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Effective Multilateralism and the EU as a
Military Power:
The Worldview of Javier Solana

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Abstract

The worldview of Javier Solana, first holder of the post of European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, depicts a multipolar world which is full of negotiable conflicts. As a result of the impact of globalisation, member states are pressed to integrate further in the EU. Solana portrays an international scene where the EU enjoys a positive international image and which is favourable to a greater role for the EU. However, the EU is far from fulfilling its potential due to several 'internal' obstacles. These impediments come solely from inside Europe and the lack of adequate EU military capabilities ranks high among them. Regarding the objectives of the EU foreign policy, Javier Solana does not perceive any trade-off between the values and interest. Although Solana's concept of multilateralism is decidedly flexible, one of the EU priorities is pushing for a more multilateral international scene. To conclude, Javier Solana aims with his worldview to represent, shape and, maybe more importantly, implement the existent European consensus in foreign affairs.

Keywords

Javier Solana, European Union, CFSP, High Representative, foreign policy, leadership, European officials

Introduction¹

Javier Solana took over the newly created position of European Union (EU) High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1999. Since then, important developments in the EU international action, such as the first military EU operations and the first European Security Strategy, have occurred under his leadership. Proof of the high esteem in which he is held is the fact that he has been designated for a second term in office as HR for CFSP and, if the Constitutional Treaty had been approved, he would have probably become the Foreign Affairs Minister of the EU.

This paper aims to analyse the worldview of Javier Solana (Vennesson, 2007: 3, 22). I will explore Solana's set of ideas, expressed more or less explicitly, regarding international politics and the EU as an international actor. I am interested in Solana's ideas regarding both how international politics and the EU foreign policy *are*, and also how they *should be*. The concept of worldview is related to the notion of 'operational code' as defined by George, a 'set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action' (George, 1969: 3). Already in 1940, Merton had coined the label to refer to 'the values, world view, and response repertoire which an individual acquires and shares with other members of an organization' (Merton, 1940 in Walker, 1990: 403).

My primary sources are a selection of the public remarks made by Javier Solana since his takeover as HR in 1999.² Among the five types of remarks available (interviews, speeches, articles, 'press releases and statements' and reports), my paper has focused on three: speeches, articles and, especially, interviews. This is because press releases, statements and reports tend to refer to specific decisions agreed by the Council of Ministers or they treat very narrow issues. By contrast, interviews, speeches and articles come closer to the 'individual' side of Javier Solana's views and they more often address the topics of interest to this paper, which are the essentials of international relations. Moreover, this paper especially prioritises interviews for being more spontaneous and, therefore, less influenced by the policy-maker's advisors (Schafer and Crichlow, 2000: 570). Instead, prepared remarks are normally based on a draft written by the policy-maker's advisors, although the draft is usually based on the policy-maker's instructions and, later on, it is checked by him or her. Among the 502 interviews, speeches and articles produced by Javier Solana from 1999 until June 2006 available in five languages (English, French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese), this paper selected a sample of 150³. The sampling strategy was three-fold. Firstly, a random selection of the remarks produced each year was carried out. Secondly, these selected remarks (100) were analysed in the light of the themes relevant for the paper, as many remarks are simply focused on commenting the latest developments in a specific region or country. Thirdly, 50 additional remarks were included. These 50 remarks address themes which, while being relevant for this paper, were not enough present in the previous selection. I especially searched for Solana's comments on two international crises (2003 Iraqi war and 2006 Cartoons crisis), on the notions of globalisation, multilateralism and on the future challenges to the

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- 1 This paper is one of a collection of six related RSCAS working papers (EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/07 to EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/12, inclusive). Earlier versions of these papers were presented at the workshop 'European Worldviews: Ideas and the European Union in World Politics', European University Institute-Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, 6 June 2006. For an overall presentation of the research project, see Pascal Vennesson, *Introduction to 'European Worldviews: Ideas and the EU in World Politics'*, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 07_07. I thank Cristina Gallach, the HR's Spokesperson, as well as Virginie Guiraudon, Pascal Vennesson and Ulrich Krötz for their helpful comments.
 - 2 Javier Solana's public remarks are available in the archive of the web page of the Council Secretariat of the EU, available on <http://ue.eu.int/solana> [Accessed 13 July 2006]. Although Solana's cabinet decides which remarks are included in this archive, the great number of remarks included (more than 1500) shows that a large majority of his comments are made available.
 - 3 These 502 are divided among 125 interviews, 231 speeches and 146 articles. When the same article is published in various media (sometimes in different languages), it adds up for this counting as only one article. These 502 interviews, speeches and articles in the five mentioned languages are the 83,5 % of the total 601 available in all languages.

EU. These primary sources are supplemented by a few press releases and statements produced by Solana and an interview conducted by the author with Solana's Spokesperson, Ms Cristina Gallach, in June 2006 (Gallach, 2006).

As the available sources on Solana's worldview are produced as part of his political activity, they are affected by Solana's vision of the role of HR and by his understanding of other actors' expectations (Walker, *et al.*, 1999: 613). Previous research on operational codes has made it clear that research based solely on public remarks captures the interplay between the policy-maker's personal views and his or her institutional presentation. For instance, the analysis of the operational codes of two US presidents based on their public remarks dealt with this interplay by assuming that the opinions expressed by each president are the administration's operational code (not only the individual operational code of the president) (Walker *et al.*, 1999: 613). To get a better understanding of this interplay between the policy-maker's personal views and his or her institutional presentation, I include a section on how Javier Solana envisages his position as EU HR for CFSP.

Regarding the range of available sources, it is remarkable that Javier Solana has not produced any writings which are *not* the result of his political performance. That is, he has not written any essay or book in a personal capacity, nor has he written his memoirs. The fact that entering the theoretical debate on EU foreign policy is not essential for Javier Solana is consistent with the worldview portrayed in this paper. He himself has repeated on several occasions that, on EU foreign policy issues, there is currently an over-focus on the discussion of ideas (especially regarding the institutional architecture) instead of a focus on taking action (2001b; 2003g; 2005e; 2005f; 2005h).⁴

This paper has four sections. The characteristics of the post of the HR for CFSP and the biography of Javier Solana are examined in section one. The worldview of Javier Solana is analysed by dividing it into two large subject areas: his views on international relations in general (section two) and his ideas on the EU role in the world (section three). The conclusion summarises the implications of the features of Solana's worldview.

High Representative for CFSP: The Individual and the Role

Who is Javier Solana?

Javier Solana Mandariaga, born in Madrid on 14 July 1942, is a scientist by training. He received a BA in chemistry in Madrid (1964), studied in the UK and was a Fulbright Scholar in the US. Afterwards, he defended his PhD and was awarded a professorship (1971) in physics at Madrid Complutense University. He joined the then illegal Spanish Socialist party at the early date of 1964. The first Spanish democratic elections since the Civil War took place in 1977 and Javier Solana became a Member of the Parliament. In 1982, when the socialists began to govern, he was appointed minister for culture by the Prime Minister Felipe González. Following this appointment, he was cabinet minister without interruption for almost all the twelve years that the Socialists were in office: Minister for Culture (1982-88), Minister for Education and Science (1988-92), and finally Minister for Foreign Affairs (1992-95). He was the only minister from the first Socialist cabinet who was present in the last cabinet, revealing the profile of an enduring statesman. Popular with the public at a time when the last Socialist cabinet was heavily criticised for corruption scandals and internal fights, some of the Spanish press nicknamed him the 'smile' of the government due to his approachable attitude and consensus-building skills.⁵

In December 1995, Solana was appointed as the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and he began his experience in international organisations. During his time in

4 The public remarks of Javier Solana are referred in this paper by only indicating the date of emission.

5 See for instance, Basterra, 1995; Vázquez Montalbán, 1990.

office, NATO went through a crucial phase. For the first time it led a multi-national peacekeeping force in Bosnia (starting in 1995) and a bombing campaign against the Serbian government, in the course of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (and further peacekeeping forces deployment). Finally, its New Strategic Concept was approved at the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Washington in 1999. In October 1999, Solana took over (and constructed) the newly created post of HR for CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU.⁶ His appointment as HR, instead of a high official, was understood by some authors as a back-up from member states to the new position (Buchet, 2002: 14).

Member states' support for Javier Solana has been restated on various occasions since. In July 2004, he was appointed for a second 5-year mandate as Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and EU HR for the CFSP.⁷ If the Constitutional Treaty for Europe entered into force, it was also decided that Javier Solana would be appointed as EU Foreign Minister, a position that combines the current HR for CFSP, the Commissioner for External Relations and the Vice-President of the European Commission.⁸

High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, a Challenging Position

The position of HR for CFSP is primarily challenging due to the ambition of the enterprise: increasing the coherence and visibility of EU foreign policy (2002c). The new position of HR for CFSP was created by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) as result of the criticism towards CFSP for its unsatisfactory performance in the Balkans wars. That is, a HR was created to enhance the coordination among the various EU/EC foreign affairs tools, the continuity beyond the six-month presidencies, and the visibility of EU international action. The institutional arrangements in place prior to the creation of the HR, which took the form of the rotating presidency and the troika, were incapable of providing enough coherence and visibility. In short, the HR was supposed to be the answer to Kissinger's (attributed) question of which one was the EU phone number.

Despite the ambitious aims attributed to the post, the job description was vague and not well equipped to perform. Three elements make this clear. Firstly, the institutional framework of the CFSP was unconsolidated. The CFSP dated only from the Treaty of the EU (TEU, 1992) and was fragile due to the large number of controversies it had experienced during the 1990s. Secondly, the creation of a HR had some strong institutional and political opponents. The French proposal to create one was tabled at the 'reflection group' preparing the Intergovernmental Conference of 1997, meeting the opposition of, among others, small states and the European Commission (Buchet, 2002: 17, 29; Wallace, 2005: 441). On the one hand, small states were suspicious of the HR idea because they did not have the resources to resist the political force of a new position which would have the advantage of continuity, even proposing to reduce the HR's term in office to six months, similar to that of the rotating presidency. On the other, the Commission was unfavourable to the creation of a HR because it perceived it as a threat to its own role in CFSP matters. Indeed, for some, the main objective in creating a HR (instead of empowering the EC External Relation Commissioner with such a role) was to avoid a strong Commission in the Second Pillar (Buchet, 2002: 26-30).

Thirdly, the HR position is not equipped with strong formal powers or large material resources. This 'weakened' HR was in fact a condition placed by several member states on their support for the creation of a Mr CFSP: the creation of a HR was not to entail the setting up of a new institution (Buchet, 2005: 61). Despite the great mission declared, the HR's legal foundational mandate (art. 18

6 The Cologne European Council of 3-4 June 1999 designated Mr Javier Solana as the HR for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the EU. See http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htm

7 On the 29 June 2004, the European Council decided to appoint Javier Solana to his second term in office and also decided that he would be appointed as EU Minister for Foreign Affairs on the day of entry into force of the Constitution. See Presidency Release: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/81278.pdf

8 *Ibid*

and 26 of the Consolidated TEU) was modest and the HR's legal powers are exclusively limited to (i) giving 'assistance' to the rotating EU Presidency, in particular, through the 'formulation, preparation and implementation' of CFSP decisions and (ii) representing the Council on political dialogue with third parties at the request of the Presidency (art 26 CTEU). The lack of right of initiative for the HR and the 'cohabitation' with the EC External Relations Commissioner are noticeable features of the weak legal status of the HR. The resources at the HR's disposal are minor too, given its undersized budget. The HR is coupled with the position of Secretary-General of the Council of the EU.⁹ This post makes him the head of the Council Secretariat which is the bureaucratic machinery backing up the Council of Ministers and its multiple working groups. However, the nomination as Secretary-General did not endow *then* a vast institutional power because, in 1999, the Council Secretariat still performed a fundamentally administrative role. As the years have passed, the Council Secretariat as well as the HR (and probably because of the HR) has gained a stronger political role.

In sum, despite the imbalance between the expectations and resources given, the incorporation of the HR position is usually evaluated as a positive innovation for European foreign policy and Javier Solana's performance is generally assessed as an important component of this success.¹⁰ This success is particularly important given that EU international action has long suffered from an 'expectations-capabilities gap' (Hill, 1993), so this positive outcome was by no means assured. In short, the worldview of Javier Solana, who has successfully constructed its vaguely described and worst equipped position as HR, is appealing.

International Relations: Solana's Views

A Globalised and Multipolar World

Javier Solana dedicates an important part of his public remarks to portraying an international arena that is going through a strong transformation as a result of the impact of globalisation. He sees the nature of globalisation as a larger 'interdependence' of various dimensions: economic, environmental and political (2003o). New technology developments have made a significant contribution to such new interconnectivity. In his view, the international system is increasingly borderless and the concept of sovereignty has changed in the sense that now any international actor is more affected than before by events happening far beyond its borders (2001c). Globalisation is presented as a process which is not in the hands of any actor, and which is not 'under control' (2003n).

The main consequences of globalisation, identified by Solana, can be grouped into two sets: consequences for the world and specific consequences for Europe. On the worldwide front, the first outcome is that, in the new borderless world, foreign and security issues are winning priority for all governments and peoples: 'we increasingly have interests worldwide' (2001c). Secondly, globalisation brings both new opportunities but also new frustrations and threats, such as international terrorism (2003n). All in all, Solana's global vision of the today's world is not especially optimistic as he sees that a 'world is full of suffering' (2005g; 2005h; Gallach, 2006). This unhappy evaluation is central for his worldview as this is, in his view, why the West and especially the EU has the responsibility to act in international affairs to transform the world into a fairer place (2005h; Gallach, 2006). Thirdly, Javier Solana sees a great impact of globalisation in the 'timing' of events: the world now evolves more rapidly than before. Solana summed this up by saying: 'I am not completely sure of where the world is going, but it is going very quickly' (2006f). International organisations but also nation-states, are struggling to react in time. Globalisation 'imposes' a new accelerated economic timing which is faster than governmental (nation-states and IOs) timing (2005h; 2006f). Non-governmental actors ('good' and 'bad' ones) do not have to follow rules, so they are able to move and adapt more quickly

9 The HR position is *de facto* also coupled with that of Secretary-General of the Western European Union.

10 See, Buchet, 2002: 13; Edwards, 2005: 43; Nuttall, 2005: 100; Smith, 2003: 45.

than governments (2005h). He defines himself as an ‘anxious man’ who, over the years, has developed an increased feeling of urgency (2005h). He thinks that the present times are crucial and require the ability to act fast and effectively (2002c; 2005h). In his view, for example, the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has led to its losing vital time in EU foreign affairs (2005h). Due to his concern over speed, Javier Solana has actually pushed for the creation of a ‘crisis mode’ of the EU decision-making mechanism which in normal circumstances takes the month as its unit (e.g. the Council of Ministers meets once every month) (2002c; Gallach, 2006).

Regarding the impact of globalisation on Europe, no member state or the EU can ignore or reverse this trend (2001b). This is because even the Western democracies, which are ‘the major driving force’ behind globalisation, have at the same time their margin of manoeuvre reduced by globalisation (2005a). However, Europe as a whole can, better than member states, ‘negotiate’ the terms of globalisation (2006a). The fact that borders are blurring makes member states increasingly weak and reinforces the need for an EU foreign policy and for greater worldwide cooperation (2001a; 2001b; 2003o).

Javier Solana divides the international sphere into nation-states and new international actors. Regarding nation-states, the US is identified by Solana as the current superpower of the world; however, he also recognizes the rise of new centres of power, portraying a world guided by the US, Europe and regional powers. He perceives as one impact of globalisation the fact that the international system is moving towards a system of regional blocks, a ‘system of continents’ (2005a; 2006a; 2006f). In his view, the transatlantic relation is the most important partnership for a fairer and more stable world. The regional powers mentioned by Solana vary, but one can notice that Russia and China are always mentioned, while Japan, India, South Africa and Latin America (or Brazil) are named from time to time.¹¹ Various third countries are denominated as ‘partners’, ‘strategic partners’ or ‘friends’, and ‘strategic partnership’ is usually reserved to label EU relations with regional powers. However, this labelling does not seem to form a hierarchy of actors consciously constructed by Solana (2006b). As globalisation brings new actors to the international sphere, nation-states are no longer the exclusive actors (2000c). Solana does not only regard multinational companies and NGOs as new global non-governmental agents but also the emergence of a powerful public opinion, which is singled out as a novelty of the current international arena (2000e). The rise of the role of public opinion as a new influential factor on foreign affairs puts an end to the situation where foreign policy was an issue solely for an elite circle of politicians and diplomats (2000b). Solana presents public opinion as a driving force for a more normative and interventionist foreign policy.

A World of Negotiable Conflicts

Javier Solana does not perceive the world as a harmonious arena, but rather as a sphere of mostly negotiable conflicts. However, he acknowledges that in some extreme and rare cases war is inevitable (2003b). Three points with respect to his view of the concept of conflict inside and outside the EU are worth developing. Firstly, when he refers to political crises, he reduces every crisis to specific conflicting issues emphasising the existence of ‘elements for reaching an agreement’ (2003b). For example, he repeated that the divergence among Western countries in the 2003 Iraqi war crisis was due only to disagreement on the ‘means to reach an objective shared by all, that is disarming Iraq’ (2003i). Secondly, he stresses that it is possible to come to agreements over troubled issues, but that this is neither easy nor rapid (1999a). Multilateralism is the ‘right’ strategy but not an easy one (2003b). As, for Solana, speed is crucial in the globalised world, the fact that multilateralism may bring long negotiations with unsure outputs is a drawback in the short-term. However, in the long run, only multilateral decisions are legitimated worldwide (2002a). His goal is to achieve an ‘effective multilateralism’ which is faster and legitimised at the same time. The importance of ‘agency’ is clearly stated as leaders should be willing to both negotiate and compromise (2003b). Thirdly, Javier Solana

¹¹ See, 2001b; 2002c; 2003m; 2004c; 2005c; 2005f.

perceives, and presents, his attitude towards conflicts as ‘pragmatic’ (2000a). He professes to dislike abstract and all-encompassing—‘cosmological’—solutions, preferring step-by-step management, as he emphasized during the discussion on the EU's institutional reforms in light of the enlargement (2000a). Moreover, he presents himself as forward-looking, and is not very willing to comment on past conflicts that cannot be altered. For instance, the question whether Iraq actually had links with Al Qaeda has become for him a ‘somewhat academic question now that military operations have begun. What is more important is the undeniable fact that al Qaeda cells operate in many countries’ (2003f).

Multilateralism: A Tool for a Better World

Multilateralism and its antagonist unilateralism are central concepts within Javier Solana's discourse. When talking about unilateralism he refers vaguely to the act of taking important foreign policy decisions without consulting any partner. Multilateralism, instead, is implicitly referred to the fact of holding consultations (and possibly negotiations) with partners before taking a fundamental foreign policy decision (2006d). Multilateralism seems to be a very flexible tool to advance towards a more stable and fair world, instead of a well-defined and strict framework where all decisions have to be taken. Five features of his understanding of multilateralism stand out.

Firstly, he does not indicate in which specific framework talks should be held, with regional and worldwide organisations being only *one* possible framework for such talks. Although Solana regularly includes proclamations supporting international organisations, especially the UN, he does not mention international organisations as the sole arrangements for multilateral talks (2002a; 2004b). Neither is his understanding of multilateralism restricted to ‘multilateral’ consultations (talks involving more than two countries or entities). It also comprises ‘bilateral’ consultations (talks involving two countries or entities). Therefore, his understanding of multilateralism refers exclusively to the need of dialogue bilaterally or multilaterally with partners (Gallach, 2006). Secondly, Javier Solana seems to imply that the partners which have to be consulted are fundamentally the US and the regional powers. Although he does not declare that only regional powers have to be consulted he only mentions their names as partners for consultations on global issues. What is explicitly stated by Solana is that the ‘world should not be only guided by the EU and USA’ (2005c). Thirdly, Javier Solana considers multilateral consultations as one of several vital tools to construct a more legitimate, fair and stable international system (2003o, 2004b). The causal link between the multilateral method and the better world outcome is taken for granted by Solana and, therefore, he does not develop this thought any further in his public remarks. Through multilateralism, agreements are reached by pacific and diplomatic means, so the international system becomes more stable, Solana implies. Since more countries (specifically the regional powers) are involved than in unilateralism, these regional powers would sanction the decision and would thus give it international legitimacy.

Furthermore, Javier Solana's view on multilateralism puts more emphasis on the fact of *consulting* regional powers than on whether those talks entail reaching agreements and on the content of agreements. He implies that dialoguing with third countries generally leads also to the reaching of agreements on the issues at stake, without further comments (2003n). Regarding the content of the agreements, he sometimes mentions that the outcomes of the consultations should follow the principles of the Charter of UN (2003n). He does, on other occasions, defend human rights, international law, and the greater distribution of wealth (2006a). However, he is careful enough not to address the complicated issue that regional powers could reach agreements among themselves which are unfair for the rest of the nation-states or which raise international instability. Finally, Solana feels that multilateralism needs to be defended from the criticism of being inefficient. He depicts a certain trade-off between multilateralism and efficacy when it comes to the short-term delivery of international outcomes (2002a; 2002b). However, in the long term, he is of the idea that only multilateral agreed decisions would be effective because solely multilateral decisions are perceived as legitimate worldwide. Although he only recognises the trade-off in the short term, when he proclaims his support for multilateralism he tends to refer to it as ‘effective multilateralism’ (2004b). This

effective multilateralism is defined by Solana's Spokesperson as 'reaching agreements in order to act, not just in order to be' (Gallach, 2006). According to Solana, unilateralism does not benefit any country, not even the country which exercises it (2003d).

In the case of military interventions, Javier Solana thinks that they are legitimated if they have the back-up of a prior UN Security Council Resolution, but not only in those cases (2003b; Gallach, 2006). In certain cases, that is, he allows for military intervention without such UNSC backing. Indeed, he as NATO Secretary-General led the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without such UNSC resolution. Under which circumstances an intervention does not need a UNSC back-up is not an issue that he addresses, following his line of no comments on controversial issues. Regarding the US-led intervention in Iraq which started in March 2003, he has now and then spoken in favour of having a new UNSC resolution that explicitly supports the military intervention (2003a).

Solana's Europe: What kind of international actor?

Europe in the World: An Excellent International Image

Javier Solana thinks that Europe, as a broad entity, has a very positive image in the world. His views on the international action of the EU are, however, more intricate. Regarding his views on Europe's image in general, its excellent image is usually explained by the following: 'Europe is a magnetic pole of stability, of peace, of prosperity' (2004c; see also 2003o; 2005a). In his view, this image is triggered by some features of European domestic features: the lack of war among EU member states, the European economic success and, especially, the 'social cohesion' of European societies. On foreign policy, Solana thinks that the good perception of Europe is due to Europe's role as a 'moderator of international conflicts' through its support of multilateralism, as a promoter of development in the poorest countries (fifth donor of aid) and as an advocate of human rights (2004c). The fact that 'everyone wants to join this club and virtually no one wants to get out' is for him clear proof of Europe's attraction capacity (2005e). Paradoxically, the positive image that Europe reflects to the world contradicts, in Solana's opinion, a certain Euroscepticism coming from within European societies.

Not only does Javier Solana consider Europe to have an excellent international image, he also claims that there is a 'demand of Europe' in the world. He explains it as a demand for Europe to play a greater international role (2005b; 2005f; 2006a; 2006b; 2006f). When travelling around the world, he is 'surprised' about how many calls for 'help' he receives (2003o; 2006a; 2006d), although the specific contributions that these third countries are demanding from Europe remain vague. Javier Solana assesses the EU's international role as very positive, especially taking into consideration that it is a recent project (2006a), since he dates the onset of a real EU foreign policy in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, which coincides with his take-over as HR. This is because until then the EC/EU did not have a policy on certain security issues such as peacekeeping operations, Solana says. In fact, Solana often uses the inclusion of the EU in the Quartet negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the new EU capacity to deploy troops or policy abroad (for example, the EU police mission 'Proxima' in Macedonia) as examples to highlight the success of the current EU (2003a; 2006a; 2006c). The inception of a real European foreign policy is, then, not linked to the establishment of the institutional arrangements of the CFSP in 1992 but to the emergence of an authentic will to act in the international sphere triggered by the Kosovo war (2003e; 2003k).

Following the current EU division of labour, Javier Solana usually does not dedicate a large part of his speeches to EU economic foreign policy, focusing on the traditional elements of foreign policy such as diplomacy or troops deployment (2002c). When it refers to them, Javier Solana does not label any of the external actions of the European Communities or the European Union done before the ends of the 1990s as foreign policy. However, on some occasions, he has referred to the EU as being a 'global player' in economics issues long before the creation of the CFSP (1999b).

In sum, the fact that Javier Solana chooses to date the start of a real foreign policy of the EU at a late point in time—the year 1999—allows him to present comforting views of the international performance of the EU. When some failures of the CFSP are mentioned, Javier Solana emphasizes that building a common European foreign policy is a recent project still in the making. The selection of such dating means that Solana does not have to give any explanation for the failures and problems of the various external actions of the European Union or the European Communities in the last five decades. Therefore, the fragmentation of the EU external action among the three pillars and the failures in the Balkans war, although mentioned by Solana in other contexts (2002c), do not damage the EU foreign policy image for him.

Values and Interests in European Foreign Policy: No Trade-Off

Javier Solana expresses mixed views on whether Europe has any common interests in the world. Sometimes he states that European common interests already exist, and, on other occasions, that ‘Europe’ should make some further efforts to define them (1999b; 2000c). However, he has also said a couple of times that Europe was already a ‘global player’ before the creation of the CFSP, which precludes the existence of shared interests in some areas (e.g. trade) (1999b). When Solana proclaims that the EU has interests in the world, these interests are framed as responses to perceived threats: instability (especially in the European neighbourhood), new threats (WMD, terrorism and organized crime) and global problems (for instance, poverty and local grievances) (2003k). For Javier Solana, the EU’s interests are expressed mainly by the concepts of stability and security: he places the emphasis on the ‘moderating’ role played by Europe in the world to avoid major conflicts (1999c). He also explains that Europe will not ‘return to exercising power across the globe for its own sake’ (2000b; see also 2006d), adopting the perspective of Defensive Realism, that is, that a state or unit mainly expands to defend itself from perceived threats.

In addition to its interests, European values are also a guide to Europe’s international action (1999b). The essential European values are identified by Javier Solana as the UN Charter of Rights (2000e; 2004b) and are expressed as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (2000b). Beyond political rights, social cohesion due to welfare policies is specifically emphasized as a European aim (2004a). Solana states that the European social model is ‘the modern social-democrat project’ which he would like to see further consolidated (2005f; 2005h). It is interesting, however, to note that he refers more to this social agenda when interviewed by the Spanish media where he is identified as a left wing politician. In Solana’s understanding, EU foreign policy is framed as a European responsibility towards the world, an engagement to transform the latter into a more democratic and just place. The more common examples of the EU exercising such responsibility are Europe’s multilateral conduct on the international arena and the enormous level of European developmental aid (2003o). The EU itself has constantly proclaimed this normative engagement in foreign policy; thus, several theoretical frameworks portray the EU as a normative actor in international relations (Manners, 2002). This is a responsibility that Europe did not fulfil for a long time, however.

In short, the concepts of stability (interest related) and responsibility (value linked) are the essentials of Solana’s views of world politics and of CFSP, and they are present in his justification on several CFSP policy actions (2003j). Javier Solana repeats time and again that no trade-off exists between interests and values in Europe’s foreign policy. That is because the extension of democratic values increases world stability, which is a common interest for Europe (2000d). He directly addresses the theoretical debate on the alleged trade-off between values and interests in foreign policy, to state clearly that ‘there is no contradiction in our vision, between defending European common interests and promoting the values enshrined in the UN Charter. And, likewise, that the debate between “realists” and “idealists” in international relations is somewhat outdated’ (2000e). Also in the fight against terrorism, ‘there is absolutely no trade-off between security and human rights’ (2005a; see also, 2006e).

In some potentially conflictive cases, such as the Danish cartoons crisis, Javier Solana has explained how even there European values (freedom of speech) have never been in contradiction with European interest (good relations with the Muslim world). Apart from assertive condemnations of the attacks on European embassies in the Middle East, Javier Solana's fundamental declaration on the cartoons crisis was the signature of a common statement with the UN Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which declared: 'We understand the deep hurt and widespread indignation felt in the Muslim world. The freedom of the press, which entails responsibility and discretion, should respect the beliefs and tenets of all religions' (Solana *et al.*, 2006c). The statement argues that the right of freedom of speech is fundamental and unquestionable but it has always been understood as linked to a sense of responsibility.

Military Capabilities as Indispensable

Probably influenced by his NATO past, Javier Solana leaves aside balanced statements when it comes to the topic of military capabilities. His resolute view is that it is indispensable for the EU to possess military means. He thinks that, in order to exercise a strong influence in the world, an actor absolutely needs the whole range of tools of foreign policy, including military ones (1999d).¹² The lack of adequate military capabilities is indeed mentioned by him as one of the five greatest obstacles for the development of a more credible EU foreign policy. Although he does not refer explicitly to the concept, Javier Solana disagrees with the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe' (Duchêne, 1972; 1973), if this is understood as disapproving of the acquisition and/or use of military means in European foreign policy.¹³ Javier Solana sees the acquisition of military capabilities, especially for sending troops to crisis management abroad, as a necessary step not only for exercising power but for fulfilling the EU normative task: 'What we just have not been hitherto, however, is a military player. But this is what we must become, if we wish to defend our values' (2003j). In his view, it is impossible to achieve a better and more stable world through only civilian means (1999e). Therefore, Solana joins the voices, for instance Stavridis (2001), who do not see a contradiction but a necessity (in extreme cases) of using military means to achieve the EU normative agenda.

Additionally to peacekeeping and peacemaking needs, Solana embraces the deterrence approach to military power. Civilian means are essential but not sufficient for Europe's international action because, among other reasons, 'we need a military deterrent in order to guarantee our civil ability to reconstruct society in countries in the grip of a crisis' (2003l). Although the need for military capabilities is clear, he never labels current or potential EU military actions as 'war.' Therefore, he says that Europe is not and will not get prepared for war, and that Europe will 'always [opt] for actions of peace, not of war' (2003l).¹⁴ Still, by actions of peace, he indeed refers to operation which are peacekeeping or peacemaking.

Solana repeatedly presents the need to respond to international crises as a demand made on the part of the European public to the EU, an idea that has been corroborated by several European polls. However, he thinks that the European public is reluctant in making use of the military means available to the EU. He has also claimed that European soldiers in peacekeeping operations have not received

12 In this paper, military means are understood as the use of armed forces, including in peacekeeping operations following Smith (2004: 1-2).

13 Indeed K. Smith (2000: 28) and others reads the notion as disapproving the acquisition/development of EU military means because this path will send the wrong signal to the world and will undo the civilian 'magnetic force' effect. However, this is not the only understanding of 'Civilian Power Europe' given that Duchêne coined the notion in broad terms. Among other interpretations, S. Stavridis (2001) and others emphasise the normative foreign policy ends which the 'Civilian Power Europe' should target, as stated by Duchêne, to argue that military tools can be used (as a last resort) for the achievement of such goals.

14 His restraint in using the term war has few exceptions, such as: 'There is regrettably some truth in the Roman saying that if you desire peace, then prepare for war. (...) Pacifism, unfortunately, is not an option' (2001c).

adequate ‘respect and recognition’ in their respective countries (2003h). In short, Solana states on several occasions that European citizens are sometimes ‘hypocritical’ as they want Europe to stop international crises but they are not ready to make the financial and human effort to generate the military capabilities needed for it (2003e; 2003h; 2005c). The insistence and clarity of Solana’s views on military means seem related to two factors. Firstly, Solana’s numerous didactic comments appear to point to the fact that he sees it as part of his task to convince the sometimes reluctant European public and its leaders of the importance of acquiring military capabilities at the EU level. Secondly, the fact that he normally does not comment on divisive issues leads us to think that he perceives the existence of a sufficient consensus on the EU acquisition of some military means in Europe. Solana’s Spokesperson (Gallach, 2006) confirmed this point: beyond some differing views, he sees a clear consensus on a certain amount of militarisation of the Union.

Solana's Views regarding his Position as HR for the CFSP

An evaluation of the picture that Javier Solana has of his own position as HR enlightens his conception of international relations and of the international role of the EU. His more recent ideas about the role of HR give more information than his initial definitions, which were modest and followed word by word the institutional definition of the HR post. At the beginning of his first term in office, Solana understood his role as that of a mere assistant to the rotating Presidency. He used to present himself in the following way: ‘my mandate as High Representative is to assist the Presidency and the Member States in developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy.’¹⁵ More recently, he has implicitly portrayed himself as *one* of the leaders of the European foreign policy. In fact, he has at some point claimed that he built his position by avoiding consultation with the member states over some of his actions. ‘As times goes by, I do whatever I want. I know what people think. I pursue my own agenda. I don’t have to check everything with everyone. I would rather have forgiveness than permission. If you ask for permission, you would never do anything’ (2003m). An example of him acting autonomously is his statement regarding the pre-opening negotiations of accession with Turkey in November 2005. In the days preceding this opening, he spoke clearly against the need for an extra ministerial meeting to re-discuss the coming opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. He labelled this meeting, which took place a few days later, as ‘odd and uncomfortable’ (2005d). Additionally, his public remarks show that the role of High Representative in general and his own role have gained more recognition as his years in office have gone by.

In his later years as HR, he put forward two characterisations of his role as HR which are especially interesting for his worldview. Firstly, he presents himself as a ‘common denominator’ of the European peoples and leaders on foreign policy issues (2003a). As he thinks that Europe should make some efforts to uncover its common interest, his role as HR is to put forward such common grounds. Secondly, he regards it as his duty to find a consensus between the bigger EU member states when it comes to essential foreign policy issues. When the Iraq war crisis split Europe, he felt that he had failed to fulfil his task of a broker: ‘There [the European split in the UNSC] we failed. And this is most bitter for me, as I saw this as my task’ (2003c). If his role as a moderator is not successful, he prefers to be silent. For example, when he was asked why he did not go public when groups of member states published opposing letters in newspapers on the Iraqi issue, he answered: ‘Let me tell you something about my job. You have to be part of the solution, not part of the problem’ (2003m). Understanding the reaching of consensus as his duty restates his idea that the international system is a world of negotiable conflicts. In Solana’s view, his foremost role is to build consensus among EU member states.

15 1999d. The same presentation can be read also in his remarks to the Press when taken up his functions as HR for CFSP (1999b). See also, 2000d.

Obstacles for the future EU foreign policy

Javier Solana sees the potentialities of the European foreign policy as going far beyond the current state of the affairs. He has emphasized the wealth, territory and population of Europe to prove that the EU can have much more influence in the world (2005c). The lack of enough military capabilities and four more problems prevent the EU from fulfilling its potential. Javier Solana does not perceive any great external obstacles to the EU foreign policy; all the obstacles come from inside Europe.

Firstly, the member states' leaders are sometimes accused by Solana of not having enough 'political will' to build a stronger EU foreign policy (2002c). Despite being a recurrent point in Solana's discourses, the 'will' of the national leaders is not defined. However, on various occasions Javier Solana equates the lack of 'will' of national leadership to act together internationally with their unwillingness to compromise. Disagreements between UK and France are especially dangerous as they make EU foreign policy impracticable (2003e). At some point, he comments that part of the problem of reaching agreements is the 'vanity' of national policy-makers (2003m). One example of the unwillingness of some leaders to compromise can be found, for Javier Solana, in the long discussion on the new EU budgetary perspectives for 2007-2013 because if 'some' would make sacrifices, an agreement could have been reached in only 24 hours, he said (2005g). Although enlarging the existing possibilities for qualified majority voting is a part of the solution for Solana, especially in the face of the Enlargement, it would not compensate for a lack of political will (2002c). Specifically, he expresses strong views against applying qualified majority voting to the deployment of troops abroad (2003c).

Secondly, he considers that the attention dedicated to the development of institutions for European foreign policy is exaggerated, for example, in the Convention for the Future of Europe (2003g). He claims that having an EU Foreign Affairs Minister (his future post) is less important than having France and UK agreeing on the fundamentals of their foreign policies (2003g). In Solana's view, European integration has entered a new phase in which priorities are no longer institutions but the development of policies. A further reform of institutions would not on its own make EU foreign policy stronger, as only the implementation of effective EU foreign policy actions can. Even the alleged bureaucratic character of the EU institutions would not be alleviated via institutional reform. In Solana's view, the essence of the problem is not the bureaucratic nature of the EU institutions, as the EU institutions are 'less bureaucratic than the Madrid Town Hall's institutions' (2005h). However, the lack of a demand for results makes any institution develop very bureaucratic behaviours (2005h).

Furthermore, Javier Solana has stated on several occasions that the EU answers international problems more with declarations than with actions (2005e; 2005f; 2005h). He thinks that the situation has improved in the last few years. The overload of pronouncements and legislation oversells EU action and does not contribute to the resolution of the conflicts. Instead, the EU should be more focused on achieving results by action through presence on the ground. An increased focus on actual policy actions would not only make the EU influence in the world increase, but it would also provide greater legitimacy for the EU foreign policy. In Solana's words: 'by achieving results in foreign policy we can also show people that the EU is relevant and influential as a force for good in world affairs. Call it legitimacy through action.' (2005e; see also, 2005h; 2006a; 2006d). This links to another obstacle for the EU foreign policy: lack of support from European people. Finally, Javier Solana refers to the attitudes of the European public toward the EU foreign policy in two ways. On the one hand, the European people are mentioned as demanding an effective and value-oriented EU foreign policy. On the other, especially after the failure of the two referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, European people are seen as having doubts regarding the whole European integration process. Javier Solana finds the 'current mood' surprising because Europe has 'rarely been more successful' in terms of peaceful relations among European states and prosperous and free European societies (2005e). In fact, 'we are admired for it by the rest of world,' he says (2005e). He also thinks that, despite its drawbacks, European foreign policy is now more successful than at any time before.

Solana does not think that EU foreign policy is particularly the accountable for the Eurosceptic momentum. The current doubts about EU legitimacy are attributed to the speed of the transformations that the EU has been through, especially the recent enlargements, which were badly explained to the public (2005f; 2005h). The European population has not had the ‘time’ to understand the 2004 enlargement or the potential adhesion of Turkey (2005d). However, the slow-down of whole European integration process does affect the making of EU foreign policy.

Conclusion

Although Javier Solana has never systematised his worldview in a single essay, he shows a fundamental coherence in the discourse regarding his conception of international relations and EU’s international action. Four implications stand out from the analysis of his worldview. Firstly, the intention of Javier Solana does not seem to be the construction of worldview which is strikingly novel. On the contrary, he targets the composition of a worldview which can be broadly accepted in Europe and possibly abroad. Solana appears to think that there is enough consensual ground in Europe to act in foreign policy. Therefore, regarding controversial issues, he prefers not to comment or else to make comments without positioning himself. Secondly, the genuine intention of his foreign policy activity seems to be putting the commonly accepted European worldview—as he perceives it—into practice. As a result, an important specificity of his ideas is how he links his worldview to EU political praxis: he produces a discourse bearing in mind its potential implementation. He repeatedly argues that Europe has had too much of a declarative foreign policy and that acting and implementing is his current and difficult goal. This would explain his tendency to make cautious statements on the EU foreign policy actions. In fact, Solana dedicates numerous efforts to emphasise that a more influential EU foreign policy is now feasible. The current international arena portrayed by Solana favours a greater EU’s international role. Globalisation, by blurring borders, presses on the member states towards a greater integration at the EU and towards greater international cooperation. When he travels, Solana listens time and again to an increasing number of actors ‘demanding’ a greater international presence of the EU, he says. However, the EU has a better image abroad than inside its borders. The impediments which stop the EU foreign policy from being stronger are all coming from inside Europe. This overconfident vision points to the idea that, if the EU does not achieve in practice a more influential stand in world affairs, the only responsible is Europe itself.

Furthermore, Solana’s policy of avoiding comments on certain controversial issues seems more a strategy than a reflection of Solana’s values. An instance of this strategy is that he dates the birth of a real EU foreign policy with the Kosovo war in 1999 in order not to evaluate the failures and successes of the EC/EU external relations since the 1950s. Moreover, he states that, in EU foreign policy, there is no trade-off between values and interests. During the Iraqi crisis, he did not comment much on the situation and did not criticise any of the positions adopted by European member states. When he is asked in the European Parliament about the alleged CIA flights over European soil, he answers that these issues do not fall under his competence and that he has no information (2006e). This strategy does not mean that he has no ‘red lines’ on his foreign policy action, but that he does not make his ‘red lines’ public. Two elements could contribute to understand why. To start with, Solana has a worldview which attaches great value to the fact that leaders in international relations need to be flexible in order to achieve their aims. His elastic and light concept of multilateralism is good proof of it. Moreover, he presents a world dominated by negotiable conflicts. A second element for understanding his strategy of avoiding certain controversial statements is his vision of the post of HR as consensus builder who avoids the increase in public disagreements among European leaders. As a result, this no comments strategy has the side effect of subtracting debate from the public arena on the options in foreign policy. However, Solana’s worldview implies that this strategy delivers effective action and implementation in EU foreign policy, an idea which is supported by the successful record of Solana as HR.

Finally, the indispensability of military capabilities is an issue where Javier Solana steps out of his normal no comment policy. Building on his experience as NATO Secretary-General, the acquisition of

military tools has become for him the area that is essential for an active and powerful EU foreign policy. Moreover, given his policy of not speaking on unsettled issues, Solana implicitly recognises that he sees the development of a consensus in Europe on the acquisition and usage of military capabilities. To conclude, Javier Solana's worldview aims to represent, shape and, maybe more importantly, implement the European consensus in foreign affairs.

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