activities. Many of these documents were not available in any Danish archives, but the information gained in the French diplomatic archives rendered a further investigation possible, based on the dates of the protests, registration of comments in the Danish press, etc. The documents from the French Copenhagen Embassy have been particularly useful, partly due to the French diplomats' perceptive registration of the Danish public and politicians' reactions to the developments in France, partly as documentation of the French representatives' intervention in the Danish debate through press contacts and relations to prominent politicians.

There was useful material about the Danish trade union movement's reactions to the EEC project and its French dimension in the archives of the Labour Movement's Economic Board at the Labour Movement's Library and Archive in Copenhagen (ABA AE) along with a few relevant documents in the archives of the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (ABA LO). Finally, I found material about the collections to Algerian refugees in the archives of the National Union of Students in Denmark (RA DSF) and information about the practical side of the French language policy in the Danish section of *Alliance Française* (RA AF).

A considerable part of the used source material, however, is the contributions to the public debate of politicians, political observers and grassroots activists. As I consider the public communicative action an integral part of the field of enquiry, the value of these contributions

consists exactly in their public character, i.e. what would figure as window-dressing or distorting elements in Morgenthau's realist universe. The public statements are pertaining to the question of what leading politicians considered expedient to argue in the campaigns for and against Denmark's NATO and EEC membership, and how different political milieus and the civil society dealt with the breakdown of democracy and the new foreign-policy agenda of the key NATO and EEC member, France.

Finally, a note on the Danish press structure in the 1950s and 1960s, as I have used plenty of leading articles. Most dailies were linked directly to the political parties then. *Berlingske Tidende* and *Dagens Nyheder* were thus attached to the Conservative Party, *Politiken* to the Radical Liberals, *Land og Folk* to the Communist Party and *Social Demokraten*, later *Aktuelt*, to the Social Democratic Party. The Aarhus based *Demokraten* was associated with a left-wing fraction of the Social Democratic Party. To some extent, the major national papers functioned as party organs, thus presenting an official party line in their editorials with a view to influence public opinion. The independent *Information* addressed an intellectual audience, and it became increasingly leftwing in the late 1960s. In the late 1950s, however, its editors were fervent NATO supporters, and its international editor, Erik Seidenfaden, was one of the most explicit supporters of the Gaullist solution to the political crisis of 1958. Another prominent independent paper, *Jyllands Posten*, which considered de Gaulle an exponent of the French-Algerian ultras, was conservative-liberalist.

Structure and Content

The thesis is built up chronologically, although with some periodical overlaps. One of the advantages of proceeding chronologically is that of bringing into the foreground the trajectory of the political cases, as they developed from secretive foreign policy deliberations to matters debated in public. The foreign-policy establishment was often against a lot of publicity, but various political and social actors attempted to increase the public focus on international issues. In addition, many of the studied cases were interrelated so that one case provides the contextual background in relation to the next ones. For instance, the Danish debates in 1958 about the French democracy (chapter 2) had some impact upon the Danish EEC membership debates of 1961-1962 (chapter 5-6), as the EEC sceptics warned against joining a Community with political leaders such as General de Gaulle. However, the chronological structure partly goes along with a division into thematic sections, as the relevance of the cases examined was changing over time. For instance, the spectre of a military coup by the French forces stationed

in Algeria was imminent in 1958 and 1961, but not so during the revolt of May 1968, where other dynamics were at play.

In chapter one, before turning to the Danish reactions to the Gaullist phenomenon, the thesis sketches some long term features of Danish state history since the Napoleonic Wars, namely the development from a medium-sized composite state to a small nation-state for which survival constantly was a key issue in the light of Prussian-German superiority. A strong and long-lasting attachment to neutrality emerged, which was abandoned only after the experience of World War II; the signs that the new United Nations (UN) was not adequate in the face of the East-West cleavage; and an abortive attempt of creating a Nordic Defence Union. We shall shortly look at Denmark's way into the various post-war Western organisations such as the Atlantic Alliance and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).

Chapter two focuses on the Danish reactions to the coming to power of de Gaulle in 1958, during the Algerian War. It looks into Danish politicians and media's endeavours of defining Danish democratic values in the light of the French political chaos as well as the Danish NATO oppositions' call for a withdrawal from the Alliance due to the French parliamentary meltdown. In some detail, chapter three deals with the Danish reactions to the French conduct in the Algerian War. The Danish government was not as overtly critical as its Scandinavian counterparts were, but we shall see how various Danish associations engaged in the Algerian question, often in coordination with transnational umbrella organisations. Chapter four scrutinises the impact of de Gaulle's early challenge of NATO upon Danish politics and the new political movements. Particularly the creation of the *force de frappe* and the nuclear tests program carried out in Algeria in 1960-61 caused a great stir, as it was launched during the informal moratorium of the existing nuclear powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

Chapter five looks at the importance of Gaullist France for Danish EEC policies, which hesitantly aimed at membership of the Community with Britain, Ireland and Norway. Although many Danish actors condemned de Gaulle's veto against British membership in January 1963, the episode clarified that Danish agriculture was dependent on the tough French negotiation tactics in order to improve its conditions on the British market for food-stuffs. Chapter six portrays the various debates about national sovereignty, identity and the welfare state associated with the perspective of EEC membership, particularly in the light of the Gaullist visions of Europe. In chapter seven, we shall look at the dramatic crises of the EEC and NATO that de Gaulle released by blocking the EEC Council and withdrawing France from NATO's integrated structures in the mid-1960s, a period characterised by the

European détente efforts. The French NATO withdrawal in 1966 prompted the Danish government to propose a reform of NATO in order to underscore the organisation's responsibility for promoting détente. The Danish proposal reflected partly a détente strategy, partly a response to the decreasing acceptance in the Danish and other populations of NATO – before the Soviet intervention in Prague in 1968. We shall see, in chapter eight, how the prospect of de Gaulle's fall affected the Danish plans of a Nordic customs union; de Gaulle was considered the most serious obstacle to an EEC enlargement and a new French president might reopen the enlargement dossiers. In the epilogue, chapter 9, we shall finally look at some Danish reactions to de Gaulle's death on 9 November 1970 as well as the impact of the Gaullist heritage for the enlargement negotiations and the Danish campaign for EC membership in 1971-72.

Chapter 1 - Denmark in the European State System from Napoleon to de Gaulle (1814-1958)

In the second half of the 20th century, Denmark's major international commitment has been its NATO membership. Shortly after the breakdown of the Third Reich in 1945, the most urgent security concern turned from the neighbour in the South to the nearby colossus in the East, the Soviet Union. Denmark's geo-strategic position at the straits connecting the Baltic Sea with the North Sea remained highly vulnerable, but a historically unique alliance option emerged with the Atlantic Alliance. In April 1949, Denmark signed the North Atlantic Treaty with Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and, most importantly, with the United States. For many involved politicians and observers, it appeared as a radical, but necessary, rupture with neutralist traditions that originated in the trade dependent, absolute monarchy and the nation-state of the mid-19th century.³⁶

In order to trace the strategic and national challenges that conditioned the Danish reservations about NATO and the EEC, as well as the reactions to the Gaullist project, we shall venture a sweep through the Danish history and experiences since the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). The episodes and problems selected are chiefly those that Danish politicians and debates still used as points of reference legitimising political choices in the mid-20th century.

The Neutralist Tradition (1814-1945)

Since the end of the Great Nordic War in 1720, the Danish-Norwegian double monarchy had managed to remain neutral with respect to the major wars fought by the European powers, although it had participated in different alliance systems with Britain, France and Russia, respectively. The monarchy's merchant navy gained particularly during the Seven Years War (1756-1763) and the War of American Independence (1775-1783), insisting on the principle of 'free ship, free cargo.' Initially, the traders were also prospering after the outbreak of the

³⁶ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 42-48.

French Revolutionary Wars in 1792, but the neutrality policy proved impossible to maintain in 1807, given the European power constellations and emphasis on 'economic warfare'.

For a period under the *de facto* rule of Crown Prince Frederik, the Danish neutrality policy was pursued less cautiously; the merchant navy went protected in convoy, refusing visitations of the belligerents. In 1807, Britain 'forbade' the ships of the neutrals the right to enter ports that denied access to British ships. Denmark-Norway found itself isolated as Russia - the monarchy's traditional ally - surrendered to France and joined the blockade of the Continent against Britain. In this situation, Denmark-Norway faced a British as well as a French ultimatum; join *our* alliance or become our enemy. The British government was not willing to risk that France should capture the Danish-Norwegian navy. It launched a naval blockade of Zealand and a massive bombardment of military and civilian targets in Copenhagen, enforcing the surrender of the Danish navy. There were mixed feelings about Revolutionary France and Napoleon Bonaparte in Denmark, but the English government had virtually become a hate object in the public after the bombardment of Copenhagen.³⁷ Strategically, the Crown Prince was pushed into Napoleon's continental alliance, placing the Danish crown on the losing side in 1814, as the great powers commenced the restoration of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. In effect, the great powers dissolved the Danish-Norwegian double monarchy, as Norway was given to Sweden in compensation of Russia's acquisition of Finland. The remaining Danish monarchy embarked on a policy of isolated neutrality, avoiding alliances with the great powers.³⁸

In the mid-19th century, however, Denmark was again involved in war acts that resulted in a further territorial reduction, namely the monarchy's loss of the duchies Schleswig and Holstein. The emergence of national movements in Germany and Denmark added a new dimension to the complex territorial disputes over Schleswig and Holstein. Modern historians argue that the first war over Schleswig (1848-1851) was a *civil war* within the Danish monarchy's multicultural realm, whereas traditional Danish historiography has considered it an unambiguous example of German aggression.³⁹ The German Association was interested in admitting the duchy of Schleswig into the Association, of which Holstein - and thusly the Danish king - were already members. On their side, the Danish 'National Liberals' were in favour of inte-

³⁷ Rasmus Glenthøj, "Venner og fjender. Danskernes holdninger til England, Frankrig og Napoleon 1799-1815", in Rasmus Glenthøj and Gertrud With (eds.), *Magtspillet. Danmark og Napoleon* (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Bibliotek, 2005), pp. 35-48.

³⁸ Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality. A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 12-20.

³⁹ Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 273-277.

grating the duchy of Schleswig into a new Danish nation-state.⁴⁰ The final blow to the Danish crown's composite Danish-German territorial state came in 1864; Prussia and Austria occupied Schleswig as the German Association was not willing to accept the Danish plans of incorporating that duchy into a Danish nation-state.⁴¹

The loss of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia was a defining event for Danish foreign policy and, in a broader sense, for the national self-understanding and culture in general. Between 1864 and 1870, there were hopes in Denmark that France would be able to check the Prussian-German expansion, ultimately giving Denmark an opportunity to regain at least Schleswig; the French defeat to Germany in the war 1870-71, however, was a great disappointment in this light. Denmark went back to a position of isolated neutrality, as there was no alliance option. The structure of the emerging party system of the reduced nation-state reflected to some extent the disagreement over the usefulness of any Danish armament, given the superior force of the newly declared German Empire. Thus, the political left-right dimension partly reflected different views on defence policies along with the disagreement over the implementation of the liberal constitution from 1849. The political left, i.e. the Liberal groups, were strongly against the right-wing government's costly project of fortifying Copenhagen, a plan the party 'Right' carried out by provisional laws, i.e. in conflict with the parliamentary majority. In general, the national project after 1864 was inward looking, aiming at 'winning internally what had been lost externally.' From around 1875, moreover, the Liberal peace movement was gaining ground, particularly campaigning in favour of Danish support to a European court of arbitration. The 'Right' government and the foreign policy establishment were rather sceptical, but the Liberal peace movement managed by 1898 to collect 286,000 signatures for the recognition of Denmark's neutrality and the implementation of a system of arbitration between states. In 1904, after the fall of the 'Right' government, Denmark entered into its first agreement of arbitration with the Netherlands.⁴²

A milestone in the formation of the 'classical' Danish party system was the split of the 'Liberal Reform Party' in 1905. Since the breakthrough of the parliamentary political system in 1901, the Liberal party leaders had slid towards a more defence friendly line – an intolerable development for the antimilitarist fraction of the Liberals. Consequently, they created the Radical Liberal Party (*Det Radikale Venstre*), featuring an antimilitarist neutrality policy and

⁴⁰ Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, *Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 3* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003), pp. 99-107.

⁴¹ Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, *Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 3* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003), pp. 236-244.

a social liberal view on society that pointed towards a partnership with the Social Democratic Party. With a view to the upcoming conflict with Germany (World War I), the Radical chief ideologist, the historian Peter Munch (MP), elaborated and advertised a survival strategy for the Danish nation-state that had a far-reaching scope. In his program, the maintenance of Denmark's neutral status was paramount - and actually beyond political dispute - as there were no alliance options, neither Scandinavian or with Britain. What was at stake was rather whether or not a *military* defence could underpin the neutral position and existence of the nation-state.

According to Peter Munch and the Radical Liberal Party, the answer was clearly negative, as they considered it completely impossible to defend Denmark under the given geopolitical circumstances in Northern Europe. In this line of reasoning, the military apparatus was not only useless; it constituted a direct danger as it increased Germany's potential gain from occupying Denmark, cf. the British capture of the Danish navy in 1807. Secondly, Peter Munch drew the 'un-heroic' and controversial conclusion that Denmark in all circumstances should refrain from going to war, even in the case of a German occupation, in order to avoid any involvement in a conflict between the great powers. After an unavoidable defeat, Germany might force Denmark into an alliance against its possible liberators of the Triple Entente, i.e. Britain, France and Russia. Participation on the losing side, again, might lead to the final dissolution of the Danish nation-state. Thirdly, in agreement with the other parties, the Radical neutrality policy emphasised the necessity of balancing the trade policy between British and German interests in order to preserve the neutral status. As exports and growth were critical for the embryonic Danish welfare state, the trade policy was also essential for a fourth dimension of the Radical survival strategy, namely that of fostering a strong adherence to the Danish state and its democratic institutions. Cultivating a national identity and avoiding the lurking class struggle and political extremism was thus a part of a *cultural-societal* defence – a substitute for a military defence against the background of an unfavourable international environment.⁴³

The policy of neutrality became particularly relevant for Denmark with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Now, the Radical Liberal Party was in charge of guiding this policy, as it formed a minority government between 1913 and 1920 with parliamentary support of the growing Social Democratic Party. The principle of neutrality was barely controversial as

⁴² Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, *Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 3* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003), pp. 333-412, 435-436, 483-485.

such; instead, the main areas of contention were the government's extensive adaptation to 'German interests' and leaning towards a 'symbolic defence', only marking sporadic violations of Danish sovereignty, at the expense of a serious military defence against the dreaded German occupation. For Peter Munch – the Radical chief ideologist and now defence minister – the armament of Denmark featured literally as a peril, as Britain regarded Denmark a part of the German 'sphere of interest' by 1914. In this line of reasoning, Copenhagen's fortifications at the Sound constituted a temptation for Germany rather than a contribution to the military security; given Denmark's inferior military standing and the missing alliance option, Germany could capture the military fortifications in Copenhagen any time, closing a main entrance to the Baltic and forcing Denmark into the war.⁴⁴

In fact, both Germany and Britain proved to be convinced about the advantages of avoiding an involvement of Scandinavia in the Great War. A peculiar trade system emerged in this context, where Denmark supplied Britain as well as Germany with vital foodstuff. Germany accepted the Danish deliverances to Britain, as the Danish farmers were dependent on supplies of feeding stuff from British contractors; there would be no Danish agricultural supplies to Germany without these critical deliverances from Britain to Denmark. On their side, the British authorities knew that a purely bilateral Danish-British trade system would lead to an immediate German occupation of Denmark. The maintenance of the Danish neutrality status was a very delicate matter, as the government clearly was accommodating Germany at several occasions. In 1914, thus, Denmark's Radical foreign minister, Erik Scavenius, indicated to a German representative, "In no case would Denmark ally itself with the enemy of Germany."⁴⁵ Bending the knee to Germany was by no means a popular gesture, but Denmark managed to keep out of the war and the agricultural sector and commerce profited massively – an outcome that lent the policy of neutrality some credit.

In the inter-war period, there were some hopes in Denmark that the unfavourable geopolitical situation had improved. Germany was weakened after the war; so was the Baltic great power, now in the shape of the Soviet Union after the revolution of 1917. Some Conservative and Liberal politicians argued in favour of rearmament and a revision of the Danish-German border – encouraged by French diplomats – in accordance with historical affiliations, dynastic sovereignties or even strategic considerations. However, the policy winning out after World

⁴³ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 16-25, 633-637.

⁴⁴ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 16-25, 49-128.

War I was to revise the border in accordance with President Woodrow Wilson's principle of *the peoples' right of self-determination*. The northern part of Schleswig was 'voted back' to Denmark on that account in 1920, rendering Denmark a uniquely homogeneous nation-state.⁴⁵

On the international level, there was an increasing emphasis on collective security and arbitration, which represented an old ideal of the Danish Liberals. The attempt of sustaining a system of international law with the League of Nations, created in 1920, was welcomed, and it was considered a reassuring development that Germany became a member in 1926. However, the League never managed to live up to the ideals of a collective security system. The rising Soviet Union did not join before 1934, and even the United States was not able to join the League due to Congressional opposition, although the organisation was a product of President Wilson's post-war plans. Finally, the League of Nations failed blatantly to respond to Fascist Italy's assault on Abyssinia in 1935. In Denmark, the feelings about the League remained very mixed as the risk of being dragged into a future war with Germany accompanied the vain hopes of the League's capacities of solving international disputes peacefully. Therefore, Denmark did by no means leave its traditional affection for neutrality in the interwar period. At the eve of World War II, the Social Democratic-Radical Liberal government had even carried out a thoroughgoing disarmament of the country.

In January 1933, against the background of Adolf Hitler's National Socialists approaching the governmental power in Germany and the emergence of political extremism in Denmark, the Social Democratic-Radical Liberal government of Thorvald Stauning entered into a far-reaching socio-economic compromise with the Liberal Party. It dealt with the consequences of the severe international economic crisis with a devaluation of the Danish currency in order to help agricultural exporters and a package of social measures directed at the rapidly growing urban proletariat.⁴⁷ Simultaneously, the Conservative leaders fought the mushrooming fascist tendencies of the Conservative youth organisation. In sum, the established political system made an effort of preserving the social balance and the democratic institutions, and, in spite of political divisions, it showed a considerable solidarity in the light of the general economic crisis and the upcoming threat from Nazi Germany.

On 9 April 1940, when Germany carried out the occupation of Denmark and Norway in a combined operation of air, navy and ground forces, the Danish army only met the German

⁴⁵ Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality. A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 49-58.

⁴⁶ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 203-207.

invaders with a symbolic defence, marking the Danish neutrality and territorial sovereignty. No declaration of war was issued! The Danish government merely protested the German occupation, maintaining that the Danish authorities would continue to govern the nation in spite of the military occupation. During the first years of the occupation, it thus upheld a 'sovereignty' and 'neutrality fiction', aiming at preserving the societal structures and democratic institutions and avoiding an enforced involvement in the hostilities against the Allies.⁴⁸ Initially, the main political parties and large parts of the population were in favour of the policy of cooperation with the German occupying power. However, the wide cross-party government accommodated largely the increasingly controversial, German demands, thus generating frustration in large parts of the population. From 1943, the resistance movement stepped up the number of sabotage acts against the German occupying forces significantly - against the Danish government's explicit instructions. In August 1943, a series of strikes and demonstrations marked that the population was turning against the policy of cooperation. Chancellor Hitler demanded the introduction of extensive precautions from censorship to death penalty against the turmoil and sabotage in Denmark, which made the Danish government suspend its activities. That was indeed a crucial step, but pronounced reminiscent of the policy of cooperation remained in the succeeding administration of permanent secretaries that 'governed' the nation in cooperation with the German representatives and largely in understanding with the Danish politicians until the liberation in May 1945.⁴⁹

Neutralism Discredited: Denmark's UN Membership (1945)

After World War II, the traditional neutralist system was severely discredited. The invoked neutrality status had not hindered the feared German occupation - as it arguably had done for all the Scandinavian countries in World War I and for Sweden in World War II as well. In the post-war political rhetoric, the slogan "No more a 9th April", i.e. the date of the German occupation of Denmark in 1940, became a commonplace historical point of reference. Moreover, Denmark had a severe image problem internationally due to the cross-party coalition government's cooperation with the representatives of the Nazi regime from 1940 to 1943, continued by the leading civil servants until 1945. Denmark was short of anything compared to General de Gaulle's 'Free French' or an exile government as that of Norway that could

⁴⁷ Tage Kaarsted, *Krise og krig, 1925-1950. Gyldendals og Politikens Danmarkshistorie. Bind 13* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politiken, 1991), pp. 75-102.

⁴⁸ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 389-404.

pave the way directly for UN membership. The Danish resistance movement had not been impressive, and only a few Danish politicians had established themselves in London, notably so the Conservative leader, John Christmas-Møller. Denmark's Ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, had been ardently against the policy of cooperation, which caused some controversies with the formally legitimate government in Copenhagen.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the allies – the Soviet Union only hesitantly - recognised that the Danish policy had aimed at avoiding the insertion of an authoritarian leader such as Marshal Pétain in unoccupied France or an outright Nazi puppet like Vidkun Quisling in Norway.

In spite of Denmark's 'un-heroic' performance during the war, the allies finally accepted Danish participation at the San Francisco Conference in the summer of 1945, where the charter of the new world organisation - the United Nations (UN) – was conceived. The UN membership appeared as a rupture with the Danish tradition of isolated neutrality. Although the UN was not exactly a traditional military alliance, it was at least founded by the war alliance, and membership might require military or other contributions clearly in conflict with a neutral status. Initially, the Danish politicians widely declared that they were willing to take this step and adjust the Danish defence and foreign policies accordingly. With the actual presence of the great powers in the Security Council, the UN might mark a new departure for the ideas of collective security, the involved Danish actors reasoned.⁵¹

Some elements of neutralism remained nevertheless in the Danish UN approach, presented under labels such as 'bridge building' and 'non-bloc' policies. In January 1948, the Social Democratic prime minister, Hans Hedtoft – a passionate champion of Nordic collaboration – outlined the Danish UN policies:

We must not at all place our country in any bloc. We are a member of the United Nations, and must do our duty there as a Nordic country [...] May I add that, in my view, it cannot be a Danish or a Nordic interest to exacerbate the all too obvious antagonisms between East and West. A final rupture between those great powers which were united in the pursuit of victory in the war, will be a catastrophe for all of us – perhaps not least for the Nordic countries.⁵²

⁴⁹ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 522-534

⁵⁰ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bind 4, 1914-1945* (København: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 605-609.

⁵¹ Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality. A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 86-93; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 24-39.

⁵² Cited in an English translation appearing in Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality. A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 91.

Within the UN, Denmark was significantly more passive than Norway, whose Atlantic orientation and experiences with the exile government in London during the war had paved the way for an increasingly activist Western engagement. There is hardly any doubt that the Danes overwhelmingly identified with the Western world like the Norwegians.⁵³ In terms of security policies, nevertheless, the possibility of returning to neutralism, if the UN system would break down under impression of the brewing East-West conflict, resurfaced in the Danish security debates around 1948.

Abandoning the traditional doctrine of isolated neutralism, while keeping out of the East-West conflict, seemed like the challenge of squaring the circle. In virtue of the unfavourable experience with nearly unarmed neutrality in 1940, and the parallel realisation that military power was not necessarily a bourgeois means of repression, the Social Democratic Party was taking an important step away from its antimilitarist traditions. The Social Democratic leadership thus approached the more defence friendly line of the Conservative and the Liberal Party.⁵⁴ However, Denmark's way to engage into a military alliance went through an attempt of creating a Scandinavian defence union, initiated shortly after the emergence of the Brussels Treaty of March 1948, in which Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had agreed upon creating a defence league.

As Sweden and Iceland, too, became UN members in 1946, the Nordic countries initiated a rather profound coordination of their UN policies – though without Finland that only became a member in 1955. A main aim of this coordination was that of keeping the Nordic countries on the sideline of the appearing East-West tension. The coordination helped avoiding isolation or the exposition of one of the Nordic countries to pressure from the leading powers in the UN. In a tense climate, where the Soviet Union directly opposed the idea of Nordic collaboration, the UN coordination gave these countries some experience of cooperation.⁵⁵ In addition, the Scandinavian countries' cautiousness of committing themselves was partly evaporating under impression of the *coup* in Prague and a Soviet media campaign against Scandinavia in the spring of 1948.

⁵³ Hans Hertel, "Kulturens kolde krig. Polarisering, antikommunisme og antiamerikanisme i dansk kulturliv 1946-60", in *Kritik*, volumen 35, no. 158, August, 2002: 9-23.

⁵⁴ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Jagten på et sikkerhedspolitisk ståsted. Socialdemokratiets holdninger til sikkerhedspolitikken 1945-1948", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *Temaer og brændpunkter i dansk politik efter 1945* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1994): pp. 15-54.

⁵⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 30-39.

The Scandinavian Defence Union Attempt (1948-49)

In retrospect, the obvious response to the emerging Cold War scenario might appear as that of immediately joining the Western alliance in the making. In March 1947, President Truman had announced in the Congress that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures", referring to the aim of containing world communism and specifically aiding the vulnerable countries Greece and Turkey.⁵⁶ In Denmark, the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union's enforcement of an "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" upon Finland in February 1948 nearly created a state of emergency. The Soviet press launched an intensive campaign against the Scandinavian countries, and rumours were circulating that Denmark was next in line after Czechoslovakia. In March 1948, the Danish Communist, Alvilda Larsen (MP), openly stated that she wanted something alike the Czech scenario to take place in Denmark too.⁵⁷

Consequently, the Danish government increased the army's state of preparedness. The claim that Denmark was next in line were unfounded, but the Danish government seized the opportunity to show the potential allies – Nordic and Anglo-American ones – that Denmark was willing to engage in a military defence under the new circumstances. In March 1948, the Danish foreign minister, Gustav Rasmussen, went to the American Copenhagen ambassador, requesting arms supplies and indirectly urging the US administration to proclaim that it would counter a Soviet campaign in Scandinavia with military force. However, the approach was in vain, as the Danish government was still not ready to commit itself to a Western alliance. For the Danish government, it was highly alarming that the military planners of the American Joint chiefs of Staff relied on a rather receded defence line at the Rhine, as contemporary rumours already pointed out.⁵⁸

There was by far more interest in a Scandinavian solution in April 1948, as the Swedish foreign minister, Östen Undén, invited the Danish and Norwegian governments to discussions about a Scandinavian defence league. Particularly the Swedish and partly the Danish government were interested in 'binding' Norway to a neutral policy with respect to the East-West

⁵⁶ Cited in Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 72-76.

⁵⁷ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 1* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 132-141; Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Neutrality. A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 91-93.

⁵⁸ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 91-125.

division, as signs appeared that Norway was moving towards a North Atlantic commitment. A full-fledged Norwegian participation in a Western security arrangement would clearly undermine the non-bloc policy on the Scandinavian Peninsula. Consequently, the main line of conflict in the negotiations about the Nordic Defence Union was between the Norwegian preference for a Western orientation and the Swedish insistence on maintaining the neutral status. Although the Danish government favoured the Swedish neutrality line, it also showed itself willing to embark upon a Scandinavian solution with a formalised Western connection. Denmark was apparently keener than both Sweden and Norway in obtaining a Scandinavian solution!⁵⁹

For the Danish Social Democratic leaders, a 'neutral' Scandinavian defence league seemed to be an appropriate adjustment to the bipolar security landscape in the making. It would balance between a genuine commitment to a military defence – relying on supplies from Sweden's highly advanced weapons industry – and an attempt of disengaging from the East-West confrontation. Politically, the Social Democratic leaders also hoped that a Scandinavian collaboration would underpin the Social Democratic model of society that prevailed even more in Sweden and Norway than in Denmark. With claims of fulfilling an exemplary societal mission, centre-left politicians and debaters cultivated the notion that the Nordic countries represented a certain *third way* between unrestrained capitalism and totalitarian socialism that was worth defending, also with military means.⁶⁰ Tellingly, the Conservative and the Liberal Party also supported an *armed* Scandinavian solution, although they preferred the Anglo-American leaning like the Norwegians. The antimilitarist Radical Liberals only supported the Scandinavian project as it reached a deadlock in early 1949, and the North Atlantic option seemed to be the last alternative. In accordance with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Danish Communists opposed all talk about creating a Scandinavian 'military bloc.'⁶¹

The Scandinavian attempt failed, finally, largely due to Swedish insistence on the Union's formal neutrality and a Norwegian preference for the Anglo-American leaning. An integral part of this story is that the United States in June 1948 had informed Norway and Denmark that the Western partners envisioned them as members of the new alliance. The American

⁵⁹ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Brødrefolk, men ikke våbenbrødre – diskussionerne om et skandinavisk forsvarsforbund 1948-49", in *Den jyske Historiker*, Volume 69-70, 1994: 151-178.

⁶⁰ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Jagten på et sikkerhedspolitisk ståsted. Socialdemokratiets holdninger til sikkerhedspolitikken 1945-1948", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *Temaer og brændpunkter i dansk politik efter 1945* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1994): pp. 15-54.

⁶¹ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 105-106.

administration was not ready to approve a Scandinavian Defence Union unless its members were free to join the emerging Atlantic Alliance.⁶² In February 1949, finally, the Norwegian government took a clear stance in favour of the Western alliance; Denmark followed suit, signing the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 with the eleven new allies.

Denmark's NATO membership (1949-1957)

Within the Western alliance, organized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1950, Denmark and Norway maintained parts of the *détente* policies concerning the Scandinavian region in understanding with the non-allied Sweden and with consideration to the highly exposed Finland. The slogans of 'bridge building' and '*détente*' as well as the long-term aim of disarmament were not given up entirely in spite of the new status as a member of a military alliance.

The dissuasive effect of the so-called nuclear umbrella, based on the United States' overwhelming technological lead over the Soviet Union, was of paramount importance for the entire Western defence. Initially, though, the successive Danish governments paid a lot of attention to the limited geographical scope of the conventional defence plans. In the tense context of the first Soviet nuclear tests; Mao Zedong's proclamation of the People's Republic of China; and the outbreak of the Korean War, the Danish government realised that the American military planners by no means were operating with a rescue plan for Scandinavia or West Germany in case of a Soviet aggression. Due to limitations of military capacities, they envisioned the Rhine as the actual defence line. In a war fought with conventional weapons, the 'Red Army' would expectedly overrun Denmark within a few hours or days, establishing a bridgehead and securing the passage for its Baltic fleet through the Great Belt and the Sound, i.e. west and east of Zealand respectively. Within the Anglo-American strategy, Scandinavia was mainly important in virtue of its capacity to hinder the establishment of Soviet bases (*denial*), and its potential to function as a so-called *stepping-stone* in a Western offensive directed at the industrial centres of the Soviet Union.⁶³

Consequently, the Danish government urged the leading allies to give higher priority to NATO's northern flank, and the Danish army prepared bridgeheads for allied rescue forces. At the same time, the Danish government maintained a rather cautious security policy with a view to avoiding controversies with the Soviet Union. In 1952, to illustrate, Denmark's

⁶² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 106-107.

Liberal-Conservative government strongly welcomed the NATO exercise “Main Brace” in the Baltic, but it insisted that only Danish vessels could embark on the Danish island Bornholm; American vessels should stay away from this easternmost Danish area in the Baltic Sea. The Soviet leaders claimed that Denmark had acknowledged the principle in 1946 that no ‘foreign’ troops, i.e. Anglo-American ones, could be stationed on Bornholm. The Danish government disagreed with the Soviet interpretation, but attempted to avoid overly provocative actions – in accordance with French and British warnings.⁶⁴

Map 1 - Denmark between the Baltic and the North Sea



Source: Political Map of the World, Miller Cylindrical Projection, 1 January 1978

Similar dilemmas marked the American-Danish talks about stationing American aircrafts in Denmark in the early 1950s. In geo-strategic terms, Denmark was an obvious place to station allied air forces as advanced positions in line with the recommendations of the early NATO

³ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 153-172.

⁴ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 165-168.

strategy. Initially, Denmark's Liberal-Conservative government tended to support the American plans as they satisfied the Danish quest for increased allied involvement in the defence of the Alliance's northern flank. However, prominent politicians like the Conservative foreign minister, Ole Bjørn Kraft, and the Liberal minister of finance, Thorkild Kristensen, were rather concerned about the consequences of stationing American air forces in Denmark. Domestically, the stationing posed the risk that the antimilitarist Radical Liberals would gain in the upcoming general election of 1953, partly undermining the Conservative, Liberal and Social Democratic consensus about Denmark's NATO engagement. In addition, it caused some concern that the Soviet Union opposed the planned stationing, which would become the allied air force closest to the industrial and urban centres of the Soviet Union. The election of the Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower as American president exacerbated these worries as his assigned Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had campaigned on a rather 'hawkish' rhetoric against the Truman administration, featuring the aim of 'liberating' and 'rolling-back' the Soviet dominance *behind* the 'iron curtain'.⁶⁵


In the negotiations with American representatives in January 1953, the Danish government made it clear that it was not willing to accept American usage of Danish airfields in 'rash' military actions in other regions, say, in the Mediterranean area. With the Danish demand of a 'right of veto' over the Americans' deployment of their stationed air force, there was barely any basis for a Danish-American agreement. The rejection became even more fervent after the strongly pro-Nordic, Social Democratic leader, Hans Hedtoft, returned as prime minister in 1953. However, the urgency of the matter was decreasing due to technical and strategic developments around 1954.⁶⁶

From the mid-1950s, the allied nuclear strategy shifted towards a 'Polar Strategy', rendering the American bases in Greenland quite indispensable. The vast, sparsely populated island in the North Atlantic polar zone had been under Danish sovereignty since 1933, but the interest in Greenland of the Norwegian and later the Danish-Norwegian monarchy went back to the Middle Ages. In 1941, however, the US Air Force had established bases there in agreement with the Danish Washington ambassador, Henrik Kauffmann, though without the acceptance of the government in occupied Denmark. As of 1949, the United States tolerated Denmark's somewhat recalcitrant NATO policies due to the subsequent Danish acceptance of the American presence in Greenland; in effect, the US administration had quite a free hand in

⁶⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 179-185.

Greenland, which included nuclear stockpiling and intermediate landings of bombers equipped with nuclear hardware. The Danish government only informed the public very sparsely about these activities, and it omitted all references to the nuclear dimension of the American presence.

Map 2 – Greenland between North America and the Soviet Union



Source: Danish Geodetic Institute, *The World: Political Map*, 1962 version (The Map Section of the Royal Library, Copenhagen).

In the late 1950s, on the contrary, there was a major political controversy over the American request of stationing nuclear weapons in Denmark proper. In 1957, the Social Democratic and Radical Liberal coalition partners agreed upon the formula of rejecting nuclear weapons 'under the present circumstances.' Rejecting the stationing of the protector's tactical nuclear weapons was a contested policy, criticized in Denmark and among the allies. However, the Danish nuclear policy defined in 1957 referred to the opportunity of suspending the rejection under 'changed circumstances', i.e. if the Soviet Union embarked upon an increasingly

⁶⁶ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 185-193.

provocative policy in the Baltic and the Scandinavian area. Accordingly, the Danish army actually prepared for receiving tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis or wartime scenario. In addition, a central aim in the Danish NATO policy was to avoid a displacement of the conventional military force from Central Europe to Southern Europe and the Mediterranean area.⁶⁷

As a former neutral, Denmark had indeed experiences of adapting to unfavourable geopolitical circumstances. With the NATO membership as of 1949, a new challenge was that of showing a commitment to the alliance and solidarity with the allies, while finding understanding for specific Danish reservations and key viewpoints. At the eve of the 1960s, however, the so-called *Pax Americana* system was widely accepted in Denmark. In fact, even the Radical Liberal Party - the old champion of Danish neutralism and pacifism - abandoned its NATO opposition in the wake of the Soviet 1956 intervention in Hungary, thus paving the way for a coalition between the Radical Liberals and Social Democrats with participation of the small Justice Party.⁶⁸ In the late 1950s, the most controversial NATO issue in Denmark was the government's acceptance of a Danish-West German military command in the Baltic area.⁶⁹

Denmark and the Early European Integration (1948-1957)

Denmark took part as well in the economic corollary to the Western alliance, namely the Marshall Plan and the recipient countries' Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), created in April 1948.⁷⁰ Initially, the Danish Conservatives and Liberals had some reservations about the infringement of national sovereignty associated with the economic interventions of the European Recovery Programme (ERP) under American surveillance. On their side, the Social Democrats were particularly worried that the OEEC might accelerate the 'bloc division' between the East and the West. Even so, Denmark's Social Democratic government was more positive than its Scandinavian counterparts were. Dollar aid and a permanent West European trade framework were deemed necessary for a trade driven, economic

⁶⁷ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 852- 861.

⁶⁸ Bent Jensen, *Bjørnen og haren. Sovjetunionen og Danmark 1945 - 1965* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1999), p. 499.

⁶⁹ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 221-273.

⁷⁰ The initial members of the OEEC were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and West Germany (bizones).

recovery of post-war Denmark, as severe trade and foreign currency deficits strained investments in the modernisation of the industrial and agricultural sectors.⁷¹

Denmark's OEEC membership, however, turned out as a somewhat mixed blessing, as the effort of liberalising trade targeted the member states' trade quotas rather than the level of their tariff rates. The Danish trade protection was chiefly based on import quotas. Hence the OEEC liberalisations undermined the protection of the Danish producers without necessarily securing mutual reductions of import levies on the Danish export markets.⁷² The intergovernmental framework of the OEEC was not very favourable for a state like Denmark with a weak bargaining position. Nevertheless, a trade expansion within the wider OEEC circle was regarded as a necessity, as Denmark's major foreign markets were dispersed over the OEEC zone, namely Britain, Norway, Sweden and West Germany.

There was significantly less interest in Denmark for the European initiative leading to the creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949. Winston Churchill had played a leading part in the prelude to the Council of Europe, urging that, "We must build a kind of United States of Europe" in his famous Zurich Speech of 1946. Churchill's United Europe Movement also organised the Congress of Europe at The Hague in May 1948, but the British Labour Party opposed his European endeavours.⁷³ On the Continent, though, many Socialists as well as Liberals of the various European movements were optimistic about the potential of the Hague Congress, especially as it concluded in a French inspired resolution on the creation of a European Assembly. But the involved governments disagreed over the scope of the cooperation, as particularly the British favoured an *intergovernmental* shape. The outcome was, from a federalist point of view, a watered-down version of an assembly with no legislative powers.⁷⁴

During the Danish debate about ratification of the Council's statutes in June 1949, some Conservatives, Liberals and a few Social Democrats endorsed the long-term aim of European unification. The Social Democratic delegate at the Hague Congress, Frode Jakobsen, praised the cautious, stepwise approach inspired by the British, but urged to maintain the wider

⁷¹ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokodelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 126-132.

⁷² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokodelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 83-90.

⁷³ John Pinder, "The Influence of European Federalists in the 1950s", in Thorsten B. Olesen (Ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 213-244. Churchill's speech is accessible online on www.europeanspirit.gr/churchill_aspeech_wemust.html (seen 30 March 2006).

⁷⁴ MarieThérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours* (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1999 (first edition 1996)), pp. 45-53.

European aims with the French. However, the Social Democratic Party in general was more hesitant regarding the federalist aims and the 'flamboyant' French visions.⁷⁵ The Danish Social Democrats had a predilection for Nordic cooperation, and they were very attentive to the British Labour's argument that the Council of Europe project was associated with the Conservative Churchill. For the Danish Social Democrats, it was less important that prominent European Socialists such as the French Léon Blum and the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak were strongly engaged in the European movement. Some Danish politicians and civil servants warned about the scenario of Denmark standing outside a continental concentration of power, but the Social Democratic government supported in effect the reluctant British line regarding the Council of Europe.⁷⁶ If the early European movement generally was an elite phenomenon, it counts even more so for the Danish branch of the movement. Public foreign-policy debates focussed more on the choice between Nordic and Atlantic cooperation.

It was a watershed in the history of European integration, when the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, launched a plan in 1950 for organising the coal and steel sectors of particularly France and West Germany, subsequently with participation of Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg. Britain was invited, too, but soon declined. In 1952, the remaining 'Six' of the Continent initiated the cooperation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with comparatively extensive, supranational authorities, regulating the production and prices within these sectors. There were concrete interests in saving industries and jobs at play, but the ECSC was also an attempt of overcoming the Franco-German rivalry. The ECSC represented the successful example of the stepwise sector strategy towards European unity, particularly promoted by Jean Monnet - the French civil servant and real mastermind of the Schuman Plan, who also founded the *Comité d'action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe* in 1955.⁷⁷

The Danish press was in general favourably disposed to the great leap towards Franco-German reconciliation associated with the ECSC. However, the economic impact of a possible Danish ECSC membership remained unpredictable. In 1951, the Danish industry was highly dependent on iron and steel imports from the ECSC countries; 74.1 per cent of Danish

⁷⁵ Hans Branner, "På vagt eller på spring? Danmark og Europæisk integration 1948-53", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948-1992* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1993), pp. 36-37; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 244-250.

⁷⁶ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 244-250.

⁷⁷ John Pinder, "The Influence of European Federalists in the 1950s", in Thorsten B. Olesen (Ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 219-222.

iron and steel imports thus came from the 'Six'. In times of scarcity, the ECSC schemes could secure vital supplies to the Danish industry – a relevant perspective as the ongoing Korean War (1950-1953) had increased the demand in the concerned sectors. The inverse scenario was correspondingly unfavourable, as the Danish industry would be committed to buying overpriced coal, iron and steel in times of low world market prices. In addition, the political perspectives of a German revival within the ECSC were a source of some concern. Deputy Head of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Division, Erling Kristiansen, thus noted that the ECSC might provide Germany a shortcut to the leadership of a 'Fourth Reich' within the economic space of the ECSC.⁷⁸ If not representative for the entire Danish political and administrative elites, the remark still hints to a somewhat different Danish approach than that of the Benelux countries, France and Italy. The fear in Denmark of being *absorbed* by Germany tended to overshadow the readiness of participating in a supranational, European framework, i.e. the remedy that most other West European states considered expedient to *reduce* that risk.⁷⁹

A handful of similar, but less successful, projects of sector integration were conceived in the slipstream of the ECSC. One of the sectors at play was agriculture. By 1950, the effort of reconstructing and mechanising agriculture had surmounted the severe food shortage of the immediate post-war years. As in the inter-war period, the European governments were now facing social and demographic problems related to overproduction and decline of relative incomes in that sector; international solutions were required in order to counter protectionism. In 1950, the Dutch agricultural minister, Sicco Mansholt, proposed the creation of a high authority like that of the ECSC to regulate the agricultural prices and trade. Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, on the other hand, favoured a trade liberalisation in the wider OEEC framework. Inspired by the ECSC design, the French agriculture minister, Pierre Pflimlin, simultaneously elaborated his *Plan vert*, chiefly relevant for French producers' interests. In principle, at least, the first agricultural plans were open to the remaining OEEC members; Britain and Denmark were mentioned as obvious candidates.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Hans Branner, "På vagt eller på spring? Danmark og Europæisk integration 1948-53", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948-1992* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1993), pp. 42-55.

⁷⁹ Hans Branner, "Denmark and the European Coal and Steel Community, 1950-1953", in Thorsten B. Olesen (Ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 115-128.

⁸⁰ Guido Thieme, *Vom „Pool Vert“ zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), pp. 34-66.

In the light of the economic importance of agricultural exports for the Danish economy – ¾ of the entire value of exports – the plans attracted surprisingly little attention in Denmark.⁸¹ Obstacles to the Danish export to the West German market would obviously be economically damaging. However, the Danish Agricultural Council and the Federation of Small Holders apparently considered the various initiatives unlikely to materialise and too loosely elaborated to warrant any market access for Danish agriculture. In addition, the competitive Danish agriculture was generally less sympathetic to ‘planned economy’ than agriculture in other ‘low tariff countries’ like Norway, Sweden and even the Netherlands. Nevertheless, as the Dutch introduced a new, “Green Pool” project in 1953, consisting of the Six ECSC members, it sent shock waves through the Danish agricultural organisations.⁸² The restricted group of members proposed made it plain that Denmark might face an outright exclusion from the continental market formation. It prompted the highly influential Danish Agricultural Council to take an increasing interest in the integrated market schemes, but, even so, it maintained a wait-and-see position, as it did not expect a successful outcome of the talks between the ECSC countries. On its side, the Social Democratic government was in support of transferring the Green Pool endeavours to the wider OEEC forum. There were still higher hopes in a British led effort than there were to French and German abilities to strike a favourable compromise.⁸³

In October 1950, finally, the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, invited Great Britain and the ‘free countries of continental Europe’ to integrate their armies under the authority of a European Minister of Defence.⁸⁴ The project, soon known as the European Defence Community (EDC), reflected the military necessity of rearming West Germany in the light of its critical geostrategic position in Europe and the deterioration of the East-West relations around 1950. Initially, leading French politicians were strongly against German rearmament in any form. However, the large-scale American military engagement in the Korean War, after the UN had labelled North Korea as the aggressor in late June 1950, rendered Western Europe even more vulnerable. At an early point, the American administration argued that the rearmament of West Germany was imperative for Western Europe. Instead of accepting rearma-

⁸¹ Anita Lehmann, “Venstres vej til Europa – Venstres europapolitik, 1945 – 1960”, in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 93, 2001: 37

⁸² Vibeke Sørensen, “How To Become a Member of a Club Without Joining. Danish Policy with Respect to European Sector Integration Schemes, 1950-1957”, in *Scandinavian Journal of History*, volume 16, 1991:105-124.

⁸³ Flemming Just and Thorsten B. Olesen, “Danish Agriculture and the European Market Schism, 1945-1960”, in Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 129-146.

⁸⁴ www.eu-history.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?c=51#top (seen 4 April 2006).

ment under full West German control, the French government launched the supranational EDC project. Britain rejected the French proposal, but the 'Six' of the ECSC signed the EDC Treaty in May 1952. However, it could not pass the final test of ratification in the French *Assemblée nationale* in August 1954, as the Gaullist and Communist deputies torpedoed the EDC and, indirectly, the associated plan for a European Political Community (EPC). Instead, the Western partners admitted West Germany and Italy to a new Western European Union (WEU) based on the Treaty of Bruxelles, i.e. the predecessor of NATO that Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had signed in March 1948. This step paved the way for a full NATO membership of a rearmed West Germany as of 1955.⁸⁵

From the outset, the Scandinavian NATO members, Denmark and Norway, were against the idea of joining the EDC. For the Danish government, however, the question of West Germany's future military status was pivotal. As NATO operated with a receded defence line at the Rhine until the mid-1950s, the rearmament of West Germany was the key to securing a defence line of the Western bloc as advanced as possible to the East, placing Denmark on the 'right side' of this line. In a 1951 report, therefore, the governing Conservatives and Liberals agreed with the Social Democrats that Denmark had to accept and support a West German rearmament. At the same time, the Danish government considered it equally important to obtain guarantees against a future German aggression. Unlike the French government, the leading Danish politicians did not consider the EDC's supranational framework an appropriate response to that challenge; a strong NATO commitment, particularly with a British and an American engagement, was the only safe way to rearm West Germany. Therefore, the Danish government, Social Democratic as of 1953, opposed the supranational features of the EDC and any displacement of the responsibility for the Western European defence from NATO to the emerging continental group of countries.⁸⁶

In this perspective, it was a relief that the Gaullists and French Communists rejected the EDC Treaty in the French *Assemblée nationale*, paving the way for a West German rearmament within the North Atlantic framework. For the time being, it seemed that the grandiose, Western European integration projects were a dead end. Still, for large parts of the Danish public and antimilitarist currents of the political establishment, the German rearmament

⁸⁵ MarieThérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours* (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1999 (first edition 1996)), pp. 39-43, 81-96; Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 100-107.

⁸⁶ Vibeke Sørensen, "Fra Marshall-plan til de store markedsdannelser, 1945-59", in Tom Swienty (ed.), *Danmark i Europa 1945-93* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1994), pp. 47-49; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaurne, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 173-179.

remained an unacceptably hazardous endeavour, and there was a widespread opposition towards the idea of engaging into a closer cooperation with West Germany. However, the Treaties of Rome of 25 March 1957, establishing the customs union EEC and the nuclear cooperation Euratom, challenged radically the conditions for Denmark's European attachments. In a stepwise process, the Danish government turned hesitantly in favour of becoming an EEC member, as we shall see in the chapters below. In turn, this implied a Danish rapprochement with the old archenemy (West) Germany and it engendered a new interest in France, the main promoter of European projects, temporarily strained by the Algerian War and the regime change in 1958.

Gaullism, *Grandeur* and Danish Small State Nationalism

While the French Christian Democrats, Radicals and the Socialists committed France to the integrated North Atlantic security structures and promoted supranational sector integration in Western Europe, a 'nationalistic' reaction emerged in France. General de Gaulle, the symbol of the French resistance in World War II, was a very vocal critic of the new, international engagements. An essential ambition of his national restoration project was to create an authoritative presidency with an extraordinarily prominent role in defining foreign and defence policies. For the younger Charles de Gaulle, the experience of World War I, and France's chronic insufficiency vis-à-vis Germany since 1870, had underlined the necessity of a strong political leader, incarnating and symbolising national unity; national cohesion could be decisive in modern wars.⁸⁷ De Gaulle and his national message became a rallying point during World War II, as he assumed the leadership of the exiled, French resistance movement.

The dynamics from the resistance years were to some extent transferred into the Gaullist movement, from 1947 organised in *Le Rassemblement du peuple français* (RPF) and reconstructed in 1958 as *L'Union pour la nouvelle république* (UNR). The fiasco against the Vietminh's independence campaign in Indochina (1946-1954) and the new Cold War paradigm exacerbated the general perception that France's great power status was declining. The construction of a 'Gaullist Republic' in 1958 was largely a response to these challenges, but particularly so to the frantic situation in the Algerian *départements*. There was some elasticity in the provisions of the new Fifth Republic's Constitution, but de Gaulle managed to seize his so-called *domaine réservé* concerning Algeria, the army, foreign policies and the new Community with the overseas countries and territories. Domestically, the antithesis to this author-

⁸⁷ Gaetano Quagliariello, *De Gaulle e il gollismo* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2003), pp. 55-62.

ity agenda was the conflict ridden 'regime of the parties'; internationally it was 'integration' and supranational cooperation - at least on the level of public rhetoric.⁸⁸

The basic motifs going through de Gaulle's solemn foreign-policy declarations were the references to the recreation of national unity and *grandeur*. As leader of France's interim, liberation government (1944-46), de Gaulle had launched a campaign for the recreation of France's international rank and for regaining its formal independence. It was not a uniquely Gaullist ambition to recreate a sense of French *grandeur*, although the Gaullists emphasised the ambition most rigorously. The Gaullist *grandeur* concept coupled France's great-power status with the vitality of the national 'soul.' In his campaign against French ratification of the EDC Treaty, de Gaulle thus proclaimed:

When a nation has no longer an army, it will lose the direction of its diplomacy. And if it has no army, if it is paralysed by bureaucracy, it will lose its soul.⁸⁹

The Gaullist articulation of French nationalism amalgamated the emotional, cultural and mythical traditions with the republican heritage, which was formed in the Enlightenment with its universal ideals and scope, thus maintaining the need for France playing a political role in the world – a need for France to perform as a great power.⁹⁰

If one should look for a parallel, or rather a contrast, to the Gaullist *grandeur* concept in the context of Danish politics in the mid-20th century, the national cult of *smallness* could be a candidate. Danish nationalism had invented an introvert component after the defeats to the rising Prussian-German mastodon in the South and the Danish Crown's loss of its duchies Schleswig and Holstein in 1864. Until the end of the Cold War, a main current of Danish politics has stressed the virtues of *smallness* and internal nation building, and even claimed the pointlessness of isolated attempts of defending the nation militarily vis-à-vis great powers. As we have seen, prominent Radical Liberal and Social Democratic ideologues in the early 20th century promoted the idea that a harmonious, socially just – or levelled - society could

⁸⁸ Serge Bernstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 82-175.

⁸⁹ Serge Bernstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), p. 186 : "Quand un peuple n'a plus d'armée, il n'a plus la direction de sa diplomatie, et, s'il n'a plus d'armée, si elle est fixée par des formulaires, il n'a plus d'âme."

⁹⁰ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 34-58, 284-286; Klaus Schubert, "Le point de vue de De Gaulle sur l'Etat et la nation, compte tenu des traditions historiques de la France et de l'Allemagne" in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome II. La République* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 114-128; Robert Frank, "The Meanings of Europe in French National Discourse: A French Europe or an Europeanized France?", in Mikael af Malmberg and Bo Strath, *The Meaning of Europe, Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), pp. 311 – 326.

serve as an indirect defence in case of a military occupation. The loyalties to the embryonic, national welfare state were supposed to foster a nation immune to assimilation policies during a possible German occupation. It was not up to Denmark to mingle with the stigmatised great powers or to participate in their military manoeuvres and rivalry. This reaction to Germany's military might was quite different to that of General de Gaulle and his adherents, who envisioned a vigorous French nation that was determined to fight.

In this historical process, a sort of *small state nationalism* emerged, as the historian Uffe Østergaard has argued. It was a central claim that smaller nations tended to be morally superior compared to great powers in terms of peaceful and peace promoting behaviour in international politics. The lack of national greatness or aspirations in world affairs equalled to a political innocence, a claim that in turn was used as a justification of Denmark actually playing an active, but modest, and often moralist role internationally.⁹¹ Activist UN policies, the self-declared, although marginal, broker role in the Cold War and the massive Third World aid programmes initiated in the early 1960s are examples of that role. However, on the continental European stage, the Danish survival strategies required prudence and caution given Denmark's vulnerable location and military weakness. There was thus a schism between the somewhat moralising demonstrations, and, on the other hand, a tendency to retreating from conflicts within the great power driven state system in Europe, or at least not taking a clear stance.

A main current of the Danish self-understanding thus tended to demarcate itself against continental Europe as something "anti-imperialist, non-colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small, and Social Democratic."⁹² Oddly, the colonial heritage with respect to Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroes was considered of a less exploitative nature than that of the main colonial powers. Similarly, the so-called 'great nation nationalism', arching over ethnical, regional or national differences, has not been celebrated in the Danish tradition, though with the important exception of a serious, but unsuccessful, flirt with the idea of creating a Scandinavian union after the defeats to Germany in the 19th century – a vision resembling the contemporary Italian and German unification efforts.⁹³ Societal progress and harmony was rather

⁹¹ Uffe Østergaard uses the concept *small state nationalism* in the article "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmarks's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 139–84.

⁹² Uffe Østergaard, "The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation-States", in Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth (eds.), *The Cultural Construction of Norden* (Scandinavian University Press, 1999), p. 25.

⁹³ Prominent scholars as Hans Kohn (*The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1945, pp. 329–331) and Anthony D. Smith (*Nationalism: theory, ideology, history* (Cambridge; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2001), p.

believed to find the right growing conditions in the small, homogeneous nation-states, marking a fundamental difference between the “small, coherent and peaceful societies and the larger, conflict-ridden and aggressive European (and American) states”, as Uffe Østergaard put it.⁹⁴

By the millennium, a political majority in Denmark has attacked the traditional adaptation policy and national self-understanding. In defence of Denmark’s participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq under American leadership, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen – leader of Denmark’s Liberal-Conservative coalition government as of 2001 – has criticised the policy of cooperation during the World War II as well as the reservations towards NATO, culminating with the so-called footnote policy between 1982 and 1988. “One cannot remain neutral in the struggle between dictatorship and democracy. One has to take a stance in favour of democracy and against dictatorship”, Prime Minister Rasmussen thundered in a speech given at the University of Copenhagen in 2003.⁹⁵ In particular, he criticised the legacy of the abovementioned chief ideologist of the Radical Liberals, Peter Munch, i.e. the principle of keeping Denmark unnoticed and out of military conflicts. As Prime Minister Rasmussen commented, “This is the attitude that we irreversibly have broken with. On the contrary, the Danish diplomacy should be active and do its utmost in order to make Denmark and the Danish [views] known and visible.”⁹⁶

On the eve of the 1960s, however, the classical *small state nationalism* still constituted a main current of Danish politics. The Danish reactions to the creation of the Gaullist Republic and its foreign policies rendered the negative assumptions about great powers very topical. With some anxiety, Danish commentators noticed that the new Gaullist regime presented its

89) have praised the overarching potential of ‘great nation nationalism’, know from the UK, France, Italy and Spain. Eric Hobsbawm gives a rather critical presentation of the liberal, overarching type of ‘great nation nationalism’ in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 30–45.

⁹⁴ Uffe Østergaard, “Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism”, in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), p. 140; Thorsten B. Olesen, “The Dilemmas of Interdependence: Danish Foreign Policy 1945–1972”, in *Journal of European Integration History*, Volume 7, Number 2, 2001 (*Small and Neutral States*): 57; Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 17, 858.

⁹⁵ www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=2&n=0&d=1628&s=1 (seen 6 April 2006): “Visioner om Danmarks aktive Europapolitik”, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s speech on the University of Copenhagen, 23 September 2003: “I kampen mellem diktatur og demokrati kan man ikke forholde sig neutral. Da må man tage stilling for demokratiet og mod diktaturet.”

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*: “Det er den holdning, vi nu endegyldigt har gjort op med. Det danske diplomati skal tværtimod være aktivt og gøre sit yderste til, at Danmark og det danske bliver kendt og synligt”.

vision of itself in terms of (re)creating national *grandeur* and military power.⁹⁷ The favourable and civilizing connotations of the *grandeur* notion, integral to its usage in French, tended to be turned into a claim that French nationalism was sheer 'great power ambition.' Many observers regarded the political aim and universal scope of French nationalism as a source of instability rather than a happy, enlightening message to the World. Even the Social Democratic information officer, Niels Alsing Andersen, who turned out to be a vigorous defender of the French ally, stated ironically: "One can always make the French shout with joy by pursuing a policy that carries words like France's Greatness, 'la gloire de la France' and so forth on its banner."⁹⁸

The last comment might appear overly ironic or polemical, but similar interpretations of the Gaullist quest for national *grandeur* were commonplace among the civil servants of the Danish Foreign Ministry. In an internal memorandum of 1961, thus, Erik Schram-Nielsen, head of the Ministry's Political-Legal Division, concluded:

It is presumably a necessity, therefore, to create a sense in the French public that the General's policy aims at recreating France's *greatness* in spite of the hard-headed character of his policies. In virtue of the French people's strong beliefs in its own military achievements in history, all that stresses the French troops' national character and equality in comparison to the proper great powers will undeniably increase the current regime's popularity. The French nationalism constitutes most likely an additional element regarding the opposition towards the idea of integration – nor should it be ignored in the question of the nuclear bomb.⁹⁹

In this view, the quest for French *grandeur* was considered a *national* ambition rather than an exclusive aim of General de Gaulle and his inner circle. De Gaulle was the mastermind of the French foreign policies, but it was a commonplace assumption in Denmark that these policies responded to a general French vision of national greatness, as we shall see in the chapters below.

⁹⁷ For instance Erling Bjøl, "Et halvt aars de Gaulle-styre", *Information*, 20-21 December 1958.

⁹⁸ Niels Alsing Andersen, "Frankrig fik de Gaulle – men får de Gaulle Frankrig?" *Verdens Gang*, årg. 12, 1958: 161 – 166. "Man kan altid få franskmænd til at juble over en politik, der på sit banner har ord som Frankrigs Storhed, "la gloire de la France" o.s.v."

⁹⁹ RA UM ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A: "Notat" ('secret', from the Divisions's steelbox) by Erik Schram-Nielsen, 13 April 1961: "Det er derfor formentlig en nødvendighed i den franske befolkning at skabe en følelse af, at generalens politik, dens nøgterne indstilling til trods, dog tilsigter at genskabe Frankrigs storhed. Henset til det franske folks stærke tro på egne tidligere militære bedrifter, vil alt, hvad der understreger de franske styrkers nationale karakter og ligestilling med de egentlige stormagters, utvivlsomt øge det værende regimes popularitet. Den franske nationalisme udgør sikkert et yderligere moment i forbindelse med modstanden mod integrationstanken, og ved bedømmelsen af atombombespørgsmålet bør der heller ikke bortses herfra." Emphasis added.

Although Denmark was a NATO ally by 1958, a range of other international commitments and considerations appeared in the Danish foreign policies. With the UN membership, the Scandinavian Defence Union attempt and particularly the NATO membership, Denmark had unequivocally abandoned its traditional neutrality. However, the UN commitment hinted at an ideal preference for collective security systems at the expense of the conflict driven system of the military 'blocs'. In the same vein, the attempt of creating a Scandinavian security arrangement in 1948 had pointed to a profound interest in finding an armed alternative to the two emerging military blocs. What remained of the historical experience was the fear of involvement in the great powers' struggle for supremacy. However, the Danish cooperation with the German authorities during World War II had also created a moral deficit that pointed towards an ideological incentive to defend the 'free world', now against Soviet totalitarianism. Most importantly, the American involvement in European affairs since World War II had paved the way for a proper alliance option. Internationally, Denmark was hitherto considered a German 'sphere of interest', and the lack of a credible alliance was one of the sources of the Danish neutralism.

In 1959, Foreign Minister Krag explained that the three cornerstones of Denmark's international engagement were the Nordic collaboration, the UN membership and NATO. As of 1961, the EEC was added to the list as Denmark applied for membership with Britain, Ireland and later Norway. For Denmark, the unilateral Gaullist foreign policies affected in particular the conditions of its NATO membership and those of the Danish admission to the EEC. As we shall see below, Gaullist France as well as Denmark obtained a reputation as reserved about NATO and the EEC. However, the respective political-ideological backgrounds differed a lot. The Danish reservations to NATO and EEC integration were predominantly a centre-left phenomenon, whereas the Gaullist challenge was based on a centre-right critique.

Chapter 2 – De Gaulle between Democracy and Dictatorship: the Danish Debate (1958-1962)

Before turning to the particular NATO and EEC issues in the chapters below, we shall look at the reception of the new Gaullist regime in different Danish political milieus.¹⁰⁰ The democratic standing of France was of some importance in Denmark, as the government had focussed on the democratic profile of the Atlantic Alliance's key members in its official justification, vis-à-vis domestic neutralist and pacifists, for joining a military alliance back in 1949. Moreover, the dramatic birth of the Gaullist Republic and the global uncertainty about its democratic standing did by no means increase the Danes' acceptance of France's overt aspirations to become a leader of the new, Western Europe in the making. With Professor Joseph S. Nye, we can regard democratic values, institutions and performances as a dimension of a nation's *soft power* - a concept Nye defines as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments."¹⁰¹

Danish left-wing circles certainly demanded a reconsideration of the Danish NATO membership in the light of the breakdown of the French democracy in May 1958. However, the Western governments considered that France was needed in their common organizations. In 1961-1962, only a few years *after* de Gaulle's coming to power, Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway even applied for membership of the EEC, a framework of which de Gaulle seemed to be pacesetter. The risk was rather that France – on its own initiative - might withdraw from the Western organizations, as France was in search of independence from the United States, and the Gaullists had criticized the European integration projects severely. For the NATO and OEEC members, the Gaullist challenges emphasized the importance of coming to terms with the new republic.

May 1958 appeared as an open-ended moment in the history of Western Europe, challenging France's status as a flagship of Western democracy. It was widely expected that the French breakdown and regime change would cause severe trouble for the Western collaboration and blurring the image of NATO as the *free world's* bulwark against undemocratic

¹⁰⁰ I use the term 'regime' as 'political system'.

¹⁰¹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. x and 55.

forces, i.e. the basic legitimacy claim of the Atlantic Alliance. On balance, however, it was a great relief for most Western governments that de Gaulle gradually was able to re-establish political authority in France, given the chaos of the Fourth Republic and the acknowledgment that France was crucial for the entire Western cooperation.

In a later history book, the popular Danish historian and political observer, Palle Lauring, pointed to the awkward situation that commentators were short of viable standard interpretations of Gaullism, as “de Gaulle took or received the power and *introduced a form of government that is not described in any handbook*.”¹⁰² Some well-informed commentators attempted a nuanced conceptualisation, playing on the apparent contradictions of the new political system. The Social Democrat Bjørn Olsen - then personal secretary to the Danish Foreign Minister - thus classified France’s new constitution as a risky attempt of “fusing certain *authoritarian* tendencies with the maintenance of *liberal* political traditions.”¹⁰³ Similarly, Erling Bjøl - the outstanding Paris correspondent of *Information* - noted that Gaullism defied definition along the democracy-dictatorship continuum. “France has obtained this most unique system that is an absolute regime, where the freedom is maintained. One can only label it the Gaullist system,” as Bjøl put it.¹⁰⁴ Ambassador Eyvind Bartels, Denmark’s representative to Paris, bluntly termed it a “liberal dictatorship”, even though he was a declared Gaullist.¹⁰⁵

These apparent contradictions apart, two main features marked the Danish debates about the French regime change. First, the major democratic parties in Denmark referred intensively to the French breakdown in order to substantiate the argument that a political culture of cooperation and consensus was a condition for a viable multiparty democracy. Second, the actual return of General de Gaulle became predominantly a point of reference for the left-wing oppositional groups, who criticised NATO or argued in favour of a Danish withdrawal from the alliance. Below, we shall start with a look at the initial Western reactions to the democratic collapse and the Gaullist takeover. Then, we shall focus upon Danish interpretations of the Gaullist venture and see how various actors mirrored the Danish society in the French political collapse. The passages attempt to contextualise these reactions against the background of some major traits of the Danish democratic tradition and self-understanding.

¹⁰² Palle Lauring, *Danmarks Historie* (Copenhagen: Forum 1971 (first edition 1968)), p. 317. Emphasis added.

¹⁰³ Bjørn Olsen, “Den Femte Republik”, in *Verdens Gang*, volumen 13, no. 2, 1959, p. 45: “... at forene visse autoritære tendenser med bevarelsen af liberale politiske traditioner...” Emphasis added.

¹⁰⁴ Erling Bjøl, “Demokratiets fremtid i Frankrig”, in *Dansk Udsyn*, volumen 41, 1961, p. 107: “... og det er derfor Frankrig har fået dette helt enestående system, der er et enevoldsstyre, hvor friheden bevares. Der er ikke andet at gøre end at kalde det for det gaullistiske system.”

Western Perspectives on de Gaulle's Coming to Power (1958)

At the eastern and southern flanks of Western Europe, there were meagre prospects for the advance of democracy and political stability in 1958. In November, the Soviet Union demanded provocatively an internationalization and demilitarization of Berlin under the control of the East German state – the prelude to the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The European populations had still a vivid recollection of the choking Soviet military intervention in Hungary in November 1956. In addition, the coinciding French-British-Israeli military intervention in the Egyptian Sinai Desert, in the wake of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, had turned out to be a milestone of a political blunder. It did not achieve the intended overthrow of Nasser, but boosted his Pan-Arab nationalism and distracted the attention from the Soviet suppression in Hungary. As the Eisenhower administration withdrew from the prestigious Aswan High Dam project in southern Egypt, President Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. Western observers generally considered Nasser a dictator heading a totalitarian movement. In this light, the prospect of the Arab countries uniting under his full or indirect leadership was indeed discouraging. Moreover, the violent overthrow of Iraq's pro-Western Prime Minister, Nuri-es-Said, in July coincided with pro-Nasser and anti-Western uprisings in Jordan and Lebanon. The US marines engaged following in favour of Lebanon's Christian President, Camille Chamoun, whereas the British army intervened in Jordan. Finally, the Algerian, provisional government chose Cairo as a base in 1958, which underscored the destabilising, or anti-colonialist, potential of 'Nasserism' – an interpretation that had featured as a main reason for the French to engage in the Suez affair in 1956.¹⁰⁶

Nevertheless, a crisis within the Western alliance's European mainland became one of the most pressing issues in 1958, namely the process catapulting, or deliberately piloting, General de Gaulle – the old war hero and leader of the French liberation government – back into power in Paris from June 1 that year. Previously, a series of episodes such as the bombardment of the Tunisian village Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in February 1958 had demonstrated that prominent French officers were acting in disregard of the government in Paris, or at least that they were more loyal to the Gaullist Minister of Defence, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, than they were to the

¹⁰⁵ RA UM 123.D.1, box X. Ambassador Bartels' report "Efter Alger. Gaullismen?" of 1 February 1962: "...det liberale diktatur."

¹⁰⁶ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), particularly the chapter on 'The Suez Crises', pp. 33-67; Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.176-183; Alistair Horne, *Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography* (London: Macmillan 1989), pp. 91-98.

head of government, the Radical Félix Gaillard. The most spectacular step, however, was the insurrection in Algeria on 13 May 1958, where military authorities created the so-called *comités de salut public* for the salvation of the French rule in Algeria. It was a direct reaction to the formation of a new government under Pierre Pflimlin of the Christian Democratic *Mouvement républicain populaire* (MRP), who was known as an advocate of negotiating with the Algerian liberation front. To the demonstrating crowd gathered at the Government House in Algiers, the newly appointed military commander, General Raoul Salan, pronounced his renowned “*Vive de Gaulle.*”

De Gaulle announced rapidly that he was ready to assume powers of the republic. Gaullist circles - civilian and military - initiated the so-called *opération résurrection* with the creation of a ‘committee of public safety’ on Corsica on May 24, while General Massu prepared a military intervention for Paris. With a view to the upcoming military *coup* and severe political chaos, the French parliamentarians chose to accept the investiture of General de Gaulle as an interim prime minister for half a year in order to re-create the state’s authority and stability, implying the tearing up of the Fourth Republic’s parliamentary system. On 1 June 1958 in the *Assemblée nationale*, 329 deputies voted in favour of de Gaulle - among them many ardent supporters of parliamentary democracy - whereas 224 voted against his investiture.¹⁰⁷ It was a spectacular humiliation of the traditional republican parties, as they had rejected de Gaulle’s 1946 constitutional proposal of creating a plebiscitary, presidential system at the expense of the parliamentary system.¹⁰⁸

Historical accounts of the Western reactions to the French crisis report that there was a general atmosphere of concern initially, also in the United States - the key Western ally - where the Algerian War had spurred a considerable public awareness of French affairs.¹⁰⁹ Traditionally, the American Democrats had been somewhat hostile to General de Gaulle, whereas the Republicans and military circles tended to respect him. During the May 1958 crisis, the Republican administration refused to support Pflimlin’s crumbling government – an approach that was “based upon disillusionment with a dysfunctional regime”, as the historian Irwin M. Wall argues.¹¹⁰ With the blatant lack of political authority in France, there was an obvious risk that the Algerian War would continue, and it even posed an imminent danger that

¹⁰⁷ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), particularly the chapters on ‘The Degeneration of the Regime’ and ‘The Fall of the Republic and the Coming of de Gaulle’, pp. 67-98 and 134-156.

¹⁰⁸ Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 70-227.

¹⁰⁹ Frédéric Bozo and Pierre Mélandri, “La France devant l’opinion américaine : le retour de de Gaulle début 1958 – printemps 1959”, in *Relations internationales*, no. 58, summer 1989: 195-215.

parts of the stationed French army in Algeria might attempt to invade Tunisia and Morocco, provoking Nasser to call in Soviet reinforcements to Egypt. The alternatives to General de Gaulle seemed to be the lurking civil war or the re-emergence of the Popular Front – the interwar centre-left coalition with participation of the French Communist Party that was still among the strongest of its kind in Western Europe by 1958. Therefore, the American government regarded the establishment of a Gaullist regime as the lesser evil. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thus noted that de Gaulle was “all that stands between France and chaos”, and the US administration seemed in effect to support the return of de Gaulle.¹¹¹

Obviously, the Eisenhower administration acknowledged that de Gaulle’s overtly nationalist regime would create frictions within the Western alliance, and prominent critics voiced the suspicion that the Gaullist movement was fascist. During the crisis, however, Gaullist emissaries successfully assured American diplomats that de Gaulle was liberal concerning Algeria and entirely different from a character like *Generalísimo* Franco – Spain’s dictator from the Civil War (1933-36) to 1975. He was neither anti-American, anti-German, anti-NATO nor anti-EEC – all he wanted to do was to create an American style presidency, they assured.¹¹² It was of utmost importance for the formation of the Western opinion that the Eisenhower administration immediately indicated its support to the Gaullist solution in June 1958. Leading American dailies such as the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune* followed the administration, now praising the coming of a strong government in France – comments that were published in Danish and other Western media as well.¹¹³ For the time being, France’s prestige was increasing drastically, as de Gaulle managed to steer France through the political crisis. Tellingly, the magazine *Time* made General de Gaulle ‘the man of the year’ in early 1959.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 134.

¹¹¹ Alessandro Brogi, *A question of self-esteem: the United States and the Cold War choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 232. In the research literature, however, there is disagreement about the scope of the American involvement in the ‘regime change.’ Irwin M. Wall (*France, the United States ... op.cit.*) emphasises the American activism, whereas Geir Lundestad argues that Wall’s thesis “represents a vast overestimation of the American role in France ...”, in his book *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 118.

¹¹² Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 134-156.

¹¹³ *Dagens Nyheder*, “Verden og de Gaulle”, leading article of 31 May 1958, referring *New York Herald Tribune*’s argument that de Gaulle would be the last chance of obtaining civil control with the French army and finding a liberal solution for the Algerian population.

¹¹⁴ Frédéric Bozo and Pierre Mélandri, “La France devant l’opinion américaine : le retour de de Gaulle début 1958 – printemps 1959”, in *Relations internationales*, no. 58, summer 1989: 205-213.

Correspondingly, Harold Macmillan's Tory government promptly bid General de Gaulle welcome, in spite of the British controversies with the General in his capacity as leader of the exiled *Free French* during World War II.¹¹⁵ There was an air of superiority in British self-understanding due to the democratic and societal stability of Britain as well as its unique determination and performance during World War II, hence a tendency of the British to look down on the French and Gaullism in particular. In terms of post-war foreign policy designs, there was a long record of Anglo-French rivalry at play, peaking in the wake of the Suez fiasco of 1956. The British increasingly accepted the role as a privileged junior partner of the United States, while the French sought refuge in 'National Molletism' – a quest for national independence under the Socialist Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, ushering in the Gaullist solution.¹¹⁶

The British press was particularly harsh in its comments about the French regime change.¹¹⁷ For many left-wing observers, Socialist leader Guy Mollet's acceptance of de Gaulle's interim government was highly deplorable. Moreover, the prominent Labour politician and social reformer, Aneurin Bevan, noted that General de Gaulle's plea for extraordinary authorities pointed to a "pompous arrogance" that was "egocentric" and "blind".¹¹⁸ British diplomats were equally critical towards the political chaos in France and the responsible politicians. In a letter to Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, the British ambassador to Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, observed, "Being Latin and legalist, the French have the unfortunate tendency to search for the origins of their misfortune in the texts that are governing their fate."¹¹⁹ However, the British government decided to support de Gaulle, as the spectre of an anti-Western chain reaction in North Africa and a Communist revival in a Popular Front appeared to be urgent. In addition, the British government faced a dependency on France with regard to the creation of a European Free Trade Area (FTA) – the British plan for industrial liberalisation that would hinder the brewing economic split between the EEC and the rest of Western Europe, while maintaining the privileged agricultural trade with the Commonwealth states.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Alistair Horne, *Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography* (London: Macmillan 1989), p. 5.

¹¹⁶ Richard Davis, "The 'problem of de Gaulle', 1958-1967", in Philippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill (eds.), *Anglo-French Relations 1898-1998. From Fashoda to Jospin* (Palgrave, 2002), pp. 161-171.

¹¹⁷ Anne Deighton, "L'image de 1958 en Grande-Bretagne : changement et continuité", in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *L'avènement de la Ve République : entre nouveauté et tradition* (A. Colin, 1999), pp. 265-276.

¹¹⁸ Aneurin Bevan, "Algier kan bringe os til randen af en krig", translated article published in the Danish Social Democratic daily *Demokraten*, 25 May 1958.

¹¹⁹ Translated from Douglas Johnson, "La Constitution de 1958 vue de Grande-Bretagne", in *Espoir*, No 85, September, 1992: 5-7. "Etant latin et légaliste, le Français a la fâcheuse tendance à chercher les origines de ses malheurs dans les textes qui dirigent son destin."

¹²⁰ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 118 and 127.

In terms of political stability, the French 1958 crisis was more relevant for the two former Axis Powers. Most noticeable, the Italian Neo-Fascist party, *Movimento sociale italiano* (MSI) - founded in 1946 - attempted to use the political breakdown in France as a way of regaining legitimacy after the failure of Benito Mussolini's Fascist experiment. By 1958, Italian right-wing groups thus praised General de Gaulle's severe critique of the 'regime of the parties', although he had been a prominent adversary of the Fascists during World War II. Under the new circumstances, they saw a glimmer of hope in his apparent determination to 'defend Western Civilization' against Communists and Arab nationalists in Algeria and North Africa.¹²¹ By the early 1960s, even some 'centrists' argued in favour of applying a Gaullist constitutional design in Italy, as there were obvious resemblances between the unstable Italian post-war republic and the Fourth French Republic.¹²²

There was a particular focus on the French drama during the general election campaign of May 1958 that brought Amintore Fanfani of the *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) to power. Some of Fanfani's political slogans had resemblances to those of the Gaullists, as he asserted that a democratic system could not function efficiently without a 'homogeneous' majority, i.e. an unequivocal mandate to the DC.¹²³ Correspondingly, Fanfani's adversaries of the *Partito comunista italiano* (PCI) engaged into a malicious campaign, portraying him as an Italian de Gaulle, for whom the Catholic clergy played a role paralleling that of the colonialist ultras in the French case.¹²⁴ In reality, however, Fanfani came into severe conflict with de Gaulle, as the latter's vision of an Anglo-American-French directorate and the creation of a Franco-German partnership tended to marginalise Italy from the core of international politics.¹²⁵

Initially, de Gaulle's political comeback almost terrified the political leaders in West Germany, as Hans-Peter Schwartz - a leading Adenauer biographer - describes. The Christian Democrats in office obviously considered de Gaulle's nationalist programme a direct threat to the European integration and NATO, hence counterproductive to Adenauer's pivotal rehabili-

¹²¹ Roberto Chiarini, "La fortuna del gollismo in Italia. L'attacco della destra alla «Repubblica dei partiti»", in *Storia Contemporanea*, volume 23, no. 3, June 1992: 385-424.

¹²² Roberto Chiarini, "La fortuna del gollismo in Italia. Le suggestioni di una «Seconda Repubblica»", in *Storia Contemporanea*, volume 25, no. 1, February 1994: 173-220; Adriano Giovannelli, "La V^e République vue d'en face", in *Espoir* (Institut Charles de G.), no. 85, September 1992: 56-62.

¹²³ Articles in the prominent, conservative daily *Corriere della Sera*, "Sputnik e fatti di Algeria, temi dominanti della lotta elettorale", 16 May 1958; "Tutti i partiti chiedono più voti traendo spunto dai fatti francesi", 15 May 1958; "La crisi francese alla base di nuove polemiche fra i partiti", 18 May 1958.

¹²⁴ Various articles in *l'Unità*, the party paper of the PCI. For example "Dalla Francia un monito all'unità democratica", 17 May 1958; "Il discorso di Amintore Fanfani su il gen. De Gaulle e la D.C.", 20 May 1958; "Il totalitarismo di Fanfani rappresenta per l'Italia quello che la minaccia di De Gaulle è per la Francia", 20 May 1958; "Gollismo e fanfanismo", 21 May 1958.

¹²⁵ Gaetano Quagliariello, "1958 en France dans les documents des diplomates italiens", in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *L'avènement de la Ve République : entre nouveauté et tradition* (A. Colin, 1999), pp. 276-297.

tation strategy featuring a Franco-German reconciliation within the Western frameworks. Moreover, the prospect of de Gaulle opting for a regular Franco-Soviet understanding was utterly alarming, as the status of the two German states and Berlin was unsettled. A key observer like Herbert Blankenhorn - the Chancellor's confidant and incoming NATO Ambassador - warned about the risk of a civil war, as the threat of a "Gaullist military dictatorship" was mounting. In May 1958, Adenauer therefore assured Prime Minister Pflimlin and the Socialist leader, Guy Mollet, about his support to their coalition, thus against the Gaullist 'usurpers.'¹²⁶ In other words, the reaction of the West German government was at variance with the Eisenhower administration's discrete support to the Gaullist solution.

In addition, the French parliamentary breakdown was unfortunate in the light of the democratic rehabilitation process engaging the Federal Republic of Germany.¹²⁷ In late May 1958, Federal President Theodor Heuss recalled his painful experiences from a certain March 1933, when the *Reichstag* endowed Adolf Hitler with exceptional powers.¹²⁸ It seemed that there were obvious resemblances between the fall of the Weimar Republic and the French collapse of 1958. The prominent Conservative-Liberalist daily, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, advertised for the imperative of proper constitutional institutions and a firm political leadership. It argued that the French lesson was relevant for all democracies, but particularly so for the German society that had experienced how populism could prosper under weak governments.¹²⁹ However, Chancellor Adenauer's celebrated summit with General de Gaulle in mid-September 1958, held in the president's home in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, was a turning point for the Federal government in terms of establishing confidence. The Federal Chancellor gradually recognised that de Gaulle was the key to re-establishing political order in France and a trustworthy political partner for a future Franco-German partnership. Subsequently, the term 'Gaullists' entered the West German political language as synonymy for the supporters

¹²⁶ Hans-Peter Schwarz, "La République fédérale allemande et la crise de mai à septembre 1958 en France", in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *L'avènement de la Ve République : entre nouveauté et tradition* (A. Colin, 1999), pp. 245-264 and Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer. Der Staatsman : 1952-1967* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), p. 441.

¹²⁷ Henning Köhler, *Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie* (Berlin, 1994), pp. 1001-1003; Jeffrey Vanke, "The European Collaborations of France and Germany, 1963-1966", in Wilfried Loth (Ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), pp. 94-95; Paul Noack, "Er kam und ging als Fremder. Charles de Gaulle in der westdeutschen Einschätzung zwischen 1958 und 1970", in Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht (Eds.), *De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa* (Opladen, Leske and Budrich, 1991), pp. 83-94.

¹²⁸ Hans-Peter Schwarz, "La République fédérale allemande et la crise de mai à septembre 1958 en France", in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *L'avènement de la Ve République : entre nouveauté et tradition* (A. Colin, 1999), p. 258.

¹²⁹ Co-Publisher Erich Dombrowski, "Eine Lehre", leading article in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1958; Political Editor Jürgen Tern, "Regierungschef in der Demokratie", leader in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 June 1958.

of Adenauer's Franco-German partnership – as opposed to the 'Atlanticists', who favoured the relationship with the United States. France was pivotal for the West German 'Gaullists', as it appeared as a sort of political and military *hinterland* for West German recovery and political strength.¹³⁰

In Denmark – in the northern periphery of continental Europe – the French turmoil appeared in a more distant perspective, void of any direct engagements comparable to the Federal Republic's reconciliation policies or the United States' global commitment to combating world communism. Nor was there any traditional hostility or rivalry at play as that characterising Franco-German and Franco-British relations. The Danish political landscape was free of any radical, rightwing groups comparable to the Italian Neo-Fascists of the MSI. The Danish society was hardly fertile ground for anti-parliamentary arguments as the parliamentary system had succeeded in forming viable governments, even based on a multiparty system like that of the Fourth Republic. There was not even a geographical proximity to France at play as that of other small democratic states like Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland. Normally, French affairs were not even the object of extensive coverage in the Danish media. There was traditionally more focus on Britain, Germany and the other Nordic countries, along with the new superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. However, France had become increasingly relevant for Denmark in virtue of its role in the regulation of the 'German problem', for the maintenance and shaping of NATO and particularly for the success of the West European collaboration. Furthermore, for a while, the Fourth Republic's chaotic decolonisation process and breakdown, coinciding with the creation of a new European order, brought French affairs to the fore of Danish politics.

Chaos or Cooperation: Democracy in French and in Danish

In the Danish political self-understanding, there is indeed an element of what the historian Wolfram Kaiser has called a 'superior democratic identity.'¹³¹ It is a feature shared with many other small Western nations and with some of the oldest democracies such as Britain, the United States and in a sense with France herself, although the Danish democracy is significantly younger than the classical ones. It was not until 1901 that the fundamental principle of

¹³⁰ Hans-Peter Schwarz, "La République fédérale allemande et la crise de mai à septembre 1958 en France", in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, *L'avènement de la Ve République : entre nouveauté et tradition* (A. Colin, 1999), pp. 260-263.

¹³¹ Wolfram Kaiser, "Culturally Embedded and Path-Dependent: Peripheral Alternatives to ECSC/EEC "core Europe" since 1945", in *Journal of European Integration History*, Volume 7, Number 2, 2001: 22-24.

cabinet responsibility worked through in practice in Denmark with the agrarian based Liberal Party coming to power, even though the bourgeois National Liberals had obtained a free constitution of the fragile, absolute monarchy in 1849. A crucial step in the democratisation process was the 1915 Constitution that introduced universal suffrage to the first chamber; the electoral age twenty-one; and enfranchised women, servants and the poor people. The Social Democratic Party accepted the parliamentary framework as the battlefield for social improvement. As mentioned above, political leaders even considered the fostering of an adherence to democracy a part of a 'soft' survival strategy during the two World Wars and to some extent during the Cold War. Denmark was - if not a pioneer - among the countries that implemented the literally social democratic strategy of national consensus in depth.¹³²

In Denmark, the post-war articulation of the principle of *people's sovereignty* has emphasised the values of anti-elitism, consensus and a down to earth spirit, typically labelled *folkelighed* - awkwardly translated as 'folkishness'. The Danish post-war rearticulating of the German concept *völkisch* emphasised democratic participation, the proximity between the government and the *people*, as a distinguishing feature of a 'folkish' culture or life form.¹³³ Election to the parliament, *Folketinget*, was and is based on proportional representation, but particularly the participatory basis and cooperative spirit of the numerous *people's parties* have been celebrated as the essence of the system's viability and legitimacy. Political and academic elites appeared as the symbolic contrast to the people, as they allegedly had no contact with the 'real people.'¹³⁴

The impact of the 'superior democratic identity' upon policy-making processes is rather subtle, but political scientists actually report that there is a high degree of consensus between the four classical parties over votes in the Danish parliament.¹³⁵ It is generally accepted that the occurrence of a political system with a variety of parties - the cut-off is only 2 per cent of the votes given - has rendered cross party cooperation necessary for obtaining political influence at all. Although dominant in the mid-20th century, the Danish Social Democratic Party never obtained a parliamentary position comparable to that of its Scandinavian 'sister parties'.

¹³² Anette Warring, *Historie, magt og identitet - grundlovsfejringer gennem 150 år* (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003), pp. 83-94; Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 456-461.

¹³³ Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 417-468; Anette Warring, *Historie, magt og identitet - grundlovsfejringer gennem 150 år* (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003), pp. 127-158.

¹³⁴ Tim Knudsen, *Da demokrati blev til folkestyre. Dansk Demokratihistorie - bind 1*, (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 2001), pp. 113-160.

¹³⁵ Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Robert Klemmensen and Martin Ejnar Hansen, "Blokpolitik og det 'samarbejdende folkestyres' fire gamle partier, 1953-2005", in *Politologiske Skrifter*, no 2, 2005: 1-8.

For decades, the Danish self-understanding featured Prussian and German political culture as a basic, symbolic contrast. As the Danish historian Uffe Østergaard provocatively has argued, "Danes have been indoctrinated at school and at home that they are different from and more democratic than the suppressed, authoritarian Germans."¹³⁶ During the Cold War, Soviet totalitarianism gradually took over that role. In 1958, however, Danish democracy debates displaced the focus to France for a while, dwelling on the exceptional paradox that democracy could break down in a nation historically featuring as a source of inspiration for democratic movements.



In late May 1958, the Social Democratic Party Organisation published a lampoon that perfectly illustrated what virtually happened to the image of France in the context of Danish politics. It was a contribution to the one-year birthday celebration of the so-called Triangular Government, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party, the Radical Liberal Party and the minor Party of Justice. Referring to the chaos of the Fourth Republic, the lampoon warned against the consequences of political intransigence. On the front page, it showed a photo of the riots in the streets of Paris under the headline *Chaos*, contrasted to a picture of an orderly working session in the Danish Parliament, symbolising *Cooperation*. The message was that genuine respect of democracy obliged the parties to cooperate. The French parties had failed to do so, resulting in the fatal crisis of the Fourth Republic. With that reference, the Social Democrats urged to overcome narrow party considerations in favour of the general interests of the nation. "The will to cooperate generates progress", the lampoon proclaimed.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), p. 169.


¹³⁷ Socialdemokratisk Forbund (ed. Niels Matthiasen), "By og Land", 28 May 1958: "Vilje til samarbejde giver fremgang." The party organisation published and handed out the lampoon in some tens of thousands of copies.



MAJ 1958



En tung skæbnetime har ramt den franske republik. Efterkrigstidens modsætninger mellem de demokratiske partier og manglen på samarbejdsvilje på tværs af principielle politiske standpunkter har i forbindelse med Frankrigs store problemer i Alger bragt den franske republik i fare. For hele Vesteuropa er forløbet af begivenhederne i Frankrig i disse dage af alvorlig betydning.



Retten til fri partidannelse og partiernes principielle politiske modsætninger må ikke medføre politisk kaos. Respekten for demokratiet tilsiger det enkelte parti at samarbejde om dagens aktuelle problemer til gavn for landet som helhed.


Inden folketingsvalget i 1957 indbød stats- og udenrigsminister H. C. Hansen til et fordomsfrit og sagligt samarbejde efter valget om alle foreliggende opgaver.

Dette samarbejde blev gennemført ved dannelsen af tre-partiregeringen. Og så Venstre og de konservative blev indbudt til at deltage i det politiske arbejde i Folketinget. Denne indbydelse er kun nødningen blevet fulgt.

I en situation hvor Danmark stadig står overfor en lang række problemer på det økonomiske område, hvor industrien skal tilpasses den stigende teknik samtidig med, at uget beskæftigelse skal skabes, er det nødvendigt, at samarbejdet mellem alle gode kræfter fortsættes. Over de snævre partimæssige hensyn står hensynet til landets interesser.

Socialdemokratiet kalder derfor fortsat til sagligt samarbejde om landbrugets, byerhvervenes og arbejderne interesser.

VILJE TIL SAMARBEJDE GIVER FREMGANG



Chaos or Cooperation, May 1958: A Social Democratic Lampoon contrasts the French political chaos with a working session in the Danish Folketing (The Royal Library (Småtryksafdelingen), Copenhagen).

The Danish Social Democrats' lampoon was an obvious attempt of branding the domestic opposition as sabotage of 'societal progress.' Considered in a longer perspective, however, it also highlights the Danish Social Democrats' dissociation from the revolutionary, socialist ideology and international class struggle - a process associated with the extensive franchise of the 1915 Constitution; the collapse of international labour solidarity in World War I; and the violent example of the Bolshevik revolution in November 1917.¹³⁸ In this perspective, the independent anti-Communist daily, *Information*, praised the Danish Social Democrats, as they unequivocally professed themselves to the principles of the *cooperating democracy* ('det samarbejdende folkestyre') and denounced the unfruitful party struggle, emblematic of the French political system.¹³⁹

On 5 June 1958, during the annual celebration of the liberal 1849 Constitution, the main motif of the speeches and comments was the French chaos and the Gaullist outcome. In Danish political liturgy, Constitution Day is an occasion of assessing the general state of the Danish democracy and of reproducing its basic values. At memorial venues across the country, the parties arrange fairly well attended political meetings.¹⁴⁰ On Constitution Day in 1958, the leading articles of the main dailies from various political corners strongly urged the parties to learn the French lesson and to strengthen the cross party cooperation. *Socialdemokraten*, still carrying the French revolutionary slogans 'liberty, equality, fraternity', thus realised that:

In the French tragedy these days, we are witnessing a shocking example of what can happen when a parliament is not able to counterbalance the weaknesses of the party struggle with a kind of cooperation, securing realistic solutions to at least the most fundamental problems.¹⁴¹

In addition, the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Hans Christian Hansen, commented the French collapse at the meeting in *Fælledparken*, the Labour Movement's historical battlefield in Copenhagen. He concluded that democracy dissolved from within, paving the way for

¹³⁸ Tim Knudsen, *Da demokrati blev til folkestyre. Dansk Demokratihistorie – bind 1*, (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 2001), pp. 136-143; Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 4, 1914-1945* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 109-112; Anette Warring, *Historie, magt og identitet - grundlovsfejringer gennem 150 år* (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003), p. 94.

¹³⁹ *Information*, "Fransk og dansk", 30 May 1958.

¹⁴⁰ Anette Warring, *Historie, magt og identitet - grundlovsfejringer gennem 150 år* (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003).

¹⁴¹ *Socialdemokraten*, "Grundlovsdag", 5 June 1958, the leading article: "Netop i disse dage ser vi i den franske tragedie et rystende eksempel på, hvordan det kan gå, når et parlament ikke formår at opveje den svækkelse, partisplittelsen betyder, ved et samarbejde, som i hvert fald sikrer realistiske løsninger af de mest væsentlige problemer."

antiparliamentarian forces, if the parties were not willing to aim for the golden mean between different interests. At the same time, he accused the main opposition parties in Denmark - the Conservatives and the Liberals - of lacking that will.¹⁴²

Post-war Denmark was evidently free from any conflicts comparable to those dragging the Fourth French Republic down. Reflecting on the French events, however, the Social Democratic President of the Parliament, Gustav Pedersen, warned that the tendency of making unrealistic political demands ultimately might imperil even an apparently well functioning democracy, paving the way for 'a strong man.' In Denmark, the societal cohesion related particularly to the balance between defence expenditure and social security, as the nation was free of challenging national or religious minorities, he argued. A declining willingness in the population to contribute to the society - to pay taxes - was therefore a possible candidate to undermine the political consensus and collaboration.¹⁴³

Obviously, the bourgeois opposition did not buy into the idea of redistribution of income by taxation as the way to societal consensus. However, they fully shared the slogans of cooperation and consensus politics, warning about the French parties' 'selfishness.' The Conservative party leader, Poul Møller (MP), thus pointed to the paralysing disagreement within the Danish centre-left government regarding NATO's defence requirements and its lack of cooperation with the pro-NATO parties in opposition.¹⁴⁴ However, the Conservatives did not call for a strong executive or parliamentary majority, as did de Gaulle and the Italian DC leader, Amintore Fanfani. Instead, they argued that the triangular government's mistake was to perform in conflict with the norms of a 'cooperating democracy.'¹⁴⁵ Tellingly, Poul Møller later used the expression 'the Danish coffee table democracy' ('kaffebordsdemokratiet') - a democratic tradition progressing in virtue of compromises rather than merciless struggles.¹⁴⁶

In his Constitution Day speech, the Conservative MP Kristen Amby even suggested to create a wide coalition government of all the democratic parties in order to bring the parliamentary democracy into accordance with the 'will of the people' and securing the closest

¹⁴² *Socialdemokraten*, "Tusinder til grundlovsfest i Fælledparken. H. C. Hansen om begivenhederne i Frankrig", 6 June 1958.

¹⁴³ Interview with Parliament President Gustav Pedersen brought in *Berlingske Tidende*, "Diktatur i Danmark? Et spørgsmål, vi ikke kan skubbe fra os...", 1 January 1959.

¹⁴⁴ In December 1957, the NATO Council had specified the requirements to memberstates' defence systems in the document MC 70, resulting in a conflictfull debate in Denmark about the future defence structure. See Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 292-295.

¹⁴⁵ *Jyllands Posten*, "Dansk Parlamentarisme paa Vej ud i Karrikaturen", 4 Juni 1958 and the leading article "Demokratiets Hverdag", 3 June 1958; *Dagens Nyheder*, "de Gaulle ringer paa igen", 28 May 1958 and "Folkestyrets anseelse", 4 June 1958.

possible cooperation.¹⁴⁷ Formerly affiliated with the aristocracy, the Conservative Party had indeed turned itself into a middle class people's party. In his reflections on the French crisis, finally, the political editor of the business paper *Børsen*, Jens Peter Jensen (Liberal MP), was formulating a general view, concluding that the 'cooperating democracy' was most suitable for 'our small society' and for 'the Danish mentality'.¹⁴⁸

Recent historical literature tends to deconstruct the standard narrative about the consensus driven and democratic nature of Danish politics and society with a reference, among other things, to the Danish nationalists' co-responsibility for the wars over Schleswig and Holstein in the mid 19th century.¹⁴⁹ In 1958, however, the 'superior democratic identity' was still relatively uncontested in Denmark. Indications of a 'disillusionment with politicians' were emerging, yet the breakdown of the French democracy was an occasion to confirm the allegiance to the Danish democracy. Ardently pro-NATO party leaders used the political culture of a main ally as a symbolic contrast to Danish democratic traditions in order to 'teach' the public the norms of a 'cooperating democracy.'

The references to the 'cooperating democracy' can partly be regarded as an idyllic ideal, partly as a political concept of struggle. Danish politics was profoundly contentious as elsewhere, but the democracy debate of 1958 highlighted the general acceptance of the idea that a multiparty, parliamentary system could only survive in virtue of respect of the norm of the 'cooperating democracy.' The Gaullist promise that a suppression of the parties and the parliament would pave the way for a more profound, undisturbed bond between the people

¹⁴⁶ Poul Møller, "En udfordring, vi må tage op", in Jens Stubbjær (ed.), *Meninger om Fællesmarkedet*, (Copenhagen: Forlaget Aktuelle Bøger, 1962), p. 29.

¹⁴⁷ *Information*, "Sensationel radio-grundlovstale om brud med det partipolitiske magtkamp-system", 6 June 1958, referring a radio broadcast of Kristen Amby's Constitution Day speech.

¹⁴⁸ *Børsen*, "Demokratiets festdag", leader of 5 June 1958 by Political Editor Jens P. Jensen (Liberal MP).

¹⁴⁹ Apart from the narrative about the Danes as pure victims for Prussian-German aggression in the mid-19th century, Danish Kingdom's bloodless abolishment of adscription (*stavnsløst*) in 1788 - a year before the French Revolution - is a standard reference in this identity construction. See for instance the Danish parliament's educational material about the Danish democracy: Folketinget (Oplysning og information), *Demokrati på dansk* (2003), accessible on www.ft.dk/pdf/demokrati.pdf (seen 17 April 2006) as well as Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's and former Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen's Constitution Day speeches of 2002, cited in Anette Warring, *Historie, magt og identitet - grundlovsfejring gennem 150 år* (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003), p. 9 as well as the interview with Professor Erling Bjøl in TEMPO (volume 38) - the online magazine of the Institut Français in Copenhagen. See also Michael Bregnsbo, "Den danske vej. Om traditionen for den danske konsensuskultur", in *Historie*, 2, 1996: 311-327; Tim Knudsen, *Da demokrati blev til folkestyre. Dansk Demokratihistorie - bind 1*, (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 2001), pp. 15, 53; François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Éditions Gallimard, 1978), p. 50 and Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 273-277.

and the state, incarnated by General de Gaulle in person, was tightly linked to specific French circumstances – it was barely an exportable idea.¹⁵⁰

De Gaulle as a Figurehead - but for Whom?

In addition, the reception of de Gaulle's political comeback was to some extent taken 'hostage' in the strongly polarised left-right cleavage and bloc thinking of the Cold War.¹⁵¹ De Gaulle's way to power appeared as a challenge to the Atlantic Alliance's legitimacy and identity as the free world's bulwark against undemocratic forces. The struggle for democracy had been a pivotal reference in the arguments for giving up Denmark's traditional neutrality in favour of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.¹⁵² Throughout the 1950s, the NATO members Denmark and Norway had strongly rejected the American idea of admitting Spain into the alliance on the ground that Franco's rule was dictatorial. Similarly, they had opposed Greek and Turkish NATO membership with a reference to the differences in political-democratic cultures.¹⁵³ But what about the cooperation with the key NATO partner, France, in its new Gaullist shape?

The immediate comments about the system change focused in particular on the question of the base of support behind General de Gaulle. Political observers universally asked *whether General de Gaulle was conspiring with the French fascists and disobeying army units in Algeria or whether he was the last voice of genuine integrity*. Was he even a sort of 'super-actor', rising above the party quarrels and particular societal interests, as he presented himself? Although he obtained a parliamentary mandate in 1958, historians tend to classify the regime change as a kind of a *coup d'état*. De Gaulle staged himself as the only possible arbiter and saviour of the Republic on the verge of a civil war, whose authors demanded *his* investiture under the threat of a military intervention in the capital.¹⁵⁴ The aim here is not to review these claims, but just to hint at the pervasiveness of the conspiracy allegation. Tellingly, even Ambassador Eyvind Bartels – Denmark's pro-Gaullist representative to Paris – seemed to admit that de Gaulle's problems of controlling the French rebel officers of the OAS (*Organisation armée secrète*) in 1961 and 1962 "at the end of the day, irrespective of how

¹⁵⁰ Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 227-234, 278.

¹⁵¹ Hans Hørel, "Kulturens kolde krig. Polarisering, antikommunisme og antiamerikanisme i dansk kulturliv 1946-60", in *Kritik*, volumen 35, no. 158, August, 2002: 12-13.

¹⁵² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 221.

¹⁵³ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 670-687.

¹⁵⁴ Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 208-214; Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 141-142.

one frames the question, was rooted in the fact that the present regime was *born in sin*.¹⁵⁵ In leftwing circles, moreover, it was a common assumption that de Gaulle represented a faction of the French society, 'the hundred families', or even of the army, whereas his slogans and appearance as a destined, national saviour, incarnating the national will and unity, were considered sheer, archaic *mysticism*.¹⁵⁶

Most noticeable, Danish Conservative circles were equally concerned about the Gaullist authority agenda. It is hardly possible to find a Conservative politician in Denmark that defended de Gaulle or used the Gaullist takeover to advertise for an expansion of the Danish government's executive powers. In mid-May 1958, the prominent Conservative paper *Dagens Nyheder* thus warned that,

The generals are assuming power in order to pave the way for a kind of Gaullism that signifies the breakdown of the French democracy and the hour of destiny, not only for France, but also for Europe and the entire Western cooperation.¹⁵⁷

Moreover, the Conservative organ presented the May 1958 crisis as a direct showdown between the parliamentary democracy and General de Gaulle.¹⁵⁸ In the same vein, the independent bourgeois daily, *Jyllands Posten*, had argued that de Gaulle's takeover would lead to a dictatorship of a yet unknown degree, superseding the Fourth Republic's 'dictatorship of the trade unions'.¹⁵⁹ Even so, the Conservatives warned against abusing the French chaos as an excuse of Danish isolationism vis-à-vis NATO and the EEC.¹⁶⁰

An example of the problem that the French events posed to actors engaged in the contemporary ideological battle are the remarks of the prominent Conservative ideologue and debater, Henning Fonsmark, affiliated to the Paris based Conference for Cultural Freedom (CCF). The CCF was a transnational, anti-totalitarian movement - partly CIA sponsored - with quite

¹⁵⁵ RA UM 123.D.1, box X. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Director Paul Fischer 23 January 1962: "... at dette til syvende og sidst må føres tilbage til den kendsgerning, at det nuværende regime, hvordan man end vender og drejer det, blev født i synd." Emphasis added.

¹⁵⁶ Lucien Jaume, "De Gaulle dans l'histoire française de la souveraineté", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome II. La République* (Paris: Plon, 1992), p. 19.

¹⁵⁷ *Dagens Nyheder*, "Fransk skæbnestund", leading article of 15 May 1958: "Generalerne er ved at tage magten for at bane vej for en Gaullisme, der betyder den franske parlamentarismes sammenbrud og skabnetime ikke blot for Frankrig, men for Europa og hele det vestlige samarbejde."

¹⁵⁸ *Dagens Nyheder*, leading article of "Demokratiets nødværge", 17 May 1958.

¹⁵⁹ *Jyllands Posten* (leading articles), "General de Gaulle stiller sig til Raadighed", 20 May 1958; "Paa Vej mod de Gaulle", 28 May 1958 and "Revolution uden Blod - endnu", 31 May 1958.

¹⁶⁰ In the Conservative magazine *Vor Tid*, "Fællesskab med Europa", leading article, presumably by Editor Erik Ninn-Hansen (MP), volume 14, no. 8, 19 June 1958.

independent local branches, also in the Nordic countries. It functioned as a Cold War battle organisation, promoting democratic values in intellectual and artistic milieus, where Communist sympathies were rather outspread. With a view to de Gaulle's approaching takeover, Fonsmark argued that the CCF probably would have to move its headquarters from Paris. The failure of the French democracy and the Algerian War severely compromised the organisation's cultural-ideological 'warfare' for 'Western' values. Only the Communists would profit from the precarious situation, he noted.¹⁶¹

However, the Danish NATO supporters faced the dilemma that an absolute denouncement of the Gaullist regime would give the NATO opponents an opportunity to demand a withdrawal from the alliance. A full embracement of the Gaullist solution, alternatively, would appear as a sell out of parliamentary democratic values, confirming the standing leftwing accusation that NATO critically constrained the political freedom of the member states. The Social Democrat and incoming foreign minister, Jens Otto Krag, tells in his diary how the Danish government's anniversary party in late May 1958 at the Prime Minister's was interrupted by listening to a radio broadcast about the revolt in Algiers. Krag commented that, "The Socialists are still standing against de Gaulle – but for how long? The situation seems to be bound to burst tonight." A few days before, he had noted that, "A lot pointed to a military revolt *à la Franco*."¹⁶² Publicly, however, Prime and Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen could only state that it was "not up to us to pass a verdict on these events."¹⁶³

From the inner circles of the Social Democratic, anti-Communist propaganda machine, Secretary Niels Alsing Andersen cautiously embarked upon a pro-Gaullist campaign. Under the subtitle "De Gaulle as a figurehead – but for whom?", he acknowledged that the generals and the capitalist circles initially appeared as the true authors of the *coup* in the hectic days in May, but all subsequent events displayed a General de Gaulle siding with democracy. He argued that,

¹⁶¹ Ingeborg Philipsen, "Selskabet for frihed og kultur. *Congress for Cultural Freedom i Danmark 1953-60*", in *Kritik*, volume 35, August 2002: 38-51 and "Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark 1953-1960", in *Intelligence and National Security*, volume 18, no. 2, Summer 2003: 237-253; Letter from Henning Fonsmark to Birgitta Stenberg and Kurt (?), 22 May 1958. Thanks a lot to Ingeborg for showing the relevant archival material.

¹⁶² ABA JOK, the Diary, book X, 29 May 1958: "Socialisterne holder endnu stand med Gaulle-[..en?] – men hvor længe. I nat synes situationen at skulle revne."; 25 May 1958: "Meget tyder i retning af militærrevolte *à la Franco*."

¹⁶³ *Folketingstidende*, folketingsets forhandlinger 1957-58, 30 May 1958, column 5036: "... tilkommer ikke os at fælde dom over disse begivenheder." See also Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 707.

a lot seems to imply that the French democracy, not the army and the anti-democratic men behind, has turned out to hold the trump, namely de Gaulle, in the last round of the game about the Fourth Republic.¹⁶⁴

However, the party leaders largely refrained from commenting de Gaulle's qualities in public.

A significant leftwing fraction of the Social Democratic Party, on the other hand, grieved loudly de Gaulle's political reappearance in an utterly condemning language. Under the editorship of the Social Democrat Holger Eriksen (MP), the party paper *Demokraten* of Aarhus, concluded on 2 June 1958 that, "Irrespective of how one turns over the matter in his mind, it is a fact that France has left democracy, today, in favour of a military dictatorship."¹⁶⁵ The paper compared the Cross of Lorraine - the resistance symbol of de Gaulle's Free French as of 1940 - with the Nazi Swastika. It deplored, moreover, the inevitable weakening of the Western collaboration, reminding that NATO was created as,

a league of democratic nations in favour of defending the democracy. As France *de facto* has become a military dictatorship, the other members have to admit that they have ended up in bad company.¹⁶⁶

Therefore, one could not count on France in international questions any longer, the leftwing paper warned.¹⁶⁷ It was indeed a challenge for the Danish Social Democrats to come to terms with the French regime change.

A similar interpretation of the French crisis was at play in the Danish milieu of 'renegade' Communists and 'homeless' socialists that finally organised a new Socialist People's Party in November 1958.¹⁶⁸ Contrary to the leftist Social Democrats, however, the 'new left' overtly supported a Danish withdrawal from NATO in favour of a Nordic collaboration, neutral with

¹⁶⁴ Niels Alsing Andersen, "Frankrig fik de Gaulle – men får de Gaulle Frankrig?", in *Verdens Gang*, volume 12, 1958, pp. 161 – 166: "... men meget tyder i øjeblikket på, at det blev det franske politiske demokrati og ikke hæren med dens antidemokratiske bagmænd, der sikrede sig trumfkortet i sidste runde af spillet om den fjerde republik: de Gaulle."

¹⁶⁵ *Demokraten*, "Militærdiktatur i Frankrig", leading article of 2 June 1958: "Man kan vende og dreje forholdene i Frankrig, som man vil, så bliver det dog en kendsgerning, at Frankrig i dag har forladt demokratiet og er gået over til et militærdiktatur."

¹⁶⁶ *Demokraten*, "Militærdiktatur ..." *op. cit.*: "... de demokratiske landes sammenslutning til værn for demokratiet. Når Frankrig nu de facto er blevet et militærdiktatur, må de andre lande jo indrømme, at de er i skidt selskab."

¹⁶⁷ *Demokraten*, "Under diktaturet", leading article of 14 June 1958.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas Jørgensen, *Transformation and Crises. The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Sweden, 1956-1980* (unpublished EUI thesis, Florence, 2004), pp. 72-75.

respect to the East-West confrontation.¹⁶⁹ In late May 1958, Gert Petersen – a prominent new left ideologue and future party leader – had warned that, “The marching up of the fascist generals in France, this is barefaced fascism.”¹⁷⁰ After General Massu’s paratroopers took over in Corsica, de Gaulle’s status as a conspirator seemed evident.¹⁷¹ In the succeeding NATO and EEC debates, the new left warned about a ‘belt of black regimes’ emerging on the Continent. The prominent new left character, Professor Mogens Fog, thus evoked a dystopia, pointing to de Gaulle’s takeover as the most urgent example of a globe in unbalance. Playing down or explaining away the perspectives of it equalled to the passive narrow-mindedness that had paved the way for Nazism in Germany. The scenario at play was that of “the strongest countries of continental Europe being united in a wide belt of full or semi-dictatorial, reactionary states from Spain, over France to West Germany.”¹⁷² The goal of screening Denmark from continental Europe within a Nordic framework was definitively urgent in that perspective.

In spite of declining electoral support and the exit from the Danish parliament in 1960, the Communists were officially considered a public danger and a potential ‘fifth column’ of the Soviet Union. The Communists asserted that the United States was the main aggressor of the globe and drew heavily on the basic fear of a remilitarised Germany, especially during the negotiations regarding a common Danish-West German NATO command on the eve of the 1960s.¹⁷³ By May and June 1958, however, the Danish Communists’ focussed on France, displaying the political melt down as proof of the advancing crisis of ‘monopoly capitalism.’ Hans Kirk, a bestselling Danish author, pointed in his column of the Communist daily, *Land og Folk*, to the hollowness of legitimising NATO as the free and democratic world’s defence against Soviet aggression. The French case highlighted the proclivity of Western army officers to defend concentration camps, torture and colonial exploitation rather than democratic institutions. From this point of view, Hans Kirk urged his Danish readers to abandon the

¹⁶⁹ ABA-net SF: “Programudtalelse fra Socialistisk Folkeparti, vedtaget af SF’s 1. kongres 6. juni 1959.”

¹⁷⁰ Gert Petersen, “- hvor er fjenden?”, in *Dialog*, volume 8, no. 4, 1958, pp. 1-2: “Fascist-generalernes opmarch i Frankrig, det er fascismens utilslørede ansigt...”

¹⁷¹ Gert Petersen, “Europas svøbe”, in *Dialog*, volume 8, no. 8, 1958, p. 30. From late 1958, the socialist-intellectual magazine, *Dialog*, edited by Gert Petersen, launched a series of articles about France, targeting the positive expectations to de Gaulle’s regime allegedly held by the lion’s share of the Danish press! See Andreas Jørgensen, “Frankrig mellem folkeafstemningen og valget”, in *Dialog*, volumen 8, no. 7, 1958 and “Orientering: Reaktionens sejr ...”, in *Dialog*, volumen 8, no. 8, 1958.

¹⁷² Mogens Fog, “Mogens Fogs tale ved Dialog-festen”, in *Dialog*, volumen 8, no. 6, 1958, pp. 7-10: “... det kontinentale Europas stærkeste lande forenet i et bredt bælte af hel- og halvdiktatoriske, reaktionære stater fra Spanien over Frankrig til Vesttyskland.”

¹⁷³ Bent Jensen, *Bjørnen og haren. Sovjetunionen og Danmark 1945 – 1965* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1999).

pp. 248, 510-513; Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 588-592.

"bourgeois stereotype" of the capitalist West as the defender of democracy and the socialist East standing for dictatorship and repression.¹⁷⁴

Moreover, the Danish Communists used the French generals' political intervention as an occasion to warn against the Danish army's contemporary recommendations of increasing military expenditures. "Generals are dangerous" and they constitute a permanent threat to the popular democracy and the peace, the party paper argued in these months, with an address to the ongoing Danish negotiations about a new defence budget and stationing of NATO troops. The party paper brought a most biting leader on 31 May 1958:

In France as in Denmark, the people has been forced to contribute tremendous sums to armament and militarization, all justified with a reference to the necessity of defending the democratic way of life and protecting the inalienable democratic freedom rights, including the parliamentary democracy; the right to vote; and to have parties, government and opposition. In France, we are now witnessing that the officers, who have suffered one dishonourable defeat after the other in filthy colonial wars, openly and directly are turning their arms – including arms belonging to the Atlantic Alliance – against the very people that paid the construction of this military NATO apparatus with their sweat and personal losses.¹⁷⁵

On June 1, the Central Committee of the Danish Communists issued a declaration, deeply deploring that the French *Assemblée nationale* was giving in to the generals and 'fascist forces.' It also warned about reactionary circles dreaming about a 'Gaullist' development in Denmark – an issue the Communist leader Aksel Larsen brought up in Parliament.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Hans Kirk, "Kampen mod demokratiet" and "Skriften på væggen", in *Land og Folk*, 18 and 25 May 1958. In the summer issues of the Communist magazine, *Tiden*, Svend Johansen explained in some detail how the Gaullist inner circles were infiltrated by the fascist generals and colonialists, as well as agents from the metropolitan, grand-scale capital. The contacts between prominent Gaullists as Jacques Soustelle, Michel Debré and Chaban-Delmas and the French-Algerian insurgents were displayed as a proof of the fascist character of the new French state. Moreover, the direct presence of 'the monopoly capital' in de Gaulle's government was evident since de Gaulle's cabinet director, George Pompidou, and foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, were recruited among French bankers. Svend Johansen, "Frankrig under diktatur", in *Tiden*, volume 19, no. 5, August 1958, pp. 201 – 210.

¹⁷⁵ *Land og Folk*, "Militarismen - en stat i staten!", leader of 31 May 1958: "Man har i Frankrig som i Danmark tvunget folket til at betale umådelige summer til oprustning og militarisering, man har forklaret, at det var nødvendigt for at beskytte den demokratiske livsform og for at forsvare de umistelige demokratiske frihedsrettigheder, hvortil parlamentarisme, stemmeret, partier, regering og opposition hørte. Og nu ser man i Frankrig, at de samme officerer, som har lidt det ene æreløse nederlag efter det andet i de beskidte kolonikrige, åbent og direkte vender våbnene – derunder også Atlantpagtens våben – imod det folk, som har betalt med sved og afsavn for at bygge det samme NATO-militærvæsen op."

¹⁷⁶ *Land og Folk*, "Generaler er farlige", leading article of 16 May 1958; "Officers-ære", Hans Kirk's column, 1 June 1958; "Kampen mod fascismen i Frankrig angår os alle", a party declaration of June 1, published on 2 June 1958; "Fagre ord", leader of 5 June 1958; *Jyllands Posten*, "Dansk Parlamentarisme paa Vej ud i Karrikaturen?", 4 June 1958.

A conspicuous feature of the Communists' coverage of the French crisis was their rigorously dialectic approach. Before the regime change was completed, *Land og Folk* framed the possible outcome of the crisis as either a temporary victory of the fascist forces' or the final triumph of the popular, democratic forces, namely the working class. To illustrate, Hans Kirk, the Communist author mentioned above, wrote:

Yes, de Gaulle is a typical fascist. Even if he came to power without being a fascist, the dynamics of reality would force him to become one. His *entourage* is first of all the hundred families in France, next a confused, proletarianized petite bourgeoisie, precisely as in Hitler's Germany, and, lastly, a significant part of the French corps of officers.¹⁷⁷

For all their rhetorical skills, the Communists' ideological framework and political intransigence impeded an understanding of the ensuing course of events.

The Gaullist Republic Solidifies (1958-62)

There was a highly varying degree of receptivity to the changing profile of the Gaullist regime, as it re-established a constitutional framework and embarked upon a more liberal course regarding Algeria.¹⁷⁸ Gradually, most observers acknowledged the legitimacy of de Gaulle's political project. It is noteworthy, though, how quickly the NATO and EEC supporters on the Danish political scene grasped the favourable events in French politics that could justify a closer cooperation with France. An increasingly central actor such as the Social Democratic Minister for Foreign Economy, Jens Otto Krag, thus seems to have modified his view at a very early stage. Two weeks after the creation of de Gaulle's interim government, his former comparison with Franco's accession to power in Spain was gone. As he indicated in a diary note, "There is silence in France. De Gaulle seems to stand firm *against* the fascists."¹⁷⁹ Many NATO and EEC opponents, on the other hand, maintained the image of de Gaulle as an exponent of the French colonialists and fascist army groups.

The French diplomats in Copenhagen took some interest in public diplomacy in order to improve the image of de Gaulle. Immediately after the takeover, Ambassador Jean Bourdeil-

¹⁷⁷ Hans Kirk, "Skriften på væggen", in *Land og Folk*, 25 May 1958: "Jo, de Gaulle er en typisk fascist, og hvis han kom til magten uden at være det, ville tingenes dynamik tvinge ham til at blive det. Hans følge er først og fremmest de hundrede familier i Frankrig, dernæst et forvirret og proletariseret småborgerskab, akkurat som i Hitlers Tyskland, og endelig en betydelig del af det franske officerskorps."

¹⁷⁸ Referring to Reinhart Koselleck's receptive dimension of concepts, see "History of Concepts and Concepts of History", in Karl Acham (ed.), *Geschichte der österreichischen Humanwissenschaften* (Wien, 1999), pp. 4-5.

lette reported that France's prestige was increasing - after an absolute lowest point during the preceding governmental crisis. However, he anticipated that de Gaulle would suffer persistently from an unfavourable prejudice in Social Democratic, Radical Liberal and 'even' Liberal circles in Denmark - a circumstance he attributed to the Danes' attachment to "the parliamentary regime." Against this background, Ambassador Bourdeillette defined the Embassy's mission as follows:

Reassuring the political leaders and the public opinion in this country about the legal character and the democratic spirit of de Gaulle's government, as well as its intentions concerning NATO and the European collaborations - these are the undertakings to which this embassy will devote itself, to the best of its abilities, vis-à-vis the press and political circles. I must add that the upcoming development of the situation in Algeria might be decisive.¹⁸⁰

Christian Fouchet - a prominent Gaullist and minister under Mendès France and later under de Gaulle - took up this mission, as de Gaulle appointed him ambassador to Copenhagen from October 1958.¹⁸¹ Before leaving for Copenhagen, Christian Fouchet assured a Danish diplomat that de Gaulle had become a more mature and genuine statesman; he had given up his reserved manners that tended to drive President Roosevelt and General Eisenhower mad during World War II. De Gaulle was the greatest living Frenchman, according to the new French Ambassador. Regarding the insurrection in Algeria on May 13 that brought de Gaulle to power, Fouchet assured that "the General had had absolutely nothing to do with it [...] It came as a big surprise for him; afterwards he became entangled in the ensuing series of events."¹⁸² In the spring of 1959, Ambassador Fouchet arranged a conference about the Gaullist Republic in the *Institut français* in Copenhagen - a conference he assessed that the Danish press had received very well.¹⁸³ He followed up in an interview to the prominent

¹⁷⁹ ABA JOK, the Diary, book X, 18 June 1958: "I Frankrig er der stilhed. De Gaulle synes endnu at holde fascisterne [?] stangen..." Emphasis added.

¹⁸⁰ MAE AD EU, volume 72. Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 5 June 1958: "*Rassurer les dirigeants et l'opinion de ce pays sur le caractère légal et sur l'esprit démocratique du Gouvernement de GAULLE, ainsi que sur ses intentions à l'égard de l'OTAN et de la collaboration européenne, telle est la tâche à laquelle cette Ambassade s'emploie de son mieux auprès de la presse et des cercles politiques. J'ajoute que la prochaine évolution de la situation en Algérie pourrait être déterminante.*"

¹⁸¹ Jean Guillon, "D'une ambassade au gouvernement", in *Espoir*, no. 45, December 1983, pp. 32-33.

¹⁸² RA UM 123.D.1, box VIII: 'Notits', by Helge Wamberg, 9 September 1958, Paris: "... Generalen havde absolut intet med den at gøre... Det kom som en stor overraskelse for ham, og han blev derefter hvirvlet ind i, hvad der fulgte."

¹⁸³ Christian Fouchet, *La gaullisme et la IVème République : conférence prononcée le 10 mars 1959* (Copenhagen: Institut français, 1959); MAE AD, volume 62: "A.s. Faisons le point", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 15 April 1959.

Conservative daily, *Berlingske Tidende*, where he legitimised the Gaullist state construction by likening it to the presidential system of the United States.¹⁸⁴

The changing basis of power from a threat of civil war to the French electorate's overwhelming approval of the Gaullist enterprise was pivotal for the Republic's prestige. The constitution text, approved by 80 % of the votes cast in a referendum of 28 September 1958, juxtaposed, in principle, parliamentary guarantees and a Gaullist conception of the state's authority. In practice, however, de Gaulle had quite a free hand in implementing the constitution; he created what has been termed a 'semi-presidential regime.'¹⁸⁵

In Denmark, an opinion poll of December 1958 pointed to a high percentage of Copenhageners expressing increased respect for France after the approval of de Gaulle's constitution.¹⁸⁶ Ambassador Bourdeillette reported that the referendum had made a very favourable impression.¹⁸⁷ However, one of the features still noticed in the Danish press was that the French public was keeping passive, while the new government was carrying out the radical reforms. The Paris correspondent of the Conservative daily *Berlingske Tidende*, Flemming Madsen, warned that,

... the French population has been substituted by automats, short of any ability of reacting against political events [...] But the scary part of it is that the democracy in a country with these traditions can become discredited to the extent that nobody lifts a finger in defence of it.¹⁸⁸

The French political nonchalance and the dazzling effect of the whole de Gaulle myth about the 'national saviour' and 'wartime icon' thus astonished many Danish commentators.¹⁸⁹ A group of young left-wing activists even vandalised the front of the French Embassy in Central Copenhagen, painting "No to the Fascism", two days before the referendum on the Gaullist

¹⁸⁴ *Berlingske Tidende*, "de Gaulles Frankrig ikke blevet mindre demokratisk", Aage Deleuran's interview with Ambassador Fouchet, 3 Maj 1959.

¹⁸⁵ Pierre Avril, "De Gaulle interprète de la Constitution. Une paradoxale leçon de droit constitutionnel", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome II. La République* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 172-179; Serge Bernstein *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 227-237.

¹⁸⁶ Ugens Gallup, "Vestens syn på de Gaulles forfatning", no. 52, 3 December 1958. The respect for France had increased, according to the responses, for 61%, not changed for 13% and fallen for 11% whereas 15% answered 'don't know.'

¹⁸⁷ MAE AD EU, volume 72. Telegram from Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 30 September 1958.

¹⁸⁸ Flemming Madsen, "Franskfjendtlige kendsgerninger", feature article in *Berlingske Tidende*, 7 August 1958: "... den franske befolkning er blevet erstattet med automater, hvis evne til at reagere over for politiske begivenheder er annulleret... Men det uhyggelige er, at demokratiet i et land med disse traditioner kan komme i den grad i miskredit, at der ikke løftes en finger for at forsvare det."

¹⁸⁹ Commentators and politicians as Niels Alsing Andersen, Erling Bjøl, Mogens Fog. Articles ... *op.cit.*

constitution.¹⁹⁰ It was indeed an extreme reaction against de Gaulle's project, but even the Conservative Party still dissociated itself from Gaullism. After the French December election in 1958, the Conservative party magazine, *Vor Tid*, emphasised that Jacques Soustelle's Gaullist movement, *l'Union pour la Nouvelle République* (UNR), under no circumstances was 'Conservative' as understood in the Danish usage of the term.¹⁹¹

Central Danish politicians from the old democratic parties, however, acknowledged the importance of the new constitution for obtaining political stability. In a series of later interviews, four former Danish ministers have recalled their initial concern about the strong presidential powers of the Fifth Republic, and later the relief as the political stability eventually superseded the feverish power struggle.¹⁹² As de Gaulle announced the policy of Algerian self-determination in September 1959, and as disobeying army units staged a *coup* in Algeria and attempted to assassinate de Gaulle, it became increasingly implausible to maintain that de Gaulle and his government in Paris were remote controlled by fascist army groups and colonialists. It is noteworthy, however, that commentators acting in the political space barely put out fully enthusiastic comments on the regime change publicly, and especially not so candidates coming up for election. In October 1962, Foreign Minister Krag acknowledged in a letter to Ambassador Bartels, that a "Europe without a stable regime in France would be a worse Europe", but that sort of assertions were chiefly expressed in private conversations, correspondences and diaries.¹⁹³

The most outspoken example of the Danes' qualms about the Gaullist solution came in the Social Democrats' organ, *Aktuelt*, after the 'putsch of the generals' in April 1961 – an occasion where de Gaulle applied article 16 of 'his' constitution, endowing him with exceptional powers.¹⁹⁴ After de Gaulle's TV and radio speech on April 23, urging the French soldiers to disobey the rebellious officers in Algeria, the paper's front-page announced, "de Gaulle assumes dictatorial powers." In a leading article, the daily also asked, "Is de Gaulle 'our man'", giving the following answer:

¹⁹⁰ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Hærværk mod den franske ambassade", 27 September 1958; RA UM 4.U.72: "Notits", H. H. Schrøder, 27 September 1958.

¹⁹¹ Leading article in *Vor Tid*, "For de Gaulle, men ikke for Frankrig", volume 14, no. 13, 16 December 1958.

¹⁹² Interviews presented in Jakob Thomsen, "Le général de Gaulle vu par les hommes politiques danois", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Plon, 1992), p. 281. The former ministers interviewed are the Radical Liberal Helge Larsen (education); the Conservative Erik Ninn-Hansen (defence); the Social Democrats Ivar Nørgaard (economy) and Erling Olesen (housing).

¹⁹³ ABA JOK, box 4, file III (Bartels, E., ambassador). Letter from Jens Otto Krag to Bartels of Oktober 19, 1962: "Et Europa uden et stabilt regime i Frankrig, ville være et dårligere Europa." Also cited in Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 66.

¹⁹⁴ Serge Bernstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)) (2002), pp. 247, 256.

Irrespective of how often we have felt a dislike and aversion towards de Gaulle's arrogance and national overestimation, we are forced, today, to realise that he is 'our man'. It is paradoxical, yes even bitter to realise that a general with dictatorial powers now is the last hope for the democratic world. Bitter it is. It is the truth, however, about the situation in France, inflicted by the insane generals in Algiers.¹⁹⁵

In the independent daily *Information*, the crisis was characterised as the "most serious France had undergone since the outbreak of World War II." The paper's editor, Erik Seidenfaden, praised de Gaulle's resolute suppression of the revolt and reopened an old polemic with the Danish Communists:

At the rebellion the other day, it was only our own lunatics in the leftover, Communist party at [the Communist paper] *Land og Folk* who could write that there is no difference between de Gaulle and the generals Salan, Challe and associates.¹⁹⁶

Editor Seidenfaden was right in his diagnosis in the sense that even the new Socialist People's Party distinguished between Gaullism and fascism by now. The new left circles thus presented the generals' *putsch* in April 1961 as a showdown between "the fascist and terrorist dictatorship of the ultras" and "de Gaulle's authoritarian rule." After all, 'authoritarian' was a less discrediting category than 'a fascist dictatorship'.¹⁹⁷

Only the Communists maintained the original interpretation of the conflict. Still in early 1962, just as France was accepting Algeria's independence, the Danish Communists' leader, Ib Nørlund, classified the conflict between the Gaullists and the OAS as a dispute between factions of the monopolistic rulers' camp, namely a "quarrel between brothers. De Gaulle's regime is fully infiltrated by the ultras due to its rise and character."¹⁹⁸ In the Communist

¹⁹⁵ Leading article in *Aktuelt*, "Er de Gaulle 'vor mand'?", 25 April 1961: "Hvor ofte vi end har følt ubehag og modvilje med de Gaulles arrogance og nationale selvovervurdering, tvinges vi i dag til at erkende, at han er 'vor mand'. Det er paradoksalt, ja også bittert at skulle erkende, at den demokratiske verden i dag må sætte sit eneste håb til en general med diktatoriske fuldmagter. Det er bittert. Men det er sandheden om den situation, som de gale generaler i Algier har bragt Frankrig i."

¹⁹⁶ Erik Seidenfaden, "Frankrigs sejr", leading article in *Information*, 26 April 1961: "Det er kun vore egne forrykte i det kommunistiske resparti paa Land og Folk, der ved oprørets start forleden kunne skrive, at der ikke var nogen forskel paa de Gaulle og generalerne Salan, Challe og konsorter! Deres franske partifæller ved bedre."; No Name, "Frankrig paa krigsfod mod invasion fra Nordafrika", in *Information*, 24 April 1961.

¹⁹⁷ Kai Moltke, "Den dobbelte krise i Frankrigs gaullisme" in *SF*, 5 February 1960 and "De 4 generalers opstand mod Den 5. Republik", 28 April 1961.

¹⁹⁸ Ib Nørlund, "Ultra-fascismen – en reel fare", in *Tiden*, volumen 23, no. 2, 1962: "... den er en strid mellem brødre. De Gaulles regime er i kraft af sin opståen og karakter helt igennem infiltreret af ultra-folkene. Det er

universe, de Gaulle's fascist, or *Bonapartistic*, rescue of capitalism 'proved' that the tension between the 'objective' class forces were mounting internationally.¹⁹⁹ The argument had lost its trenchancy by 1962 - it only survived undisputed in esoteric Communist circles.

That said the idea that de Gaulle had some non-democratic inclinations survived throughout the 1960s. In 1965, a Gallup poll noted that only 14 per cent of the Danish respondents considered de Gaulle in favour of democracy, whereas 39 per cent believed he was against democracy, while 47 per cent could not express an opinion about his democratic standing. However, 54 per cent of the respondents believed that de Gaulle had made France stronger, while only 3 per cent considered France weaker now (43 per cent answered "don't know").²⁰⁰ In addition, in July 1964, the pro-Gaullist Danish Ambassador, Eyvind Bartels, reported:

It is a fact that the democratic dialogue has vanished more or less as a base of domestic and foreign policy making, in spite of the indisputable maintenance of the rights of freedom as in any Western democracy.²⁰¹

Bartels doubted whether a parliamentary democracy suited a strongly centralised country like France. De Gaulle had managed to play off one societal group against another, thus paving the way for an executive almost as strong as that of Napoleon's regime, he argued. De Gaulle had not allied himself with the police, the army or 'political suppression' as a dictator normally does, but he had satisfied the need of order and economic growth. Ambassador Bartels concluded that de Gaulle had taken advantage of the nation's enormous confidence in him, and "not to be forgotten - the Frenchmen's ingrained suspicion and aversion towards foreigners. He has finally appealed to the heroism of the French people and the French respect for [military] parades in a wide sense."²⁰² As we shall see in the epilogue, it took de Gaulle's voluntary resignation in 1969 to exorcise the suspicion that he harboured dictatorial inclinations.

det, som gør fascismen til så aktuel en fare i Frankrig."; Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 73-77.

¹⁹⁹ Svend Johansen, "Frankrig under diktatur", in *Tiden*, volumen 19, no. 5, August 1958, pp. 201 - 210.

²⁰⁰ Ugens Gallup, no. 47, December 1965.

²⁰¹ RA UM 123.D.1, box 13. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Gunnar Seidenfaden, head of the Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division, 15 July 1964: "Selv om ingen alvorligt kan bestride, at frihedsrettighederne i Frankrig i dag består som i et hvilket som helst andet vestligt demokrati, er det en kendsgerning, at den demokratiske dialog som grundlaget for fransk indenrigs- og udenrigspolitik mere eller mindre er forsvundet."

²⁰² *Ibid.*: "... - lad dette ikke blive glemt - franskmandens naturlige mistænksomhed og uvilje over for udlændinge. Endelig har han appelleret til heroismen i det franske folk og den franske respekt for paraden i ordets videste forstand."

For Danish politicians, it was hardly expedient to promote a positive image of Gaullism or appear as a pro-Gaullist. It is difficult to imagine a political fraction in Denmark as Chancellor Adenauer's 'Gaullists' in the Federal Republic. Symptomatically, the few actors in Denmark, who publicly embraced de Gaulle's 'liberal dictatorship', were not involved in party politics. Most had professional experiences as interpreters of French politics and close personal relations to France. Ambassador Bartels was thus a true insider of the Parisian elites. He argued that the consensus seeking, participatory democracy (*folkestyre*) was not necessarily the most efficient guardian of the celebrated *freedom* values, as the Danish national tradition assumed.²⁰³

Another prominent example of a 'Danish Gaullist' was the independent *Information's* foreign-policy editor, Erik Seidenfaden, who was a vigorous NATO supporter. He virtually argued that General Massu - one of the leaders of the revolt of May 13 - only became a conspirator as a protective measure when facing the growing anarchy. Despair had driven the French Army, not a fundamental, fascist or exploitative nature. He called General de Gaulle an "incarnation of integrity of thought and moral conduct", who might be able, finally, to overcome the French Revolution's division between 'right' and 'left'.²⁰⁴ "In this sense, Gaullism is more than a French phenomenon and more than a French need", he urged.²⁰⁵ Proposing to substitute the 'cooperating democracy', supposed to generate consensus from

²⁰³ Bartels, Eyvind, "Fællesmarkedet og kulturen", feature article in *Politiken*, 11 November 1961. "Dertil kommer, at det ikke kan betragtes som givet, at parlamentarismen - som vi jo sidestiller med politisk frihed - er den form for demokrati, som også i fremtiden vil være den levedygtige. Parlamentarismen er forbundet med liberalismen, og mon ikke dennes bedste tid er forbi? Thi liberalismen havde sit udspring i en bestemt epoke og i en bestemt økonomiske organisation" and Paul Raae's interview with Eyvind Bartels, "Om general de Gaulles strategi og taktik ... En ambassadør har ordet", in *Berlingske Tidende*, 25 March 1962 The author George Damborg argued in the same vein in "Frankrig under de Gaulle", in *Økonomi og politik*, volumen 35, no. 1, 1961, p. 25: "En flytning af 'decision making' fra den folkevalgte forsamling til regering og partiledelser er et generelt politisk fænomen... er vel mere i overensstemmelse med nutidens krav..."

²⁰⁴ Erik Seidenfaden, "Refleksioner over revolutionen i Frankrig: Generalen - Autoriteten - Demokratiet", a feature article paraphrasing Edmond Burke in *Information*, 7-8 June 1958: "... personificering af tankens og den moralske holdnings fuldstændige integritet." See also Gerhardt Eriksen, *Erik Seidenfaden, En biografi* (Spektrum, 2000), pp. 187, 194-195 and François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Éditions Gallimard, 1978), p. 11.

²⁰⁵ Erik Seidenfaden, "Refleksioner over revolutionen i Frankrig: Generalen - Autoriteten - Demokratiet", feature article in *Information*, June 7-8, 1958: "Gaullismen kan måske bedst bestemmes som en tværpolitisk bestræbelse for at løse denne konflikt, for at gengive regeringerne handlekraft, uanset hvilket handlingsprogram der i øvrigt måtte blive tale om. I denne mening er gaullismen mere end et fransk fænomen og mere end et fransk behov."

below, with the Gaullist alternative of endowing a strong, charismatic leader the powers to impose consensus from *above*, was indeed a provocative and rare denouncement of integral features of the Danish democracy. It was a position on the outskirts of national politics, and for the EEC opponents of the early 1960s, the Danish 'Gaullists' appeared as national traitors.

Whereas the leaders of the central pro-NATO parties in Denmark largely refrained from criticising de Gaulle publicly in the early summer of 1958, they frequently referred to the breakdown of democracy in the Fourth Republic. In Constitution Day speeches all over the country, they lectured that the French breakdown was associated with the lack of will to cooperate and to compromise in French politics. On the other hand, Social Democratic left-wing fractions, emerging new left circles and old school Communists commented very directly on de Gaulle's political reappearance. The utterly condemning language of the new left and the Communists about 'the fascist military dictator' obviously aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the Danish NATO membership.

Equally sharp comments were initially put out among Conservatives and in the independent daily, *Jyllands Posten*. However, the pro-NATO parties quickly noticed General de Gaulle's success at recreating order within the French army and his efforts of promoting political reforms within a constitutional framework. Danish politicians did by no means consider the watering down of the French parliament in the Fifth Republic in line with their political ideals. Reluctantly, though, they had to admit that de Gaulle was the French democracy's last chance in the face of the military *coup* attempt in April 1961.

In Professor Nye's 'soft power' perspective, we can ascertain that there were not many particles of delight or admiration in the Danish political parties concerning the Gaullist regime. Collaboration with Gaullist France was becoming relevant in virtue of France's position within the increasingly multilateral organisation of the Western world, as we shall see below. In Denmark, explicit references to the conflict-ridden political culture of a key ally, France, were used in semi-official propaganda for the 'cooperative democracy'. With de Gaulle back in office, however, France was regaining its political authority and unity, thus rendering it an interesting political partner.

Chapter 3 – Algerian Gangrene: Reactions of the Danish Government and Civil Society (1956-1962)

More than anything, the return of General de Gaulle as leader of the French Republic was linked to the Algerian War (1954-1962) and the severe disagreement about how to confront the major Algerian independence movement, *Front de libération nationale* (FLN), and its armed wing, *Armée de libération nationale* (ALN). The French-Algerian war rendered France a hot spot in the emerging North-South conflict, which became an additional challenge to the East-West confrontation of the Cold War. Whereas the breakdown of the French democracy in 1958 was a spot on NATO's image as the alliance of democratic powers in the confrontation with Soviet totalitarianism, the Algerian War became a liability to the post-colonial North-South relations in the making.

Initially, the Algerian War barely attracted the public attention in Denmark. There were no reactions comparable to the protests after the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.²⁰⁶ By the end of 1959, however, the Danish opposition towards the French warfare in Algeria became more vocal with the emergence of organised protest initiatives. Within the governing Social Democratic Party, moreover, the war became an object of an internal struggle, as particularly the critical youth organisations challenged the party leaders' policy of avoiding conflicts with the NATO partner, France. Some critical Social Democrats even drew a parallel between the French 'colonial policy' and the Soviet intervention in Hungary. However, the Danish movement against the Algerian War had a quite short lifetime, paradoxically blooming as de Gaulle finally embarked upon a policy of Algerian self-determination.

Although the French counter-insurgency campaign in Algeria was extraordinarily inconvenient for most of the Western allies, the Danish government largely witnessed the escalation of the war in silence. The successive French governments of the Fourth and the Fifth Republic threatened to leave NATO if the allies did not accept and support the French supremacy in

²⁰⁶ Morten Bendix Andersen, *Ungarnsopstanden 1956 i danskernes erindring: på sporet af nationale erindringsdannelse i Danmark 1948-1968* (Copenhagen: unpublished master thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2004) and "Fra frihedskamp til underholdningsshow: Ungarnshjælpens mange ansigter" in N.A. Sørensen and K. Petersen (eds.), *Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2004), pp. 115-132.

Algeria. France's claims were undeniably relevant, as the Algerian *départements* were included in the North Atlantic Treaty (article 6).²⁰⁷ The United States, though, was very reluctant to support France's military and *de facto* colonial engagements in North Africa, as the Eisenhower administration considered the French policy counterproductive to the aim of keeping North Africa free from Communism. The French government, on the other hand, maintained that the military campaign in Algeria was the Alliance's defence against Communism and Nasserism on Western Europe's southern flank.²⁰⁸ The controversy sharpened the French appetite for a reform of NATO that would take the overseas engagements of the main allies into consideration, and it contributed to the deepening of a serious Franco-American rift.²⁰⁹

Whatever the significance of the Alliance's 'Mediterranean flank', most Western observers deplored the weakening of NATO's conventional 'shield defence' in North-Western Europe: France had transferred 'earmarked' NATO troops from West Germany to Algeria on a grand-scale from 1956 and withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet from the NATO structures as of 1959. In addition, the crisis involved the risk of repelling the newly independent Afro-Asian countries from possible Western affiliations. In the West, the war provided pacifist and Communist NATO-critics an occasion for presenting the Alliance as an imperialistic club, tacitly supporting the heavy-handed French suppression of the rising Muslim population in Algeria.²¹⁰ However, the Danish government took a rather accommodating stance to France in the name of 'NATO solidarity.' Critical voices had to express their views through alternative channels.

A salient feature of the Danish involvement in the Algerian crisis is the high number of letters of protest to the French authorities, issued by various civil society associations. These groups obviously did not exert any direct influence or power, as typically understood in studies of international relations. The material from the French diplomatic archives, used in

²⁰⁷ The treaty text is accessible on www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm (seen 19 April 2006). Article 6.1 reads: "For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer".

²⁰⁸ Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003), p. 77; Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 119. In April 1961, the political-legal division of the Danish Foreign Ministry warned about this weakening of the Western shield defence: RA UM ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A. "Notat til brug ved udenrigsministerens rejse til Paris i april 1961. IV. Frankrigs militære stilling i NATO", by Torben Ronne, 12 April 1961.

²⁰⁹ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 9-32.

²¹⁰ On the French repression and use of torture against the Algerian independence movement/terrorists, see Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003).

the present analysis, gives, nevertheless, a glimpse of the French diplomats' embarrassment as letters of protest arrived and unfavourable leading articles appeared in the press, and they saw France's prestige falling into decay. Moreover, the increasingly unfavourable references to France boded ill for the French diplomacy's demand to the Danish government of keeping up a passive line in the UN debates about Algeria. The fact that the Danish protests typically were coordinated with relevant transnational umbrella organisations underscores the significance of the protest initiatives; they represented a national instantiation of a worldwide campaign.

During the Algerian War, the dynamics of the state system were indeed in the foreground. In order to understand the complexity of the crisis, however, there are reasons to look at a wider range of actors and structures. The protagonist was not even a state, but rather a *want-to-be* state promoted by the Algerian FLN. Next, the UN was highly important, not as an actor or an authority, but as one of the most prominent forums or battlefields for the formation of a world opinion. For that reason, France stubbornly opposed a UN treatment of the Algerian question. Based on the Danish case, I will particularly argue that the *transnational umbrella organisations* also played a critical role in the coordination of the actions of Western civil society organisations across national boundaries. The pertinence of the transnational umbrella organisations and the national, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) obviously differed from that of states in the sense that they could not impose direct legal or other sanctions on other actors. They mainly played a role in terms of setting the public agenda - an issue that is a main thread in the following analysis.

In the Danish context, there were obviously not the same direct interests and patriotic sentiments at play as those involving the entire France and the emerging Algerian nation.²¹¹ However, it was a deliberate strategy on both sides of the conflict to exploit the dreadful images and the receivers' anticipated feelings of resentment in the battle of international sympathy. The Algerian FLN thus recommended its worldwide network of sympathizers to accuse the French of genocide and to hint at NATO's indirect complicity.²¹² Correspondingly,

²¹¹ The French historian Guy Pervillé has analysed the sociology of political violence in the Algerian War, describing how both parts branded their enemy as 'evil' or 'inhumane', while excusing their own acts of violence as unfortunate human shortcomings, or as necessary means for a larger cause. The FLN-ALN thus justified the numerous cases of their *Mujahedins* killing and mutilating Algerians by categorising the victims as traitors and collaborators, who had betrayed the larger aim of throwing off the colonial yoke. On the French side, the army's outspread usage of torture was presented either as a 'lie', as a few unfortunate, but unavoidable exceptions, or as a necessary means - in the name of 'peace', 'order' or 'Western Civilization' - to prevent the Algerian 'rebels' from mutilating their peaceful compatriots. See Guy Pervillé, *Pour une histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962* (Paris: Picard, 2002), pp. 140-166.

²¹² As outlined in an open letter from the Algerian students' organisation, UGEMA (*l'Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens*) to students' and youth organisations, in Denmark published by Niels Eiler

the French Ministry of Defence recommended to provide photographic documentation of the FLN-ALN atrocities to the Western press and to promote an unfavourable image of the FLN 'rebels'.²¹³ In September 1957, to illustrate, the French Copenhagen Embassy complained directly to the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR), as a TV journalist had called the FLN "a national movement", "a resistance movement" and "partisans" – instead of "rebels" – in an item about Algeria.²¹⁴ In addition, Ambassador Fouchet threatened the Danish government with an 'extraordinarily sharp French reaction' in February 1962, if the DR showed a programme about "the inner French decay", portraying the "murders, cases of ill-treatment and deportations" in France and Algeria, as the programme news had announced.²¹⁵

For Danish NATO opponents, particularly those of the Socialist People's Party and the Communist Party, the French conduct in Algeria substantiated the argument that Denmark did not belong to the Atlantic Alliance. In Social Democratic and Radical Liberal circles, however, many hesitantly favoured the Alliance, while urging the Danish government to protest the French policies. In public, the government argued against disturbing France, as de Gaulle seemed to embark upon a liberal policy, although the demand of the Social Democratic and Radical Liberal base of supporters put the government under strain. Conservative and Liberal politicians regretted the weakening of NATO associated with the Algerian War, but they tended to oppose an idealistically based critique of France with a reference to the imperative of keeping the solidarity of NATO.

Danish Moderation and Sporadic Criticism (1956-58)

Before the come back of General de Gaulle, the successive Danish governments had obtained some credit in Paris for their accommodating position regarding France's colonial problems.

Andersen, "Hele verden i protest mod Frankrigs algerpolitik", in *Pacifisten*, volume 28, no. 12, December 1961, p. 136.

²¹³ MAE AD EU, volume 71. Cabinet Director A. Thomas, on behalf of the French Minister of Defence to the French Foreign Ministry, 20 April 1956. The occasion for the recommendation concerning the Danish Embassy was presumably Correspondent Bjøl's upcoming visit to Algeria and the expected anti-French 'propaganda' in Danish media.

²¹⁴ MAE AD EU, volume 71: "A.s. emission de la Télévision danoise sur l'Algérie". Chargé d'Affaires Jacques Grellet to the French Foreign Ministry, 10 September 1957. Grellet noted that Director General F. E. Jensen promised to question the journalist, John Danstrup, and broadcast a new and more 'objective' program on Algeria.

²¹⁵ Ambassador Fouchet warned that it would be very embarrassing if he had to report about this programme in his upcoming meeting with General de Gaulle. Previously, the Belgian Television had showed the documentary from Grenada TV, for which reason the Belgian government had received a 'sharp official French protest', according to Ambassador Fouchet. The Danish Foreign Ministry raised the subject with the Minister of Culture, Julius Bombholt, who finally rejected to intervene. On its side, the Danish Radio argued that its reworked version of the documentary was "significantly moderated compared to the original". See RA UM 120.D.82: "Notits", Per Frellesvig, 5 February 1962; *Politiken*, "Frankrigs ulyksalige Alger-krig", 1 February 1962; *Berlingske Tidende*, "Radio og Fjernsyn", 1 February 1962.

During France's war in Indochina against the rising Vietminh (1946-1954), the Danish government thus bracketed its traditional adherence to the 'principle of the peoples' right of self-determination' - a principle typically applied in cases of border disputes, but increasingly so in questions of decolonisation. NATO solidarity and maintenance of consensus among the allies had a higher priority than anti-colonial demonstrations. Concerning the independence struggle of the French protectorates Morocco and Tunisia, the Danish government had indicated in 1953 that it would support the protectorates' full right of self-determination, but it rejected, on the other hand, an Afro-Asian proposal of putting France's military interventions in Morocco on the agenda of the UN Security Council.²¹⁶ However, the Tunisian and Moroccan way towards independence did not attract the attention of the international society to the same extent as that of Algeria.

On 1 November 1954, in the wake of the landmark French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the ensuing retreat from Indochina, the Algerian independence movement heralded its political-military independence campaign by blowing up some official French buildings in Algeria. An important dimension of the FLN's independence strategy was to render the conflict an international matter to embarrass the French, particularly in the UN, and undermine the international society's acceptance of France's presence in Algeria. In addition, the Bandung Conference of 1955, where representatives of the non-aligned, Afro-Asian countries gathered, became a symbol of a new, Third World solidarity in international politics. Many of these countries had recently gained independence from their West European colonisers, and they were eager to bring the question of Algeria's status to the fore in the UN system, just as laid down in the FLN strategy.²¹⁷

From the outset of the crisis, the Danish government found apparently no reasons to disturb the French in the UN. From 1955 to 1958, the Danish UN delegation showed a considerable degree of understanding for the successive French governments, recognising the French sovereignty in Algeria and, consequently, that the UN had no right to intervene in the conflict. It was unthinkable that the Danish government should dispute the status of the Algerian

²¹⁶ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 700; Tom Sigurd Sørhus, *Mellomstandpunktet. Norsk utenriksledelses holdning i Algerie-konflikten 1954-1962* (Oslo: unpublished master thesis, University of Oslo, 1984), p. 75.

²¹⁷ Guy Pervillé, *Pour une histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962* (Paris: Picard, 2002), p. 124; Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 63; Marie Demker, *Sverige och Algeriets frigörelse 1954-1962. Kriget som förändrade svensk utrikespolitik* (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus Förlag, 1996), p. 16.

administrative units (*départments*) as genuine French state territory.²¹⁸ The status of Algeria differed from that of the neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco, as the latter 'only' were internationally recognised protectorates under French tutelage, until they gained full independence in 1956. Within NATO, on the contrary, the Danish and Norwegian delegations opposed a French 1956 proposal of recognising North Africa as "a safety factor for the alliance", thus justifying the French transfer of earmarked NATO troops from West Germany. After American pressure, however, the Danish government finally accepted a slightly revised resolution and lobbied its Norwegian counterpart to accept it as well.²¹⁹

The French government had taken great pains to convince the Western allies that the Algerian uprising did not come under *international* law, hence that the UN had no authority in this regard. It turned out to be rather sensible concerning the allies' reactions to the crisis, even when it came to minor utterances or acts, which did not pay adequate respect for the French sovereignty in Algeria. In February 1957, to illustrate, the French ambassador to Denmark, Jean Bourdeillette, expressed his disappointment with a Danish and common Nordic *abstention* at the vote in the UN Political Committee on a Japanese-Siamese resolution proposal that implied a certain role of the UN. Previously, France's Socialist Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, had urged the Danish government to be loyal to France on this issue.²²⁰ However, the French Foreign Ministry was also very attentive to the Scandinavian governments' sensitivity to changes in the public opinion. "We know that we can only count on their support if the public opinion of these countries is convinced about the good right of France", as H. Langlais of the French Foreign Ministry noted.²²¹

Some critical remarks came to the fore, internally, in the Danish UN delegation in 1956 and 1957. The Social Democrat Frode Jacobsen (MP) and his Radical Liberal colleagues, Hermod

²¹⁸ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 700-709; Anne Mette Grønberg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 47-50.

²¹⁹ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 702-705.

²²⁰ RA UM 123.K.3, box 3. "Note", by Nils Svenningsen, 15 February 1957; Marie Demker, *Sverige och Algeriets frigörelse 1954-1962. Kriget som förändrade svensk utrikespolitik* (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus Förlag, 1996), p. 77; Tom Sigurd Sørhus, *Mellomstandpunktet. Norsk utenriksledelses holdning i Algeriekonflikten 1954-1962* (Oslo: unpublished master thesis, University of Oslo, 1984), p. 42.

²²¹ MAE AD EU, volumen 71: "A/s Question algérienne", H. Langlais of the French Foreign Ministry's Political Division for Northern Europe, 20 April 1957: "[N]ous savons que nous ne pouvons compter sur leur appui que si l'opinion publique de ces pays est convaincue du bon droit de la France." In vain, the Ministry proposed to invite a delegation of Scandinavian politicians to Algeria to draw their attention to 'the remarkable progress that France had accomplished' and to 'the fatal and criminal acts of the rebels.' After a Norwegian and Swedish rejection of participating, the Predisident of the Danish Parliament declined as well, in spite of an initial positive indication of the Danish Foreign Ministry (MAE AD EU, volume 71. Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 17 June 1957.)

Lannung and Peter Veistrup (MPs) - all engaged in Third World issues - thus argued that it would be appropriate to put the Algerian question on the UN agenda and criticised the Danish UN instruction of avoiding support to any resolutions going against French interests.²²² These voices, however, were a minority, and they did not manage to set the public agenda or to challenge the Danish government's 'tolerant' line. In that respect, the initial Danish debate differed from that of Norway and Sweden, where the trade unions and the Social Democratic youth organisations raised the issue as early as 1957. Internally, the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvard Lange, justified the abovementioned abstention in the UN with a reference to the critical public opinion, whereas the involved Danish actors chiefly referred to the imperative of keeping the Nordic solidarity in the UN. In May 1957, the Norwegian Labour Party even urged the Socialist International to put the issue on the agenda on its upcoming conference in Vienna, where particularly the British, Norwegian, Irish and Swedish representatives criticized France.²²³ More importantly, a vocal public opinion regarding Algeria also emerged in the United States, partly due to an effective FLN campaign in New York (UN) and in Washington. On 1 July 1957, Senator John F. Kennedy made a remarkable speech, criticising the Republican administration for supporting France. To the French government's consternation, Senator Kennedy called for an American or a UN intervention in favour of a negotiated peace, based on Algerian autonomy or independence.²²⁴

In Denmark, anti-colonialist comments and manifestations found their way through a few alternative channels. The independent, pro-NATO daily *Information* was one of the earliest and most persistent critics of the French policy in North Africa. A look in the French diplomatic archives reveals the concern and embarrassment on the French side, caused by the articles published in *Information*. The daily's outstanding correspondent, Erling Bjøl, had by far the largest personal *dossier* in the French Copenhagen Embassy's files. He had built an unfavourable reputation after aiding a representative of the Moroccan independence movement, El Fassi, during his visit to Denmark in 1952. In May 1956, Ambassador Bourdeillette therefore warned the French Foreign Ministry against approving Bjøl's planned visit to Algeria and Morocco. Even 'objective' articles about Algeria from his hand could provoke

²²² Anne Mette Grønborg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 49.

²²³ MAE CADN RP ONU NY, box 39: "Pays scandinaves", the French UN delegation's papers, not dated but presumably from 1961; Tom Sigurd Sørhus, *Mellomstandpunktet. Norsk utenriksledelses holdning i Algeriekonflikten 1954-1962* (Oslo: unpublished master thesis, University of Oslo, 1984), pp. 42, 54-55; RA UM 123.K.3, box 3. "Note", by Nils Svenningsen, 15 February 1957.

²²⁴ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 80-86; Frédéric Bozo and Pierre Mélandri, "La France devant l'opinion américaine : le retour de de Gaulle début 1958 - printemps 1959", in *Relations internationales*, no. 58, summer 1989: 195-215.

unfortunate polemics regarding the French policies, as the ambassador noted, since the other newspapers largely had refrained from commenting on the Algerian problem so far.²²⁵

In March 1957, the Danish correspondent again attracted the attention of the French diplomats, after publishing an article about the "Gestapo methods" used in the Algerian War.²²⁶ Erling Bjøl had completed the visit to Algeria the previous year, and contributed with some accounts of the problems on both sides of the conflict, which the French actually recognised were rather balanced. Now, in March 1957 he turned the focus to the rising opposition in France proper against the army's methods, including torture, passing on the information from the critical French press. The editorial comments of *Le Monde*, Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber's eyewitness accounts in *L'Express* and the revealing letters of the former soldier Jean Muller, published in the leftwing, Catholic *Témoignage Chrétien*, thus found its way to a Danish audience.²²⁷ The office of the Resident Minister for Algeria (then under the hardliner Robert Lacoste) reacted subsequently in a letter to Bjøl, arguing that Communist forces in the Soviet Union and Cairo were orchestrating this 'anti-French' campaign, aided by some naïve 'professors of virtue', who had not objected to the Soviet intervention in Hungary. However, the Danish correspondent had strong anti-communist credentials, and the attempt to silence him was obviously in vain.²²⁸

Nevertheless, the French diplomats' accusations hinted at the impact of the inflamed debate climate upon the treatment of the Algerian question. In Denmark as elsewhere in the West, the Soviet military intervention in Hungary had undermined any wider understanding for the world communist movement. However, the increasingly marginalised Danish Communists attempted to draw the French 'imperialism' and the rough counter-insurgency measures into the picture, thus displacing the focus from the Soviet intervention. They attempted to draw the public attention the 'mass hypocrisy' of the Danish press, as it had supported the Hungarian uprising, while being silent on the French 'massacres' against the 'Algerian patriots' and the

²²⁵ MAE AD EU, volumen 71: "A/s: voyage éventuel en Algérie et au Maroc de M. BJØL, collaborateur d' 'Information.' ", Ambassador Jean Bourdeillette to the Foreign Ministry, 7 May 1956.

²²⁶ Erling Bjøl, "Fransk røre om Gestapo-metoder i Alger-krigen", in *Information*, 20 March 1957.

²²⁷ See Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003), pp. 219-226 regarding the increasing awareness in France about the stationed army's abuse of power from March 1957 and the contribution of Simon and Muller.

²²⁸ MAE CADN CPH, box 1. Letter of 10 May 1957 from Michel Gorlin, for the Resident Minister for Algeria, to Ambassador Bourdeillette in Denmark, attached the letter from the Cabinet services to Bjøl of 19 April 1957. Erling Bjøl mentions the episode in his *memoirs*: *Set i bakspejlet. Erindringer fra 30'erne, 40'erne & 50'erne* (Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1993), p. 205.

French-British-Israeli 'imperialistic' intervention in Suez.²²⁹ The Communist daily, *Land og Folk*, was apparently the only Danish paper that reported about a FLN delegation visiting Denmark on a publicity tour in February 1957 - a tour reported even in *Le Monde*.²³⁰

In fact, Ambassador Bourdeillette estimated that he personally had succeeded in dissuading the editors of the non-Communist dailies from reporting about the FLN emissaries in February 1957.²³¹ In an extensive dossier on the Danish press from the summer of 1957, the French Embassy staff praised in particular the two Conservative papers, *Berlingske Tidende* and *Dagens Nyheder*. The centre-left press was not considered directly hostile, but a declining reputation of France could be traced here.²³² As a countermeasure to the declining reputation and the upcoming arrival of a new FLN delegation to the Nordic countries, the French authorities arranged a visit in August 1957 of the Algerian Secretary of State Dr. Chérif Sid Cara - a prominent advocate of the French presence in Algeria. In May 1958, he became a co-president of the *Comité de salut public* of Algiers and the Sahara with General Massu, and he later supported the so-called Generals' Putsch of April 1961.

On the Nordic tour in 1957, Dr. Sid Cara was supposed to show a good example of a cultivated spirit and to provide a "precious testimony, emanating from an Algerian Muslim, a living example of what France has given Algeria."²³³ According to Ambassador Bourdeillette, Dr. Sid Cara impressed the chosen circle of Danish politicians, civil servants and journalists with his life story, personifying the virtues of the French *oeuvre*:

²²⁹ ABA AIC, box 47, file 'Kommunister diverse.' Leaflet of the Danish Communist Party (Nørrebro), "Kender De Kommunisterne stilling til disse spørgsmål?", from early 1957; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokopdelings tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 362.

²³⁰ That is what Ambassador Bourdeillette concluded, MAE AD EU, volumen 71. "A.s. Passage au Danemark de deux émissaires du F.L.N.", Ambassador Bourdeillette's report to the French Foreign Ministry of 6 February 1957. He refers that *Le Monde* reported about the FLN emissary M. Khiouane's preceding visit to Stockholm and Oslo in *Le Monde*, 26 and 31 January and 3 and 4 February 1957.

²³¹ MAE AD EU, volumen 71. "A.s. Passage au Danemark de deux émissaires du F.L.N.", Ambassador Bourdeillette's report to the French Foreign Ministry of 6 February 1957.

²³² MAE AD EU, volume 71, "Principales personnalités rencontrées par M. le Docteur SID CARA à l'Ambassade (déjeuner et dîner du vendredi 30 août 1957)", 2 September 1957. *Berlingske Tidende*: "... s'est toujours montré compréhensif à notre égard. *Dagens Nyheder*: Ce journal a toujours été l'organe danois le plus favorable à la France. *Politiken* (Radical Liberal): "... sans être hostile à la France, a adopté en ce qui concerne la question d'Algérie une attitude nuancée mais non exempte de critiques, qui s'explique par les tendances bien connues du parti radical." *Socialdemokraten* (Social Democratic): "M. Hvidtfeldt est un excellent journaliste, qui fait autorité. Il n'a jamais attaqué la France pour laquelle il a des sympathies personnelles. Mais la position de son parti l'a mené à prendre à l'égard de notre politique en Afrique du Nord une attitude réservée et quelquefois critique."

²³³ *Documents Diplomatique Français* (DDF), 1957, tome II, doc. 161: "M. Bourdeillette, Ambassadeur de France à Copenhague, à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. Copenhague, 5 septembre 1957" ...

In that way, he threw light on the assimilatory efforts that France already has accomplished: has he – a person with a simple background – not been able to climb the social and even the political hierarchies under the French regime, exclusively thanks to his own efforts?²³⁴

For the French representatives, France's *civilising mission* still legitimised the presence in Algeria. It was considered a 'soft power' resource in other words. To his Danish interlocutors, Dr. Sid Cara thus took great pains to explain the constructive and social dimensions of the contemporary Bourguès-Maunoury government's proposed framework law for Algeria. He contrasted it with the disastrous scenario of the FLN seizing power on a non-democratic, Communist base – a situation he warned would lead to a dramatic decline in NATO's credibility worldwide.²³⁵ Subsequently, the French officials reported about favourable results of Dr. Sid Cara's visit to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, though the impression was somewhat blurred in the Norwegian and Swedish cases: the Foreign Ministries had received the competing FLN delegation in these countries.²³⁶ However, the French diplomats largely trusted the Danish politicians and particularly their interlocutors in the Danish Foreign Ministry. The file on the Ministry's director, Nils Svenningsen, thus reads: "It is a very sincere and a very good friend of France with whom the embassy has close and friendly relations. We can count on him!"²³⁷

In November 1957, a critical indication of the decreasing acceptance of the French policies came in the leading articles of the Conservative daily, *Berlingske Tidende* – so far loyal to

"témoignage précieux émanant d'un musulman algérien, exemple vivant de ce que la France a donné à l'Algérie."

²³⁴ DDF, ... op cit: "C'est ainsi qu'il a mis en lumière l'effort d'assimilation déjà accompli par la France: sorti d'une famille modeste, n'a-t-il pas pu lui-même franchir, sous le régime français, grâce uniquement à son travail, les échelons de la hiérarchie sociale et même politique?"

²³⁵ DDF, ... op.cit. Bourdillet's list of arguments for the Danes: *collusion du F.L.N. et du communisme, aide étrangère à la rebellion, impossibilité de négocier avec des éléments qui ne représentent pas, au sens démocratique du mot, la population, danger que constituerait pour l'O.T.A.N., pour les populations musulmanes et européennes, ainsi que pour la paix elle-même, l'avènement de l'indépendance algérienne.*

²³⁶ MAE CADN RP ONU NY, box 39: "Pays scandinaves", the French UN delegation's papers, not dated but presumably from 1961.

²³⁷ MAE AD EU, volume 71, "Principales personnalités rencontrées par M. le Docteur SID CARA à l'Ambassade (déjeuner et dîner du vendredi 30 août 1957)", 2 September 1957: "C'est un très sincère et très grand amis de la France qui entretient avec l'Ambassade d'étroites et amicales relations. – Nous pouvons compter sur lui." Regarding the head of the Danish Foreign Ministry's Political Division, Aage Hesselund-Jensen, the French Embassy noted: "A parfaitement compris les données du problème algérien et se montre très désireux de nous aider. Il est d'ailleurs comme ses deux subordonnés [J. Knox & Troels Oldenburg] un ami sincère de la France." The Social Democratic leader of Denmark's UN delegation, Ernst Christiansen: "... s'est toujours montré fort bien disposé à notre égard. Il a pour notre pays des sentiments d'attachement qui lui font désirer sincèrement de ne pas accroître nos difficultés." Concerning the leader of the Danish Justice Party and minister without portfolio, Viggo Starcke, it noted: "A toujours manifesté des sentiments de sympathie pour la France. A notamment montré sa compréhension à l'égard de nos problèmes en Afrique du Nord. La composition du Cabinet actuel lui permet d'exercer une influence qui n'est pas négligeable."

France – as it blamed the French war in Algeria for undermining the credibility of NATO.²³⁸ The decline of the French position was particularly related to the internal French debate about abuse of power, a problem the *Assemblée nationale* openly confronted on 12 November 1957. The increasing awareness in France about the cases of torture was, among other things, the result of the eyewitness accounts published in the critical press, particularly in the magazine *L'Express* and the daily *Le Monde*.²³⁹ In Copenhagen, Ambassador Bourdeillette estimated that the writings of *Le Monde* and *L'Express* had a major share of responsibility for the increasingly anti-colonial position of the Danish press.²⁴⁰ The situation was awkward for the Danish government, as it still tended to portray France publicly as an ally championing Western values, also in Algeria. In January 1958, Prime and Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen thus stated in Parliament that the new Felix Gaillard government's framework law on autonomy and democracy in Algeria might give hopes for a solution serving the Algerian people as well as French interests.²⁴¹ From Ambassador Bourdeillette's point of view, it was therefore justified to call Prime and Foreign Minister Hansen a partisan of 'moderation' and 'realism' in the Algerian question compared to his Scandinavian counterparts – an early sign of the Danish rapprochement policy vis-à-vis France. However, the French suspected that Hans Christian Hansen personally sympathised with the liberal visions of the Radical Pierre Méndes France – the French prime minister, who had sanctioned the independence of Indochina in 1954.²⁴²

On 8 February 1958, the French air force gave in effect the kiss of death to the remains of Western understanding for the Fourth Republic's *oeuvre* in Algeria, as it carpet bombed the village Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, located on the Tunisian side of the border, killing around 70 civilians, while hunting Algerian insurgents.²⁴³ The expedition was condemned internationally, and it undermined the original French argument that the UN had no right to intervene in a purely French matter. It also eroded the last remains of trust in the Fourth Republic's ability

²³⁸ Anne Mette Grønberg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 50. The article refers to the leader in *Berlingske Tidende* on 16 November 1957.

²³⁹ Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003), pp. 187-190, 219-226; Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 81.

²⁴⁰ DDF, 1957, tome II. Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 5 September 1957.

²⁴¹ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1957-58: "Forespørgsel til stats- og udenrigsministeren, 21./1.-58", columns 1924-1925.

²⁴² DDF, 1957, tome II, doc. 161: "M. Bourdeillette, Ambassadeur de France à Copenhague, à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. Copenhague, 5 septembre 1957" and MAE AD EU, volume 71. "Personnalités avec lesquelles M. le Docteur SID CARA s'est entretenu au Palais de Christiansborg", 2 September 1957.

to control its administration and army stationed in Algeria and prompted particularly the United States to consider the pros and cons of the Gaullist alternative. On February 11, Ambassador Bourdeillette reported about a general Danish condemnation of the French bombardment and violation of international law, and about the lonely position of France: "*Aucune voix ne s'élève pour nous défendre ou nous excuser.*" The affair provoked an examination of conscience in Denmark, questioning the legitimacy of the French presence in Algeria, the ambassador noted.²⁴⁴

There were profound concerns in government circles, but the Danish politicians kept a low profile in public. In a conversation with Ambassador Bourdeillette in April 1958, however, Prime and Foreign Minister Hansen deplored that the French-Algerian crisis imperilled the success of the upcoming NATO Council Meeting in Copenhagen. Even "the future of NATO" was at stake, the Danish head of government warned, as the Franco-American rift was deepening. More than ever, he urged, France needed the determination and imagination to resolve the Algerian problem in keeping with French as well as the Western world's overall interests. Loyal NATO supporters across the political spectrum could not ignore the political meltdown of a leading ally. Moreover, the French Copenhagen Ambassador reported that political circles in Denmark seemed to ventilate the idea of a coordinated NATO initiative regarding the French collapse - contrary to the initial position of avoiding any NATO involvement at all.²⁴⁵ On the cabinet meeting of 20 May 1958, however, Prime and Foreign Minister Hansen noted that he had abandoned the idea of endorsing a NATO declaration of support to the crumbling Pflimlin government, because it would appear as a declaration of solidarity with the French policy on Algeria.²⁴⁶

De Gaulle and Algeria: Official Danish Reactions (1958-62)

When de Gaulle took office in June 1958, the prestige of his regime - in France and abroad - was extraordinarily dependent upon its ability to cure the Algerian 'gangrene', as a critical 1959 book tellingly coined the conflict.²⁴⁷ The legitimacy of the regime's extensive powers rested on its ability to re-establish order and the state's authority among the Algerian Muslim nationalists, the Europeans residing in Algeria and the stationed French officers, by now

²⁴³ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 60-61; Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Pion, 2003), p. 211.

²⁴⁴ MAE AD EU, volume 71. Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 11 and 25 February 1958.

²⁴⁵ MAE AD EU, volume 72. Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 22 April 1958.

²⁴⁶ RA Cabinet Meetings, 20 May 1958.

commanding almost half a million soldiers.²⁴⁸ Initially, it seemed clearly that General de Gaulle aimed at maintaining the French presence in Algeria by improving the relations with the Muslim Algerian society within a new French Community, as laid down in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. On Algerian soil in the city of Oran, General de Gaulle proclaimed victoriously in early June 1958: “Yes, yes, yes! France will stay here forever! She is here with her millenarian vocation, which can be expressed in three words today: ‘Freedom, equality, fraternity.’”²⁴⁹ In October in the Algerian city Constantine, moreover, de Gaulle announced a vast economic and social reform plan for Algeria, which was received as a blueprint for reviving a French Algeria, economically integrated with the French Republic.²⁵⁰ The admission of Jacques Soustelle and Michel Debré – some of the most notorious champions of the *Algérie française* programme – into the government’s inner circle appeared as a clear indication that the emerging Gaullist Republic would *not* abandon Algeria. There was still a ‘colonial consensus’ in the *Assemblée nationale*, and de Gaulle was, after all, the man brought to power in virtue of the insurrection in Algeria of May 13. He proclaimed the emblematic “*Je vous ai compris*” to the crowd in Algiers on 4 June 1958.²⁵¹ De Gaulle’s proposal in September 1958 of creating a political-strategic NATO ‘triumvirate’ with a Franco-British-American nucleus, underpinned this interpretation, as it featured an expansion of NATO’s geographical scope, rendering France’s North African policies a common matter upon which it could claim NATO’s support.²⁵² In 1958, the more radical solution of ‘amputating’ Algeria from France did not seem to be a likely outcome.

Nonetheless, de Gaulle also put out some liberal indications, foreseeing a transformation of ‘the colonial dominance’ into a relationship based on formal autonomy, association and the creation of an Algerian ‘personality’, as he called it in his Constantine speech of October 1958. A central question was, therefore, which course the new regime was going to steer.²⁵³ De Gaulle’s landmark acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination on a press conference of 16 September 1959 and the beginning of ceasefire negotiations appears as

²⁴⁷ Jérôme Lindon (*et. al.*), *La gangrène* (Paris: les Éditions de Minuit, 1959).

²⁴⁸ Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 244-263.

²⁴⁹ Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003), p. 243: “Oui, oui, oui ! La France est ici pour toujours ! Elle est ici avec sa vocation millénaire qui s’exprime aujourd’hui en trois mots : ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité.’”

²⁵⁰ Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages. Tome III. Avec le renouveau. Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962* (Librairie Plon, 1970), pp. 48-51.

²⁵¹ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 61.

²⁵² This is one of the basic arguments in Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 157-191.

responses to a deadlocked situation, aggravated by the mounting international condemnation and the breakdown of the 'colonial consensus' in metropolitan France. It seems that there was not a grandiose master plan for Algerian independence at hand in 1958, even though de Gaulle probably had realised by then that French colonialism in its traditional form was in its last phase, as the French historian, Guy Pervillé, has argued.²⁵⁴ However, the issue is still contested within the historiography. The American history professor, Irwin M. Wall, thus argues in favour of reconsidering the traditional memory of General de Gaulle as the visionary statesman, who anticipated the inevitable decolonisation. Professor Wall emphasises that de Gaulle consistently attempted to maintain control over Algeria, as he insisted on negotiating a peace on French terms; escalated the fight against the FLN-ALN (the Challe Plan); and employed social policy instruments on a large scale (the Constantine Plan).²⁵⁵

The comments of contemporary Danish observers illustrate well the widespread uncertainty about de Gaulle's line. The independent right-wing daily, *Jyllands Posten*, was among the keenest sceptics concerning de Gaulle's agenda. In a leading article of May 1958, it estimated that de Gaulle's upcoming investiture would be equal to a fatal continuation of a hopeless war, paving the way for racial segregation in Algeria; France's expulsion from the Western community; and electoral gains for the Communists.²⁵⁶ Others, like the editors of the independent *Information* and the Radical Liberal *Politiken*, were more optimistic about de Gaulle's possibility of re-establishing the national authority and ending the Algerian war. At the same time, though, they realised that de Gaulle's ability to stand up against the officers in Algeria constituted a main element of uncertainty; the Western community faced an open-ended scenario concerning the French-Algerian conflict.²⁵⁷ Even the prominent pacifist leader, Kate Fleron – an ardent anti-Gaullist – acknowledged the paradox that there was no reliable knowledge available about the old war hero's program for Algeria.²⁵⁸

The information concerning Algeria obtained directly from French government circles was ambiguous as well. In September, France's incoming Copenhagen Ambassador and former

²⁵³ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 60-63; Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 244-248.

²⁵⁴ Guy Pervillé, *Pour une histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962* (Paris: Picard, 2002), pp. 184-190.

²⁵⁵ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), particular the chapter "De Gaulle Reconsidered", pp. 192-228.

²⁵⁶ *Jyllands Posten*, "Frankrigs Tragedie", leading article of 17 May 1958.

²⁵⁷ Erik Seidenfaden's leading articles in *Information*, "Frankrigs eksplosion", 14 May 1958, "Hvorfor de Gaulle", 20 May 1958, "Ved de Gaulle's tiltræden", 31 May-1 June 1958, "Generalen – Autoriteten – Demokratiet", 7-8 June 1958; *Politiken*, "Forfatning og demokrati", leading article of 5 Juni 1958.

²⁵⁸ Kate Fleron's leader in *Frit Danmark*, "Frankrigs tragedie", volume 17, no. 3, June 1958: 1-2.

Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, Christian Fouchet, thus explained that he did not know about any master plan for Algeria. He suggested that,

... Algeria might well be independent in 15 or 20 years from now. In political terms, it is correct to say that Algeria is a French province, but it is obviously wrong in a geographical and ethnical sense. The city of Algiers is French, but the countryside is Arabic.²⁵⁹

Not surprisingly, the Danish Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division maintained that de Gaulle's Algerian policies were un-clarified yet.²⁶⁰ Whatever de Gaulle's policies were aiming at initially, the official France insisted strongly that the participation in the Atlantic Alliance implied an obligation to support France unconditionally. On several occasions, Minister of Justice and later Prime Minister Michel Debré implied that France might reconsider its affiliation to the alliance if the partners did not support the French cause.²⁶¹ That was one of the main sources to the Western governments' cautious policies.

In addition, there were concerns that a direct confrontation regarding the Algerian question in the UN would repel France from the world organisation, thus further undermining its credibility as a conflict-solving organ.²⁶² De Gaulle vigorously maintained that the UN had no right whatsoever to intervene in the Algerian crisis, even after announcing the self-determination programme for Algeria in September 1959. Showing solidarity with France meant largely to comply with the French view in the UN Assembly, where even the vote of the small member states could be critical. As the five Nordic countries went quite far in coordinating their UN policies, a moderating Danish influence might tip the Nordic position to France's advantage. However, the Danish UN delegation was instructed to follow Norway and Sweden if it was not possible to find a 'moderate' common approach.²⁶³

During the thirteenth UN General Assembly in late 1958, the Danish government still adhered to the accommodating line. A report prepared by the Danish Foreign Ministry for the

²⁵⁹ RA UM 123.D.1, box 8: "Notits", by Helge Wamberg, 9 September 1958. Fouchet's statement, according to Wamberg's minutes: "... det er jo muligt, at Algier om 15 eller 20 år bliver uafhængigt. Når det siges, at Algier er en fransk provins, er det politisk rigtigt, men geografisk og folkeligt selvfølgelig forkert."

²⁶⁰ RA UM 123.K.3, box 1. "Udkast til instruktion for den danske delegation til FN's 13. plenarforsamling. Ad dagsordenens punkt 65: Algier-spørgsmålet", by Torben Jantzen, 14 August 1958.

²⁶¹ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 66. Correspondent Erling Bjøl informed the readers of the Danish foreign-policy magazine, *Fremtiden*, about Prime Minister Debré's threats: "Den algierske koldbrand", volume 21, no. 6, 1959: 22-25.

²⁶² It seems that the Norwegian government was particularly attentive to that problem. See Tom Sigurd Sørhus, *Mellomstandpunktet. Norsk utenriksledelses holdning i Algerie-konflikten 1954-1962* (Oslo: unpublished master thesis, University of Oslo, 1984), pp. 19-38.

Danish UN delegation reminded of France's status as a NATO ally, which required cautiousness regarding possible UN proposals or measures conflicting with French interests.²⁶⁴ On a meeting with the Nordic foreign ministers in September 1958, Prime and Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen argued against causing any trouble for the French government with an extensive UN debate and for postponing it, if possible, until de Gaulle had defined his policies.²⁶⁵ On the UN General Assembly in December 1958, the Danish delegation therefore abstained from an Afro-Asian proposal regarding Algerian independence.²⁶⁶ The Danish government hardly commented on the issue, and some of the Social Democratic party leaders opposed virtually to debate the question in public.²⁶⁷ As the other Western states, Denmark refrained from recognising Ferhat Abbas' Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) proclaimed on 19 September 1958 in Nasser's Cairo. Fifteen countries did recognise the GPRA, predominantly so members of the Arabic League and some Communist Asian states.²⁶⁸

In August 1958, a Danish-French controversy arose, nevertheless, as Denmark's Social Minister, Julius Bomholt (Social Democrat), received a pro-Algerian delegation, which consisted of diplomats from the newly independent countries Ghana, Morocco and Sudan. The delegation was an offshoot of the so-called Accra Conference held in Ghana's capital in April 1958, where the eight participating African countries had reasserted the Algerians' right of self-determination and demanded a French retreat from Algeria.²⁶⁹ The Gaullist interim-government requested that Denmark and other Western states should refrain from receiving or assisting the emissaries officially, as the initiative allegedly was contrary to international law

²⁶³ RA Cabinet Meetings, 4 December 1959; Anne Mette Grønborg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 51.

²⁶⁴ RA UM 123.K.3, box 1. "Udkast til instruktion for den danske delegation til FN's 13 plenarforsamling. Ad dagsordenens punkt 65: Algier-spørgsmålet", by Torben Jantzen, 14 August 1958.

²⁶⁵ RA UM 123.K.3.a, box 5: "Notat", 10 September 1958; Marie Demker, *Sverige och Algeriets frigörelse 1954-1962. Kriget som förändrade svensk utrikespolitik* (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus Förlag, 1996), p. 77; Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 707.

²⁶⁶ *Folketingstidende: Betænkninger 1958-59, tillæg B*. Columns 548-552.

²⁶⁷ According to the critical Social Democratic youth leader, Henning Kjeldgaard, it counts especially for the Social Democratic vice-chairman and president of The Socialist International from 1957 to 1962, Alsing Andersen, and his son Niels Alsing Andersen, Henning Kjeldgaard, *I Skyggen af den kolde krig* (Gedved: Eigil Holms Forlag, 2002), pp. 42-44; Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 707.

²⁶⁸ Anne Mette Grønborg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 50-51; Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 61-62. The states recognising the GPRA were the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia and Indonesia.

and would become a practical obstacle to France's sincere efforts of finding a pacific solution.²⁷⁰ Even so, the Danish government accepted a meeting with Social Minister Bomholt - to the pronounced regret of the French Ambassador.²⁷¹ The French diplomacy was indeed interested in avoiding any moral support to the Africans' pro-Algerian activities as well as the rise of a pro-Algerian public awareness in Denmark that could spur a more critical Danish position in the UN and NATO. However, the Danish officials seemed to respond to Moroccan delegation leader Abderrahman Ben Abdelali's threat that a Danish rejection of receiving the African emissaries on cabinet level would severely damage Denmark's reputation in the eight African states of the Accra Conference.²⁷²

For all the Danish government had done so far for downplaying the criticism of France's Algeria policies, it was less willing to counter the challenge that the press, some parties and various organisations posed by the summer of 1959.²⁷³ In a conversation with Ambassador Fouchet in August 1959, Foreign Minister Krag alluded to the incoherence of France insisting that the UN had no authority in the Algerian question, while calling for NATO assistance at the same time. Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen underlined that a treatment of the Algerian crisis in the UN was becoming unavoidable.²⁷⁴ At the UN debate in December 1959, the Danish delegation nevertheless took up a position that was subsequently criticised; the delegation voted for the *parts* of the Afro-Asian proposal that recognised the principle of self-determination, but opposed or abstained from voting on other paragraphs that were controversial for France. Ambassador Fouchet had previously contended that,

²⁶⁹ Namely Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Libya and Sudan.

²⁷⁰ RA UM 123.K.3.a, box 5. Letter from Ambassador Bourdeillette to General Secretary Svenningsen of 12 June 1958, attached a French memorandum on the approaching African delegation.

²⁷¹ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 1. "Notits til Ass.afdelingschef, dr. Schram-Nielsen", by M Melchior, 16 June 1958 and 123.K.3.a, box 5: "Notat", 10 September 1958; DDF, 1958, tome II, doc. 172: "Note de la sous-direction des Nations Unies et des relations internationales. Mission de la conférence d'Accra dans les pays nordiques et en Irlande. Paris, 18 septembre 1958"; Marie Demker, *Sverige och Algeriets frigörelse 1954-1962. Kriget som förändrade svensk utrikespolitik* (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus Förlag, 1996), pp. 84-85.

²⁷² RA UM 123.K.3.a, box 5: "Referat af møde i udenrigsministeriet torsdag den 28. august 1958 kl. 16.00", Sigurd Christensen, 28 August 1958, continued by M. Melchior 29 August 1958 and "Referat", Torben Jantzen, 29 August 1958.

²⁷³ A Foreign Ministry memo of December 1959 thus concluded that the Danish government by now was willing to permit humanitarian collections to Algerian refugees, in spite of French protests, whenever there was a public pressure for doing so. (RA UM 123.K.3.c. "Referat. Oprettelse af en 'Dansk Algierkomité'", approved by Foreign Minister Krag on 8 December 1959).

²⁷⁴ MAE AD EU, volume 72: "A.s. Conversations avec le Premier Ministre et avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au sujet de l'Algérie", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 21 August 1959.

... France had the right to expect a complete understanding and an efficient support from her friends and allies. To that end, the UN assembly coming up in a few weeks would provide an occasion.²⁷⁵

Moreover, he informed the Danish government that France would consider it an 'unfriendly' act - a rather strong diplomatic formula - if the Danish delegation supported resolutions inconsistent with the principles outlined by de Gaulle. In particular, as Ambassador Fouchet pointed out, allusions to talks between the two parties concerned were not acceptable to France, as it implicitly would recognise the status of the GPRA as an embryonic government.²⁷⁶

The principles that Ambassador Fouchet mentioned referred to de Gaulle's solemn announcement in his press conference of 16 September 1959. De Gaulle declared that the day was approaching, thanks to France's developing measures and pacifying efforts, where the Algerians should have a choice between a complete *secession* from France, a full *integration* into the French Republic, and a somewhat looser *association* with France. De Gaulle indicated that he favoured the latter formula, association. Importantly, France was determined to settle the affair directly with the 'Algerian people', not with the FLN and the GPRA, which the French government still considered illegitimate, terrorist and totalitarian. De Gaulle also required a four-year period of ceasefire, defined as maximum 200 yearly murders, before arranging a referendum on independence. The offer did not include the Algerian part of the Sahara - a vast territory rich in oil, which was chosen for France's pivotal nuclear tests programme.²⁷⁷ Quite a few observers therefore received de Gaulle's self-determination offer with some suspicion or reservation - even some of the rare 'Gaullists' in Denmark.²⁷⁸

Foreign Minister Krag defended publicly Denmark's cautious UN line with a reference to the Gaullist Republic's serious engagement in the peace process. His argument was that a 'problem solving approach' would be more efficient than the Afro-Asian countries' vocifer-

²⁷⁵ MAE ADEU, volume 72: "A.s. Conversations avec le Premier Ministre et avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au sujet de l'Algérie", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 21 August 1959: "... *la France était en droit d'attendre de ses amis et de ses alliés la compréhension la plus entière et un soutien efficace ; que la prochaine réunion de l'O.N.U., dans quelques semaines, en fournirait une occasion.*"

²⁷⁶ MAE CADN CP11, box 1. Memorandum from Ambassador Fouchet to General Secretary Nils Svenningsen, 5 December 1959.

²⁷⁷ Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages. Tome III. Avec le renouveau. Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962* (Librairie Plon, 1970), pp. 117-123.

²⁷⁸ Erik Seidenfaden, "Algier", leading article in *Information* of 5-6 November 1960. Seidenfaden – the pro-Gaullist editor – thus questioned the prudence of excluding negotiations with the FLN. Simultaneously, he acknowledged that the price for a peace might be the relocation of a million European North Africans and the establishment of a totalitarian regime in Algeria.

ous attacks on France, as they eroded the basis for a compromise.²⁷⁹ However, the Danish Foreign Ministry's notes from early 1960 hint to a profound pessimism regarding the possibility of implementing the self-determination principle, as the French insisted on a previous surrender of the FLN, and demanded that the French army, rather than UN monitors, should supervise the planned referendum.²⁸⁰ In 1960 and 1961, the Danish UN delegation eventually voted in favour of the non-allied countries' proposals regarding the Algerians' right to self-determination.²⁸¹ The landmark opening of negotiations between France and the GPRA certainly facilitated the Danish government's increasingly pro-Algerian profile. To the Danish Paris Ambassador in December 1960, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville stated directly that he had no objections against a UN resolution that underlined the right of self-determination.²⁸² Moreover, the United States seemed to lose patience with France, again, and the vocal critic, John F. Kennedy, was on his way to the White House, which was of some importance for the hitherto cautious Danish government. Convergence with the increasingly critical Nordic 'sister' countries also featured prominently in the Danish government's internal deliberations.²⁸³ However, these dynamics were additionally associated with an increasing discontent within the government's political constituencies and the emergence of a worldwide anti-colonial movement.²⁸⁴

Party Debates (1958-1962)

Danish politics was in a process of transformation with the emergence of the Socialist People's Party, which strongly supported a Danish withdrawal from NATO in favour of Nordic collaboration. Its weekly magazine, *SF*, brought a considerable number of articles about the Algerian question. Editor Kai Moltke (MP from 1960) largely blamed the atrocities in Algeria on the Gaullist regime. In a portrait of the miserable living conditions in the so-called reception camps in Algeria, Moltke systematically used the genitive form, terming them "*de*

²⁷⁹ Jens Otto Krag, "- og parade", in *Verdens Gang*, no. 3, 1960, pp. 94-95; .

²⁸⁰ RA UM 123.K.3.a, box VII: "Notat. Algierspørgsmålet", the Political-Legal Division, 19 Februar 1960; "Notat. Danmarks holdning til Algierspørgsmålet i De forenede Nationer", by Otto Borch, the Political Legal Division, 21 March 1960; "Notat til brug ved udarbejdelse af udenrigsministerens redegørelse i Folketinget den 31. maj 1960", the Political-Legal Division, 21 May 1960

²⁸¹ *Folketings Tidende*, Udvalgets betænkninger m.v. 1959-60. Tillæg B, columns 981-982; ... 1960-61. Tillæg B, columns 309-312. Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 707-709.

²⁸² RA UM 123.D.1, box VIII: "Samtale med udenrigsminister Couve de Murville", by Ambassador Bartels of 2 December 1960.

²⁸³ Anne Mette Grønberg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 54.

²⁸⁴ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 63-66.

Gaulle's concentration camps" or "the French dictator and *his* concentration camp regime in North Africa."²⁸⁵ De Gaulle's self-determination speech of September 1959 was characterised as a 'dubious manoeuvre', as "*no real self-determination can be ensured in Algeria under the pressure of the French armed forces and their terror. The interest of peace requires an independent intervention, controlled by the UN.*"²⁸⁶ Denmark risked, in virtue of its NATO membership and the Treaty's extension to Algeria, to be drawn into a depraved power struggle. The 'siding arm-in-arm with de Gaulle's colonial warriors' brought dishonour to Denmark's name, Moltke argued.²⁸⁷ The Socialist People's Party expressed its support to all legal initiatives for the Algerians' struggle for freedom, thus assuming a position as the most vocal pro-Algerian party represented in the Danish Parliament as of 1960.²⁸⁸ The Danish Communists lost their parliamentary seats, and they suffered from their 'hypocritical' stance. As the prominent new-left profile, Professor Mogens Fog, pointed out, the outrageous executions in Algeria could not justify or neutralise the scope of the tragedy in Hungary!²⁸⁹

The Social Democratic Party faced a profound split on the Algerian question - a considerable challenge given the new, non-Communist alternative on its left flank. In a January 1961 comment to FLN's representative to Scandinavia, Mohammed Sahli, the Social Democratic party paper, *Aktuelt*, expressed its disappointment with FLN's intransigence, while acknowledging that de Gaulle had taken the first step towards peace.²⁹⁰ The anti-authoritarian, Social Democratic youth and student organisation, *Frit Forum*, on the other hand, strongly condemned France, and it urged Denmark and Scandinavia to assume an active, 'progressive' role in relation to the emerging Third World. Inspired by the International Union of Socialist Youth and conversations with FLN activists, International Secretary of *Frit Forum*, Henning

²⁸⁵ Kai Moltke, "Frankrigs valgfasko i KZ-lejr Algier", in *SF*, 8 May 1959, p. 1 and "Frankrig - NATO og krigen i Algier", in *SF*, 19 June 1959, p. 4. Emphasis added.

²⁸⁶ Kai Moltke, "Algierkrigens baggrund", in *SF*, 23 October 1959, p. 4, 10; "Frankrig - NATO og krigen i Algier", in *SF*, 19 June 1959, p. 4; "Algiers frihed smaa Koreakrige og FN's krise...", in *SF*, 23 December 1960, p. 4, 10: "... at ingen real selvbestemmelse kan sikres Algier under presset af Frankrigs væbnede styrker og under deres terror. Der maa i fredens interesse et FN-indgreb og en uvildig FN-kontrol til." Emphasis in original.

²⁸⁷ Kai Moltke, "Algier og NATO", in *SF*, 18 November 1960, p. 12; "Danmark og Algierkrigen", in *SF*, 11 December 1959, p. 1, 12.

²⁸⁸ Letter from Morten Lange, on Aksel Larsen's behalf, to Oustrup Jensen, 3 November 1960, published in *Algier Frit*, volume 1, no 2, 1960, p. 5.

²⁸⁹ Mogens Fog, "Mogens Fogs tale ved Dialog-festen", in *Dialog*, volumen 8, no. 6, 1958, pp. 7-10. The leader of the party's Trotskyite fraction, Georg Moltved, pointed out that the world communist movement had oscillated blindly in line with Moscow's manoeuvres rather than opposing the war escalation. See Georg Moltved, "Frankrig, Algier og Thorez", in *SF*, 8 January 1960, p. 2.

²⁹⁰ *Aktuelt*, "Billedet er mere nuanceret", leading article, 16 January 1961. Mohammed Chérif Sahli, "En stemme fra Algier", feature article in *Aktuelt*, 15 January 1961. In the leftist cultural magazine *Vindrosen*, Sahli had argued that the Western allies were co-responsible for the continuation of the French warfare against the FLN, as it relied on Western support to the French notions: "Frankrig og algierkrigen", volume 6, 1959: 396-403.

Kjeldgaard, confronted Foreign Minister Krag with the allegation that Denmark had a share in the responsibility for the misery in Algeria.²⁹¹ He deemed the Danish abstention to a peace proposal at the preceding year's UN session intolerable since:

... the French atrocities in Algeria in reality are significantly worse than those committed by the Russians in Hungary – both in terms of numbers of victims and people removed with force, and in the perspective that the injustice in Hungary was committed by a dictatorship, whereas the incidents taking place in Algeria are committed by France which at least still purports to be a democracy.²⁹²

Moreover, he asked whether the sympathy in Denmark with the Hungarians and ignorance of the Algerians was a result of racial prejudice, or was it due to the circumstance “that *our cooperation with France* has entailed a recognition of the imperialistic policy of this country – of [the French] ‘right’ to Algeria?” Accepting “violence and terror” taking place on “our own side” in the name of NATO solidarity was a counterproductive policy vis-à-vis the newly independent countries, he argued.²⁹³ Kjeldgaard's contributions provoked a debate in the Social Democratic magazine *Verdens Gang*, as he maintained that the French “apparently have learned a lot from the Nazis.” In the same vein, the co-editor of the Social Democratic students' magazine, Jørgen E. Petersen, called de Gaulle's self-determination proposal pure bluff and asked what Denmark had done, while the detainment of 1.2 million Algerians under conditions similar to those of the ‘captives in Hitler's concentration camps’ had been exposed.²⁹⁴

Particularly Secretary Niels Alsing Andersen from the Labour Movement's Information Central countered the young Social Democrats. His bureau had functioned as a deliberate anti-Nazi and later anti-Communist propaganda and intelligence organization since its birth in the 1930s.²⁹⁵ Niels Alsing Andersen now conceded that FLN-ALN's terror and coercion had

²⁹¹ In his autobiography, Henning Kjeldgaard thus tells that he had contacts with some FLN leaders that fled to West Berlin. Retrospectively, the Algerian resisters acknowledged that the contacts with the IUSY were crucial at a moment when the Social Democratic mother parties and their *Socialist International*, presided by the Danish MP Alsing Andersen, denied dealing with the issue. See Kjeldgaard's *I Skyggen af den kolde krig* (Gedved: Eigel Holms Forlag, 2002), p. 44.

²⁹² Henning Kjeldgaard, “Hvad med at få en udenrigspolitik?”, in *Frit Forum*, December 1959, 3, pp. 3-4: “... at Frankrigs overgreb i Algier i virkeligheden er adskilligt værre end russernes overgreb i Ungarn – såvel i antal døds ofre og tvangsfordrevne som i det forhold, at overgrebet i Ungarn blev udført af et diktatur, mens det, der er sket og stadig sker i Algier, udføres af Frankrig, der dog stadig kalder sig et demokrati.”

²⁹³ Henning Kjeldgaard, “Hug – Tanker efter en konference”, in *Verdens Gang*, no. 3, 1960, pp. 92-94: “... at vort samarbejde med Frankrig samtidig har medført en anerkendelse af dette lands imperialistiske politik – af deres ‘ret’ til Algier?” Kjeldgaard's emphasis.

²⁹⁴ Jørgen E. Petersen, “de Gaulles bluff”, in *Frit Forum*, no 2, October 1959, p. 5 and “De farlige floskler”, in *Verdens Gang*, volumen 14, nr. 6, 1960, pp. 184-185.

²⁹⁵ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 588-591.

forced the French to use some inappropriate methods. However, he argued that the French soldiers had attended "the Arabic School" in daily confrontations, where they unfortunately had learned how war is conducted in the Orient and faced "the refined acts of classical, Oriental sadism." He argued that the well-known pictures of starving Algerians in the French camps were as a relieving picnic compared to the photos of FLN's victims that his bureau received from the French Interior Ministry.²⁹⁶ The Danish main tabloid *Ekstrabladet* published Secretary Andersen's version, portraying how his colleagues fainted, as they were opening the envelopes with pictures of FLN's victims.²⁹⁷ It seems, however, that even the French officials were somewhat surprised about Niels Alsing Andersen's whole-hearted support and they classified him as 'very understanding for our Algerian problems.'²⁹⁸

During the Danish Social Democratic Party's congress in June 1961, on the other hand, the Third World advocate, Frode Jakobsen (MP), pointed to the imperative of offering the party's idealistic youth an alternative to the former Communist, Aksel Larsen, and his Socialist People's Party. Concerning Algeria, de Gaulle's programme deserved a chance, but Denmark could not accept a continuation of the crisis; NATO had to live up to its own ideals.²⁹⁹ Frode Jakobsen had initially urged the Danish government to criticise France, but by September 1961 he actually praised the government for fulfilling what he called Denmark's basic mission in the East-West confrontation, namely that of "winning souls" in the newly independent countries in the South. The French policy in Algeria "could only lead to depravity", he warned in the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee. Denmark's NATO membership, which he strongly endorsed, could not imply an obligation to support the allies when they were as 'blatantly wrong' as France appeared in the case of Algeria.³⁰⁰ The government's (hesitant) policy adjustment certainly reflected the changing international circumstances, but a leading Social Democrat such as Foreign Minister Krag seems also to have been aware of the

²⁹⁶ Niels Alsing Andersen, "Det tredje standpunkt", in *Verdens Gang*, volume 14, no. 5, 1960, pp. 158-159: "... den klassiske, orientalske sadismes raffinement?"

²⁹⁷ *Ekstrabladet*, "Danske kontorfolk besvime ved synet af Alger-billeder", 8 August 1960.

²⁹⁸ MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s. d'un débat dans la presse social-démocrate sur la question algérienne", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 10 August 1960; box 3: "M. Niels Alsing Andersen", 15 November 1960.

²⁹⁹ *Politiken*, "Socialdemokratiets kongres", 14 June 1961.

³⁰⁰ Anne Mette Grønberg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 51; RA UM 3.E.92/61 (MIK 02:2) "Møder i det udenrigspolitiske nævn" 1/1 1961 - 31.12.1961: "Referat af møde i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn onsdag den 18. januar 1961, kl. 9.30 (FORTROLIGT). RA UM 3.E.92/61 (MIK 02:2) "Møder i det udenrigspolitiske nævn" 1/1 1961 - 31.12.1961. Referat af møde i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn onsdag den 13. september 1961, kl. 13.30 (FORTROLIGT)."

significance of the anti-authoritarian youth movement and their emotional engagement in Third World issues.³⁰¹

The approach of the Social Democratic leftwing was not far from that of the Radical Liberal Party – the major coalition partner. On the Radical Liberals' behalf, Hermod Lannung (MP) thus emphasised that the Algerian conflict was becoming a burden to the reputation of the 'Western' countries in Africa. He argued that Denmark had a certain mission to carry out as a conciliator or mediator between the Western World and the free countries in Africa and Asia.³⁰² The Liberal and Conservative opposition, on the contrary, was hesitant about a more comprehensive Cold War approach. The Liberal speaker and President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1960-1963), Per Federspiel, urged – with support from his Conservative colleague and former foreign minister, Ole Bjørn Kraft – that, "We should not disturb our allies unduly by paying attention to abstract principles. [...] Denmark needed France, and a position dictated by ideological considerations would not bring about anything practical." He questioned the basis of the Danish non-exploitative and anti-colonial political identity, referring to Denmark's colonial heritage and practices in Greenland. On that background, the Danes were not in a position to condemn the Gaullists' Algerian policy, or the Portuguese conduct in Angola. He urged, therefore, to consider the alliance with France purely in terms of the common interest in maintaining NATO.³⁰³ As we have seen, that had been the initial approach of the Danish Social Democratic leaders, but a profound challenge of the unconditional NATO solidarity principle was emerging among the Social Democrats in the later phase of the Algerian War.

The Civil Society and the Transnational Campaign (1958-1959)

By early 1958, an increasing number of protests had appeared from different corners of the Danish 'civil society'. A group of students at the University of Copenhagen thus published a pamphlet on "Facts about Algeria" that called Paris and the emerging "fascist government" a menace to world peace and the democratic order in Europe.³⁰⁴ Many of the initiatives ema-

³⁰¹ Ering Bjøl. *Hvem bestemmer? Studier i den udenrigspolitiske beslutningsproces* (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1983), p. 326.

³⁰² *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1958-59, columns 3348-54.

³⁰³ RA UM 3.E.92/61 *op.cit.*: "Vi skulle ikke unødigt genere vore allierede ud fra abstrakte principper... Danmark havde brug for Frankrig, og en stilling dikteret af ideologiske hensyn førte ikke til noget praktisk." On Per Federspiel as European politician see: Hans Branner, "With all respect, ... Per Federspiel - Portræt af en dansk europapolitiker", in *Vandkunsten*, 9/10, June 1994: 117 – 131; Ditlev Tamm, *Federspiel. En dansk europæer* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 248-251.

³⁰⁴ P. Brask-Andersen, "Kendsgerninger om Alger", in *Dansk Udsyn*, volume 38, 1958: 139-42; MAE AD EU, volume 72, "A.s.: attaques contre l'action de la France en Algérie", Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 25 April 1958.

nated evidently from Communist circles. In a demarche to the French embassy the Danish Communists thus condemned the French bombardment of the Tunisian village Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. Moreover, the partially Communist peace association, No More War, denounced France's 'imperialistic' war in its annual meeting in April 1958, urging the Danish government to abstain from any armed NATO engagement in the conflict.³⁰⁵

More noticeable, however, several of the protest initiatives were linked to transnational organisations, of which many were created as alternatives to their Communist counterparts. For example, the cross party National Union of Students in Denmark protested against the French government's decision to dissolve the Algerian student organisation, UGEMA (*l'Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens*), in January 1958.³⁰⁶ Like their fellow students organisations in Western Europe, America and Africa, the Danish students responded to an appeal from the Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students (COSEC) in Leiden.³⁰⁷ The COSEC was an ostensibly non-political - though partly CIA sponsored - service organ of chiefly Western student organisations, created after Communist representatives had gained control of the Prague based International Union of Students (IUS) in 1950.³⁰⁸ The two student organisations were in direct competition in the decolonising countries. At an 'Extraordinary International Conference' in April 1958, the COSEC expressed "its conviction that the end of the state of war by peaceful means of negotiation, and the *independence of Algeria* are the only means permitting the solution of all problems facing Algerian students and the University Community in an effective and definitive fashion."³⁰⁹ While many Western governments were reluctant to criticise France, particularly in the UN, the transnational NGOs thus entered the sphere of international politics.

From the early summer of 1958, spontaneously gathered youth and students groups and some established organisations arranged aid collections for the numerous Algerian refugees, stranded in the neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco. There were activists from Copenhagen's old student dormitory, Regensen; workers of the shipyard Burmeister & Wain, known for

³⁰⁵ MAE AD EU, volume 71: "A.s. protestation de communistes danois contre l'action de Sakiet", Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 21 February 1958.

³⁰⁶ MAE AD EU, volume 71: "A.s. demarche des étudiants danois auprès du gouvernement français concernant la dissolution de 'UGEMA et de l'AMEMA", Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 5 February 1958.

³⁰⁷ A document from COSEC in Leiden thus reports about letters of protests from the student organisations of Canada, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Norway, Scotland, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia and the United States (RA DSF, serial number 53. Letter from Administrative Secretary Hans Dall of COSEC to the national unions, 7 February 1958).

³⁰⁸ Philip G. Altbach, "The International Student Movement", in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1970: 156-174.

their leftist political engagement; activists from the Danish Youth Council, from the National Union of Students in Denmark and from Askov Højskole – a so-called folk high school.³¹⁰ In other words, they were actors who predominantly had a social and political identity as members of the ‘civil society’, rather than exponents of the state apparatus. Many had left-wing sympathies, but they acted partly independently of the formal political system.

The involvement of the Danish Red Cross, however, was a rather ambiguous case. The Geneva based International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – a transnational parent organisation – repeatedly urged the national Red Cross societies to aid the Algerian refugees, and it had taken an active part in the revelation of torture in Algeria.³¹¹ However, the Danish Red Cross was rather unenthusiastic in this matter - contrary to its high profile in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Hungary.³¹² This reluctance, moreover, was at variance with the involvement of the Scandinavian sister organisations; there were no activities in Denmark comparable to the Swedish Radio’s request programmes, co-organised with the Swedish Red Cross and Save the Children in favour of the Algerian refugees. Instead, the Danish Red Cross coordinated its activities with Danish government officials.³¹³ In the spring of 1958, the Danish Red Cross explained the overall circumstances in a letter to the Foreign Ministry, namely the problem that it could not ignore the appeals from Danish grassroots activists and the ICRC any longer. It would appear as if the Danish Red Cross obstructed the humanitarian aid initiatives, as an alternative aid committee was in the making.³¹⁴

The officials of the Danish Foreign Ministry noted that an alternative aid committee might have a political agenda deliberately offensive to France; there was a risk that the collected resources might go to the FLN-ALN. A collection arranged by the Red Cross, on the other hand, could secure the keeping of ‘purely humanitarian lines’, thus avoiding any provocation of the French government. After mutual agreement, the Danish Red Cross accepted to take up the task of acting as a link between the grassroots groups in Denmark and the relevant organi-

³⁰⁹ RA DSF, serial number 53. “General Resolution on Algeria”, after the Extraordinary International Conference, London 17-18 April 1958. Emphasis added.

³¹⁰ As a part of the Danish peasant farmers’ formation and emancipation project in the late 19th century, they created a network of independent ‘folk high schools’, where the youth could receive general education and learn national, folkish values. In the 20th century, the target groups of the folk high schools became the youth in general. They have had some importance in Denmark as cultural and educational institutions and as debate fora.

³¹¹ David P. Forsythe, “The Red Cross as Transnational Movement: Conserving and Changing the Nation-State System”, in *International Organization*, volume 30, no. 4, Autumn 1976: 607-630.

³¹² Morten Bendix Andersen, *Ungarnsopstanden 1956 i danskernes erindring: på sporet af nationale erindringsdannelse i Danmark 1948-1968* (Copenhagen: unpublished master thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2004) and “Fra frihedskamp til underholdningsshow: Ungarnshjælpens mange ansigter” in N.A. Sørensen and K. Petersen (eds.), *Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2004), pp. 115-132.

³¹³ In effect, the Foreign Ministry had to approve of collections to foreign missions. Formally, though, it was the Ministry of Justice’s domain.

sations operating in North Africa.³¹⁵ In early June 1958, nonetheless, France's *chargé d'affaires* in Copenhagen, Charles H. Lesca, complained that it had been an embarrassing surprise to learn that the Danish authorities had approved the students groups' collection. The Algerian refugees were not 'real' refugees, since their own compatriots had driven them away from the Algerian *départements*, he argued. The Danish students' initiative would only appear as a political manifestation, giving the impression that the French acted like 'barbarians' in North Africa!³¹⁶

The transnational organisations' involvement in the main aid initiatives is striking. For example, the Danish Youth Council referred directly to an appeal issued by the non-Communist World Alliance of Youth to help the Algerian refugees and even to support the Algerians' struggle for freedom from France. Moreover, a new aid initiative of the National Union of Students in Denmark for the Algerian student refugees in Tunisia and Morocco was conceived in collaboration with the above-mentioned COSEC. Initially, the students obtained permission from the Ministry of Justice to support Algerian students, *provided that they did not make any public announcements of the initiative*, not even in the students' own magazines. However, the new initiative of January 1959 was dependent on a wider public support, and the maintenance of a ban on a public appeal imperilled the collection. After some polemics in the press and a direct approach to Foreign Minister Krag from the Social Democratic student organisation, Frit Forum, the students finally obtained a full permission in mid-January 1959. Again, the French *chargé d'affaires* complained about what he called a deviation from the 'understanding' Danish policy up to now, emphasising his regret of *the resulting publicity*.³¹⁷ The students had admittedly distributed a lampoon displaying the miseries of the

³¹⁴ RA UM 123.K.3.c: "Notits til Chefen for P.J.", 28 April 1958.

³¹⁵ *Dagens Nyheder*, "Dansk aktion for Algier-studerter", 29 April 1958; RA UM 123.K.3.c: "Notits til Chefen for P.J.", 28 April 1958; RA UM 123.K.3.a, box 5: "Dansk hjælp til algierske flygtninge", 17 September 1958; RA UM 6.U.550 "Notits til P.J.I. Svensk hjælp til algierske flygtninge i Morokko", 16 June 1958.

³¹⁶ RA UM 123.K.3.a, box 5: "Notits", by T. Oldenburg of the Political-Legal Division after a conversation with *chargé d'affaires* Charles H. Lesca on 6 June 1958.

³¹⁷ RA UM 123.K.3.c: "Vedrørende indsamling til nødlidende algierske studenter", an address from Jens Høgel, President of the *National Union of Danish Students* (Danske Studerendes Fællesråd) to the Danish Foreign Ministry of 5 January 1959; "Notits", 5 and 7 January 1959 by Klaus Kjølser and Erik Schram-Nielsen; "Notits", 17 January 1959 by General Secretary Nils Svenningsen; *Information*, "Dansk indsamling til algierske studenter stoppes", 8 January 1959; *Socialdemokratiske Noter*, "Dansk hjælp til algierske flygtninge studenter", volume 30, no 4, p. 336; Henning Kjeldgaard, *I Skyggen af den kolde krig* (Gedved: Eigil Holms Forlag, 2002), p. 42. At a cabinet meeting of 13 January 1959, Foreign Minister Krag claimed that the civil servants had rejected the collection without his knowledge and contrary to his position, however, noting that it was too late to change it (RA Cabinet Meetings).

Algerian refugees, but - according to internal communications - they were not interested in provoking any polemics deliberately offensive to France.³¹⁸

In an interview of May 1959 in the Conservative *Berlingske Tidende*, Ambassador Fouchet got an opportunity to explain de Gaulle's Algerian policy for a wider audience. Replying on the interviewer's reference to the Danes' lack of knowledge about de Gaulle's actual aims, Fouchet evoked de Gaulle's apocalyptic scenario of an Algeria torn to pieces by internal strife after independence, adding that the effort of creating an Algerian 'personality' was unthinkable without France's presence and participation. The daily's readers received the interview very favourably, if we are to believe the editor's feedback to Ambassador Fouchet.³¹⁹ Strikingly, a Gallup survey polled in late May 1959 about the Danes' stance on the idea of granting Algeria full independence showed that most of the interviewed could not even express an opinion about the question.³²⁰

In August 1959, however, Ambassador Fouchet had to deliver a very pessimistic report concerning the general opinion in Denmark, emphasising the following points:

- In general, the Danes considered the Algerian conflict to be eating into the moral capital and cohesion of the entire Western World.
- Without being hostile to France, the Danes believed in the necessity of a compromise and recognition of *the principle of the peoples' right of self-determination* in the Algerian case.
- The hitherto pro-French, Conservative press was by now taking the same position as that of the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals regarding Algeria.
- The modest hope of a peaceful solution in Algeria, thriving in Denmark after de Gaulle's takeover, was vanishing.

³¹⁸ Jens Høgel, the leader of the National Union of Danish Students, thus wrote Foreign Minister Krag, expressing his regret that the collection had become a political 'affair.' He also advised to downplay the affair in a letter to the Associate secretary M. Crawford Young of the COSEC. (RA DSF, serial number 53, letter from Jens Høgel and Niels Thygesen to Foreign Minister Krag, 23 January 1959 and letter from Jens Høgel to M. Crawford Young, 27 January 1959). The Danish students lampoon was titled: "Du kan lindre en students sult og nød" (RA DSF, serial number 53.)

³¹⁹ *Berlingske Tidende*, "de Gaulles Frankrig ikke blevet mindre demokratisk", Aage Deleuran's interview with Ambassador Fouchet, 3 Maj 1959; MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s. Interview dans le "BERLINGSKE TIDENDE"", Ambassador Fouchet's report to the French Foreign Ministry, 9 May 1959.

³²⁰ *Ugens Gallup*, no. 20, May 28, 1959. Of the answers given to the question "Do you think that France should grant full independence to Algeria?", 72% responded 'don't know', 21% 'yes' and 7% 'no'.

- The recent kidnapping, torture and murder of the Algerian trade unionist, Aissat Idir, brought about an outcry in the Danish centre-left press, which deplored the usage of torture in the country that gave the *Declaration of Human Rights* to humanity.³²¹

The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, which represented the vast majority of Danish employees and which was closely affiliated with the governing Social Democratic Party, protested the disappearance of the unionist, Aissat Idir, in an August 1959 letter to the French government. In this case, there was again a direct connection to the transnational networks, as the protest initiative originated in the International Conference of Free Trade Unions – a prominent forum of the Social Democratic trade unions.³²²

The Pro-Algerian Committees (1959-62)

Paradoxically, the organised pro-Algerian movement in Denmark appeared almost simultaneously with de Gaulle's announcement of the Algerian self-determination programme. In August 1959, a group mainly consisting of old volunteers of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War and a Trotskyite fraction of Socialist People's Party created an association called The Friends of the Free Algeria. The initiative commanded the public's attention, after the dailies *Aktuelt* and *Information* published a story about the FLN planning to create a recruitment office in Denmark in collaboration with the Socialist People's Party. Party leader Aksel Larsen denied, on the party's behalf, any connection to the recruitment initiative.³²³ However, the Trotskyite oriented Friends of the Free Algeria did actually plan to organise an international brigade for Algeria – a case subsequently raised at diplomatic level.³²⁴ The Danish government assured the French *chargé d'affaires* that it would not permit any FLN-ALN recruitment in Denmark and, if necessary, take steps to prevent the initiative.³²⁵

In August 1960, the *Friends of the Free Algeria* modified their official purpose somewhat, now concentrating on the 'war of information' – on rendering the Algerian War a public affair - with the foundation of the magazine *Free Algeria*. It released a first issue in November 1960, promoted by the artist Leo Kari, known in the public as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil

³²¹ MAE AD EU, volume 72: "A.s. l'opinion publique danoise et l'Algérie", Ambassador Fouchet's report to the French Foreign Ministry, 21 August 1959.

³²² MAE CADN CP11, box 1. Letter of protest from President Eiler Jensen (LO) to Ambassador Fouchet, 31 August 1959.

³²³ *Aktuelt*, "Algier-oprøerne vil hverve i Danmark", 17 August 1959; *Information*, "Paastand om hvervning af danske til Algier", 17 August 1959.

³²⁴ *Information*, "Forsøg paa hvervning til Algier", 7 September 1959.

³²⁵ MAE AD EU, volume 72. "A.s. Activités F.L.N. au Danemark", *Chargé d'Affaires* Lesca to the French Foreign Ministry, 10 September 1959.

War. Leo Kari launched the magazine successfully with a media event, declaring that the anti-terror branch of the French secret services, *la Main rouge*, planned to assassinate him. All main newspapers, particularly the tabloids, carried stories about the alleged threat, thus indirectly advertising for the new magazine and its cause.³²⁶ In November 1960, Leo Kari got access to give an interview to the independent Radio Mercur, where he argued that Algeria was the hottest spot in world politics, comparing the possible ramifications of the crisis to that of the Spanish Civil War, namely as a prelude to a new world war. He appealed that the Danes could no longer behave as if nothing was happening.³²⁷ The Friends of the Free Algeria contended that Denmark had a share in the responsibility of the Algerian War by virtue of its alliance with France.³²⁸ In October 1961, the group staged a demonstration against the heavy-handed chase of Algerian activists in Paris, ordered by Paris' police prefect, Maurice Pappon.³²⁹ The popular support to the manifestation in Copenhagen was negligible, but the French Embassy officially protested after the activists had waved a FLN flag in front of the embassy. Ambassador Fouchet 'insisted' on the Danish authorities taking action against a repetition of the 'incident' – a requirement that the Danish Minister of Justice could not comply with, in the end.³³⁰

The Friends of the Free Algeria remained a relatively limited lot, but it succeeded in bringing the Algerian issue on the public agenda. There was some discomfort in pacifist, 'progressive' circles with the group's unconventional methods and radical profile, as it still called for an international brigade to support the FLN-ALN. The Friends' affiliation to the Trotskyite Fourth International - and later the revelation of its role as spare parts supplier to a FLN-ALN arms factory in Morocco - underlined its radical character.³³¹ An alternative association, the

³²⁶ *Billedbladet*, "Terror-frygt i Hvidovre", 3 or 4 November 1959; *Ekstrabladet*, "Forseglet dokument skal redde dansker fra 'Den røde hånd'", 3 November 1959; MAE AD EU, volume 72: "A.s. : Publication de la revue 'ALGIER FRIT'", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 4 November 1959.

³²⁷ Interview with Leo Kari, broadcasted in *Mercur Radio* on 5 November 1960, extracts transcribed in *Algier Frit*, "Hvad kan vi gøre?", volume 1, no 2, 1960: 7.

³²⁸ *Information*, "Paastand om hvervning af danske til Algier", 17 August 1959.

³²⁹ MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s. Manifestation des Algériens à Paris", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 27 October 1960, attached *Free Algeria's* letter of protest of 23 October 1961. The letter was signed by some leaders of the Socialist People's Party s (Villy Brauer (MF) and Editor Gert Petersen), by the peace movement leader Kate Fleron and by a group of trade unionists.

³³⁰ Philippe Bourdrel, *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003), pp. 321-340; RA UM 4.U.72, box 1. Letter from Minister of Justice Hans Hækkerup to Foreign Minister Krag, 2 November 1961 and "Notits" by Peter Frellesvig, 17 November 1961.

³³¹ Leo Kari's declaration, "Om baggrunden for 'Algier Frit'", in *Algier Frit*, volume 1, no. 2, 1960, p. 6-7; MAE CADN CPH, "Procès des faussaires en Hollande et aide au FLN au Danemark", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 4 July 1961. The Trotskyites' descendants' of the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) underlines the pro-Algerian activities' formative significance for their party, see Åge Skovrind, "Trotskisterne og befrielseskampen i Algeriet", in *Socialistisk Information*, no. 181, November 2003 (online accessible on www.sap-fi.dk/si/181/181-23.html, seen 9 May 2006).

Algeria Committee, gained wider support on a more moderate programme in understanding with the GPRAs official representative in Scandinavia, Mohammed Chérif Sahli.³³² Its agenda was to continue the students' aid collections; to awaken the Danish public to the Algerian tragedy and urge the Danish government to support a UN controlled election and peace in Algeria.³³³

Initially, the initiative caused some alarm in the French Embassy with a view to the group's somewhat broader political composition.³³⁴ The committee had an imposing list of supporters for its first public address in November 1960, including main characters of the cultural-intellectual elite in Denmark.³³⁵ Some Social Democratic MPs backed the committee as well, such as *Demokraten's* editor Holger Eriksen (MP) and Knud Børge Andersen (MP) – Denmark's coming minister of education (1964-68) and minister for foreign affairs (1971-73 and 1975-78). It also planned to involve the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Bodil Koch – one of the most undaunted anti-colonialists voices in Danish politics. She actually refrained from doing so, after the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly advised against a cabinet minister supporting the committee.³³⁶ On cabinet meetings, however, Bodil Koch still urged the government to take up a more critical position vis-à-vis France.³³⁷

Leading representatives of the Algeria Committee managed to get access to Foreign Minister Krag before the UN General Assembly in December 1960.³³⁸ They argued in favour of Denmark not only supporting the self-determination principle, but also calling for a UN controlled election in Algeria.³³⁹ As the Danish UN delegation only had supported the clauses on self-determination and had voted against those referring to a UN monitored action, the

³³² Mohammed Chérif Sahli was delegated for the FLN / GPRA from mid-1958, residing in Stockholm. He went to Copenhagen from time to time, typically on his way to Switzerland (Evian), see MAE CADN CPII: "Fiche à l'attention de Monsieur l'Ambassadeur. Objet : Studentersamfundet et Chérif SAHLI", 21 November 1961.

³³³ Den Danske Algerkomité, *Algier 1954-1960* (Copenhagen, 1961), pp. 30-31.

³³⁴ MAE AD EU, volume 72: "A.s. d'un Comité danois de l'Algérie", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 7 November 1960.

³³⁵ The following examples of authors, intellectuals and opinion-makers, standing out in the Danish cultural life, were represented on the list of signatories of the association's first public address: Thorkild Bjørnvig, Leif Blædel, Thorkild Hansen, Uffe Harder, Erik Aalbæk Jensen, Knud W. Jensen, K. E. Løgstrup, Hal Koch, Ivan Malinowski, Leif Panduro, Halfdan Rasmussen, Klaus Rifbjerg, Villy Sørensen, Ole Wivel. Source: *SF*, "Dansk Alger-komité gaar til regeringen", 11 November 1960, p. 7. There was a majority of leftwing personalities, but an influential centre-right intellectual as Editor Henning Fønsmark of the literature magazine *Perspektiv* supported the new initiative, while criticising the more radical 'propaganda' of *Free Algeria*. Henning Fønsmark (ed.), "For fred i Alger", in *Perspektiv*, volume 8, December 1960, pp. 5-7.

³³⁶ MAE CADN CPII, box 1: "A.s. de l'opinion danoise et des initiatives du Comité danois de l'Algérie", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 28 December 1960 ; RA UM 123.K.3.c: "Notits. Oprettelse af en 'Dansk Algerkomité'", by Janus Paludan, 3 December 1959. Approved by Erik Schram-Nielsen and Nils Svenningsen on 5 December 1959.

³³⁷ RA Cabinet Meetings, 4 December 1959 and 20 December 1960.

³³⁸ The most prominent representative was Ole Wivel, who had a background as an author and was the director of Denmark's largest and most illustrious publisher, *Gyldendal*.



Danish Algeria Committee's standing board expressed on its signatories' behalf a deep disappointment and concern that 'the Danish government did not contribute to encourage the peace in Algeria.'³⁴⁰ However, even the GPRA's 'foreign minister', Belkacem Krim, warmly thanked the Danish government for recognising the Algerian people's right of self-determination.³⁴¹ The Algeria Committee's critique backfired in effect, as the Social Democratic members denounced the committee's 'abuse' of their names in the attack against their own government. It considerably weakened the credibility of the committee that then appeared more radicalised.³⁴²

The Fall of French Humanism

A noticeable feature of the Danish debate is the references to certain expectations of France on the background of France's human rights traditions. In the Social Democrats' debate, journalist and co-editor Jørgen E. Petersen argued that the essential circumstance was that France was a Western society and partner, purporting to be founded on *the rule of law*. Not so the FLN.³⁴³ In the same vein, the National Union of Students in Denmark urged the French government to take the French '*traditions of liberty*' seriously.³⁴⁴ The rupture with the French freedom principles was particularly emphasised after the revelation of state reprisals carried out against some of the 121 signatories of a manifest inspired by the existentialist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, which justified the refusal of taking up arms against the Algerian people.³⁴⁵ In *SF*, the magazine of the Socialist People's Party, Editor Kai Moltke reported about the "brute mobilisation of the authoritarian, Gaullist state machine", claiming that the French state reprisals resembled the McCarthyism of the 1950s. Moltke even called it an attempt to reverse the spirit of the post-war Nuremberg processes against Nazi crimes and alleged that the 'authoritarian' leader de Gaulle demanded full obedience, regardless of the

³³⁹ *SF*, "Dansk Alger-komité gaar til regeringen", 11 November 1960, p. 7.

³⁴⁰ *Land og Folk*, "Det er muligt vi atter må opsøge udenrigsministeren", interview with the member of the Algeria Committee, Kaj Matthiessen, 17 December 1960; MAE CADN CPH, box 39: "Pays scandinaves – Danemark", the French UN delegation's record of the Nordic countries' voting behavior etc. regarding the Algerian question from 1957 to 1961.

³⁴¹ RA UM 123.K.3.b. Letter from the GPRA's Foreign Minister, Belkacem Krim to Foreign Minister Krag, 28 December 1960; Anne Mette Grønberg Jakobsen, "Ideologiske præferencer kontra realpolitiske hensyn. Den danske politik i Algierspørgsmålet 1954-62", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 97, 2002: 53.

³⁴² MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s. Activités du "Comité danois de l'Algérie"", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 19 December 1960.

³⁴³ Jørgen E. Petersen, "De farlige floskler", in *Verdens Gang*, volumen 14, nr. 6, 1960, pp. 184-185.

³⁴⁴ MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s. D'une resolution sur l'Algérie de l'Union Nationale des Étudiants du Danemark", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 7 November 1960, attached the letter from Erik Holm on behalf of the National Union of Students in Denmark to Fouchet, 1 November 1960.

³⁴⁵ Philippe Bourdrel *Le livre noir de la guerre d'Algérie. Français et Algériens, 1945-1962* (Plon, 2003), pp. 271-273.

violations of fundamental human rights!³⁴⁶ In sympathy with the Sartre initiative, moreover, the radical group behind *Algeria Free* collected signatures among Danish intellectuals, and the Danish Society of Authors complained directly in an address to de Gaulle.³⁴⁷ In extract, the Danish Society of Authors' admonishing letter of 24 October 1960 reads:

Mr. President,

In a democratic state, all writers have the right to express themselves freely and frankly about any problem – in respect of the national laws. When a writer is deprived of that right, or if the state seeks to restrain it, for instance by affecting his financial situation – in other words, when the freedom of speech, one of the most important principles and even the basis of democracy, is threatened – then democracy is in peril.

[...]

The Danish people and the Danish writers have always cherished the warmest admiration for French intellectual life. Even more so, we are disillusioned to learn that the French government has acted against those who, confident in the traditions of liberty, have pronounced themselves in accordance with their conscience.³⁴⁸

The disappointment expressed in the letter – partly reproduced in the Danish press - alludes to a considerable group of intellectuals, who were *Francophiles* in a cultural sense, but felt under an obligation to dissociate themselves from the specific state policy carried out in Algeria.³⁴⁹ However, the involved French officials categorised rigidly relevant actors as 'friends' or 'foes', and a number of 'culturally Francophile' characters ended with the label

³⁴⁶ Kai Moltke, "Fransk kulturkamp mod Alger-krig og gaullisme", in *SF*, 7 October 1960, p. 6-8.

³⁴⁷ The letter of sympathy and list of signatories (as Prof. Jørgen Jørgensen, the author Ivan Malinovski, the painter Jørgen Nash, Prof. Morten Lange ...) was brought in *Alger Frit*, "Dansk mod og mandshjerte –", volume 1, no. 1, p. 2.

³⁴⁸ MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s Lettre de la Société danoise des gens de lettres au Président de la République", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1960, attached a copy of the letter, signed by Hans Lyngby Jeppesen to General de Gaulle, 24 October 1960:

"Monsieur le Président,

Dans un Etat démocratique, c'est le droit de tout écrivain de pouvoir se prononcer librement et franchement - sous sa responsabilité vis-à-vis des lois de l'Etat - sur tout problème, et lorsqu'il est privé de ce droit ou si l'on cherche à restreindre ce droit par des mesures de l'Etat frappant par ex., sa situation financière - en d'autres termes, lorsque la liberté de la parole, un des principes les plus importants, constituant la base même des démocraties, est menacée - la démocratie est en péril.

[...]

Le peuple danois et les gens de lettres danois ont toujours enveloppé la vie intellectuelle de la France de la plus chaleureuse admiration. A plus forte raison, nous sommes déçus d'apprendre que le gouvernement français même a agi contre ceux qui pleins de confiance dans les traditions de la liberté se sont prononcés selon leur conscience."

³⁴⁹ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Dansk forfatter-protest", 25 October 1960; *Information*, "Dansk forfatterforening protesterer i [sic] Frankrig", 20 October 1960.

'enemy of France' after expressing their concern about the warfare in Algeria. A good example is the Fourth Republic's 'enemy No. 1' in the Danish press, Erling Bjøl of *Information*.³⁵⁰ Erling Bjøl moved to Paris to live after ending his career as a journalist and a political science professor in Denmark. These 'Francophiles' were anything but hostile to France, and the young correspondent Erling Bjøl was presumably sincere in 1957 when he replied to Michel Gordin of the Cabinet of the Resident Minister for Algeria that he personally, "had suffered deeply, witnessing a Western country that I love, acting in a way resembling, even vaguely, the methods used by the Russians."³⁵¹ For good reasons, the Fifth Republic actually nominated Professor Bjøl *Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur* in 2004.³⁵²

France's troublesome retreat from Algeria became a prominent political issue in Denmark, although it happened significantly later than in the other Scandinavian countries and in the United States. As we have seen, the Danish government was initially hesitant to disturb France with the aim of keeping Denmark out of the conflict and thus not provoking a French withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance and the UN. The French government threatened that France would reconsider its affiliation to the Atlantic Alliance, if the allies did not support the French position in the UN. In Copenhagen, Ambassador Bourdeillette and his successor, Christian Fouchet, kept stressing Denmark's informal alliance obligations, and they continuously tried to influence politicians, editors and public opinion. As the war escalated, however, the international condemnation gained momentum, and some opinion-forming and influential societal groups, leading intellectuals and a few politicians started to object to the 'atrocities' in Algeria. They warned that the official interpretation of the alliance obligations compromised the pacifist Danish small state identity.

³⁵⁰ For instance Ambassador Bourdeillette's report of May 1956: "M. BJØL est l'un des principaux collaborateurs du journal 'Information' dont l'attitude critique sinon hostile à l'égard de notre pays, a été maintes fois signalée à 'attention du Département'", in MAE AD EU, volume 71: "a.s. voyage éventuel en Algérie et au Maroc de M. BJØL, collaborateur d'Information."

³⁵¹ MAE CADN CPH, box 1. Letter of 10 May 1957 from Michel Gorlin, for the Resident Minister for Algeria, to Ambassador Bourdeillette in Denmark, attached the letters from the Cabinet services of 19 April 1957 and Erling Bjøl's reply of 27 April 1957: "... comme beaucoup de Français, un grand chagrin de voir un pays occidental que j'aime agir d'une façon même vaguement ressemblante aux méthodes des Russes."

³⁵² www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=PREX0407240D (seen 9 May 2006).

The political debates and activities illustrate a new line of conflict regarding Denmark's NATO membership. The new, political movements attempted to add a North-South dimension to the original East-West orientation of the 1950s Cold War concept. In addition, the protest movements, the new left, some anti-authoritarian (young) Social Democrats and Radical Liberals challenged the existing order of politics, traditionally demarcating foreign relations as a political field unsuited for public debate. A new type of youth culture was emerging in educated circles and societal associations, featuring an emotional, social engagement in the welfare of formerly colonised people. Solidarity with the Third World on its way to independence became an important political, social and cultural issue, as the general boom in development aid and the emergence of the movement against the Vietnam War in the late 1960s hint.³⁵³ This said, the protests against the Algerian War did not spur any street demonstrations or a mass movement comparable to that of the movement against the Vietnam War.³⁵⁴

A salient feature of the case analysed above, ignored in most existing literature, is the *non-governmental* and *transnational* structure of the independence campaign that ramified through major organisations' common networks and transnational umbrella organisations. The lion's share of the Danish organisations' activities pertaining to Algeria had origins in the appeals of the respective transnational umbrella organisations - in some cases in understanding with the FLN. In addition, the transnationally coordinated protests in Denmark were very 'topical' in the sense that they were in accordance with the organisations' official purpose. Thus, the Danish Society of Authors protested the violations of freedom of speech, the trade unions objected to reprisals against Algerian trade unionists and the students' union protested the dissolving of its Algerian counterpart. The prominent Social Democratic debater, Jørgen Schleimann, who headed the Danish branch of the anti-totalitarian Congress for Cultural Freedom, gives an impression of his organisation's deliberations regarding the borderland between political and cultural activities in a letter of April 1958 to the CCF's headquarter in Paris. Commenting on an enthusiastic, Icelandic initiative of involving the CCF in an investigation of the French abuse of power in Algeria, Schleimann writes:

³⁵³ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Jagten på et sikkerhedspolitisk ståsted. Socialdemokratiets holdninger til sikkerhedspolitikken 1945-1948", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *Temaer og brændpunkter i dansk politik efter 1945* (Odense Universitetsforlag, 1994): p. 25; Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 55-56; Erling Bjøl, *Hvem bestemmer? Studier i den udenrigspolitiske beslutningsproces* (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1983), p. 326.

It is a hard task to explain to these people, who are nothing but political types that they can say individually – as I did myself recently in a broadcast – whatever they like on the Algerian situation and the undignified attitude of the French, but it is no matter of the Congress to make purely political investigations. [...] I hate the idea of mixing all things together just as much as I approve the idea of protesting against the French behaviour – *when it is done before the proper forum and through the proper institutions and organizations.*³⁵⁵

The editorial of *Perspektiv* – the literature magazine affiliated to the CCF - could therefore express its concern about the *freedom of speech*, after the confiscation in France of the magazines *L'Express*, *France-Observateur* and *France-Nouvelle* in 1958. It refrained, on the contrary, from commenting the general political breakdown.³⁵⁶

The table below outlines some Danish organisations' activities pertaining to the Algerian crisis. It illustrates that various non-governmental organisations - with other official purposes than Algerian independence - took part in the campaign, and that the relevant, transnational umbrella organisations played an active part in most cases. In that sense they can be considered as 'transnational actors', attempting to bring about a specific change in the traditional state system – the centre of gravity in traditional studies of international relations and history.

³⁵⁴ Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 57-62.

³⁵⁵ Ingeborg Philipsen, "Selskabet for frihed og kultur. Congress for Cultural Freedom i Danmark 1953-60", in *Kritik*, volume 35, August 2002: 38-51 and "Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark 1953-1960", in *Intelligence and National Security*, volume 18, no. 2, Summer 2003: 237-253. Thanks to Ingeborg for showing the letter from Jørgen Schleimann to John C. Hunt, Secretary of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Paris, 14 April 1958. Emphases added.

³⁵⁶ Henning Fonsmark (editorial remarks), "Tre beslaglæggelser", in *Perspektiv*, no. 5, Summer 1958, pp. 5-6, attached an article of Jacques Carat, editor of *Preuves*, published by the French section of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Table 1 - Danish organisations' activities regarding the Algerian War and coordination with transnational umbrella organisations

Organisation	Action	Issue	Coordination with transnational umbrella organisation?
The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)	Letter of protest to the French government	The disappearance of the Algerian trade unionist, Aissat Idir	Yes - the International Conference of Free Trade Unions
Danish Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	Letter to the Danish Prime and Foreign Minister ³⁵⁷	The war acts in general	Yes - Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
Danish Youth Council	Aid collection to the Algerian students in Tunisia and Morocco	Act of solidarity with persecuted Algerian students	Yes - the World Alliance of Youth
National Union of Students in Denmark	Aid collection to the Algerian students in Tunisia and Morocco	Act of solidarity with persecuted Algerian students	Yes - the International Student Conference
Danish Red Cross	Aid collection and mediation of smaller groups' means	Humanitarian aid to refugees, ostensibly neutral	Yes, <i>reluctantly</i> - the ICRC
National Union of Students in Denmark	Demarche to the French Government	Dissolution of UGEMA (Algerian student organisation)	Yes - the International Student Conference
Danish Society of Authors	Letter to General de Gaulle	Freedom of Speech (Sartre on conscientious objectors)	<i>Not known</i> - but other (Nordic) organisations protested too
Congress for Cultural Freedom, Danish Section	Editorial in the Danish section's magazine	Freedom of Speech (confiscation of <i>L'Express</i> etc.)	<i>Partly</i> - a moderation of a more radical Icelandic initiative
Frit Forum, Danish Social Democratic students organisation	Internal Democratic debate	Social Party Danish UN voting regarding Algeria	Yes - International Union of Socialist Youth

³⁵⁷ The letter from Fanny Hartmann, Radical Liberal and President of the Danish Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, to Prime and Foreign Minister H. C. Hansen is in RA UM 123.K.3, box 4, dated 19 November 1957. About Fanny Hartmann, see www.kvinfo.dk/side/597/bio/178/origin/170/ (seen 10 July 2006).

Algeria's independence, finally accepted by France in the Treaties of Evian in March 1962, was an enormous relief for France and its allies. The Radical Liberal Danish paper *Politiken* commented that no colonial power other than France had departed ever further from its own standards of civilised behaviour in a vain attempt of hindering 'the course of history' in the 'new world.' The independence was mainly a victory for the FLN, but de Gaulle had also a personal share at stake: the peace obtained with the Evian Treaties contributed considerably to his mythical status in France and abroad.³⁵⁸ His effort demonstrated that he was a statesman above narrow interests, as he broke with the French officers and colonialists that brought him to power in May 1958.

France's abandonment of the Algerian *départements* coincided with the first EEC enlargement round. For the sceptical Danish electorate, Denmark's pro-EEC government could now present a positive version of the future EEC partner's 'progressive' African policies as an alternative to the discrediting narrative of France's exploitative nature. In April 1962, Foreign Minister Krag summoned the press to a meeting on global issues, where he emphasized de Gaulle's "grandiose effort" on the African continent. The impressive Gaullist policies of independence in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s - unique in world history - would enable France to combat Communist activities there, Krag advertised.³⁵⁹ Even if the Algerian independence was a great relief, the relation with the new Algerian state was awkward for Denmark. France's Copenhagen Ambassador, Albert Ledoux - the successor of Christian Fouchet, who was appointed French High Commissioner to Algeria in April 1962 - observed that leading political circles in Denmark were reserved vis-à-vis the new Algerian state because Denmark had applied for EEC membership and the government did not want to disturb France.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ *Politiken*, "Freden", leading article of 19 March 1962.

³⁵⁹ ABA JOK, box 61, file "Taler 1962". Memo by the Foreign Ministry's political-legal division (Otto Borch) of March 30, 1962: "Bidrag til Udenrigsministerens redegørelse på pressemødet den 3. april 1962."

³⁶⁰ MAE CADN CPH, box 1: "A.s. de l'Algerie", Ambassador Ledoux to the French Foreign Ministry, 11 July 1962.

Chapter 4 – Denmark and the Gaullist Challenge to the Atlantic Alliance (1958-63)

A core feature of General de Gaulle's political vision was the aim of reforming the Atlantic Alliance and expanding its geographical scope in accordance with contemporary challenges. De Gaulle's fierce opposition to the projected EDC in 1954 and his critique of NATO's integrated defence structures were well known by 1958. It was, therefore, a relevant question whether the Alliance, created in the context of war scare and Soviet intimidation in 1949, could survive in its original form. The American leadership of NATO, with British assistance, was already a thorn in the side of the leaders of the Fourth Republic. The resentment towards the 'Anglo-Saxons' was also mushrooming in the French public, as the United States and Britain tended to exclude France from their "special relationship" and the expected allied support concerning the Algerian War did not materialize. One of the French attempts of coping with the deteriorating position was the EDC project; another was the rudimentary Franco-German-Italian strategic cooperation, originally including the essential nuclear field.³⁶¹

Back in power, General de Gaulle self-confidently presented a memorandum to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan on 17 September 1958, outlining his ideas of reforming NATO. The most well-known proposal was that of creating a three-power directorate for strategic planning, allowing France to participate in what appeared as a *de facto* American-British leadership of the Western alliance. For a couple of years, the United States and Britain actually engaged into informal, tripartite consultations concerning global strategy, although the remaining NATO partners strongly contested the *triumvirate* notion. On the background of the endemic political instability of the Fourth Republic and the need to end the Algerian War, the Eisenhower administration initially was favourably disposed towards de Gaulle. In 1959, the National Security Council noted that:

There is little question as to France's importance to the Western Alliance, or that the Gaullist experiment offers the best hope in decades of rejuvenating France as a strong ally. Nor is there any

³⁶¹ Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard : 1996), pp. 35-50.

argument that a strong if nationalistic France is so important to long-run US interests that, to the extent compatible with US interests, we should do all we reasonably can to accommodate de Gaulle.³⁶²

In 1958, however, the United States and Britain had not consulted France as they intervened militarily in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, and de Gaulle uttered concerns about France being dragged into a war provoked by American and British interventions. In the same vein, the French considered the American and British arms supplies to Tunisia during the Algerian War a blatant example of the lack of Western coordination.³⁶³ One of the Gaullist Republic's principal objectives was therefore to expand the geographical range of NATO's commitments and to secure France a role in a tripartite leadership of the Alliance. The attempt failed, however, and de Gaulle increasingly embarked on the project of creating a "European Europe", thus limiting the American dominance in Western Europe. As of 1962, a deep Franco-American rift seemed to be a basic condition of the Western alliance.³⁶⁴

In Denmark, there was barely an audience for the Gaullist reform project, although the American dominance of the Atlantic system was evident. From a small state's perspective, the Gaullist talk about the great powers' obvious right to direct the "free world" did not inspire any confidence in the French alternative. In the Danish administration, it was even a prevailing perception that de Gaulle's proposals would enhance France's position in the West *at the expense of the Western defence and security structures*.³⁶⁵ There was concern that an expansion of NATO's geographical range would increase the risk of dragging the members into colonial conflicts and compromise NATO's "free world" brand. France's unilateral policies might encourage a new nuclear arms race and imperil the general ambition of embedding West Germany into the Atlantic system. Finally, the French great power ambition and nuclear programme provoked some rather strong reactions in pacifist and new left circles, thus nourishing the new social movements.

³⁶² Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 118.

³⁶³ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 111-145.

³⁶⁴ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 120-132.

³⁶⁵ RA UM ad 5.D.25.b, box A (MIK 02:2). "Referat til brug for Udenrigsministeren i anledning af besøget i Paris i april 1961. Nogle bemærkninger om Frankrigs udenrigspolitik", the Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division, 13 April 1961 and "Notat" by the Division's head, Erik Schram-Nielsen.

Breaking the Nuclear Oligopoly: Government Reactions

A key dimension of the Gaullist restoration project was the completion of a nuclear programme initiated by Pierre Mendès France in 1954 and hastened by Guy Mollet in 1956. Few incidents had underscored France's (and Britain's) military dependence on the United States as much as the Soviet threat of 'raining nuclear missiles' on Paris and London during the two European powers' 1956 military intervention in Suez. The Eisenhower administration rejected outright to comment on these threats, in spite of the French call for an American response. For France the logical conclusion was that the maintenance of a military role in North Africa was dependent on the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent under national control.³⁶⁶ It was a grand scale enterprise, though, as the US administration denied to share its nuclear expertise with France in conformity with the restrictions of the so-called McMahon Act of 1946. There were sincere concerns in the United States about nuclear proliferation and fears of endowing a malfunctioning state, challenged by the Army, French-Algerian ultras and Communists, with nuclear weapons. Internationally, the French aspirations were problematic too, as the French programme coincided with the informal nuclear testing moratorium between 1958 and 1961 of the existing nuclear powers - the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain - as well as the public breakthrough of nuclear disarmers throughout the West. Along with the Algerian War, the independent French nuclear programme was one of the main sources of internal tension in NATO.³⁶⁷

Gaullist France thus turned out to oppose the dependence on American nuclear guaranties as they limited France's freedom of action. Moreover, the landmark launching of the Soviet Union's first *Sputnik* satellite in October 1957 demonstrated that the Eastern bloc indeed mastered the technology required for constructing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, thus shaking up existing assumptions of the global security landscape. Consequently, the NATO strategy of *massive retaliation* in case of a Soviet aggression tended to become obsolete from an American viewpoint. In addition, the US administration revised its nuclear strategy in favour of the *flexible response* doctrine around 1960 - a strategy that NATO finally endorsed

³⁶⁶ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 57-58.

³⁶⁷ Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 - 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 152-158; Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard: 1996), pp. 35, 72; Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 133.

in 1967, i.e. after the French withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated structures.³⁶⁸ The Gaullists were particularly alarmed that the technological innovations and the new strategies might render Europe a nuclear battlefield in a limited, though devastating confrontation between the new military giants, fought with *tactical* nuclear weapons, as Couve de Murville warned the Danish government in April 1961. The West Europeans could not expect the Americans to risk nuclear annihilation if the fatal scenario of a limited Soviet attack on Western Europe happened to come true.³⁶⁹

Complying with an international test ban would in effect push France into a further marginalized position in world politics – a tendency that had haunted the old great power since the 1945 Yalta Conference, where the American, British and Soviet leaders had agreed upon dividing Europe in a Western and Eastern sphere without asking France. The effort of catching up and constructing an independent, French nuclear *force de frappe* became therefore an obsession for the late Fourth Republic and for the Gaullist Republic as well. For external observers, France embodied *the problem of the fourth country*, as expressed in Cold War jargon, referring to the country that was going to acquire the bomb next. If the nuclear proliferation were not hindered at 'the fourth country', then West Germany, China and numerous other states would follow suit.³⁷⁰ When the French nuclear test programme started in February 1960, France therefore stood conspicuously out as a violator against the - admittedly feeble - international understanding of controlling the nuclear arms race.

For the Danish government, on the contrary, reliance on the American nuclear deterrent remained a security dogma, as the contemporary Soviet interventions in Central and Eastern Europe and intimidations of Finland highlighted the spectre of Soviet aggression. Traditional anti-militarists still deplored what they considered as the Western contribution to the 'nuclear brinkmanship', associated with the dynamics of the arms race and the rhetoric of 'pre-emptive strike.' Thus, in the main governmental parties' hinterlands, i.e. among Radical Liberals and Social Democrats, there were widespread objections against embracing NATO's nuclear strategy – the 'terror balance' - at all. On their side, the various Danish NATO supporters had a common interest in avoiding any affirmation of the leftwing allegation that Denmark was contributing to an aggressive or warmongering NATO strategy. Given Denmark's exposed

³⁶⁸ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 644.

³⁶⁹ RA UM ad.5.D.25.b. box A: "Referat af Møde i det franske udenrigsministerium fredag den 21. april 1961 kl. 11.00."

³⁷⁰ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 125; Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 179-181.

position at the straits to the Baltic Sea, moreover, the Danish government deliberately abstained from provoking the Soviet Union in order to maintain Scandinavia as a low-tension area in the Cold War. Therefore, the formula laid down in May 1957 was to decline the American offer of stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Denmark "under the present circumstances."³⁷¹

The Danish policy was clearly at variance with the contemporary NATO strategy of endowing the shield forces in Western Europe with nuclear hardware. Nevertheless, it left open the option of allowing the stationing of American nuclear warheads in Denmark in times of "crisis or war". Denmark received the so-called Long John and Nike missiles and some army units trained in nuclear warfare, but the nuclear warheads themselves were conveniently deposited in West Germany, a few kilometres south of the border to Denmark. In sum, a combination of a regional *détente* policy and *integration* into NATO's dissuasive nuclear structures was at play, as the Danish historian Poul Villaume has argued.³⁷²

The embryonic French nuclear force by no means appeared as a reliable alternative to the American nuclear warrant. From November 1964, France had only four *Mirage* jet planes with nuclear devices at its disposal, while more advanced delivery vehicles had still not passed the drawing board. Until 1962, moreover, France's conventional forces were partly engaged in counter insurgency campaigns in the colonies, while the worldwide American web of military bases - approximately 450 in thirty-six countries - largely were accepted as a means to contain Communism.³⁷³ During the NATO crisis of March 1966, therefore, a memorandum of the Danish Foreign Ministry noted that one of the dangers associated with de Gaulle's independence notion - from a Danish point of view - was that France still did not have an adequate military force to take over the responsibilities from the United States.³⁷⁴ After all, it was also a basic Gaullist assumption that it would be contrary to the 'nature of a nation' to risk nuclear annihilation in rescue of another nation!

At the same time, the French nuclear endeavour and tests in the Sahara were disturbing in the light of the resistance to nuclear proliferation that was gaining ground in Denmark as

³⁷¹ Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 39-55; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 301-313.

³⁷² Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 498-625.

³⁷³ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 31.

³⁷⁴ Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard : 1996), p. 240; RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 4: "Notat. Nogle betragtninger vedrørende Frankrigs NATO-politik og dens mulige følger", the Political-Legal Division 7 March 1966, with comments of Per Frellesvig, 9 March 1966.

elsewhere. At the UN General Assembly in September 1959, Foreign Minister Krag thus declared his government's support to a controlled nuclear test stop as the way to global détente.³⁷⁵ It was a widespread assumption that the proliferation of nuclear technology, even to the NATO partners, would foster an increasingly risky and unforeseeable security environment. It was better to keep the control of the Western nuclear 'doomsday instrument' a privilege of the American president than to disperse it among the old, European great powers, of whom some were suffering severely from political instability.³⁷⁶ Even the American plan of creating a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) was met with no enthusiasm. Again, the Danish government warned against increasing the number of states in the nuclear arms race, also the NATO partners and particularly West Germany.³⁷⁷ In this perspective, the start of a Soviet nuclear moratorium from March 1958 and the American ditto as of October 1958 were very positive news. In the summer of 1958, the existing nuclear powers even opened the test ban talks in Geneva that finally resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.³⁷⁸

Whereas the Danish reservations to NATO's nuclear strategy pertained to the regional détente policy and accommodation of domestic antimilitarists, France was pursuing a more ambitious vision of regaining its great power status and maintaining a role particularly in North Africa. France aimed at *changing* the NATO structures, whereas Denmark chiefly *adapted* to it or *opted out* from specific, politically sensitive fields. It seems that the Danish government did not buy into the Gaullist argument of the defective nature of the American defence warranty. For the first time in a century, Denmark had a credible alliance option it appeared, whereas the French independence policy was driven by *fear* of being left in the lurch by the Americans. Danish government circles assumed that the French policies reflected a popular ambition of restoring France's national *grandeur*, whereas the Danish government itself faced a considerable pressure from antimilitarists and nuclear disarmers.³⁷⁹ Therefore,

³⁷⁵ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 587.

³⁷⁶ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 679-683. The Social Democrat Axel Mossin, for instance, argued "better a US-USSR nuclear duopoly than the risk of a nuclear apocalypse associated with nuclear proliferation" in the article "Duopol eller ragnarok", in *Frit Forum*, no. 4, 1961, pp. 7, 12.

³⁷⁷ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995). *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), p. 596.

³⁷⁸ Thomas Christensen of the *Danish Peace Conference* thus declared that the initiative was filling the organisation with joy. ABA DF, box 1, file 4: "Henvendelse til Geneve" of 23 November 1958.

³⁷⁹ RA UM ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A: "Notat" ('secret', contained in a steelbox) by Erik Schram-Nielsen, 13 April 1961 and "Referat til brug for Udenrigsministeren i anledning af besøget i Paris i april 1961. Nogle bemærkninger om Frankrigs udenrigspolitik", 13 April 1961.

the idea of Western Europe embarking on its own nuclear venture, under French leadership, had barely any appeal at all in Danish government environments.

Opposing the French Nuclear Tests

It is also remarkable that the acceleration of the French nuclear programme coincided with the rise of a worldwide movement of nuclear disarmers at the eve of the 1960s. In Denmark, the disarmers rallied a great deal of support at a series of protest marches and meetings. Whereas the popular image and trenchancy of the preceding, leftwing pacifists had suffered from Communist participation, the new Campaign against Nuclear Weapons of June 1960 managed to some extent to exclude Communists from its ranks.³⁸⁰ Instead, there were close bonds to the Socialist People's Party, which had international détente, a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament as policy goals in its first party programme from 1959.³⁸¹

The Danish government attempted to accommodate the nuclear disarmers regarding nuclear non-proliferation and a test ban, but not so in the disarmers' absolute rejection of nuclear weapons. Government circles supposed that the only feasible way to carry out any nuclear disarmament was in a mutual agreement between the superpowers, not through a unilateral Western step. However, the apocalyptic dangers of the nuclear deterrent and the fatal consequences of fallout after nuclear tests were still a taboo for the Danish government. Leading political circles supposed that an emotional debate or even an official information campaign would cause anxiety and undermine the population's support for the Danish NATO membership. From the mid-1950s, Danish grassroots activists had tried - in vain - to put the issue on the public agenda, after prominent scientists such as the American chemist Linus Pauling had warned against the dire consequences of nuclear fallout. The Danish government's deliberate downplaying of these problems was a disappointment for many antimilitarist Radical Liberals.³⁸²

In this context, the Socialist People's Party managed to seize the initiative from late 1959. In Parliament, party leader Aksel Larsen raised the question of Denmark's stance to the

³⁸⁰ Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 46-55.

³⁸¹ ABA-homepage SF: "Programudtalelse fra Socialistisk Folkeparti. Vedtaget af SF's 1. kongres 6. juni 1959."

³⁸² Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 39-45; Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 608-610; Erik Boel, *Socialdemokratiets atomvåbenpolitik 1945-88* (Akademisk Forlag, 1988), p. 181; Klaus Jørgensen, *Atomvåbnes rolle i dansk politik. Med særligt henblik på Kampagnen mod Atomvåben 1960 - 68* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1973), p. 52; Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 - 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 155.

French nuclear test plans on the approaching UN General Assembly.³⁸³ Initially, the Danish government had instructed its UN delegation to oppose a Moroccan UN proposal that expressed “grave concern” over the French test plans.³⁸⁴ After Aksel Larsen’s intervention, however, the Danish government changed the instruction. Now, the UN delegation was to support the strong appeal to France of refraining from the tests, at least if a compromise was not obtainable.³⁸⁵ From an antimilitaristic point of view, the Socialist People’s Party thus made a name of itself as ‘progressive’ in the nuclear question. For the Danish government and the bourgeois opposition, it was not as straightforward to brand this Socialist intervention as ‘fifth column activity’ as it had been in the case of the Communist Party’s ‘peace proposals.’

After the UN General Assembly, the Danish government obtained letters of thanks from the Moroccan government and the Arab League. The French *chargé d'affaires*, Charles H. Lesca, on the contrary, protested and drew the Danish officials’ attention to the great consternation that the policy change had caused in the French Embassy. There were mitigating circumstances, though, as the Danish UN delegation had encouraged some attempts of toning down the aggressive profile of the circulating UN proposals.³⁸⁶ The Danish government also evaded Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld’s proposal to summon an extraordinary UN Assembly after France had carried out its first nuclear test in the Sahara on 13 February 1960. Ambassador Fouchet even acknowledged that Denmark’s line hitherto had been rather accommodating compared to that of the other Scandinavian countries and expressed his understanding for the domestic political reasons for revising the original Danish position.³⁸⁷

Apparently, the Danish government’s new indications mainly targeted a national audience.³⁸⁸ The Foreign Ministry’s notes concerning the proposed UN debate in early 1960 refer

³⁸³ Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997, p. 48.

³⁸⁴ RA UM 119.K.4.g (MIK 02:2): “Instruktion for den danske delegation til De forenede Nationers 14. plenarforsamling”, from early November 1959 and “Notits til eventuel brug i Den udenrigspolitiske Nævns møde den 13. november 1959. De franske planer om atombombeforsøg i Sahara”

³⁸⁵ RA UM 119.K.4.g (MIK 02:2). Telex of 17 November 1959 from the Danish Foreign Ministry to the Danish UN delegation. ‘Seen’ by Foreign Minister Krag, ‘approved’ by Director Svenningsen.

³⁸⁶ Namely by voting against the most critical passages in the UN’s First Committee, where the resolutions were prepared. See RA UM 119.K.4.g (MIK 02:2). Telex from the Danish UN to the Foreign Ministry, 20 November 1959 and a letter from the Danish UN delegation, presumably its leader Ernst Christiansen, to Foreign Minister Krag, 20 November 1959.

³⁸⁷ RA UM 119.K.4.g (MIK 02:2): “Notat. Prøvesprængninger med kernevåben”, 19 Februar 1960; “Franske atomsprængninger i Sahara. Anmodning om indkaldelse af særlig FN-samling”, Erik Schram-Nielsen, 23 March 1960; “Notat. Eventuel indkaldelse af en ekstraordinær samling af FN’s plenarforsamling til drøgtelse af de franske atom sprængninger i Sahara”, Otto Borch, 23 March 1960; “Notits”, by Nils Svenningsen, 2 November 1959 after a meeting with Ambassador Fouchet and “Notat”, by Erik Schram-Nielsen, 20 November 1959, after meeting Lesca and Fouchet.

³⁸⁸ RA UM 119.K.4.g (MIK 02:2). Letters of thanks from the Moroccan Foreign Ministry, 26 November 1959 and from the Secretary General of the Arab League to the Danish government, presumably November 1959.

to the objective of avoiding any debate in the light of the expected domestic repercussions. On behalf of the Socialist People's Party, Aksel Larsen actually declared that he was fully satisfied with the government's handling of the affair! Thus, the Danish government enjoyed a limited victory in closing the case. However, the young, 'rebellious' Social Democrats in the student organisation, Frit Forum, maintained a very challenging line in the nuclear question. In December 1959, International Secretary Henning Kjeldgaard asked Foreign Minister Krag:

Is our emotional commitment to the 'Atlantic solidarity' really so strong that it has become a mission for the Danish foreign policy to promote the French ruler complex that they have never left?³⁸⁹

The Danish position at the UN, only changed in the last minute, left a bad impression of Denmark's foreign policies in the emerging Third World, Kjeldgaard contended.

The attempt of raising the nuclear issue within the established political system would have been rather faint if it was not for the emergence of a popular movement of nuclear disarmers. They were primarily protesting the superpowers' arms race, but they also called attention to France's co-responsibility for the future of humanity during the superpowers test stop between 1958 and 1961. In September 1959, the cross-party Danish Peace Conference, chaired by the Radical Liberal Thomas Christensen, issued an appeal, requesting de Gaulle to abstain from the nuclear project conducted at "the peril of humanity's future." Could the French president carry the moral burden of 15.000 children's premature death, and the responsibility of the existing nuclear powers resuming their devastating test programmes, he asked.³⁹⁰ Additionally, the Danish section of War Resisters International, called No More War, issued a similar appeal to de Gaulle in the name of humanity and "the idea of democracy." The international stability was at risk if a *democratic* power ignored the unanimous global opinion, it argued.³⁹¹

After the first French nuclear test in the Sahara in February 1960, No More War organised a torchlight procession against the French test programme in sympathy with the protesting African states. The disarmers handed in a protest resolution to the closely guarded French

³⁸⁹ Henning Kjeldgaard, "Hvad med at få en udenrigspolitik?", in *Frit Forum*, December 1959, 3, pp. 3-4: "Føler vi virkelig den 'atlantiske solidaritet' så stærkt, at det kan blive en opgave for dansk udenrigspolitik at fremme det herskerkompleks, som franskmændene endnu ikke har aflagt?"

³⁹⁰ Thomas Christensen, "Til den franske regering ved Præsident de Gaulle", in *Dansk Fredskonferences Nyhedstjeneste*, no. 53, November 1959.

³⁹¹ H. Jonassen (international secretary of *No More War*), "Hr. præsident de Gaulle", in *Pacifisten*, no. 27, January, 1960.

Embassy in the centre of Copenhagen and to the French Consulate in Odense.³⁹² In Copenhagen, furthermore, the protesters proceeded to the Danish parliament, Christiansborg, with a petition to the government, in spite of an official ban on the demonstration.³⁹³ No More War deplored the apparent success of “the absolute dictator in France” in its magazine *Pacifisten*. De Gaulle’s nuclear test was termed a crime against humankind as the nuclear fallout was already detectable in the Sahara and it was causing a tremendously tense political situation in Africa. The “dictator’s insane act” was contrary to the global rejection of nuclear war preparations, they argued.³⁹⁴

From the summer of 1960, the nuclear disarmers’ activities were canalised into the new Campaign against Nuclear Weapons, inspired by the West German *Kampf dem Atomtod* and especially the protest marches of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The movement gained the broadest public support of any Danish peace initiative hitherto seen at a series of protest marches in October and during Easter the following years.³⁹⁵ After the third French nuclear test on 27 December 1960, the Campaign arranged a series of demonstrations and torchlight processions at the French Embassy in Copenhagen and at seven French consulates across the country.³⁹⁶ *Aktuelt* reported that the voices of a thousand demonstrators filled the streets of central Copenhagen with the battle cry: “Down with de Gaulle, down with de Gaulle!” Their banners accused, “You despise humanity, we despise your challenge” and “All experiments with nuclear weapons is an experiment with mankind.”³⁹⁷ In its leading article, the Social Democratic daily deplored the French neglect of the UN appeal, but it deemed the street demonstrations against de Gaulle’s bomb futile. It argued in favour of leaving protest

³⁹² The Danish police had increased the surveillance of the French Embassy on the Ambassador’s request after some cases of anti-French embassy graffiti throughout the 1950s, referring to the French measures against the headquarter of the world communist youth organisation ‘DUV’ (1951), to ‘the bloodbath in Morocco’ (1955) and the ‘no to the fascism’ (1958). See RA UM 4.U.72. Secretary General Svenningsen to chargés des affaires le Baron de Sainte-Marie, 7 October 1955; letter from the Danish Foreign Ministry (Kate Lomholdt) to the Justice Ministry, 4 July 1956; “Notits”, H. H. Schrøder, 27 September 1958.

³⁹³ RA UM 4.U.72: “Indberetning vedrørende foreningen “Aldrig mere krig”’s demonstrationsmøde på Kgs. Nytorv d. 16.2.60”, by Superintenden H. Mauritsen from the Copenhagen Police’s turnout division, 17 February 1960; *Pacifisten*, “Demonstrationer i København og Odense mod Frankrigs atombombesprængninger”, vol. 27, no. 3, March 1960, p. 35; *Land og Folk*, “Demonstration i aften ved Frankrigs ambassade mod atom-eksplosionen”, 16 February 1960.

³⁹⁴ Otto Mathiasen (presumably) “Bomben i ørkenen ...”, in *Pacifisten*, vol. 27., no. 3 March 1960, p. 27.

³⁹⁵ Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 49-50.

³⁹⁶ Klaus Jørgensen, *Atomvåbnenes rolle i dansk politik. Med særligt henblik på Kampagnen mod Atomvåben 1960 – 68* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1973), pp. 66-74.

³⁹⁷ *Dansk Fredskonferences Nyhedstjeneste*, no. 57, January 1961, pp. 3-4: “Protest mod den franske prøvesprængning”; *Aktuelt*, “Atom-march-folkene til protest på Kgs. Nytorv”, 29 December 1960.

initiatives to the Danish government in order to avoid an uncontrollable protest movement, sensitive to Communist infiltration.³⁹⁸

With a lot of pathos, the nuclear campaign applied a moral language resembling that of the pro-Algerian initiatives. The leading figures at the Campaign's demonstration, Carl Scharnberg and Tage Hind, thus hinted to the tension between the French self-understanding as the spearhead of civilization and the present state of affairs, stating:

We would like to express the strongest resentment to the French government regarding the peace crime committed, as well as our sorrow that a country which wants to be called a cultured nation, has fallen so deep.³⁹⁹

In addition, the Danish Peace Conference condemned sharply the French gambling with humankind, urging the Danish government to take action in the UN and NATO.⁴⁰⁰ The allegation of Denmark's passive co-responsibility, in virtue of its NATO membership, was another parallel between the Algeria movement and the nuclear disarmers.

The disarmers repeated the protest pattern after the fourth test bomb, completing the nuclear breakthrough of Gaullist France on 26 April 1961.⁴⁰¹ A considerable number of demonstrators, by Danish standards, were participating by now. The Social Democrat and leader of the Danish section of the anti-totalitarian Conference for Cultural Freedom, Jørgen Schleimann, commented that the testing of a nuclear bomb on Algerian soil, while the Generals' *putsch* was unfolding, clearly demonstrated de Gaulle's complete lack of understanding for the seriousness of the French-Algerian situation. The campaign leader, Carl Scharnberg, placed the men behind the last nuclear test next to Adolf Eichmann in his gallery of historical figures, accusing the Danish government of co-responsibility if it did not object to France.⁴⁰² In

³⁹⁸ Leading article in *Aktuelt*, "de Gaulles bombe", late December 1960; Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 606-613; Bent Jensen, *Bjørnen og haren. Sovjetunionen og Danmark 1945 - 1965* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1999), pp. 387, 494.

³⁹⁹ Carl Scharnberg and Tage Hind on behalf of the *Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons*, "Til den franske regering", in *Pacifisten*, volumen 28, no. 1, January 1961, p. 16: "Vi ønsker for den franske regering at udtrykke den stærkeste harme over den foretagne fredsforskydelse og vor sorg over, at et land, der vil kaldes en kulturnation, er faldet så dybt."

⁴⁰⁰ The protest issued by Thomas Christensen and Jørgen Larsen on behalf of the *Danish Peace Conference* published in *Pacifisten*, volumen 28, no. 2, February 1961: "Protest mod de franske a-bombeforsøg."

⁴⁰¹ *Information*, 26 and 27 April 1961; Klaus Jørgensen, *Atomvåbenes rolle i dansk politik. Med særligt henblik på Kampagnen mod Atomvåben 1960 - 68* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1973), p. 75; Erling Bjøl, *Hvem bestemmer? Studier i den udenrigspolitiske beslutningsproces* (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1983), pp. 212-253.

⁴⁰² *SF*, "Masseprotest mod den franske atomsprængning", 5 May 1961, p. 12; *Land og Folk*, "De Gaulle forbyder sig atter mod menneskeheden", 26 April 1961 and "4000 i atom-protest i aften", 27 April 1961.

the same vein, the speaker at the demonstration in Copenhagen, the trade unionist Freddy Breck, regretted the French priority of national prestige and self-assertion over humanity.⁴⁰³

At a meeting in the Elysée a few days before France's fourth nuclear test and the generals' *putsch*, Foreign Minister Krag had actually tried to explain the Danish reservation about the stationing of nuclear devices in Denmark on General de Gaulle's critical inquiry into the Danish contribution to the Western defence. Krag expounded the story of the Danish "population's psychological attitude to foreign-policy questions" that had "necessitated the country's neutrality between 1864 and 1949." After Denmark had joined NATO, however, a new attitude was emerging, he claimed.⁴⁰⁴ The two 'statesmen' apparently did not discuss the French nuclear programme directly, but Krag declared, according to the French minutes, that Denmark, in its own speed, "is preparing to cooperate with the other [NATO] members without any reservations."⁴⁰⁵ On a meeting with Couve de Murville in November 1962, Denmark's new Foreign Minister, Per Hækkerup, followed up, declaring that Denmark was against the proliferation of nuclear arms, but it did not mean that Denmark was against the French nuclear policies. It was not up to Denmark to judge in this matter!⁴⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the Social Democratic Party's political indications on nuclear tests and proliferation were increasingly critical, partly in consideration of the success of the nuclear disarmers and the Socialist People's Party. The Social Democrats thus called for an international, nuclear test ban in their party programme of June 1961, and Denmark supported a UN resolution condemning all nuclear tests in November 1962. In the election campaign in 1964, the Social Democrats even featured "A clear 'no' to nuclear weapons" as one of the party's main slogans.⁴⁰⁷

There were only few voices defending the French nuclear policy loudly in Denmark in spite of the lucidity of the Gaullist political-strategic argument for possessing the bomb and minimising the risk of Europe becoming a nuclear battlefield. In April 1961, though, the association Conservative Youth tried to stage a demonstration *for* de Gaulle in Copenhagen - next to that of the nuclear disarmers - as a tribute to de Gaulle's recent scuttling of the generals'

⁴⁰³ Freddy Breck's speech cited in *SF*, "Fronten for og imod det dejlige liv. Fagbevægelse og atomtest". 12 May 1961, p. 12.

⁴⁰⁴ RA UM ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A: Foreign Minister Krag's personal minutes from his meeting with General de Gaulle on 20 April 1961. Partly cited in Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 688-690.

⁴⁰⁵ HAEU MAEF SG 13.28: "Compte rendu de l'entretien du General de Gaulle avec M. Krag, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Danemark le Jeudi 20 Avril 1961, de 17 h. 05 à 17 h. 55, à l'Elysée." Krag: "... se prépare progressivement à coopérer avec les autres Membres sans aucune réserve."

⁴⁰⁶ MAE AD EU, volume 100: "Entretien entre M. HAEKKERUP, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Danemark et M. COUVE de MURVILLE le 13 Novembre 1962 au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères."

putsch. Erik Svendsen - the leader of the pro-Gaullist initiative - stated to *Information* that the generals' plot was "by far more dangerous than any nuclear bomb."⁴⁰⁸ In the end, the police did not permit the pro-Gaullist demonstration, as it was in conflict with the disarmers' parallel procession.

Denmark's Paris ambassador, Eyvind Bartels, though, managed to stir up some debate in the Danish public with a lonely defence of his host country's nuclear policies, targeting Danish neutralism and consensus traditions. Bartels did not speak on behalf of any political grouping, but his contributions brought some of the tacit assumptions of the Danish nuclear debate to the fore. He argued that the Danish cautiousness in defence matters was blatantly incoherent in the light of Denmark's strong reliance on the American nuclear deterrent. The Danish political culture, celebrating "understanding, levelling of differences and harmony" had proved to be counterproductive in international politics, where resoluteness often was imperative. "Peace relies on power and will, and the will to use the power", as he explained to the readers of *Kristeligt Dagblad*. Denmark could only save its soul by endorsing the Gaullist attempts of casting Western Europe as a "third force", endowed with its own nuclear hardware.⁴⁰⁹ It was a very controversial stance in the midst of the nuclear disarmers' campaign and the EEC membership debate, and Foreign Minister Krag ordered Ambassador Bartels to stop his misguided pro-Gaullist initiative.⁴¹⁰

The Fouchet Plan: Western Europe as a "Third Force"

In addition to the costly nuclear programme, the French independence vision relied heavily on Western European collaboration. With the prospect of a profound, Franco-German collaboration and the so-called Fouchet Plan about political cooperation in Western Europe, de Gaulle had a starting point for improving France's position simultaneously in France's European environment as well as in the North Atlantic circle.⁴¹¹ De Gaulle's twofold plan would thus enable France to speak on continental Europe's behalf within NATO and on the Atlantic

⁴⁰⁷ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 597-616.

⁴⁰⁸ *Information*, "Demonstrationer i aften for og imod de Gaulle", 26 April 1961. Erik Svendsen: "... langt farligere end nogen atombombe."

⁴⁰⁹ Eyvind Bartels (feature articles), "Neutralisme og folkelighed", in *Politiken*, 5 December 1961, "Fællesmarkedet og kulturen", in *Politiken*, 1 November 1961 and "1963 – Europas krise?", in *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 31 December 1963: "... at freden bygger på magt og vilje, vilje til at anvende magt"; Paul Raae's interview with Bartels, "En ambassadør har ordet: Om general de Gaulles strategi og taktik ...", in *Berlingske Tidende*, 25 March 1962.

⁴¹⁰ ABA JOK, the diary, book XIII, 2 April 1962.

triumvirate's behalf among the Six of the EEC. In the initial design, France would also remain the pivot of the French Community – the colonial empire – within a federal structure, thus reinforcing the French position further in the European and Atlantic circles.⁴¹²

In the contemporary debate, the Gaullist European vision was known as the idea of creating a “European Europe”, a corrective to the *Pax Americana*. On a French initiative, the six members of the EEC agreed in principle on the creation of a “political union” with meetings of ministers on a regular basis, as stated in the so-called “Bonn Declaration” of 18 July 1961. For this purpose, they set up a working committee chaired by the prominent Gaullist and ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet. In October 1961, France contributed a proposal to the Fouchet Committee concerning a confederation in the fields of foreign policy, defence, science and culture. On the institutional level, the proposal foresaw the creation of a *council* of heads of states and governments, supplemented by a parliamentary *assembly* and a political *commission*. The political commission should only assume a purely administrative role, deprived of the activist profile known from the EEC Commission and the ECSC High Authority.⁴¹³

However, there were severe disagreements about the collaboration's status within the Atlantic security system. As a part of the wider Franco-German strategic understanding, Chancellor Adenauer hesitantly accepted the project, although he faced a considerable Atlanticist opposition within his Christian Democratic hinterland. The Italian Christian Democrats had co-sponsored a forerunner of the project in 1959 and seemed favourably disposed. The same counted in particular for Luxembourg. During 1960 and 1961, Belgium was mainly preoccupied with the secession of Congo, and initially the Belgian government tended to back the French proposal.⁴¹⁴ The main opponent of de Gaulle's project was the Netherlands. Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns had a strong domestic support of his dismissive line, based on a strong commitment to the Atlantic framework; to inclusion of Britain and a rather outspoken fear of French dominance and the Gaullist ideology of *grandeur*.⁴¹⁵ For the Dutch govern-

⁴¹¹ Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard, 1996), p. 55; Serge Bernstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), p. 299; Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 113 - 126.

⁴¹² Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 201-202.

⁴¹³ Robert Bloes, *Le «Plan Fouchet» et le problème de l'Europe politique* (Bruges: Collège d'Europe, 1970), pp. 117-237. The first Fouchet Plan is attached on pp. 487-492.

⁴¹⁴ Yves Stellandre, “Les pays du Benelux, l'Europe politique et les négociations Fouchet” in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (Eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957 – 1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999), p. 80.

⁴¹⁵ Suzanne Bodenheimer, *Political union: a microcosm of European politics 1960-1966* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1967), pp. 213-230.

ment, the preference for a supranational framework was arguably of secondary order, as it insisted on the inclusion of the UK - the very champion of intergovernmental cooperation. Some historians even argue that the Dutch and later the Belgian governments insisted on the supranational approach in order to torpedo de Gaulle's project.⁴¹⁶

In November 1961, the Belgian government endorsed the Dutch criticism regarding the absence of an Atlantic dimension of the plan. The Fouchet Committee attempted to emphasise the Atlantic commitment, but de Gaulle sponsored a radical revision of the plan in January 1962. It left out the references to the Atlantic Alliance and proposed to pull the economic collaboration, hitherto regulated according to the Treaties of Rome and Paris, into the new intergovernmental structures. France became increasingly isolated, and the negotiations were finally wrecked at a foreign ministers' meeting on 17 April 1962.⁴¹⁷

In the historical literature, there has been a passionate debate about the status of the Fouchet Plan in de Gaulle's strategy. Especially the French historian, Maurice Vaisse, has linked it to an axiomatic, Gaullist aim of giving back France a *free hand* internationally and a sense of national *grandeur*.⁴¹⁸ The American political scientist, Andrew Moravcsik, on the contrary, has argued that the Fouchet Plan basically was a French smokescreen, a "part of an elaborate and deliberate deception designed to maintain the illusion of a positive European vision" on France's behalf.⁴¹⁹ Commercial interests, as defined by peak interest organisations, restrained de Gaulle's European policies, so that the achievement of a favourable Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), at the end of the day, was the French EEC goal pursued most rigorously.⁴²⁰ The debate about the status of the Fouchet Plan shall not be dwelled on in further details here, but we can ascertain that a considerable number of scholars have criticised Moravcsik's revision-

⁴¹⁶ Jeffrey W. Vanke, "An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959 - 62", *Cold War History*, Volume 2, Number 1, October, 2001: 95-112; Yves Stellandre, "Les pays du Benelux, l'Europe politique et les négociations Fouchet" in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (Eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957 - 1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999), pp. 87-88.

⁴¹⁷ Yves Stellandre, "Les pays du Benelux, l'Europe politique et les négociations Fouchet" in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (Eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957 - 1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999), pp. 73 - 87; Jeffrey W. Vanke, "An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959 - 62", *Cold War History*, Volume 2, Number 1, October, 2001: 105-106.

⁴¹⁸ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 175-191. Serge Bernstein characterizes Vaisse's writing on de Gaulle's foreign policies as "l'ouvrage le plus complet sur la question", in *Histoire du gaullisme*, (2002) p. 538, note 51.

⁴¹⁹ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998), pp. 177. Emphasis added.

⁴²⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998), pp. 186 - 187; Andrew Moravcsik, "De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958 - 1970 (Part 1)", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2.2, 2000: 38-39.

ist rudiment, targeting the quality of what he calls “hard sources” and his reductionist approach to historical complexities.⁴²¹

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the United States initially supported the Fouchet Plan. The Kennedy administration strongly favoured political cooperation among the Western Europeans, as long as it did not harm the cohesion of the Atlantic community. The American administration rejected therefore the plan, as de Gaulle finally attempted to remove the plan’s references to the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, the Kennedy administration favoured discretely British membership of the Communities in the hope, among other things, that Britain would bring a sense of the special Anglo-American relationship into the Communities.⁴²² In the meantime, on 31 July 1961, Conservative British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had announced that Britain intended to start membership negotiations with the EEC. Even so, the Six of the EEC did not invite Britain or the other declared EEC applicants, Denmark and Ireland, to participate in the elaboration of the “political union”. In December 1961, however, the Six agreed that accession to the EEC was dependent on acceptance of the political framework as well.⁴²³

Danish Acceptance as an EEC Entrance Card

What matters for our purpose is that the Danish government continuously faced a French (and German) demand of committing Denmark to the political project.⁴²⁴ At a Franco-Danish meeting in April 1961, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville raised the sensitive question whether the Danish government had considered the consequences of political and military cooperation as well as those of economic engagement. Foreign Minister Krag replied that he was aware of the implications and stated that he personally would recommend his government

⁴²¹ Robert H. Lieshout, Mathieu L. L. Seegers, and Anna M. van der Vleuten, “De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and *The Choice for Europe. Soft Sources, Weak Evidence*”, in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 2004: 89-139.

⁴²² Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 246-264 and “United States-European Relationships, 1961-1963”, in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (Eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957 – 1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999), pp. 17-30; Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 119-122.

⁴²³ Robert Bloes, *Le «Plan Fouchet» et le problème de l’Europe politique* (Bruges: Collège d’Europe, 1970), pp. 154-164; Yves Stellandre, “Les pays du Benelux, l’Europe politique et les négociations Fouchet” in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (Eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957 – 1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999), p. 85.

⁴²⁴ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box V: “Nogle franske udenrigspolitiske bedømmelser”, Ambassdor Bartels’ report of 2 April 1962 after a meeting with Couve de Murville.

and the Danish parliament to accept these requirements.⁴²⁵ In October 1961, at an extended EEC Council of Ministers meeting, Krag furthermore expressed the Danish government's full acceptance of the Treaties of Rome and the political project.

Not only do we share your aims in the economic field. We are equally prepared to participate fully and actively on equal terms with the other Member countries in a closer political co-operation aimed at furthering the unity of Europe, as foreseen in the Bonn Declaration of July 18th this year.⁴²⁶

Domestically, however, the statement was potentially controversial and Foreign Minister Krag postponed publishing it. As he later remarked in a diary note, "Parts of the general public will not be able to understand the phrases expressed in order to benefit Denmark in the negotiations."⁴²⁷ He also urged Ambassador Fouchet to refrain from emphasising in public that the Danish EEC membership required a commitment to the political project.⁴²⁸ Leading civil servants of the Danish Foreign Ministry assumed that a focus on the political visions in the ongoing membership campaign might engender a strong reaction *against* the idea of Danish membership in the Communities.⁴²⁹

That being said, the Danish government actually pointed to the *intergovernmental* features of the Gaullist project in order to downplay the consequences of the political venture. In the Danish debate, supranational integration never gained the status as a safeguard against great power dictate or Franco-German dominance, as it partly did in the Netherlands and Belgium.⁴³⁰ In the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Foreign Minister Krag reassured that,

⁴²⁵ RA UM, ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A: The minutes from Krag's meeting with de Gaulle is in: "Referat. Paris, den 20. april 1961." From the meetings with Couve de Murville: "Referat af Møde i det franske udenrigsministerium fredag den 21. april 1961 kl. 11.00. Hemmeligt."

⁴²⁶ RA UM 5.B.43.a, Box 5. "Betragtninger vedrørende Danmarks stilling til det franske udkast til en traktat om politisk samarbejde mellem De Seks. P.J.I, den 1. december 1961." The document cites Krag's speech in English; Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 701 - 707.

⁴²⁷ ABA JOK, Krag's diary of January 11, 1962, in Book XIII: "Dagbog: 11. januar 1962 - 16. januar 1965": "De formuleringer, der skal gavn D. i forh. vil dele af offentligheden ikke forstaa. Jeg ville imidlertid ikke risikere, at der blev myte og problem omkring talen."

⁴²⁸ MAEAD AEF-DE, volume 2044. Telegram from Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 21 December 1961.

⁴²⁹ In a letter to Ambassador Bartels of January 1962, the head of the Danish Foreign Ministry's Economic-Political Division, Erling Kristiansen, thus pointed to the negative correlation between playing on the political visions and the population's adherence to the EEC. See Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 488-489.

⁴³⁰ Robert Bloes, *Le «Plan Fouchet» et le problème de l'Europe politique* (Bruges: Collège d'Europe, 1970), p. 162.

... the Danes could look at the political cooperation with peace in their mind in the moderate version taking shape in accordance with the French idea of a cooperation between governments with no supranational organs involved.⁴³¹

However, the official interpretation was not unchallenged. The Political-Legal Division of the Foreign Ministry thus argued that an intensification of *intergovernmental* political cooperation would be a power instrument of France and West Germany.⁴³² In July 1961, the officials noted, "from a Danish point of view, one can expect to be subjected to a certain French pressure when traditional Danish foreign policies do not correspond with French viewpoints."⁴³³ So far, the Danish government had "been able to continue promoting viewpoints which the *liberal, tolerant, neutral Denmark* hitherto had maintained", only giving in to majority viewpoints in vital NATO matters.⁴³⁴ However, the officials concluded that de Gaulle's political confederation would accentuate these dynamics crucially:

... politically the possibility of taking up a separate position will hardly be too good within a limited circle of countries as in the present case which, additionally, are bound together by the closest and most intimate economic bonds.⁴³⁵

In this light, Denmark might have to give up its resistance towards the French nuclear tests, and the Nordic solidarity might recede into the background, they argued. The government's

⁴³¹ RA UM 3.B.92/62 (MIK 02:2), April 11, 1962. Foreign Minister Krag: "På den anden side fandt han, at man fra dansk side med ro kunne se på det politiske samarbejde i den besindige udformning, det syntes at få i retning af de franske tanker om et samarbejde mellem regeringer uden overstatslige organer. Såfremt man nærede ønske om at gå videre, ville man utvivlsomt rejse store vanskeligheder for såvel Storbritannien som Norge. Om udviklingen på længere sigt ville komme til at gå i retning af et mere indgribende samarbejde, kunne man endnu ikke vide. Skete det, måtte man tage standpunkt til det til den tid og eventuelt gøre brug af sin veto. Han fandt, at det var hensigtsmæssigt med det skel, der findes mellem det økonomiske og det politiske samarbejde, også udfra et dansk synspunkt."

⁴³² RA UM 5.B.43.a, Box 2: "Politisk samarbejde mellem de Seks indbyrdes og mellem de Seks og de Syv. Referat til brug for Udenrigsministeren i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævns møde den 10. marts 1961".

⁴³³ UM RA Box 5.B.43.a, box 3: "Politiske konsekvenser af Danmarks eventuelle tilslutning til De Seks", a report elaborated by the Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division: "Fra dansk side må man derfor forvente at kunne komme ud for et vist fransk pres, når traditionelle danske udenrigspolitiske standpunkter ikke falder sammen med de franske." (p. 65).

⁴³⁴ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box 5. "Referat. Betagninger vedrørende Danmarks stilling til det franske udkast til en traktat om politisk samarbejde mellem de Seks. P.J.I, den 1. december 1961.": "- indtil nu har kunnet fortsætte med at tale for de synspunkter, som det liberale, tolerante, neutrale Danmark hidtil havde forfægtet." Emphasis added.

⁴³⁵ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box 5. "Referat. Betagninger vedrørende Danmarks stilling til det franske udkast til en traktat om politisk samarbejde mellem de Seks. P.J.I, den 1. december 1961.": "... politisk vil mulighederne for særstandpunkter i en begrænset kreds af lande, som der her er tale om, og som derudover forbindes ved de snævraste og mest intime økonomiske bånd, næppe blive store."

public communication, on the contrary, largely presented the intergovernmental features of de Gaulle's project as a safeguard against political 'entrapment'.⁴³⁶

A relatively small group of leading politicians in Denmark actually favoured strengthening the political coordination in Western Europe, but they were all known as fervent Atlanticists as well. Western European cohesion and strength was important, but they did not conceive of it as an alternative to the Atlantic security system. Foreign Minister Krag was among the pro-Europeans in that limited sense.⁴³⁷ However, the government faced a considerable opposition towards political cooperation in its own sceptical hinterland; from the new left; and a newly organised movement of EEC opponents. Hans Rasmussen, the leading Social Democratic EEC sceptic, openly expressed his worries about the conservative, 'de-stabilizing forces' within the Six:

I feel highly insecure regarding France's aggression vis-à-vis the developing countries. It is a policy that really does not please me, and I have to say that it is a company that I would not be able to join with any kind of enthusiasm.⁴³⁸

He even presented the partnership issue as a problem concerning "the German past and the French present".⁴³⁹

Similarly, the leader of the Socialist People's Party, Aksel Larsen, invoked Denmark's fateful choice between the Nordic countries and a so-called "*Pax Germanica*." In August 1961, he argued in parliament that the EEC basically was a political union, a new "third

⁴³⁶ This was one of Foreign Minister Krag's main points in his first address to Parliament in August 1961 after the Danish EEC application (*Folketingstidende*, 3 August 1961, column 4685-6) and in his official answer to the Social Democratic vice-chairman and leading EEC sceptic, Hans Rasmussen, in the Parliamentary *Market Committee*: "... General de Gaulle's notion that cooperation in the political field has to be established as collaboration between the governments. It cannot be built by replicating the patterns of the existing communities. One of the implications is that supranational authorities, majority voting and so forth, can be completely ignored as regards the political collaboration" (*Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1. samling 1962, sp. 333: "... de Gaulles synspunkter om, at samarbejdet på det politiske område må være et samarbejde mellem regeringerne og ikke opbygges efter det mønster, de allerede eksisterende fællesskaber er opbygget efter. Dette betyder bl. a., at man i det politiske samarbejde helt ser bort fra overnationale myndigheder, flertalsafgørelser o. s. v.").

⁴³⁷ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 11-26; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 476-478.

⁴³⁸ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1961-1962, August 4, 1961, columns 4737-4742, 4761, 4693. A.L.: "... tænk på Frankrig med dets krige i Alger, dets krig med Tunis og alle de øvrige konflikter." H.R.: "Jeg føler mig i høj grad utryk, når det drejer sig om Frankrigs aggression over for udviklingslandene. Det er en politik, som ikke rigtig passer mig, og jeg kan godt sige, at det er et selskab, som jeg ikke med særlig glæde går ind i."

⁴³⁹ ABA AE, Box 155. Untitled manuscript by Hans Rasmussen, most likely from spring 1962; Jørgen Paldam, *Danmark og Det europæiske Fællesskab* (Copenhagen: Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, 1961), p. 10.

force". It would necessarily drag the small member states into the troubles of the dominant great powers. Aksel Larsen pointed to Germany's latent conflicts with other European states, and he urged to, "Consider France in the light of its wars in Algeria, its war with Tunisia and all the remaining conflicts." Editor Kai Moltke of the party's magazine, *SF*, castigated the EEC's association of the member states' colonies: "The Common Market is becoming a belligerent, colonial bloc that supports France's wars against the colonial peoples." Even more alarming, he suspected that Germany was attempting to seize control of this "common colonial empire" through massive investments.⁴⁴⁰

Professor Jørgen S. Dich, a Social Democrat and leader of the new Committee for the Preservation of Denmark's Freedom, conceded that everybody could understand the value of the Fouchet Plan in terms of binding Germany as closely as possible to France and avoiding a German-Soviet *rapprochement*. However, it did by no means follow from these premises that *Denmark* should bind herself to Germany! In virtue of Denmark's "smallness", Danish participation would not make a difference anyway, he argued. "In this perspective there is no *European* justification that the small nations – which never have caused any war – should bring a political sacrifice on the altar to this unity."⁴⁴¹

In Danish centre-left circles, there was a suspicion that a militarist spirit and a hazardous culture of "brinkmanship" permeated the United States as well as the Soviet Union. The Soviet/Communist propaganda diffused in Denmark deliberately exploited the underlying ideals of neutrality and antimilitarism, and American civil servants expressed some concern about them.⁴⁴² Nevertheless, the idea of creating a Western European alternative to American and Soviet power and dominance in the international system – a "third force" – became one of the main *objections* in Denmark towards EEC membership. In the radical left-wing interpretation, the Western European project featured as a bellicose "power bloc" of the old, colonial

⁴⁴⁰ Kai Moltke, "Frankrig – NATO og krigen i Algier", *SF*, 19 June 1959: "Fællesmarkedet er ved at blive en krigsførende koloniblok, som støtter Frankrigs krige mod kolonifolkene" and "det fælles kolonirige."

⁴⁴¹ Jørgen S. Dich, "Danmarks "frihed" under Rom-unionen", feature article in *Berlingske Tidendes*, January 31, 1962; "Et system, der ligger demokratiet fjernt", in *Meninger om Fællesmarkedet*, Copenhagen 1962, pp. 60-70: "Der findes derfor ingen *europæisk* grund til, at de små nationer – der aldrig har været årsag til nogen krig – skulle bringe noget politisk offer på denne enheds alter."

⁴⁴² Bent Jensen, *Bjørnen og haren. Sovjetunionen og Danmark 1945 – 1965* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1999), pp. 520-530, 547; Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949 – 1961* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), pp. 799-810; Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), p 172.

great powers.⁴⁴³ On the other hand, the aim of defining a Scandinavian "third way" in terms of societal progress was quite commonplace.

In a sarcastic, but striking criticism of the Scandinavian policies, Ambassador Bartels pointed out that their hesitant stance regarding the political Europe was as easy to unite with the Gaullists' views, as it is to mix oil and water. "Gaullism is founded on an evaluation of power politics which the Scandinavians would like to be history due to their moving naivety", as the spell of a somewhat blurred vision of a liberal world system paralysed them, he warned.⁴⁴⁴ France, on the other hand, grasped the European problem better than any other country by identifying the need of ensuring European independence.⁴⁴⁵ Provocatively, Bartels wrote to Foreign Minister Krag that "*there is something rotten in the Kingdom of Denmark*", and he asked "whether we deserve a better destiny than continuing our century old policy of prostitution which is going to strengthen the tendency of regarding us as a people that has lost its soul."⁴⁴⁶ It was the shadow of the neutralist past and the cooperation with the Third Reich during the World War II that Ambassador Bartels urged to overcome in favour of active participation in the construction of a powerful Western Europe.

In late 1962, Jens Otto Krag's newly formed government actually accentuated its adherence to the political obligations of the EEC in public. Rumours of an isolated British EEC entrance were circulating after the EEC Council had decided to focus on the negotiations with Britain. An atmosphere that the EEC tried to sidetrack Denmark, Norway and Ireland emerged, and the Danish government found it expedient to stress Denmark's complete adherence to the *acquis communautaire* as well as to the wider political goals. Even after de Gaulle's 1963 veto, the Danish government gave such accommodating indications regarding political cooperation in order to keep the door open to the EEC.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴³ A Gallup survey of October 1963 concluded that the Danish population tended to favour an EEC with a *neutral* position between the superpowers. However, that was not identical with the idea of a "Third Force". Of the polled Danes 39 per cent thus answered that they favoured a "neutral" Europe, 22 per cent preferred developing the transatlantic bonds further, whereas only 1 percent would go for the Soviet Union. 38 % answered "don't know." (Ugens Gallup, 1963, nr. 40).

⁴⁴⁴ RA UM 5.B.43.a, Box 6. Bartels to Gunnar Seidenfaden, Head of the Foreign Ministry's Political Division, May 1962: "Gaullismen er bygget på en magtpolitisk vurdering, som jo i hvert fald skandinaverne i deres rørende naivitet gerne ser henvist til fortiden." And: "... en noget sløret liberal verden."

⁴⁴⁵ ABA JOK, Box 48, file: F4 EF: 1961 (April 4. – Juni 14. 1961). Letter from Bartels to Erling Kristiansen of April 4th, 1961.

⁴⁴⁶ ABA JOK, Box 4, file A III (Bartels, E., ambassador). Letter from Bartels to Krag, of March 28, 1962: "... there is something rotten in the Kingdom of Denmark ..." And: "... om hvorvidt vi fortjener en bedre skæbne end at fortsætte vor århundrede-gamle prostitutionspolitik, som vil styrke den tendens, som alt består, til at betragte os som et folk, der har mistet sin sjæl."

⁴⁴⁷ Johnny Laursen, "Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Challenge", in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961 – 1963* (London, 1996), p. 223; ABA JOK, Box 65, file: "Paris 25. – 28. januar". Krag's summary of his talks with de

An understanding had emerged in Danish political and diplomatic circles that the acceptance of foreign-policy cooperation was a necessary 'entrance card' to the EEC. From Paris, Ambassador Bartels permanently insisted that the Gaullist political visions were a critical part of the entire market issue.⁴⁴⁸ In January 1962, he solemnly wrote that Europe was dependent upon French leadership and initiative, and one would have to "accept as a matter of fact that Danish membership of the Six can not be ensured without, simultaneously, accepting certain political ideas." In a reply to Bartels, Foreign Minister Krag and the Ministry's Director, Paul Fischer, fully endorsed this view.⁴⁴⁹ Undersecretary Peter Michaelsen, bluntly argued that Denmark had to express its unequivocal intention to participate in the political cooperation, also in spite of Denmark's political traditions and reluctance in the field: "[A]n other stance would simply cause the most serious risk of wrecking our membership application to the economic community."⁴⁵⁰

In this perspective, the Danish government's acceptance of de Gaulle political project seems predominantly to be associated with the objective of becoming a member of the economic club, the EEC. The compliance of the EEC applicant Denmark is in stark contrast to the intransigent opposition of the Netherlands in the Fouchet negotiations. The case illustrates in particular the difference between being an insider and an outsider. As an EEC member, the Netherlands were in a position to oppose the Gaullist project, whereas the Danish government considered that it had to uncritically accept the entire package. A somewhat frustrated Ambassador Fouchet clearly grasped these circumstances, as indicated in his comment about the Danes' EEC policies in March 1962:

In fact, the political dimension of the Common Market is deliberately ignored. They indicate that they are ready to form a coherent political entity, but, at the end of the day, they only think about selling agricultural products.⁴⁵¹

Gaulle of January 26, 1963 in: "Notat om Statsministerens besøg i Paris 25. – 28. januar 1963."; Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 87.

⁴⁴⁸ RA UM 5.B.43.a, Box II. Bartels' report "Europa" of February 15, 1961 and "Referat af møde i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn den 10. Marts 1961, kl. 11"; Birgit Nüchel Thomsen, "Danmarks vej til Europa. Det politiske forløb 1957-61", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948 – 1992* (Odense, 1993), p. 128.

⁴⁴⁹ RA UM, 123.D.1, Box 10. Letter from Bartels to Director Fischer of 23 January 1962: "... acceptere som et faktum, at dansk medlemskab af de Seks ikke kan sikres uden samtidig accept af visse politiske forestillinger ..." and the letter from Fischer to Bartels of 5 February 1962.

⁴⁵⁰ RA UM, 5.B.43.a, Box 7. "Notits. Betragtninger over spørgsmålet om dansk medlemskab af en europæisk politisk union", of 10 October 1962 by Peter Michaelsen.

⁴⁵¹ MAE AD EU, volume 89: "Télégramme a l'arrivée", Ambassador Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 1 March 1962: "En fait, l'aspect politique du Marché Commun est volontairement négligé. Du bout des lèvres, on

In general, foreign-policy cooperation did not appear as a positive European vision in the context of Danish politics, but it had become an unavoidable issue in connection with the EEC application.

Cooperation with West Germany: the French and the Danish Approach

De Gaulle's proposal regarding the political confederation had a counterpart in the Franco-German collaboration. The French historian George-Henri Soutou describes in his work on the post-war Franco-German rapprochement - *L'alliance incertaine* - that de Gaulle inherited an embryonic Franco-German-Italian strategic cooperation, initiated under the collapsing Fourth Republic. Initially, the Gaullists sidetracked it, but then revived it in a Franco-German constellation in the summer of 1960. Among other things, the Franco-German understanding was nourished by a common dissatisfaction that the American administration tended to leave the dissuasive nuclear doctrine of *massive retaliation* in favour of the *flexible response* strategy. West German strategists were as horrified as the French about the nuclear vacuum in Central Europe, but Chancellor Adenauer's government was moving on a more delicate balance between Atlantic and West European cooperation than its French counterpart was.⁴⁵²

In Denmark, the government and the non-socialist parties emphasised the aim of binding Germany to the West and encouraged the reconciliation between the two great powers and 'archenemies' on the European continent. During the first EEC campaign, Jens Christensen – the key aide of Foreign Minister Krag – thus outlined the advantages of securing the new, democratic and peaceful Germany its proper place in the European economy and politics.

The fear of possible German and French initiatives in particular which in many circles seems to be the driving force for the emotive opposition towards the Common Market, should be an excellent argument in favour of accession.⁴⁵³

In his talks with General de Gaulle in April 1961, moreover, Foreign Minister Krag endorsed France's policies of "involving Germany as much as possible in the Western collaboration", in order to avoid West German *Alleingang* regarding German unification and collaboration

indique qu'on est prêt à former avec les futurs partenaires un ensemble politique cohérent, mais on ne pense en fait qu'à vendre les produits agricoles."

⁴⁵² Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard, 1996), pp. 158-166.

⁴⁵³ Jens Christensen, "Følelser og realiteter i fællesmarkedsdebatten", *"Politiken"s kronik* 4.1.-1962; Lidegaard (2002), pp. 171 – 173.

with the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁴ Four days after de Gaulle and Adenauer had signed the milestone Franco-German Elysée Treaty of 22 January 1963, Jens Otto Krag – Prime Minister by now – had again a meeting with de Gaulle, where he went more thoroughly into the issue from a Danish point of view:

Like France, we have frontiers with Germany, and we have had similar experiences in the last centuries. From these, we have drawn the same conclusions as France. I make a personal effort to obtain a complete reconciliation and restore full confidence with Germany. In Bonn, I have signed a commercial treaty for several years. I have had the occasion to contribute to the establishment of the common Baltic Command, and, two years ago, we have engaged into negotiations with a view to conclude a general agreement. They have been postponed due to the possible enlargement of the Common Market, but our relations with Germany are vital on the political, the economic and the military level. Today, Denmark cannot be defended without the collaboration of Germany. This is the reason that we cherish a lot of sympathy for the treaty concluded by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer.⁴⁵⁵

For large parts of the Danish public, however, the appearance of a Franco-German alliance had some unfavourable connotations, which overshadowed the historical perspective of the Franco-German reconciliation. General de Gaulle's way to power and his 'militaristic' approach to security policy was not a reassuring perspective for the pacifist undercurrent of the Danish society. For the new left, the "de Gaulle-Adenauer brotherhood", as Herluf Rasmussen (MP) of the Socialist People's Party called the Franco-German alliance, even signified a horrifying, reactionary concentration on military power in the heart of continental Europe.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁴ RA UM ad 5.D.25.b, box A. "Referat", minutes from Krag's meeting with de Gaulle on April 20, 1961: "... at inddrage Tyskland så stærkt som muligt i det vestlige samarbejde."

⁴⁵⁵ HAEU MAEF SG 18.6, reel 208. "Entretien du General de Gaulle et de M. Krag, le Samedi 26 Janvier 1963, de 11 h.30 à 12 h.30 [...] Nous avons avec la France des frontières communes avec l'Allemagne, et avons fait dans les derniers siècles des expériences de même nature. Nous en avons tiré les mêmes conclusions que la France. Je me suis personnellement efforcé d'obtenir une réconciliation complète et pleine de confiance avec l'Allemagne. J'ai signé à Bonn un traité commercial de plusieurs années. J'ai eu l'occasion de contribuer à l'établissement du Commandement commun en Baltique et nous avons engagé, il y a deux ans, des pourparlers en vue de la conclusion d'un accord général. Les pourparlers ont été ajournés en raison de l'élargissement éventuel du Marché Commun, mais nos relations avec l'Allemagne sont vitales sur le plan politique, économique et militaire. Aujourd'hui le Danemark ne pourrait pas être défendu sans la collaboration avec l'Allemagne. C'est pourquoi nous éprouvons une grande sympathie pour le traité conclu entre le Général de GAULLE et le Chancelier ADENAUER."

⁴⁵⁶ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandling, 1962-63, column 2804.

Anti-German slogans became a main rhetorical tool of the EEC and NATO opponents. However, the integration of West Germany in the European project was a primary objective for the Danish government, and France constituted a corner stone in this process. In this perspective, the prospect of a pacesetter, i.e. dominating, Franco-German axis was the lesser evil compared to an unconstrained West German political, economic and military revival.

Denmark was also embarking on a persistent line of cooperation with West Germany. Social Democratic leaders with a European outlook such as Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Hækkerup whole-heartedly encouraged the reconciliation process, breaking with the Danes' historically formed resentment and anti-German identity. In the military field, a Danish-German Baltic Command, integrated in the NATO structures, had been in the pipeline from the early 1950s. Only five years after the collapse of the Third Reich, Danish and Norwegian navies had actually established secret contacts with German naval officers concerning the defence of the Western part of the strategically important Baltic Sea and the straits to the Skagerrak and the North Sea. From the mid-1950s, moreover, General Norstad - NATO's supreme commander in Europe - strongly suggested the creation of a common Danish-German Baltic Command with a British leader under NATO's northern region. There were obviously strong misgivings about the notion of a common Danish-German Baltic Command in Denmark, also in governmental and administrative inner circles. On the surface, the advancing West German rearmament appeared as a revival of Denmark's classical security nightmare. However, the Cold War scenario imposed a reinterpretation of the role of (West) German military force; now it was a precondition for organising any serious defence of Denmark vis-à-vis the 'Red Army.' A 'conventional' Soviet offensive, aiming at the so-called stepping-stone country Denmark, would most likely advance through Northern Germany or the Baltic Sea. The overall NATO defence was barely prepared for relieving the territories to the east of the Rhine at the eve of the 1960s. A conventional, military defence of Denmark would therefore be extraordinarily dependent on the West German engagement in Northern Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) in an East-West confrontation.⁴⁵⁷

Still, the French and the Danish approaches to collaboration with West Germany differed significantly. Both governments had arrived at the conclusion that a West German (re)armament was imperative for creating a viable defence of Western Europe vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc. However, the Danes favoured a tight integration of the Danish-German Baltic

⁴⁵⁷ Jens Otto Krag, "Danmark, De Seks og Tysklands-problemer", in *Politiken*, 1 April 1962 and "Danmark og Europa", feature article in *Information*, 30 December 1961; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villume, *I Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 487.

Command in the NATO structures as a measure against the widespread fears of West German dominance.⁴⁵⁸ During the April 1961 meeting with de Gaulle, Foreign Minister Krag explained the Danish approach to the Baltic Command.

Denmark wants this command internationalised so that it does not assume a strictly bilateral character. An American or a British admiral, a Norwegian or a Canadian general could be appointed to that end. It would be easier to explain such an arrangement to the Danish public.⁴⁵⁹

Foreign Minister Krag attempted to convince the public that the Baltic Command by no means was a purely Danish-German matter; it was a NATO command with one third of the officers coming from other NATO countries. He regretted that the media did not spell out sufficiently this moderating circumstance for the sceptical public, in which the apprehension was thriving that military collaboration with the 'aggressive' and 'revisionist' (West) Germany might pull Denmark into a devastating confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁴⁶⁰

One of the main French interests in the Franco-German collaboration, on the contrary, was to bolster up the Gaullist independence design vis-à-vis the NATO structures and the United States. Thus, the Elysée Treaty was formed as a *bilateral* Franco-German agreement. It can be interpreted as a substitute for the abortive Fouchet Plan that also challenged the existing NATO structure and the dependence on the United States. During the ratification process, however, the German *Bundestag* enforced a pro-Atlanticist preamble to the *Elysée Treaty* after exceptionally strong American pressure.⁴⁶¹ It made it clear that the Franco-German strategic ambitions had to take NATO and Britain's future EEC membership into consideration. The concrete results of the Franco-German alliance were meagre, but it remains a symbol of the French and German political willingness to break with the conflict ridden past.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁸ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 323-340.

⁴⁵⁹ HAEU MAEF SG 13.28: "Compte rendu de l'entretien du General de Gaulle avec M. Krag, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Danemark le Jeudi 20 Avril 1961, de 17 h. 05 à 17 h. 55, à l'Elysée. [...] *Le Danemark souhaiterait internationaliser ce commandement pour qu'il ne comporte pas un caractère strictement bilatéral. Un amiral américain ou britannique, un général norvégien ou canadien pourraient y être appelés. Un tel arrangement serait plus facile à expliquer à l'opinion publique danoise.*"

⁴⁶⁰ Tage Mortensen's interview with Jens Otto Krag, "Danmark, Fællesmarkedet og enhedskommandoen", in *Berlingske Tidende*, 31 December 1961.

⁴⁶¹ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 123-126.

⁴⁶² Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Fayard : 1996), pp. 166-232 ; Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 255-262.

Although the French nuclear project and the "third force" vision were not considered a viable alternative to the *Pax Americana* in Denmark, the Gaullist challenge attracted a lot of attention on the level of decision-makers as well as in the new political movements. In the UN, the Danish government dissociated itself from the nuclear test programme that France launched during the moratorium of the existing nuclear powers. This position represented partly the Danish government's profound opposition towards nuclear proliferation, partly a response to the movement of nuclear disarmers emerging within and to the left of the governing parties. For all the Gaullist talk about the independent "European Europe", France could not provide a credible defence guaranty for the Western European partners. There was a wide interest in political cooperation in Western Europe, but only the Gaullists envisioned a "political union" that would challenge the Atlantic system.

Danish political elites took an interest in the idea of political consultations, too, but it featured as a controversial issue in the membership debate of 1961-1962. Although the bipolar bloc system was considered a historical mistake in centre-left circles, there was definitely no wider support to the idea of creating an independent "third force". Based on the former axis powers and de Gaulle's ambitions, many Danish observers doubted that the European venture would contribute to international détente. Nevertheless, the Danish government fully accepted the political project during the EEC membership negotiations. Committing Denmark to the project was considered a necessity in the negotiations with the EEC.

In the Danish debate, the question emerged whether Germany, the 'archenemy' in the south, or Gaullist France, a more distant power in search of its old *grandeur*, was becoming an informal leader of the EEC. It is hardly surprising that the EEC opponents presented the EEC as a "*Pax Germanica*". However, France also appeared as pertinent candidate as the leading European nation. In the light of the Gaullists contempt for the parliamentary system; the Algerian War; and France's assertive nuclear programme, there was not a lot of confidence in that prospect, as the EEC antis pointed out. The same was the case with respect to the emerging Franco-German axis for the general public. However, the Danish government was very pleased with the Franco-German reconciliation process as such. Whereas de Gaulle engaged France into a bilateral collaboration with West Germany, the Danish government invited

NATO to lead the Baltic Command – a military cooperation between Denmark and West Germany.

Chapter 5 - First stop 'Paris' on Denmark's Way to EEC Membership (1958-63)

In the era of superpower dominance, France was chronically haunted by a decreasing significance on the global scene, and the colonial and political chaos tended to paralyse the '*grande nation*'. However, the rudimentary Franco-German collaboration and France's key role in the creation of the EEC hint that France in some respects was finding a renaissance on the less 'exotic' Western European scene. These dynamics strongly affected the northern peripheries of Western Europe. The Danish government deliberately attempted to strengthen the contact with its French counterpart, although the Danish EEC sceptics argued against engaging with France in the light of the political 'decay' and the colonial war. France was in a key position regarding the EEC's enlargement, and it was a driving force with the Netherlands for the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Western Europe. The conditions of the Danish market policies were tightly related to France's EEC policies.

First, we shall have a short look at de Gaulle's endorsement of the Fourth Republic's engagements in the EEC Treaty, which surprised many observers. Then we sketches some features of the Danish market policies, particularly the problems of the Western European market split associated with the breakdown of the wide free trade negotiations in 1958 – a situation that rendered the Danish export-based economy rather dependent on France and Britain coming to terms in trade policies. Finally, we shall look into the Danish reactions to de Gaulle's 1963 veto against British EEC membership.

The Paradoxes of de Gaulle's EEC Policies

With the other five governments of the ECSC, France's Socialist prime minister, Guy Mollet, agreed to create a customs union and a cooperation in the nuclear sector (Euratom), as outlined in the landmark Treaties of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957. It might appear as a paradox that France was able to contribute to the creation of the EEC, as the escalating war in Algeria drained the state's resources and required the nation's full attention. In spite of the colonial burdens and political chaos, the Fourth Republic managed to leave its stamp on the

EEC, particularly on the embryonic CAP; on the provisions for social harmonization; and on certain escape clauses from the common liberalisation programme.⁴⁶³ In addition, France obtained a significant economic contribution to the development of France's overseas departments and territories, a project often flagged as the *Eurafrica* vision. In Part Four of the EEC Treaty, the member states agreed "to bring into association with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands." In effect, the EEC partners thus accepted to co-finance predominantly French overseas development projects and to create a free trade area, which largely covered Francophone Africa and the EEC area.⁴⁶⁴ In this particular respect, the EEC was a lever for France's overseas modernisation programme. Most importantly, however, French industry and agriculture was intended to engage further on the growing West German market.⁴⁶⁵

General de Gaulle's interim government of 1958 thus inherited a membership of the EEC from the dissolving Fourth Republic. Before returning to French politics, the notorious nationalist de Gaulle as well as his associates such as Michel Debré had spoken out strongly against the supranational type of integration associated with the ECSC, the EDC project and European pioneers such as Jean Monnet.⁴⁶⁶ Reportedly, de Gaulle thus commented, "What use are these treaties? We will tear them up when we are in office."⁴⁶⁷ Although the war in Algeria had absolutely precedence on the Gaullist interim government's agenda, the EEC question was urgent for it, as the Treaty envisaged the first trade liberalisation on 1 January

⁴⁶³ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 2000 (first edition 1992)), 209-223.

⁴⁶⁴ Treaty establishing the EEC - Annex IV: *Overseas countries and territories to which the provisions of Part IV of the Treaty apply:*

- French West Africa: Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta;
- French Equatorial Africa: Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gabon;
- Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoro Archipelago, Madagascar and dependencies, French Somaliland, New Caledonia and dependencies, French Settlements in Oceania, southern and Antarctic Territories;
- The Autonomous Republic of Togoland;
- The trust territory of the Cameroons under French administration;
- The Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi;
- The trust territory of Somaliland under Italian administration;
- Netherlands New Guinea

⁴⁶⁵ René Girault, "La France entre l'Europe et l'Afrique", in Enrico Serra (ed.), *Il Rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp. 351-78; Poul Noer, *Frankrig mellem Afrika og Europa* (Aarhus: Jean Monnet Centret, 2002), pp. 11-67.

⁴⁶⁶ Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe des français, 1943-1959. La IV^e République aux sources de l'Europe communautaire* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996), pp. 383-384.

⁴⁶⁷ William B. Cohen, "De Gaulle et l'Europe d'avant 1958", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Plon, 1992), pp. 53-65; Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 162-175.

1959. Moreover, the British had launched an alternative project in 1956 for creating a wider Free Trade Area (FTA) in the OEEC that would imperil the EEC of the Six and the advantages that France had obtained in the Treaties of Rome.

To the general surprise, de Gaulle managed to carry through a package of fiscal reforms and to devalue the French franc (the Rueff-Pinay Plan), thus preparing France for the trade liberalisation agreed upon in EEC Treaty. A silent but drastic reappraisal of the EEC had taken place among leading Gaullists after the regime change in June 1958. They realised that the EEC Treaty was deeply marked by the desires and preoccupations of the preceding French governments. That was particularly the case regarding the provisions on the overseas territories; the harmonization of social costs; and the CAP. Therefore, the new government realised that France might be one of the greatest losers if the EEC broke up.⁴⁶⁸

De Gaulle remained reserved regarding parts of the treaty complex, though, and he was particularly hostile towards Commission President Walter Hallstein (1958-1967) – a devoted federalist German. For contemporary observers, Gaullist France became the ultimate symbol of an unenthusiastic or recalcitrant EEC member. The creation of the Fifth Republic on a profoundly *nationalist* reconstruction programme seemed therefore to mark the end of an epoch, where France was promoting the most effective visions and plans of Western European cooperation like Foreign Minister Schuman and Jean Monnet's path-breaking design for ECSC from 1950. In principle, de Gaulle had a possible ally in the British, Danish and Norwegian governments in his opposition towards the supranational principle of integration. However, Gaullist France rejected the British proposal of creating a free trade area within the intergovernmental OEEC framework, and he vetoed in effect British, Danish, Irish and Norwegian membership in 1963 and again in 1967.

One of the most notable and disputed explanations of this apparent incoherence is advanced by Andrew Moravcsik. He contends that Gaullist France was a 'normal' post-war nation-state in the sense that its EEC policy was constrained by dominant producer groups to the same extent as the other Western European states. De Gaulle's self-declared objective of rising above party strife and particular interests was sheer rhetoric (or megalomania) in the field of EEC policy, in Moravcsik's revisionist interpretation. In order to secure the agricultural vote and to avoid "another Algeria on our own soil", General de Gaulle had to safeguard the commercial interests of the distressed French farmers and to provide subsidies, partly from

⁴⁶⁸ N. Piers Ludlow, "Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crises 1965 – 1966", *Contemporary European History*, 8, 2, 1999: 231 – 248;

EEC sources. In this line of reasoning, the rationale of excluding Britain from the EEC was not rooted in the French geopolitical vision of assuming the leadership of Western Europe; it was rather a way of securing the construction and implementation of an advantageous agricultural policy before Britain joined the EEC.⁴⁶⁹ Professor Moravcsik's attempt of reducing the French EEC policy to a question of grain prices rather than geopolitical visions and *grandeur* is highly contested, but historians tend to concede that the CAP played a larger role in de Gaulle's EEC policy than hitherto assumed. The French preference for a strong Commission engagement in the administration and surveillance of the CAP illustrate the dependence and commitment of the Gaullist Republic in the EEC endeavour.⁴⁷⁰ For analytical and heuristic reasons, we shall chiefly follow this perspective in the present chapter. One of the features that mattered for the Danish market policy was indeed the prominence of the CAP in the French EEC approach.

The Danish Market Schism (1957-1960)

When the six continental ECSC partners launched the Euratom and the customs union project at the Messina Conference in 1955, Hans Christian Hansen's Social Democratic minority government was by no means keen on redirecting Denmark's economic and political bonds towards the European Continent or the envisioned *Eurafrican* formation at the expense of Scandinavia and Britain. Moreover, the Danish government supported the British 1956 initiative of establishing a wide free trade area in Western Europe.⁴⁷¹ The attention initially paid to the continental EEC project in Danish government circles and in the agricultural and industrial organisations was largely negative, expressed in terms of the EEC's future discrimination against Danish exports to the West German market, as the *common external tariff* gradually was going to take effect. In many centre-left groups, additionally, there was an outspoken fear that the EEC ushered in the formation of a 'reactionary political bloc' – an issue we shall return to in the following chapter.⁴⁷²

Frances M. B. Lynch, "De Gaulle's First Veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area", *Contemporary European History*, 9, 1, 2000: 111 - 135.

⁴⁶⁹ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998), pp. 176-197; Marc Trachtenberg, "De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe", in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2.3, 2000: 101 - 116.

⁴⁷⁰ Alan Milward, "A Comment on the Article by Andrew Moravcsik", in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2.3, 2000: 77-80.

⁴⁷¹ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), p. 98.

⁴⁷² Sebastian Lang-Jensen, *Den danske venstrefløj's modstand mod EF 1957-72* (Aarhus: Jean Monnet Centret, 2003).

Although the United Kingdom enjoyed a very favourable reputation in post-war Denmark as a liberator and as an island of democracy and stability, the image had some minor spots. The protectionist agricultural policies of the successive British post-war governments had become a liability for Danish exporters, thus impeding the earnings of foreign exchange. Denmark's meagre foreign currency reserves were particularly harmful to the efforts of modernising the comparatively backward Danish industrial sector. In order to protect Commonwealth suppliers and the directly subsidised British farmers, the British government refused, at the end of the day, to continue the opening for agricultural products from the Continent. British trade concessions were granted *bilaterally* to Denmark, independently of the *multilateral* trade framework, in which the Danish government was under strong pressure to liberalise trade with manufactured goods. Thus, the Danish trade negotiators could not obtain any compensation from Britain regarding the crucial agricultural trade, although Denmark dismantled its general import quotas for industrial products in accordance with the OEEC efforts. The organization of post-war trade in Western Europe had not rendered Denmark less vulnerable to protectionism on the major export markets.⁴⁷³

When the Six signed the Treaties of Rome in March 1957, the Danish agricultural exports were concentrated on two main markets, namely the UK with 43 per cent and the emerging EEC taking 39 per cent.⁴⁷⁴ Among the EEC partners, West Germany was by far the largest market for Danish agricultural exporters, whereas France was rather insignificant, as the 1960 distribution indicates:

Table 2 - Geographical distribution of Danish agricultural exports to the EEC markets, 1960.

Market	Per cent
Belgium & Luxembourg	1.5
The Netherlands	2.0
France	3.9
Italy	19.7
West Germany	72.9
Total	100

⁴⁷³ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 384-385.

⁴⁷⁴ Cited in Flemming Just and Thorsten B. Olesen, "Danish Agriculture and the European Market Schism. 1945-1960", in Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), p. 139 (the numbers are from "Danmarks vareindførsel og -udførsen", in *Statistisk Tabelværk*, 5. række, litra D, no. 78 tabel VIII, 1957.)

Ireland was by far more dependent on the British market for agricultural products, as Britain imported 81.72 per cent of the total Irish agricultural export in 1960.⁴⁷⁵ Norwegian agriculture, on the other hand, was an insignificant exporter, and it was subsidised to the extent that the individual farmer would lose if the emerging agricultural system of the EEC was applied in Norway.⁴⁷⁶

In the Danish economy, agricultural exports were still a cornerstone. In 1957, agricultural exports to Britain thus mounted up to 23.3 per cent of the total Danish exports, while the corresponding share of the EEC countries, altogether, was 20.1 per cent.⁴⁷⁷ With the mechanisation and modernisation of the agricultural sector, the productivity increased dramatically in the period. The Danish agricultural sector was in principle very competitive on the world market, but it was powerless against the global tendency of protecting and subsidising the farmers. The market value of the agricultural products was falling and the income of farmers thus in stagnation compared to other sectors in the incipient growth decade. These features prompted a profound demographic and societal transformation as some 50.000 workers migrated from the countryside to the towns and cities between 1953 and 1958.⁴⁷⁸ Denmark was becoming a semi-industrial society – a feature reflected in the circumstance that industrials exports surpassed that of the agricultural sector around 1961.⁴⁷⁹

In 1958, the Danish government was still awaiting the outcome of the European negotiations on the wide free trade area. Its primary goal was to create a Nordic Customs Union, negotiated since 1954, within a wider OEEC framework. At the same time, it was aiming at obtaining British concessions regarding agricultural trade within the free trade area, and securing an agreement with the EEC, especially concerning exports to West Germany. However, there was a stagnating tendency for agricultural exports to the British market, while

⁴⁷⁵ Alan Milward, "Denmark, Ireland and the political economy of industrialisation" in Alan Milward, *Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 43.

⁴⁷⁶ Hans-Otto Frøland, *Choosing the Periphery: The Political Economy of Norway's European Integration Policy, 1948-73* in *Journal of European Integration History* 2001, Volume 7, Number 1: 77-103.

⁴⁷⁷ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), p. 97.

⁴⁷⁸ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), p. 69.

⁴⁷⁹ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 379-397.

those going to the Continent increased.⁴⁸⁰ That was one of the main reasons why the Danish Agricultural Council - an extraordinarily influential interest organization - announced its support of Danish EEC membership in 1957 in accordance with the agrarian based Liberal Party. From the late 1950s, the agricultural sector's income problems compounded, and the Danish farmers went on 'strike' in 1961, holding back vital supplies - as their French colleagues.⁴⁸¹ As of 1958, the Danish agricultural sector had obtained minor state subsidies that increased from 9.0 per cent to 17.5 per cent of the value of production between 1961 and 1969.⁴⁸² In this light, the lucrative price regulations emerging within the EEC were attractive, particularly if the CAP was applied to the low-price British market.⁴⁸³ In this context, the Liberal Party's principled adherence to economic liberalism receded into the background.

The Danish government's preference for the Nordic Customs Union project might appear as a curiosity in the light of the EEC's dynamics and lucrative agricultural schemes. However, the exports of the growing Danish industrial sector were largely oriented towards the near EFTA markets, Britain, Norway and Sweden. In 1960, the distribution of Danish industrial exports to the EFTA, the EEC and other markets were as follows:

Table 3 - Distribution of Danish industrial exports to the EEC, the EFTA and other markets, 1960

Market	Per cent
EFTA + Finland	39
EEC	18
Other markets	38
Total	100

Source: Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De Europæiske Fællesskaber, *Danmark og De Europæiske Fællesskaber. Bind I* (Copenhagen: 1968), p. 82.

⁴⁸⁰ Gunnar Preben Nielsson *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), p. 348; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 283.

⁴⁸¹ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 380.

⁴⁸² Gunnar Preben Nielsson, *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), pp. 333-334; Anita Lehmann, "Venstres vej til Europa - Venstres europapolitik, 1945 - 1960", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 93, 2001: 45; Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities - Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), p. 71.

⁴⁸³ Alan Milward, "Denmark, Ireland and the political economy of industrialisation" in Alan Milward *Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 46-48.

Moreover, a 1958 study, commissioned by the government, stirred a lot of concern, as it concluded that around 40 per cent of the Danish industry would not survive within a liberalized West European market. As a consequence, major branches of the Danish industry opposed Danish EEC membership, an option that would expose them especially to West German competition at a merciless speed of liberalisation according to the EEC treaty. Most of the vulnerable industries, partly based on the home market, favoured a Nordic Customs Union within a West European free trade area. The more competitive industries, on the other hand, tended to favour Danish EEC membership with Britain. The Industrial Council and the Conservative Party, strongly affiliated to the former, supported in effect the centre-left government's 'wait-and-see' policy as of 1958, thus isolating the Liberal Party's quest for immediate EEC membership.⁴⁸⁴

Initially, the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions opposed the continental integration project in line with its British counterpart, the Trade Union Conference.⁴⁸⁵ The high degree of organisation of the Danish labour market and the trade unions' affiliation to the Social Democratic Party gave them a prominent role in the shaping of the Danish society. After the Six agreed upon the EEC Treaty in 1957, the Danish trade unions contributed considerably to foster a sceptic attitude towards continental integration, as we shall see in chapter six. Their reluctance partly reflected the objections raised by the vulnerable, labour intensive industries, partly a set of political concerns regarding the viability of the Danish welfare society and their own role in framing it. What was at stake was a certain labour market structure, characterised by a 'sacrosanct' right of the two sides of industry to negotiate wages directly, generally without state intervention. The Danish labour movement insisted that the universal, state financed social system would be hard to maintain if Denmark linked up with the politically 'Conservative, Catholic and Capitalist regimes' in the South. Finally, mass immigration from the South and especially 'German capital' was supposed to be a threat to the Danish labour market structure – and to the trade unions' omnipresent position in the society.⁴⁸⁶

From a Danish viewpoint, however, the Nordic design was barely envisioned as an alternative to a wider Western European framework. Instead it was supposed to accelerate the

⁴⁸⁴ Emmett Caraker and Adam Johansen, *Tilslutning og modstand til EF i perioden 1957-1993 – særlig med henblik på Dansk Industris og modstanderbevægelsernes kampanjer op til folkeafstemningerne i 1992 og 1993* (MA thesis from University of Copenhagen and Roskilde University, 1995), pp. 60-69; Rasmussen and Johnny Laursen, *Denmark's Road to the EEC, 1945-72. The State of the Art. Arbejdspapirer - Historisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet, nr. 13* (Aarhus, 2002), p. 7.

⁴⁸⁵ Erin Delaney, "The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe. The Expansion of European Social Policy", in *Journal of European Integration History*, 2002, Volume 8, Number 1: 122-127.

⁴⁸⁶ Johnny Laursen, "Det danske tilfælde. En studie i dansk Europapolitikens begrebsdannelse 1956-57", in Johnny Laursen (Ed.), *I Tradition og kaos: festskrift til Henning Poulsen* (Aarhus, 2000), pp. 238 – 276.

general liberalisation process regionally, exposing the industry to a moderate competition. The Nordic framework could thus provide a training ground for Danish exporters before the completion of a wider free trade area or an enlarged EEC. For the Danish government, the Nordic collaboration seemed to secure a political majority in market policies.⁴⁸⁷ The Social Democrats' main coalition partner from 1957 to 1964, the Radical Liberal Party, was among the strongest champions of Nordic collaboration and the Conservative Party was in favour too. Even the pro-EEC Liberal Party could hardly be directly opposed to the idea of Nordic collaboration – a vision the Liberals' predecessors had promoted in the 19th century as an alternative to German dominance. However, a Nordic framework was not a viable alternative to the EEC, as particularly Norway refused to liberalize trade with agricultural produce.

The EEC Reconsidered, but only with Britain (1961-1963)

The creation of the EEC significantly complicated the OEEC's attempt to liberalize Western European trade. It was widely considered a black day for the Danish market policy when the news arrived in November 1958 about de Gaulle's first *de facto* veto against the free trade area. In effect, France chose the small EEC club at the expense of the wide European market framework.⁴⁸⁸ With the wreckage of the OEEC solution, it seemed that Western Europe was facing an economic division. An 'economic iron curtain' around the Six was emerging, as the Social Democratic speaker and coming foreign minister, Per Hækkerup, warned in August 1958.⁴⁸⁹ An attractive, bilateral Danish-West German agricultural trade agreement of 1958 provided a temporary relief, but the prospect for the 1960s was that of the EEC erecting a trade wall concerning agricultural products in particular at the border to the Federal Republic – as it looked from Danish farmers' perspective.⁴⁹⁰

Denmark was arguably one of the countries hardest hit by the EEC's trade policies in the 1960s. It experienced a decline in exports to the West German market from 20.2 per cent of total Danish exports in 1961 to 12.8 per cent in 1970, while the German purchasing power

⁴⁸⁷ Johnny Laursen and Thorsten B. Olesen, "A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark's Nordic and European Policies, 1945 – 1998", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 223-259; Vibeke Sørensen, "Nordic Cooperation – A Social Democratic Alternative to Europe?", in Thorsten B. Olesen (Ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945 – 1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1994), p. 81.

⁴⁸⁸ Frances M. B. Lynch, "De Gaulle's First Veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area", *Contemporary European History*, 9, 1, 2000: 111–135.

⁴⁸⁹ Gunnar Preben Nielsson, *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), p. 387.

⁴⁹⁰ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 42-58.

was growing.⁴⁹¹ In spite of the fear of cementing the emerging economic blocs, the Danish government accepted to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of the remaining OEEC countries, though without Finland and Spain, agreed upon in 1959. Still, the EFTA did not provide a solution for the Danish agricultural trade, and the arrangement had a provisional character – at least for the Danes, the Irish and the British.

Some of the formerly critical Social Democrats moved hesitantly towards a profound reappraisal of the Danish market policy. They had, therefore, to convince the electorate and their political hinterland that the initial, critical analyses were not pertinent if Denmark joined with the United Kingdom, Ireland and, hopefully, Norway. With the admission of these countries, the political balance of the EEC would change character, so the new pro-EEC argument went. The Social Democratic leaders now emphasised that EEC membership was a prerequisite for maintaining an export-driven economic growth and for reinforcing the Danish welfare state and society - not a threat to it as they had initially argued. According to contemporary polls, the electorate was generally in favour of joining the EEC with Britain, as indicated in an opinion poll of August 1961:

Table 4 - Public Opinion towards Danish EEC Membership with Britain, August 1961

Answer	Per cent
In favour	53
Against	9
Don't know	38
Total	100

Source: Gallups Markedsanalyse A/S, www.gallup.dk/ugens_gallup/pdf_doc/ug_1962_19.pdf (seen 22 May 2006). The question asked was: "Are you in favour or against Danish accession to the European Common Market, provided Britain join?" Also published in Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), p. 131.

However, Denmark's 1953 Constitution stipulated that a transfer of sovereignty to international organizations in a clearly defined realm required a 5/6-majority in parliament. With a simple parliamentary majority, moreover, the government could submit the question to a referendum – the option actually chosen in 1972. In Norway, there was a similar 3/4-majority

⁴⁹¹ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 47-48.

rule.⁴⁹² These requirements were more rigid than in most other West European countries, and the Danish 5/6-majority requirement thus “placed Danish European policy at the centre stage of parliamentary policy with all its aspects of inter-party struggle”, as Morten Rasmussen correctly put it.⁴⁹³

When the contours of a revised British European policy, now aiming at exploring the conditions for EEC membership, appeared in early 1961, Danish membership and participation in the agricultural arrangement showed up as a way out of the market schism. The formula taking shape, now, was to shadow the British government as closely as possible in its negotiations with the EEC authorities and governments. On 31 July 1961, right after the British and the Irish governments had revealed their intention of entering into negotiations about EEC membership, the Danish government thus announced Denmark’s candidature.⁴⁹⁴ A cautious development in favour of Danish EEC membership *with and only with Britain* had taken place in the Danish industry and decisive parts of the labour movement. To some extent, this evolution mirrored a realization of the harmful consequences of the accelerated EEC trade wall and the perception that the competitive power of the Danish industries in question was increasing.⁴⁹⁵ In August 1961, the government obtained a solid parliamentary backing of its EEC policy by 152 votes. The strongly pro-EEC Liberal Party criticised the rigid condition of entering only with the UK, but it supported the government’s motion. Only the 11 MPs of the new Socialist People’s Party, represented in parliament after the 1960 election, directly opposed EEC membership under any conditions.⁴⁹⁶

If the government to some extent could remedy the problems of agricultural exports and earnings within an enlarged EEC, then a Danish membership would exacerbate the difficulties of maintaining Denmark’s Nordic bonds. Danish membership of the customs union of the EEC and participation in the planned Nordic Customs Union were mutually exclusive options. Although there was a strong pro-Nordic tradition in the four classical parties (the Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, Conservatives and Liberals), the anti-EEC Socialist People’s Party aspired to the role of the ‘true’ Nordic party. In this light, the Danish EEC supporters

⁴⁹² Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, Oljealder, 1965-1995* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), p. 157.

⁴⁹³ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark’s Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 86-87.

⁴⁹⁴ Johnny Laursen, “Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Challenge”, in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961 – 1963* (London, 1996), pp. 215.

⁴⁹⁵ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark’s Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 110-112.

⁴⁹⁶ Birgit Nüchel Thomsen, “Danmarks vej til Europa. Det politiske forløb 1957-61”, in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948 – 1992* (Odense, 1993), pp. 130-132.

warmly welcomed the Norwegian decision to enter into negotiations with the EEC in 1962. The neutral Sweden's rejection of following the Scandinavian neighbours, on the other hand, destroyed all hopes that a Scandinavian community could join, thrive and solidify within a wider Western European framework. However, de Gaulle's famous veto in January 1963 ended the first round of enlargement negotiations with a clamour. The applicants' EEC policies were by large formulated by the beginning of the 1960s, and patiently maintained throughout the 1960s. In Denmark's case the basic formula was to follow Britain, probably Ireland and, it was hoped, Norway into the EEC.⁴⁹⁷

Denmark and the Franco-British Controversy

Charles de Gaulle's coming to power in the summer of 1958 posed the question of the future of the Western European market plans throughout Europe. In Denmark, the Social Democratic 'crown prince', Jens Otto Krag - then in charge of the government's market policies - wondered in his diary notes what would happen to the Six and the free trade area after the military *coup* in Algiers.⁴⁹⁸ Prime and Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen also expressed his concern regarding Western cooperation in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, noting that "it was not clarified at all yet which course de Gaulle was going to steer."⁴⁹⁹ The great question was whether the political collapse and the nationalist quest of Gaullist France would hinder further steps towards European integration and collaboration. Was the new regime even going to roll back the EEC Treaty? The Gaullists' national position had, after all, played a crucial role in 1954, when the French *Assemblée nationale* refused to ratify the European Defence Community project, agreed upon by the Six two years earlier.⁵⁰⁰ France's Copenhagen Ambassador, Jean Bourdeillette, was right in his observation that one of the Danish political establishment's main concerns regarding the regime change was whether France would maintain its European and Atlantic commitments in the future.⁵⁰¹

A first indication of the European policies of the emerging Fifth Republic appeared as the free trade area negotiations of the OEEC broke down in November 1958. France's Minister of

⁴⁹⁷ Johnny Laursen, "Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Challenge", in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961 - 1963* (London, 1996), pp. 111-216.

⁴⁹⁸ ABA JOK, the Diary May 25, 1958: "Hvad saa De 6 og FTA?"

⁴⁹⁹ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 1: "Udklip af referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn 30/5 -58 kl. 16.45. I. Situationen i Frankrig." H. C. Hansen: "Det var dog endnu ganske uafklaret, hvilken kurs de Gaulle ville følge...."

⁵⁰⁰ Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), p. 186.

⁵⁰¹ MAE CADN CPH, box 3. "TELEGRAMME AU DEPART, Copenhague, le 2 juin 1958". Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry.

Information – the ardent Gaullist Jacques Soustelle - provoked a British withdrawal from the negotiations, as he announced that the French and British positions were irreconcilable. His remark reflected a basic Franco-British dispute regarding the legitimacy of British agricultural protectionism and Commonwealth preferences in any European market arrangement - a core problem, too, for Denmark. The newly appointed foreign minister, Jens Otto Krag, was therefore rather critical of the British inflexibility in spite of the tendency in Europe to blame the collapse on the French.⁵⁰² There was some discontent with de Gaulle's provocative, diplomatic style in Denmark, but the French diplomats in Copenhagen were pleased that Danish politicians and the press focussed more on the British intransigence than on that of France.⁵⁰³

As the negotiations on the free trade area were stalling in November 1958, Foreign Minister Krag also noted that the final French position vis-à-vis the British would be decisive for Denmark at the end of the day.⁵⁰⁴ In spite of the limited Danish exports to the French market, namely about a tenth of that going to the Federal Republic, the contours of France in an increasingly important role for Danish market policies appeared.⁵⁰⁵ In virtue of its position within the EEC, France was in a sense holding the key to solve the primary, Danish market problem, namely to bring the Danish main markets together in a wide trade framework including agricultural products. For that reason, the Danish centre-left government attempted to strengthen its contacts with France, while its political constituency was unsympathetic to the Gaullist authority agenda and foreign policies as such. In addition, it decided to invite the American administration to mediate in the Franco-British dispute.⁵⁰⁶

Gaullist France featured indeed as an unpredictable and yet crucial factor during the first enlargement attempt in the summer of 1961.⁵⁰⁷ Britain and Denmark started negotiations about the conditions for EEC membership in October 1961, while Norway only approached the EEC in the summer of 1962. Initially, France and Belgium blocked Ireland's membership

⁵⁰² Vibeke Sørensen, "Fra Marshall-plan til de store markedsdannelser, 1945-59", in Tom Swienty (ed.), *Danmark i Europa 1945-93* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1994), pp. 82-83.

⁵⁰³ MAE AD EU, volume 63: "A.s. Le Danemark et la zone de libre-échange", Ambassador Christian Fouchet to the French Foreign Ministry, 22 November 1958.

⁵⁰⁴ ABA JOK, the Diary November 1, 1958; Vibeke Sørensen, "Fra Marshall-plan til de store markedsdannelser, 1945-59", in Tom Swienty (ed.), *Danmark i Europa 1945-93* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1994), p. 83; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 414.

⁵⁰⁵ Namely 2191 million Danish Crowns against 238 million Crowns in 1962. See Erling Bjøl, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), p. 240.

⁵⁰⁶ RA UM Cabinet Meetings, 19 November 1958.

⁵⁰⁷ Vibeke Sørensen, "Fra Marshall-plan til de store markedsdannelser, 1945-59", in Tom Swienty (ed.), *Danmark i Europa 1945-93* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1994), pp. 82-83.

negotiations (until January 1962), in consideration of its neutral status and conflict with Britain over Northern Ireland, and probably due to the Irish critique of the French and Belgian conduct in Algeria and Congo, respectively.⁵⁰⁸ Danish Foreign Minister Krag referred several times to France's decisive role, and he tended to treat the EEC as *the Five and France*.⁵⁰⁹ Before Christmas 1961, Krag noted in his personal diary: "At times, one could wish de Gaulle falling at the end of the year. If we just had a more co-operative European instead (Pineau – Mendès France)!"⁵¹⁰ The Danish foreign minister even took the liberty of urging de Gaulle directly to adopt a more flexible approach vis-à-vis the UK in order to facilitate the market negotiations at a bilateral meeting in April 1961 – an appeal Krag maintained on successive occasions.⁵¹¹

That said, the French hard talk with the British was in a sense as necessary for Danish agriculture as it was for the French.⁵¹² A Franco-Danish understanding seemed to be developing on that point. Initially, the French negotiators had rigorously emphasised that Denmark had to accept the Treaties of Rome, and Couve de Murville gave the Danes a cold shoulder regarding their worries of blindly accepting the coming CAP, not knowing its future content.⁵¹³ In September 1961, the French foreign minister stirred some unrest in the Danish public by refusing Denmark a say in the elaboration of the CAP until the candidates had become full members.⁵¹⁴ He conceded, on the other hand, that the incorporation of Danish agriculture into the EEC system did not pose any problem as that of British agriculture and the Commonwealth system.⁵¹⁵ Couve de Murville offered assurances, too, that there would be room for everybody on the German market for meat products, a concern the Danish govern-

⁵⁰⁸ That is the argument of Joseph T. Carroll, *General de Gaulle and Ireland's EEC Application*, in Pierre Joannon (ed.), *De Gaulle and Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1991), pp. 84-85.

⁵⁰⁹ RA UM 3.E.92 January 22, 1959; June 20, 1960; January 1961; April 1961; July 1961.

⁵¹⁰ ABA JOK, the Diary, Christmas 1961: "Somme tider kunne man ønske sig De Gaulles fald i løbet af året. Hvis man fik en mere medgørlig europæer i stedet (Pineau – Mendès France)."

⁵¹¹ RA UM ad.5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2), box A: "Referat", Krag's summary of talks with de Gaulle on April 20, 1961 and "Referat af samtale mellem Statsministeren og general de Gaulle den 18.4. 1966."

⁵¹² Johnny Laursen, "Mellem fællesmarkedet og frihandelszonen. Dansk markedspolitik 1956-1958", in Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (Ed.), *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948 – 1992* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1993), pp. 78-79; Flemming Just and Thorsten B. Olesen, "Danish Agriculture and the European Market Schism, 1945-1960", in Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.), *Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 139-141.

⁵¹³ UM ad.5.D.25.b, box A: "Referat af møde i det franske udenrigsministerium fredag den 21. april 1961 kl. 11.00."

⁵¹⁴ *Politiken*, "Fransk afvisning af dansk markedsønske", 3 September 1961; *Børsen*, "Fransk glæde over vor ansøgning til De Seks", 3 September 1961. The French Embassy staff also noted that the Danish press comments were marked by disillusion after Couve de Murville's rejection of giving the Danes a say in the negotiations (MAE AD EU, volume 100: "A.s. L'opinion danoise et la visite de M. COUVE DE MURVILLE", 7 September 1961).

⁵¹⁵ ABA JOK, box 56, file 'F4d – Fransk udenrigsministers besøg 31. aug. – 2. sept. 1961': "Refereat af møde i udenrigsministeriet torsdag den 31. august 1961 kl. 15.30."

ment had raised earlier.⁵¹⁶ The French export of frozen meat did not compete with Danish exports, as the latter largely were based on live cattle exports to the German market and bacon and butter to the British consumers. The French foreign minister stated: "Concerning the meat prices, it would be to Denmark's as well as to France's advantage, if the selling prices on the British market were higher."⁵¹⁷ Finally, Olivier Wormser - Director of the French Foreign Ministry's Economic Division - claimed correctly that the French delegation in effect defended Danish exporters' interests in higher bacon prices on the British market in the EEC negotiations.⁵¹⁸

In this perspective, the Danish government faced a dilemma concerning the French European policies. De Gaulle's resolute demands to the British of accepting the EEC Treaty and its future agricultural regulations could pave the way for the preferred Danish market solution, namely that of bringing together the booming West German market with the British market *including* agricultural products. On the other hand, failing to reach the wide Western European agreement would expose the Danish export orientated economy to a highly fragile position on its continental main markets. De Gaulle's January 1963 veto brought this dilemma to the fore.

De Gaulle's 1963 Veto: a Moderate Danish Reaction

The French veto of British membership cast a shadow over Anglo-French relations for decades. It was strongly condemned in Western Europe and in the United States, where Cold War anxiousness had just reached a peak after the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis. On a melodramatic press conference staged on 14 January 1963, de Gaulle bluntly declared Britain unripe to EEC membership after 18 months of hard negotiations in Brussels. Commissioners, leading politicians and commentators in the EEC states, and the opposition in France, expressed sincere disappointment, as de Gaulle's step was considered a severe breach of confidence and an undisguised outburst of lust for power. Politicians in the Federal Republic felt a need to dissociate themselves from de Gaulle and from the marginalized Chancellor Adenauer. In addition, Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani of the *Democrazia Cristiana* sought to further the historical opening to the pro-European left with anti-

⁵¹⁶ ABA JOK, box 48, file 'F4, EF:1961': "Audiens hos general de Gaulle", by Ambassador Bartels, 17 November 1961.

⁵¹⁷ MAE AD EU volume 100: "Entretien entre M. HAEKKERUP, Minisre des Affaires Etrangères du Danemark et M. COUVE de MURVILLE le 13 Novembre 1962 au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. [...] "Pour les prix de la viande le Danemark a, comme la France, avantage à ce que les prix de vente sur le marché anglais soient plus élevés."

⁵¹⁸ op.cit.

Gaullist slogans. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak and his Dutch counterpart, Joseph Luns, were reportedly exceptionally furious in the aftermath of de Gaulle's press conference.⁵¹⁹

In neutral states such as Sweden and Finland, the press was critical as well, but the failure of the EEC enlargement was a great relief for the respective governments there. An enlarged EEC tended to undermine the EFTA that particularly Sweden favoured and which Finland hoped to join after the Soviet Union finally had consented in that regard.⁵²⁰ Although disappointed, the Irish government also reacted moderately compared to its British counterpart, but the Irish press tended to follow the anti-Gaullist tone of the British press.⁵²¹ Gaullist France and the president's highhanded approach to European cooperation were headline stuff again.

In Denmark, the veto set indeed the frame for deliberations about the nation's European affiliations. Back in November 1961, Foreign Minister Krag had expressed his doubts that de Gaulle would dare to torpedo the negotiations with the British. "It would not be responsible Western policy", he reasoned in the light of contemporary Soviet intimidation.⁵²² By late 1962, however, a breakdown seemed less unlikely, and Ambassador Bartels warned that de Gaulle was steering in that direction.⁵²³ After de Gaulle's press conference, Karl Skytte - the Radical Liberal Minister of Agriculture - was perplexed, and Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup called the veto "unduly brute and insulting."⁵²⁴ The Liberal Party leader, Erik Eriksen, was also highly concerned about the consequences of the veto on his rural constituency's behalf, but he attempted to seize the opportunity of the fluid situation to opt for Danish membership unilaterally. He suggested that Prime Minister Krag should form a wide coalition government with the primary purpose of shepherding Denmark into the EEC, even, if necessary, without Britain. However, Krag rejected this proposal, as his political hinterland still was reluctant. The idea of Denmark going solo seemed to be a dead-end, as the linkage between Danish and British EEC membership remained the key condition of the hesitant political groupings.⁵²⁵

⁵¹⁹ N. Piers, Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negoting the Gaullist challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 11-17; Richard Davis, "The 'problem of de Gaulle', 1958-1967", in Philippe Chassaing and Michael Dockrill (eds.), *Anglo-French Relations 1898-1998. From Fashoda to Jospin* (Palgrave, 2002), pp. 161-171; Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 220-224.

⁵²⁰ Mikael af Malmberg, "Gaullism in the North? Sweden, Finland and the EEC in the 1960s", in W. Loth (ed), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), pp. 489-490.

⁵²¹ Joseph T. Carroll, *General de Gaulle and Ireland's EEC Application*, in Pierre Joannon (ed.), *De Gaulle and Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1991), pp. 90-91.

⁵²² ABA JOK, the Diary, 20 November 1961: "Det er ikke ansvarlig vestlig politik".

⁵²³ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 - 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 81-82.

⁵²⁴ Gunnar Preben Nielsson *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), p. 591; Nikolaj Bøgh, *Hækkerup* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 2002), pp. 191: "... unødigt brutal og krænkende".

⁵²⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 503; Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities -*

Prime Minister Krag's indications under the tumultuous European circumstances displayed, nevertheless, some ambiguous traits. On 26 January 1963 in the *Elysée*, the Danish Prime Minister got the opportunity to explore de Gaulle's stance towards the future affiliation of Denmark to the EEC under the new circumstances. Krag took a particular interest in the French president's assurances that there would be no objections on France's behalf towards a Danish accession or a tight association to the EEC. It was indeed a significant prospect at this stage, only twelve days after the president's clamorous refusal of British membership. On his leave from the *Elysée*, in front of the international press, the Danish prime minister announced that de Gaulle had offered Denmark EEC membership or an association, including an arrangement for agricultural produce. He added that it was a generous offer that the Danish government had to consider thoroughly.⁵²⁶ In Krag's personal contribution to the European press conference diplomacy, he thus hinted that the EFTA partners could not take Denmark's loyalty for granted.

The historical literature has disputed whether de Gaulle literally 'offered' Denmark EEC membership, or whether he just stated the obvious, namely that it was up to Denmark to make a choice. The French minutes taken down in shorthand give reason to believe that Prime Minister Krag slightly exaggerated the character of the 'offer' at his press conference.⁵²⁷ Nevertheless, his statements became quite controversial on a European level. Especially the British and the Swedish governments reacted strongly against the Danish prime minister's flirtation with the idea of an isolated Danish EEC membership that might undermine the EFTA and the Scandinavian solidarity. In addition, the Federal Republic's foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder, protested the French attempt to open the EEC for Denmark without consulting the EEC partners – a new instance of French unilateralism.⁵²⁸

On this background, the French Foreign Ministry attempted to downplay the whole affair. It instructed the embassies in Europe and the main capitals abroad that: "There is no way, and there has never been any way, that we could promise admission of Denmark to the Common Market without an agreement with our partners."⁵²⁹ Before the Franco-Danish meeting of

Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973 (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 133-138.

⁵²⁶ *Aktuelt*, "de Gaulle yderst positiv overfor Danmark – Tilbyder os ekstra fordel", 27 January 1963.

⁵²⁷ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 86-93; Gunnar Preben Nielsson *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), p. 593.

⁵²⁸ MAE AD AEF.CE volume 2049. Telegram from the French Bonn Ambassador, Roland de Magerie, to the Ministry in Paris, 7 February 1963.

⁵²⁹ MAE AD AEF.CE volume 2049. Telegram from the French Foreign Ministry's Director of Political Affairs, Charles Lucet, of 31 January 1963 to 21 French Embassies: "*Il n'est et n'a été nullement question de promettre au Danemark son admission au Marché Commun sans accord avec nos partenaires.*"

January 1963, the French Foreign Ministry's Service of Economic Cooperation had warned against conceding to the Danish government:

In fact, the Danish demands do not pose any overwhelming problems. However, it seems preferable to us to avoid creating a precedence that could weaken our position vis-à-vis the British.⁵³⁰

De Gaulle's obliging indications conflicted to some extent with the French Foreign Ministry's approach to handling the Danish EEC application. In all probability, the French president aimed higher, namely at undermining the cohesion of EFTA, as a positive Danish reaction would demonstrate its fragile nature.⁵³¹

Prime Minister Krag withdrew from his unilateralist adventure shortly afterwards, assuring Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and the international press in London of the Danish government's sincere EFTA engagement.⁵³² Various Danish key actors had politely rejected de Gaulle's opening, namely Foreign Minister Hækkerup, Chairman Eiler Jensen of the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, the Conservative leader, Poul Møller, and Chairman I. C. Thygesen of the Industrial Council. Only some Liberals such as party leader Erik Eriksen, emphasised the increased Danish room of manoeuvre associated with de Gaulle's 'offer'.⁵³³ In the press, correspondent Erling Bjøl praised Prime Minister Krag for not going into anti-French or anti-Gaullist hysteria like the British and defended his disclosure of de Gaulle's EEC 'offer' as a message to the British and the EFTA.⁵³⁴ However, the episode contributed to the reputation of Prime Minister Krag as a keen and impatient European, an 'elitist' politician that the reluctant 'people' could not trust in European affairs. He was criticised for not blam-

⁵³⁰ MAE AD AEF.CE volume 2049: "A.s. Le Danemark et les Communauté européennes", 24 January 1963: "En effet, les demandes danoises ne posaient pas en elles-mêmes des problèmes insolubles, mais il nous paraissait préférable de ne pas créer de précédents qui pourraient affaiblir notre position à l'égard des Britanniques."

⁵³¹ Erling Bjøl, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 244-246; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 501.

⁵³² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 502-503; Gunnar Preben Nielsson *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), p. 593.

⁵³³ Aktuelt, "Kommentarer til de Gaulles tilbud", 27 or 28, January 1963; Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 - 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 90.

⁵³⁴ Erling Bjøl, "Krag og de Gaulle", feature article in *Politiken*, 13 February 1963. Recent research literature has given Krag some credit as a great tactician, able to strengthening Denmark's position within the EFTA. See Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 502-503. Gunnar Preben Nielsson argued also in terms of Krag giving a signal to the EFTA partners, but assessed that his 'communication' was clumsy, see his *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), pp. 595-596.

ing de Gaulle hard enough after the enlargement collapse.⁵³⁵ The pacifist magazine, *Frit Danmark*, renamed ironically the top ministers Jens Otto Krag and Per Hækkerup to the corresponding French names, *Jean* and *Pierre* to indicate that their rapprochement to Gaullist France went too far.⁵³⁶ More importantly, the whole episode spelled out the importance for Denmark of France and Britain coming to terms about the conditions of British membership.

An interpellation debate in the Danish parliament in February 1963 dealt with de Gaulle's veto and his favourable 'offer' to Denmark. Only the speakers of the pro-EEC Liberal Party positively expressed understanding for Krag's disclosure of de Gaulle's openness for Danish membership or association. However, the Liberals were disappointed with Krag's following retreat, where he fell back to the 'only with Britain' approach.⁵³⁷ The Liberal Axel Kristensen observed from his agrarian hinterland's perspective that:

- it would be unwise to paint one part – England - entirely in white, and France - de Gaulle - completely in black. [...] It would also be fair to realise that de Gaulle's conditions for British membership coincides with Denmark's interests. Our interests are not safeguarded as an act of charity, but obviously in line with selfish, French interest. However, these coincide with our own interests.⁵³⁸

Indeed, the Conservative and Radical Liberal speakers portrayed de Gaulle's veto in very negative terms. Poul Sørensen of the Conservative Party – traditionally an outright Anglophile party - stated that President de Gaulle carried the heavy burden of responsibility for the breakdown and regretted that Denmark was the only country where politicians could not tell the truth about de Gaulle's devastating, unilateral blow to European collaboration. He blamed Prime Minister Krag for initially "bubbling over with praise for the General" - and then criticised him for abandoning his initial enthusiasm without consulting the parliament.⁵³⁹ According to the Radical Liberal Helge Larsen, the British government had displayed a

⁵³⁵ For instance Hans Jensen, "Charles den Store og Danmark den lille", feature article in *Politiken*, 7 February 1963.

⁵³⁶ *Frit Danmark*, "Jean og Pierre, illusionister", volume 21, no. 11, February 1963.

⁵³⁷ *Folketingstidende*, folketingets forhandlinger, 1962-63, column 2739 (Per Hækkerup).

⁵³⁸ *Folketingstidende*, folketingets forhandlinger, 1962-63, column 2805: "- at vi ikke gør klogt i at male den ene part, England, helt hvid og Frankrig, de Gaulle, helt sort ... Der er også rimelig at fastslå, at de krav, de Gaulle stiller, for at England kan blive medlem, falder sammen med Danmarks interesser. Vore interesser er her ikke varetaget af kærlighed til os, men naturligvis af egoistiske interesser fra fransk side, men disse falder sammen med vore interesser." See also Erling Bjøl, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle, Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990*, Tome V. *L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 244.

⁵³⁹ *Folketingstidende*, folketingets forhandlinger, 1962-63, column 2742-9: "... strømmede over af venlig beskrivelse af generalen."

considerable degree of flexibility in Brussels, whereas de Gaulle had acted arrogantly and self-sufficiently by declaring his “*dixi*” – I have spoken – as an ancient Roman consul.⁵⁴⁰

The French officials noticed that de Gaulle’s press conference had caused a lot of trouble in Denmark, but they also reported about the Danish government’s zealous efforts of strengthening its ties to France.⁵⁴¹ In spite of the general perception that Gaullist France had played the main hand in the suspension of the British, Irish, Danish and Norwegian entry in 1963, Ambassador Albert Ledoux concluded that Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Hækkerup had showed “*grande moderation*.”⁵⁴² In September 1962, the French Ambassador had reported that France’s prestige in Denmark was increasing, as there were high expectations that France would show understanding for Denmark’s precarious situation in the market negotiations.⁵⁴³ The French Foreign Ministry maintained this analysis after the 1963 veto, and added:

In recognition of the role we play in the Communities of the Six, moreover, the Danish government, which is approaching the Common Market, is keen on making more frequent contacts with the French government.⁵⁴⁴

Like its Irish counterpart, the Danish government deliberately attempted to cultivate the ‘friendship’ with France, with a view to the upcoming market negotiations – in line with Ambassador Bartels’ recommendation from April 1961.⁵⁴⁵ Even Sweden embarked upon a rapprochement line with Gaullist France in spite of the Swedish rejection of becoming an EEC member and an outspoken opposition towards the Gaullist regime. To some extent, the

⁵⁴⁰ *Folketingstidende*, folketingsets forhandling, 1962-63, column 2758.

⁵⁴¹ MAE AD EU, volume 100: “Note. A/S – Relations franco-danoises”, 22 January 1963 and “Note. A.s. Danemark”, 25 April 1963, both notes elaborated by the *Direction d’Europe Occidentale*.

⁵⁴² MAE AD EU volume 89: “A/s : Le Danemark et la suspension des négociations de Bruxelles”, Ambassador Ledoux to the French Foreign Ministry, February 18, 1963.

⁵⁴³ MAE AD EU, volume 100. Telegram from Ambassador Ledoux to the French Foreign Ministry, 3 September 1962. Ledoux build his conclusion on the fact that Jens Otto Krag had spared some time with the visiting Charles Lucet, director of political affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, while standing in the middle of the process of succession after Prime Minister Kampmann, whose illness had made him unable to work.

⁵⁴⁴ MAE AD EU, volume 100: “Note [...] Relations franco-danoises”. [?] August 1963: “*D’autres reconnaissant le rôle que nous jouons dans la Communauté des Six, le Gouvernement danois, qui cherchait à se rapprocher du Marché Commun, [?] tenu à prendre plus fréquent contact avec le gouvernement français.*”

⁵⁴⁵ RA UM 5.D.25.b, box 1. Ambassador Bartels to Foreign Minister Krag, April 28, 1961; Joseph T. Carroll. *General de Gaulle and Ireland’s EEC Application*, in Pierre Joannon (ed.), *De Gaulle and Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1991), p. 88.

Swedish government, too, considered the criterion of coming to terms with the EEC a matter of coming to terms with France.⁵⁴⁶

...

In spite of the small significance of the French market for Danish exporters, French goodwill and flexibility was considered crucial for Danish market policies by 1958. The (West) German market was traditionally important for Danish agriculture, and the competitive, large-scale industries realised that their future growth was dependent on gaining better access to the continental markets. In November 1958, that prospect was severely jeopardized, as de Gaulle's interim government in effect torpedoed the wide free trade area in favour of the EEC and its planned agricultural policy. The Danish government and particularly the agricultural lobby shared the aim with the French of enforcing a British acceptance of a regulated agricultural market, though there were some reservations regarding de Gaulle's Machiavellian negotiating style. A Franco-British compromise would be decisive at the end of the day, and the Danish government constantly urged the French to show flexibility vis-à-vis the British.

De Gaulle's 1963 veto against British membership provoked strong and emotional reactions in Denmark as it did in all the involved countries. The nationalist general had spoken, and Western Europe remained divided, the Western opinion accused. In Danish media and in the public debate, Denmark's possibilities in European market affairs were presented as almost entirely dependent on the moods and whims of the French president. Only a few of General de Gaulle's contributions to international politics could match the veto in terms of cementing his reputation as a ruthless arch nationalist.

In Danish politics, however, Prime Minister Krag's slightly positive response to de Gaulle's membership 'offer' was as controversial as General de Gaulle's veto itself. Krag's indications were presumably intended as a signal to the EFTA partners, warning that they could not take Denmark's loyalty for granted without concessions in the agricultural field. Only the agrarian based Liberal Party was in favour of actually entering the EEC in spite of de Gaulle's 'no' to Britain. However, Jens Otto Krag's declaration in August 1963 to Prime Minister Pompidou that Denmark understood the French European policies better than any other country was not

⁵⁴⁶ Mikael af Malmberg, "Gaullism in the North? Sweden, Finland and the EEC in the 1960s", in W. Loth (ed), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), pp.489-494.

entirely farfetched. Among other things, the two countries envisaged themselves as 'natural' suppliers of agricultural products in Europe.⁵⁴⁷ In turn, Georges Pompidou expressed understanding for Denmark being one of the European countries most inconveniently situated in the light of the market split that was increasing with the implementation of the EEC countries' 'common external tariffs.'⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁷ ABA JOK, file 'Pompidou: Kbh. 26.-28. august', box 65. "Notits til eventuelt brug under drøftelserne i forbindelse med premierminister Pompidou's besøg i Danmark den 26.-28. august 1963. Økonomisk-politiske spørgsmål" – a note elaborated by the Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division.

⁵⁴⁸ MAE AD EU, volume 100: "Entretien entre le premier ministre et M. KRAG, premier ministre du Danemark, mardi 27 août 1963."

Chapter 6 – Danish Sovereignty, Society, and Identity and the French Europe (1958-1969)

With the institutional structures, commitments and political aims announced in the Treaties of Rome, the EEC and Euratom projects appeared by far more ambitious than the purely 'inter-governmental' OEEC framework. The EEC Treaty stipulated that the Council of Ministers should act by virtue of *qualified majority voting* on proposal from the Commission, particularly from the third and final stage of the customs union (Article 14, 2c). In other words, the Treaty envisioned supranational features in certain fields. As compared with the trade frameworks of the OEEC and the EFTA, moreover, the EEC expanded the number of policy areas touched upon by common policies. Although the Treaty was not very elaborate, a set of provisions referred to the aim of *harmonising* the member states' social systems and labour market legislations (Articles 117 – 122). These references became the basis for the critical approach of the Danish trade unions and centre-left politicians, who presented the EEC as an imminent threat to Denmark's Scandinavian style of welfare state and society.⁵⁴⁹ In addition, the member states declared, in the preamble of the EEC Treaty, their determination "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." In the standard left-wing interpretation, this phrase ushered in the formation of a new, bellicose power bloc, relying on the 'stigmatised' continental great powers' assertive international outlook and (neo-) colonial interests.

The European Movement have never had a stronghold in Denmark. To the extent that there were any integrationist or federalist affections, they tended to be associated with the visions of Nordic collaboration. Tellingly, the emerging EEC opposition presented itself as a revival of the World War II resistance movement, defending the nation against the political elites' treachery ... again. The EEC-antis thus accused the Danish government of disguising the

⁵⁴⁹ Johnny Laursen, "Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Challenge", in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961 – 1963* (London, 1996), pp. 212; ABA AE, box 155: "NOTAT vedrørende de direkte økonomiske konsekvenser af en dansk tiltræden af Rom-traktaten om oprettelse af et europæisk økonomisk Fællesskab", a report of September 14, 1957, elaborated by the Danish Foreign Ministry.

EEC's true and harmful aims, and they contested the official argument that the EEC was a prerequisite for trade driven growth and the financing of the Danish welfare state.

The prospect of Danish EEC membership spurred a new sort of nationalist movement with the aim of *protecting* what the internal nation-building project actually had accomplished in Denmark in the wake of the traumatic loss of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia in 1864.⁵⁵⁰ The new 'threat' – the EEC – was obviously more subtle than traditional military threats, but it was presented as equally severe in terms of undermining the Danish societal structure and egalitarian culture. For many EEC-antis, the idea of joining the EEC, looming within the political and bureaucratic elites, tantamount to giving in the nation voluntarily to the mercy of the Franco-German controlled 'Brussels power.' A majority of the Danish EEC opponents and sceptics were affiliated to centre-left parties and networks, but a peculiar alliance, made up of bourgeois and leftwing nationalists, was taking shape. In 1959, the shipping magnate A. P. Møller – a most respected symbol for the Conservative Denmark – thus warned about Denmark becoming a German dependency (*biland*) within the EEC, and he financed some of the early anti-EEC publications. "For me, it appears as selling one's birthright, not even for a mess of pottage, but for the sheer hope of a mess of pottage", he fulminated.⁵⁵¹

A salient feature of the early Danish EEC opposition and scepticism was the focus on the particular member states rather than the institutions in Brussels as such. The small Benelux countries were by no means a source of concern – they were rather considered innocent victims. Instead, the EEC opponents contrasted the political culture of the larger EEC states with that of the Nordic countries and partly of Britain. They referred to an *egalitarian, progressive* ideal type of Scandinavia and a *hierarchical, reactionary* model of the continental great powers. In the same vein, they associated the continental societies with Catholic influence, channelled into the civil societies and political spheres through the Catholic trade unions and the Christian Democrat parties. A prevalent expression for the EEC in Denmark was 'the Rome Union', which hinted that Vatican power was behind the Community.⁵⁵² Partly in vain.

⁵⁵⁰ The constitutive principle of the anti-EEC movement can be classified 'nationalist' if we follow Ernest Gellner's influential definition: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent", from his *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.

⁵⁵¹ Cited from Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), p. 69: "Det står for mig som at sælge sin førstefødsret, ikke for en ret linser, men for håbet om en ret linser."

⁵⁵² Johnny Laursen and Thorsten B. Olesen, "A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark's Nordic and European Policies, 1945 – 1998", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 223-259; Sebastian Lang-Jensen, *Den danske venstrefløjs modstand mod EF 1957-72* (Aarhus: Jean Monnet

the EEC supporters objected that the Nordic political and cultural values overwhelmingly had continental roots such as the Italian Renaissance; the German idealism; the German Social Democratic movement and the principle of 'people's sovereignty' born with the French Revolution.⁵⁵³

The state most persistently referred to in the EEC-sceptics' arguments was undoubtedly Denmark's southern neighbour – Germany - now in the shape of the Federal Republic. During the first enlargement campaign, a foreign-policy working group of the EEC-sceptical and pacifist Radical Liberal Party observed that one of the basic problems regarding the European Communities was that:

We do not like our partners. We do not think they are worthy. First of all, we can not forgive Germany who started the dreadful wars twice in this century, leading millions of people to unprecedented depths of brutality in World History – notwithstanding other grave lapses.⁵⁵⁴

However, the Radical Liberals participated in the coalition government with the Social Democrats, which applied for membership in 1961. Therefore, the party moderated to some extent its reluctances regarding EEC cooperation with (West) Germany. Instead, the full-blown anti-EEC, Socialist People's Party seized the anti-German theme; the party slogans systematically asserted that Hitler's *Neuropa* project was re-emerging disguised as a European *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*.

Whereas the (negative) stereotypes of Germany and the Germans were like written in stone by the eve of the 1960s, the various images of the Gaullist Republic were clearly in a more volatile state. The British, Danish, Irish and Norwegian public had to come to terms with the Gaullist phenomenon, while debating their future relations with the Continent. In the Danish EEC debate, Gaullist France figured alternately as an assertive great power with a failed democracy and the defender of national sovereignty towards federalist dreamers. The last dimension had some importance, as there barely was any type of objection towards membership in the Danish debate that was not presented in terms of defending the 'national sover-

Centret, 2003), p. 29; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik's Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 485.

⁵⁵³ Jens Engberg, *I minesfattet. Træk af Arbejderbevægelsens historie siden 1936* (Copenhagen: Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, 1986), p. 69.

⁵⁵⁴ RA Rad.: "Referat. Arbejdsgruppens 1. møde tirsdag den 20. februar 1962 på værelse 34 i Folketinget" and "Udenrigs- og militærpolitik", February 1962: "Vi kan ikke lide vore makkere. Vi synes ikke, de er os værdige. Først og fremmest kan vi ikke tilgive Tyskland, der to gange i dette århundrede har påbegyndt frygtelige krige, og som i den sidste krig førte millioner af mennesker til dybder af råhed, verdenshistorien aldrig – trods dybe fald – har opvist magen til."

eignty' - though the concept was used rather indiscriminately. Debaters hardly distinguished between emotional, formal (juridical) and more practicable aspects of the sovereignty concept. It popped up in debates ranging from technical labour market issues to rather pompous arguments about the protection of a thousand-year-long national tradition.⁵⁵⁵ In this context, the official Gaullist sovereignty agenda provided the Danish EEC supporters with a counter argument against the 'scare campaign' of the EEC-antis. The EEC supporters applied the symbol of the 'strong man' in the *Elysée* and the Gaullist slogan of *l'Europe des patries* as a challenge to the emerging popular image of the EEC as a supranational Leviathan, aiming to swallow up smaller nations.⁵⁵⁶

Pooling Sovereignty: the Small States' Opportunity?

By 1961, a considerable number of Danish actors professionally engaged in EEC policies considered that the Communities' supranational features were a useful framework for a small and highly dependent nation-state like Denmark. Pooling sovereignty with the stigmatised, continental great powers could be an alternative to the tradition of dealing bilaterally with these powers, based on a chronic position of weakness, and to the dream of retreating into a peaceful Nordic 'nirvana.' A supranational EEC structure might remedy Denmark's lack of bargaining power vis-à-vis the major states and facilitate a solution to the mounting Danish trade problems. The Nordic countries faced the same choice as the other West European states with regard to the EEC. As the Danish historian, Thorsten Olesen observes:

... the domestic conflicts in the Nordic countries over whether to be involved or not in the European integration process are and have been linked to defining what are the national interests and whether or not the transfer of formal sovereignty can be exploited to enhance such interests.⁵⁵⁷

In other words, the reasoning on European integration known from most of the EEC member states, and often promoted by the smaller ones, was not entirely unfamiliar for a Nordic mindset.⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Choosing or Refuting Europe? The Nordic Countries and European Integration, 1945 – 2000", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 – 2, 2000: 162.

⁵⁵⁶ Here the slogan comes in its popularized form, whereas de Gaulle referred to *l'Europe des états*. See Edmond Joue, *Le Général de Gaulle et la Construction de l'Europe 1940 – 1966* (Paris, 1967), p. 71 ; Erling Bjøl, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 239 - 246.

⁵⁵⁷ Thorsten B. Olesen, "Choosing or Refuting Europe? The Nordic Countries and European Integration, 1945 – 2000", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 – 2, 2000: 147-148.

The historical literature on European integration illustrates that governments often used supranational cooperation as an 'instrument' to pursue national policies. Particularly Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik have promoted the view that the involved governments predominantly have encouraged supranational integration as a means to obtain a credible commitment in specific policy fields, which involve prominent interests as defined within *national* political processes. Thus, the basic rationale of supranational cooperation, from the nation-states' point of view, is the advantage of securing or 'locking in' favourable outcomes of interstate bargains and encouraging future dynamics in favoured policy fields. A common feature of this research tradition - often referred to as *rational intergovernmentalism* - is the repudiation that *federalist ideology* or *internal dynamics*, spilling over from the ECSC and EEC institutions, have constituted a 'driving force' behind the European integration process.⁵⁵⁹ To underscore his point, Moravcsik cites the Federal Republic's *de facto* opposition towards qualified majority voting in the fields of agricultural, atomic and transports policies during the negotiations of the EEC Treaty. In these areas, the Federal Republic opposed far-reaching policies and a loss of national control, although the Germans were among the keenest supporters of supranational cooperation in other fields. On its side, Gaullist France – the champion of the intergovernmental approach - supported in effect a strong institutional framework for the common agricultural policy in order to create a credible arrangement, which had a high priority for France, Moravcsik argues.⁵⁶⁰

As we shall see, these dynamics were clearly at play in the Danish case, particularly in the perspective that the EEC could push the great powers to keep their side of concluded bargains. However, the Danish membership debates also highlighted the prominence of national sovereignty and identity constructs. Even though a supranational framework tempted parts of the Social Democratic, the Conservative and particularly the Liberal establishment, the Danish government tended to point to the *intergovernmental* approach of Gaullist France and Britain in public statements about the EEC. An acknowledgement of the advantages of pursuing commercial interests within a 'credible', supranational framework was identifiable in the

⁵⁵⁸ Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, "For Once a United Front. The Netherlands and the »Empty Chair « Crisis of the Mid-1960s", in Wilfried Loth (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), p. 175; Thorsten B. Olesen, "Choosing or Refuting Europe? The Nordic Countries and European Integration, 1945 – 2000", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 – 2, 2000: 162.

⁵⁵⁹ Alan S. Milward and Vibeke Sørensen, "Interdependence or integration? A national choice", in *The Frontier of National Sovereignty, History and theory 1945-1992* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 4; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998), pp. 67-77.

⁵⁶⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe ... op.cit.*, pp. 154-155 and 236.

Danish government's internal reasoning, but the achievement of the public's and the trade union movement's approval of the entire venture and a 5/6-majority in parliament, as the 1953 Constitution required, was probably more urgent. The Danish case thus differs from that of the Netherlands, where the cabinet often was more hesitant towards supranational cooperation than the parliament was, and it varies from Ireland, for which the EEC appeared as a platform upon which to gain *de facto* sovereignty after years of complete British dominance.⁵⁶¹

During the parliamentary session of early August 1961 on Denmark's EEC application, the representatives of the pro-EEC Liberal Party overtly argued in favour of a supranational EEC architecture. The leading party member, Axel Christensen, who was strongly affiliated to the Danish agriculture's peak organisation, presented the EEC structure as the smaller states' shield against great power *diktat*. "Entering the large market would make me anxious, if all the members could maintain their sovereignty. Nothing would have changed, then, and the strong would still make the decisions", he argued.⁵⁶² In the same vein, the Liberal Party's speaker on European affairs, Per Federspiel, praised the small nation's possibility and need of "pooling its so-called sovereignty in common interest with that of the other partners, without losing its national identity."⁵⁶³ In the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Federspiel dissociated himself from the 'popular' Gaullist sovereignty agenda, and accused the Danish government of having a vague position regarding de Gaulle's 'Europe of the Fatherlands'. What would happen to the EEC's protection of the small nations if the EEC accepted the Gaullist principles, he asked the Danish government in April 1962.⁵⁶⁴

Foreign Minister Krag admitted that:

⁵⁶¹ Alan Milward, "Denmark, Ireland and the political economy of industrialisation" in Alan Milward, *Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 64; Suzanne Bodenheimer, *Political union: a microcosm of European politics 1960-1966* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1967), p. 213.

⁵⁶² *Folketingetstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1961-62, column 4772: "Jeg ville være angst for at gå ind i det store marked, hvis alle kunne opretholde deres suverænitet; så skete der ingen forskel, det var stadig den stærke, der bestemte."

⁵⁶³ *Folketingetstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1961-62, column 4704.

⁵⁶⁴ RA UM 3.B.92/62 (MIK 02:2), [Møde i udenrigspolitiske nævn], 11 April 1962; Hans Branner, "With all respect, ... Per Federspiel - Portræt af en dansk europapolitiker", in *Vandkunsten*, Nr. 9/10, June 1994: 117-131; Anita Lehmann, "Venstres vej til Europa – Venstres europapolitik, 1945 – 1960", in *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 93, 2001: 49-50.

... the security provisions of the Treaty of Rome were of particular interest for the small countries. From a Danish point of view, he supposed, one could not be interested in undermining the authority of the supranational organs in the economic field.⁵⁶⁵

It was a quite clear acknowledgement from the Danish foreign minister that he considered it an advantage to organise certain economic policies within a supranational framework. Discreetly, many actors in political, administrative and economic circles - *the elites* - thus accepted that formal surrenders of national sovereignty could be an advantageous framework for Denmark to deal with the states of the Continent and to avoid the paralyses associated with unanimity voting known from the OEEC. It is noteworthy, though, how little emphasis the early pro-EEC campaign (1961-63) of the centre-left government put on a favourable version of the supranational argument. It remained largely a Liberal and partly a Conservative speciality.

Instead, Foreign Minister Krag referred frequently to the Gaullist approach. During a Franco-Danish meeting in April 1961, de Gaulle had previously confirmed - on Krag's enquiry - that his policy did not aim at an 'integrated Europe' but instead at a 'close cooperation between independent European nations.' Krag had no objections to Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's expectation that a somewhat 'deeper' kind of collaboration would take place in the complex economic field.⁵⁶⁶ However, Krag noted that the intergovernmental form would make it "significantly easier for Denmark to accept the commitments associated with political cooperation within the Six."⁵⁶⁷ In a radio interview from Paris, the Danish foreign minister emphasised the significance of the Gaullist intergovernmental visions for the Danish listeners.⁵⁶⁸ In the Danish Foreign Policy Committee, Krag assured that Gaullist France offered 'a moderate European vision' as it featured a confederative structure, and in parliament, he advertised that the French emphasis on national governments increasingly character-

⁵⁶⁵ RA UM 3.B.92/62 (MIK 02:2), April 11, 1962. Foreign Minister Krag: "... at Romtraktatens sikkerhedsbestemmelser var af særlig interesse for de små lande. Han gik ud fra, at man fra dansk side ikke kunne være interesseret i en udhuling af de overstatslige organers beføjelser på det økonomiske område."

⁵⁶⁶ RA UM, ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2) "Udenrigsministerens besøg i Frankrig april 1961/ og senere statsministerens besøg i Frankrig april 66. Pakke A: 1961 - 31.12.72." The minutes from Krag's meeting with de Gaulle is in: "Referat. Paris, den 20. april 1961." From the meetings with Couve de Murville: "Referat af Møde i det franske udenrigsministerium fredag den 21. april 1961 kl. 11.00. Hemmeligt."

⁵⁶⁷ RA UM, ad 5.D.25.b (MIK 02:2) "Udenrigsministerens ...op.cit.": Krag ville gerne understrege, at dette fra et dansk synspunkt gjorde det betydelig lettere at acceptere de forpligtelser for Danmark, som ville følge af et politisk samarbejde inden for de Seks."

⁵⁶⁸ Cited in Gunnar Preben Nielsson, *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), p. 536. The French Embassy observers reported about Krag's positive usage of the Gaullist European vision in this radio broadcast see MAE AD EU, volume 100. "Télégramme a l'arrivée", from Peyster at the French embassy in Copenhagen to the French Foreign Ministry, 22 April 1961.

ised the EEC.⁵⁶⁹ Finally, the Social Democratic speaker, Per Hækkerup, argued that the Community would not pose a 'threat' since a state leader as prominent as de Gaulle had ruled out the possibility of European bureaucrats governing France.⁵⁷⁰

Facing severe reservations in the trade union movement and in centre-left circles, the government also sharpened the pro-campaign's Anglo-Scandinavian profile, assuring the public that EEC membership would only take place with the UK and hopefully Norway, with a satisfying solution for Sweden. In parliament, Per Hækkerup thus made the obvious, but politically important observation that 'the Six' would cease being 'the Six' after enlargement with, at least, Denmark and the UK.⁵⁷¹ The enlargement would change the political balance, including the balance between federalists and intergovernmentalists, and add a group of solid democracies to the EEC. The Social Democrats' political slogans even featured a missionary dimension, claiming that the Anglo-Scandinavian applicants' understanding of social justice and political culture was needed on the Continent.

There was thus a basic distinction in the Danish sovereignty debate of the 1960s between the continental great powers and the Nordic countries. Surrendering sovereignty was barely an issue in Denmark when it came to the successive proposals of institutionalising a cooperation with the Nordic 'sister countries', made up of a resembling national material and small populations.⁵⁷² A common Nordic labour market had functioned smoothly since 1954 without serious, political objections regarding loss of national sovereignty, identity or mass immigration.⁵⁷³ In 1965, moreover, the fervent EEC opponent and leader of the Socialist People's Party, Aksel Larsen, even recommended that the Nordic Council should become a genuinely decision-making authority, i.e. what one would classify as a supranational authority in EEC terminology.⁵⁷⁴ As we shall see in chapter seven, moreover, the Danish, Social Democratic government actually proposed to create a Nordic Economic Union with strong institutions and macroeconomic coordination in 1967 – a rather unthinkable initiative with regard to continen-

⁵⁶⁹ RA UM 3.E.92/61 (MIK 02:2), July 31, 1961; *Folketingstidende*, 3 August 1961, column 4685.

⁵⁷⁰ *Folketingstidende*, 4 August 1961, column 4693.

⁵⁷¹ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1961-62, column 4688.

⁵⁷² 'Norden' or 'the Nordic countries' consists of the three Scandinavian countries Norway, Sweden and Denmark, along with Finland and Iceland.

⁵⁷³ Thorsten B. Olesen and Johnny Laursen: "A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark's Nordic and European Policies, 1945 – 1998. *Contemporary European History*, 9, 1, 2000: 59–92; Lene Hansen, "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 55–57.

⁵⁷⁴ Sebastian Lang-Jensen, *Den danske venstrefløjs modstand mod EF 1957-72* (Aarhus: Jean Monnet Centret, 2003), pp. 34–35.

tal cooperation.⁵⁷⁵ On the contrary, Danish EEC opponents had a considerable success with slogans about *protecting* Danish sovereignty against Europe (to the south of the Danish-German border), shielding the nation from continental, great power interference. Freedom from *German-Prussian* interference had figured as the central sovereignty and identity issue from at least 1848, and the new EEC opposition largely managed to present the membership question in extension of that complex of problems.⁵⁷⁶

In some respects, the critical Danish sovereignty understanding was akin to that highlighted in the Gaullist concept of the 'Europe of the Fatherlands.'⁵⁷⁷ The inability to think of the nation and the state on separate levels seems to be a common trait of the French-Gaullist and the Danish nation-state constructions. As the Danish political scientist, Lene Hansen, has argued:

A Europe which goes beyond 'Europe of the nation-states' is a threat in Danish political discourses, and being able to construct one's opponent as a proponent of a tightly integrated Europe is a powerful discursive move.⁵⁷⁸

In this vein, Lene Hansen and her colleague Ole Wæver hypothesise that the ability of competing European visions to gain political *legitimacy* varies with the conceptual constellation of state-nation ties in national discourses. In the German context, the concept of the so-called *Kulturnation* features independently of the state; hence, an integrated Europe generally does not appear as a threat, they argue. As the dominant Danish tradition supports a tight link between nation and state, on the contrary, a transfer of state capacities to European institutions, but not to Nordic ones, tends to be conceived as a step towards the dissolution of the 'national community.'⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁵ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), p. 159.

⁵⁷⁶ Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 157-158; Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, *Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 3* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003), pp. 143-259.

⁵⁷⁷ Mikael af Malmberg, "Gaullism in the North? Sweden, Finland and the EEC in the 1960s", in W. Loth (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), pp. 489-508.

⁵⁷⁸ Lene Hansen, "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 81.

⁵⁷⁹ Ole Wæver, "Identity, communities and foreign policy. Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states*

The references of the leading EEC supporters of the Danish centre-left to de Gaulle's intergovernmental agenda seem to corroborate this point. In anticipation of negative reactions towards membership of a supranational Community, politicians 'offered' the critical electorate a membership of a seemingly harmless, intergovernmental organisation rather than a supranational framework.⁵⁸⁰ Gaullist France thus represented an exception within the EEC as an opponent to what many Danes regarded as the 'exaggeratedly' pro-European approach of the other member states and the 'founding fathers' of the Western European projects. Paradoxically, thus, de Gaulle's 'Europe of the Fatherlands' featured as a moderating circumstance in the Danish debate, while the Gaullists considered intergovernmental cooperation a platform for French leadership in Western Europe.

Protecting the Danish Welfare State *against* the EEC

A core feature of the Danish EEC scepticism was the fear of losing control with the national welfare state project and labour market design - a dimension tightly interwoven with the national sovereignty and identity debates. The Danish social security system was created in continuation of the landmark, cross party compromise of January 1933, agreed upon in the context of political radicalisation all over Europe and Adolf Hitler coming to power in Germany.⁵⁸¹ The impressive economic growth rates in the 1960s - on average 4.5 per cent annually per capita in Denmark - paved the way for a radical expansion of the social welfare systems.⁵⁸² There was indeed contention about the scope of the welfare state and the redistribution of income by taxation, but the low unemployment rates and increasing tax revenues, emblematic to the period, facilitated the process of expansion. Even the centre-right government in office from 1968 to 1971 in effect expanded the provisions of the welfare state. The socio-economic agenda of the 1960s was not exclusively about the distribution of wealth, as it had a larger scope of social emancipation. It emphasised the dignity of the 'unfortunate' individuals in need of social benefits, in contrast to earlier social regimes' tendency to blame

(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 33-42; Lene Hansen, "Introduction", in Lene Hansen *op.cit.*, pp. 4-5; Lene Hansen, "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe", in Lene Hansen *op.cit.*, p. 81; Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), p. 150.

⁵⁸⁰ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 489.

⁵⁸¹ Bo Lidegaard, *Overleveren. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 4, 1914-1945* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), 270-273.

⁵⁸² Hans Chr. Johansen, *Danmark i tal. Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie. Bind 16* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politikens Folag, 1991), pp. 157.

and shame the receivers, stressing their 'own responsibility' for socioeconomic failure.⁵⁸³ However, the 1960s were also associated with the breakthrough of an increasingly individualistic, materialistic and consumer oriented culture.

Social responsibilities tended to be extricated from traditional spheres such as the households, the families, the companies and even mutual insurance arrangements, in favour of national schemes. In comparison to the EEC countries, the Danish welfare system was *state financed* to a very high extent: it was applicable to all Danish citizens, *irrespective of one's attachment to the labour market*. The table below shows who financed the social systems in Denmark and in the EEC countries, including pensions, sickness benefits, unemployment insurances, accident insurances and certain health services:

Table 5 - Financing of the social systems in Denmark and the EEC countries, 1964 (composition in per cent).

Country	State & local authorities	The insured	Employers	Others	Total
Denmark	82.8	13.9	3.3	0	100
Belgium	23.5	25.2	45.0	6.3	100
Luxembourg	23.0	25.6	39.4	12.0	100
W. Germany	17.6	38.0	40.4	4.0	100
Italy	9.6	14.3	70.6	5.5	100
Holland	6.6	45.7	37.6	10.1	100
France	6.6	19.5	68.5	5.4	100

Source: Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De Europæiske Fællesskaber. *Danmark og De Europæiske Fællesskaber. Bind II* (Copenhagen: 1968), pp. 933-934. The data from Denmark are from 1962-63, the others from 1964.

The Danish state thus assumed a far-reaching social responsibility, rendering it a citizen's right to receive various social benefits in case of personal need. A part of the underlying theory was that it was supposed to be less degrading to receive the social benefits from the welfare state than traditional charity or poor relief. In this process, the 'people' - formerly a category of suppression - obtained a status as the backbone of the nation.⁵⁸⁴ The national schemes were universal as indicated in the name of retirement pension, "people's pension"

⁵⁸³ Henrik S. Nissen, *Landet blev by. Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie. Bind 14* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politikens Folag, 1991), pp. 237-248.

⁵⁸⁴ Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelseperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 417-422.

(*folkepension*). To some extent, the Danish construction resembles the Norwegian and the better-known Swedish model called *folkhemmet*, the 'people's home', although the Danish version was based on state financing to an even greater extent.⁵⁸⁵ The Scandinavian populations' acceptance of comparatively high tax levels, gradually introduced in this period, was presumably linked to a strong sense of belonging to a national community that took care of its citizens, by analogy, as a family cares for its members.

The membership question caused a serious controversy among the supporters of the welfare state. As described above, the Danish government reasoned that access to the EEC markets was a necessary means to promote foreign trade, economic growth and job-creation in the industrial sector in accordance with the prevailing growth philosophy and encouragement of large-scale industries and international division of labour. Ultimately, it was the key to financing a large public sector. However, a significant number of the Danish welfare state's most devoted champions contested this conclusion. A central objection was that the tax-financed structure of the Danish social security system and the particular labour market organisation were incompatible with EEC membership. By 1957, some trade unionists and Social Democrats launched an emotive anti-EEC campaign, focussing on the 'defective' character of the continental countries' social systems. Denmark - the small 'welfare-nation-state' - would hardly be able to stand up against the influence from what they called the Catholic, Conservative and Capitalist Continent.⁵⁸⁶ They argued that a surge of foreign investments and mass immigration would ultimately catapult Catholic trade unions into the heart of the Danish society, i.e. the workplaces, where the Social Democratic labour movement just had consolidated its monopolistic position against the Communist challengers. Per Hækkerup, a prominent Social Democrat and foreign minister to-be, warned at an early stage against "the politically active Catholic Church" and stated that "the national borders must be maintained for collective bargaining agreements".⁵⁸⁷ These agreements have had an almost sacrosanct status in the Danish society since the General Agreement of 1899 between the two sides of industry; there was no readiness in the labour movement to sacrifice it on the altar of any market plans or European unity. Moreover, the labour force was less organised in most of the EEC countries (25 per cent in France), and many of the continental trade unions were divided along

⁵⁸⁵ Bo Stråth, *Folkhemmet mot Europa : ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1992).

⁵⁸⁶ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 419-423 and 472-490.

⁵⁸⁷ Gunnar Preben Nielsson, *Denmark and European Integration: a small country at the crossroads* (Los Angeles: University of California PhD., 1966), pp. 368-387. Cited from Nielson's translations on page 373 and 378, respectively.

confessional and ideological lines.⁵⁸⁸ In that perspective, cooperation with the Scandinavian countries and the UK were by far preferable to the EEC.

The EEC Treaty's provisions for a "Common Labour Market" were a main target of suspicion in the Danish labour movement. Hordes of immigrants from the South would not only suppress the relatively high Danish wage level – they would also get the opportunity to enjoy the tax financed, universal welfare benefits, immediately after finding a job in Denmark. If the EEC labour market enforced the Danish government to relinquish the strictly *national* scope of the tax financed, welfare state construction, its legitimacy or acceptability would potentially vanish. With the resulting fiscal and political pressure, the labour movement was particularly concerned that Denmark would have to adapt to the social security structure of the EEC countries, typically based on *insurance schemes*.⁵⁸⁹ Although the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions ultimately acknowledged the links between the access to the continental markets, growth, employment and 'progressive' welfare policies, it shared the reservations regarding the labour market regulations of the EEC. Therefore, the trade union movement made the preservation of the Danish labour market structure a precondition for accepting the EEC venture at all.

Paradoxically, the Danish trade unions were critical towards the EEC Treaty's relatively advanced social provisions regarding equal pay for men and women, holiday rights and overtime pay. On France's behalf, Guy Mollet's centre-left government had obtained these concessions from the coming EEC partners in 1957, partly in order to cushion the effects of the planned trade liberalisations, as France's extensive social regulations were supposed to cause unequal terms of competition.⁵⁹⁰ It is not so surprising that the Confederation of Danish Employers viewed the costly provisions of the EEC Treaty with alarm.⁵⁹¹ However, the concerns were at least as outspread in the Danish labour movement; the Treaty's references to the labour market sphere were considered an infringement of the well-established rights of negotiating the labour market terms with the employers' organisations. It was hardly considered a reassuring circumstance that the West German trade unions defended the principle of

⁵⁸⁸ Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De Europæiske Fællesskaber, *Danmark og De Europæiske Fællesskaber. Bind II* (Copenhagen: 1968), pp. 921.

⁵⁸⁹ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD. thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 300-302.

⁵⁹⁰ Lise Rye Svartvatn, "In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 1955-56", in *Journal of European Integration History*, Volume 8, Number 1, 2002: 85-102.

⁵⁹¹ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 418-419.

free collective bargaining.⁵⁹² The EEC treaty acknowledged the need to improve and maintain working conditions and the standard of living of workers, but it used the concept *harmonization* that became one of the main references in the EEC antis' vocabulary. Article 117 reads that the Member States:

... believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the common market which will favour *the harmonization of social systems*, but also from the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from *the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action*.⁵⁹³

An internal *Information Letter* of the Danish Labour Movement's Economic Board emphasised in August 1957 the undesirable consequences of letting a 'bureaucratic regime' in the middle of Europe *harmonize* the Danish social policy with that of the EEC countries. The perspective of co-financing the reconstruction of France and Italy through the European Social Fund (Articles 123-125) was not attractive either.⁵⁹⁴

In early 1958, the Labour Movement's Economic Board published a lampoon about 'Denmark in Europe' that provided a set of standard arguments for the following years' EEC resistance. It claimed that the so-called Latin countries had inherently different reasons for surrendering national sovereignty to the EEC agencies than the Scandinavians and the British could possibly have. When things have failed at home for the allegedly irresponsible EEC governments in question, "it appears as an attractive response to push over the troubles to the supranational agency", the Economic Board's chairman, Frederik Dalgaard, argued.⁵⁹⁵ The Social Democratic Party's secretary, Niels Matthiasen, emphasised in a 'standard talk' that:

In the labour movement, I suppose we have to take into account that we will become affiliated with countries ruled by more or less reactionary parties, if Denmark becomes the seventh member of the Six's customs union. In this situation, we will also turn away from the countries, where the labour

⁵⁹² Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 2000 (first edition 1992)), pp. 211-214.

⁵⁹³ Emphases added to the EEC Treaty, Article 117.

⁵⁹⁴ ABA AE, box 93, file 'C.6 Informationsbrev.' "Informationsbrev fra Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd. Nr. 227. 26/8 1957", by Henrik Heie and KS.

⁵⁹⁵ ABA, AE, box 91, file 2, "Danmark i Europa." Print of speech by Frederik Dalgaard, president of the Labour Movement's Economic Board, at a Council meeting of November 26, 1957: "... synes det tiltalende, at skyde vanskelighederne over på det overstatslige organ."

parties are governing and guaranteeing a line of social progress in accordance with a Danish mindset and will.⁵⁹⁶

There was a basic contrast between socially *reactionary* and *progressive* forces at play in the symbolic universe of the critical Social Democrats. 'Social progress' even appeared as a national or a Nordic value, not a mere class interest.

Thus, the Danish labour movement's reluctance concerning West European integration was by no means associated exclusively with the supranational principle as such. For many observers, the problem was rather the specific group of countries in question, as the head of the Labour Movement's Economic Board, Jørgen Paldam, noted and spelled out in a letter to Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen in 1959. Tellingly, he recommended the provision for the administration of the emerging, alternative trade bloc, the EFTA, with strong institutions to enforce larger political goals as higher growth, employment rates and standard of living.⁵⁹⁷

Did Gaullist France provide any reasons for revising the stereotypical image of a socially backward, continental Europe? In the Gaullist universe, there is certainly room for state intervention and extensive social policies, as it repudiates *laissez-faire* liberalism. The Gaullist liberation government thus set up the macroeconomic *Commissariat du Plan* headed by Jean Monnet, and a main current of the 1950s' Gaullist movement - the Social Republicans - favoured social policy activism.⁵⁹⁸ As de Gaulle finally took over in 1958, he reappointed Paul Bacon - a left wing Christian Democrat - Minister of Labour, indicating the continuity with the extensive social policies of the Fourth Republic.⁵⁹⁹ However, a basic concept of de Gaulle's social philosophy was that of "*participation*", which encouraged employee participation and stressed the employers' co-responsibility in social matters. As we saw in table 5, the French employers financed 68.5 per cent of the social systems, whereas their Danish counter-

⁵⁹⁶ Cited in Jens Engberg, *I minefeltet. Træk af Arbejderevælgelsens historie siden 1936* (Copenhagen: Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, 1986), p. 68: "Vi i arbejderbevægelsen kan vel ikke undgå at tænke på, at bliver Danmark syvende medlem af De Seks' toldunion, så tilslutter Danmark sig de lande, hvor mere eller mindre reaktionære partier står for styret og vender sig fra de lande, hvor arbejderpartierne har ledelsen og garanterer en social fremgangslinje, der er i overensstemmelse med dansk takesæt og vilje."

⁵⁹⁷ ABA AE, box 91, file 1, "Nogle synspunkter. Fortroligt", by Jørgen Paldam of June 22, 1959: "Når vi har været betænkelige ved overstatslige institutioner m.v. indenfor 'de 6', har det jo heller ikke så meget været princippet om de overstatslige organer, som den særlige gruppe af lande, det her drejede sig om."; "Notat til brug for møde i udenrigsministeriet torsdag den 9/7-59 kl. 11.": The Economic Board to Prime Minister H. C. Hansen 7 July 1959; "Danmarks stilling til de europæiske markedsplaner", undated by the Economic Board; Sebastian Lang-Jensen, *Den danske venstrefløjs modstand mod EF 1957-72* (Aarhus: Jean Monnet Centret, 2003), pp. 26-28.

⁵⁹⁸ Serge Bernstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), p. 183

parts only contributed 3.3 per cent of these expenses. The Danish social security was based on state funding by 82.8 per cent of the expenses, whereas the French state only contributed 6.6 per cent. In terms of social responsibilities, there was a fundamentally different functional differentiation between the state and the civil society (employers and labour) in Denmark and France. Given the aims and strategies of the Danish labour movement, it could barely acknowledge the Gaullist social policies as a potentially progressive instrument.

The leaders of the Danish labour movement debated the Community's social provisions at a conference about the market plans in February 1959. On the Social Democratic Party's behalf, Foreign Minister Krag acknowledged the principle of free collective bargaining, and, consequently, that an enforcement of equal pay and improvements of overtime and holiday payment through legislation - national or EEC-wide - would undermine this principle. Krag maintained that the French demands regarding social harmonization, now championed by the Gaullists, would not pose any problems for the Danish model of society in virtue of the generally high wage level of Danish labour. However, the trade unionists' fears of a *downward* social harmonization in the EEC were rather endemic. Erling Dinesen - the chairperson of the Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees, and future Social Democratic chairperson - thus noted:

As regards the social harmonization, the situation is rather that a man in France earns a woman's salary. We do not want the French or Italian state of affairs in this country.⁶⁰⁰

Animated by the European perspectives, the chairperson of the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, Eiler Jensen, visited some of his French colleagues in 1960. He reported in particular about the paralysing consequences of the split of the French labour movement in Communist, Catholic and Social Democratic branches as well as the comparatively low percentage of labour unionisation. Moreover, Eiler Jensen argued that the French tradition of pervasive state regulation of the labour market contributed to the French political instability. The wage earners could only achieve social progress by seizing control with the state apparatus, he argued. This situation paved the way for radical political activities on the left as on the

⁵⁹⁹ Alain-René Michel, "Paul Bacon", in Marc Sadoun *et. al.* (eds), *La politique sociale du Général de Gaulle. Actes du colloque de Lille 8-9 décembre 1989* (Université Charles de Gaulle, Lille III, 1990), pp. 223-239.

⁶⁰⁰ ABA AE, box 89, file 'c.5': "Referat fra De samvirkende Fagforbunds konference om markedsplanerne i dagene 19. 20. februar 1959 i Folkets hus, Enghavevej." Erling Dinensen's intervention: "Med hensyn til den social harmonisering er det vel sådan med ligeløn i Frankrig, at der får mændene også kvindeløn. Vi ønsker ikke franske eller italienske tilstande her i landet."

right.⁶⁰¹ On the contrary, the Danish labour market model, featuring free collective bargaining and a tax financed security system, was a supporting pillar of societal consensus in the labour movement's self-understanding.

As the Danish government started the membership negotiations in Brussels in October 1961, the Danish trade unions made their case directly to Prime Minister Viggo Kampmann. Eiler Jensen and Jørgen Paldam of the Labour Movement's Economic Board thus emphasised the goals of advancing the industrialisation of Denmark and maintaining a high and stable rate of employment. Preserving the structure of the social legislation was also a priority for the trade unions; social benefits should remain a tax financed, civil right, not a matter of the labour market organisations as in France or Italy, where the employers carried the burden of social insurances. Moreover, the labour market organisations' positions in the society were at stake, they warned. Equal and overtime pay was an interesting prospect, but Eiler Jensen emphasised the labour market organisations' basic right to negotiate these conditions.⁶⁰²

These worries featured among the main themes in the Danish EEC debates from 1961 and in the final membership campaign of 1972.⁶⁰³ However, the basic structure of the Danish labour market and social security system has survived in spite of major crises in the 1970s and 1980s; adjustments to the EC/EU; and 'tightenings' under the Liberal-Conservative government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen from 2001. Under the current heading 'flexicurity', the Danish societal model has gained some international acknowledgement for its performance in terms of high growth and employment rates, while maintaining comparatively high standards of social security. In 2005, France's neo-Gaullist Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, actually referred to the Danish 'flexicurity' model in relation to the planned reform of the French labour market. A commission of the *Assemblée nationale* previously visited Copenhagen to study 'flexicurity' and to consider its applicability in France. Although the French parliamentarians were very favourably disposed to this model, they concluded that:

⁶⁰¹ ABA LO, box 1333, file "Udland Frankrig / Rapport fra Eiler Jensen's besøg i Frankrig i 1960. 1960." Partly referred in *Aktuelt*, "Farlige og politiske glimt fra Frankrig i Algier-krisens tegn", feature article of 5 December 1960.

⁶⁰² ABA AE, box 91, file 2. Letter from Eiler Jensen and Kai Pedersen, The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, to Prime Minister Kampmann, 20. October 1961; ABA AE, box 104, file 'AE: Brevkopier 1/7 – 1961 – 31/1 – 1962.' Letter from Jørgen Paldam, on behalf of the Labour Movement's Economic Board, to Prime Minister Kampmann, 18 October 1961.

⁶⁰³ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 490-496; Johnny Laursen, "Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Challenge", in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961 – 1963* (London, 1996), pp. 216-219.

Besides the economic realities, it should particularly be emphasised to what extent this system, at the end of the day, relies on agreement between the actors. The consensus, which is the very foundation of the system, is not transposable to France, where the trade unions have a very strong role in public functions and where they are little open to the logics of competition and performance – criteria that will be paramount with the organic [expansive] fiscal laws.⁶⁰⁴

When mirroring the French society in the Danish, the French parliamentarians thus pointed to some of the same difference that the Danish observers had done half a century before.

National Identity and Danish EEC Scepticism

Another prominent feature of the Danish EEC resistance was the emphasis on protecting the 'national identity'. From a legal point of view, an EEC membership would involve limited surrenders of sovereignty - and even less so in the 'Europe of the Fatherlands' that the Gaullists envisioned.⁶⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the Danish anti-EEC campaign argued with some success that the maintenance of national sovereignty was a condition for preserving the national identity and a certain way of life.

The Danish EEC opposition resorted to a concept of the nation rooted in the mid-19th century principle of people's sovereignty. A particularly tight identity between state, nation and people (*folket*) had emerged in the small Danish nation-state - the left over from a multi-ethnic, North European empire. As the fragile monarchy granted a free constitution in 1849, the nationalist bourgeoisie became the agenda setting social group. Yet, the independent and prosperous Danish peasant farmers managed to gain political and ideological hegemony around 1900. The main ideological source of inspiration of the farmers' popular movement was the theologian, philosopher and hymn writer, Nikolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783-1872), who still features as a fixed point in Danish identity debates. Grundtvig fused British liberalist thought with the German *Volksgeist* concept and a vision of a common Nordic history, destiny and spirit expressed in the Nordic mythology. With the coming of a strong

⁶⁰⁴ *Rapport d'information déposé en application de l'article 145 du Règlement par la commission des finances, de l'économie générale et du plan sur le marché de l'emploi au Danemark et présenté par M. Pierre Méhaignerie, Président.* Accessible on www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rap-info/i1913.asp (seen 15 August 2006): "Au-delà des réalités économiques, il faut surtout souligner à quel point le système repose, in fine, sur l'accord des acteurs. Le consensus, qui est le fondement même du système, n'est pas transposable en France, où les syndicats sont très puissants dans la fonction publique, et peu perméables à des logiques de concurrence et de performance, critères qui, pourtant vont devenir prépondérants avec la loi organique relative aux lois de finances."

⁶⁰⁵ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 2000 (first edition 1992)), pp. 217-218; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 484-490.

labour movement and mass culture from the 1930s on, the 'ordinary people', traditionally referring to the peasants farmers and workers, gained a status as the backbone of the nation. A mixture of liberal, egalitarian and parliamentary principles struck highly enduring roots in the national political culture. The people, *folket* - or its self-declared spokespersons in politics and the cultural life – featured a self-understanding as a down-to-earth, consensus seeking national collective with a 'folkish' (*folkelig*) way of life.⁶⁰⁶

In the 20th century, the nation and *folket* had become the main category of sovereignty, and those in power endeavoured to show that they were in keeping with the people. The academic, cosmopolitan and urban elites and the nobility tended to be cast as a contrast or threat to *folket*, and political actors with an elitist reputation risked to suffer from a disadvantage in public life.⁶⁰⁷ Thus, the legitimacy of state powers was based on its direct or imagined bonds to the nation and *folket*. A supporting pillar in this construct was the Social Democratic Party's commitment from the 1930s on to play down class divisions and to upgrade *folket* as a basic point of reference. In 1958, this pattern was repeated as the Danish Communist Party nearly collapsed, and the new Socialist People's Party articulated a non-revolutionary, national or Nordic way to Socialism, based on the principles of the cooperating democracy, *folkestyre*.⁶⁰⁸

In the EEC debate of the 1960s, the Danish opponents repudiated the argument that a Gaullist 'Europe of the Fatherlands' was a 'guaranty' for national sovereignty and identity. They depicted Gaullist France as an elitist, authoritarian, reactionary or hierarchical society – the anti-thesis to what they called Danish 'folkishness'. In October 1961, the Socialist People's Party thus issued a "Declaration on the Common Market" that read:

⁶⁰⁶ Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmarks's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 145-150, 157-169; Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 105-468.

⁶⁰⁷ Ulf Hedetoft, "The Interplay Between Mass and Elite Attitudes to European Integration in Denmark", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (2000), *Denmarks's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), pp. 282-304; Lene Hansen, "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe", in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 57-61.

⁶⁰⁸ Tim Knudsen, *Da demokrati blev til folkestyre. Dansk Demokratihistorie – bind 1* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 2001), p. 139; Uffe Østergaard, "Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism", in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmarks's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), p. 160; Thomas Jørgensen, *Transformation and Crises. The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Sweden, 1956-1980* (unpublished EUI thesis, Florence, 2004), pp. 120-122.

This Western European Common Market, where people like de Gaulle and Adenauer determine the meaning of concepts as progress and democracy, will pose a threat of regression rather than an opportunity of progress for our country.⁶⁰⁹

In parliament, moreover, the party's leader, Aksel Larsen, announced:

Yes, I consider membership of the so-called Common Market an economic danger for Denmark. I am aware that the consequence will be that Denmark *loses its political, cultural and national sovereignty*, and I recognise that we will become a member of an association, which is dominated by autocratic, predominantly Catholic states.⁶¹⁰

According to Aksel Larsen, the experience from international cooperation had revealed that the 'pressure from outside' would be too strong for the small nations, *also within an intergovernmental framework*.⁶¹¹ De Gaulle's 1963 veto had demonstrated this, as it represented a 'dictatorial act' rather than a sovereign state's legitimate policy choice. Aksel Larsen welcomed the suspension of the enlargement process, but underlined that de Gaulle should not expect an honourable membership of the Danish anti-EEC committees.⁶¹²

The Socialist People's Party dismissed the standard argument of 'the Six' undergoing a political metamorphosis with the British, Danish, Irish and Norwegian membership.⁶¹³ In July 1962, the Party's increasingly prominent debater and future party leader, Gert Petersen, thus warned that these expectations were misleading since Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal and Greece would follow suit as EEC members, watering down the 'favourable' impact of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway joining. The 'authoritarian-reactionary' member states, i.e. France and Germany, would take the Danish democracy hostage within an enlarged EEC. He therefore urged the group of democratic states outside the Communities to prepare a trade barrier if a full-blown fascist takeover took place on the Continent.⁶¹⁴ In parliament, his party comrade, Herluf Rasmussen (MP), warned about the incipient Bonn-Paris-Madrid axis, whose

⁶⁰⁹ ABA-homepage SF: "Udtalelse om fællesmarkedet (vedtaget af SF's 2. kongres 28. oktober 1961)." – "Dette vesteuropæiske fællesmarked, hvor begreberne om fremskridt og demokrati bestemmes af folk som de Gaulle og Adenauer, vil for vort land blive en trussel om tilbagegang i stedet for fremgang."

⁶¹⁰ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1961-62, August 4, 1961, column 4740: "Ja, jeg anser medlemsskab i det såkaldte fællesmarked for at være farligt for Danmark økonomisk. Jeg er klar over, at det vil betyde, at Danmark mister sin politiske, kulturelle og nationale suverænitet, og jeg er klar over, at vi bliver medlem af en sammenslutning, som overvejende domineres af autokratisk styrede, overvejende katolske stater." Emphasis added.

⁶¹¹ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1961-62, SPALTE

⁶¹² *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1962-63, 13 February 1963, columns 2762-66.

⁶¹³ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1961-62, August 4, 1961, column 4688.

clerical character allegedly was obvious, while it still disguised its true, fascist nature.⁶¹⁵ Choosing the right economic and political partners was indeed of utmost importance in this perspective.

Among the Danish Social Democrats, furthermore, prominent figures diverged from the official EEC line, referring to the devastating consequences for the Danish democracy and the 'folkish' culture. In a public polemic with Denmark's pro-European and pro-Gaullist Ambassador to Paris, Eyvind Bartels, the theology professor Hal Koch – one of the most influential Social Democratic ideologues in post-war Denmark – thus warned about the possible loss of a certain Danish democratic culture, built on 'folkishness' and welfare policies.⁶¹⁶ Professor Koch argued that the Danes "sense very vividly that North-Western Europe has the best understanding of the meaning of *paideia*, human and 'folkish' culture, at the present." Even France – a 'Catholic, hierarchic society' – lacked the freedom and humanity pervading the way of life in the modern, Lutheran Scandinavia! The rulers in Spain, Portugal, Germany and France did not bring about any political confidence, and "from a 'folkish' point of view we don't feel on line with de Gaulle – to say it mildly", as Hal Koch put it.⁶¹⁷ In Professor Koch's universe, the participatory, democratic 'folkishness' was *the* feature distinguishing the Danish way of life and political-culture from that of the larger continental societies.⁶¹⁸

If Professor Koch represented an intellectual 'ivory tower' view on the mundane market question, the concerns regarding the French democracy under de Gaulle were rather widespread. In August 1961, for instance, the leading Social Democrat and trade unionist, Hans Rasmussen, who had lifelong blue-collar credentials, expressed his qualms regarding Gaullist France as a future EEC partner. He referred to the threat of Conservative, un-stabilizing forces, aggression vis-à-vis the developing countries and de Gaulle's 'dubious' democracy.⁶¹⁹ On the Radical Liberal Party's behalf, the speaker Helge Larsen (MP) opposed a Europe under de Gaulle's "arrogant" leadership after the 1963 veto, as it demonstrated the lack of a

⁶¹⁴ Gert Petersen, "Imod Rom-unionen. Ikke demokratiets gidsler", in *Debat* July 5, 1962.

⁶¹⁵ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1962-63, 13 February 1963, columns 2802-3.

⁶¹⁶ Ove Korsgaard, *Kampen om folket. Et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), pp. 449-456; Jes Fabricius Møller, "Hal Koch og Grundtvig", in *Historisk Tidsskrift*, volume 104, 2004: 391-405.

⁶¹⁷ Hal Koch, "Ambassadørens vejledning for landsmænd", feature article in *Politikens*, 8 November 1961: "... en meget levende fornemmelse af, at det er Nord- og Vesteuropa, som trods alt i øjeblikket forstår mest af, hvad *paideia*, menneskelig og folkelig dannelse vil sige... Vi føler os ikke folkeligt på linje med de Gaulle – for at sige det blidt."

⁶¹⁸ Hal Koch, "En livsform skal stå sin prøve", in *Meninger om Fællesmarkedet*, Copenhagen 1962, pp. 87-92.

⁶¹⁹ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1961-61, August 4, 1961, columns 4761, 4813.

genuinely democratic spirit. De Gaulle's veto was a sinister echo of the 'old Europe', characterised by *distrust* and *quarrelsomeness*, he argued.⁶²⁰

An innovation of the Danish political landscape came with the founding of an organised EEC-resistance, ostensibly shaped as a cross party movement. In January 1962, the Committee for the Preservation of Denmark's Freedom, followed by the Committee for Information about the Rome-Union, sprang up. The committees extensively employed the national slogans of preserving cultural, political and social values, and they excluded in principle Communists and the People's Socialists so as to avoid a leftwing stigma. Prominent personalities from the non-socialist, resistance movement of World War II made up the core of the movement, although a few 'deviating' Social Democrats and leading left-wing activists gained access.⁶²¹ The leading committee member and Social Democrat, Professor Jørgen S. Dich, trumpeted that the emerging state colossus, the EEC, posed a threat to the cooperating democracy (*folkestyre*) of the small nations. The supranational EEC structures were 'inhumane' and the possible EEC partners were bad company.

Some believe that the democratic system we know from the Nordic countries is dated; they favour the subversion of fundamental, national affairs to foreign influences through an essentially authoritarian regime, governed by technocrats, short of any responsibility vis-à-vis the population or its representatives. [...] It is a neo-fascist mentality, which the French Constitution also has expressed.⁶²²

For Professor Dich, the existence of Danish defenders of the 'Gaullist regime', such as Ambassador Bartels, was scandalizing and cynical.⁶²³ In a leaflet about the "Common Market and the Democracy", similarly, the associated Information Foundation Concerning Denmark and the Rome Union warned that France was ruled by an outspoken authoritarian regime. On the Foundation's behalf, Professor Sven Danø argued that the Federal Republic was still marked by the Hitler epoch and the conservative-authoritarian forces would gain momentum with the

⁶²⁰ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1962-63, 13 February 1963, column 2758-9.

⁶²¹ Søren Hein Rasmussen, *Sære Alliancer. Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1997), pp. 64-69.

⁶²² Jørgen S. Dich, "Danmarks 'frihed' under Rom-unionen", feature article in *Berlingske Tidende*, January 31, 1962; "Et system, der ligger demokratiet fjært", in *Meninger om Fællesmarkedet*, Copenhagen 1962, pp. 60-70: "der er dem, der mener, at det demokratiske system i den form, som vi har det i de nordiske lande, muligvis har overlevet sig selv, og at det vil være en fordel, at vi underkaster os fremmedes indflydelse på visse fundamentale forhold i vort land gennem et styre, som i væsentlig grad bliver af autoritær karakter ledet af teknokrater uden ansvar over for befolkningen eller over for befolkningens repræsentanter... .. Dette er en nyfascistisk mentalitet, således som den også har givet sig udtryk i den franske forfatning."

expected accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece.⁶²⁴ The prominence of 'the people' (*folket*) in society seemed indeed to be at stake in this perspective.

French: the European Language?

The post-war international reorganisation also involved a cultural battle about the status of the so-called world languages. Gaullist France fought, partly in vain, for maintaining French as a major international language, as English penetrated all spheres of communication from popular culture, over science, to diplomacy. France thus engaged into a vast cultural and scientific programme that absorbed more than half of the Foreign Ministry's budget, and involved the sending out of some 30.000 French teachers at the end of de Gaulle's reign. The main target of the language mission was North Africa and the former French colonies, but an increasing number of teachers and experts were sent out to North and Latin America, the Middle East and Central Europe.⁶²⁵

Scandinavia was not a main 'sphere of interest' of the French cultural-linguistic endeavour. The French Foreign Ministry thus referred to Sweden as one of the least approachable countries for French influence, both in political, cultural and scientific terms.⁶²⁶ Politically, Denmark was definitively more open for French influence than Sweden, but the public took hardly notice of French culture. In November 1958, however, the EEC supporter and 'Francophile' author Gustav Barfod argued that the French language – and the French culture and way of life – had an enormous advantage over that of Germany within the future Europe:

He, who wants to make his way in the new Community, where the opportunities of the individuals are independent of nationality, has the best chance if he masters French. For that reason, the learning of French will become tremendously more popular in the different countries, thus giving French culture and way of life an exceptional occasion of permeating the populations. The way of the language is also the way of thought and feeling.⁶²⁷

⁶²³ Jørgen S. Dich, "Danmarks "frihed" under Rom-unionen", feature article in *Berlingske Tidende*, 31 January 1962.

⁶²⁴ Sven Danø, "Fællesmarkedet og demokratiet", in *Oplysningsfonden om Danmark og Rom-unionen*, series II, no. 2-3, January 1963.

⁶²⁵ Gilbert Pilleul, "La politique culturelle extérieure (1958-1969)", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome VII. De Gaulle et la culture* (Plon, 1992), pp. 141-156; Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 315-318.

⁶²⁶ Mikael af Malmberg, "Gaullism in the North? Sweden, Finland and the EEC in the 1960s", in W. Loth (ed), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), p. 492.

⁶²⁷ Gustav Barfod, "Frankrig og Europa", feature article in *Berlingske Tidende*, 19 November 1958: "Den, der vil gøre sig gældende i det ny fællesskab, der netop giver individerne særlige muligheder uden hensyn til nationalitet, har størst chancer, hvis han kan fransk. Det vil sige, at fransktilegnelsen vil få et mægtigt opsving i

Barfod presented the historical chance of promoting French culture in the new Europe as a reassuring perspective in the light of the widespread suspicion of German dominance within the EEC. However, the positive prospects that Barfod outlined by no means spurred a demand of more French classes in the Danish educational system.

What mattered most from a French perspective was that British and particularly American culture had gained a solid footing during World War II, as the population increasingly identified itself with the liberators. Many of the French Embassy reports from Copenhagen in the post-war years are characterised by an explicit frustration about the advance of the English language at the expense of French. In July 1956, Ambassador Bourdeillette thus complained about an Air France exhibition in Copenhagen, displaying artistic posters with explanatory remarks in English:

In a country where we make an effort to maintain the position of our language; where we have to fight obstinately to resist the progress of English; where we, besides, have obtained encouraging results thanks to the efforts of the *Institut français*, it is particularly untimely that that a state agency makes its advertisements in a language, whose dissemination most directly threatens the French language. [...] During my visit to the offices of Air France, I have likewise noticed that the leaflets and flyers that they distribute to the local market are edited in English. [...] It is indeed intolerable that a semi-official organ in its domain counters the meritorious efforts of our cultural services.⁶²⁸

There is hardly any doubt that the status of French was declining at the expense of English in the wider population in post-war Denmark; the inauguration in October 1958 of an enlarged *Institut Français* in Copenhagen was one of the reactions to this deterioration. With the activities of the *Institut Français*, the French embassy's cultural staff achieved some success, though the institute mainly addressed and reached the well-educated, cultured elites.⁶²⁹

de forskellige lande, og derigennem vil fransk kultur og livsform faa særlige muligheder for at trænge ned i befolkningerne. Sprogets vej er ogsaa tankens og følelsens vej."

⁶²⁸ MAE AD EU, volume 71: "A.s. Emploi de la langue anglaise par la Cie AIR-FRANCE", Ambassador Bourdeillette to the French Foreign Ministry, 27 July 1956: "*Dans un pays où nous nous efforçons de maintenir les positions de notre langue et où nous devons lutter opiniâtement pour résister aux progrès de l'anglais, où d'ailleurs nous obtenons, grâce notamment à l'action de l'Institut français, des résultats encourageants, il est particulièrement inopportun qu'une entreprise d'Etat fasse sa publicité dans la langue dont l'extension menace le plus directement le français. [...] J'ai également remarqué, au cours de ma visite dans les bureaux d'AIR-FRANCE, que les prospectus et dépliants distribués par eux à la clientèle locale étaient également rédigés en anglais. [...] Il est en effet inadmissible qu'un organisme semi-officiel contrarie, dans son domaine, les efforts si méritoires accomplis par nos services culturels.*"

⁶²⁹ MAE CADN CPH, box 38: "Note sur l'action culturelle française au Danemark", and "Note sur l'accord culturel Franco-Danoise (Etat des négociations)", both on 15 May 1964; Farewell speeches by Prime Minister II.

There was a somewhat wider scope with the fine-meshed network of the *Alliance Française* (AF). Historically, the AF was created in Paris in 1883 - in the wake of the humiliating military defeat to Prussia in 1870 - with illustrious profiles such as Louis Pasteur, Ernest Renan and Jules Verne on its board. With the aim of promoting the French language and culture in the colonies and abroad, the AF established an enormous international network, based on a joint venture of French state agencies and civil actors. For General de Gaulle, cultural *grandeur* constituted a prominent 'soft power' dimension of his overall recovery design, and he gave the AF a favourable treatment in his periods in office.⁶³⁰ In Denmark, the AF had established a section in Copenhagen already in 1884, and the number of AF sections had risen to some 26 across the country in the mid-1960s. The French Embassy clearly appreciated the AF's activities; Christian Fouchet thus paid a visit to several of the AF sections, and the most dedicated section leaders were made *Chevaliers de la légion d'honneur*. In the season of 1964-65, for instance, the Danish AF sections hosted 118 public lectures with prominent French cultural personalities, and they arranged the display of an Albert Camus exposition and showed the French movie *l'Assassin*. Additionally, the AF attempted indefatigably to get in touch with the Danish youth, giving away prizes to the best French students in the upper secondary schools - in the form of books in French.⁶³¹

In the summer of 1958 - right after the regime change - a group of Danish industrialists and diplomats had attempted to invigorate the so-called *Association Franco-Danoise* - a dormant 'friendship association' set up in the early 1920s. Culture and Press Attaché Mogen Hermansen from the Danish Paris Embassy was nominated secretary general of the association with the aim of encouraging cultural, commercial and technical collaboration between France and Denmark. The originators of the project counted on a strong financial support of Danish companies with economic interests in France. This hope was in vain, though, and they gave up the entire venture in 1965.⁶³²

It seems that the Danish and the French governments were more interested in encouraging cultural exchanges than were the civil societies and business communities of the two countries. In a conversation with Prime Minister Krag in October 1962, the French Ambassador suggested to enter into a cultural agreement between France and Denmark. From a French

C. Hansen and Ambassador Jean Bourdeillette published in *Berlingske Aftenavis*, "Det dansk-franske venskab", 1 October 1958.

⁶³⁰ François Roche, "Pour une géopolitique de la culture", in MEFIM, volume 114, no. 1, 2002: 22-23

⁶³¹ RA AF, 3.3 (1965), box 12: "Rapport d'activités sur la saison 1964-65", *Alliance Française* (NN), 14 April 1965 and RA AF 3.3 (1967), box 12: "Alliances de province", *Alliance Française* (NN), 1967.

point of view, the cultural cooperation between Denmark and France was too weak in the light of an upcoming Soviet-Danish cultural agreement; even the Norwegians had a cultural agreement with the French.⁶³³ In November 1962, Foreign Minister Hækkerup therefore raised this question during a meeting with Couve de Murville, after emphasising the Danish adherence to the Treaties of Rome and the Community's political aims. The Danish foreign minister acknowledged that it was necessary to give the French language a more prominent place in the Danish school system considered the European endeavours.⁶³⁴ However, the minister had no political backing, and the Danish Ministry of Education opposed a French 1963 proposal of upgrading French to a first foreign language in some upper secondary schools and of increasing the number of French lessons in general.⁶³⁵

During a Franco-Danish governmental meeting in September 1963, Prime Minister Pompidou showed considerable interest in the language affair and stressed his wish of giving Danish youth the opportunity of learning French at an earlier stage. The French language should enjoy the same position as English and German - rather than ranking below Russian! A seemingly innocent press story about 40 students in Aarhus, who had chosen Russian at the expense of French, was referred to as a problem in the French Ambassadors' intervention.⁶³⁶ On his side, Foreign Minister Hækkerup excused the Danish rejection of the French proposal with the comparatively liberal traditions of the Danish school system. However, a cultural agreement would only be of any interest for the French if it improved the status of French with concrete remedies.⁶³⁷

In February 1967, the two governments finally managed to sign a somewhat watered-down agreement. It provided for a pilot scheme in Denmark for the upper secondary school, allowing for French as a first foreign language on schools, where a sufficient number of students would volunteer. The circumstance that the two countries' foreign ministries, rather than their ministries of culture or education, signed the cultural agreement provoked some discontent:

⁶³² RA UM 17.H.161. Letter from Minister Helge Wamberg to Jean Eilertsen, 28 July 1958; "Association Franco-Danoise", by Director Jonas Lind, Minister Mogens Wamberg, Ingeneer Jean Eilertsen, 28 October 1958; Letter from Embassy Councillor Mogens Hermannsen to Ingeneer Jean Eilertsen, 8 October 1965.

⁶³³ RA UM 5.B.43.a. box 8: "Referat af samtaler med den franske, den belgiske og den italienske ambassadør", Prime Minister Krag, 15 October 1962; Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villume, *I Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 575-577.

⁶³⁴ MAE AD EU, volume 100: "A/s - entretien entre M. HAEKKERUP Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Danemark et M. COUVE de MURVILLE le 13 Novembre 1962", 20 November 1962.

⁶³⁵ MAE AD EU, volume 100: "A.s. Danemark", 25 April 1963.

⁶³⁶ MAE AD EU, volume 100: "Entretien entre le Premier Ministre et M. KRAG, Premier Ministre du Danemark, mardi 27 Août 1963", 3 September 1963.

⁶³⁷ MAE CADN CPH, box 38: "Note sur l'action culturelle française au Danemark", and "Note sur l'accord culturel Franco-Danoise (Etat des négociations)", both on 15 May 1964.

the Danish government was accused of mixing up foreign policies with educational needs.⁶³⁸ The writer, debater and secondary upper school headmaster, Johannes Hoffmeyer, for instance, protested that the Danish "school arrangement should not give into French ideas of dominance, the public's feelings in relation to the wedding of the princess or other irrelevant phenomena."⁶³⁹

France's new Copenhagen Ambassador, Pierre Sebilleau, had actually an open eye for the PR value and interest for French, which the marriage of Crown Princess Margrethe and the French Count, Henri de Monpezat, spurred.⁶⁴⁰ Later he noted that: "In 1967, the Danes have restarted to talk more about France than any other country, like their ancestors did a century ago."⁶⁴¹ The French Ambassador reported extensively about the status of the French language in Denmark and about the problems of French business in a country with such a poor knowledge of French. At his departure from Copenhagen in 1970, though, the ambassador congratulated himself with a significant improvement in the teaching of French in his host country, a development he partly ascribed to the concrete measures taken, partly due to the fashion effect of the royal wedding in 1967.⁶⁴²

Revising the Reactionary Image of Gaullist France

The prevailing, unfavourable images of Gaullist France and West Germany that the Danish EEC opposition cultivated, was obviously not a good recommendation for the EEC applicant, Denmark. In order to counter the Danish EEC resistance's arguments and to improve the bilateral Danish-French relations, Ambassador Bartels made some effort to ameliorate the Danes' image of Gaullist France. In 1960, he strongly criticized the daily *Politiken*, because its articles about torture in Algeria confirmed the Danes' prejudices against the French, as the daily's correspondent, Erling Bjøl, recount.⁶⁴³ In July 1961, as the British, Danish and Irish EEC applications were on the doorstep, Ambassador Bartels articulated his regrets about Danish Francophobia in a report to the Danish Foreign Ministry, arguing: "In reality, the

⁶³⁸ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Mere fransk til Danmark", 15 Februar 1967; Niels Jørgen Haagerup, "Frankrig-Danmark", feature article in *Berlingske Tidende*, 5 October 1966

⁶³⁹ Johs. Hoffmeyer, "Kup til fordel for fransk i det sproglige gymnasium", letter in *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 23 February 1967: "... skoleording skal heller ikke ligge under for franske dominansønsker, stemninger omkring et prinsessebryllup og andre irrelevante fænomener."

⁶⁴⁰ MAE AD EU, volume 91: "A.s. Premières impressions sur le Danemark. OTAN, Marché Commun, rapports avec la Franc", Ambassador Sebilleau to the French Foreign Ministry, 22 September 1966.

⁶⁴¹ MAE AD EU, volume 100: "A.s. Les relations franco-danoises en 1968", Ambassador Sebilleau to the French Foreign Ministry 10 January 1969: "*Les Danois en 1967 avaient recommencé à parler de la France plus que d'aucun autre pays, comme le faisant leurs ancêtres, il y a un siècle.*"

⁶⁴² MAE AD EU, volume 100: "A.s. Quatre ans au Danemark. La vie politique danoise. Les rapports franco-danois. Le socialisme nordique", Ambassador Sebilleau to the French Foreign Ministry, 19 May 1970.

French policy is often considerably more liberal and progressive than, for instance, the policy of the Scandinavian countries." He attacked the Danish EEC critics' contention that "French policy regarding the Six - and the Six as such - are *reactionary*."⁶⁴⁴ In a series of very pro-French and pro-European feature articles of 1961 and early 1962, he contributed in effect to spark of the Danish membership debate with his attack on the Danish 'folkishness' concept.

On a meeting with Denmark's permanent EEC representative, Hans Tabor, in March 1962, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville brought up the issue of the Danes' very 'reserved' attitude towards France and the Federal Republic as well as their scepticism toward political cooperation. After the meeting, Hans Tabor summarised Couve de Murville's grievances:

It was obvious that we were not too fond of the Germans, but at least we respected them in virtue of their strength. Nor did we like the French, though without any respect in this case since they were 'Latin.' In his eyes, it was fully natural that we had an emotional binding as members of the Nordic cultural sphere and by instinct were holding on to our attachment to the other Nordic countries. Nevertheless, in the case of Danish accession to the Six, a significant task was obviously coming up in terms of achieving an adjustment towards a more European attitude in the Danish population.⁶⁴⁵

There was an acknowledgement in Danish government circles that the unfavourable images of particularly Gaullist France and Germany had to be improved. The effect of the PR steps consequently taken is hardly measurable, but the endeavours shed some light on the basic lines of conflict. In April 1962, the Foreign Ministry thus elaborated a report that associated the widespread EEC scepticism with the representation of the Community as a 'reactionary' venture. Many Danes believed that 'reactionary', political forces had created the EEC, whereas 'progressive' forces tended to oppose the EEC.⁶⁴⁶ For that reason, it would be useful

⁶⁴³ Erling Bjøl. *Fra magtens korridorer. Erindringer fra 60'erne, 70'erne & 80'erne* (Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1994), p. 13.

⁶⁴⁴ ABA JOK, Box 48, file F4 EF: 1961 Juli 8. - September 30. 1961: "Politiske aspekter i forbindelse med en eventuel dansk tiltrædelse af de Seks." Ambassador Bartels' report of 27 July 1961: "Fransk politik er i realiteten ganske ofte adskilligt mere liberal og progressiv en f.eks. skandinavisk politik." And: "... at fransk politik i de Seks og de Seks i det hele taget er reaktionære." Emphasis added.

⁶⁴⁵ RA UM 5.B.43.a, Box VI. EEC Ambassador Hans Tabor's report "Franske synspunkter vedrørende spørgsmål i forbindelse med forhandlingerne om dansk og britisk medlemskab af Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab" of March 7, 1962 concerning his meeting with Couve de Murville: "Det syntes således åbenbart, at vi ikke holdt af tyskerne, men respekterede dem, fordi de var stærke, og at vi ikke holdt af franskmændene, men ej heller respekterede dem, al den stund de var latinere. Han fandt det ganske naturligt, at vi følte os som medlemmer af den nordiske kulturkreds og instinktivt holdt fast ved tilknytningen til de andre nordiske lande. I tilfælde af dansk tilslutning til De Seks forestod der imidlertid ganske øjensynligt et betydeligt arbejde for at opnå en tilpasning i retning af en mere europæisk indstilling hos den danske befolkning."

⁶⁴⁶ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box VI. "Politiske partiers holdning til den europæiske samling i Fællesmarkeds-landene og England", by Victor Andreassen of the Secretariat, April 16, 1962: "I den danske debat om Fællesmarkedet henviser modstandere af dansk tilslutning hyppigt til, at Fællesmarkedet er et "reaktionært" foretagende. En

to make the Danes aware of the centre-left parties' pro-European attitudes in the member states such as that of Pierre Mendès France's PSU and Guy Mollet's Socialists. A report by the Danish Paris Embassy about "The Left in France" was passed on to the members of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. The basic argument of the report was that "*left* as a political concept is French national property and not in opposition to Gaullism for which the dynamic military and foreign-policy goals presuppose intimate social collaboration."⁶⁴⁷ Thus, active social policies were not against the nature of the major EEC countries.

In April 1962, Foreign Minister Krag summoned the editors of the Danish press to a meeting about European affairs, where he stressed the responsibility of the 'opinion makers' for creating a more pro-European attitude in the population.⁶⁴⁸ To that end, the foreign minister referred to the greatness of de Gaulle's 'progressive' African policies in the wake of the Evian Treaties on Algerian independence and the launching of a vast, French aid programme for francophone, Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁴⁹ The end of the Algerian War was obviously a relief for the EEC supporters. By 1961, the issue had entered into the debate about Denmark's affiliations to the Continent, and the politicians in favour of membership received letters from concerned citizens, asking whether France - the 'colonial' great power - was an appropriate political partner for the Danish 'people'.⁶⁵⁰

There were limits, though, as to how Gaullist one could appear in the Danish context, as a correspondence between Ambassador Bartels and Foreign Minister Krag illustrates. In some feature articles, Krag had noticed that the French and Italian governments were marked by a touch of Conservatism.⁶⁵¹ In January 1962, Ambassador Bartels urged the foreign minister to "avoid characterizing the Gaullist regime as 'reactionary' as it wasn't so."⁶⁵² On the contrary, France pursued a progressive policy regarding the initiatives of Algerian independence and of

vigtig side af denne påstand går ud på, at det er de "reaktionære" kræfter, herunder de højreorienterede politiske partier, der har ført an ved dannelsen af Fællesmarkedet, ligesom Fællesmarkedet siden dets start har haft sin politiske basis i disse partier. Påstanden indebærer samtidig, at de "progressive" kræfter, d.v.s. de venstreorienterede politiske partier, fagforeninger m.m. er passive over for eller modstandere af Fællesmarkedet som sådan eller over for de mål og midler, som hidtil har præget Fællesskabets virksomhed."

⁶⁴⁷ RA UM 123.D.1, box X. "Venstre i Frankrig", of February 21, 1962 by Falbe-Hansen: "... venstre som politisk begreb er fransk nationalejendom og ikke står i modsætningsforhold til gaullismen, hvis dynamiske militær- og udenrigspolitiske målsætning netop forudsætter et intenst socialt samvirke."

⁶⁴⁸ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box VI. Otto Borch of the Political-Legal division, "Refereat til brug for udenrigsministeren ved mødet med pressen den 3. april kl. 18.30."

⁶⁴⁹ ABA JOK, box 61, file "Taler 1962" Otto Borch of the Political-Legal division, "Bidrag til Udenrigsministerens redegørelse på pressemødet den 3. april 1962", of March 30, 1962.

⁶⁵⁰ RA UM 5.B.43.1, box 6. Letter from Head of Laboratory Henrik S. Jensen to Foreign Minister Krag, 26 February 1962, published in *Berlingske Aftenavis*, "Modstand mod at gå ind i de 6", 27 February 1962.

⁶⁵¹ Jens Otto Krag, "Denmark and Europe", in *Information*, December 30, 1961.

⁶⁵² ABA JOK, Box 4, file A III (Bartels, E., ambassadør), letter from Bartels to Krag, January 3th, 1962: "... undgået at betegne de Gaulle-regiment som "reaktionært" så meget mere som dette ikke er tilfældet."; Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1914 - 1961* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 613-614.

economic reforms. In March 1962, Ambassador Bartels' pro-Gaullist activities culminated in an interview about de Gaulle's policies, where he targeted Professor Hal Koch's Social Democratic defence of Danish 'folkishness', referred to above, as well as the Scandinavians' naïve beliefs in conciliatory policies. In order to dismantle the myth of a threatening, all-embracing French Conservatism or crypto-fascism Bartels argued that:

France does not march towards fascism as many think. Almost fifty per cent of the population votes for the leftwing parties. Twenty per cent votes for the Communist, though without knowing what Communism really is. By looking at the present regime, everybody should be able to see that the policy de Gaulle actually pursues is everything but reactionary. The mistake is rather that de Gaulle as all great figures is ahead of his time – and therefore difficult to follow.⁶⁵³

Foreign Minister Krag instructed Ambassador Bartels to stop his pro-Gaullist campaign and wondered in his diary "what frightened most people away from the European ideas today; Bartels' enthusiasm in *Berlingske Tidende*, or the scepticism of Professor Lindhardt's feature article in *Politiken*?"⁶⁵⁴ Consequently, Bartels moderated his Gaullist writing. He mainly restricted his comments to internal reports, where he kept regretting that the Scandinavian countries focussed too much on their own material welfare and moralised about the militaristic international behaviour of the great powers! It brought Ambassador Bartels some comfort, however, that Denmark seemed to enjoy the lion's share of positive publicity in France as compared to the other Scandinavian countries.⁶⁵⁵ The Danish ambassador would undoubtedly have been more than delighted, had he heard that de Gaulle personally acknowledged his role for improving the Franco-Danish relationship, as the French President did in a talk with Bartels' successor, Ambassador K. Knuth-Winterfeldt, in March 1965.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵³ Paul Raae's interview with Bartels, "Om general de Gaulles strategi og taktik ...", in *Berlingske Tidende*, March 25, 1962: "Frankrig marcherer ikke mod fascismen, som mange tror. Små 50 % af befolkningen stemmer på venstre-partierne. 20 % af vælgerne stemmer kommunistisk uden dog at vide, hvad kommunisme er! Og tager man det aktuelle regime, kan enhver da se, at den politik, som general de Gaulle faktisk har ført, på ingen måde er reaktionær. Fejlen er vel snarere, at general de Gaulle som alle store skikkelser er forud for sin tid – og derfor vanskelig at følge."

⁶⁵⁴ Professor Lindhardt, co-founder of the so-called Committee for the Preservation of Denmark's Freedom, had argued that the German way of life would pervade European culture given the relative weaknesses of other EEC countries. P. G. Lindhardt, "En livsform i livsfare", feature article in *Politiken*, 25 March 1962; ABA JOK, Krag's diary, 25 March 1962 in "Bog XIII: Dagbog: 11. januar 1962 – 16. januar 1965": "... hvad der i dag skræmte flest væk fra europæisk tankegang, Bartels entusiasme i interview i Berl.T eller Prof Lindhardts skepsis i Politikens kronik." Also cited in Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 20.

⁶⁵⁵ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box VII. "Skandinavien og Frankrig", by Ambassador Bartels, 18 September 1962.

⁶⁵⁶ RA UM 5.D.25.a, box 2: "Ambassadørskiftet", Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt, 4 March 1965.

Although the Danish deliberations about the EEC focussed a lot upon market policies, the aim of sustaining formal sovereignty, a certain societal structure and national identity also featured prominently in the public debate. Some industrial branches could partly anticipate relevant commercial consequences of EEC membership, but the lion's share of the labour force and the population could hardly identify its precise role and opportunities within the European division of labour. Many of the actors reasoned in terms different from commercial ones. On the salary owners' behalf, the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions emphasised the importance of maintaining the Danish labour market structure, featuring free collective bargaining and a tax financed social security system in the face of the EEC provisions regarding *social harmonization*. In addition, many intellectuals and some politicians launched a defence of national democratic-cultural values that they considered in peril if even limited state authorities were transferred from the national level to Brussels: 'the people' would become a subject under Brussels power and loose its identity as an egalitarian community of autonomous individuals, they argued. On the contrary, the EEC supporters assured that there was no reason to worry, as Gaullist France and Britain would prevent the federalist visions materialise.

The relative low standing of the French language and culture in Denmark; the post-war breakthrough of American popular culture and the English language; and the Danes' emotional attachment to the Nordic countries epitomise the cultural orientation of the Danish population. It is quite obvious that the Franco-Danish bilateral cooperation did not reflect any sense of profound cultural affinities. However, the Danish government attempted to ameliorate the image of France in the public and accepted to improve the French teaching in the Danish upper secondary schools.

Chapter 7 – Détente and Empty Chairs (1965-68)

With the creation of the Fifth Republic and the end of the Algerian War, General de Gaulle had managed to obtain a considerable political stability in France by 1962. Internationally, however, a series of high-level crises unfolded. On 23 October 1961, the Soviet Union detonated the largest thermonuclear device ever tested (58 megaton), ending the voluntary test stop from 1958. In addition, the crisis over Berlin resurfaced in the summer of 1961, as the two superpowers 'brandished their nuclear weapons' and the East German authorities began the construction of the Berlin Wall.⁶⁵⁷ From October 1962, the crisis after the revelation of Soviet missile sites on Cuba rendered the spectre of a fatal East-West conflict highly pertinent. The Cuban Missiles Crisis contributed to the general atmosphere of anxiety of the early 1960s – a negative corollary to the material improvements and consumer boom pervading the Western lifestyle.

After reaching one of the lowest points during the crises concerning Berlin and Cuba in 1961-62, new and important dynamics were added to the prevailing Cold War scenario. The frightening perspectives of the Cuban Missile Crisis stimulated some admittedly tentative steps towards détente, symbolised by the 'hot-line' phone connection between the leaders in Washington and Moscow and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 1963. However, the beginning of a profound Sino-Soviet conflict, which revealed the deep cracks within what hitherto was considered a monolithic, Communist bloc, was one of the most far-reaching developments in the global security landscape of the mid-1960s. These international trends were further advanced with the Chinese exploration of contacts with the United States. A triangular relationship started to replace the bipolar system that had structured the conduct of security policies in the early phases of the Cold War.⁶⁵⁸

At the same time, the internal cohesion of the Western security system, as well as that of the Warsaw Pact, could not be taken for granted as it could in the 1950s. The Gaullist quest for independence within the Western alliance was a central part of this phenomenon, but the Federal Republic of Germany also embarked upon a reform of its West leaning orthodoxies.

⁶⁵⁷ Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 155.

The coming into power of the so-called 'Grand Coalition' of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in 1966 ushered in a gradual departure from Adenauer's rather inflexible policy of avoiding diplomatic relations with states that recognised the East German state, known as the Hallstein Doctrine. The slogan of the new West German '*Ostpolitik*' was '*Wandel durch Annäherung*' – change through rapprochement. Its rationale was that an acknowledgement of the actual partition of Germany might facilitate the cooperation and contacts between the two German states and foster new, political dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe, partially independently of the Soviet Union. Willy Brandt – the Social Democratic foreign minister of the 'Grand Coalition'; prime minister from 1969; and a very close friend of the Scandinavian Social Democratic leaders – became probably the most well known symbol of the new, West German *Ostpolitik*.⁶⁵⁹

The slightly deteriorating cohesion of the Warsaw Pact in the mid-1960s was characterised by internal reform attempts and positive responses to the Western détente policies. In Czechoslovakia, the attempt to articulate a new 'Socialism with a human face' marked an ambition to break with the inherited Soviet hegemony. In Romania, President Ceausescu was also trying to carve out a more independent profile, although with modest ambitions of giving it a 'human face.' However, the intervention of the Warsaw Pact's forces in Prague in August 1968 underscored that there were definite limits as to how far the reform endeavours could be taken. It would be intolerably Eurocentric to characterise the international system of the mid-1960s unqualifiedly as a period of détente, as the US Army was engaged in a large-scale and morally controversial war in Vietnam. The détente concept is nevertheless useful in an analysis of Western Europe's ambitions of improving the relations with Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. With Richard Crockatt we can distinguish between a European détente of the mid-1960s and the détente between the superpowers, associated with the Nixon-Kissinger duo; the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of May 1972; the American-Soviet trade agreements; the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT).⁶⁶⁰

Below we shall look at the impact of Gaullist France's unilateral policies on Danish NATO and EEC policies in the mid-1960s. The NATO crisis contributed to defining a multilateral détente approach, which emphasized the importance of engaging the United States and

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 207-208.

⁶⁵⁹ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 19-21; Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 207-216.

NATO. In addition, NATO opponents argued that Denmark could follow the French example and withdraw from NATO. The so-called Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 about the EEC's decision-making procedures was mainly important in terms of establishing that the Community was not a new super state in the making. There was not a lot of focus on the issue during the crisis between the Six, but the references to the Luxembourg Compromise became prominent in the ensuing EC debate.

Socialism in Denmark (1966-1968)

All the talk about détente and disarmament in the mid-1960s might appear somewhat naïve, retrospectively, as we know that the Soviet Union intervened with military force in Prague already in 1968. In Denmark, however, the public was quite impressed by Prime Minister Krag's visits to the Soviet Union in February 1964 and October 1965 and a Soviet return visit to Denmark in the summer of 1964. The press photos of First Secretary and Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev in Krag's garden, playing with his children, illustrated that the East-West relations had entered a new epoch.⁶⁶¹ Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Hækkerup noted that their Soviet interlocutors toned down their criticism of Denmark's NATO membership and the Danish-German military cooperation.⁶⁶² In 1967, the fervent 'cold warrior' and Liberal speaker, Per Federspiel (MP), even observed that: "We were still living in the shadow of the Cold War then [in 1961], and the European unification efforts still had the character, to some extent, of a manoeuvre of warding off foreign forces that might threaten us."⁶⁶³ It was not only pacifists or the emerging flower power movement that perceived a change of the international climate by the mid-1960s.

Danish politics was also in a process of transformation. After the general election of September 1964, the traditionally pacifist Radical Liberal Party left the coalition government, prompting the Social Democrats to form a minority government. The Radical Liberals now took up an increasingly critical stance to NATO, although they had endorsed the Danish membership under impression of the Soviet intervention in Hungary back in 1956. In the November 1966 election, the outright NATO hostile Socialist People's Party even doubled its

⁶⁶⁰ Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 224-234.

⁶⁶¹ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 131-145, 243-247.

⁶⁶² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokodelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 575-587.

⁶⁶³ *Folketingstidende*, folketingets forhandlinger, 1966-67, 11 May 1967, columns 4084-85: "Dengang levede vi stadig i skyggen af den kolde krig, og de europæiske samlingsbestrebelse havde stadig til en vis grad karakter af afværgeforanstaltninger, beskyttelse mod kræfter, der kunne true os udefra."

mandate from ten to twenty seats in parliament, whereas the Social Democratic Party lost seven seats, as shown in the table below:

Table 6 - Distribution of parliamentary seats, 1966

Party	1966	(1964)
Social Democrats	69	(76)
People's Socialists	20	(10)
Liberals	35	(36)
Conservatives	34	(36)
Radical Liberals	13	(10)
Liberal Centrists	4	(2)
Independents	0	(5)
Total	175	(175)

Source: Henrik S. Nissen, *Landet blev by. Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie. Bind 14* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politikens Folag, 1991), pp. 306, 315.

These mandatory displacements paved the way for a new political constellation in Danish politics, as the Social Democratic leader, Jens Otto Krag, formed a minority government based on parliamentary support, but not participation, of the Socialist People's Party – the 'Red Cabinet', as the opposition called it. Under the socialist majority, however, the Social Democrats emphasised their NATO engagement, while the leaders of the Socialist People's Party for a while toned down their goal of Danish withdrawal from NATO. The aim of encouraging international détente was accepted at both ends of the political spectrum; the great question was whether to promote détente and stability thorough the military blocs or from a position outside the alliances.⁶⁶⁴

By the mid-1960s, Gaullist France was hardly considered an obvious candidate to be the champion of détente or global disarmament. On 2 July 1966, for instance, Prime Minister Krag protested publicly against France's fifth atmospheric nuclear test, now in the Pacific, in disregard of the landmark Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.⁶⁶⁵ Central Danish observers argued that de Gaulle embodied a 'national ambition', deeply rooted in the French people's

⁶⁶⁴ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 65-81.

⁶⁶⁵ MAE AD EU, volume 100. Telegram from Ambassador Ledoux to the French Foreign Ministry, 4 July 1966.

quest for national, military *grandeur*. In March 1963, Erik Schram-Nielsen - the new Danish NATO Ambassador and later bilateral Paris ambassador – reported:

To a large extent, the disagreements between France and NATO undeniably originate in the conflict between France's great power dreams and the NATO partners' resistance towards the Gaullist manipulation. However, it does not mean that the present situation is the result of a single statesman's dictatorial inclinations. De Gaulle's inability to imagine France without greatness [...] is undoubtedly an understanding shared by wide circles in France. National pride is traditionally associated with martial performance [...]. *It is only natural that the present French government and the lion's share of the French people believe that the way to recreate French greatness goes through a particular effort in the military field.*⁶⁶⁶

In this view, France represented the nationalistic great power traditions of the 'old Europe.' In a 1967 report, moreover, Ambassador Schram-Nielsen reported about the marginalisation of foreign policy making from the French parliament, noting: "[T]he situation is obviously not quite the same as it is at home".⁶⁶⁷ Gaullist France was still far from the ruling Danish centre-left's antimilitarist and democratic ideals, and the French unilateralism severely disappointed many Conservatives, Liberals and Social Democrats. In left-wing circles, however, the French withdrawal from NATO, the firm criticism of the Vietnam War and the rapprochement with the Soviet Union spurred a partial reappraisal of de Gaulle.

France's Withdrawal from NATO: Danish Mitigation (1966)

France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structures, announced in March 1966, was one of the most spectacular manifestations of the Fifth Republic's independence

⁶⁶⁶ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 2. "Uoverensstemmelserne mellem Frankrig og NATO", by NATO Ambassador Erik Schram-Nielsen, Paris 29 March 1963: "Uoverensstemmelserne mellem Frankrig og NATO har utvivlsomt i ikke ringe omfang deres udspring i modsætningen mellem Frankrigs storhedsdrømme og dets NATO-partners uvilje mod at lade sig spænde for den gaullistiske karosse. Dermed være dog ikke sagt, at det er rigtigt at fremstille baggrunden for den bestående tilstand som resultatet af en enkelt statsmands diktatoriske tilbøjeligheder. Når general de Gaulle – som han skriver i sine erindringer – ikke kan forestille sig Frankrig uden storhed, deles dene opfattelse utvivlsomt i vide kredse i Frankrig. Da national stolthed traditionelt sættes i forbindelse med krigeriske bedrifter, og da årstal som 1870-71, 1914-18 og 1940 ikke er egnede til at underbygge en fransk magtposition, er det kun naturligt, at den nuværende franske regering og store dele af det franske folk er af den mening, at det ikke mindst er på det militære område, at der skal gøres en indsats, om Frankrigs storhed skal genskabes." Emphasis added.

⁶⁶⁷ RA UM 123.D.1, box 15. Ambassador Schram-Nielsen to Secretary General Paul Fischer, 4 July 1967: "... - men for såvidt angår forholdet mellem regeringen og parlamentet, er tilstandene jo ikke helt de samme som hjemme." Emphasis added. The comment hints to the partial attempts in Denmark of democratizing the foreign-policy field, i.e. the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee of 1923, made constitutional in 1953, and the establishment of a pivotal Market Affairs Committee in 1961. Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopol- delingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 762-765.

policies. In the Gaullist universe of meaning, NATO integration appeared as a vehicle for an unacceptable subordination of France to American hegemony. It constrained the national control of the army, without giving France a say on the elaboration of the Alliance's nuclear strategy. Gaullist France maintained that the American leaning towards the 'flexible response' nuclear doctrine rendered Europe a potential battlefield in case of a military East-West confrontation fought with tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States' escalating warfare in Vietnam had boosted the French critique of the American hegemony and increased the French's appetite for independence from NATO. The particular Gaullist distinction between the Atlantic *Alliance* and the superimposed *organisation* (NATO) had not been a relevant feature of the conceptual landscape at the alliance's creation in 1949. However, the French withdrawal from the integrated structures forced the fourteen remaining NATO members to accept France's status as an ally with a self-defined affiliation to the Alliance.⁶⁶⁸

An important corollary to the French emancipation from NATO was the opening towards the countries of the 'Eastern bloc.' Even if much national historical literature tends to overstate the contribution of particular countries or state leaders to the partial defrosting of East-West relations in the mid-1960s, it goes to say that the French contribution stands out in its scope and character. It had profound, historical roots in the past Franco-Russian alliances vis-à-vis Germany; in the post-war quest for French independence; and in de Gaulle's particular vision of a European sphere stretching from *the Atlantic to the Ural* in the then Soviet Union. The Gaullist ambition thus envisioned a Europe that would be able to cooperate across the 'Iron Curtain', sidetracking the United States from the European détente process in favour of the "Eternal Russia", as de Gaulle called the Soviet Union.⁶⁶⁹ A radical vision of reorganising the predominantly bipolar, international system of the Cold War was at play. De Gaulle's détente policies thus featured a rejection of the two-bloc system in favour of a multipolar world, where France would not be stemrolled politically by the mastodons.⁶⁷⁰ In this way, the French recognition of the People's Republic of China in January 1964 was intended to spark of a process towards a multipolar world system.⁶⁷¹ France's 'grand policy' of changing the

⁶⁶⁸ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 381-390.

⁶⁶⁹ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 419-425.

⁶⁷⁰ Frédéric Bozo, *Deux Stratégies pour l'Europe. De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique 1958-1969* (Plon and Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996), pp. 14-17.

⁶⁷¹ Zhou Jianqing, "De Gaulle et le triangle sino-soviéto-américain", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco. Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome IV. La sécurité et l'indépendance de la France* (La Documentation française – Plon, 1992), pp. 402-409

rules of the international game and of creating a so-called 'European Europe' was in direct conflict with the US administration's vision of an Atlantic Partnership.⁶⁷²

Notwithstanding some scepticism towards French policies, the Danish government actually embraced and acknowledged the importance of the French détente policies of the mid-1960s. In several bilateral talks with French representatives, the Danish government stressed the converging views on détente, although they envisioned different roles of the United States in the process.⁶⁷³ During a Franco-Danish governmental meeting in 1964, Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag argued that Khrushchev had established a comparatively trustful regime and apparently was seeking an understanding with the West.⁶⁷⁴ In a conversation with de Gaulle in April 1966, moreover, the Danish prime minister acknowledged that he shared the French president's slightly optimistic interpretation of the Soviet foreign policy, namely that it was assuming an increasingly 'peaceful' profile. However, Prime Minister Krag emphasised that the very presence of a strong, Western defence organisation had fostered this relaxation in relations between the East and the West. It was essential, therefore, that France remained within the Atlantic Alliance, he urged.⁶⁷⁵

For the Danish government, it was obvious that the French unilateralism tended to undermine the Western alliance system. After General de Gaulle's September 1965 press conference, where he denounced the 'subordination' of France to foreign authorities, the Danish Foreign Ministry enumerated the advantages of the Alliance:

- i) A permanent military command structure was crucial for a country like Denmark, strategically exposed in the first line in a possible East-West conflict;
- ii) An elaborate command system underpinned the deterring effect of the Alliance;
- iii) Involvement of British and American officers would facilitate the releasing of the alliance obligations;
- iv) Incorporation of the West German army into the NATO structures could hinder its potentially aggressive usage;

⁶⁷² Pascaline Winand, "L'Administration Johnson, les Communautés européennes et le partenariat atlantique", in *Relations Internationales*, no. 119, autumn 2004: 381-393.

⁶⁷³ MAE AD EU, volume 89. Telegramme from Ambassador Sebillieu to the French Foreign Ministry, 3 August 1966.

⁶⁷⁴ RA UM 5.D.25.a, box 2. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Deputy Councillor Oldenburg, summarising Foreign Minister Krag's meeting with Couve de Murville, 20 May 1964.

⁶⁷⁵ MAE AD EU, volume 27: "Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Krag le 18 avril 1966 (Très secret)."

- v) With the insertion of the Danish-German military cooperation in a NATO framework, Denmark could avoid to deal directly and alone with the Federal Republic⁶⁷⁶

In this light, it appeared as a basic Danish security interest to maintain the permanent NATO structures and to overcome the Danes' reluctance towards the principle of military integration with the great powers. Nonetheless, the report urged the Danish government to receive de Gaulle's reform plans in a positive and accommodating spirit, as an actual French withdrawal from NATO would signify a severe loss of prestige and it might boost a new West German assertiveness. Some Danish opinion formers argued similarly in favour of a limited revision of the North Atlantic Treaty that would allow for a French withdrawal from the command structures, while leaving the organisation intact for the other fourteen members.⁶⁷⁷ The challenge was to *keep France in* and simultaneously to *maintain as much as possible of the integrated structures*.

The NATO crisis culminated with General de Gaulle's letter to President Lyndon Johnson of 7 March 1966 and an *aide-mémoire* of 11 March 1966 to the allies.⁶⁷⁸ France planned to exercise full sovereignty over its territory by moving the allied bases and to withdraw from the 'integrated' command structures of the Alliance, the French president proclaimed. In his view, the integrated structures, organised shortly after the allies contracted the Alliance of 1949, could not be justified any longer. The reactions were particularly severe in Britain and the United States, where anti-French demonstrations took place. In a telling comment, the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, cuttingly asked de Gaulle whether the requested removal of American troops from French territory also applied to the American cemeteries in France from the world wars.⁶⁷⁹ Dean Rusk and his State Department represented the 'hard-liners', demanding an unequivocal denunciation of the unilateral French act and its grave consequences, whereas the Pentagon - headed by Robert McNamara - recommended to avoid any polemics and to seize the opportunity to reform NATO. The Netherlands tended to follow the 'hard liners', whereas Belgium, Canada, Denmark and Norway endeavoured a moderating approach in order to preserve the cohesion of the alliance.

⁶⁷⁶ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 3. "Frankrigs stilling i NATO", by Per Frellesvig, the Political-Legal Division, 16 September 1965; Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages, pour l'effort, 1962-1965, tome IV* (Librairie Plon: 1970), pp. 383-384.

⁶⁷⁷ *Information*, "NATO ud af Frankrig", leading article of 10 September 1965.

⁶⁷⁸ Reproduced in Frédéric Bozo, *Deux Stratégies pour l'Europe. De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique 1958-1969* (Plon and Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996), pp. 263-266.

⁶⁷⁹ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 - 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 387-390.

As other Western media, including the French ones, the Danish press expressed surprise and regret at de Gaulle's decision.⁶⁸⁰ Foreign Minister Hækkerup opened a debate about the French withdrawal with the Danish party leaders and the Foreign Policy Committee. Disdainful and frustrated remarks about French 'national egoism' apart, the contributions featured a general cautiousness regarding the somewhat reproachful line of some American actors and particularly of the British.⁶⁸¹ The British government had suggested a common proclamation regarding the French step which the Danish government regarded unacceptably polemical vis-à-vis France. With wide political support, the Danish government instructed its NATO delegation in Paris to encourage a more moderate declaration on the issue. Given the unilateral French approach, it was more important to avoid pushing France further away from the Alliance than to 'lecture' the Gaullists about Western solidarity. As the Johnson administration moved towards a moderate reaction, in disregard of the State Department, the remaining NATO members managed to agree upon a somewhat milder and obliging text. With a declaration published on 18 March 1966, the fourteen remaining NATO partners thus confirmed their conviction in maintaining a common strategy and the military integration.⁶⁸²

Many Danish politicians and diplomats understood themselves as 'mediators' or 'bridge builders' in international politics, like other small state actors such as Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden.⁶⁸³ In a 1964 report from Paris, Ambassador Bartels had ventured a comparison of the French and the Danish foreign-policy style:

While we in Denmark understand the *compromise* as synonymous with politics, for good reasons, I should also stress that the technique of the present French regime is *dialectical*. Therefore, one is

⁶⁸⁰ Niels Jørgen Haagerup, "Réactions scandinaves a la politique atlantique du président de Gaulle", in *Politique étrangère*, no. 3, 1966, pp. 237-252.

⁶⁸¹ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 4. "Referat af møde hos gruppeformændene den 11. marts 1966 kl. 9.30" and "Referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn, den 11. marts 1966 kl. 12.30 ... På mødet behandledes som eneste sag Frankrigs forhold til NATO." From box 5: "Referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn, den 14. marts 1966 kl. 12 Referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn, den 11. marts 1966 kl. 12."

⁶⁸² *Information*, "Udenrigsnævnet støtter et afdæmpet svar til Frankrig", 14 March 1966; *Politiken*, "Bred NATO-støtte", 19 March 1966; RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 4. Telex from the Danish Foreign Ministry to the Danish NATO delegation, 11 March 1966. Box 5, "NATO og Frankrig", telex from the Danish Foreign Ministry to DANATO, 16 March 1966.

⁶⁸³ Étienne Deschamps, "More than 'Honest Brokers'? Belgium, Luxembourg and the Empty Chair Crisis (1965-66), in Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crises and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 153-180; Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk utenrikspolitikk historie, Oljealder, 1965-1995* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), pp. 28-30.

not afraid of the sharp viewpoints or the *conflict* between the partners. One believes probably that the processes sparked off in that way even advance the development.⁶⁸⁴

The 1966 crisis of NATO underscored the relevance of that point. Initially, the Danish Conservative and Liberal politicians, who had been very tolerant during the Algerian War, were severely disappointed with the French disregard of the Western solidarity. They put out the most disdainful remarks about the French withdrawal and they tended initially to support the sharper British declaration regarding NATO. The Social Democratic Foreign Minister, Per Hækkerup, also declared that the French step was extraordinarily deplorable, short-sighted and even dangerous. However, what counted was the aim of avoiding a further complication of France's relation to the Alliance; a cutting British-American declaration would presumably *strengthen* the French inflexibility and the French people's support to de Gaulle's independence policies, Foreign Minister Hækkerup argued. Even Poul Møller – the strongly disappointed Conservative speaker – finally approved this line, noting that it would be correct to emphasise the willingness to cooperate with France.⁶⁸⁵

Another key issue for the allies in the summer of 1966 was that of the future location of the North Atlantic Council. As an ally, France was still a member of the Council, and de Gaulle preferred to maintain its seat in Paris.⁶⁸⁶ Particularly the British government was in favour of removing the Council from Paris along with the military headquarters, a position the United States, the Netherlands and finally West Germany also were leaning towards. Denmark and Canada were isolated in their support of preserving the Council in Paris. In August 1966, the Political-Legal Division of the Danish Foreign Ministry warned that a removal of the NATO seat from Paris would be a victory for the anti-French line, only serving as a *declaration of mistrust* or a useless *retaliatory measure* against France. After all, preserving the Council in Paris would be advantageous in order to involve and commit France as much as possible to the Alliance.⁶⁸⁷ In addition, Foreign Minister Hækkerup argued that his government's opposition to the resolute British line reflected the Danish concern about aggravating the French aversion towards Britain in 'other political contexts', i.e. with regards to the British EC

⁶⁸⁴ RA UM 5.D.25.a, box 2. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Deputy Councillor Troels Oldenburg, 26 May 1964: "Jeg fremhæver også, at medens vi jo i Danmark af forståelige grunde nok har den opfattelse, at synonymet til politik er kompromis, er det nuværende franske regimes teknik dialektisk. Man frygter derfor heller ikke de skarpe standpunkter og konflikten mellem partnere. Måske mener man endog, at det er gennem den derved udløste proces, at udviklingen fremmes." Emphases added.

⁶⁸⁵ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK O2:2), box 5. "Referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn, den 11. marts 1966 kl. 12.30" and "Referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn, den 14. marts 1966 kl. 12."

⁶⁸⁶ Frédéric Bozo, *Deux Stratégies pour l'Europe. De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique 1958-1969* (Plon and Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996), p. 170.

accession. But as the Danish government found itself isolated, and since it would not cause 'irritation' among the allies, Denmark finally approved the relocation of the Council, though noting that it found the step politically unwise.⁶⁸⁸

The French government indicated at several occasions its satisfaction with the Danish "*prudence et sagesse*" regarding the 'Fourteen's declaration' and the location of the Council. In October, the Danish Washington Ambassador, Torben Rønne, thus reported that his French counterpart, Charles Lucet, had praised the Danish and Canadian attempt of avoiding the removal of the North Atlantic Council.⁶⁸⁹ Fears of the destiny of the EC enlargement were clearly a part of the background for the Danish government's conciliatory policy. However, the aim of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance cannot be underestimated as a rationale of the Danish mitigation policy.⁶⁹⁰ In August 1966, Gunnar Seidenfaden – the head of the Danish Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division – went surprisingly far in his analysis of the undergoing NATO crisis, as his contribution to a meeting of ambassadors indicates:

We find that the alleged risk of a hazardous Soviet initiative, inspired by the current weakening of NATO, is encouraged more by the dramatic, political reactions of the Fourteen than it is by the French action itself. In our judgement, moreover, a military weakening of the Western defence will only occur if the Fourteen - in virtue of a hard and prestige driven line - push France to unintended reactions that might impede a satisfactory and efficient cooperation in the future.⁶⁹¹

On sober consideration, according to the Danish Foreign Ministry, the rather reproachful Anglo-American reaction was even more damaging than the French withdrawal itself. In keeping with this approach, the Danish Foreign Minister referred to the NATO issue without

⁶⁸⁷ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 15 3/5: "Notits. NATO-rådets sæde", Per W. Frellesvig, 30 August 1966.

⁶⁸⁸ RA UM 108.B.2 Dan: "Referat af fællesmødet den 25. oktober 1966 kl. 16.20 med Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn og Udvalget angende Markedsforhandlingerne og af det i tilslutning hertil stedfundne Nævnsmøde", 4 November 1966.

⁶⁸⁹ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 5: "Notits", Per Groot, 18 March 1966, after a conversation with the French ambassador; RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 17 5/7. Letter from Ambassador Rønne to Permanent Undersecretary, Niels Boel, 28 October 1966.

⁶⁹⁰ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 15: "Representationschefmødet den 15. august 1966: De aktuelle NATO-spørgsmål", 16 August 1966. The Danish Foreign Ministry's Director, Paul Fisher, thus established that maintenance of the alliance was the main goal of the Danish policy.

⁶⁹¹ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 15: "Aktuelle NATO problemer", Head of Division Gunnar Seidenfaden's text prepared for a meeting of Ambassadors, 15 August 1966: "Den risiko, der er blevet bragt frem, for at Sovjetunionen under indtryk af en aktuel svækkelse af NATO skulle føle sig fristet til at tage et risikofyldt initiativ, vil, finder vi, i højere grad blive fremmet ved kraftige politiske reaktioner fra De 14 end ved de faktiske følger af den franske aktion. Yderligere vil der for os at dømme først for alvor blive tale om en militær svækkelse af vestens forsvar, hvis De 14 ved en hård og prestigebetonet linie tvinger Frankrig ud i reaktioner, som går ud over dets oprindelige hensigter, og som vanskeliggør et tilfredsstillende og effektivt samarbejde i fremtiden."

the slightest criticism of the French government, as Ambassador Sebilleau reported in August 1966.⁶⁹²

With or without NATO: two Roads to Détente

In the public debate, too, the French withdrawal from NATO had some impact, underpinning the left-wing argument that Denmark could actually leave NATO. In 1964, after seven years in government, the Radical Liberal Party left the partnership with the Social Democrats, and the party returned partly to its pacifist and neutralist roots. The following year, the Socialist People's Party proposed a formal inquiry into Denmark's future affiliation to the Alliance after the Treaty's expiration in 1969. Many Radical Liberals supported the idea, whereas the remaining parties in parliament opposed it.⁶⁹³ Foreign Minister Hækkerup warned that the question was not suited for a wider public debate or a referendum, as some Radicals and People's Socialist preferred.⁶⁹⁴ There was a slightly decreasing adherence to NATO in the Danish public, as expressed in Gallup polls, between 1965 and 1968. It took the Soviet intervention in Prague in August 1968 to reverse that trend, as highlighted in the table below:

Table 7 - Support and opposition to NATO in the Danish population, 1963-1972 (per cent)

	In favour	Against	Don't know	Total
June 1963	50	11	39	100
June 1964	49	13	38	100
November 1965	41	13	46	100
June 1966	41	17	42	100
October 1967	47	14	39	100
June 1968	39	20	41	100
Aug./Sept. 1968	54	16	30	100
April 1969	53	13	34	100
October 1970	52	15	33	100

⁶⁹² MAE AD EU, volume 89. Telegram from Ambassador Sebilleau to the French Foreign Ministry, 3 August 1966: "... la position du gouvernement danois vis-à-vis de l'OTAN sans y mettre la moindre intention critique vis-à-vis de celle du gouvernement français."

⁶⁹³ In 1964, the Radical Liberal party conference demanded that the population had to be consulted before a renewal of the Danish NATO membership. Some Radicals argued in favour of a referendum, others in favour of a general election focussing on the membership question. See for instance the MP Helge Larsen, "Valg eller folkeafstemning om NATO", in *Fremsyn*, 1964, volume 1, no. 6: 14.

⁶⁹⁴ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 40-42, 65-72.

March 1972	50	22	28	100
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Source: "Ugens Gallup", no. 26, 1978: "Are you in favour or against Danish participation in the Atlantic Alliance (NATO)?"

In Washington, the State Department consequently noted that the Soviet 1968 intervention generally had created a new and positive atmosphere for NATO and the American leadership.⁶⁹⁵

The declining NATO support in the mid-1960s was associated with the widespread belief in the improving relations with the Soviet Union and the growing discontent concerning the war escalation in Vietnam. Moreover, the French NATO withdrawal and rapprochement to the Soviet Union was an important part of the picture. During the 1966 crisis, the Danish Communist Party's paper, *Land og Folk*, focussed almost excessively on de Gaulle's 'wise decision', only few years after they had categorized him a fascist.⁶⁹⁶ The Danish Communists were not in parliament then, but they played an active part in the peace movements. In an address to the government and parliament, the Communists' Central Committee stated:

If Denmark wants to protect herself against a war that contradicts the nation's interests, it has to follow the French example and denounce the military cooperation with West Germany and NATO's supreme command.⁶⁹⁷

Moreover, the Socialist People's Party exploited the French challenge to advertise for a new security policy. As the party's leader, Aksel Larsen argued in the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee in March 1966:

... the French step was a symptom of the ongoing changes within NATO. It would be appropriate to examine Denmark's security policies and options now, in order to provide the parliament a basis for the upcoming decision [in 1969].⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁵ Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to NATO, 29 August 1968, cited in Pascaline Winand, "L'Administration Johnson, les Communautés européennes et le partenariat atlantique", in *Relations Internationales*, no. 119, autumn 2004: 392.

⁶⁹⁶ *Land og Folk*, "Europas sikkerhedskrise", 11 March 1966; "NATO-krisen ryster danske politikere", 13-14 March 1966; "Ordet »uprovokeret« i centrum i NATO-debatten med Frankrig", 4 May 1966; "En farlig sag for et lille land", 23 June 1966.

⁶⁹⁷ Denmark's Communist Party, "Danmarks forbliven i NATO uholdbar", published in *Land og Folk*, 16 March 1966: "Hvis Danmark vil sikre sig mod at blive draget ind i en krig mod dets interesser, må det derfor følge det franske eksempel og sige sig fri af det militære samarbejde med Vesttyskland og NATO-overkommandoerne."

⁶⁹⁸ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 5. "Referat af mødet i Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn, den 14. marts 1966 kl. 12.00." Aksel Larsen: "... at det franske skridt var et symptom på en igangværende bevægelse indenfor NATO. Danmarks sikkerhedspolitik og dens muligheder måtte nu undersøges, så folkettingen kunne få et grundlag for den afgørelse, der til sin tid måtte træffes.

Correspondingly, the Socialist People's Party re-launched the vision of creating a Nordic defence union – an idea that the Soviet Union now supported.

For the governing Social Democrats, these indications were particularly alarming in the light of the internal opposition, mushrooming in the environments of Social Democratic intellectuals and youth groups.⁶⁹⁹ Therefore, the party leaders were very keen to present a more 'progressive' and modern vision of NATO. In internal notes and approaches to Western diplomats, the Danish government argued that NATO had to show that it was more than a *military* alliance, namely that it was capable of promoting an international climate of cooperation and détente.⁷⁰⁰ In the beginning of May 1966, Prime Minister Krag intervened in the Danish NATO debate, arguing that de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO by no means ushered the apocalypse; the French president was partially right in his analysis, although these premises could not justify the regrettable French withdrawal. Instead, the international alterations pointed towards a reconsideration of NATO's future roles: "Back in 1949, the partners had emphasised the defence guaranties. Today, however, one could consider to entrust NATO the cooperation with the Eastern Block in order to advance in the decisive détente fields", the Danish prime minister argued.⁷⁰¹ His indications were very much in line with the ideas diffused in centre-left dailies such as *Information* and *Politiken*.⁷⁰²

In contrast to de Gaulle's policies, the Danish reform vision featured a multilateral détente approach which emphasised the need of a US and NATO involvement. Hitherto, the Danish government had favoured a predominantly bilateral approach to promoting détente across the 'Iron Curtain' – like France. In 1964, the Danes politely rejected a Polish proposal of summoning a European security conference with American and Soviet participation – a shelved Soviet idea from 1954 that Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki had revived during the Nineteenth UN Assembly. In a conversation with Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz, the Danish foreign minister had specified that Denmark favoured to improve the bilateral

⁶⁹⁹ Svend Auken, "Socialdemokratiets syn på dansk sikkerhedspolitik", in *Verdens Gang*, volume 21, 1967: 51-63.

⁷⁰⁰ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 187-189.

⁷⁰¹ Jens Otto Krag, "Nye opgaver for NATO bør overvejes i dag", in *Information*, 5 May 1966: "Hvor man i 1949 lagde hovedvægten på at sikre forsvaret, kan det overvejes i dag at tillægge NATO opgaver af at forhandle med øst-blokken og opnå fremskridt på de afgørende afspændingsfelter."

⁷⁰² Erik Seidenfaden, "Intet NATO – eller et nyt" and "NATO-krisen og den europæiske fremtid", in *Information*, 12 March and 11 May, respectively. Leading article of *Politiken*, "Svar til de Gaulle", 15 March 1966.

contacts rather than to proceed through a wide security conference.⁷⁰³ With a series of official visits to the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the Danish government displayed a remarkable travel activity to Warsaw Bloc countries in 1965 in keeping with the bilateral approach.⁷⁰⁴

During the North Atlantic Council's meeting in early June 1966, the Danish foreign minister nevertheless proposed to call in a wide, i.e. a *multilateral*, European security conference with both American and Soviet participation. Foreign Minister Hækkerup argued that it was of utmost importance for NATO to take the lead in the détente field, rather than leaving it to the Eastern powers ... or to Gaullist France. In Washington in April 1966, moreover, Prime Minister Krag had urged President Johnson to encourage a new, political-diplomatic role of NATO as a promoter of détente, while maintaining the military integration. After all, de Gaulle was right in his diagnostics about NATO's inadequate response to the changing security landscape and East-West relations of the mid-1960s, it seemed.⁷⁰⁵

Initially, the Johnson administration was rather split with regards to the NATO reform. Prominent figures such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under-Secretary George Ball and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson favoured a resolute, retaliatory response to the French step. A softer answer was also in the pipeline, however, as indicated in President Johnson's instruction to Dean Rusk and Defence Minister Robert McNamara:

I would be grateful if you would make it known that I wish the articulation of our position with respect to NATO to be in constructive terms. I see no benefit to ourselves or our allies in debating the position of the French government [...] we shall develop [...] proposals which would bind the Atlantic nations closer together; support, as best we can, the long term movement towards unity in Western Europe; and exploit the possibilities of easing East-West tensions.⁷⁰⁶

In fact, the personal adviser of Defence Minister McNamara - Arthur W. Barber - had encouraged the Danish security conference proposal in a conversation with a Danish diplomat in the Pentagon on 17 May 1966. The Danish diplomats reasoned that the direct contact with Barber signified that Defence Minister McNamara was sympathetic to the idea of a Danish

⁷⁰³ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 172-173.

⁷⁰⁴ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 - 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 243-247.

⁷⁰⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 590-591; Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), p. 181.

initiative. Moreover, President Johnson had put out some slightly positive statements about reforming NATO. In the North Atlantic Council, however, Secretary of State Dean Rusk dismissed categorically the Danish proposal – as did the French – in June 1966.⁷⁰⁷

In August 1966, the head of the Danish Foreign Ministry's Political-Legal Division, Gunnar Seidenfaden, recognised that there was a lot of sympathy in the Ministry with the French détente attempts.⁷⁰⁸ Moreover, antimilitaristic and leftist circles tended to reappraise General de Gaulle – hitherto considered a bellicose ruler – in virtue of his opening to the East. Nevertheless, the Danish proposal about a European security conference was largely elaborated as a direct *alternative* to the unilateral French détente approach. In the context of de Gaulle's upcoming and much publicized state visit to the Soviet Union (20-30 June 1966), the Danish government wanted to canalize the détente process into a common Western dialogue with the Soviet Union, rather than leaving the initiative to France and the Soviet Union. The Franco-Soviet rapprochement might spur a new West German assertiveness and pave the way for German-Soviet deliberations over Germany's future status. Paradoxically, the French withdrawal from NATO could also increase West Germany's influence in the Atlantic Alliance via a closer German-American collaboration.⁷⁰⁹ In a *balance of power* perspective, the Danish government thus considered it of utmost importance to keep France within the Alliance and to maintain its integrated structures.⁷¹⁰

Prime Minister Krag boasted publicly that, “we can ascertain that it was a Danish proposal from the NATO meeting in Brussels in the spring that led to a thorough consideration of the East-West problems.”⁷¹¹ However, the Danish government clearly envied its Belgian counterpart, as the North Atlantic Council approved a reform initiative in 1967 of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, which referred to the aim of securing “a more stable relationship”

⁷⁰⁶ Cited in Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 129.

⁷⁰⁷ Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 189-192; Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 279-283.

⁷⁰⁸ RA UM 105.S.3 (MIK 02:2), box 15: “Aktuelle NATO problemer”. Head of Division Gunnar Seidenfaden's text prepared for a meeting of ambassadors, 15 August 1966.

⁷⁰⁹ Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 184-185.

⁷¹⁰ MAE AD EU volume 91: “A/s. Le Danemark et l'OTAN”, note of the French Foreign Ministry's Political Department (Service des pactes), 7 April 1966.

⁷¹¹ Jens Otto Krag, “Europa 1967”, 1 January 1967: “... vi konstaterer, at det var et dansk forslag fra forråsmødet i NATO i Bruxelles, der medførte, at Øst-Vest-problemerne blev taget op til indgående overvejelse.”

with the Soviet Union.⁷¹² Inasmuch as the remaining NATO members initiated a transformation of the defence organisation, they partly endorsed de Gaulle's argument that its structure was obsolete. However, the measures taken were at odds with the Gaullist vision, namely as they formally approved the flexible response doctrine and the multilateral détente approach. France's self-imposed marginalisation in the Atlantic Alliance facilitated in effect the integrated cooperation and the episode had underscored the solidarity of the fourteen remaining member states.

In the light of the widespread hopes to the early détente endeavours, the Soviet 1968 intervention in Prague was obviously an enormous disappointment. In a conversation with Foreign Minister Michel Debré in December 1968, however, the foreign minister of the new Danish centre-right government, the Liberal Poul Hartling, emphasised the importance of the détente ambition for Denmark, acknowledging that France had played a pioneering role in this field. The Soviet intervention was certainly a setback, but Foreign Minister Hartling expressed the Danish government's support to resume the process.⁷¹³ It seemed, however, that the bilateral French approach was dated, as the remaining NATO partners emphasised the need of American and NATO participation in the process. Consequently, the United States and Canada engaged into the so-called Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with thirty-three European states, concluding in the 'Final Act' in Helsinki in August 1975.⁷¹⁴

The Luxembourg Compromise: a Nationalistic Outburst or a Reassuring Agreement?

Back in July 1965, moreover, France had provoked a crisis within the EEC, as de Gaulle launched the so-called policy of the empty chair. In protest against an extensive Commission proposal of speeding up the integration process, presented to the European Parliament in March 1965 without briefing the EEC Council, the French government simply withdrew from the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives – although leaving its deputy permanent representative in Brussels. France could not accept the Commission's idea of establishing an independent funding of the Communities based on tariffs and duties levied on imports from third countries to the EEC area, replacing the direct financing of the Communities from the treasuries of the member states. Moreover, the proposal featured an expansion of the European Parliament's (EP) say in budgetary matters in relation to the new agricultural

⁷¹² Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 131.

⁷¹³ RA UM 5.D.25.a, box 2: "Refereat. Udenrigsministerens samtale i Paris med udenrigsminister Debré den 12. december 1968."

arrangement. Increasing the role of the EP would be against the Gaullist vision of creating a European confederation in general, and it might specifically undermine the French government's control with the development of the crucial agricultural regulations.⁷¹⁵ Some recent research literature tends to deemphasise the relation between the French empty chair policy and the unilateral Gaullist security policies of the mid-1960s.⁷¹⁶ However, most contemporary observers – including the American administration – suspected that de Gaulle's unilateral EEC policy was a corollary to the brewing challenge of NATO and the Gaullist vision of creating a so-called 'European Europe'.⁷¹⁷

On a press conference of 9 September 1965, de Gaulle proclaimed that the French intended to stop the 'subordination' of France within NATO at the latest in 1969.⁷¹⁸ He devoted some rather disdainful comments to the European Commission and those dreaming of a European federation governed by some "stateless and irresponsible technocratic Areopagus".⁷¹⁹ The institutional question had some urgency, as the principle of majority voting in the Council of Ministers was planned to be introduced to new policy areas (transport, agricultural prices, trade policies and capital movements) as of 1 January 1966 according to the Treaties of Rome. This would expectedly increase the powers of the Commission significantly and render France vulnerable to coalitions against French CAP interests. Although sharing the interest in completing the CAP, the Dutch government was among the main antagonists of the French policies, as it had been during the Fouchet negotiations of 1961-62. The governments' of Belgium and Luxembourg also emphasised the importance of the EEC Treaty and its supranational features, but they assumed a more conciliatory approach in order to bring France back to the EEC institutions. However, France faced a rather united front against its 'boycott' of

⁷¹⁴ Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 232-233.

⁷¹⁵ Jean-Marie Palayret, "De Gaulle Challenges the Community. France, the Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise", in Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crises and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 45-77.

⁷¹⁶ N. Piers Ludlow thus examines the crisis in the perspective of supranational EEC dynamics in *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 7.

⁷¹⁷ Pascaline Winand, "Kennedy's Atlantic Partnership, the EEC Empty Chair Crisis and the French/NATO Problem", in Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crises and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 183-218.

⁷¹⁸ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958 – 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 384.

⁷¹⁹ Following the translation of de Gaulle in Jean-Marie Palayret, "De Gaulle Challenges the Community. France, the Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise", in Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crises and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), p. 62: "... aréopage technocratique, apatride et irresponsable".

the EEC; the Five did not buy into what they considered de Gaulle's institutional 'black-mail'.⁷²⁰

In December 1965, in the first round of the presidential election in France, de Gaulle failed to obtain a majority, as he received 44.64 per cent of the vote. In the second round, he beat the Socialist candidate, François Mitterrand, with a modest 55.91 per cent. It was an important political signal that many Conservatives and Centrists had voted for the more enthusiastic European Jean Lacanuet in the first ballot. Previously, the important agricultural interest organisation, *Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles*, had even urged its millions of members to vote against de Gaulle. Consequently, de Gaulle faced five rather dismissive EEC partners and a critical electorate that demanded an end to the empty chair crisis. Shortly after the December election, the French diplomacy indicated that France was willing to let its representatives return to Brussels. The challenge was now to define the conditions and to save faces of the involved actors.⁷²¹

In January 1966, during a special Council meeting in Luxembourg, without the participation of the Commission, France's EEC partners acknowledged that the Council should make an effort to find a solution acceptable for all members, *within a reasonable period*, when a member state considered a 'very important interest' at stake. This principle hardly differed from the implicit norms of everyday EEC decision-making. However, the French delegation inserted unilaterally the more radical principle that the discussion in the Council had to proceed *until* a unanimous agreement could be obtained. Hence the 'Luxembourg Compromise' was not an acceptance of any 'veto right' in a legal sense as widely believed, but rather a pronouncement of an obvious principle with a somewhat stronger French footnote attached. The statements from the Luxembourg meeting had nevertheless a considerable symbolic significance, as there had been strong expectations among pro-European groups and widespread fears among EEC sceptics that the EEC would take a giant step into a supranational reality as of 1 January 1966.⁷²²

⁷²⁰ Anjo G. Harryvan, "A Successful Defence of the Communitarian Model? The Netherlands and the Empty Chair Crisis", in Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crises and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 129-152; Étienne Deschamps, "More than 'Honest Brokers'? Belgium, Luxembourg and the Empty Chair Crisis (1965-66), in Jean-Marie Palayret ... *op.cit.*, pp. 153-180.

⁷²¹ Jean-Marie Palayret, "De Gaulle Challenges the Community. France, the Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise", in Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crises and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 45-77.

⁷²² N. Piers Ludlow, "The Eclipse of the Extremes. Demythologising the Luxembourg Compromise", in W. Loth (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2001), pp. 247-264; Maurice Vaisse, "La politique européenne de la France en 1965: pourquoi »la chaise vide«?", in W. Loth

In Denmark, there was surprisingly little focus on the direct consequences of the French initiative, considering the enormous interest in getting access to the EEC's agricultural market and funds. Initially, it was barely possible to categorise the Danish government as a supporter or an opponent of the French positions as such, although the crisis was not a big surprise. Based on Belgian sources, Prime Minister Krag had informed the Danish Foreign Policy Committee as early as November 1964 about the likelihood of a French boycott of the EEC due to disagreements about the CAP.⁷²³ In May 1965, a memorandum elaborated by the Prime Minister's Office noted that it was not necessarily a 'Danish interest' to weaken the position of the Commission, thus undermining the only supranational structure within the European framework. In addition, the Prime Minister's Office warned: "The danger that nationalistic currents will gain a footing in the European countries is increasing as time goes by, and the soil for the idea of European unity is getting less and less fertile".⁷²⁴

Particularly the claim that *French unilateralism and nationalism might weaken the binding of Germany to NATO and the EEC and even legitimise or fan the flames of a revived German nationalism* was outspread in the mid-1960s. Prominent European actors contributed to this understanding in Danish government circles, as an October 1965 conversation between the Danish Paris ambassador and presidential candidate François Mitterrand illustrates. Mitterrand thus denounced General de Gaulle's foreign policies, among other things because they might spur a "revival of German nationalism and increased international tension or encourage an old fashioned alliance system". In extract, the ambassador's minutes of the meeting reads:

Mitterrand emphasised several times that he was considerably more Atlanticist than General de Gaulle was. In particular, he endorsed the endeavours of creating a virtually integrated Europe, i.e. a United States of Europe. Europe would only be able to perform with strength as an equal partner vis-à-vis the United States when this goal was accomplished. In addition, Germany's national aspirations, also regarding nuclear arms, could only be satisfied, without increasing the international tension, within this commonwealth of states.⁷²⁵

(ed), *Crises and Compromises... op.cit.* pp. 193-214; Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages, pour l'effort, 1962-1965, tome IV* (Librairie Plon: 1970), pp. 377-381.

⁷²³ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I blokodelingens tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5, 1945-72* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 514-515.

⁷²⁴ ABA JOK, box 75, file 3a: "Notat vedrørende det påtænkte nye europæiske initiativ", by Henning Gottlieb, principal in the Prime Minister's Office on 5 May 1965: "Som tiden går, bliver faren for, at nationalistiske strømninger skal vinde indpas i de enkelte europæiske lande større, og den europæiske enhedstanke får ringere og ringere kår."

⁷²⁵ RA UM 123.D.1, box 13: "Den politiske situation i Frankrig. Samtale med venstrepartiernes præsidentkandidat, M. François Mitterrand", Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt to the Foreign Ministry, 19

In November 1965, likewise, Joseph Luns - the Dutch foreign minister affiliated to the Catholic People's Party - explained the Danish Haag ambassador that "the most hazardous part of the French nationalism was its potential impact upon the attitudes in the neighbouring countries." He considered French nationalism introvert, short of territorial ambitions, but a nationalistic revival in Germany was particularly regrettable, as German nationalism "traditionally had been of expansive character."⁷²⁶

However, many well-informed actors argued that it barely was a French aim to dissolve or weaken the central role of the Commission, as many of its activities were particularly conducive to French agricultural interests. The Danish EEC Ambassador and incoming Minister of European Market Affairs, Tyge Dahlgaard, suggested that the French assault on the principle of majority voting in the Council principally was staged in order to impress on the EEC partners that they had to practice the future majority voting, while respecting basic French interests.⁷²⁷ In this perspective, the French demands were not that alarming.

Public commentators particularly deplored de Gaulle's disdainful declarations about the current Western cooperation, issued in his press conference of September 1965. The Danish media largely associated the empty chair policy with a pompous and futile Gaullist demonstration of national independence and *grandeur* related to the upcoming presidential election in France.⁷²⁸ In the light of the recent developments, the leading Social Democratic daily, *Aktuelt*, tended to reappraise its traditional opposition to a supranational EEC. Now it argued that the Gaullist policies were 'undemocratic' on the *European* level, as France did not accept "*democratic majority decisions*" in the EEC - a procedure the Social Democratic press paradoxically had associated with *authoritarian* or *non-democratic* decision-making earlier.⁷²⁹

October 1965: "... genoplivelse af tysk nationalisme og øget international spænding eller til et gammeldags alliancesystem..." ... "Mitterrand fremhævede gentagne gange, at han var atlantisk indstillet i langt højere grad end general de Gaulle og navnlig tilsluttede sig bestræbelserne for at skabe et egentligt integreret Europa, d.v.s. et Europas forenede stater. Først når dette mål var nået, kunne Europa optræde med styrke som ligeberettiget partner over for USA, og kun inden for et sådant statssamfund kunne Vest-Tyskands nationale aspirationer herunder også eventuelle sådanne i relation til atomvåbnet tilfredsstilles uden forøgelse af den internationale spænding."

⁷²⁶ RA UM 123.D.1, box 13: "Europæiske problemer", the Danish Haag Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, 18 November 1965: "... at det farligste ved den franske nationalisme er dens potentielle virkninger på nabolandenes indstilling [...] ... traditionelt har været af ekspansiv karakter."

⁷²⁷ RA UM 5.B.43.a: "Europaproblemerne", EEC Ambassador Tyge Dahlgaard's report of 10 July 1965.

⁷²⁸ *Berlingske Tidende*, "De Gaulles verden", leader of 12 September 1965; *Information*, "De 5 mod nr. 6", leader of 16 September 1965.

⁷²⁹ *Aktuelt*, "Er de Gaulle udemokratisk?", leading article of 11 September 1965.

For convinced Europeans, the 'nationalistic' or 'egoistic' crescendo was a further confirmation of the necessity of transcending the purely intergovernmental approach to European cooperation. After receiving the prestigious Charlemagne Prize of the city of Aachen in May 1966, Prime Minister Krag stated in a radio interview that there was understanding in Denmark for both main approaches to the European cooperation: "A small country will often enjoy the benefits of a strong organisation. On the other hand, de Gaulle's view might paradoxically facilitate British membership."⁷³⁰ In his diary, however, Krag also noted that he tended to agree with Chancellor Erhard's claim that de Gaulle still championed an unrealistic belief in the French dominance of Europe and that he was aiming at a *bilateral* agreement with the Soviet Union at the expense of the remaining Europe.⁷³¹ In May 1966 in parliament, the Social Democratic Foreign Minister, Per Hækkerup, engaged into an even more elaborate defence of the blessings of supranational institutions:

... it is in the interest of a small state that the supranational institutions are as strong as possible since it gives the best protection. In other words, it means that the interpretations and judgements are based on the Community's viewpoints rather than the individual member's national interests.⁷³²

Hækkerup conceded that the "political scruples with supranational institutions that some have had, were not completely dispelled", but his defence of a supranational Europe was clearly at odds with the sceptical mainstream of the Social Democratic Party.⁷³³ The Conservative speaker, Poul Møller, expressed similar view and warned that the revived French *nationalism* might choke the European integration and the European idea as such. In virtue of Denmark's 'smallness', it would be in Denmark's interest to advance the process of surrendering sovereignty to the European institutions, he argued.⁷³⁴

In spite of the strongly negative comments on French nationalism, and some positive remarks about supranationalism, put out in Denmark in 1965-66, a more favourable version of the events can be singled out as a candidate of a dominant interpretation in the longer term.

⁷³⁰ Cited from Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 287: "Et lille land kan ofte have fordel af at der findes en stærk organisation. Omvendt vil de Gaulles synspunkt – paradoksalt nok – lette Englands medlemskab (...)"

⁷³¹ Cited in Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 286.

⁷³² *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1965-66, 26 May 1966, column 5620: "... er det i en lille stats interesse, at de overnationale institutioner er så stærke som muligt, for det giver den bedste beskyttelse, nemlig den, at fortolkningen og bedømmelsen sker ud fra Fællesskabets synspunkter og ikke ud fra det enkelte lands nationale interesser."

⁷³³ *op.cit.* column 5618: "... så tror jeg ikke, vi skal regne med, at den politiske betænkelighed, som nogle har haft overfor det overnationale, er helt bortvejret."

⁷³⁴ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1965-66, 26 May 1966, columns 5565-66.

Already in October 1965, President I. C. Thygesen of the Danish Industrial Council stated that he did not agree with the 'pessimists', as de Gaulle's last initiative would facilitate the Danish EEC accession, given the population's scepticism regarding supranational institutions.⁷³⁵ Similarly, papers such as the Radical *Politiken* and the Social Democratic left-wing paper *Demokraten* noticed the paradox that de Gaulle's seemingly obstructionist policy could pave the way for other sceptics, i.e. the UK and the Nordic countries.⁷³⁶ The diplomatic style of Gaullist France was probably unduly brutal, but the intergovernmental dimension was interesting in terms of gaining popular acceptance for the enlargement venture.

With a little distance to the EEC and NATO crises of the mid-1960s, the Danish Social Democratic leaders also tended to deemphasise the undesirable effects of the Gaullist policies in favour of the 'tranquillising' sides of the Luxembourg Compromise. In May 1967, Tyge Dahlgaard - the Minister of Trade and European Market Affairs and former EEC Ambassador - argued that the concerns about the technocrats in Brussels were antiquated, as the Luxembourg Compromise had de-dramatized the whole construction.⁷³⁷ The Social Democratic Party's focus on the Luxembourg Compromise was further accentuated from 1968, as the former EEC opponent and editor of *Aktuelt*, Ivar Nørgaard, was appointed spokesperson on European affairs for the Social Democrats. Nørgaard and associates' precondition for accepting Danish EC membership was a somewhat radical interpretation of the Luxembourg Compromise, insisting that it had established the states' right to veto undesired changes of the EEC, particularly in the field of economic, fiscal and social policies. In fact, the Social Democratic leader, Jens Otto Krag, and key officials in the Danish Market Secretariat referred increasingly to the Communities as an intergovernmental, economic arrangement, in some respects resembling the OEEC of the 1950s.⁷³⁸ Per Frellesvig from the Danish Paris Embassy, for instance, argued in March 1969 that de Gaulle's latest indications appeared as a revival of a more open and somewhat broader Fouchet Plan. There would be no supranational EC as long as the Gaullists were in power, and the emerging type of cooperation would be less 'threatening' than the initial EEC plans had indicated.⁷³⁹ In the 1971-72 EC membership campaign, moreover, the Social Democratic EC supporters frequently referred to the Luxem-

⁷³⁵ *Information*, "De Gaulles markedspolitik er måske til gavn for Danmark", 21 October 1965.

⁷³⁶ *Politiken*, "Den franske fremtid", leading article of 10 September 1965; *Information*, "Fransk brutalitet", leader of 21 January 1966; *Demokraten*, "de Gaulle's to nej'er", leading article of 11 September 1965.

⁷³⁷ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1966-67, 11 May 1967, column 4182.

⁷³⁸ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 388-389.

⁷³⁹ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box 15. Letter from Per Frellesvig to the the Market Secretariat's Permanent Undersecretary, Niels Ersbøll, 20 March 1969.

bourg Compromise, and the Anglo-French view on the role of the Commission, as a positive, or reassuring, argument in favour of membership.⁷⁴⁰

The symbolic significance of the Luxembourg Compromise was also reflected in the arguments of the Danish EEC opposition. Aksel Larsen, the leader of the Socialist People's Party, tended initially to welcome the new development of the 'stigmatized' EEC. In May 1966, he conceded that the EEC to some extent appeared as a simple economic arrangement, now deprived of all "the unpleasant and unacceptable features that characterised the Common Market initially and to some extent still does."⁷⁴¹ In the second membership debate of 1967, however, he again claimed that the EEC was still striving for "a close-knit economic-political union with supranational organs, to which the member states have to surrender a very big part of their sovereignty, the right to be in charge of their own affairs."⁷⁴² The leader of the Socialist People's Party acknowledged that the principle of unanimity voting seemingly was gaining ground, but a small country like Denmark would *not* even be able to benefit from this warranty. Paraphrasing George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, he argued that, "the great and economically dominating powers will be more equal than others in an organisation like the EEC, irrespective of the formal equality of rights."⁷⁴³ In the same vein, his party colleague, Poul Dam (MP), argued that the imbalance between small countries and great powers remained, and "our opportunities of elaborating Danish policies, of shaping the future structure of the Danish society, will be critically reduced".⁷⁴⁴

The reasoning of the Socialist People's Party is particularly interesting in the light of the party's whole-hearted support of a neutral Nordic Defence Union and the contemporary plan of a Nordic economic cooperation (NORDEK). In May 1967, the party leader, Aksel Larsen, argued that the Nordic countries had the best economic, democratic and cultural (*folkelige*) reasons to found the most intimate cooperation. Aksel Larsen had no hesitations of using the concepts of 'economic integration' or 'union' in connection with his visions for the Nordic

⁷⁴⁰ Jens Otto Krag, "Vi er forsigtige europæere men betænkelighederne blev mindre under forhandlingerne", in an offprint of *Aktuelt*, 7 July 1971; Erling Bjøl, "De Gaulle, l'Europe et le Danemark", in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990. Tome V. L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), p. 246.

⁷⁴¹ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger 1965-66, 26 May 1966, columns 5590: "... de ubehagelige og uantagelige sider, som fællesmarkedet i hvert fald var og endnu delvis er behæftet med."

⁷⁴² *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1966-67, 11 May 1967, column 4106: "... en fast sammentømret økonomisk-politisk union med overnationale organer, hvortil medlemslandene skal afgive en meget stor del af deres suverænitet, deres bestemmelsesret over egne anliggender."

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.* column 4107: "Uanset ligeberettigelse vil det jo i en organisation som EEC være sådan, at nogle, nemlig de store og økonomisk dominerende magter, vil være mere lige end andre."

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.* column 4163.

countries.⁷⁴⁵ In February 1969, he emotionally stated that, "I would so much like to have supranational institutions in this Nordic economic union" – a union he also would have liked to see endowed with its own resources from the customs receipts in order to loosen its dependence of the national governments.⁷⁴⁶ No parties were against strengthening the Nordic 'integration'; the question was whether to promote it as an *alternative* to EEC membership or as a *part* of Denmark's overall European efforts, as we shall see below.⁷⁴⁷

De Gaulle's 1967 Veto and the Nordic Explorations

General de Gaulle cemented his reputation as an inflexible negotiator after the renewed veto against British EC membership in late 1967. In Denmark, a leading article of the Social Democratic paper, *Aktuelt*, denounced the prevalent French unilateralism, as it tended to undermine the 'progressive' détente policies. "All this is in line with a conservative nationalism to the extent that we cannot escape the question: is France European?", *Aktuelt* wondered.⁷⁴⁸ Similarly, Erik Seidenfaden – now an international commentator of the Conservative daily *Berlingske Tidende* – observed that *France* appeared as an 'island' in the European context rather than the UK.⁷⁴⁹ However, the blame was not exclusively directed at the French president's highhanded style, but increasingly so at the French people and society as such. Ivar Nørgaard, the Social Democratic spokesperson on European affairs, commented in a parliamentary market debate of May 1968 that he personally considered "de Gaulle an excellent mouthpiece of very strong political and commercial forces in France" – a claim the Conservative and Radical Liberal speakers endorsed.⁷⁵⁰

Moreover, the Danish economy of the mid-1960s was rather sensitive to the European deadlock, as the EEC's agricultural policies and import duties of 1966 were put into effect. The CAP severely impeded the Danish agriculture's cornerstone export of cattle to West Germany, and rendered it impossible to continue the favourable bilateral Danish-German trade arrangements from 1958. The Danish government reckoned that France and the UK together had the key to cut the Gordian knot of bringing about a wider Western European

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.* column 4114-15.

⁷⁴⁶ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1968-69, 6 February 1969, column 3772.

⁷⁴⁷ Thorsten B. Olesen and Johnny Laursen, "Det europæiske markedsskisma", in Tom Swienty (ed.), *Danmark i Europa 1945-93* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1994), pp. 145-149; *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1966-67, 11 May 1967, column 4071.

⁷⁴⁸ *Aktuelt*, "Frankrigs rolle i Europa-fællesskab", leading article of 23 December 1967: "Alt sker det ud fra en konservativ nationalisme af en grad, så vi andre efterhånden ikke undgår spørgsmålet: Er Frankrig europæisk?"

⁷⁴⁹ Erik Seidenfaden, "Englands Europa", in *Berlingske Tidende*, 24 December 1967.

⁷⁵⁰ *Folketingstidende*, Folketingets forhandlinger, 1967-68, 15 May 1968, columns 2930, 2941 and 2953: "... de Gaulle et ganske godt talerør for meget stærke politiske og erhvervsmæssige kræfter i Frankrig."

market, and it directly urged *the governments on both sides of the Channel* to be more flexible in the upcoming negotiations.⁷⁵¹ After General de Gaulle had given his so-called 'velvet veto' regarding the British EEC membership in a press conference of 16 May 1967, Principal Niels Ersbøll of the Danish Foreign Ministry's influential Market Secretariat remarked that the French "statements have character of unsubstantiated assertions that completely ignore Britain's political and economic development since 1963."⁷⁵² De Gaulle's negative indications hinted that the negotiations were heading for an impasse again, and the Danish Market Secretariat assumed that it might last up to ten years before Denmark could rely on a unification of the European main markets.⁷⁵³ There was still no wider interest in a unilateral EEC accession, the agricultural lobby apart, although the French government seemed to advocate that solution again as de Gaulle had done after the 1963 veto.⁷⁵⁴

The French-British deadlock prompted a new Nordic initiative of the Danish Market Secretariat. Two weeks after de Gaulle 'velvet veto', it conceived a far-reaching 'Draft of a Nordic Union', envisioning a Scandinavian economic union with possible Finnish and Icelandic participation. It was strongly inspired by the EEC construction and encouraged by the Nordic countries' successful collaboration during the Kennedy Round of the GATT. Moreover, the Nordic countries had become increasingly important to the Danish economy, accounting for 21 per cent of the total Danish exports in 1966 as compared with only 14 per cent back in 1957. In the same period, the exports to the British market had decreased from 30 to 25 per cent, while the exports to the EEC had fallen from 28 to 23 per cent.⁷⁵⁵ This said, the Nordic initiative was by no means conceived as an enduring alternative to EC membership. The rationale was rather to loosen the constricting Danish dependence on Britain in EC policies and to strengthen the Nordic countries vis-à-vis the EC, thus paving the way for an arrangement between the EC and the Nordic 'bloc.' Finally, it involved a considerable political

⁷⁵¹ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 459-465; RA UM 108.B.2, box ???: "Referat af fællesmødet den 25. oktober 1966 kl. 16.20 med Det udenrigspolitiske Nævn og Udvalget angående Markedsforhandlingerne og af det i tilslutning hertil stedfundne Nævnsmøde", 4 November 1966.

⁷⁵² RA UM 108.B.2, box 19: "Til brug ved handels- og markedsministerens redegørelse ved fællesmøde af markedsudvalget og det udenrigspolitiske nævn den 23. maj 1967", 23 May 1967 by Principal Niels Ersbøll: "... udtalelser har karakter af postulater, som i realiteten ikke underbygges af egentlige argumenter, og som ganske ignorerer den siden 1963 skete politiske og økonomiske udvikling i Storbritanien."

⁷⁵³ Michael Bruun Andersen, "Dansk europapolitik og nordisk samarbejde", in *Historisk Tidsskrift*, volume 104, no. 1, 2004: 86-121.

⁷⁵⁴ RA UM 108.B.2, box 18: "Handels- og markedsministerens drøftelser i Paris", telex from Niels Ersbøll to the Danmission, Genève, 6 February 1967.

⁷⁵⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 485.

advantage that the pro-Nordic groups would have to acknowledge that the government actually considered the celebrated idea of Nordic solidarity.⁷⁵⁶

In order to present a 'progressive' programme, the Social Democratic minority government launched the Nordic plan in the January 1968 general election campaign.⁷⁵⁷ However, the election ended fifteen years of uninterrupted Social Democratic rule in Denmark. As it appears in the table below, the antimilitaristic Radical Liberal Party went from thirteen seats in parliament to twenty-seven:

Table 8 - Distribution of parliamentary seats, 1968

Party	1968	(1966)
Conservatives	37	(34)
Liberals	34	(35)
Radical Liberals	27	(13)
Social Democrats	62	(69)
People's Socialists	11	(20)
The Socialist Left	4	(0)
Independents	0	(4)
Total	175	(175)

Source: Henrik S. Nissen, *Landet blev by. Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie. Bind 14* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politikens Folag, 1991), p. 324.

The leader of the Radical Liberal Party, Hilmar Baunsgaard, consequently formed a majority government with the Conservatives and the Liberals. However, the overthrow of the Social Democratic government by no means signified a departure from Denmark's particular NATO or EC policies. Within the so-called 'trefoil' coalition, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Radical Liberals hold one another in check concerning security policies from 1968 to 1971.⁷⁵⁸

At a Nordic Council meeting in Oslo of 17 February 1968, Hilmar Baunsgaard's new centre left government presented the initiative of creating a Nordic economic union, the so-called NORDEK. Iceland turned down the invitation, but a committee of civil servants from Nor-

⁷⁵⁶ Michael Bruun Andersen, "Dansk europapolitik og nordisk samarbejde", in *Historisk Tidsskrift*, volume 104, no. 1, 2004: 86-121.

⁷⁵⁷ Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 348-349.

⁷⁵⁸ Henrik S. Nissen, *Landet blev by. Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie. Bind 14* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politikens Folag, 1991), pp. 302-331; Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991. Bind 2* (Copenhagen, 2005), pp. 11-98.

way, Sweden, Denmark and Finland was established with a view to elaborate a report before 1 January 1969. As we shall see in the chapter below, the May 1968 crisis and the fall of de Gaulle changed significantly the conditions of the Nordic endeavours.

The Danish government and wide political circles shared definitively the Gaullist vision of overcoming the bipolar bloc system of the early Cold War. From the Gaullist point of view, however, the East-West dialogue and détente process was supposed to pave the way for a return to a *multipolar* 'golden age', where at least the traditional great powers would not be satellites to the superpowers. By contrast, the Danish utopia featured a UN regulated system or, second best, an Atlantic system. Back in July 1965, the French Copenhagen Ambassador, Albert Ledoux, had reported:

The principal aim of the Danish foreign policy is and remains the détente between East and West. The Alliance is only a means to that effect, and the resort to the UN is preferred whenever it is possible.

[...]

Just as much as Denmark is ready to give its support to the UN, so much can one doubt the sincerity of the Danish adhesion to the Alliance. It seems that the Danes experience it as a liability to participate in the Atlantic Alliance and that they seize all occasions to appear as little engaged as possible in the Western camp, by their declarations and acts, particularly by conducting a prudent and reserved nuclear policy...⁷⁵⁹

However, the 1966 crisis and the French unilateralism clarified that the Danish government was very committed to the Atlantic Alliance. In September 1966, therefore, France's new

⁷⁵⁹ MAE AD EU, volume 91. "A.s. Position du Danemark à l'égard de l'OTAN et de l'ONU", Ambassador Ledoux to the French Foreign Ministry, 10 July 1965: "*Le but principal de la politique étrangère danoise est et demeure la détente Est-Ouest. A cet effet, l'Alliance n'est qu'un moyen et le recours à l'O.N.U. doit lui être chaque fois que possible préféré.*"

Autant le Danemark est-il prêt à accorder aux Nations-Unies tous ses efforts, autant peut on douter de la sincérité de son adhésion à l'Alliance. Il semble que les Danois éprouveront comme un malaise à être membre du Pacte Atlantique et qu'ils saisissent toutes les occasions pour apparaître tant par leur déclarations que par leur actes aussi peu engagés que possible dans le camp Occidental, en particulier en menant un politique prudente et réservée dans le domaine atomique ..."

ambassador to Copenhagen, Pierre Sebillau, reported about his great surprise at learning about Denmark's strong adherence to NATO.⁷⁶⁰

While France withdrew from the integrated structures, the Danish government favoured the Alliance's military integration. Moreover, the Danish *détente* policies emerging in 1966 favoured a strengthening of NATO's political profile and a European security conference with American participation. There was still a touch of traditional Danish small state pacifism at play, assuming that the military apparatuses, on both sides of the iron curtain, were a potential source of distrust and tension. On Prime Minister Krag's mentioning of a possible disarmament agreement between the two superpowers, to illustrate, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville commented that *disarmament* was the result of *détente* - not the other way round.⁷⁶¹ With a view to obtain a regional *détente* effect, the Danish government had actually rejected the stationing of American nuclear devices in Denmark in peacetime, though it relied on the dissuasive effects of the American strategy. Tacitly, however, the Danish government accepted the stockpiling in Greenland of American nuclear missiles and daily overflights by B-52s armed with H-bombs - until January 1968, when a plane crashed with four 1.1-ton devices near the American Thule Base in northern Greenland.⁷⁶²

In Denmark, the NATO and EEC crises of the mid-1960s did not spur any organised civil society reactions comparable to those against the Algerian War or the French nuclear tests of 1960-61. The opponents of NATO exploited the French withdrawal to argue in favour of a similar Danish withdrawal, but the crises remained largely a government matter. Even so, the government's presentation of Danish EEC and NATO policies to the public were strongly marked by the anticipation of public reactions. It was of some importance to give NATO a new, positive profile as a promoter of *détente* in line with the political climate of the mid-1960s; otherwise, the Eastern powers or France would take the initiative.

Similarly, the Danish government was keen on promoting a certain interpretation of the Luxembourg Compromise to the public, namely that it cemented the moderate nature of the EC. During the empty chair crisis, it had pointed to the regrettable 'nationalistic' sides of the French EEC blockade, although there was not a lot of attention at all. As the membership perspective reappeared from 1967, however, the government referred to the Luxembourg Compromise as a favourable feature. The French European policy remained pivotal for

⁷⁶⁰ MAE AD EU, volume 91. "A.s. Premières impressions sur le Danemark, OTAN, Marché Commun, rapports avec la France". Ambassador Sebillau to the French Foreign Ministry, 22 September 1966.

⁷⁶¹ RA UM 5.D.25.a, box 2. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Deputy Councillor Oldenburg, summarising Foreign Minister Krag's meeting with Couve de Murville, 20 May 1964.

Denmark in the late 1960s: De Gaulle's renewed veto of 1967 even prompted the Danish governments to launch a Nordic initiative as a temporary substitute to the EC and a lever in the future relations with the Community.

⁷⁶² Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 563-575, 635-640.

Chapter 8 - Towards the Fall of de Gaulle (1965-69)

With the French acceptance of Algerian independence in 1962 and the neutralisation of the OAS backlash, General de Gaulle had fulfilled the mission that originally had justified his exceptional powers. Towards the mid-1960s, the question thus reappeared whether the presidential system was democratically appropriate. Would the ageing Charles de Gaulle - born in 1890 - be at all able to stand for another presidential term of seven years? After the French 1963 veto against British EEC membership, Danish observers were particularly interested in the prospect of de Gaulle's possible withdrawal as it might pave the way for an enlargement of the Community. A main question was whether the Gaullist movement could survive the disappearance of its pivotal point - General de Gaulle - the charismatic leader and tactical mastermind, who still benefited from his status as a national saviour and political oracle.

Observers also asked to what extent the foreign policies of an alternative presidential majority would differ at all from that of de Gaulle. In October 1963, Ambassador Bartels reported from Paris, "It is by no means excluded that Gaullism will dominate in French politics in the longer term in virtue of its progressive nationalism - even without de Gaulle." Bartels tended to agree with de Gaulle's own assertion, "that he always had known and realized what the French people wanted."⁷⁶³ In a correspondence with division leader Gunnar Seidenfaden of the Danish Foreign Ministry in 1964, Bartels envisaged that,

... in a not so distant future, one might realise that Gaullism, in the widest sense of the word, is installed so vigorously in France that the fall of de Gaulle will not have a radical impact on French policies.⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶³ RA UM 123.D.1, box 12. "Hvorhen?", Bartels to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 2 October 1963: "Det er derfor ingenlunde udelukket, at gaullismen med sin progressive nationalisme også på noget længere sigt vil dominere i fransk politik - selv uden general de Gaulle. [...] ... at han altid havde vist og virkeliggjort det, som det franske folk ville."

⁷⁶⁴ RA UM 123.D.1, box 13. Ambassador Bartels to Head of Division Seidenfaden, 15 July 1964: "... at den tid måske ikke er så fjern, hvor man vil konstatere, at gaullismen i dette ords videste forstand er så kraftigt installeret i Frankrig, at general de Gaulle's bortfald ikke radikalt vil ændre den franske politik."

The French 1965 election spurred some speculations in Denmark and elsewhere about the nature of the era after General de Gaulle.

The Presidential Election of 1965

In December 1965, General de Gaulle was finally to pass the direct test vis-à-vis the electorate in line with the constitutional reform that the French had endorsed massively in October 1962. In accordance with de Gaulle's constitutional visions, the president was elected directly by the 'people' rather than the Electoral College that had been set up in the 1958 election. Symbolically, the President of the Republic was thus supposed to incarnate the nation's will. As mentioned, de Gaulle was re-elected in a second round against the Socialist candidate, François Mitterrand, who gained 32.2 per cent of the votes in the first round and 45.5 per cent in the second. Consequently, de Gaulle could hardly stage himself as a complete incarnation of the national will and destiny any longer. During the presidential campaigns of 1965, the 'stigmatised' French parties found a renaissance as platforms for the presidential candidates – an outcome that partly contradicted de Gaulle's visions of a plebiscitary democracy. Political commentators talked about the irony that the election finally had forced de Gaulle to step down from his elevated Olympus to the political realities.⁷⁶⁵

On the Danish government's behalf, Ambassador Bartels started an examination of the French presidential candidates, particularly investigating their view on an EEC enlargement and the Atlantic Alliance. In April 1964, he met the Socialist candidate, Gaston Defferre – the mayor of Marseille, who had been Minister for the Overseas France in the Mollet Cabinet from 1956-57. It was encouraging for the Danes to hear Defferre noting that de Gaulle had made a serious mistake by excluding Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Ambassador Bartels offered assurances that Denmark was the Scandinavian country most closely related to the Continent. The ambassador flattered Defferre that he personally had the reputation in the Danish public as the one person, who could open the Communities for the Scandinavians. However, Ambassador Bartels deemed that Gaston Defferre's chances vis-à-vis de Gaulle in the election equalled to zero.⁷⁶⁶

As it were, Gaston Defferre was in conflict with the Socialist's leader Guy Mollet and unable to unite the political left with the centrist groups. He gave up his candidature in June 1965, thus paving the way for François Mitterrand, who declared that he would run as the left-

⁷⁶⁵ Serge Bernstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 271-280.

⁷⁶⁶ RA UM 123.D.1, box 12: "Møde med den socialistiske præsidentkandidat, M. Gaston Defferre", Ambassador Bartels to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 30 April 1964. Bartels to Head of Division Seidenfaden, 12 May 1964.

wing candidate in September 1965, supported by Pierre Mendès France - the former prime minister and anti-Gaullist icon.⁷⁶⁷ The Danish Paris Ambassador, Knuth-Winterfeldt, reported that Mitterrand found de Gaulle's foreign policies directly damaging for both France and the world peace. With regard to the EEC, Mitterrand emphasised that he strongly favoured a virtually integrated Europe, a 'United States of Europe', enabling Europe to appear on a par with the United States of America. Moreover, he preferred to strengthen the influence of the European Commission and Parliament with a view to promoting economic and political integration.⁷⁶⁸ Mitterrand made an impression as a very serious candidate, whereas the centrist candidate, Jean Lecanuet, was considered a player without any chances. Finally, de Gaulle pompously presented his candidature in early November as a choice between *de Gaulle* and *chaos* – between France's success and self-destruction – as Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt critically reported.⁷⁶⁹

In the wake of the first round of the election, the independent Danish paper *Information* commented that the results signified a political awakening in France, after seven years of dullness and paternalism. It seemed obvious that de Gaulle would beat Mitterrand in the second round, thus postponing the final overthrow of what *Information's* leading article called 'absolutism' in France. Back in May 1958, the paper's then editor, Erik Seidenfaden, had strongly welcomed de Gaulle; now as a commentator in 1965, he welcomed the weakening of de Gaulle, noting that it looked promising for Europe and world politics.⁷⁷⁰ In the same vein, Foreign Minister Hækkerup noted in a speech to the Danish Social Democratic Youth that the French NATO policy had contributed to the tension and instability in the Western camp, and the effect of de Gaulle's possible weakening might be favourable for the Western world.⁷⁷¹ The Danish Paris Ambassador expected that the result of the first round would signify a new departure in French politics as de Gaulle's claim of representing the whole nation had shown to be illusory. The awakening of an opposition in France might even restrain de Gaulle's unilateral EEC and NATO policies. Moreover,

⁷⁶⁷ Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 271-273.

⁷⁶⁸ RA UM 123.D.1, box 13: "Den politiske situation i Frankrig. Samtale med venstrepartiernes præsidentkandidat, M. François Mitterrand", Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt to the Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1965.

⁷⁶⁹ RA UM 123.D.1, box 13: "Præsidentvalget: de Gaulle anmelder sin kandidatur den 4. november 1965", Knuth-Winterfeldt to the Foreign Ministry, 5 November 1965.

⁷⁷⁰ Erik Seidenfaden, "Et andet Frankrig", 6 December 1965; "Frankrigs opgaven", 3 December 1965; "Adieu, mon général!", 7 December 1965, all in *Information*.

⁷⁷¹ RA UM 5.B.43.a, box 13: "Uddrag af UMerens tale i DSU, Lyngby", 8 December 1965.

In all probability, de Gaulle will finally take an interest in Gaullism, so that the desire of securing the order of succession will become his driving force. Gaullism is first of all nationalism. Its precondition is order and stability. Its means is a strong leadership, based on a majority party.⁷⁷²

As the movement lacked an obvious charismatic successor, it might prove impossible to obtain a political majority simply based on the patriotic slogans of national independence and *grandeur*. Would it be possible at all to stage Georges Pompidou or Michel Debré as a leader of the heterogeneous political masses, for whom the only role would be to constitute the majority of the president?

With the French withdrawal from NATO in March 1966, we know that the mentioned Danish observers were blatantly wrong in their assumption that the election would soften de Gaulle's NATO policies. However, their comments illustrate very well the growing impatience and expectations of a political change in France. As the presidential term was seven years, there was little hope for an EC enlargement before 1972. Therefore, the reception in Denmark of the French crisis in May 1968 was rather ambiguous: it appeared as a symptom of a grave societal disorder, while showing a ray of hope for a precipitation of de Gaulle's fall and, consequently, an opening in the stalled EC enlargement process.

May 1968: Paternalism, Welfare and Nuclear Bombs

The May 1968 riots in the streets of Paris figure prominently, today, as a symbol of the so-called student and youth rebellion and the general anti-authoritarian critique of the established society, mushrooming in the industrialised world from the late 1960s. In fact, the French version of '68' became the most radical, violent and profound rising in the West, as the main trade unions and workers at the Renault factories joined the students in the Parisian Latin Quarter from 13 May 1968 – exactly on the tenth anniversary of the revolt in Algiers that paved the way for de Gaulle. Initially, the Gaullist leaders blatantly underestimated the scope of the crisis. Prime Minister Pompidou was visiting Iran and Afghanistan and President de Gaulle was promoting détente in Rumania, while the Latin Quarter in Paris was barricaded. The opposition leaders Pierre Mendès France and François Mitterrand seized the occasion to launch an attack on the Gaullist regime. Subsequently, Prime Minister Pompidou engaged the trembling state into negotiations with the trade unions and conceded wage increases and

⁷⁷² RA UM 123.D.1, box 13: "Situationen mellem valgene den 5. og 19. december 1965", Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt to the Foreign Ministry, 10 December 1965: "Sandsynligheden taler snarere for at de Gaulle endelig vil begynde at interessere sig for gaullismen, at det vil være ønsket om at sikre arvefølgen, der vil drive ham.

educational reforms. It looked like the end of the Gaullist era when de Gaulle disappeared on May 29 to Baden-Baden in West Germany, where he met no less a person than General Massu at the headquarter of the stationed French troops. De Gaulle nevertheless returned on the political scene to announce the dissolving of the *Assemblée nationale*, threatening with a Communist anarchy if the population did not show confidence in his regime. It turned out as a spectacular comeback as the Gaullist deputies obtained a surprisingly large majority of 293 seats out of 487 at the elections on 23 and 30 June.⁷⁷³

In Denmark, the political-cultural rising of 1968 had most visibly commenced with a 'student rebellion' at the Institute of Psychology at the University of Copenhagen in March. The students 'occupied' the institute's laboratory, putting forward their demands of better conditions and participation in the decision-making of the university. It remained a 'velvet rebellion' as the university's rector, the prominent new-left activist Mogens Fog, was accommodating and agreed with the reform proposals.⁷⁷⁴ The Danish students' initiative was contemporary with that of the students of the Nanterre campus outside Paris, but the Danes were more inspired by the developments in West Germany, Italy and the United States.

From the beginning of May, however, the Danish public paid increasingly attention to France, as the revolt was displaced to the Sorbonne in the heart of Paris and the students manned the barricades.⁷⁷⁵ After the first demonstrations, the Danish Students' Council expressed its support to the French students' reform demands.⁷⁷⁶ The Danish 'youth rebel', Ole Grünbaum – son of the Social Democratic Minister of Finance – rushed to Paris to witness the 'revolution'. In Danish media, he reported about the Gaullist regime's repressive and paternalistic reactions against the French students. Rather fascinated, he accounted that the anti-Gaullist slogans and the street fights united youth groups, who had idols as various as Mao Zedong, Leon Trotsky, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Mikhail Bakunin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and Fidel Castro.⁷⁷⁷

Gaullismen er først og fremmest nationalisme. Dens forudsætninger orden og stabilitet. Dens midler er stærk ledelse, der støtter sig på et majoritetsparti."

⁷⁷³ Gaetano Quagliariello, *De Gaulle e il gollismo* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2003), pp. 619-652; Serge Berstein, *Histoire du gaullisme* (Perrin, 2002 (1. ed. 2001)), pp. 324-327.

⁷⁷⁴ *Information* accounted that the students praised Rector Mogens Fog as their 'great helmsman.' See "Oprørerts 2. fase", 26 April 1968.

⁷⁷⁵ Steeven L. B. Jensen, "'Unge leger samfund og nogle laver kup' Det danske studenteroprør mellem livsstilsradikalisme og politisk aktivisme", in Morten Bendix Andersen og Niklas Olsen (eds.), *1968 Dengang og nu* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2004), pp. 31-56.

⁷⁷⁶ *Information*, "Danske studenter støtter de franske", 9-10 May 1968.

⁷⁷⁷ Ole Grünbaum, "Revolutionen eksisterer ikke", feature article in *Information*, 30 May 1968; Ole Grünbaum, *Bar røv i 60'erne. Dengang verden stod på skrå, eller osse var det mig der var skæv* (Copenhagen: People's Press, 2005), particularly the chapter "Maj 1968. Paris".

After the further radicalisation in France, however, the French rebellion became largely a negative point of reference. For the 'established society', the French street riots demonstrated the dangers of letting radical, extra-parliamentarian forces loose. For many observers, the rebellion in Paris also exposed the shortcomings of the 'authoritarian' Gaullist system. The events in France provided an occasion to assess the basic values of national political culture by asking whether the French rebellion could be repeated in Denmark.

The vocabulary of '1968' admitted the concept 'French circumstances' as a symbolic yardstick, measuring the degree of political radicalism in the Danish context. During a workers demonstration of May 24 in Copenhagen, the shop steward of the shipyard Burmeister & Wain, Ivan Hansen, thus conceded that 'French circumstances' were not relevant in Denmark yet, but they could become so if the workers had to carry on with their demonstrations. Some 30.000 workers had gathered outside the Danish parliament, Christiansborg, in a protest against the centre-right government's intervention in a conflict between the two sides of industry that culminated with the forcible opening of the door to the parliament with a pile driver.⁷⁷⁸ The future Social Democratic prime minister, Anker Jørgensen, launched a polemic against the government, explaining that the precious consensus on the labour market was threatened with the government's violation of the labour market's sacrosanct right of free bargaining. He warned that, "The closing of the valves [...] builds up to a great explosion. The bourgeois government might very well provoke 'French circumstances' in Denmark."⁷⁷⁹ In the same vein, Jens Otto Krag – now Social Democratic opposition leader – alluded to the rigidity of the Gaullist regime in his polemics against the new centre-right government in Denmark. Denmark was not or should not become a 'Gaullist' society, he maintained; the government ought to submit to the 'sound' Danish dialogue and debate traditions associated with the 'cooperating democracy'.⁷⁸⁰ However, the 'French circumstances' remained a threatening prospect in Denmark rather than a social reality, as the wider student and youth movement did not join the workers demonstrations as they had done in France.

In mid-May, the Danish Social Democratic daily *Aktuelt* proclaimed maliciously, "De Gaulle reaps what he sows." It argued that the common Frenchman felt as alienated to the French state apparatus as the students did, because de Gaulle's conservative regime had ruled

⁷⁷⁸ *Information*, "Ikke franske tilstande endnu ... men døren til folketinget blev sprængt", 25-26 May 1968.

⁷⁷⁹ *Aktuelt*, "Regeringen kan blive årsag til franske tilstande her", 2 June 1968, citing a political speech of Anker Jørgensen: "Ved at lukke for ventilerne – således som regeringen gjorde det ved den tvungne voldgift i søfartskonflikten – samler man op til en stor eksplosion. Den borgerlige regering kan meget vel blive årsag til franske tilstande i Danmark."

by decree with an extensive control of the dissemination of news in the state radio and TV. The legitimacy of the Gaullist authority programme, launched ten years earlier, had undermined itself:

General de Gaulle has created stability in France. Too much, though, to secure success in the long run – for he still stands in a relation to the citizens he represents, as a general stands to his soldiers.⁷⁸¹

In Denmark, however, it was by no means exclusively the centre-left opposition or the anti-authoritarian movement that dissociated themselves from the Gaullist model of society. Representatives of the established, 'bourgeois' society also contributed to the writing of the Gaullist regime's death certificate during the crisis in May and June 1968, partly arguing along the same lines as that of the 'progressive', anti-authoritarian movements. After the generalisation of the rebellion in France, *Berlingske Tidende*, Denmark's Conservative daily *par excellence*, thus noted that the stubborn and uncompromising Gaullist majority itself had fostered the climate of division and tension in France.⁷⁸² It was a general claim diffused in the Danish media that the French society was suffering from an overdose of Gaullist 'paternalism' (*umyndiggørelse*) - a contemporary buzzword that the 'anti-authoritarian' circles had not monopolised completely, at least when it came to assessments of Gaullist France.

From the established society's point of view, however, the Danish 'cooperative democracy' was not in an urgent need of reforms, contrary to the Gaullist Republic. In a TV debate about the mushrooming street demonstrations and democracy, the Social Democratic speaker and former foreign minister, Per Hækkerup, emphasised that the maintenance of the representative democracy was the pre-condition for obtaining a true democratic participation at the universities and on the workplaces, i.e. in the society. Peaceful demonstrations were acknowledged as an integral part of democratic practice, but the 'barricade democracy' was its enemy.⁷⁸³ The prominent Social Democratic debater Jørgen Schleimann even argued that the radical student movement potentially was the most dangerous totalitarian phenomenon since the emergence

⁷⁸⁰ Jens Otto Krag, "Regeringen er ømskindet når det gælder kritik", letter in *Aktuelt*, 13 June 1968. The conservative *Berlingske Tidende* devoted a leading article to counter Krag's contribution, arguing that the reference to Gaullism was out of context: "Uden sammenhæng", 15 June 1968.

⁷⁸¹ *Aktuelt*, "Som de Gaulle sår, høster han", leader on 18 May 1968: "General de Gaulle har skabt stabilitet i Frankrig. For megen til at det i længden kan gå godt – for han har fortsat det samme forhold til de borgere, han repræsenterer, som generalen har til sine menige."

⁷⁸² *Berlingske Tidende*, "De Gaulle og studenterne", leader on 14 May 1968.

⁷⁸³ *Berlingske Tidende*, "En afsløring", leading article on 2 June 1968.

of Communism and Nazism in Europe.⁷⁸⁴ On Constitution Day, 5 June 1968, finally, the centre-right government's leaders warned against accepting violence and anti-parliamentarian activities in the Danish political culture.⁷⁸⁵

Another basic assumption in the Danish comments on France was that of a negative relationship between the Gaullist regime's engagement in social policies and its great power ambitions. Even *Berlingske Tidende*, usually in favour of national defence and against increases in social expenditures, commented in late May that,

De Gaulle cannot escape from the responsibility for the existence of a deep and dangerous chasm in the French society. This is the exaggerated price he has paid for an ambitious and expensive foreign policy. Domestic reforms have been downgraded, and the ordinary people have not obtained a just share of the country's undeniably growing wealth.⁷⁸⁶

For the former editor Erik Seidenfaden, who had supported de Gaulle strongly in 1958, the French May rebellion demonstrated that there was no backing in the population for de Gaulle's *grandeur* policies. The priority of external prestige at the expense of social policies and democratic participation had created a new, national crisis. De Gaulle had appeared as a national saviour in 1944 and 1958, but the 1968 crisis was his own doing.⁷⁸⁷

For the leading Social Democrats in Denmark, finally, the crumbling of the Gaullist state authority was taken as a confirmation of their own way of balancing between expenditures to social welfare and to defence policies. Former foreign minister Per Hækkerup alluded to the 'authoritarian' de Gaulle's alleged lack of understanding of domestic issues as social, educational and cultural policies, while party leader Jens Otto Krag observed that the French economic reconstruction was obtained on the blue and white-collar workers expense.⁷⁸⁸ A leader of the Social Democratic daily, *Aktuelt*, linked the social unrest directly to France's

⁷⁸⁴ Jørgen Schleimann, "Den arrogante studenterradikalisme", in *Aktuelt*, 1 May 1968.

⁷⁸⁵ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Vold kan aldrig forenes med demokrati", 6 June 1968.

⁷⁸⁶ *Berlingske Tidende*, "De Gaulle viger ikke", leading article on 31 May 1968: "Ansvaret for at kløften i det franske samfund er så dyb og så farlig, kan præsident de Gaulle ikke unddrage sig. Den er den alt for høje pris, han har betalt for en ambitiøs og kostbar udenrigspolitik, som har givet de hjemlige reformer en for lille rolle og den brede befolkning en for beskeden andel i landets ubestridelige velstandsstigning."

⁷⁸⁷ Erik Seidenfaden, "Borgerkrig, men kun i ord" and "Tæmnet storhed", both contributions in *Berlingske Tidende*, 2 and 16 June 1968, respectively.

⁷⁸⁸ *Aktuelt*, "Han har stadig magten", 26 May 1968.

defence policies, asking how France could afford its own nuclear bombs, while the workers' minimal wages were still around half of those in Denmark.⁷⁸⁹

In the Danish context, representatives of the established society thus blamed the violent, French rebellion on de Gaulle's authoritarian style of policymaking and stagnating standards of living and social welfare in France, associated with the costly great power project. The Danish or Scandinavian model of society, on the other hand, was supposed to take care of legitimate democratic and social claims. A prominent welfare state architect such as Jens Otto Krag did not have a lot of sympathy or understanding for the new, emancipatory system critique and demands of direct democracy associated with 1968 – issues that were prominent indeed for many young Social Democrats, who identified with the anti-authoritarian movements. The Social Democrats had successfully fought for an elaborate welfare state for decades, but parts of the youth turned its back to the whole project, calling it materialistic and repressive.⁷⁹⁰ From this point of departure, the sociologist and Social Democrat, Eggert Petersen, warned against excluding the possibility of a French style rebellion in Denmark. The problem of 'alienation' from the societal systems was as outspread in a materially oriented welfare society such as Denmark, he argued. The French rebellion was associated with a lack of *welfare* (the Renault workers) and alienation from the society, whereas a possible Danish variant would grow among materially satisfied individuals, lacking general *wellbeing* connected to alienation from the established political and economic systems.⁷⁹¹

De Gaulle's Departure: Denmark between the EC and NORDEK (1969)

During the May 1968 rebellion in France, the Danish press had raised the question of NORDEK's future in the light of de Gaulle's expected fall, which might reinvigorate the EC enlargement process.⁷⁹² De Gaulle finally resigned on 28 April 1969, after a referendum had turned down his proposal of reforming the Senate. The '*de Gaulle or chaos*' formula was not credible any longer. In Denmark, most comments focussed on the European perspectives and the consequences for Denmark's engagement in the ongoing NORDEK negotiations. Whereas the Swedish interest in the NORDEK endeavour rose significantly after de Gaulle's departure,

⁷⁸⁹ *Aktuelt*, "Fransk mindsteløn og atombombe", the leading article, and "Derfor strejker de franske arbejdere", 28 May 1968.

⁷⁹⁰ Klaus Petersen, "De loyales ungdomsoprør. Socialdemokratisk Samfund 1966-73", in Morten Bendix Andersen og Niklas Olsen (eds.), *1968 Dengang og nu* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanums Forlag, 2004), pp. 57-86; Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 – 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), 422-430

⁷⁹¹ Eggert Petersen, "Hvad der sker for de Gaulle kan også ske for Baunsgaard", letter in *Aktuelt*, 1 June 1968.

⁷⁹² *Berlingske Tidende*, "De Gaulle's dilemma og Norden", by Vagn Heiselberg, 24 May 1968; *Politiken*, "Paris og Europa", leading article, 29 May 1968.

the Danes considered whether to continue the NORDEK negotiations or to turn directly to the EC.⁷⁹³

An evidently disappointed Ambassador Bartels, then displaced to Cairo, could not help intervening in the debate about Gaullism after de Gaulle. Georges Pompidou – the expected successor – was not as accommodating as widely believed, Bartels argued. He was a passionate admirer of de Gaulle, and the frictions concerning the EC enlargement would therefore remain. Bartels expected that Pompidou would maintain the French scepticism towards ‘integration’. As Bartels put it in his letter to the leader of the Danish Market Secretariat, Jens Christensen,

As you might have seen, the conclusion of what I write above is that Denmark has to be cautious in its policy towards France in the next year or two. It would be in Denmark’s interest to re-establish the relationship of trust that existed between France and Denmark in my time – a relationship paid with so many wasted efforts. Today, the relationship is almost bad, apart from the rather comical royal hysteria, if I am not completely wrong.⁷⁹⁴

Moreover, the former and future Minister of European Market Affairs, Ivar Nørgaard – a devoted pro-Nordic Social Democrat – rejected the common expectation that the European political landscape would change radically with de Gaulle’s resignation. He argued that the French European policies by no means were based exclusively on the person of Charles de Gaulle. They corresponded rather to a national quest of the French people and the requirements of the vulnerable commercial sector.⁷⁹⁵ France was not temporarily enchanted or manipulated by the charismatic leader, Charles de Gaulle; *the French people and society had rather become Gaullist*. In this light, it seemed that there was no reason to pursue the doubtful EC track at the expense of the Nordic dream.

However, the prevailing perspective on the events among Danish observers was that “the Gaullist Ice Age of Europe” seemed to be over, as the Danish London Embassy put it.⁷⁹⁶ It

⁷⁹³ Mikael af Malmberg, “Sweden’s Long Road to an Agreement with the EEC 1956-1972”, in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger (eds.), *Die Neutralen und die Europäische Integration 1945-1995* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag,

⁷⁹⁴ RA UM 108.B.2.Dan, box 21. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Jens Christensen, 11 June 1969: “Den konklusion jeg drager af foranstående er, som du nok kan tænke dig, at Danmark i det kommende års tid eller to må passe på med sin politik i forhold til Frankrig, og at det vil være i Danmarks interesse, at det tillidsforhold, der bestod mellem Danmark og Frankrig i min tid – og som kostede mig så mange dyre spildte kræfter – genetableres. Tager jeg ikke meget fejl, er det dansk-franske forhold idag, når bortses fra det lidt komiske kongeri, nærmest slet.”

⁷⁹⁵ *Politiken*, “Hurtig EFTA-debat efter afgang”, 29 April 1969.

⁷⁹⁶ Michael Bruun Andersen, “Dansk europapolitik og nordisk samarbejde”, in *Historisk Tidsskrift*, volume 104, no. 1, 2004: 112-115.

was hard for the main actors to hide their enthusiasm for the new development in French politics. In early June, after the first round of the presidential election in France, *Le Monde* featured an interview with the Danish prime minister, Hilmar Baunsgaard, which trumpeted: "General de Gaulle's resignation has moved the main obstacle to our entrance to the Common Market."⁷⁹⁷ From Cairo, Ambassador Bartels noted regretfully that the prime minister's comment in *Le Monde* had made a foul impression, but his view was now that of a minority.⁷⁹⁸

The unexpected reopening of the European *dossiers* posed the question of the utility of continuing the NORDEK negotiations. The Conservative paper, *Berlingske Tidende*, argued that it would not be appropriate to establish a Nordic union with a view to the changing conditions associated with de Gaulle's departure: a fully accomplished Nordic union might complicate the future EC accession.⁷⁹⁹ In February 1969, thus before de Gaulle's resignation, the Liberal Minister of Economy and European Market Affairs, Poul Nyboe Andersen, had stated that the process towards NORDEK was in a final phase. Internally in the Foreign Ministry, however, Nyboe Andersen specified that a Nordic cooperation should not impede Denmark's EC accession.⁸⁰⁰ In an interview after de Gaulle's fall, he emphasised the Danish EC priority – a message he also delivered to Foreign Minister Debré in late May, unequivocally stressing that the EC option *always* would have priority over the Nordic cooperation.⁸⁰¹

Former prime minister Jens Otto Krag - now Social Democratic party leader - argued too that the fall of de Gaulle heralded a new departure for Europe. Although he supported the NORDEK endeavour enthusiastically, also backstage, he maintained that the NORDEK was a stage on the way to the 'final destination', the enlarged Europe of the EC.⁸⁰² A similar, but slightly more Nordic perspective was presented in the Social Democratic press. *Aktuelt* thus referred to the considerable popular support that the Nordic initiative had gained and deplored the tendencies to regard it as a merely tactical means, a way of exerting a pressure vis-à-vis

⁷⁹⁷ *Le Monde*, "»Le Départ du général de Gaulle a fait disparaître le principal obstacle à notre adhésion au Marché commun«, nous déclare le premier ministre du Danemark", 4 June 1969.

⁷⁹⁸ RA UM 108.B.2.Dan, box 21. Letter from Ambassador Bartels to Jens Christensen, 11 June 1969.

⁷⁹⁹ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Norden og Europa", leading article, 4 May 1969.

⁸⁰⁰ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *1 Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 543.

⁸⁰¹ *Politiken*, "Hurtig EFTA-debat efter afgang", 29 April 1969; RA UM 108.B.2: "Referat af møde mellem udenrigsminister Debré og økonomi- og handelsminister Nyboe Andersen", 23 May 1969.

⁸⁰² Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 - 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 469-481.

the EC. "For the idea of a Nordic community on the way to Europe and the World is good", as *Aktuelt* emotionally put it.⁸⁰³

On the EC summit of December 1969 in The Hague, the EC partners finally agreed to resume the enlargement process. Apart from the actual disappearance of General de Gaulle from French politics, the main reason of the new dynamics was that the British government now accepted to co-finance the CAP according to the newly agreed schemes - to the new French government's satisfaction. The British as well as the French seemed to be more conciliatory now, and President Pompidou could accept entering into enlargement negotiations.⁸⁰⁴ The contemporary NORDEK negotiations were directly affected as the Finnish government partly retreated from the Nordic endeavour. Participation in the NORDEK would not be acceptable for Finland, if Denmark and Norway at the same time took part in the EC. Among the Nordic countries, Finland was clearly in the most vulnerable geopolitical situation, located as it was at the border to the Soviet Union and with a history marked by Russian dominance and Soviet aspirations that had culminated in the Winter War (1939-40) and the so-called Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1948. Still in December 1969, the Danish government launched a SCANDEK proposal about economic cooperation between Denmark, Norway and Sweden, but in vain. These proposals represented a sincere interest in Nordic or Scandinavian cooperation, but it was equally important for the Danish government to demonstrate that it had exhausted all possibilities of obtaining an agreement. Therefore, Danish EC supporters had virtually mixed feelings about the Nordic negotiations fading into insignificance during 1970. Most of them regretted it, but the question of Denmark's EC entrance was simplified significantly before the final EC campaign in 1971 and 1972.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰³ *Politiken*, "Hurtig EFTA-debat efter afgang", 29 April 1969; *Aktuelt*, "Den nordiske tanke må virkeliggøres", leading article, 3 May 1969: "Tanken om vejen gennem Norden til Europa og verden er nemlig god."

⁸⁰⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (New York: Ithaca, 1998), p. 303.

⁸⁰⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelings Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 35, 545-551.

In spite of the wide acknowledgment of the Gaullist détente policies in the mid-1960s, a major feature of the Danish debate about de Gaulle was the hope for his quick departure and the expected reinvigorating of the EC enlargement process. In 1967, the renewed French veto against British membership had made the Danish dependence upon the French European policies abundantly clear, and the European deadlock prompted the Social Democratic government to prepare a new Nordic project. With de Gaulle's fall in 1969 and the opening of a new enlargement round in December that year, these plans tended in turn to be sidetracked, although the negotiations went on.

Paradoxically, the Danish government was highly dependent upon a regime that again in May 1968 featured as an example of political excesses rather than a societal role model. For the Danes, the EC membership perspective was by no means a question of becoming more Continental European and 'French circumstances' was not a tempting perspective. With a rather self-righteous tone, the 'established society' confirmed its adherence to the 'cooperating democracy' against the 'democracy of the barricades' and Gaullist paternalism. Moreover, many Social Democrats and even some Conservatives argued that the French crisis was associated with the expensive Gaullist policy of *grandeur*, as it had displaced the focus from major societal problems and welfare to military independence and nuclear bombs. However, this line of reasoning revealed that many key politicians were out of tune with the anti-materialistic current of the new youth and anti-authoritarian movements.

Chapter 9 – Epilogue

The Gaullism in Our Hearts?

Given the enormous frustration Charles de Gaulle had caused throughout the 1960s, the General's death on 9 November 1970, at the age of 80, spurred a surprisingly devout atmosphere among Danish commentators. It symbolised the end of an era and the passing away of what many agreed was one of the greatest statesmen of a dramatic period in the history of Europe. His resignation over a seemingly trivial reform of the Senate seems to have been important in terms of revising his image as a dubious democrat. To illustrate, the centre-left paper *Politiken* acknowledged that the General never had degraded himself to a common power seeker in spite of his involvement in some of the most ruthless struggles of power imaginable. "The dictatorship was a barbarian or proletarian phenomenon for him", the paper noted and concluded:

Apart from his historical struggle for the rescue and reconstruction of France, de Gaulle stands out as the ruler without the dictatorship - the one who hated everything totalitarian, who secured a moderation of the power, and who was the most ruthless to himself.⁸⁰⁶

Similarly, the Conservative *Berlingske Tidende* recognised that the will to power *never* corrupted de Gaulle. He acted in regard of what he believed to be the interest of France, not his own interests. His efforts assumed superhuman proportions in an age that denied the individual any role in determining the course of history, the leading article pondered.⁸⁰⁷

In a remarkably emotional leader, the independent *Information* noted that everyone had had a reason to hate or to love General de Gaulle. His arrogance appeared sharp, witty, intelligent and useful when it targeted our enemies, but it was demagogic, tyrannical, nationalistic or senile when it touched upon our own interests:

⁸⁰⁶ *Politiken*, "Menneskets magt", leading article of 11 November 1970: "Diktaturet var for ham et barbarisk eller proletarisk fænomen" ... "Men ud over sin historiske kamp for Frankrigs redning og genoprejsning står de Gaulle som herskeren uden diktaturet, den, der hadede det totalitære, sikrede mådeholdet midt i magten og var var den mest hensynsløse over for sig selv."

⁸⁰⁷ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Charles de Gaulle", leading article of 11 November 1970.

But the dialectics is not short of a synthesis. The Gaullism in our hearts is his encouragement of our desire for independence – of our endeavours of finding oneself, of finding our own identity in a world, which demands that we are chewing gum or drinking vodka.

[...]

Lastly, we should recall what de Gaulle pointed out himself: "Gaullism" does not exist, cannot exist.

Except from in our hearts.⁸⁰⁸

Gaullism was not a political ideology, but a universal feeling or desire of independence, a denial of the apparent realities, *Information* concluded.

Ambassador Bartels naturally regretted that the Scandinavians never understood de Gaulle's dialectical approach to international politics, as they worshipped international harmony and tended to shy away from face-to-face conflict. He was disappointed that his political idol, Charles de Gaulle, remained "General No" for the Danes.⁸⁰⁹ Less fascinated the Social Democratic leader, Jens Otto Krag, noted:

De Gaulle was entirely different from other statesmen I ever came across. Many considered him a great European or a particular character formed upon his bitter war experiences. I think both interpretations are wrong. France was his object in life.⁸¹⁰

As a foreign and prime minister, Krag had experienced that several of times. During the May 1968 rebellion, as the world expected de Gaulle's fall, Krag had furthermore commented that "the antiquated dreams of power" would vanish from France with de Gaulle:

The name de Gaulle leaves behind will be that of conceding Algeria freedom without provoking a civil war in France, and that of keeping order in the French economy – partly at the expense of the blue and white-collar workers. However, he aimed at another reputation.⁸¹¹

⁸⁰⁸ *Information*, "Gaullismen i vore hjerter", leading article of 11 November 1970: "MEN dialektikken er ikke uden syntese. Gaullismen i vore hjerter er hans opmuntring af vor selvstændighedstrang, af vor søgning mod at være os selv, at finde vor egen identitet i en verden, der enten kræver, at vi skal gumle tyggegummi eller drikke vodka." [...] "Og lad os da også til sidst huske det, som også de Gaulle selv har påpeget: »gaullisme« eksisterer ikke, kan ikke eksistere. Undtagen i vore hjerter".

⁸⁰⁹ Eyvind Bartels, "Respekteret, men ikke beundret", in *Berlingske Tidende*, 11 November 1970.

⁸¹⁰ *Berlingske Tidende*, "Baunsgaard og J.O.Krag om de Gaulle", 11 November 1970.

⁸¹¹ *Søndags-Aktuel*, "Han har stadig magten", 26 May 1968: "de Gaulles eftermæle vil blive, at han frigav Algeriet, uden at der i den anledning blev borgerkrig i Frankrig, og at han i 10 år – delvis på arbejdernes og funktionærernes bekostning – holdt orden i fransk økonomi. Det var imidlertid ikke det eftermæle, han tilstræbte."

Krag considered the Gaullist vision of French dominance in Europe as the ultimate leitmotif of de Gaulle's entire endeavours.

Towards Danish EC Membership (1970-72)

In June 1970, the Six finally opened the membership negotiations with Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway that resulted in the enlargement of the EC as of 1 January 1973, though without Norway. The British accepted the *acquis communautaire*, and President Pompidou showed less intransigent than General de Gaulle had done. However, the Gaullist legacy was still at play, and certain elements of it remained very pertinent for Denmark. Jens Otto Krag's new Social Democratic minority government of October 1971 subscribed to the French interpretation of the Luxembourg Compromise, i.e. that it had established a genuine national veto right. Moreover, the Danish government collaborated closely with the French in order to enforce a fast implementation of the CAP on the British market and secure financial contributions from the UK to the communitarian subsidy system.⁸¹²

In November 1971, Prime Minister Krag and President Pompidou discussed the similarities and differences between the Danish and the French policies. Krag noted that:

There is a certain similarity between the Danish and the French attitudes to the evolution of the Community in two regards: first of all, these two countries with agricultural traditions are rapidly industrialising, even though France is more advanced in this respect than my country is. Politically, moreover, I think that we understand the things in the same way: we want a close cooperation and still to conserve our national sovereignty. We are both convinced that it is pragmatically possible to combine these two aspects, namely a reinforced Europe and a preserved national individuality.⁸¹³

However, the Danish government's opposition towards supranational cooperation went in some respects even further than that of France. Initially, the centre-right government had

⁸¹² Morten Rasmussen, "How Denmark made Britain Pay the Bills - Danish-British Relations during the Enlargement Negotiations of the European Community 1970-72", in J. Sevaldsen, C. Bjørn and B. Bjørke (eds.), *Britain and Denmark: Political, economic and Cultural Relations in the 19th and 20th centuries* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum, 2003), pp. 617-644.

⁸¹³ MAE AD SG, volume 51: "Entretien entre le Président de la République et M. KRAG, le 26 novembre 1971. [...] Il y a un certain parallèle dans l'attitude de la France et celle du Danemark vis-à-vis de l'évolution de la Communauté, et cela sous deux aspects: d'abord les deux pays, qui ont longtemps été agricoles, s'industrialisant rapidement, encore que la France ait en la matière de l'avance sur mon pays. Ensuite, je crois que, politiquement, nous comprenons les choses de la même façon: nous voulons une coopération étroite et en même temps conserver notre souveraineté nationale. Nous sommes tous les deux convaincus qu'il est pragmatiquement possible de combiner ces deux aspects, à savoir: une Europe renforcée et une individualité nationale conservée." See also Bo Lidegaard, *Jens Otto Krag 1962 - 1978* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), 575-577.

responded positively to the so-called Werner Plan about an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that envisaged some supranational features. But the new Social Democratic minority government turned against the EMU plans. During a meeting with the EC in Brussels in November 1971, the new Minister of Nordic and European relations, Ivar Nørgaard, caused a minor crisis declaring:

The Danish government finds it essential to maintain the possibility of carrying out national policies, which will ensure a more just distribution of wealth and thereby greater equality and personal freedom for the individual citizens. [...] Our participation in the planned cooperation must not prevent the Danish parliament from deciding an economic policy including tax policy and a social policy, which will ensure greater equality between the various groups of the population.⁸¹⁴

Minister Nørgaard made his remarks in spite of the fact that France had obtained a modification of the Werner Plan in February 1971, now featuring as an intergovernmental monetary framework. Nonetheless, Nørgaard and other sceptics were still concerned about the perspectives of the EMU upon Danish tax policies and efforts of equalizing incomes. Vis-à-vis the sceptical public, it was of utmost importance to demonstrate that the Danish government defended its national independence regarding social and incomes policy. Facing the upcoming EC referendum and an internal Social Democratic split, the Danish government proved even more 'Gaullist' than the Gaullist Pompidou in terms of defending the principle of national sovereignty. However, these indications caused trouble vis-à-vis the EC partners, and the EC Council rebuked Nørgaard for not showing a Communitarian spirit.⁸¹⁵

On the meeting with Prime Minister Krag in November 1971, the French president also underlined the nuances between the French and the Danish sovereignty view:

It means that all the states retain their sovereignty - and this is the reason that we have invoked the unanimity provision regarding questions that a state considers important - but it also means that we allow a process that can lead to the accomplishment of something beyond the economic field.⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁴ Cited in Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 338-339.

⁸¹⁵ Thorsten B. Olesen and Poul Villaume, *I Blokopdelingens Tegn. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie 5. 1945-1972* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 710-713.

⁸¹⁶ MAE AD SG, volume 51 : "Entretien entre le Président de la République et M. KRAG, le 26 novembre 1971" [...] *Cela veut dire que chaque Etat garde sa souveraineté (et c'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons fait prévaloir la règle de l'unanimité sur des questions qu'un Etat jugerait importantes), mais cela signifie aussi que l'on admet un processus qui peut conduire à quelque chose situé au-delà du domaine économique.*"

Along with the hesitations concerning the EMU, the reservations towards the European Political Cooperation, associated with the so-called Davignon Report, became a major issue in the Danish EC campaign. Mainly in order to strengthen the Danish negotiation position, the centre-right government had supported the project in 1970, although stressing that defence policies should remain a NATO matter. For the subsequent Social Democratic government, however, it was of utmost importance to distinguish between the *consultation* of the European Political Cooperation and the *decision-making* of NATO. Among the original EC members, the Danish government's statements caused some doubt about the sincerity of the Danish EC application and formal acceptance of the *finalité politique* of the European endeavour. However, as the Danish government stressed on several bilateral meetings with the original EC existing members, the indications about preserving national sovereignty were necessary in order to win the upcoming referendum.⁸¹⁷

Concerning the unsettled language dossier, finally, the French strengthened the tone considerably during the enlargement negotiations. In July 1971, the French Foreign Ministry's division of cultural affairs summoned the Danish Embassy Councillor, Mogens Hermannsen, to a meeting, where the French complained about the "unacceptable discrimination against the French language" in Denmark. The low rank of French was particularly intolerable in the light of Denmark's upcoming EC membership as the Federal Republic already had accepted the privileged role of French as the negotiation language of the EC and the British government was called on to do so. The French official explained that 80 per cent of the French pupils were learning English by now, but the French government was going to give way to other languages, as it would be fairer if only 50 per cent learned English.⁸¹⁸

President Pompidou and Foreign Minister Schumann followed the language case personally, and the French diplomacy reminded repeatedly the Danish government about it during 1971 and 1972.⁸¹⁹ In a communication to France's Copenhagen Embassy, Foreign Minister Schumann urged:

⁸¹⁷ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities – Denmark's Road to EC-membership, 1961-1973* (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004), pp. 343-365.

⁸¹⁸ RA UM 42.Dan-Fra.1.a: "Franskundervisningen i danske skoler", Embassy Councillor Mogens Hermannsen to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 16 July 1971.

⁸¹⁹ AN 5 AG 2/1013 'Danemark', "NOTE pour Monsieur le Président de la République - a.s. Enseignement de la langue française au Danemark", 18 October 1972; RA UM 42.Dan-Fra.1.a: "ambassadoerens aflevering af akkreditiver til præsident pompidou", telex from Ambassador Fischer to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 30 September 1971.

The entrance of your host country into the European Economic Community is an occasion we cannot let go without obtaining a modification of the Danish educational regulations, which favour English and German. I consider that this situation has to change before the access of Denmark to the Common Market, and I expect to share these thoughts with my Danish interlocutors.⁸²⁰

In an *Aide Memoire* to the Danish government, the French government explained the informal EC membership conditions: "Consequently, it wishes that the French language in particular will be offered as a first [foreign] language on the same level as other languages in the national school system."⁸²¹ Somewhat surprised at the straightforward statements, Councillor Hermannsen from the Danish Paris Embassy commented that the overall aim of the French policy was to secure French a leading position as a world language.

⁸²⁰ AN 5 AG 2/1013 'Danemark, notes, télégrammes', telegram from Foreign Minister Schumann to the French Copenhagen Embassy, 12 July 1971: "*L'entrée du pays de votre résidence dans la Communauté économique Européenne est l'occasion que nous ne devons pas laisser échapper d'obtenir une modification d'une réglementation qui privilégie l'anglais et l'allemand au sein de l'enseignement danois. J'estime cette situation devoir être modifiée avant l'entrée du Danemark dans le Marché Commun et compte faire part de ce sentiment à mes interlocuteurs danois.*"

⁸²¹ RA UM 42.Dan-Fra.1.a: "Franskundervisningen i danske skoler", Embassy Councillor Mogens Hermannsen to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 16 July 1971 and "Aide Memoire", from the French Embassy, Copenhagen, to the Danish government, 19 July 1971: "*Il déciderait, en conséquence, que la langue française, notamment, soit offerte au choix des élèves danois comme première langue dans l'ensemble des établissements nationaux au même titre que d'autres langues.*"

Conclusions

In the introduction, we advanced the ambition of increasing the considerations to the civil society and the public sphere compared to the state centric approaches of realism and traditional diplomatic history. Before evaluating the advantages of this approach, we can ascertain that the Gaullist critique and challenge of the Western security system indeed was a serious matter of concern to the Danish government. On several occasions, the Fifth Republic found itself in direct conflict with Britain and the United States, but also with the small state Holland, over the structure and substance of NATO and the EEC. These conflicts had a considerable impact upon Denmark as well, but the Danish government barely went into any direct conflict with the French. By accommodating the French and sometimes by attempting a role as a bridge builder between the parties concerned, the Danish government sought to 'keep France in', i.e. to maintain the French engagement in the Western frameworks.

By defining the thesis' guiding criterion of relevance as the political action and contention in Denmark generated by the Gaullist policies, however, we furthermore discovered that there was a considerable activity, not only in the government and the formalised political system, but also within associations, interest organisations and media, i.e. the civil society. A conspicuous implication of this multilevel analysis was that of throwing into relief the tension between the governmental establishment's experience of being *dependent* upon the policies of Gaullist France and the widespread *dissociation* from several parts of the Gaullist agenda. That governments adapt to international conditions and dependencies, pursuing what they define as overall or national interests, rather than accommodating particularistic civil society actors, is barely surprising. However, that is not necessarily the end of the story, as the state centric focus of IR realism tends to imply. The dramatic events in France and Algeria; the Gaullist solution to the political breakdown; and the bombastic measures to recreate France's international status and a 'Gaullist Europe', had an impact on many other levels besides government policies. In the context of the Cold War cleavage, the emergence of the Gaullist Republic complemented and challenged the pervasively bipolar political and intellectual horizon. Observers were compelled to consider democracy; North-South relations; defence policies; Western European and North Atlantic identities in a more nuanced perspective than

the East-West conflict tended to encourage. In Denmark, many self-righteous commentators had reluctantly to concede that a 'strong leader' could be a 'necessary evil' to save the democracy from totalitarianism and civil war, and they had to contemplate the problems of Western Europe's military dependence on the United States.

Denmark and France

In the following paragraphs, we shall look into some of the results of our approach and see how the overall aim of the thesis succeeded in the various cases:

The Algerian War

The attempt of bringing the civil society back into the analysis of international politics yielded the most interesting and far-reaching results in the case study of the Danish reactions to the Algerian War. France's rough counter-insurgency campaign put the Danish NATO solidarity to the test; it spurred several activities in the civil society and nourished new political identities. It is well known in the historical literature that the Danish government was quite attentive to the French threat of withdrawing from NATO and that it largely opposed pro-Algerian resolutions in the UN, thus that it was more 'French friendly' than both neutral Sweden and the ally Norway. As the Algerian War also was an obvious case for leftist environments, the Danish government was not interested in involving the public sphere, which it actually had done after the Soviet intervention in Hungary. We have provided a new case study of the Social Democratic students' confrontation of Foreign Minister Krag with charges of tacitly supporting a policy that was as discrediting as the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. In addition, the thesis has thrown some light on the French diplomats generally very good relations with the Danish government and their efforts of influencing Danish media.

Less explored in the Danish literature is the engagement of civil society associations and grassroots activists, and how they organised aid collections and wrote letters of protest to the French and the Danish governments. The associations typically acted in keeping with their official field of interest, for instance those of students, the youth, trade unions or authors, in order to avoid a brand as political organisations. However, two overtly pro-Algerian ad-hoc committees emerged, which had some success in attracting the attention of the Danish public to the Algerian War – an explicit goal with a view to bring about a more critical Danish profile in the UN. It was surprisingly the studies in the diplomatic archives of the French Copenhagen Embassy, deposited in Nantes (CADN), that pointed the research in the direction of the civil society associations. The further studies in Danish archives threw some light on

the interplay and conflicts between civil society actors and both French and Danish governmental officials. The latter were by no means interested in public aid campaigns that would expose the miseries of Algerian refugees or the French 'reception camps' in Algeria. The study also illustrated that the borders between government and civil society at times are rather blurred, namely by the collaboration between the Danish Red Cross and the Foreign Ministry in an attempt to enclose the grass roots' aid collections in a less polemical and semi-official endeavour.

The most surprising and original result of the analysis of non-state actors is the profoundly transnational dimension of the Danish associations' activities, a perspective inspired by Thomas Risses and others' writings on transnational relations. Non-governmental, Western umbrella organisations informed their Danish contacts about specific cases of French abuse of power and urged them to take action. In this perspective, the Danish protests and aid initiatives, taking off around 1958, appears as a national instance of a worldwide campaign. The implications are quite radical if we hypothesise that civil society associations in other Western nations also responded positively to the transnational organisations' call for action. If they did so, the transnational organisations had a significantly larger capacity than hitherto assumed in terms of forming a world opinion, or at least a Western opinion, concerning the Algerian War. We can talk about a worldwide, or a Western, communication structure – an obvious field for further studies, particularly concerning the scope of the national responses and possible interference in the organisations of various state actors and the FLN. These perspectives might also pertain to cases such as the protest movements against the Vietnam War or the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Détente and the NATO Reforms

The study of the Danish reactions to the French détente policies and withdrawal from NATO in the mid-1960s can be placed at the other end of the spectrum as the case revealing the weakest involvement of civil society associations. It was mainly relevant in terms of showing the general importance of the Gaullist challenge of the Western framework to Danish security policies. The Danish government attempted actively to mitigate in the 1966 crisis, encouraging a soft reaction of the 'Anglo-Americans'. We also saw that the bilateral French détente strategy; the rapprochement to the Soviet Union; and the withdrawal from NATO's integrated structures catalysed a reappraisal of the Danish policies in favour of a multilateral approach. Denmark thus proposed to give NATO a role in the European détente process in order to maintain the relevance and initiative of the Western security organisation.

Even so, the case also pointed to the relevance of the public sphere for governmental actors. Foreign Minister Hækkerup was explicitly against a wider public debate or a referendum about Denmark's NATO membership. However, the government put some efforts into an attempt of presenting NATO as a progressive organisation, which was one of the rationales of proposing a NATO reform in 1966. Before the Soviet intervention in Prague in 1968, the support to NATO was declining in the public, also in Social Democratic circles. Similar points have admittedly been made in the existing literature, but the thesis has added some illustrating examples from the material found in the Danish and French archives.

The Democracy Debate

Similarly, the study of the initial Danish debates about the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the Gaullist solution revealed that civil society actors barely mobilised against or in favour of the Gaullist takeover, apart from the media and a few activists. That said, the conceptual analysis of the public debate provided some genuine contributions to the historical literature, namely about the political usage of the French political breakdown and the peculiar Danish reactions to the French regime change. The debates were indeed played out in the public sphere, but the protagonists were chiefly high-ranking representatives of the established political system. Initially, the public sphere was mainly important in a passive way, namely as a receiver or addressee of the established parties' various interpretations of the regime change.

In the summer of 1958, it was mainly the Danish NATO opponents and sceptics that attempted to put de Gaulle's takeover on the public agenda. The Communist paper, *Land og Folk*, outshone the other dailies in dystopian portraits of the advance of 'international fascism'. New left circles, moreover, referred to what they called a belt of black regimes running through the Continent – a Madrid-Paris-Bonn axis. Closer to the centre of political power, Social Democratic left-wing fractions also promoted the idea that de Gaulle's regime was a 'military dictatorship'. As the left-wing argument warned against Danish cooperation with France, these views illustrate what we could call France's declining 'soft power' with Professor Nye's term.

Symptomatically, though, prominent NATO supporters were much more hesitant on criticising de Gaulle and his national restoration project. Instead, leading representatives of the major parties overtly contrasted the ideal type 'cooperative spirit' of the Danish democracy with the 'culture of conflict' known from the crumbling Fourth Republic so as to bolster the adherence to the former. Contrary to the Italian case, most strikingly, no organised political

forces in Denmark recommended a 'Gaullist' cure for the structural weaknesses of the parliamentary system. Gradually, the democratic parties acknowledged the fundamental distinction between Gaullism and fascism, which actually had appeared rather blurred for many actors in May 1958. In April 1961, after the *generals' putsch* in Algeria, the main Social Democratic daily in Denmark thus noted that an authoritarian general had turned out to be the guardian of French democracy. However, the Danish anti-EEC activists used the 'otherness' of the Gaullist political system as a point of reference in their 'no' campaign - a point that did not appear entirely farfetched to the public, as it remained an outspread perception that the French president was not a true democrat, at least until his voluntary resignation in 1969.

Force de Frappe

The multilevel approach also revealed that the Danish reactions to the completion of the French *force de frappe* project came in a strikingly hybrid form, featuring elements of governmental high politics along with grass-roots activities of the new left and the emerging popular movement of nuclear disarmers. We saw that the Danish government clearly was against proliferation of nuclear weapons, also to the West European allies, as it regarded the *de facto* American-Soviet nuclear duopoly as less risky than a multipolar nuclear environment. However, government circles were hesitant on encouraging public campaigns against nuclear proliferations, as the new movement of nuclear disarmers might undermine the acceptance of NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence with their warnings about nuclear fallout and the spectre of a nuclear apocalypse.

By further exploring the civil society perspective, we saw that a considerable part of the nuclear disarmers' protests specifically targeted the French tests. There was a general frustration with the French disregard for the temporary test moratorium of the existing nuclear powers. The Danish government agreed with the nuclear disarmers about the undesirability of the French nuclear initiatives, but they disagreed about Denmark's basic security policy, i.e. the reliance on the American nuclear deterrent. The political establishment considered that question too sensitive to leave to extra parliamentary processes, and the Social Democratic leaders strongly opposed the participation of their fellow party members in the nuclear marches. They wanted to draw a line between governmental security policies and the protests of the nuclear disarmers. Quite a few historical accounts about the Danish nuclear policies and the movement of the nuclear disarmers are available. The thesis attempted mainly to contribute to the debate by combining these levels and to expand the analysis of the Danish reactions to de Gaulle's nuclear bombs. A relevant field for further research would be the

transnational level of the protest initiatives. British and West German initiatives had clearly inspired the Danish campaign, but was there any formal coordination between the nuclear disarmers?

De Gaulle and the EEC

Most of all, the Danish interest in Gaullist France was associated with France's pivotal role in the creation and development of the EEC, as de Gaulle's policies vis-à-vis Britain tightly constrained Denmark's options on the European scene, often to great frustration. The existing literature has exhaustively pointed to this dependence, and the thesis has only contributed marginally with some illustrations of the Danish-French coincidence of interests from the governmental archives. Given the Danish need for larger agricultural exports markets, as we saw, de Gaulle's brute enlargement tactics were in a sense considered necessary for Denmark in order to secure a British commitment to a common agricultural arrangement.

The existing historical accounts have indeed applied various civil society perspectives in the analysis of Denmark's EEC policies. We looked specifically into the differences between the Danish and the French labour markets and societal structures, in which the role of the state and the two sides of industry differs a lot. The Danish trade unions worried that the embryonic Danish 'flexicurity' system would have to adapt to the French traditions of industrial conflict and they were keen on safeguarding their pivotal and 'monopolistic' position in the society. The Scandinavian trade unions were unitary, whereas those of the Continent tended to be split into Catholic, Social Democratic and Communist ones. In addition, the Danish labour market structure was firmly based on the right of free collective bargaining, i.e. central negotiations between the two sides of industry without state interference. The social provisions of the EEC Treaty were considered an infringement on the trade unions' well-established 'right' to negotiate favourable terms for its members, and the Danish trade unions expected the EEC's provisions for social harmonization and equal pay to be *downwards* adjustments. However, the Danish Conference of Trade Unions supported ultimately the idea of joining the EEC, provided that the labour market structures and social policies were not affected.

Moreover, the conceptual analysis of the public EEC debates revealed that there were formal parallels between the mainstream Danish national discourse and the Gaullist defence of national sovereignty. Danish EEC supporters referred to the prominence of de Gaulle's intergovernmental visions in order to take the wind out of the opponents' sails, and the Danish government promoted the French interpretation of the Luxembourg Compromise in January

1966, which featured the right of veto if the EEC partner could not come to terms. However, de Gaulle's visions of Europe as a third force in world politics differed substantially from that of the Danish Eurosceptics. Even the Danish government's acceptance of the Bonn Declaration and the Fouchet Plan was largely considered a concession given to the EEC to become a member of the economic club.

In spite of the underlying scepticism, several Danish EEC supporters actually argued that a supranational EEC framework was particularly advantageous to small nations. In Denmark, however, there was no public call or a parliamentary pressure for further EEC integration like there was in the Netherlands. We saw that the Danish EEC opponents instead managed to frame the sovereignty theme defensively, rendering 'sovereignty' a pivotal category of contention in the public sphere, a question of sustaining Denmark's 'national identity'. They argued that the EEC was a threat to a certain way of life of the people, featuring democratic, egalitarian, welfare and protestant or secular values, as opposed to the Capitalist, Conservative and Catholic Continent. Given the constitutional demand of a 5/6-majority in parliament or a simple majority in a referendum to any surrenders of sovereignty to international organisations, the Eurosceptics and the new popular movements against the EC could hardly be ignored by the established political system.

State and Civil Society

To sum up, the investigation illustrated that the engagement of the civil society was important for the Danish government in two analytically distinctive, but interrelated ways. One dimension pertained to the 'public sphere', a field constituted by public deliberative and rhetorical processes, in principle distinct from the state apparatus and the formalised political system in liberal democracies. Although foreign-policy choices typically reflected a 'reason of state' perspective and, for small states, particularly the adaptation to existing balances of power in line with realist assumptions, political leaders often considered it critical to obtain a wider public support for their policies. Sometimes, correspondingly, they sought to avoid publicity exactly in anticipation of negative reactions – domestically or internationally – to their policies. This view does by no means contradict Hans Morgenthau's realism, which even conceded that "the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself."⁸²² Whereas Morgenthau regretted the conflation of 'reason of state' and public opinion for theoretical reasons, however, the present thesis

⁸²² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition. Revised. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 4-15.

took a profound interest in the public sphere and its role in government policies. It has by no means been the intention to argue that the changing opinions that characterise the public sphere 'determine' foreign policy choices. Instead, our point was that the status of a given foreign policy issue as a public affair or as a secretive cabinet matter was not given *a priori*. It depended on the *agency* of the involved actors, on their interests in and efforts of rendering a given issue a public affair or of avoiding publicity. For civil society actors and oppositional groupings, the public sphere was indeed a main field of action.

The other important dimension of the civil society was the involvement of specific non-governmental associations. In terms of societal importance, the relevant civil society groups ranged from influential economic peak organisations and trade unions to spontaneously gathered protest movements. In some of the cases studied, civil society associations, predominantly the well-established ones, appeared to be affiliated with government circles. Government officials coordinated their activities with certain organisations that represented important societal interests and potential votes or with prestigious charities such as the Red Cross – often at the expense of other civil society groups. In other words, some associations were privileged, closely affiliated to the government and state bureaucracies, in virtue of their central position in society.

The thesis did not venture to test IR or other theories, but the very ambition of paying attention to civil society is very much alike that of the *liberalist* IR paradigm. Our interest differs, however, in one important regard. Whereas IR liberalism stresses the importance of civil society actors in the formulation of a nation's foreign policies, we have also taken an interest in the impact of foreign policies upon civil society and the public sphere, i.e. the inverse relationship. As we saw, this idea paved the way for the investigation of Danish democracy debates; the transnational structure of the pro-Algerian campaign; the Danish nuclear disarmers' specific interest in the French test bombs; and the image of Gaullism as a reactionary militarism within the Danish anti-EEC campaign. It was the spirit of the thesis to apply and combine various research traditions of the history field, and to consider the body of theoretical literature as a toolbox of approaches that *can* be useful, that *can* yield interesting result. In terms of analysing the democracy and sovereignty issues, we thus looked into constructs of people-nation-state concepts in public discourses, which are far from the focus of traditional IR history. We have taken no interest at all in confirming or selecting the *right theory*: what can be a promising theoretical approach in one case, can lead into a blind ally in other cases. Finding the most interesting and rewarding approach is a question of trial and error, of imagination and hermeneutic processes.

A disadvantage of the multilevel approach is, obviously, that the analysis of the political leaders' strategy and the reason of state become less sharp than in a traditional diplomatic approach, such as that of Professor Soutou. In terms of mapping the thesis' contributions to the historiography, however, it seems that the most promising results were situated on the border between the history of international politics and of civil society studies, both on a national and a transnational basis. Many of the points about the Danish government's foreign policies vis-à-vis Gaullist France have been advanced elsewhere in the historical literature. A few points from the French governmental archives were added, but the continued lack of access to General de Gaulle's personal papers renders unfortunately a further investigation of French policies towards Denmark and other countries very difficult.

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ABA JOK: *Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, Jens Otto Krag* (the Labour Movement's Library and Archives (Copenhagen), Jens Otto Krag papers.)

ABA LO: *Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, Landsorganisationen i Danmark* (the Labour Movement's Library and Archives (Copenhagen), the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions).

FB SDGP: *Folketingets Bibliotek, Den Socialdemokratiske Gruppeprotokol* (the Parliament Library (Copenhagen), the minutes of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group).

RA AF: *Rigsarkivet, Alliance Française* (National Archives (Copenhagen)).

RA DSF: *Rigsarkivet, Danske Studerendes Fællesråd* (National Archives (Copenhagen), the National Union of Students in Denmark).

RA MM: *Rigsarkivet, Ministermøder* (National Archives (Copenhagen), Danish Cabinet Meetings).

RA Rad.: *Rigsarkivet, Det Radikale Venstres Arkiv* (National Archives (Copenhagen), the Radical Party's Archives).

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Main Dailies and party affiliations:

- *Berlingske Tidende*: Conservative
- *Demokraten*: left-wing fraction of the Social Democratic Party.
- *Dagens Nyheder*: Conservative
- *Information*: independent, pro-NATO, but increasingly left-wing towards the late 1960s
- *Jyllands Posten*: independent, conservative-liberalist
- *Land og Folk*: Communist
- *Politiken*: Radical Liberal
- *Social Demokraten / Aktuelt*: Social Democratic

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