Is There a Populist Zeitgeist?

Coming to Grips With an Elusive Phenomenon

Sophia Hunger

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 06 July 2020

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Is There a Populist Zeitgeist?

Coming to Grips With an Elusive Phenomenon

Sophia Hunger

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Examining Board

Prof. Dr. Hanspeter Kriesi, EUI (supervisor)
Prof. Dr. Ellen Immergut, EUI
Prof. Dr. Sarah de Lange, University of Amsterdam
Prof. Dr. Heike Klüver, Humboldt University

© Hunger, 2020

No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior
permission of the author

Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work
Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme

I Sophia Hunger certify that I am the author of the work "Is There a Populist Zeitgeist? Coming to Grips With an Elusive Phenomenon" I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297).

The copyright of this work rests with its author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This work may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that this work consists of 48,514 words.

Statement of inclusion of previous work:

I confirm that chapter 2 was jointly co-authored with Mr Fred Paxton and I contributed 50% of the work.
I confirm that chapter 4 was jointly co-authored with Dr Theresa Gessler and I contributed 50% of the work.

Statement of language correction:
This thesis has been corrected for linguistic and stylistic errors. I certify that I have checked and approved all language corrections, and that these have not affected the content of this work.

Signature and date:

Florence, 07.06.2020

Contents

Thesis abstract **v**

Acknowledgements **vii**

1 Introduction **1**

Content and structure of the thesis . . . 3

Definitions . . . 4

Data and methods . . . 6

Geographical scope and case selection . . . 7

2 What's in a Buzzword? A Systematic Review of the State of Populism Research **9**

Introduction . . . 9

Systematic reviews in political science . . . 14

Data collection and methods . . . 15

Empirical results . . . 17

Conclusion . . . 29

3 Virtuous People and Evil Elites? Moralizing Frames and Normative Distinctions in Identifying Populist Discourse **31**

Introduction . . . 31

Populism as a discourse . . . 32

The moral distinction between the people and the elites – a tool for identifying populist discourse? . . . 34

Data and methods . . . 37

Who uses populism? . . . 50

Conclusion . . . 55

4 The Refugee Crisis and Radical Right Parties' Impact on Party Competition **57**

Introduction . . . 57

Politics of immigration and the refugee crisis . . . 58

Data and Methods . . . 63

Results . . . 71

Conclusion . . . 79

5 A Contagious Zeitgeist? The Diffusion of Populism in the European Parliament 81

Introduction 81
A haunting populist zeitgeist? 82
The populist zeitgeist: definition and expectations 85
Data 87
Results 89
Conclusion 97

6 Conclusion 99

References 105

Appendix 125

Appendix A Chapter 2 125
Appendix B Chapter 3 133
Appendix C Chapter 4 137
Appendix D Chapter 5 149

List of Figures

2.1 Yearly number of published journal articles on populism across disciplines . . . 19
2.2 Yearly number of published journal articles on populism by regional focus . . . 21
2.3 Wordfish features plotted by weight and frequency . . . 23
3.1 Cross tabulation of anti-elitism and people-centrism being present in the same speech . . . 52
3.2 Scatter plot for percentage of people-centrism and anti-elitism in MEPs' speeches . . . 54
3.3 Box plots for parties by left-right dimension . . . 54
4.1 Full model of theoretical expectations . . . 63
4.2 Salience of immigration in 14 European countries . . . 65
4.3 Asylum applications per country . . . 66
4.4 Estimated salience of immigration in 3 countries . . . 72
4.5 Estimated party positions on immigration in 3 countries . . . 76
5.1 Monthly count of speeches in the European Parliament . . . 89
5.2 Mean monthly share of populist discourse over time . . . 91
6.1 Number of articles published per year from WoS . . . 125
6.2 Results for two-dimensional scaling/correspondence analysis (CA) . . . 129
6.3 Density of sample and population of political science papers . . . 130
6.4 Google Trends for four topics related to immigration . . . 147
6.5 Total and average number of words per month . . . 149

List of Tables

2.1 Comparison between number of hits in searches on *Web of Science* and journals' websites . . . 17
2.2 Overview: Methods employed for different trends and possible divides 17
2.3 Total number of published journal articles by disciplines . . . 18
2.4 Categorization of hand-coded papers . . . 25
3.1 Morality and antagonistic groups as markers of populist discourse . 35
3.2 Keywords for references to the people and the elite . . . 40
3.3 Keywords for positive and negative framing of the people and the elite 43
3.4 Selection of samples for gold standard . . . 49
3.5 Classification Accuracy . . . 50
3.6 Classification of speeches for different dictionaries . . . 51
4.1 Number of press releases . . . 68
4.2 Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration . 74
4.3 Regression results for mainstream parties' positions on immigration 78
5.1 Regression results for the level of populist discourse among non-populist parties . . . 94
5.2 Regression results for the level of populist discourse among CR and CL parties . . . 95
6.1 Numbers of articles on populism per journal, more than 10 articles from 2004 to 2018 . . . 126
6.2 Selection of top negative and positives features . . . 126
6.3 Frequency of keywords for people and elite dictionaries . . . 133
6.4 Example for snippets . . . 134
6.5 Classification Accuracy . . . 135
6.6 Classification Accuracy Germany . . . 138
6.7 Classification Accuracy Austria . . . 138
6.8 Classification Accuracy Switzerland . . . 139
6.9 Arellano-Bond tests for autoregressive lags . . . 140
6.10 Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration including lag for main IV . . . 142
6.11 Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration by country . . . 143
6.12 Regression results for mainstream parties' position immigration including lag for main IV . . . 144

6.13 Regression results for mainstream parties' position immigration by country . . . 145
6.14 Average and Stability of party positions . . . 146
6.15 Arellano-Bond tests for auto-regressive lags . . . 149

Thesis abstract

This thesis assesses the existence of a populist zeitgeist in Europe. Even though populism and radical right-wing ideology often coincide empirically, I argue for treating both concepts as distinct features that ought to be studied using different theoretical lenses and methods. This becomes particularly crucial, when we study their diffusion and contagion effects on mainstream parties. Hence, my dissertation aims at disentangling the effect of radical right ideology as a fully-fledged thick ideology and populism as a thin ideology attached to it. The thesis is structured in four papers.

Chapter 2 consists of an automated systematic review of populism research applying text-as-data-methods to the abstracts of all political sciences articles published between 2004 and 2018. I show that populism research is divided by geographical foci, methods, and conceptions of populism. This stems from a common overstatement of populism's significance, which comes at the expense of its host ideologies, thus confounding the effects of these thick and thin ideologies. Based on this finding, I argue to study the contagion effect of populism and radical-right ideology thoroughly and separately.

In order to do so, my third chapter develops a novel automated approach to measure populist discourse, which is a prerequisite to study its spreading in political discourse. I argue that established theoretical assumptions, i.e. presenting the people as morally superior and the elite as evil, are a valuable means to identify populist discourse. My two-step dictionary approach allows to detect references to both groups and to identify whether they are framed in a moralizing way.

Subsequently, the last two chapters of my thesis assess a possible contagion of mainstream parties with populist rhetoric and radical right programmatic appeals in a comparative perspective. Serving as an example on how to study radical right programmatic contagion, the chapter 4 focuses on the impact of the refugee crisis and radical right party pressure on party competition regarding immigration in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Using 120,000 party press releases issued between 2013 and 2017 and text-as-data methods, we calculate monthly measures of salience and positions. We show how the 2015 crisis and the success of radical right parties interact by studying how mainstream parties react to the behaviour of the radical right in terms of salience and positional change.

Finally, chapter 5 studies the diffusion of populism in the EP and assesses whether mainstream parties adapt a populist discourse. Theoretically, I argue that scholars ought to study populist contagion in terms of what populism is: an ideational, thin feature of parties, rather than a fully-fledged programmatic orientation. Thus, the study uses my measurement of populist discourse in order to show its development over time and across

actors, particularly assessing whether there are time trends and mutual influences between parties.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I am indebted to my supervisor, Hanspeter Kriesi, for his sincere support and his incredibly helpful and incredibly prompt feedback. Our long – and sometimes heated – discussions helped me tremendously in developing and refining my research. Thanks for sharing so much of your knowledge, for always pushing me to advance my thesis, and for your openness to new ideas and perspectives.

I wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Heike Klüver, Ellen Immergut, and Sarah de Lange for generously offering their time and for their brilliant comments and suggestions.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the POLCON team. Being part of our team helped me in (academically) settling in at the EUI and gave me a peer-group that I could always turn to. I've learnt a ton during our intense collaboration in the last years and and working with all of you was a great pleasure. I particularly thank Swen Hutter and Jasmine Lorenzini, who both are true mentors and role models to me. A very special thanks goes to Maureen Lechleitner. Thank you for having an open ear for any of our sorrows, for your help to navigate around the EUI and Italian bureaucracy, and for always cheering us up with a nice chat and a smile!

I want to thank my co-authors for their hard work and for bearing with me. I am greatly indebted to Theresa Gessler. You've taught me so much on every possible level well beyond this paper and academia. I am also grateful to Fred Paxton for endless discussions about the definition of populism and for playing "theoretical sudoku." Working with both of you did not only result in two papers that I am profoundly proud of, it was also – as academic collaboration should be – creative, motivating, and a lot of fun.

The one thing that makes the EUI truly unique is its community. For me, this institution is built on collaboration between scholars and it is dedicated to pass on this spirit of cooperation to generations of PhD students. I am greatly indebted to the whole academic community at the EUI for its support, inspiration, guidance, and helpful contributions through each stage of the process. A special thanks goes to all presenters and attendees of the Political Behaviour Colloquium – and to Reto Bürgisser and Vicente Valentim for organizing it with me.

This dissertation would never have come to life without the support and friendship of my friends at the EUI, and I want to acknowledge your share in this. Endless nights of chats, Spritz, and dancing have noticeably smoothed the writing process – while also making focusing on the thesis sometimes rather difficult. Thanks to Elisa, Wiebke, Giorgio, Endre,

to all the Kriesi Kids, Franci, Marco, the one and only Knarre, Adam, Julian, Jonas, Nena, and Emma. To Martin, for teaching me how to play Skat (so everyone would us find weird), for writing days (sometimes more, sometimes less efficient), for your unique sense of humor and all your wisdom. To Julia, for our time in Piero Cironi, for giving me the warmest welcome in Florence, for bringing Lipa to my life, for making road trips a fun and legit hobby. To Louisa, for often knowing me better than I know myself, for a friendship that is independent from time and place, for all the small and the big moments, good and bad. All of you have made my time at the EUI unforgettable.

I am not only indebted to colleagues and friends at the EUI and in academia, but to many people from the "real", outside world. First, a huge thanks for putting things into perspective in situations when the academic struggle and life becomes all narrow, self-contained, and self-referential. Thanks to all the people in Munich, Greater Munich, and Landshut for providing me a home away from home. To the L66, to the fantastic four, and all the others: I deeply value your friendship and I am so grateful that we've come a long way together. Thanks for late-night phone calls, listening to Data Science problems, for distraction when I needed it, and being like a second family to me.

And to Tobi – you make my life so easy.

The final thanks goes to my family - in particular to my father, my mother, my grandmother, and my sister Laura. Much of this thesis I owe to you - thank you for always giving me the confidence to take up and continue this endeavor. You have supported me endlessly – apart from the (many, many) moves – it is your humor, your wit, your ease, your sense for pragmatism and "hilft ja nix", and the feeling that I will always be understood and loved that keeps me going.

1 Introduction

In 2017, *populism* was declared Word of the Year by the Cambridge Dictionary. This decision manifests a steady trend across Europe in the last years: Media reporting and political commentary have dedicated a great amount of attention to populism and its rise, with articles titled "How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe" (Henley 2018, The Guardian) , "European Populism Is Here to Stay" (Goodwin 2017, The New York Times), and "Dancing with danger – Europe's populists are waltzing into the mainstream" (The Economist 2018) to name just a few. And while we witness an indisputable rise of parties which may be characterised as "populist", this label does not do justice to the whole ideological profile of these parties. Political science nearly unanimously agrees that populism is rather a discursive characteristic of parties, a so-called "thin ideology", which ought to be combined with a programmatic orientation, i.e. a "thick ideology" such as socialism or nativism. And indeed, many of the parties that contributed to this rise can be allocated to the very right fringe of European party systems (Mudde 2016, 5–7).

Cas Mudde, the political scientist, who coined one of the most influential academic definitions of populism, disagreed with populism's new status as Word of the Year: "If anything, 2017 was the year of nativism, or more correctly, yet another year of nativism, as we have had many of these years since the turn of the century" (2017b). This highlights a central problem in the public perception of populism: an overstatement of populism at the expense of the host ideologies. Mudde claims that blurring populism and nativism plays into populist radical right parties' cards as it enables them to whitewash their nativism – which comes with a bad reputation – with populism as a means of appearing down to earth and close to the people. This whitewashing is especially misleading as "populism comes secondary to nativism, and within contemporary European and US politics, populism functions at best as a fuzzy blanket to camouflage the nastier nativism" (Mudde 2017b).

The full scope of the problem runs even deeper. Populism is not only used to describe populist radical right actors and their behavior, such as the FPÖ in Austria, the Danish People's Party, and the AfD in Germany, but journalists and scholars alike have hunted a phenomenon called the "Populist Zeitgeist." This often proposed zeitgeist rests on the assumption that mainstream parties will – driven by the success of populist (read: populist radical right) parties – become more populist over time. There are endless journalistic examples describing this development: "Martin Schulz - der nette Populist (*the nice populist*)" (Gerwien 2017, Stern), "Emmanuel Macron: a populist eruption from the liberal centre" (Cowsey 2017, New Statesman), or "Danish populists' support collapses but their policies live on" (Milne 2019, Financial Times). But not only political commentary suffers

from this shortcoming: plenty of academic contributions have claimed to study a populist zeitgeist although programmatic contagion is at the core of their empirical and theoretical insights.

This short sketch of some conceptual issues around populism already provides a road map through this dissertation. Each of the chapters attempts to tackle one of these theoretical debates or empirical challenges and is tailored to contribute to our understanding of populism, to the way we conduct research on populism, and to our knowledge on the impact populism might have on political conflict. At the core of my dissertation is the question of populist radical right parties' influence on parties in Europe. While there is vast scholarship concerned with how populist radical right parties and their success alters party systems and party competition, I aim to contribute to the literature in several regards.

My first main argument concerns the distinction between the thin ideology of populism and its various host ideologies. Populism is most often combined with a radical right-wing ideology in the European context (Kessel 2015, 2; see also Mudde 2007), nevertheless – so I argue – conceptual clarity and academic rigour still require political scientists to determine the consequences of the thin and thick ideologies separately. Several scholars have emphasized the need to treat populism and its host ideology as separate features of parties, particularly as a "a necessary step in further deepening our understanding of the variety and complexity of populist politics" (Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 2; see also Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017b, 17–18; Rooduijn 2019, 365–67). However, as the first empirical chapter of this dissertation argues, academics still frequently blur populism and its host ideologies. Chapter 2 shows that while scholars claim to study populism, its causes, and consequences, many studies are often focused on characteristics and traits of the host ideologies.

These findings – and the related theoretical claims – build the groundwork for the remaining three chapters of this dissertation. While the conflation of populism and host ideologies is present across the whole field of populism research, my thesis focuses on the way populist parties affect other parties. As discussed above, both academics and journalists have claimed that there is a contagion effect of populism, which is often called *populist zeitgeist*. This debate is where I situate the other three empirical chapters of my dissertation: As a framework to study to mainstream parties' contagion with populism and radical right ideology separately. The third chapter's contribution is a novel measurement of populist discourse that allows to determine to which extent mainstream parties mimic populist parties' language. My main argument in developing this measurement is that previous (mainly automated) approaches to measuring populism have not taken theoretical

considerations seriously enough. This concerns particularly the moral framing of the references to 'the people' and 'the elites' as central elements of populist rhetoric. While various (thick) ideologies center around the people, populism manifest itself in the way the people are presented: as homogeneous and morally superior, hence opposed to a morally degenerated, evil elite. The fourth and fifth chapter are exemplary studies for the analysis of contagion effects both in terms of programmatic profiles and discourse. Chapter 4 focuses on "nativist" contagion of mainstream parties, i.e. it investigates whether and how mainstream parties in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland have adopted radical right parties' positions on immigration before, during, and after the refugee crisis. Lastly, in chapter 5, I use my measures of populist rhetoric developed in chapter 3 for an assessment of the possible existence of a populist zeitgeist in Europe, which is understood as the contagion of non-populist parties with populist discourse.

Content and structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 identifies the character and implications of populism's conceptual ambiguity in political science through a comprehensive two-step analysis of the field. First, we conduct a quantitative review of 884 articles from 2004 to 2018 using text-as-data methods. Following Almond's (1988) famous analogy, we show that populism scholars sit at "separate tables", divided by geographical foci, methods, and host ideologies of populism. We then conduct a qualitative analysis of 50 journal articles focusing on how populism and its host ideologies are used in this research. We find a common conflation of the 'thin' populist ideology with its host ideology which results in the analytical neglect of populism on both sides of the divided literature. We therefore urge researchers to properly distinguish populism from 'what it travels with' and engage more strongly with the dynamic inter-linkages between populism and its host ideologies.

In chapter 3, I develop a fine-grained, theoretically-grounded way to measure populist discourse. I argue that established theoretical assumptions, i.e. presenting the people as morally superior and the elite as evil, should be considered more thoroughly when carrying out research on populism. The moral framing of the two antagonistic groups is a valuable means to identify populist discourse and to prevent conflating populism with empirically related concepts, e.g. radical right-wing ideology. To test the role of this normative distinction in populist discourse, I propose a novel two-step dictionary approach that allows to detect references to both groups and identify whether they are framed in a moralizing way. I apply this approach to a text corpus of all speeches given in the European Parliament from 1999 to 2014 and carry out extensive validity checks. Taking the moralizing notion of populism more seriously does not only contribute to our

theoretical understanding of populist discourse and its impact on the political sphere: The new measure also enables us to assess which actors use populism in different context independently from pre-defined, and hence biased, categorizations of parties.

The following chapter 4 assesses programmatic contagion focusing on how the radical right affects mainstream parties' stances on immigration. We analyse how radical right parties drove mainstream parties' issue emphasis and positional strategy regarding immigration before, during, and after the refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland from 2013 to 2018. The study is based on data concerning parties' immigration salience and positions, which allows for studying changes in close time-intervals, thus providing crucial detail for disentangling the impact of the crisis itself and the contribution of right-wing parties. While we present evidence that attention to immigration increased drastically for all parties during the crisis, radical right parties remained issue owners and drove the attention of mainstream parties. However, the attention of mainstream parties to immigration decreased towards the end of the refugee crisis and we only find limited evidence of these parties accommodating the positions of the radical right, i.e. for nativist contagion in terms of positions.

While the previous chapter has focused on programmatic contagion, the last chapter aims at studying discursive contagion. As populism is nearly unanimously seen as a thin ideology, I argue that we should study populist contagion in terms of discursive adoption rather than on the level of programmatic contagion. Thus, chapter 5 assesses the existence of a populist zeitgeist and the role of populist parties in driving this zeitgeist. I situate the long-lasting assumption of the emergence of this zeitgeist in the theoretical literature on programmatic contagion and develop expectations based on this literature. Using the data resulting from the measurement developed in chapter 3, I show that we rarely find any evidence for an increase in the use of populist discourse in the European Parliament.

Definitions

While the elusiveness of the concept of populism has been pointed out repeatedly over the last decades and Margret Canovan even claimed "if the notion of populism did not exist, no social scientist would deliberately invent it; the term is far too ambiguous for that" (1981, 301), a consensus seems to be emerging in large segments of the scientific literature. Various scholars claim that an ideational understanding of populism is increasingly uncontested and hence unifying the field (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 2–3; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 527; Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62; Rooduijn 2019, 363; Aslanidis 2016, 89).

Ideational approaches draw on Laclau's (1978, 2005) seminal discusive understanding

of populism, as both strands highlight the centrality of ideas to their conception of populism (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017, 515). However, several scholars have pointed out, that Laclau's theory of populism "fails to provide objective comparative methodological instruments, remaining indifferent towards any quantitative valuations" (Aslanidis 2016, 97; see also Moffitt and Tormey 2014, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012)). Furthermore, the Laclauian take on populism has been criticised for equating populism with politics, hence making normative judgements and presenting "populism as the only democratic discourse capable of unifying and inspiring large majorities" (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017, 515). Within the ideational strand, Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as a thin ideology has made a particularly profound impact. He defines populism:

> *as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volontè gènèrale* (general will) *of the people.*

Even though scholars might deviate from Mudde's understanding of populism as a 'thin' ideology – perceiving populism as "framing device" (Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62), "discursive frame" (Aslanidis 2016, 98), "communication style" (Brubaker 2017b, 2017a), "communication phenomenon" (Vreese et al. 2018), or "worldview" (Hawkins 2009) – many share the ideational component, i.e. the centrality of ideas. While these definitions might not agree on the forms that populism can take – e.g. a style, strategy, or thin ideology – or the set of actors that use populism, the important unifying factor is that they agree on the attributes that populism comes with (Kessel 2015, 9). These differences often stem from different semantic traditions in the various (sub-)fields and are used interchangeably and the differences are often minor, as several scholars have argued (Kessel 2015, 9; Mudde 2017a, 31–33; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017, 514). Oftentimes, these labels refer to different levels of politics, Hawkins (2010, 10) argues, for instance that populism is "a worldview and is expressed as a discourse."

The debate on the definition of populism is central for this dissertation in three different regards: first, the ideational "camp" agrees on the moral notion of populism, the famous Manichean antagonism between the people and the elites. This normative divide is inherent to ideational definitions and should thus also be central to attempts of measuring populist discourse: it is at the core of the measurement developed in chapter 3 and further discussed in this chapter. Second, the minimal understanding of populism as thin ideology which can be combined with full, thick ideologies is crucial for chapters 4 and 5, which provide two exemplary studies on discursive and programmatic contagion. Furthermore, the ideational camp agrees on attributes that are independent from different host ideologies, in contrast

to definitions that borrow from host ideologies, such as nativism, for instance by adding a third opposed group (see e.g. Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3). And lastly, an ideational understanding of populism is most often – especially in quantitative research (see Aslanidis 2016, 92–93 for an in-depth discussion) – tied to perceiving populism as a matter of degree. This notion implies that we should rather use 'populist' as a gradaual adjective, instead of 'populist' as a noun in order to categorize actors in a static way (Cammack 2000, 155). While all my chapters assume degree-ism, I will sometimes use the noun "populists" or refer to "populist actors," thus violating a degree-ist understanding of populism. In these cases, I use the label to compare the parties under study distinguishing populists and non-populists following the academic consensus using the classification by Rooduijn et al. (2019).

Data and methods

All chapters in this dissertation draw on political text as empirical material and use text-as-data methods in one way or the other. Chapter 2 uses abstracts of political science articles to assess how scholarly research conflates populism and its host ideologies. The data are scraped from *Web of Science*, before we use a Wordfish model in order to show how the research field is divided by a focus on different host ideologies, geographical scope and methodological orientation. Chapter 3 develops a novel measurement for populist discourse that allows for detecting not only sole references to the people and the elites, but identifies the necessary moral framing of these references using a two-step dictionary approach. The measurements are applied to all speeches held in the European Parliament from 1999 – 2014 and the approach is carefully validated against a hand-coded gold standard. In chapter 4, press releases are used in order to acquire measures of parties immigration salience and their positions on the topics in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Starting with 120,000 press releases from all major parties published between 2013 and 2018, we classify those dealing with immigration issues using a novel dictionary. The proportion of these immigration-related press releases provides an exact, monthly measurement of how much attention each party dedicated to immigration. Following, we estimate parties' positions on immigration using a Wordscores model based on hand-coded data on parties' immigration positions during election campaigns. Subsequently, we use these measurements for descriptive and regression analyses to whether radical right parties drive mainstream parties' changes in salience and positions. The last part of the dissertation, chapter 5, uses the measurement of populist discourse developed in chapter 3 and the resulting data from the European Parliament in order to study populist contagion using descriptive evidence and explanatory, regressional methods, similar to those used in chapter 4.

Geographical scope and case selection

The geographical focus of the different chapters varies quite extensively. Chapter 2 is a meta study of the research field on populism and uses all papers indiscriminately of their geographical focus. In fact, differences in research output with focus on different world regions is of interest for the study and we thus used all Political Science papers published from 2004 to 2018 that were listed in *Web of Science*. The latter three papers, which are targeted towards more substantive research questions on the impact of populist radical right parties on party competition, focus on the European context. The two studies concerned with populist contagion – i.e. chapter 3 and 5 – draw on all speeches held in the European Parliament in the 5th to the 7th legislative period. This inclusive and large-scale study allows for comprehensive insights on the nature and expansion of populist discourse across the European political sphere. Lastly, in the study on radical right party contagion and the impact of the refugee crisis (chapter 4), we focus on three European countries – namely Austria, Germany, and Switzerland – for several reasons. First, – since we are interested in in the interaction between the short-term shock of the refugee crisis and the impact of radical right parties – we choose these three countries as we consider them exemplary for the broader trends in other European countries regarding both the refugee intake and the general trend of increasing importance of immigration for political conflict. And second, all countries share the same (majority) language, which ties in well with our approach to studying issue attention and policy positions through text analysis.

2 What's in a Buzzword? A Systematic Review of the State of Populism Research[1]

Introduction

Populism has been the subject of ever-increasing levels of media attention and political debate in recent years. Simultaneously, the number of scholarly articles regarding populism rises year on year. For political scientists, lamenting the lack of conceptual clarity and consensus on what the term populism denotes in the extensive literature has become something of a cliché. However, recently, a consensus seems to be emerging. Most scholars settle upon Mudde's (2004) seminal definition of populism "as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people." Even among scholars deviating from Mudde's definition, most agree on the idea that populism itself comes without any fixed programmatic orientation (Stavrakakis et al. 2017).

Due to the 'thin' nature of populism, it is able to shift its shape depending on "what it travels with" (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017b, 17) and "thanks to its chameleon-like nature, may adapt to different contexts" (Mazzoleni 2003, 5). In this chapter, we argue that this trait significantly impacts the study of populism as it might drive its conflation with the accompanying 'host' ideology. Several scholars (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017b, 17; Rooduijn 2019, 365–67; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 4) have pleaded for greater attention to the distinction between populism and its host ideologies. We take up this argument and, through analyses of peer-reviewed academic articles, we present evidence for several splits that run through the field of populism research. These rifts not only stem from different host ideologies, but are also rooted in researchers' different methodological approaches and geographical foci.

In order to study the state of the art in populism research, we carry out a systematic review using text-as-data and qualitative methods. Unlike review articles (see for instance Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (2017a); Gidron and Bonikowski (2013);), we do not present synthesis of previous studies' substantive findings. We rather aim to conduct a meta analysis of research approaches taken in populism research, hence studying scholarship's conceptual focus and the set-up of previous studies. Our unit of analysis consists of 2794 abstracts of English-language journal articles coming from all disciplines, published between 2004 and 2019. First, we aim to give a broad overview of the development of populism research

[1] based on a paper co-authored with Fred Paxton

in recent years regarding the quantity of research output and the disciplinary diversity. Second, we turn to study how united or divided political science scholarship on populism is in terms of methodological, theoretical, and substantive focus. Our analysis of 884 abstracts of political science articles on populism does not only provide a valuable overview of an ever-growing research strand, but also strengthens the aforementioned appeal to study populism as a global phenomenon instead of maintaining distinct local clusters. Third, we move to a more in-depth hand-coded analysis of 50 randomly selected articles in order to understand the extent to which populism is conflated with its host ideologies across the divided field. Systematic literature reviews have received little attention within the social sciences. Next to the substantive contribution of this article, we aim to show how systematic literature reviews - especially using text-as-data approaches - may be beneficial for social sciences. A noteworthy exception is a study by Schwemmer and Wieczorek (2019), which use automated text analysis in order to show how sociology is divided by the use of different methods and hence also by different choices in research topics.

Our research provides empirical support for several points of criticism that have been raised within the field: the ad-hoc conceptualization of populism based on single cases or host ideologies, the need for comparative research across regions and host ideologies, and the lack of fruitful exchanges and stimulation between researchers with different regional foci. Additionally, our study shows how systematic reviews can help political scientists to identify flaws and trends in exceptionally productive fields of study. Furthermore, the particularly insightful quality of text-as-data approaches for systematic reviews are demonstrated, in their ability to detect patterns, differences, and commonalities in large sets of texts, e.g. abstracts of peer-reviewed papers.

It seems that populism is everywhere these days. Since Trump was elected to the White House and the British people voted to leave the European Union, attention to the concept has sky-rocketed. This trend manifests itself in several ways. Most striking is perhaps the increased public attention: the Cambridge Dictionary declared populism the Word of the Year 2017, as media outlets intensified their reporting drastically. Rooduijn (2019, 362) points out that occurrences of the words "populism" and "populist" in the New York Times have nearly quadrupled from 2015 to 2017 resulting in 2,537 mentions. Simultaneously, this trend is mirrored in academia: research on populism is in fashion and increasingly employed across various disciplines.

This chapter attempts to study the heightened research output on populism in several regards. While this rise in populism research has resulted in important innovations and scientific insights, we lack a systematic overview of the state of this vast field. Hence, we first aim to show how populism research increased by relying on a novel data set and

comparing different disciplines. Second, we analyze *how* the field developed, given the innovations and the progress of the last 15 years. We argue that there are still many rifts running through the study of populism and that academics often sit on "separate tables" - following the famous analogy of Almond (1988). Almond used this metaphor to refer to divides between different ideological and methodological "camps". Such divisions come with several negative externalities for the progress and innovation in academic research. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018, 20) point out: "many of those who are starting to undertake comparative research on populism overlook an important wealth of knowledge that they could, and should, build on." While their argumentation calls for "standing on the shoulders of giants" – that is, referring to previous research – we aim to show that there are also parallel trends in populism research, that mostly develop and grow separately from each other. In the following section, we discuss three possible roots for divides that have been brought forward by several scholars writing about the field (see Urbinati 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Cleen, Glynos, and Mondon 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017b). We claim that 1) the geographical variance in the empirical manifestations of populism, and 2) hence necessarily the host ideologies of these examples of populism, as well as 3) the methodological discrepancies, have all led to a divided research field. We argue that this divide drives an overstatement of populism at the expense of the host ideologies in the interpretation of research findings.

The elusiveness of the concept of populism has been pointed out repeatedly (Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981), described by Taggart (2000) as "an essential impalpability, an awkward conceptual slipperiness". However, various scholars claim that recent scholarship increasingly agrees upon an ideational understanding of populism and hence attribute a unifying impact of these approaches (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 2–3; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 527; Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62; Rooduijn 2019, 363; Aslanidis 2016, 89). Mudde's (2004) seminal ideological definition of populism has made a particularly profound impact on the field. Even though scholars might deviate from Mudde's understanding of populism as a 'thin' ideology – perceiving populism as "framing device" (Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62), "discursive frame" (Aslanidis 2016, 98), "communication style" (Brubaker 2017b, 2017a), "communication phenomenon" (Vreese et al. 2018), or "worldview" (Hawkins 2009) – most share the ideational component, thereby distinguishing themselves from definitions of populism as a "strategic approach" (see e.g. Weyland 2017, 2001; Betz 2002) or a "socio-cultural approach" (Ostiguy 2017).

Apart from a broad debate on the definition of populism, academics' methodological choices represent another possible divide in the research field. For researchers who conceive of populism as combined with host ideologies and of a more discursive quality, attempts to

measure populism have become a major strand in the literature, either using hand-coding approaches (Reungoat 2010; Jagers and Walgrave 2007), holistic grading (Hawkins 2009), discourse theories (De Cleen et al. 2019; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2019), or automated methods (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). Closely related to the attempts to measure populism is the debate about the 'degree-ism' of the concept (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; see also Aslanidis 2016). This notion implies that we should rather use 'populist' as a gradated adjective, instead of 'populist' as a noun in order to categorize actors in a static way (Cammack 2000, 155). Manucci and Weber (2017, 322) illustrate this understanding using the alcohol-content of beverages, stating that: "(...) the manifesto of a highly populist party (...) with 20–30% of populist statements, would be a Martini cocktail, while the manifesto of a moderately populist party – 5% populist statements (...) – would be a pilsner beer." Contrary to a degree-ist understanding, populist parties have been treated like a party family, hence employing a more static understanding of populism. Populism has been used defining moment of the sample of parties under study distinguishing between populist and non-populist parties (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; for a discussion see also Aslanidis 2016, 92–92). The degree-ism vis-à-vis a static understanding of populism as categorization tool is expected to be reflected in different methodological approaches, for instance, qualitative studies versus quantitative analyses.

While populism has become a global phenomenon in recent decades, its empirical manifestations in different geographical regions are ideologically diverse, with profound consequences for scholarship. Since the 1990s, populism research on Latin America and Europe has grown at an especially fast pace. In Latin America, a succession of new populist leaders of various ideological subtypes emerged in the early 1990s and around the turn of the millennium (De la Torre 2017). Archetypal examples include the neoliberal Alberto Fujimori in Peru during the 1990s, and socialist Hugo Chavez in the following decade in Venezuela. Tensions between the inclusionary promises of populists in the region and the harm done to liberal democratic institutions once in power have been core to debates in the literature (Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012).

Europe faced a wave of electoral success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in the early 1990s, which has sparked academic interest on the determinants of this breakthrough (McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Norris 2005; Taggart 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008). Examples of this early wave of successful PRRPs are the Front National, the FPÖ, and the SVP (McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Surel 2019). In the subsequent one and a half decades, scholarship on populism in Europe has broadened its focus to now also include studies on populists in government, their impact on party systems as a whole, as

well as more research on left-wing populist parties.

Even though left-wing populism becomes more and more relevant in Europe, especially in Southern countries like Greece, Spain, and Italy, we argue that the geographical divide in the study of populism is mostly rooted in the different host ideologies that are prevalent on the two continents. Several authors have warned about the risk of conflating populism with its host ideologies. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018, 4) point out that "we need to study populism not in isolation but rather in combination with different ideologies." Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) argue that distinguishing between populism and nationalism is neccessary in order to grasp the complexity and variance of different populist actors. Rooduijn (2019, 365–67) emphasizes that we must not draw generalization from findings on – for instance – right-wing populist voters to the "broader category of 'populists in general.' " Additionally, he stresses that populism is often used as central explanatory concept for outcomes that are much more related to the host ideology, for instance contagion effects on mainstream parties' immigration positions. Studying populism in a broader comparative set-up between populism in different regions and of different 'colors' would allow researchers to draw more reliable conclusions. Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (2017b, 17–18) also argue for thinking "thoroughly about differences and similarities between populism and other phenomena that regularly occur together with it but are not necessarily part of it" and call for more cross-regional focused research.

Drawing on these urges voiced by leading scholars in the field, we claim that these imprecisions in the study of populism and its host ideologies are deeply rooted in three intertwined rifts: first, the geographical variance in the empirical manifestations of populism, second, the conflation of populism with its host ideologies as well as third, the methodological discrepancies. Geography and ideology are two rifts that are intertwined due to a regional clustering of populism sharing the same host ideologies. Ontology and thus different methodological "camps" are linked to geography and host ideology as leading scholars shaped the sub-fields and thus paved the way for very different methodological traditions. For instance, the late Ernest Laclau (1978, 2005) whose work builds on a Gramscian and psychoanalytical tradition and which rejects quantitative approaches has been very influential for Latin American research on populism. In our analyses, we aim to show that these divides are mirrored in general trends in the research field using test-as-data and hand-coding methods.

Systematic reviews in political science

Many disciplines inside and outside of Social Sciences rely heavily on systematic reviews. While Political Science scholars have made use of broader literature reviews or meta-analyses that compare findings of several studies, systematic reviews in order to gain insight into research trends and to identify avenues for further research have hardly ever been employed in the discipline (Dacombe 2018, 148). Systematic reviews differ from classical literature reviews by "the fact that they conform to the methodological standards used in primary research, namely transparency, rigor, comprehensiveness, and reproducibility" (Daigneault, Jacob, and Ouimet 2014, 268). They typically use existing studies as the unit of analysis (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). This specific methodology "locates existing studies, selects and evaluates contributions, analyses and synthesizes data, and reports the evidence in such a way that allows reasonably clear conclusions to be reached about what is and is not known" (Denyer and Tranfield 2009, 672). As laid out by Cooper (1982), this requires a rigorous methodology represented by his five step research process which consists of (1) problem formulation; (2) data collection; (3) evaluation of data points; (4) data analysis and interpretation; and (5) presentation of results. The first step includes specifying a research question and making a decision on which evidence ought to be included, while the second step consists of determining the exact process of the data collection. Data evaluation refers to deciding which parts of the data will be included as evidence in the fourth step, which involves the research design, the analysis of the data, and the presentation of the findings. Finally, the findings have to be discussed and put into a broader context.

Dacombe (2018, 154–55) convincingly argues that systematic reviews can be particularly helpful to political science in three regards: for scoping, problem formation, and as meta-analysis of existing findings. The first two uses of systematic reviews help researchers to locate flaws and gaps in the literature. They are also suitable to detect where conflicting findings and research evidence point towards a more complex picture than previously assumed. Meta-analyses serve as a way to deal with statistical imprecisions and to identify common findings of previous studies. While Dacombe (2018) mostly discusses examples of systematic reviews which study outcomes and different sets of explanatory variables, our chapter aims to target an even earlier stage of the research cycle by focusing on existing studies' research design and research objects rather than their findings. Especially in such a fast-growing research field as populism studies, where it has become nearly impossible for an individual academic to keep up with the vast amount of published studies, a transparent and systematic synthesis of the conceptualization and set-up of studies in the field can provide us with valuable insights on the strengths and weaknesses of existing scholarship.

While we have outlined our research questions in the theory section, we next discuss our decisions on which studies to include and present our data collection process.

Data collection and methods

Collecting data for a systematic review is - like in any other type of research - no trivial matter. Petticrew and Roberts (2006, 81–85) discuss two different characteristics of the search strategy that are mutually exclusive: sensitivity and specificity. While a high sensitivity achieves finding *all* relevant studies, a high specificity comes with a greater accuracy, i.e. only relevant studies will be identified and the number of false positives is kept low.

As we are interested in both the general increase of studies on populism as well as political science research more specifically, we start with a broader approach to data collection before narrowing it down to the discipline of interest. Our data consists of abstracts of peer-reviewed journal articles that were downloaded from *Web of Science* using a web scraper developed by Serôdio (2018). We chose to analyse abstracts instead of full papers for several reasons. First, data availability, as most paper in our study are gated behind pay walls whereas abstracts are freely available. Second, abstracts serve the very purpose of presenting the key aims, methods, and findings of a journal article. Previous work from other disciplines has shown how valuable the usage of abstracts is for meta studies and literature reviews (see e.g. Hofstra et al. 2020; Orasan 2001; Syed and Spruit 2017). Compared to similar platforms, *Web of Science* ("Web of Science" 2012) comes with several advantages regarding accessibility, selectivity, and coverage. Google Scholar, for instance, includes far more non peer-reviewed and other 'grey' literature. *Web of Science* covers more than 18,000 journals and allows for flexible search queries. We limited our search in several ways, so as to only include: 1) English-language publications[2], 2) articles as document type, 3) which were published in journals that are included in at least one of the following indexes: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), and Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI). Moreover, we limited the time period to 2004 to 2018, as Mudde's ideational definition was first published in 2004. The time frame also includes the years in which populism research was growing at the highest pace (see figure 6.1 in the appendix

[2]While we are aware that selecting only English-language publications might introduce some bias, we still opted to exclude publications in other languages. First, for reasons of practicability: unsupervised and supervised text-as-data approaches hardly work when the empirical material is in several languages. Second, we argue that English has the status of a lingua franca and developments in national, non-English communities are mirrored in English-language publications. The predominance of English becomes also apparent in the WoS search. If we include the years 1972 to 2018, we find 3026 articles on populism in English and only 405 in other languages.

and Mudde (2016, 1–4)). *Web of Science* offers a basic topic search that covers title, abstract, and keywords of the article. For our topic search, we specified the global pattern "populis*" which picks up, for example, "populist", "populists" and "populism", as the asterisk works as a wild card that may take the form of any string of characters.[3] After removing duplicates based on the title, our full data set consists of 2794 journal articles coming from various disciplines. The data include the title, journal, abstract, keywords, date of publication, author(s) and their affiliation, grant number and funding text of grants, doi, and the *Web of Science* category (i.e. discipline) for each article. In order to validate our sample, we cross-checked our findings with search queries on the websites of two journals, *Party Politics* and *West European Politics*. We chose these two journals, as they are among the journals that publish most articles on populism (see also table 6.1, appendix) and because they are published by two different publishing houses: Sage and Taylor & Francis. Table 2.1 compares the number of papers that are identified using the search function on the different websites and differentiates between the number of hits in each part of the paper. As outlined above, we include articles which include the string "populis*" in either the title, the keywords, or the abstract. The first thing to notice is that the general searches on the journals' websites result in a significantly higher number of articles than our search query. This is, however, due to the fact, that both websites allow for a full-text search, which is not possible through *Web of Science*. Comparing the numbers of hits in title, keywords, and abstracts separately, our *Web of Science* search comes fairly close to the search results on the respective websites. Small differences might also stem from online first articles, which are not included in *Web of Science* yet. Given the consistency between the articles identified by the website search queries and by *Web of Science*, we argue that our approach manages to strike a good balance between sensitivity and accuracy.

We employ a multi-step research design (see table 2.2) to analyse this data. Each step is tailored to show different aspects of our theoretical expectations. First, we study the expansion of populism research and differences herein between disciplines in their engagement with populism using the counts of populism papers. Second, we show which geographical foci researchers choose using the newsmap dictionary. Third, our Wordfish model – created using Benoit et al. (2018) – shows how the research field is divided by different geographical foci, methods, and a conflation of host ideology and populism. This conflation is then assessed in more detail using hand-coding for a random sample of 50

[3] Additional to searching for the title, abstract, and keywords of articles, the *Web of Science* search includes "KeyWords Plus" which is a product developed by Thomson Reuters, which we decided to exclude based on a cursory reading of articles that were only included based on the KeyWords Plus-metric. This results in removing 98 articles.

Table 2.1: Comparison between number of hits in searches on *Web of Science* and journals' websites

	Journal	Web of Science
	Party Politics	
Title	13	12
Keyword	20	20
Abstract	25	24
Anywhere	146	NA
	West European Politics	
Title	15	14
Keyword	7	9
Abstract	NA	21
Anywhere	251	NA

articles.

Table 2.2: Overview: Methods employed for different trends and possible divides

	substantive interest	**research design**
trends	increase in research output	visualization of counts
	differences between disciplines	counts using *Web of Science categories*
conflation	geography	Newsmap dictionary & hand-coding
	host ideology	Wordfish & hand-coding
	definition	Wordfish & hand-coding
	methods	Wordfish & hand-coding

Empirical results

The surge of populism research across disciplines and geographical regions

First, we turn to the broader developments in the study of populism. We are interested in the output of populism research comparing various disciplines. In order to do so, we use the *Web of Science* categories. Each research item, which is part of the *Web of Science*-core collection, is assigned to at least one of the 250 disciplinary categories. We use this very detailed classification in order to show trends in the general and discipline-specific attention towards populism. Table 2.3 shows the total number of articles that were published in the various *Web of Science*-categories from 2004 to 2018. We only report disciplines with at least 20 publications on populism. Please note that one article can be part of several categories and hence we report 4344 different instances of disciplines, while we only have 2794 articles in our data. Political Science is by far the front runner with 884 articles

published on populism, followed by Sociology, Communication Studies, Area Studies, and History.

Table 2.3: Total number of published journal articles by disciplines

Discipline	Articles	Discipline	Articles
Political Science	884	Religion	52
Sociology	239	Psychology	49
Communication	226	Public	47
Area Studies	225	Literature	45
History	200	Educational	45
Economics	173	Education	43
International Relations	171	Linguistics	43
Social Sciences	166	Language & Linguistics	42
Interdisciplinary	152	Public Administration	39
Multidisciplinary	146	Social Issues	39
Humanities	123	Environmental Studies	31
Law	98	Industrial Relations & Labor	27
Cultural Studies	79	Film	26
Ethnic Studies	77	Radio	26
Philosophy	76	Television	26
Criminology & Penology	73	Asian Studies	24
Planning & Development	73	Business	24
Anthropology	68	Art	20
Geography	58	other	389

Next, we turn to figure 2.1 which shows how the number of publications developed over time in several selected disciplines. Here, we focus on Political Science, as our main discipline under study, and several closely related disciplines, i.e. International Relations, Sociology, Communication Studies, History, Area Studies, and Economics, which account for most publications. All other disciplines in our data are subsumed under the category "Other." Figure 2.1 and the subsequent graph report absolute numbers and not percentages. Both Political Science and the "Other" category show a steady growth in research output related to populism from 2004 onward. The trend for Political Science seems to really take off in 2012. For Sociology, Communication Studies, International Relations, Area Studies, and Economics the numbers are comparatively low and stable over the years, until a sharp increase occurs in 2016, which seems to confirm the interpretation of Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (2017b, 11), who see the 2016 US presidential election as a turning point that greatly motivated US scholars to dedicate attention to the concept of populism.

In the next parts of the analysis, we limit our data to Political Science articles, which



Figure 2.1: Yearly number of published journal articles on populism across disciplines

amount to a total of 884. First, we aim to study how the focus on different world regions is distributed across the research field. In order to do so, we use the `newsmap` dictionary developed by Watanabe (2018). This dictionary was initially developed to replace hand-coding in order to obtain labelled data for training a geographical news classifier. It is structured into three different levels: the country-level (e.g. France, China, Zimbabwe), regions within continents (e.g. North America, South-East Asia), and continents. At the lowest level, each country-specific dictionary comes with several keywords, e.g. uk, united kingdom, britain, british, briton*, brit*, london for Great Britain. The country-dictionaries are clustered into regions and then continents by adding up the hits for each country. An advantage of the `newsmap` dictionary is flexibility. We added the keywords such as "*europe*" and "latin america*" to the dictionaries. The multi-level design of the dictionary allows us to categorize the abstracts by the regions mentioned. As we include abstracts falling into several categories, graph 2.2 includes 1079 geographical references while our sample includes only 884 papers.

The information on regions is missing for 237 abstracts in our data, which is shown by the category "no information" in graph 2.2. More interesting is, however, how Europe sticks out. The region receives by far the most attention by researchers, at least six times more than North America, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. Of the 482 papers with a focus on Europe, only 85 make a specific reference to Eastern European countries.

The unidimensional divide: different regions, methods, and host ideologies

In this section, we aim to show how methods, regions, and host ideologies divide the field of populism research in two different camps. We do so by using a Wordfish model. This text analysis model was developed in order to scale large numbers of text based on a latent dimension in an unsupervised manner (Slapin and Proksch 2008; see also Grimmer and Stewart 2013) and is often used to estimate the position of political speeches on a left-right ideological space. In scaling the texts, the Wordfish approach assumes that some words are more used by one side of the spectrum (e.g. left-wing politicians) than by the other. While its initial application was ideology, we use the Wordscore algorithm in order to show how much abstracts differ from each other and which words are indicative for a position on the extremes of the spectrum. As the model is unsupervised, it picks up the *least* latent dimension present in the texts. The researcher employing the model has no control over what this dimension is but can interpret this dimension after applying the model by reading the words that 'load' most heavily on this dimension.

Figure 2.3 shows the Wordfish model applied to the abstracts of the 884 Political Science papers published from 2004 to 2018. The three panels in the figure contain the distribution



Figure 2.2: Yearly number of published journal articles on populism by regional focus

of the "features", i.e. the words in the abstracts, where the x-axis shows the relevance of the single words for the underlying dimension and the y-axis shows their frequency across the texts. The graph is shaped in a way that is typical for such models, with more common words being less indicative for the position of a text on the dimension. In our case, "populism", "populist", and "populism's" are assigned to very low beta-coefficients which means that they are not indicative for the position of a text on the dimension[4].

While panels a, b, and c show the exact same underlying model, we decided to highlight different features in each panel. These words were identified through a close reading of the features at the extremes of the one dimension (see Table 6.2) and are related to the different rifts which separate the field of populism research. In panel a, the highlighted words on both ends on the spectrum – the latent dimension that the Wordfish models measures – are related to geography. While the words on the right-hand side are related to European countries and European parties, the words on the left refer to countries and politicians in the Global South. In panel b, we focused on words that are indicative of a methodological divide between the "different tables" of the research field. While the left-hand side of the dimension is related to qualitative, constructivist research, the words on the right-hand side point in the direction of quantitative, research designs, with words such as 'determinants', 'controlling', and 'estimate'. Finally, panel c shows words that are related to the host ideology that is studied in the respective abstract. While we find words like 'revolutionary', 'Marxists', 'socialism', or 'classes' on the left, the highlighted features on the right suggest a radical right host ideology, for example 'immigrants' and 'anti-immigrants'.

These findings indicate that the field of populism research is indeed relatively clearly split into two different tables, and this divide stems from different factors: differences in host ideologies, geographical focus, and methodological approaches.[5] While the graph above only shows us the features, i.e. the words, we argue that the clustered location of features related to methods, geography, and host ideology points the existence of two camps in the field of populism research. Next, our hand-coded analysis of a sample of these papers aims to show that this divide may be traced back to an overstatement of populism at the expense of host ideologies. As we have argued in the theory section, the regional clustering of populist sharing the same host ideologies and regionally-grown traditions of populism theory and research drive this conflation of host ideology and populism.

[4]Table 6.2 in the appendix shows the 40 most negative and positive features that are associated with the two poles of the dimension.

[5]Additionally, we carried out a two-dimensional scaling (see figure 6.2, appendix). The resulting graph as well as the features that load most on the ends of the two dimensions also serve as evidence that the split is in fact uni-dimensional.

Figure 2.3: Wordfish features plotted by weight and frequency

The latent conflation of populism and host ideologies

The preceding Wordfish model reveals what researchers *claim* to study; that is, how they frame their papers in their abstracts. The last step of our analysis focuses on the relationship between populism and host ideology within the papers themselves. We aim to study whether the theoretical mechanisms employed are in fact based on populism or if they are rather rooted in its host ideology due to a conflation between the two. In order to do so, we hand-code a random sample of 50 full articles out of our population of 884 populism abstracts.[6] We select the articles at random using R, in order to avoid the introduction of bias as other selection criteria would. For example, to instead select by journal impact factor would likely favour quantitative and/or European focused studies. Comprehensiveness across both sides of the divided field - in terms of host ideologies, geographical focus, and methodological approaches - is of course crucial to our analysis. As our findings show (see table 4), there seems to be no relationship between the journal impact factor and an article's effective conceptualisation of populism[7]. Our coding scheme includes several characteristics: ideology under study, geographical focus, and methodological approach. We present the hand-coded papers following several criteria, which are also depicted in table 2.4. First, we assess whether a paper provides a clear definition of the concept of populism. Second, we check whether populism is relevant for the argument of the paper, rather than, for instance, merely being used as a label. Third, we ask whether populism is used in a way that does not conflate its features with the features of its host ideology, either left- or right-wing. Fourth, does the paper consider both populism and host ideologies separately and fifth, most sophisticated of all, does it consider the concepts in interaction with each other. In our opinion, those papers that do not fulfil any of the criteria would have been just as successful without employing the populist concept.

Our analysis reveals, firstly, the prevalence of the use of populism purely as a label. In such papers, the focus is upon so-called 'populist parties' (of various forms), while in fact the very concept of populism is irrelevant to the argument or causal claim made by the authors. For instance, Afonso (2015) and Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007) study cases from the universe of the populist radical right party family, to which they repeatedly refer (specifically, in the form of 'populist right-wing' and 'anti-immigrant populist' parties). Despite the use of the populism label, the mechanisms in both papers are unrelated to the presumed populist nature of the parties. Similarly, in studies of the

[6] The analysis refers to 32 papers, as 18 of the sample were excluded for two reasons. Out of these articles, 15 were purely theoretical and therefore could not be coded according to our coding scheme. The other three papers were commentaries and are hence not of interest for our study of populism research.

[7] The density plot in table 6.3 shows the distribution of impact factors in the population of political science papers and our random sample.

Table 2.4: Categorization of hand-coded papers

paper	Populism defined	Populism relevant for argument	Populism not conflated with host ideology	Consideration of populism and and host ideology	Populism and host ideology in interaction	Impact factor
Afonso 2015						1.755
Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007						1.203
Bornschier 2015						0.741
Buzalka 2018						0.817
Börzel and Risse 2018						2.994
Hosu and Stoica 2017						NA
Jasiewicz 2008						0.722
Kahler 2018						NA
Laméris, Jong-A-Pin, and Garretsen 2018						3.576
Malová and Dolný 2016						1.481
Ost 2015						0.817
Scrinzi 2017						2.545
Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2011						2.545
Toomey 2018						NA
Traber 2015						0.741
Rydgren 2011		✓				0.739
De La Torre 2016	✓	✓				NA
Krieckhaus 2006	✓	✓				1.543
Lowndes 2016		✓				NA
Ostaijen and Scholten 2014	✓	✓				2.286
Pei 2017	✓	✓				NA
Stavrakakis et al. 2016	✓	✓				NA
Levitsky and Loxton 2013	✓	✓	✓			2.500
Posner 2016	✓	✓	✓	✓		NA
Bale, Taggart, and Webb 2006		✓	✓	✓		1.339
Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern 2011	✓	✓	✓	✓		2.532
Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013		✓	✓	✓		2.155
Castelli Gattinara 2017	✓	✓	✓	✓		2.155
Havlík and Voda 2018	✓	✓	✓	✓		0.741
O'Mahony 2009	✓	✓	✓	✓		0.852
Rooduijn 2018	✓	✓	✓	✓		1.755
Saffon and González-Bertomeu 2017	✓	✓	✓	✓		NA
Wellings 2010		✓	✓	✓		0.679
Ivaldi, Lanzone, and Woods 2017	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	0.741
Caiani and Della Porta 2011	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	0.739

'right-wing populist' SVP by Traber (2015), the 'populist radical right' Lega Nord by Scrinzi (2017), the 'right-wing populist' LAOS by Teperoglou and Tsatsanis (2011), the 'radical populists' SRP by Jasiewicz (2008), and the Polish 'illiberal populist nationalism' by Ost (2015) the concept plays no analytical role. This is not to deny these parties' populism; however, populism is irrelevant to these studies. Consequently, the populist label is attached to research that speaks rather of other related, but often confounded, concepts. Research on the European radical right often subsumes actions related to their nativism under the populism label: which is then unhelpfully used as the primary, or even sole, label with these parties are categorized. For example, Börzel and Risse (2018) assign culpability to 'populist parties' for the stalemate in the Schengen crisis, due their mobilization on nationalist and anti-migrant attitudes, the resulting dominance of exclusionary positions in the politicization of EU affairs, which prevented an agreed common European interest to tackle the crisis. Kahler (2018) discusses the dangers of "emerging populist groups" such as 'supporters of Trump, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), or [...] the National Front" for global governance due to their anti-globalisation stances. The opposition to globalisation is not part of the populist 'thin' ideology, but rather rooted in radical-right and radical-left ideologies. Bornschier (2015) refers to the (extreme) populist right who represent the polar opposite of the New Left on the cultural dimension. Clearly, 'nationalist', 'anti-migrant', or simply 'radical right', parties would be a more appropriate label in such cases.

The conflation of populism with other ideological concepts in research is, indeed, a common feature of research into the European populist radical right. This issue often derives from a fundamental lack of clarity in the definition of populism in many of these studies. For example, the research of Toomey (2018) into Orban's election victories posits the importance of a 'populist-urbanist cleavage' that helped to legitimate Orban's reactionary image of Hungarian nationalism. Populism is largely undefined but in its position of opposition to urban citizens *seems* to refer to a quality of rural citizens[8]. Populism is left undefined by Buzalka (2018) but is argued to be characterised by a strategy of peasant mobilisation based upon nostalgia for the communist period. The terms extreme right-wing, radical right and radical right-wing populist are used interchangeably by Rydgren (2011) which leaves us unable to assess the contribution of each separate ideological component to his argumentation.

A resulting feature of European populism research, sadly too common, is the conflation of populism with nativism. Laméris, Jong-A-Pin, and Garretsen (2018) develop a typology

[8]This is not to overlook that populism may draw on urban-rural divides. Indeed, the identification of 'the people' with rural citizens can be seen in the original American populism of the 1890s (Canovan 1999, 12). We merely argue here that an urban-rural division is not inherently populist but may become so if it is framed in a populist manner, which therefore requires a clear definition to justify the populist label.

of voter ideology dimensions along economic and cultural lines: the latter opposing preferences for personal and cultural freedom to 'nationalist, protectionist and populist preferences.' The latter grouping suggests that populism is inherently linked to nationalism and protectionism, rather than a concept that can also be comfortably linked with left-wing ideas. A similar issue arises in the North American context. Pei (2017) attributes the promotion of white supremacism to the 'populist campaign proposals' of Trump, as "with relation to foreigners and to minorities distinct from 'the people,' populism emphasizes hostility and exclusion." In their analysis of policy populism, Ostaijen and Scholten (2014, 685) speak of 'typically "populist" topics like immigration, integration, justice and crime' and focus upon policies that exclude migrants; and Malová and Dolný (2016, 9) refer to a "populist and paternalist political style, [that portrays] refugees and migrants as a security risk". While Hosu and Stoica (2017) does well to consider populism as a possible presence on both sides of the political spectrum, the analysis focuses upon right-wing populist parties, which are defined by their nationalist appeals and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Our position is that nativism – and not populism – is in fact the relevant concept to explain the hostile and exclusionary emphasis on foreigners and minorities.

The conflation of populism and host ideology is also evident on the other side of the divided field. Latin American populism research is distinctive in its focus upon the character and consequences of its exercise of power. The majority of papers on Latin American populism analyse (leftist) populists in government and study the consequences for the national economies and democratic quality (e.g. Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern 2011; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Yet many papers are not clear in the conceptual divide between the thin populism and the leftist host ideology. Stavrakakis et al. (2016) ascribes the success of Chavez's 'populist politics' to democratization, wealth redistribution, social welfare programs, participation in governance, and symbolic recognition. In so doing, actions which may well be considered populist – democratization, participatory reform – are lumped in with clearly left-wing policies – for example, wealth redistribution and social welfare programs. Studies from De la Torre (2016) and Levitsky and Loxton (2013) aim to delineate the democratic consequences of populism, yet the separate contribution of left-wing ideological components are not considered, nor are the crucial differences from non-populist leftists clearly argued. Some even focus upon the consequences of left-wing ideology rather than populism. For example, Krieckhaus (2006) refers to economic populism, defined as the promise of higher wages and increased government spending, that is, specifically left-wing policies. A similar approach is shown in the (this time North American) research of Lowndes (2016) that concerns Trump's 'White Populism', defined as the combination of nativism with progressive economic positions. The conclusions of

research that conflates populism and left-wing ideology are thus prevented from being applied to cases of populism on the other side of the 'divide', for example, increasingly common examples of European right-wing populism in government.

Ideally, research into populism would provide a clear definition that justifies its inclusion, beyond its value as a buzzword, and consider it separately to other host ideologies. A praiseworthy example is provided by the study of Posner (2016) into the worsening of labour conditions in Venezuela under the Chavez government. Egalitarian economic goals were demoted by the regime in favour of the need to maintain power. Populism is here defined in a strategic sense following Weyland (2001), and clearly distinguished from the leftist rhetoric of the regime. Similarly, Saffon and González-Bertomeu (2017) argue against the dominant conflation of socioeconomic policy with populism in Latin American focused research and consider the democratic consequences of populist governments in isolation from their varied economic orientations. In their analysis of hydrocarbon nationalization by Latin American leaders, Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern (2011) consider the separate contribution of leftist ideology and populism, following Roberts (2006) organisational conceptualisation. Other positive examples include: the study of centrist populism in Eastern Europe from Havlík and Voda (2018), which test models based upon the theoretical underpinnings of both populist attitudes and centre-right ideology; the discursive analysis of three types of far-right actors from Castelli Gattinara (2017) which shows the populist features that differentiate the populist radical right from extreme-right and ultra-religious groups; and the study from O'Mahony (2009) which demonstrates the use of populist rhetoric during the Irish referendum debate from actors across the political spectrum. Focusing instead upon the demand-side, Rooduijn (2018) assesses the importance of populist attitudes towards voting for populist parties of various host ideologies. Although the studies of Wellings (2010), Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013) and Bale, Taggart, and Webb (2006) lack a clear definition of populism, their argumentations are admirable. Each considers the distinct contribution made by features of populism that fit with the ideational conceptualisation without conflation with other ideological features.

The most sophisticated dostudies not only consider populism and other host ideologies separately, but their interaction with each other. The study of Ivaldi, Lanzone, and Woods (2017) is commendable in this regard, due to its consideration of parties from across the left-right spectrum, and the interaction between the core features of populism with their varied 'host' ideologies. Caiani and della Porta (2011) reveal the various forms of populism that emerge in different extreme right-wing parties and movements in Italy and Germany. The different discursive opportunity structures provided by different organisational and national contexts affect how relevant populism is for the actors and thus the way populism

is embodied. We are convinced that such deep engagement with the interdependence between populism and its host ideologies is exemplary and we emphasize its applicability to other research foci, across geographical regions, that would benefit from this (still relatively rare) use of the populism concept.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we aimed to conduct a comprehensive meta-study of the field of populism research. We show that scholars of populism are "sitting at separate tables" due to three divides. These are rooted in a) the different host ideologies under analysis, b) different geographical foci, and c) methodological differences. These rifts may come with negative consequences for the field. In particular, they are likely to hinder cross-fertilization between different strands and hence pose an obstacle to generalizable scientific findings regarding populism, distinct from host ideologies. We posit that while many studies use populism as a central theme, the actual focus of this research is the host ideology.

In our empirical analyses, we show this in two main steps. First, we rely on the abstract of all 884 Political Science articles published in peer-reviewed journals from 2004 to 2018 and analyse them using text-as-data approaches. Our Wordfish model shows that all three proposed divides actually exist. Furthermore, they cut through the research field in the same vein, that is: all divides align on one dimension. One pole is typified by a focus on the Global South, a left-wing host ideology and the use of qualitative methods, while a focus on Western countries, a radical-right host ideology and quantitative methods are located on the other side of the spectrum.

In a second step, we complement the quantitative analyses with a more in-depth assessment of the field. We carry out a detailed hand-coding of a random sample of 50 articles. This step goes beyond quantifying the use of populism in the 884 articles and aims to assess the *true* role that populism, host ideologies, geography, and methods play in these articles. Our results show that populism is often used as a label to describe the party family without being used in the studies' argumentation. Moreover, we present further evidence on how the field is split by the aforementioned three factors. We show examples of papers from both sides of the divide that base their theoretical expectations on host ideologies, while claiming that the phenomenon under study is populism. We conclude by presenting papers that are exemplary in studying populism across ideologies and emphasize the interplay between host ideologies and populism.

Our chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we offer a comprehensive yet simple overview of how populism research, a field that experienced an enormous growth,

has emerged and developed since 2004. While classical literature reviews might not be suited to keep track of such rapidly growing fields, our systematic review offers a broad overview of these developments. Second, we provide evidence for a divided field and for how a focus on host ideologies comes at the expense of clear findings on populism. We argue that the fact that researchers often limit their focus on populists from one host ideology and region drives this conflation. The two sides of the field - both of which have a tendency for this lack of conceptual distinction - develop conceptions of populism that are different from one another due to their different host ideological, geographical, and methodological focuses. Thus, to crudely stereotype, in European studies nativism and populism are combined and portrayed fearfully, and in Latin American studies socialism and populism are combined and portrayed more hopefully. Thus, the lessons about populism that are learnt from one side of the field cannot be easily applied to the other side. This limitation to clusters of populists has led to different traditions of populism research with very little cross-fertilizaton. Third, the use of both text-as-data methods and qualitative hand-coding shows the usefulness of mixed methods in order to conduct systematic literature reviews of research strands in political science. While classic literature reviews are set to focus on few key publications, systematic reviews are equipped to show where the field as a whole is headed and hence might be able to point towards inaccuracies that are easily overlooked in classical reviews.

3 Virtuous People and Evil Elites? Moralizing Frames and Normative Distinctions in Identifying Populist Discourse

Introduction

Populism has become a buzzword which is applied to very different politicians, which is said to be contagious for mainstream parties, and which supposedly affects citizens in their political behavior. Especially in times of the often proposed *'populist zeitgeist'*, it is necessary to handle the term with caution and academic accuracy. Particularly if we are interested in how populist discourse affects other actors, such as parties and voters, we need a theoretically informed way to be able to measure populism on a large scale. Academics increasingly agree on an ideational understanding of populism, which stresses the morally charged understanding of "the people" and "the elites" as central and antagonistic elements of populism. In this chapter, I argue that this normative distinction between the two groups is central to populism and needs to be taken more seriously when measuring the concept and in the study of its consequences, e.g. on other parties, voters, or the media. Many influential studies (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011) have laid important groundwork for the endeavor of measuring populist discourse across large quantities of text. Drawing on these studies, this chapter develops a new measurement for populist discourse emphasizing the moral notion of populism.

Theoretical accounts of populism stress the centrality of the morally-charged Manichean distinction between the people and the elites. That is, populists refer to the people by portraying them as homogenous, superior, and good, while the elites are presented as corrupt, evil, and degenerated. While theoretically well established, this moral distinction has not travelled to quantitative measurements of populism. This poses several problems, as not only populism, but also thick ideologies are based on a differentiation between the people and an out-group, e.g. in the case of nationalism the people understood as "natives" vs. immigrants as "non-natives." This example is particularly crucial, as populist radical right parties experienced a leap of support in recent years in Europe (Kessel 2015, 2; see also Mudde 2007).

In order to ground my measurement of populist discourse more thoroughly in the theory, I propose a two-step dictionary approach. The first part of this approach employs two *baseline dictionaries,* one for "the people" and one for "the elite", which consist of morally neutral words for both groups, such as "elite", "politicians", "citizens", or "taxpayers." These baseline dictionaries are used to detect neutral mentions of each of the groups and

for extracting the section or snippets of the speeches in which these mentions occur. In the second step, these snippets are then analysed using *frame dictionaries,* one for each group. The frame dictionaries contain words and phrases which can be used to present the groups as morally superior, i.e. the people, or as morally corrupted, i.e. the elite.

This approach comes with several advantages. First, by using a different measurement for anti-elitism and people-centrism, it allows for assessing how these different features of populism are used by different actors. Second, by taking the moral distinction between the people and the elites into account, it provides a way of measuring populism that is less prone to be conflated with references to the people in nationalist, socialist, or other ways. Third, after having established and validated my measure, I compare my discourse-based measures to categorizations of populist parties based on experts in order to assess if "populist is what populists do." Fourth, the combination of *base* and *frame* dictionaries provides a straight-forward approach to quantitative frame analysis more generally, which might be of interest for a broader range of scholarship beyond populism research, for instance for assessing how specific groups of people, e.g. female politicians, experts, etc., are presented in different sets of texts.

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I discuss the most common definitions of populism emphasizing the moral distinction between the people and the elite as a common ground. Second, I present my novel two-step dictionary approach. In the third section, I introduce my data, which consists of speeches given in the European Parliament (EP) in 1999 to 2014. Fourth, – after applying my dictionaries, I carry out a series of validity checks. Fifth, I show how actors in the EP differ in their use of populist discourse and how this connects to external categorizations of populist parties. Lastly, I conclude and discuss further avenues for research.

Populism as a discourse

Already more than a decade ago, Panizza (2005, 1) noted: "It has become almost a cliché to start writing on populism by lamenting the lack of clarity about the concept and casting doubts about its usefulness for political analysis." And while this assessment certainly proves to be true and scholars tend to complain about the manifold ways to define populism, these complaints are not unsubstantiated. In fact, populism has been described in various way: as a structural (Di Tella 1965, 1997; Germani 1978; Cardoso and Faletto 1979), economic (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991), and political institutional concept (Weyland 2001; Roberts 2003), as an ideology, movement, symptom (Wiles 1969), or political logic (Laclau 2005). In the 15 years since Panizza wrote these lines, the

conceptual debate around populism has not waned, it is still alive and kicking. However, several scholars (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 2–3; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 527; Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62; Rooduijn 2019, 363; Aslanidis 2016, 89) have noted a trends towards agreeing on an ideational definition, famously phrased by Mudde (2004, 543) describing populism as:

> *as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volontè gènèrale* (general will) *of the people.*

This "thin ideology" can be combined with different host ideologies. Like host or "thick" ideologies, populism is "a kind of mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 498 – 499). However, "unlike [a thick] ideology, populism is a latent set of ideas or a world view that lacks significant exposition and (. . .) and is usually low on policy specifics" (Hawkins 2009, 6). While thick ideologies result in programmatic orientations of parties, the thin ideology becomes visible through the use of a specific discourse (Hawkins 2010, 10).

Even though scholars do not agree on the label of a "thin ideology", and rather define populism as "framing device" (Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62), "discursive frame" (Aslanidis 2016, 98), "communication style" (Brubaker 2017b, 2017a), "communication phenomenon" (Vreese et al. 2018), or "worldview" (Hawkins 2009), the common denominator of these definitions is the understanding of populism as discursive feature rather than a fixed policy orientation. This so-called ideational approach has become predominant in the field of populism research (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 2–3; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 527; Bonikowski et al. 2019, 62; Rooduijn 2019, 363; Aslanidis 2016, 89).

Closely connected to the discursive understanding of populism is the debate around the "degree-ism" of populism. Aslanidis (2016, 96) proposes to consider populism as a gradual rather than a dichotomous concept since this is "more or less, how the concept has been operationalised in the growing quantitative literature." This allows for having varying degrees of populist discourse across different political actors and contexts. And in fact, most quantitative measurements of populism have treated the concept as a matter of degree (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Bernhard, Kriesi, and Weber 2015; Reungoat 2010). Along similar lines, various authors have argued for the continuous nature of populist appeals. For instance, Cammack (2000, 155) makes a case for rather using the adjective 'populist' instead of the noun as a "qualifier of some substantive political project." Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009, 822) also suggest that to shift

"our understanding of populism (. . .) to a description of party appeals rather than parties themselves also allow us to neutralize the term's negative connotations by allowing *all* parties may use populist attempts to some extent." Additionally, treating populism solely as graded discourse instead of a binary ideology allows for a more nuanced study of the phenomenon and decreases normative biases and the compulsion for academics to take sides in an essentialist struggle (Aslanidis 2016).

Using populism as an adjective to describe an actor's discourse rather than a categorization of this very actor is central to this study. It allows for developing a measurement that is independent from "external" categorizations of actors into a binary measure of populist and non-populist. On the other hand, it makes it crucial to develop a measurement which is strongly based on theoretical assumptions instead of relying on a "we know it when we see it"-logic. The next section introduces the theoretical foundation of my measurement approach, i.e. the moral framing of the people and the elites as antagonistic groups.

The moral distinction between the people and the elites – a tool for identifying populist discourse?

As the previous section has briefly discussed, both the opposition to the "evil" elites and the praise for the "good" people are well-established core features of populist discourse. While centrality of "the people" is core to various ideologies, e.g. socialism or nationalism, the *moral* distinction between the people and the elites is essential to populism. This moral elevation of the people, however, requires a references category, an "other", an anti-pole. This reference category is embodied by the "morally degenerated" elites and hence completes this dyadic relationship. Various authors have emphasized this normative distinction between both groups as central to the concept itself by stressing a definition of populism as "a Manichean and moralistic discourse that divides society into el pueblo and oligarchy [. . .]" (De la Torre 2000, 4). In a similar vein, Müller (2017, 19–20) defines populism as "a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified (. . .) people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior." In the following section, I show that references to both groups and their moralized framing are inextricable markers of populism, that are both necessary but not sufficient (see also table 3.1).

The centrality of moral framing for populist discourse

Actors, who employ populist discourse, need to discriminate between the people and the elites and they do so by presenting one side as pure, good, and virtuous and the other

Table 3.1: Morality and antagonistic groups as markers of populist discourse

		antagonistic groups: elite vs. people	
		yes	no
moralized language	yes	populist	not sufficient
	no	not sufficient	not populist

side as evil, corrupt, and rotten. Thus, Wiles (1969, 167) connects the ideational, thin nature of populism and its moral notion stating that populism "is moralistic rather than programmatic." This normative distinction comes with several advantages for actors which employ populist discourse. Panizza (2005, 22) argues that populists substitute a moral discourse for a political discourse in order to be able "to talk politics while denouncing it as a dirty game." That is, by employing a moralistic discourse that differentiates them from other political actors, they can be part of politics while condemning the whole political sphere and its actors. By using universal abstractions, they "contrast the high moral grounding of [their] message with the corruption and betrayal of the political establishment." In this moralistic logic, the elites, e.g. other political actors, are presented as enemies who are not "sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place" (Mouffe 2000, 20). This makes compromise or even dialogue with the opponent unacceptable for populist parties (De la Torre 2000). Panizza (2005, 22 - 23) also points out that moral divides are used by populists in order to disqualify adversaries thereby making legitimate dissent impossible. Mudde dedicates a significant share of his chapter on the ideational approach to populism to morality, which he calls "the essence of the populist division" (2017a, 29). *Purity* and *authenticity* are for him at the core of the distinction between the two groups: the people are equipped with these values, while the elite lacks them and is hence to be condemned.

Despite this multitude of scholars emphasizing the role of morality in our understanding of populism, there is no consensus. Stavrakakis and Jäger (2017, 12) even identify morality as "the shaky basis" of "the 'new' mainstream in contemporary populism study" and criticize this trend as both under-defined and too broad to be a distinct feature of populist rhetoric. Moreover, they (13-14) criticize that the morally charged distinction between 'evil' and 'good' has been employed by various politicians of manifold orientations and ideologies, especially as it is "more or less unavoidable in any political conjuncture, and especially pronounced in crucial turning points." They stress that moral discourse is implemented by both populists and anti-populists, especially when the latter call for employ a "neoliberal strategy of exorcising the populist challenge" (ibid, 13-14). In order to prove this point they provide several quotes by politicians, e.g. by Thatcher, where she states: "I am in

politics because of the conflict between good and evil, I believe that in the end good will triumph." While this quote certainly includes moral elements, it falls short of qualifying as populist as the antagonistic divide Thatcher refers to is not specified and independent from references to people or elites. Moralized language is certainly employed by manifold actors (see e.g. Jung 2019; Jasper 1992) and purity and idealization may be used for various political arguments (e.g. during the recent political crisis in Europe, see Narotzky (2016)), but Stavrakakis and Jäger (2017) neglect the necessary combination of moralized framing with the references to the people and the elites. In this regard, their critique of morality is under-specified and does not apply to a shared theoretical understanding of populism, but rather to attempts of measuring populism quantitatively.

The antagonism between the people and the elites

While morality and moralized discourse alone are not sufficient markers for populist discourse, the same applies for sole references to the people and the elites. It is not just bare references to 'the people' and 'the elites' that characterizes populism but presenting and framing them in a morally charged way. First, 'appeals to the people' as marker are not explicit enough about how 'the people' are perceived by populists. Referring to the people is a trait that is shared by politicians from nearly all political camps and colors. Authors have described various understandings of 'the people' that may be at play in political discourse: nationalistic, economic, cultural, or political (Meny and Surel 2002). Referring to 'the people' is seen as "empty signifier" (Laclau 2005) that can be interpreted in different ways. This "appeal to the people" is often based on arguments that populists "are attempting to bring a subject called 'the people' into being: they produce what they claim to represent" (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 389). Authors have described various understandings of 'the people' that may be at play in political discourse: nationalistic, economic, cultural, or political (Mény and Surel 2002). Differences may also be found between left- and right-wing populists, the first uses this empty signifier as 'people as a nation,' while the latter rather emphasizes the class (Kriesi 2014, 362). While the people are presented as an ethnic or civic entity, when employing an anti-immigrant discourse, I argue that the core of the rejection of the elites lies in the construction of the people as morally superior, honest and virtuous, and thus as monolithic as they all share the same positive qualities. If those differences are not considered, previous studies might rather be measuring concepts other than populism, e.g. nationalism. However, as many radical right parties also employ populist discourse, these studies might still be able to identify the correct parties as populist.

Many authors (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Hawkins 2009; Reungoat 2010; Rooduijn

and Pauwels 2011) have used "appeals to the people" as identifier for people-centrism, which is often operationalized by measuring word frequencies of term such as *the people, we, us,* or e.g. *the Greeks.* When measuring appeals to the people, Jagers and Walgrave (2007, 339) stress that references to the population (group) as an inseparable unity mostly preceded by a definite article (e.g., the voter, the people, the consumer) "can be regarded as the most solid indicator of populism." Reungoat (2010) operationalizes people-centrism as the frequent use of "terms that referred to the population (population as a whole or population categories)" but does not specify any moral evaluation or construction as superior and therefore might overestimate people-centrism. Aslanidis (2017, 9) points out that with this approach "people-centrism tends to get over-coded, since all references to 'the People' are coded indiscriminately into this category."

The necessary combination of references to the antagonistic groups and a moralized framing of these requires a careful operationalization. In the next section, I shall present my approach which takes both markers into account.

Data and methods

Measuring populism using dictionaries

Some of the aforementioned studies use dictionaries to identify and measure populist discourse. This approach draws on word frequencies that are used in a respective text. Dictionaries are designed to capture categories of a theoretical concept "by allocating words to these categories using a combination of a priori and empirical criteria" (Laver and Garry 2000, 626). Based on this dictionary, a computer program then counts the occurrences of these words in different texts. By assessing the frequency in which the keywords are used, it measures to which extent a certain concept is prevalent in a document (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 8). Hence, this approach requires a deep understanding of the concept at hand, as it is only valid with a precise choice of keywords and it might otherwise result in numerous false positives (Ruedin and Morales 2017). Furthermore, qualitative, in-depth assessment and validation is crucial.

Most authors using dictionaries carry out some qualitative validation of their dictionaries before applying them in order to assess the number of false positives. Deleting and adding keywords based on this, however, may result in rather *ad hoc* dictionaries of either extreme brevity or excessive length (Aslanidis 2017). Hence, the terms that are included often seem too broad, e.g. *class, politic*; propaganda; referend*; regime, people* (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), as there is no strong theoretical reason why – for instance using the word politics – qualifies for a populist statement. Other keywords seem very arbitrary and

tailored to a very specific context, such as *loophole* and *long nose* (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016), or *donors* (Oliver and Rahn 2016). Many of these words are not theoretically connected to the concept of populism and hence capture other phenomena.

My empirical analysis is based on strong theoretical assumptions, i.e. the centrality of moral framing for populist discourse. I argue that this theoretical foundation allows us to choose keywords for the two reference groups and their respective framing that permits to identify populist discourse. This approach draws on a communication-centered rather than an actor-centered understanding of populism (Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck 2016, 354). While the first focuses on the theoretical characteristics of populist communication, the latter one uses the characteristics of populist political actors as starting point. The actor-centered approach assumes that we already know who populist actors are and draws conclusions about populist communication based on these actors' political communication. Focusing on a pre-defined set of populist actors and the way they talk, comes at risk, I argue, of conflating populist discourse with the programmatic profile of the populists' host ideologies. Furthermore, an actor-based approach is at odds with an understanding of populism as a matter of degree, as discussed in section 3. If we use a set of actors as heuristic to measure populist discourse, we discount the possibility that populist discourse can vary across setting, contexts, issues and actors.

Identifying the moral distinction in populist discourse through a two-step dictionary

In order to use the normative distinction between the elite and the people as a tool for identifying populist discourse, I suggest using a novel two-step dictionary approach, that allows for detecting whether one of the groups is referred to in a morally charged way. Unlike most previous studies, I use separate dictionaries in order to capture the reference to the two groups. This allows for measuring people-centrism and anti-elitism, i.e. two core features of populism, separately and thus for assessing differences in the number of references across actors. My two-step dictionary approach is set-up as follows: First, I design two *baseline dictionaries* for references towards the people and the elites. This allows me to identify the references to the two groups as distinct features and to show how they are used by different parties as well as when they occur together. Studying micro-level populist attitudes Schulz et al. (2017, 2) make a similar argument stating "that a uni-dimensional model fails to adequately describe populist attitudes, as it does not account for the different political ideas that have been identified as distinct yet correlated facets of a populist ideology." As argued above, mentioning the elites and the people is not fine-grained enough to measure populist discourse. As referring to the people can be

done in neutral, nationalist, and many other ways, I suggest that the construction of the people as morally superior captures populism in a more exact manner. Similarly, not all references to the elite are necessarily populist, i.e. negative, as politicians could refer to the elite in a positive manner as well. In order to capture this moral framing, I develop two additional *frame dictionaries* which aim to capture whether the people are presented in a morally superior and the elites in a morally degenerated manner.

In the first step, the *baseline dictionaries* are tailored to identify references to the people or the elites (see table 3.2). I created them drawing on previous automated approaches and codebooks for hand-coding (Reungoat 2010; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Hameleers and Vliegenthart 2019; Bonikowski and Gidron 2018). Next, I assessed the quality of the two dictionaries by looking at a sample of appearances of every word in the people- and the elite-dictionary and judged whether they capture the right concepts. I excluded words as false positives if they were mostly used to refer to specific, narrow groups of people or other concepts that are not related to 'the people' or 'the elites'. For instance, some studies claim that *caste* is often used in populist discourse in order to refer to the elites (Rooduijn 2015). However, most of the occurrences of the word caste were in fact referring to the Indian caste system. Hence, the keyword "caste" was removed from the dictionary. Some keywords were included using globing, i.e. wildcard characters (depicted by an asterisk *) thus allowing for any string following the specified keywords. This means that the keyword elit* will pick up *elite, elitism, elitist, elite-focused* and so on. For other words, e.g. *resident* I included are theoretically relevant grammatical forms, as the keyword with an asterisk otherwise would pick up words such as "residential" over proportionally. The final set of words for the base-dictionaries is depicted in table 3.2. Some of the keywords are quite broad and neutral, e.g. *citizen*, while others – especially for the elite – carry a value judgement, for instance *cronies*. I consider these morally charged keywords as sufficient markers for a moral framing. These words are highlighted in bold in table 3.2. Using the baseline dictionaries, I find a total of 13967 references to the elite and 183980 references to the people. The overrepresentation of references to the people serves as indication that referring to the people is done by most politicians in a multitude of ways, that are not populist. Table 6.3 in the appendix shows the frequency of the individual keywords for people and elites in the corpus.

As I have argued above, references to the people and the elites ought to be presented in a moralized way in order to be considered as populist rhetoric. In order to perform the next step of my analysis, i.e. determining if the two groups are framed in a morally-charged way, I select 'snippets' around the occurrences of the people- and the elite-dictionary. This means, that I create a new text corpus, that does not consist of the full speeches anymore,

but only of the parts of the speeches in which we find a reference to the people or the elites. Considering the length of the speeches and the sentence within them, I decided to select a window of eight words before and after each keyword. The extraction of these snippets was conducted using the `KeyWord in Context (kwic)` function in the `quanteda package` for `R` (Benoit et al. 2018). A selected example of these snippets (see table 6.4 in the appendix) already shows that while some of these snippets clearly contain populist rhetoric, e.g. the need to defend the interests of hard-working taxpayers or references to the ordinary people. Other snippets contain references to the people but completely lack any trait of populist communication, for instance the phrase "these figures really speak for themselves. Citizens gain many advantages through the single market." Next, the frame dictionaries are applied to these snippets detecting instances of moralized framing around the occurrences of references to the people and the elites.

Table 3.2: Keywords for references to the people and the elite

People		Elite	
citizen	population's	**apparatchik***	**europhil***
citizen's	resident	aristocrat*	**financial sharks**
citizens	resident's	**bad apples***	financier*
citizens'	residents	banks	mafia
europeans	residents'	bosses	mafia's
europeans'	taxpayer	bosses'	**old elites**
families	taxpayer's	**Brussels mafia**	oligarch*
family	taxpayers	bureaucrat	**political class***
man on the street*	taxpayers'	circles*	politician*
ordinary person*	the public	**cronies**	**power monger**
ordinary person*	the public's	elit*	**ruling circles**
people		establishment	**ruling class**
people's		establishment's	**sycophancy**
population		**eurocra***	

In order to do so, I develop two *frame dictionaries* that consist of words that are associated with moralizing frames; positive for the people and negative for the elites (see table 3.3). The frame dictionary for the elite consists of 146 keywords, while the one for the people consists of 45 word stems. The positive and negative framing can be further distinguished in sub-categories, loosely following the hand-coding schemes of Manucci and Weber (2017) and Ernst et al. (2019). These two schemes provide a very detailed operationalization in fine-grained key messages. Hence, anti-elitism can be expressed in several ways, either discrediting the elites, blaming them, or detaching them from the people. All three of these carry a negative value judgement. Similarly, people-centrism is expressed by stressing the people's virtues, praising their achievements, stating that they are monolithic, or

demonstrating closeness to them.

Following these key messages, I develop my dictionaries, both for group references and the moral frames, based on theoretical considerations, previous works which measure populism (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Bonikowski and Gidron 2018), and the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Haidt and Graham 2007; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Graham et al.'s (2009) extensive dictionary measures sets of moral intuitions. These different moral foundations are well established in the field of moral psychology and based on the Moral Foundations theory (Haidt and Graham 2007; Haidt and Joseph 2005). For the *frame dictionaries*, I only selected those words that can be used to present groups of people in a negative and a positive way and hence capture the moralizing notion of populism. In order to do so, I checked the occurrences of my keywords in their context and accordingly adjust my dictionaries deleting some of the keywords, which did not perform well. However, I am very careful with adding new keywords, as this could lead to keywords that are not grounded in the theory and only used over-proportionally by populist actors due to other ideological or political traits, such as nationalism. Thus, I aim to prevent my dictionary from being *ad hoc* as Aslanidis (2017) points out.

The words in the negative frame dictionary can be broadly distinguished in three groups: First, adjectives that attribute negative characteristics to the elite, such as *crooked*, immoral*, power-hungry, self-serving, unelected,* or *wealthy.* Second, verbs that describe the way in which elites harm or betray the people: *disrespect* damag**, or *ignore**, *refuse**. Third, nouns that are connected to a negative depiction of the elite, such as *favoritism, fraud, or lobby**. The words for the positive framing of the people consist of words that are mostly related to the moral superiority of the people: *decent, hard working, honour** (e.g. *honourable*), *principled,* or *virtuous.* Some word in the positive dictionary are also tailored towards capturing how these people are left behind by the elite: e.g. *betray*, expense of.*

Based on the coding scheme by Ernst et al. (2019, 3), popular sovereignty is divided into two key messages, demanding popular sovereignty and denying elite sovereignty. While I do not provide a dictionary specifically tailored for popular sovereignty, my manual assessment showed that these demands are often tied to a value statement and hence picked up by my approach[9]. This might include statement in which the people role is threatened by elites and claims that politicians ought to act in the pure interest of people. Theses statement are very well along the lines of Mény and Surel (2000, 181), which phrase the restoration of popular sovereignty as the re-establishment of the people's place in society.

[9]Previous hand-coded analysis (see e.g. Ernst et al. (2017, 1359) show that "The dimension of restoring sovereignty is almost absent."

In the following, I apply my two-step dictionary approach to a text corpus consisting of all speeches given at the European Parliament (EP) from 1999 to 2014 and extensively validate this approach. This vast number of speeches was delivered by members of populist and non-populist parties of all facets.

Table 3.3: Keywords for positive and negative framing of the people and the elite

negative frame					positive frame	
abuse*	deprav*	hungry for power	political class	sins	betray*	noble
alienate	desecrat*	ignore*	power grabbing	spurn	blameless	ordinary man
annihilate	deserted	immoral*	power hungry	stain*	brave	ordinary men
apostasy	deserter*	impair	power monger	stomp	bravely	ordinary person
apostate	deserting	imperialist*	power-grabbing	sycophany	cleanliness	ordinary
apparatchik*	destroy	impiety	power-hungry	taint*	decency	praiseworthy
arrogan*	detriment*	impious	privilege	tarnish*	decent	principled
bad	discrimnat*	imposter	privileges	traitor*	defen*	reasonable
bad apples	disgust*	indecen*	profan*	transgress*	digni*	refined
betray*	dishones	inequitable	profligate	trashy	ethic*	the good
bias*	disloyal*	inhuman*	ravage	treacher*	expense of	upright
bigot*	disobe*	instable	refuse	treason*	fair	upstanding
blemish	disproportion	insubordinat*	refuse*	unacceptable*	forget	valor
Brussels mafia	disrespect*	insurgent	renegade	uncaring	forgetting	valour*
contagio*	dissociate	intemperate	repuls*	unchaste	hard earned	virtuous
corrupt*	dysfunctional*	jilt*	ruin*	unclean*	hard working	
coward*	endanger*	lawless*	ruling circles	undemocratic*	hard-earned	
cronies	enem*	lobby*	ruling circles	unelected	hard-working	
crooked*	eurocrat*	miscreant	sediti*	unequal*	hardworking	
cynical*	europhil*	mutinous	self-interested	unfaithful	honest*	
damag*	evil	nonconformist	self-satisfied	unhealthy	honor*	
debase*	favoritism	not in touch	self-serving	unresponsive	honour*	
debauche*	filth*	obscen*	sequester	unscrupulos	ignor*	
deceiv*	fraud	obstruct	sick	useless	interest	
defector	greed	offend*	sin	venal	loyal	
defian*	gross	old elites	sinful*	wantona	loyalt*	
defile*	harmful*	oppose	sinned	wealthy	man on the street*	
defy*	heretic*	out of touch	sinner*	wicked*	modesty	
denounce	hot air	pervert	sinning	wretched*	moral	
				wrongdo*	morally	

Data

Previous studies measuring populism have used diverse empirical material such as party broadcasts (Jagers and Walgrave 2007), parliamentary debates (Cranmer 2011) talk shows (Armony and Armony 2005), party manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Reungoat 2010), parties' membership magazines (Pauwels 2011), public speeches (Hawkins 2009), newspapers (Hameleers and Vliegenthart 2019) or internet forums (Caiani and della Porta 2011). In my quantitative analysis, I draw on a text corpus provided by Cross and Greene (2016) which consists of all the plenary speeches held in the European Parliament (EP) in its 5th to 7th term, i.e. from July 1999 to April 2014 by a total of 1735 Members of European Parliament (MEPs). On the one hand, these speeches are – unlike party internal documents and speeches – not only directed to party members and can be used to get media attention and are – unlike party manifestos – not too broad and strategic, but issue-specific. However, they are on the other hand, less vote- or office-seeking then speeches in campaigns or at party conventions – which might be where we expect populism to be mostly present. Rather EP speeches are oftn used as a tool of communication between MEPs, the party groups and national parties (Slapin and Proksch 2010). Hence, I argue that parliamentary speeches provide a rather conservative test for populist discourse especially compared to campaign materials. However, other than policy-seeking materials, such as manifestos, EP are spoken word and thus the means of communication, where populism as a *discourse style* or *thin ideology* should occur. While the EP differs in its outreach from national parliaments, the EP often serves as a springboard to national success for (populist) challenger parties (Schulte-Cloos 2018). Thus, these challengers might use the EP more for public outreach than mainstream parties in order to communicate with (potential) voters as they lack other platforms (Grabbe and Groot 2014, 38–39). Populist parties and their behaviour in the EP differ from mainstream parties' behaviour in several regards: They have been largely marginalized until recently and were deprived on many positions of procedural powers (Grabbe and Groot 2014).

The speeches were automatically downloaded from the EP's official website by Cross and Greene (2016). The corpus is limited to the speeches translated into English[10], which is 77.95 percent of the total numbers of speeches. This, however, results in an under-representation of certain countries. The number of translated speeches ranges from 87 percent for Germany to 66.2 percent for Romania. This might introduce bias as some

[10]The EP does however not provide detailed information on the translation process, i.e. which and how many translators are involved in the translation of a single speech. This could introduce a bias as the translation might be structurally different from each other. In terms of bias regarding losing specific meanings I would deem the potential translation relatively low as the European Parliament employs over professional 600 translators (see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/multilingualism).

countries are under-represented in the corpus and we might hence under- or overestimate the extent of populist language. However, we can assume that the decision to translate speeches is independent from whether they are populist or not. Nevertheless, the corpus includes a vast number of speeches from a diverse set of politicians, which is an advantage compared to other studies that often translate the dictionaries and apply them to speeches in different languages (e.g. Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). This procedure alters the measurement and might hence introduce bias. Furthermore, the corpus was translated by professional translators and interpreters and is hence less biased than automatically translated documents as human translation is more sensitive to context and nuances. In order to exclude interposed questions which are often technical or procedural, I introduce a minimum length of 26 words. The maximum speech length is 2528 words, with a mean of 210 words. Additionally, I remove speeches on foreign policy, as they often contain references to people and elites of non-European countries debated, which amounts to 43309 speeches[11]. My sample consists of 178905 speeches.

The original corpus contains only information on the MEPs' affiliation to political groups in the EP. I hand-coded their national party affiliation, which allows for a more fine-grained analysis. There are 323 parties in my data sets. For my analysis of the use of populist speech by different actors I draw on several other resources, specifically PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019), which provides an overview of parties that are considered populist in Europe and is conducted by a large expert team. This external categorization of actors into populist and non-populist allows to compare my more communication-based, degree-ist measurement of populism with an actor-based, binary classification. Of a total of 1704 MEPs, about 18 percent (i.e. 310) of MEPs belong to a party that is considered populist. They delivered 19 percent of all speeches, which serves as indication that "populist" MEP do not speak less in the EP than their "non-populist" colleagues.

Validation of the two-step dictionary

In order to show the additional empirical value of my populism measurement, I employ an extensive validation strategy. First, I present several examples that show how the combination of two dictionaries allows for detecting instances of populist rhetoric. This allows to establish face validity showing how the moralized framing matters. Second, I test my approach and other dictionaries against a hand-coded gold standard in order to test the construct validity of my measures, i.e. whether they are empirically associated with a manually coded measure of populism (Adcock and Collier 2001).

[11] The removal of speeches on foreign policy was done using the `newsmap` dictionary created by Watanabe (2018). Specifically, I removed all speeches with references to non-European countries with exception of the US.

Reading through the instances of populist discourse detected by my frame dictionaries shows the advantages of my approach. Consider, for instance, the keyword "politicians": it can be used in a completely morally neutral, non-populist way, as done by Nicole Thomas-Mauro, an MEP for the Rassemblement pour la France, in 1999:

> Is climate change the major challenge of the next century or a good New Year's resolution without any significant value? It is difficult for us **politicians** to sell to our electors political decisions which are planned over ten or twenty years. Yet have we not agreed to take responsibility? The debate on climate change is not a trivial affair. (Document ID of speech: 1999/12/15/TEXT_CRE_19991215_3-025)

Introducing the *frame dictionaries* as a more fine-grained measure allows to detect morally charged references to politicians. The following example of a speech by Czech MEP Jana Bobošíková (Independent Democrats) shows this very clearly:

> I am delighted that defeatist talk of a crisis has given way to such courageous notions as opportunity, modernization and change, and that Tony Blair is prepared to tackle the glaring discrepancies that exist between the **arrogance of EU politicians**, the real lives of our citizens and overall developments in the world economy. (Document ID of speech: 2005/06/23/TEXT_CRE_20050623_4-047)

Similarly, the people are often mentioned without any reference to their moral superiority, in fact the global pattern "people*" matches 72396 hits in the whole corpus. Among these hits are instances that are certainly not populist, as the following part of the Dutch MEP Bartho Pronk (Christian Democratic Appeal) on the "Safety and health of workers at risk from explosive atmospheres" shows:

> The directive will not enter into effect until 2003. This illustrates that it sometimes all takes longer sometimes than expected. If we consider the numbers of **people** still being killed due to unsafe working conditions, then more urgency is needed. So what was the key point in the negotiations with the Council? This is when codecision proves so important. (Document ID of speech: 1999/12/01/TEXT_CRE_19991201_3-163)

Applying the *frame dictionary* to the snippets enables us to detect morally superior framing of the people as this speech of British MEP Nicole Sinclaire (We Demand a Referendum Party) shows:

> Through the fault of unelected, incompetent Eurocrats and blinded Mem-

> ber State leaders, the financial crisis is being used as a tool for further EU integration. What a heavy price we are paying for the Eurocrats' fantasy of a United States of Europe. Have they learned nothing from their folly? President Barroso and his apparatchiks care little for **the ordinary person** This latest round has been done on the back of the Greek collapse and the 43 percent increase in the suicide rate there. (Document ID of Speech: 2012/10/23/TEXT_CRE_20121023_2-094-000)

The last example picks up "ordinary people", i.e. one of the keywords that were considered sufficent for populist discourse even without the application of the frame dictionary. Furthermore, this speech represents an example that also includes markers of anti-elitism, i.e. "Eurocrats" and "apparatchiks." The next two speeches show how the frame dictionaries are capable of detecting moral frames even in greater distance to the reference to the people. In the first speech, held by Greek politician Toussas from the the Greek Communist Party, the people-centrism is also combined with strong enti-elitism and the bemoaning of the loss of popular sovereignity. It also serves as a good example of how the communist host ideology ("audacious imperialist plans,"capitalist restructurings") of the party is combined with populist elements:

> The pressure on Bulgaria and Romania is mounting to ensure their people are fully subject to the dictats of the EU, so that more onerous terms can be imposed which will make it easier for the plutocracy to exploit the workers. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU is being pushed through along with the enlargement of NATO, the demand for the involvement of military forces and the concession of the sovereign rights of these countries to the audacious imperialist plans of the USA, NATO, and the EU, **at the expense of the people**. The continual adaptation of accession conditions to the acquis communautaire for the purposes of the Lisbon Strategy, the reform of the CAP, capitalist restructurings and the EU's more general anti-grassroots and anti-labour policy is resulting in extremely poor terms for the workers, with sweeping changes to fundamental employment and social rights. The people of these countries are realising day by day that they cannot expect anything positive to come out of their accession to the EU. The European Parliament motion for a resolution supports the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the imperialist union and their concession to the plans of the EU and a more intensive anti-grassroots policy against their people, which is why the European parliamentary group of the Greek Communist Party will vote against it. (Document ID of Speech: 2006/06/14/TEXT_CRE_20060614_3-154)

The second example showing the additional value of the frame dictionaries is a speech held by UK Conservative Party politician Marina Yannakoudakis. It is less focused on the praising the people as morally superior, but presenting them as threatened by evil elites, hence serving as good illustration how these two core features may coincide with each other. It also includes other, very particular moralized language such as "tub-thumping rhetoric" and stresses that might be let down by their representatives and that they deserve to know what these MEP voted for.

> When David Cameron and the other heads of government struck a deal to reduce the EU's 7-year budget by €12 billion the Prime Minister said, 'I think the British people can be proud.' I am duly proud of the decision to offer long overdue savings to the beleaguered taxpayer. Which is why I am ashamed that MEPs have put forward a resolution which 'rejects this agreement in its current form'. I voted against this resolution and I deplore the tub-thumping rhetoric of this House. The European Parliament is trying to flex its muscles while **ignoring its citizens** who are crying out for a cut-back, streamlined European Union. I am at least pleased that this resolution sends out a clear signal to those Members who wished to conduct the business of the house behind closed doors. It is curious that a parliament which desires democratic legitimacy should wish to vote on a matter as important as the 7-year budget in secret. Citizens deserve to know how their MEPs voted. And I hope that citizens who feel let down by those Members who choose to reject budget savings will express their displeasure at the ballot box. (Document ID of Speech: 2013/03/14/TEXT_CRE_20130314_4-171)

Moving to a more systematic evaluation of the measurement's construct validity, I draw on a set of four different random samples containing 100 speeches each. The composition of the samples is presented in table 3.4. As outlined above the EP can be seen as a conservative test for measuring populism, since populist elements are expected to be scarcer in this context - especially compared to campaign speeches and the like. Taking the possible sparsity of populist rhetoric in the EP into account, I used a sampling strategy that artificially increases the number of populist speeches. First, I draw on two sets containing only instances which my approach classifies as either anti-elitist or people-centrist, thus examining the occurrence of false and true positives. Next, I use a sample that is a "hard test" for my dictionaries which consists of 100 speeches that were classified as populist by the dictionaries of Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) and of Bonikowski and Gidron (2018) while also being classified as non-populist by my approach. This sample is hence tailored for detecting both false and true negatives. Lastly, I include a random sample of 100

speeches, in which I over-sampled speeches by populist actors as defined by the PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019). Thus, the fourth sample includes 50 speeches of parties classified as non-populist and 50 speeches of parties which are considered populist. The four samples were hand-coded by the authors.

Table 3.4: Selection of samples for gold standard

	false positives		
	sampling	no of speeches	hand-coding
sample 1	based on instances of people-centrism following my approach	100	people-centrism
sample 2	based on instances of anti-elitism following my approach	100	anti-elitism
	false negatives		
sample 3	based on Bonikowski & Gidron (2019) and Roodujin & Pauwels (2011)	100	populism
	false positives and false negatives		
sample 4	random, over-sampling populist parties (50:50)	100	populism

The performance of my approach and the other two dictionaries is assessed with several measures presented in the confusion matrix in table 3.5. All these measures describe the outcomes of the different models, using different ratios of false and true *negatives* as well as false and true *positives*. I rely on the most common measures in the literature which are sensitivity (i.e. precision), specificity (i.e. recall), and the accuracy (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Hopkins and King 2010). More detailed measures are presented in table 6.5 in the appendix. Sensitivity - also called precision - represents the true positive rate, i.e. the share of true positives that are classified as positives. Specificity (or recall), on the other hand, is the true negative rate, measuring the proportion of true negatives classified as negatives. Accuracy combines these two measures, showing the proportion of correctly classified documents. I also present the balanced accuracy here, which accounts for a possibly skewed proportion between true positives and true negatives in the gold standard. Additionally to the dictionaries by Bonikowski and Gidron (2018) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), I compare my approach to a measurement solely relying on my baseline dictionaries (i.e. references to people and elites without the frame dictionaries), presented in the last column of table 3.5. This allows for testing whether adding the moralized framing indeed comes with additional measurement performance. I present the measures for both my dictionaries combined, i.e. clustering the two core features

anti-elitism and people-centrism together. My approach outperforms the other measures, only the specificity of the baseline dictionaries combined is higher with 0.94. This means that references to the people tend to be better at classifying true negatives. However, the sensitivity of the reference dictionaries is lower compared to the frame dictionaries, which shows that the approach over-estimates the occurrence of populist rhetoric.

Table 3.5: Classification Accuracy

	My approach	**Bonikowski & Gidron**	**Rooduijn & Pauwels**	**References to groups**
Sensitivity	0.66	0.49	0.49	0.51
Specificity	0.84	0.61	0.72	0.94
Balanced Accuracy	0.75	0.55	0.61	0.72
Overall Accuracy	0.74	0.56	0.55	0.58

Who uses populism?

After having established my approach as valid tool to identify populist discourse, the next section has several purposes. First, I aim to show whether parties traditionally classified as populists indeed use more populist discourse in the EP. Second, I shall focus on the relationship between people-centrism and anti-elitism as core features of populism. And third, I assess whether radical left and radical right parties use populism to a larger extent than mainstream parties.

Populist is as Populist does?

In a 1994 US movie, the protagonist Forrest Gump gets asked a couple of times whether he considers himself stupid and responds with “Stupid is as stupid does.” This mirrors - as already discussed above - a discussion on populism research that could be summarized as “Populist is as populist does?” Or put differently: How do we define whether an actor or a party is populist? Gumps answer implies that a person should rather be judged by actions and not her appearance. Transferred to the study of parties and party actors, this calls for perceiving populism as a “description of parties’ appeals rather than parties themselves” (Degan-Krause and Haughton 2009, 822) as already discussed in section 3.

Table 3.6 shows the total number of speeches given by MEPs of parties that are classified as populist or non-populist following Rooduijn et al. (2019). The three last columns show the classification of populist speech based on my measure, and the measures of

Bonikowski and Gidron (2018) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), separately for populist and non-populist parties. Of all speeches in the EP between 1999 and 2014, about 20 percent were given by actors belonging to parties that are traditionally considered populist. A first difference that sticks out is the mismatch regarding the total share of speeches classified as populist between the measures. While the dictionary by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) hits in nearly 40 percent of the speeches, my measures classifies around 2.6 percent as populist and the approach of Bonikowski and Gidron (2018) classifies only around 1.6 percent of all speeches as populist[12]. This serves as additional indication that Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) approach drasticallly over-estimates populism. This is in line with the expectation of the EP as a hard test for populism. While the share of populist discourse is similar to Bonikowski and Gidron's (2018) approach, their small accuracy serves as indication that they identify different speeches than my approach. Looking at the set of parties that are classified as populist *a priori* based on Rooduijn et al. (2019), all three measures identify a higher share of populist rhetoric among them compared to the parties categorized as non-populist. Hence, it seems that the parties generally seen as populist in academic literature also show higher levels of populist rhetoric in the EP. However, the difference between both groups are fairly small, or in the case of Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) even negligible.

Table 3.6: Classification of speeches for different dictionaries

Populist party		**My approach**	**Bonikowski & Gidron**	**Rooduijn & Pauwels**
No	count	3623	2003	53281
No	percent	0.025	0.014	0.371
Yes	count	1148	880	13715
Yes	percent	0.032	0.025	0.389

Core features - anti-elitism and people-centrism

This section breaks up my measurement in the two core features: anti-elitism and people-centrism. Other than previous approaches, having separate dictionaries provides the opportunity to study how they relate to each other. In order to assess how their use

[12]The hand-coded random sample, which only contains 100 speeches and needs thus to be taken with a pinch of salt, contains 6 percent of populist speeches. Other approaches to measure populism find similar numbers for different text corpora: Bernhard and Kriesi (2019) in 5 percent of parties' press releases in 11 countries, Ernst et al. (2017) in about 10 percent of their analyzed twitter and facebook posts, Zulianello, Albertini, and Ceccobelli (2018) in about 1.9 percent of the facebook posts in their sample.

coincides, I present two different figures. First, I show how often both concepts are present in the very same speech. Second, I show whether actors who are using people-centrism also use anti-elitism, i.e. whether the use of references to both groups is correlated within actors.

Figure 3.1 shows the presence of anti-elitism and people-centrism in single speeches. Zero denotes no presence of people-centrism or anti-elitism, while the category one subsumes all speeches were at least one instance of these features is present. The two-by-two table shows that people-centrism is around six times more common than anti-elitism. Additionally, the figure allows to assess the co-occurrence of anti-elitism and people-centrism within a single speech. This is, however, an extremely rare event. It appears in 61 speeches in the whole corpus i.e. in only 0.03 percent of the speeches.



Figure 3.1: Cross tabulation of anti-elitism and people-centrism being present in the same speech

Next, I turn to the MEP-level, assessing whether there is any relationship between the use of the two core features anti-elitism and people-centrism in all speeches given by an individual parliamentarian. Figure 3.2 presents as scatter plot between these two features, showing the percent of speeches in which MEPs used each of them. The percentage of speeches including people-centrism is shown on the x-axis, while the y-axis shows the percentage of anti-elitism. The black dots represent MEPs who are classified as populist

a priori following Rooduijn et al. (2019), while each grey dot represents a non-populist MEP. Additionally, the graph presents the fitted lines for both groups separately, again for populist MEPs in black and for non-populist MEPs in grey. For the sake of readability, I removed outliers from the graph, they were however included in the estimation of the fitted lines. The graph confirms the findings already presented above: people-centrism is far more used than anti-elitism. However, there seems to be a positive correlation for the usage of both core concepts for populist parties, while this correlation is nearly absent for non-populist parties.

These findings speak to a conceptual issue which has sparked a debate among populism scholars: Do markers of populism have to co-occur in the same speech or text or is it "enough" if an actor uses both core features separately? Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug (2014, 567) argue that "it is the combination of people-centrism and anti-elitism that defines populism. Only if a critique on the (bad) elite coincides with an emphasis on the (good) people, can we speak of populism." However, if they re-run their analyses removing this condition, their results are robust.

Engesser et al. (2017) argue for a "fragmented concept" , i.e. the core features of populism do not necessarily have to be present in one speech by a politician in order to consider the speech populist. Along similar lines, Ernst et al. (2017) show that the core features occur in a fragmented manner, but still emphasize the importance of combining them. The results presented above support this view, showing that a co-occurrence of both features is rather rare in the EP, but the use of both features by a single MEP is correlated for MEPs belonging to parties that are classified as populist.

Populism left and right?

Lastly, I present evidence that populism is more commonly used by parties on the fringes of the political spectrum. Several previous studies (Ernst et al. 2017; Bernhard and Kriesi 2019; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017) have argued and shown that parties at the fringes of the political system tend to use populism more than those positioned in the center. Figure 3.3 show the use of anti-elitism, people-centrism, my combined measures, and the measures by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) and Bonikowski and Gidron (2018). The parties are clustered along their left-right dimension using the ParlGov (2016) left-right measures, where 0 denotes the left end and 10 the right end of the spectrum. While ParlGov provides the most exhaustive measure of parties' left-right position, I also include the category "NA" in order to show that the missings do not introduce additional bias.

Panel A clearly shows that far-right parties use anti-elitism to the largest extent, followed



Figure 3.2: Scatter plot for percentage of people-centrism and anti-elitism in MEPs' speeches



Figure 3.3: Box plots for parties by left-right dimension

by far-left parties. Unsurprisingly, mainstream parties use very little anti-elitism, given that they are considered part of the "establishment" themselves. For people-centrism (panel B), the differences shrink. While the far-left and the far-right use appeals to the people nearly equally often, mainstream parties also do employ the people-centrist rhetoric, however to a smaller extent. This partly confirms March's (2017, 290) findings of "demoticism (i.e. closeness to 'ordinary' people without this antagonistic identity)" as a common trait of mainstream parties' rhetoric. My combined measures (panel C) still show that radical left and radical right parties use more populism than centrist parties. Turning to the outcomes of the other two dictionaries, we also see the inverse u-shaped curve in Bonikowski and Gidron's (2018) (panel D) measure. It is worth pointing out that here radical left parties turn out to be more populist than radical right parties. For the measure by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) (panel E) the differences between parties of different ideological orientations nearly vanish.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the moral distinction between the people and the elites is a central component of populist discourse. While this is theoretically well-established, quantitative approaches to measuring populism have often neglected this moral divide. Building on this centrality of the two antagonistic groups for populism discourse, I developed a novel two-step dictionary approach to measure populist discourse. My approach comes with several advantages. First, as my dictionaries are well-grounded in the literature, they are less at risk of being context dependent and hence less *ad hoc*-fashioned. Second, as I designed the approach based on theoretical assumptions and not actor-based, it is less prone to conflate populism with empirically co-occurring concepts, such as nationalism and radical right ideology. Additionally, combining dictionaries for references to groups and then identifying their framing with a second set of dictionaries is a research design which can be transferred to other fields of study.

I validated my measures carefully, against a hand-coded gold standard and compared their performance to other populism dictionaries. While the accuracy is not sky-rocketing, my dictionaries outperform previous approaches and are hence a valuable tool for identifying populist discourse. While Bonikowski and Gidron (2018) obtain very similar results in terms of the share of speeches containing populist discourse, their accuracy measures differ significantly from my approach. This might be due to the fact that their dictionary mostly includes words related to anti-elitism rather than people-centrism. Hence, it is very likely that their approach is not suitable for measuring people-centrism.

A valid automated approach to measure populist discourse is particularly valuable for large sets of texts, as manual approaches often require a unmanageable effort, Zulianello, Albertini, and Ceccobelli (2018) for instance hand-coded 24,240 Facebook posts. I use my measures to analyse the occurrence of populist discourse in the European Parliament from 1999 to 2014 drawing on a corpus of 178905 speeches held by 1704 individual MEPs. Drawing on a predefined classification of populist parties, I show that populist parties use more populist speech than mainstream parties, however only to a small margin. Next, I show how the two core features of populism interact with each other, showing that their co-occurrence in one single speech is empirically scarce. Nevertheless, actors traditionally defined as populist are more prone to use both features across their speeches than mainstream party parliamentarians. Lastly, I show that radical left and radical right actors use populist discourse to a greater extent than mainstream parties. This difference is, however, more pronounced for anti-elitism than for people-centrism.

Apart from serving as a tool to identify populist discourse, showing how moralized framing is central for populism provides further avenues for future research. A first possible expansion is to study the effect of moral framing on individuals. This might well speak to scholarship on individuals' motivation to vote for populist parties (Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher 2016; Arzheimer 2009; Dunn 2015). We might argue that aside from classical voting theories, populist manage to activate people's moral convictions (see e.g. Ryan (2014); Ryan (2017)) by using their moralized framing and hence gain their votes (see e.g. Hameleers, Bos, and Vreese 2017). Second – and connected to scholarship on individual level populist attitudes (see e.g. Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Schulz et al. 2017) we could ask which role the moralized framing and moral convictions play in these populist attitudes.

4 The Refugee Crisis and Radical Right Parties' Impact on Party Competition[13]

Introduction

The literature on party competition has typically stressed long-term trends. However, change may also occur quickly, facilitated by extraordinary events: In 2013, immigration was a minor concern in the German elections with less than five percent of parties' media statements dedicated to the issue. At the next election in 2017, 19 percent of such statements concerned immigration (Hutter and Kriesi 2018). This can be interpreted in different ways. Was it the long-term transformation of the German party system and the rise of the immigration-critical Alternative for Germany (AfD)? Or was it events external to the party system such as the humanitarian crisis of 2015 and Merkel's handling of it that played a pivotal role here? In short: What determines the changing politicization of immigration in Germany and elsewhere?

In this chapter, we argue that events like the 2015 crisis play a crucial role in the politicization of issues. Among long-term trends, scholarly literature has established the role of radical right parties in increasing the salience of immigration (Rydgren 2008; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Alonso and da Fonseca 2012; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; Dancygier and Margalit 2019). However, attention to issues which few citizens have personal experiences with – like immigration – crucially depends on information through media and public discourse (Green-Pedersen 2019, 83). We posit that both factors interact: events like the humanitarian crisis of 2015 move an issue into the spotlight. This provides radical right parties with an opportunity to further politicize immigration (e.g. Mader and Schoen 2018). Moreover, they increase the pressure on mainstream parties to respond to their radical right challengers - a crucial factor that previous research has highlighted (Meguid 2005, 2008; Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; van Spanje 2010; Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). So how does the pressure of rising public attention to immigration change mainstream parties' reactions to the radical right in terms of salience and positional change?

As this dissertation is concerned with the impact populist radical right parties have on party competition in Europe, this chapter will focus on the programmtic impact these parties might exert. While of populist zeitgeist is often over-emphasized in current research, we assess how mainstream parties' issue attention and position might be driven by radical right competitors. Thus, we study the dynamics of party competition on the immigration

[13]based on a chapter co-authored with Theresa Gessler

issue in the context of the refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. We argue that the 2015 crisis changed the 'rules of engagement' on the immigration issue as it forced all parties to address the issue, regardless of whether it is beneficial to them. Studying parties' strategic responses to this dilemma is crucial – not only for understanding the politics of the refugee crisis – but also to help us to understand the impact of the radical right on the politicization of immigration. We build our argument on a dynamic analysis of party competition around immigration in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Our empirical approach incorporates three steps. First, out of 120,000 press releases from all major parties published between 2013 and 2018, we identify those releases concerned with immigration through a novel dictionary. The proportion of these immigration-related press releases provides us with a monthly measure of the each party's immigration salience. Second, we estimate parties' immigration positions using a Wordscores model. Finally, we use our measures for descriptive and time-series regression analyses.

We show that the crisis moved mainstream parties to address the immigration issue, regardless of whether it was beneficial to them. Immigration salience increased for all parties across the three countries with the beginning of the refugee crisis. In line with previous findings, we show that radical right parties were by far the forerunner and managed to retain their position as issue owners during the whole crisis period. Increasing levels of salience by radical right parties are associated with a rise in attention for immigration by mainstream parties. However, we do not find the same for positions, where changes for mainstream parties are not clearly driven by radical right parties. We also qualify previous manifesto- and media-based studies' findings (Hutter and Kriesi 2018; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018) on the period after the immediate crisis as we show that salience returns to the pre-crisis level for most of parties towards the end of the crisis.

Overall, we contribute to the measurement of party positions on the immigration issue, as well as to our knowledge about an important episode of European politics, the 2015 refugee crisis. We believe that studying parties' strategic responses to events in the field of immigration is crucial – not only for understanding the politics of the refugee crisis but also for the radical right's impact on the politicization of immigration as mediated through mainstream parties.

Politics of immigration and the refugee crisis

Our analysis builds on the premise that the refugee crisis radically changed the importance of the immigration issue. We do not mean to suggest that the crisis necessarily marks a

turning point in the politicization of immigration.[14] Rather, we argue that highly salient public events like crises change the 'rules of engagement' on an issue. They put topics on the party-system agenda and hence force other parties to address an issue, whether it is beneficial to them or not. As changes in the salience of an issue may lead parties to adapt their positions (Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2019), crisis events have the power to reshape party strategies and can have long-lasting consequences.

We build our argument in several steps: First, we argue that the crisis increases the general salience of immigration due parties' quest to seem responsive. Second, we posit that the crisis also changes the 'rules of engagement' as it affects the responsiveness of mainstream parties to right-wing challengers whom the crisis presumably benefits. Third, we claim that the established incentives of party competition cause heterogeneity in this increased responsiveness that leads center-right parties to react more strongly.

The direct impact of the crisis

Multiple factors determine parties' salience strategies (Green-Pedersen 2019, 24–40). While the literature has typically highlighted parties' ideological profile and the structure of party competition, we focus on more variable determinants. Specifically, we argue that events like the 2015 crisis have a powerful role in shaping salience strategies by increasing the so-called 'problem pressure' (Green-Pedersen 2019, 22). The enormous news coverage of the refugee crisis (Harteveld et al. 2018; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017) and the importance citizens attributed to the topic (European Commission 2018) during the crisis force parties to address the issue.

Previous studies have shown that parties' salience and positional strategies often depend on public salience of issues and the issue priorities of voters (Sides 2006; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). Similarly, literature on election campaigns has argued that 'riding the wave', i.e. campaigning on issues that dominate the news cycle, provides politicians with an opportunity to appear concerned and responsive (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Hence, we expect the salience of immigration in party competition to increase for all parties.

H1: Parties increase their attention to immigration with the start of the refugee crisis.

Changing responsiveness to challengers

However, our argument extends beyond a direct response *to the crisis* once we consider mainstream parties' responses *to challenger parties.* Despite their diverse ideological

[14] In fact, there is evidence that higher numbers of refugees in the early 1990s similarly led to a rise in immigration salience which reverted to the previous level over time (Hutter and Kriesi 2018, 19).

appeals, radical right parties are united in their anti-immigration mobilization (Ivarsflaten 2008; Betz 2002; Fennema and Van Der Brug 2003). Given their strong emphasis on immigration, these parties have become associated with the issue in the minds of voters in Western Europe, i.e. they have developed a so-called ‘associative issue ownership’ (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012, 779; see also Mudde 2010; Udris 2012)[15]. We argue that the radical right's ownership of the immigration issue posits a dilemma to mainstream parties - particularly so during times of heightened attention to the issue. We build our theoretical model on Meguid's seminal framework (Meguid 2005, 2008): She argues mainstream parties may respond to the electoral success of niche (here: green and radical right) parties by a) ignoring the issue, b) actively mobilizing against the niche party's position and take an adversial position, or c) adopting the niche party's position to win back voters.

Meguid's model assumes that reactions in terms of salience and positions are inherently tied. Expanding her approach, we conceptualize mainstream parties' responses as a two-step decision: Parties first need to decide whether to address an issue more, i.e. increasing the salience. In a second step, parties decide whether an increase in salience is accompanied by a change in their issue position. Namely, they may accommodate the challenger's positions, stick to their previous position, or articulate an explicit counter-position. This allows for courses of action which Meguid's framework does not foresee, e.g. parties may decide to engage with an issue without altering their position at all. While in some cases altering both salience and positions might seem beneficial, other situations may require strategic action only regadring salience.

While we expect that all parties will heighten their immigration salience in response to the crisis itself, we believe mainstream parties will also increase their responsiveness to radical right challengers. As news coverage affects which issues voters base their choices on (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), increased salience of an issue ‘owned’ by a party may sway voters towards this party (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Geers and Bos 2017; Thesen, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2017). Thus, increasing attention towards immigration may benefit radical right parties and thereby put additional pressure on mainstream parties. To counter this effect, mainstream parties have to actively challenge the radical right's issue ownership: Mainstream parties can strive to re-gain issue ownership through showing engagement with the issue (Walgrave, Tresch, and Lefevere 2015; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012). Thus, a crisis changes the incentives of mainstream parties and makes them

[15]While radical right associative issue ownership of immigration is established in the literature, competence ownership is often more volatile (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Nuytemans 2009). But even considering this second dimension of issue ownership, radical right parties are on average considered twice as competent as their competitors (Seeberg 2017, own calculation).

more likely to respond to challengers by engaging with the issue. Hence, we expect that mainstream parties react to pressure from the radical right by addressing the immigration issue. This should go beyond the general increase in the salience of immigration we outlined in H1 and be driven by radical right parties' issue emphasis.

H2a Mainstream parties' emphasis on immigration increases when radical right parties emphasize immigration.

While we argue that parties can hardly afford to ignore the immigration issue in reaction to the refugee crisis and radical right parties' behavior, our two-step interpretation of Meguid's (2005) framework provides mainstream parties with more leeway regarding their positional reactions (see Figure 4.1). Hence, we inquire whether mainstream parties remain with their position, choose to actively mobilize against the radical rights' position or are tempted to adopt their position. Much of the theoretical and case-study literature suggests that mainstream parties are more prone to adjust their position to radical right parties and refers to this as (positional) contagion (Bale et al. 2010; Bale 2003; van Spanje 2010; Schumacher and Kersbergen 2016). However, results from quantitative, comparative research are inconclusive and bear inconsistent effects (e.g. Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). Given mainstream parties are unlikely to benefit from a long-term politicization of immigration, we expect them to avoid anything that would increase conflict on the issue. In a multi-party system where only the radical right clearly opposes immigration (as predominant in Western Europe), this means other parties should stick to their previous positions and maintain distance from the radical right. We expect parties to instead focus on the pragmatic politics of crisis management. While increasing the salience of immigration, this limits the politicization of immigration and is thus attractive to mainstream parties.

H2b Mainstream parties do not adjust their position in response to the radical right.

Partisan differences in responsiveness

Despite our emphasis on the crisis, we do not presume that its effect occurs independent of other factors. Rather, external events interact with the existing context of party competition. Hence, we expect differences between party families' reactions which are grounded in their different incentives to address immigration. Notably, an increasing strength of radical right-wing parties presents a more drastic dilemma for left wing parties (Bale et al. 2010; Abou-Chadi 2016) than for the right.

While increasing importance of immigration as vote-deciding issue may primarily favor the radical right, the tripolar structure of political competition (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012)

also means immigration can help right-wing parties. They might be able to mobilize so-called left-authoritarian voters (Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014; Van Der Brug and Spanje 2009) that may otherwise consider voting for center left parties. Hence, Abou-Chadi (2016) argues, center-right parties can potentially gain from a higher salience of immigration by attracting these cross-pressured voters towards the right side of the party spectrum. These incentives for center-right parties should hold during crises as well. Hence, we expect the outlined salience-based contagion of the radical right to be stronger for center-right parties:

H3a The radical right driven increase in salience is stronger for center-right parties than for other mainstream parties.

This may also affect positional considerations, tempting center-right parties to adopt tougher stances on immigration. On the one hand, this may be driven by the risk of losing voters: If voters choose depending on parties' immigration stances during the crisis (Mader and Schoen 2018), fear may drive right voters towards the radical right. This makes it more attractive for center-right parties to accommodate immigration-critical stances to prevent a restructuration within the right camp. Additionally, if the radical right indeed gains in strength by attracting left-authoritarian voters, radical right parties become potential coalition partners whom center-right parties may want to appease (Abou-Chadi 2016, 423; also Bale 2003). Hence, different from the stability we expected in hypothesis H2b, we posit:

H3b Center-right parties will adjust their positions in response to the radical right.

Figure 4.1 summarizes our expectations. In H1 we outline a "crisis-effect" which leads all parties to increase their immigration salience. Additionally, we argue that the crisis forces mainstream parties to emphasize immigration in response to radical-right challengers (H2a). Furthermore, in H2b we posit that – despite their increased immigration salience – mainstream parties have little incentive to further politicize immigration by altering their issue positions. The crisis does, however, not overrule well-established incentives for particular party families. Hence, we expect stronger increases in salience for center-right parties (H3a). Additionally, in H3b, we posit that center-right parties accommodate their challengers' positions during the refugee crisis.



Figure 4.1: Full model of theoretical expectations

Data and Methods

Case Selection

Given text-based measures of party strategies depend on language, we take a pragmatic decision to focus on Swiss, German, and Austrian parties that publish their press releases in German. While this selection is partially motivated by our methodological approach, we also think the three countries are representative of broader developments in Europe. In what follows, we situate our cases within patterns of party competition in Europe regadring immigration salience, the role of the radical right, and their exposure to the crisis.

Previous research has shown that rising immigration salience in Europe is a general trend which is mirrored by our three countries under study. Figure 4.2 shows the salience of immigration in election campaigns in 14 European countries (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). For Austria, Germany, and Switzerland we show patterned lines, while salience in the other countries is shown by grey dots with annotations for important outliers. The dotted area

depicts the 95 percent confidence interval around the smoothed trend for all countries. The vertical line marks the beginning of the refugee crisis. Clearly, all three countries were typical rather than outlier cases compared to the European average, especially in the pre-crisis period.

While 2015 refugee crisis affected the different European countries with varying levels of severity and it constituted a unique event in each country, the countries under study experienced the 2015 crisis at least as much as other European countries. Figure 4.3 shows the yearly asylum applications in the 14 countries discussed above. The number of applications is standardized per 100,000 inhabitants for each country. While public debate and media reporting presented the German case as quite exceptional, figure 4.3 shows that most European countries experienced a peak in refugee arrivals.[16]

We argue that the crisis empowered radical right parties and increased their potential to pressure mainstream parties. Hence, we posit – despite their historically different roles – that radical right parties take a functionally equivalent role during the crisis. Both the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) were mainstream right parties that radicalized towards a nationalist, populist, and anti-immigration position during the 1990s (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 20; Kriesi et al. 2008, 20). In contrast, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged only after 2013. Initially a neoliberal anti-EU party (Bremer and Schulte-Cloos 2019), the AfD established itself as an anti-immigration and anti-Islam party already before the beginn of the crisis and entered parliament in the 2017 election.

[16]Note that we use a smaller smoothing parameter in this Figure than in the rest of the paper, given the magnitude of short-term changes.



Figure 4.2: Salience of immigration in 14 European countries



Figure 4.3: Asylum applications per country

Research Design

Our new data set consists of press releases from Swiss, German, and Austrian parties (see Table 4.1) which were published by party headquarters and parliamentary groups between January 2013 and March 2018 and collected from party web pages and national press release archives, resulting in up to 63 months per country and party. We include all parties that poll above the parliamentary threshold for most of our period of study.[17] The construction of our dependent variables then follows a two-step logic drawing on quantitative text analysis (Benoit et al. 2018). First, we identify all immigration-related press releases using a dictionary. In a second step, we take these press releases and scale them from opposition to support of immigration. The detailed approach is described below.

A Dictionary Approach to immigration salience

We evaluated different approaches to identify immigration-related press releases based on more than 750 randomly-selected press releases which were hand-annotated by the authors. This procedure is considered to be the gold standard for our evaluation. Eventually, we develop a novel dictionary (see Appendix), based on a close reading of the press releases and drawing on previous approaches (Pauwels 2011; Ruedin and Morales 2017). In line with recommendations (Muddiman, McGregor, and Stroud 2018), we restrict our dictionary to words that refer to immigration and integration, avoiding overly specific terms as well as frequently used concepts that might lead to a conflation with diversity or religious rights, e.g. 'minaret' and 'christian'. Our dictionary outperforms those used in previous research (Pauwels 2011; Ruedin and Morales 2017) and performs on par with a support vector machine classifier (see Tables 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8). Given the computational efficiency and clearer decision-rules of the dictionary solution, we opt for our small dictionary rather than the SVM classifier. Overall, this offers the best compromise in terms of accuracy, interpretability, and computational efficiency. Table 4.1 presents the results of this classification.

Tables 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 present the sensitivity, specificity, as well as the balanced and overall accuracy of our dictionary based on a hand-annotated gold standard. We also compare the performance of our dictionary to a support vector machine (SVM) classifier and two other dictionaries (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Ruedin and Morales 2017). As visible in the tables, our parsimonious dictionary outperforms the ones developed by

[17]We hence exclude Team Stronach, a party founded by businessman Frank Stronach in 2012 that gained 5.7 percent in the 2013 elections but precipitously lost support afterwards and was dissolved in August 2017.

Table 4.1: Number of press releases

party	N (Total)	monthly	N (immigration)	Salience
Austria				
FPÖ	7981	126.7	1601	20.1
Green Party	5969	94.7	872	14.6
NEOS	2712	43.0	306	11.3
OVP	7236	114.9	993	13.7
Pilz	221	27.6	14	6.3
SPÖ	11395	189.9	1287	11.3
Germany				
AfD	1736	28.9	598	34.4
CDU	3475	55.2	503	14.5
CSU	1463	21.5	294	20.1
FDP	973	27.8	228	23.4
Green Party	3403	55.8	556	16.3
Left Party	5165	82.0	917	17.8
SPD	3875	61.5	416	10.7
Switzerland				
BDP	331	5.3	75	22.7
CVP	1294	19.3	291	22.5
FDP	432	8.6	107	24.8
Green Liberal Party	259	4.0	46	17.8
Green Party	962	14.4	140	14.6
SPS	803	11.8	151	18.8
SVP	544	8.1	291	53.5

Ruedin and Morales (2017) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) and performs on par with the SVM classifier. Given the computational efficiency and clearer decision-rules of the dictionary solution, we opt for our small dictionary rather than the SVM classifier. Overall, this offers the best compromise in terms of accuracy, interpretability, and computational efficiency. Table 4.1 presents the results of this classification.

Measuring party positions with Wordscores

In a second step, we use these immigration-related press releases to scale parties' positions with Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003), a scaling technique that estimates political positions based on the similarity of word usage between a sets of texts with known and unknown policy positions. Our pre-processing strategy follows previous research's suggestions (Lowe 2008; Ruedin 2013): we remove frequently used words that lack substantive meaning, stem the words, and remove words occuring less than four times. We have tested several pre-processing steps, such as removing names or relying exclusively on nouns, based on a parts-of-speech tagging pipeline. As results were not substantively different, we used the full text.

Slightly deviating from previous applications, we calculated wordscores only based on substantively meaningful words. For this, we compare immigration-related and other texts to calculate keyness-statistics for each word. For estimating the wordscores model, we only keep words with a χ^2 higher than zero. While this does not lead to systematically different results, it allows us to calculate party positions based on words that are substantively meaningful regarding immigration making human validation of our measures more credible.

As input for our Wordscore model, we data on party positions in national election campaigns (Kriesi et al. 2020; Hutter and Gessler 2019). This data is particularly suitable since it covers party positions at a specific moment in time, rather than expert surveys where scores may be influenced by past positions of a party. We only include parties with more than 100 immigration-related press releases (see Table 4.1). As Wordscores are systematically biased if the word distribution across the different reference texts is insufficient, we assign our reference scores to the press releases of the entire election month, which is roughly the same period for which the Kriesi et al.'s (2020) reference scores are valid.

Modelling Strategy

We use our measures (namely, monthly party-specific salience measures as the share of immigration-related press and estimates of positions based on wordscores) for descriptive and regression analyses. This section discusses our modelling strategy as well as control

variables. We employ Arellano-Bond models (Arellano and Bond 1991), a dynamic panel model estimator which allows for including lagged dependent variables (DVs) and thus accounts for autoregression. Arellano-Bond models use a Generalized Method of Moments which includes deeper lags of the DV as instruments for endogenous lags of the DV. The model assumes a serial correlation structure: while the first-order lag of the DV is serially correlated to the DV, there must not be second-order serial correlation, i.e. the second lag may not be correlated with the DV. We test the model assumptions for our measures of salience and position, i.e. the two DVs in our models, using the Arellano-Bond test for serial autocorrelation (see table 6.10). Since our regression models aim at assessing the impact of the refugee crisis and radical right parties on parties' salience and positions, we limit the analyses to non-radical right parties. In total, our sample consists of 209 party-months for Austria, 299 party-months for Germany, and 138 party-months for Switzerland. For both DVs, we could not reject H0 of no correlation for the first-order lags, while we could reject it for the second-order correlations. Hence, the model assumptions are satisfied.

We use our measures of radical right parties' immigration salience and positions as main independent variables. We control for radical right parties' electoral pressure and a country's exposure to the refugee crisis. As discussed, previous literature has often assumed the radical right's strength affects mainstream parties' motivation to address immigration. Thus, we include radical right parties' strength by using monthly polls of the FPÖ, AfD, and SVP.[18]

We include several measures to capture the effect of the crisis: For exposure to the crisis, we use the monthly number of asylum applications as research assumes that refugee arrival and the state's capacity to react determines the problematization of immigration in public discourse. W assume that citizens' concerns on immigration, i.e. public attention towards immigration, affects parties' behavior. Though many countries faced limits of their administrative capacity during the crisis, what mattered could be rather *the perception of a crisis* rather than the extent of refugee arrivals. Given the scarcity of public opinion data over time, we rely on Google Search Trends to measure public attention to immigration.[19] Specifically, we use the Google Knowledge Graph technology to track the frequency of a search query *topic* rather than individual search strings (Siliverstovs and Wochner 2018). After careful comparison with Eurobarometer results for immigration salience as most important problem in a country, we use the Google trend for 'refugee' which correlates at .87 respectively .86 with the Eurobarometer values in Germany and Austria.

[18]We obtained polls from different agencies collected by poll of polls, neuwal.com, and the research projects VoxIt (Kriesi, Brunner, and Lorétan 2016) and Voto (FORS 2018).

[19]For similar applications of the data: Chykina and Crabtree (2018); Granka (2013); Mellon (2013)

In order to delimit the crisis period, we calculate a binary measure based on our public attention measure. For each country, we determine as refugee crisis the period in which the searches for the refugee topic are above the country average. Thereby, we determine the start of the crisis for July 2015 in Austria, and for August 2015 for Germany and Switzerland. The crisis ends in July 2016 in Austria, in November 2016 in Germany, and in February 2017 in Switzerland, which is the first month in which attention to the topic falls below the mean in the respective countries.[20]

Results

The rising salience of immigration

We first address how much the salience of immigration has in fact risen. We start by presenting our measures of salience for each party in the three countries. Figure 4.4 visualizes our results in two ways: The points represent monthly averages of salience while the curves represent the trend using locally smoothed daily estimates. The gray lines in the background show the smoothed lines for the other national parties. The dashed vertical line marks July respectively August 2015 as start of the refugee crisis.

The first set of plots in in figure 4.4 shows the salience in Austria. Clearly, all parties react to the crisis with increasing attention to immigration. This increase is most pronounced for the right-wing FPÖ, which already addressed the issue most before the crisis. In line with our expectations, ÖVP becomes the party with the second highest salience of immigration during the crisis, while previously the Greens primarily competed with the FPÖ on the issue. Nevertheless, the increase is relatively similar for all Austrian parties, except for a short period of divergence at the start of the crisis visible only in the point estimates.

In Germany, depicted in the second set of plots in figure 4.4, the initial increase is steeper for several parties compared to Austria. Notably, differences between the parties are more pronounced: The right-wing AfD clearly stands out for its strong emphasis on immigration, especially compared to the Greens and Social Democrats that maintain a limited salience. We also find an interesting contrast between the strong increase of salience for the Bavarian CSU which differs from its federal-level sister party CDU. Generally, the sudden impact of the crisis in August is more apparent in Germany, as even AfD's emphasis on the issue was rather low in the months before the crisis. This is primarily visible in the distribution of monthly averages.

The third set of plots in figure 4.4 shows the estimated salience in Switzerland. The baseline

[20]This does not preclude future increases above the mean which occur in Switzerland and Germany.







Figure 4.4: Estimated salience of immigration in 3 countries

level of immigration salience is higher compared to most parties in the other countries. Overall, we only see a slight increase during the refugee crisis, and a slow decrease from mid-2016 onward. The SVP clearly stands out regarding its attention towards this issue. However, this is not a product of the crisis as the SVP emphasized immigration already beforehand, including a previous peak in early 2014 related to a popular initiative against so-called "mass immigration". A second period of increased emphasis for the SVP includes the period of the refugee crisis and continues throughout the 2015 Swiss elections, which gave the SVP an ideal opportunity to campaign on immigration.

Generalizing to the party system-level, the salience of immigration increased in all three countries. The difference between the radical right and its mainstream competitors is most notable in Switzerland where, comparing the general level of immigration salience, we also find a more steady attention to the issue. We suspect this difference is due to Switzerland's internal political dynamic with the importance of popular votes as well as the relevance of immigration beyond forced migration, e.g. in the context of migration from the EU.

While the general increase in salience is certainly interesting, it is also important that the salience did not only increase drastically, but it also faded out nearly completely after the crisis for most mainstream parties. This suggests that parties might have changed their strategy and tried to de-emphasize immigration once the immediate problem pressure decreased. Competing findings based on media reports, e.g. during election campaigns (Hutter and Kriesi 2018; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018), suggest that the media might still have reported parties' immigration-related statements disproportionately, even though parties had started to avoid the issue.

Dynamics of salience

We now proceed to explicitly test our salience hypotheses in a regression framework. Table 4.2 presents eight models, first including all mainstream parties in our sample, then splitting the sample by country, distinguishing by time periods (i.e. before, during, and after the crisis) and finally including an interaction term for center-right parties (i.e. all parties right of the center). All models include the monthly number of asylum applications, public salience of immigration, and radical right parties' polls as control variables.

Our main independent variable of interest – radical right parties' immigration attention – is highly positively associated with increasing mainstream party attention toward the issue. This lends support to our hypothesis H2a as the direction of the effect is consistent across all models and, except for model 3 (Germany), statistically significant. Generally, radical

Table 4.2: Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration

	(1) all	(2) AT	(3) DE	(4) CH	(5) before	(6) during	(7) after	(8) center-right
RRP's salience of imm.	0.16***	0.27***	0.05	0.21***	0.21**	0.15***	0.14**	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)
center-right party								0.00
								(0.00)
center-right * RRP's salience of imm.								0.19***
								(0.06)
asylum applications (N)	1.03***	0.85**	1.29***	0.95	3.16**	-1.07*	-0.82	1.06***
	(0.32)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.86)	(1.59)	(0.55)	(2.28)	(0.32)
polls RRP	-0.01	0.21	-0.33***	1.32***	-0.32	-0.15	0.16	0.07
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.18)
public salience	3.09***	3.52***	3.97***	1.07**	5.42	3.41***	19.96***	3.19***
	(0.52)	(0.73)	(0.95)	(0.49)	(8.82)	(0.66)	(6.54)	(0.54)
salience of immigration (lag 1)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
salience of immigration (lag 2)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	9.34***	0.33	12.61***	-0.88	18.56**	17.71***	8.89	8.23***
	(2.91)	(4.12)	(1.01)	(3.93)	(7.82)	(5.65)	(6.90)	(2.93)
Observations	646	209	299	138	286	188	172	646
Number of parties	14	4	6	4	13	14	13	14

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

right parties' salience contagion on mainstream parties remains positive and significant throughout the three time periods (models 5-7). The effect sizes vary across the models. In Austria, each 1 percent increase in radical right parties' salience accounts for an average increase of 0.27 percent for other parties, while the effect size is only 0.14 percent for all parties after the crisis. These findings indicate that radical right parties can pressure mainstream parties to increase their immigration salience.

We test our expectation H3a that center-right parties react more strongly to radical right parties' increased issue emphasis (H3a) by including an interaction term in model 8. While the zero-finding of the center-right dummy shows that these parties do not generally dedicate more attention to immigration than other parties, the coefficient of the interaction term - positive and highly significant - serves as indication that center-right parties react more strongly to the behavior of radical right parties[21]. The general coefficient of radical right parties' immigration salience is not significant in model 8 - this is due to the lack of an effect in Germany (see table 6.11) and hence consistent with model 3.[22]. We find mixed results for our control variables, i.e. the monthly number of asylum applications, the public salience of immigration, and radical right parties' polls.

Overall, our findings match our theoretical expectations and the descriptive analyses above. Additionally, the regression analyses show – even controlling an upward trend during the refugee crisis – that radical right parties' emphasis on immigration positively affects mainstream parties' salience. In the next section, we move to parties' positions on immigration and assess their change during the refugee crisis.

Party positions on immigration over time

As parties have incentives to avoid increasing political conflict around immigration, we expect party positions to be more stable than the salience of the issue. We present the development of party positions in figure 4.5 before we analyze their determinants with regression analyses. The first set of plots in figure 4.5 shows the development of party positions in Austria. Most parties' positions are rather stable. Notably, we see a small shift in the positions of ÖVP and the Greens during the refugee crisis. SPÖ's and FPÖ's positions are rather stable, while our estimates for NEOS during 2017 are inconsistent. Overall, we do not see similar changes as observable for salience.

[21] This holds when running separate models for the three countries, see table 6.11.

[22] We also provide robustness checks including a lag of radical right parties' issue attention (see Table 6.10.) The significance and direction of the effects described above is robust to including this additional lag. Additionally, the check shows a positive and significant effect in model 8, which includes the interaction term of the center-right dummy and radical right parties' issue attention.







Figure 4.5: Estimated party positions on immigration in 3 countries

The second set of plots in figure 4.5 depicts the position estimates for Germany. Compared to Austria, shifts are more pronounced. Most notably, AfD increasingly radicalizes its anti-immigration stance. This finding is in line with previous research on the party (Schulte-Cloos and Rüttenauer 2018; Arzheimer 2015; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri 2015; Decker 2016). Additionally, CSU progressively takes an anti-immigration position, more and more diverging from its sister-party CDU. This mirrors a growing and heated conflict during the refugee crisis: Horst Seehofer, the by-then CSU party leader, and his sharp criticism of Chancellor Merkel filled the headlines for weeks. The Greens' pro-immigration stance only shows small changes that do not seem to be systematically related to the refugee crisis. The positions of CDU, SPD, and the Left are very stable throughout the whole period, although individual estimates for SPD deviate considerably.

Our results for Switzerland in the third set of plots in figure 4.5 show the clearest position shifts of mainstream parties. While CVP and FDP remain stable, the Greens and the Social democrats alter their position notably to a more positive stance for a prolonged period. This development begins in early 2014 and might hence be related to the popular votes on immigration taking place in February and November 2014. Interestingly, this trend continues until fall 2015, the beginning of the refugee crisis. Since then, the Greens and the Social democrats again turned more negative regarding immigration. Unsurprisingly, SVP holds the most anti-immigration stance. While the smoothed line is relatively stable until early 2016, more extreme monthly scores are present throughout the period. From mid-2016 onward, SVP moderates its position, moving towards the other parties' position. This temporally coincides with a decline of SVP's emphasis on immigration as shown in Figure 4.4 and may show a re-orientation of the party: After a long period of mobilization against immigration using popular votes, the defeat of its 'Durchsetzungsinitiative' marked a turning point for SVP.

Overall, radical right parties exhibit by far the most critical stances on immigration. While some mainstream parties like CSU adjust their position, most do not. Moreover, some parties like ÖVP seem to take more positive stances on immigration during the refugee crisis. In the following section, we shed light on the factors that drive mainstream parties' positions on immigration using regression analyses.

Dynamics of positional change

Following the same research design as for salience, we carry out regression analyses for party positions using Arellano-Bond estimators. We again present models with split-samples and use the same control variables. Considering the three different courses of options for mainstream parties presented in our theoretical model, i.e. sticking to positions, taking

Table 4.3: Regression results for mainstream parties' positions on immigration

	(1) all	(2) AT	(3) DE	(4) CH	(5) before	(6) during	(7) after	(8) center-right
RRP's position on immigration	-0.00	0.14	-0.08***	0.05	-0.05	0.12	0.03	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)
center-right								0.00
								(0.00)
center-right * RRP's position on imm.								-0.00
								(0.05)
asylum applications (N)	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.03***	-0.21	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.17)	(0.01)
polls RRP	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
public salience	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.09	0.00	0.47	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.28)	(0.01)	(0.30)	(0.01)
position on immigration (lag 1)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
position on immigration (lag 2)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.12	0.32	0.10	-0.37	0.20	0.26**	0.33	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.39)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.34)	(0.09)
Observations	646	209	299	138	286	188	172	646
Number of parties	14	4	6	4	13	14	13	14

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

a more positive stance, or accommodating the radical right, we find mostly null results in line with our expectations in H2b. The only exception are the German parties in our sample, which take more positive positions when radical right parties become more critical, as the negative and significant coefficient in model 3 suggests.[23]

Concerning center-right parties, we can only partly confirm our hypothesis that these parties will adjust their positions following radical right parties (H3b). The coefficient of the interaction term in model 8 presents a null finding of no such effect. Note, however, that this differs by country (see table 6.13): we can confirm the expectation of an effect for Switzerland, while the effect is negative for Germany and Austria (in the latter case, this finding is statistically significant). That suggests that in Austria, center-right parties adopted more pro-immigration attitudes when FPÖ radicalized its position.

Beyond the lack of significance for almost all models, we want to highlight the small effect sizes as party positions are overall rather stable. Additionally, all control variables have no effect. Only the monthly number of asylum applications shows a small positive effect on mainstream parties' positions for the crisis-period in model 6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we studied how radical right parties influenced mainstream parties' emphasis and positions on immigration in the context of the refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. We propose that – next to the effect of the crisis – mainstream parties' reactions are based on a two-step decision model drawing on Meguid's seminal framework. Specifically, we argue that parties are forced to increase their immigration emphasis, while adjusting their positions is not beneficial to them. Rather, they try to seems responsible, while also focusing on crisis management.

We show that mainstream parties' attention to immigration is not only affected by the crisis itself but also driven by radical right parties' emphasis of the topic. While we have focused on showing the existence of this contagion effect, our robustness checks also show that this effect works primarily within the same month, suggesting that parties react to their competitors within few days or weeks. This is important since our study constitutes the first empirical analysis that explores the immediate dynamics party competition on the immigration issue. Previous research on contagion has mostly studied a far longer timeline, e.g. from one election to the next. Our results suggest further research into contagion as a

[23] Again, we carry out a model additionally including a lag of radical right parties' position (see table 6.12). Controlling for the previous position of radical right parties, most null effects remain, only in the model for during the crisis the coefficient of radical right parties' current salience becomes positive and significant. The one-month lag of the DV, however, is not significant in any model.

direct interaction between competitors, e.g. regarding which messages parties are more likely to react to, may be promising.

However, our findings also suggest limits to the effect of the refugee crisis: First, we observed significant differences between party families and countries. After the end of the refugee crisis most parties' attention to immigration petered out quite soon, despite the radical leap in salience right after the beginning of the crisis. Only AfD in Germany maintained a high attention to immigration. In spite of this decrease in salience, radical right parties still manage to drive mainstream parties' issue attention. Hence, salience contagion is already in place before the refugee crisis and continues to exist in the post-crisis period.

Regarding parties' positions on immigration, we find great disparities between parties and countries. Most parties' positions are rather stable. We find little evidence that parties took more negative stances on immigration during the refugee crisis. In Germany, FDP and CSU shift to a more negative position. For some other parties, we actually find the opposite: The Greens and the Social democrats in Switzerland, as well as ÖVP in Austria became more pro-immigration during the crisis. In a regression framework, the radical right's impact on parties is rather limited and we only find evidence for such an effect in Germany where parties have seemingly taken a more adversarial stance towards the radical right. We suspect this may be due to the specificities of the case: Unlike the well-established radical right parties in Austria and Switzerland, AfD constituted a new challenger and hence sparked more drastic reactions. Of course, a careful validation has to show to which extent these parties really took a more positive stance or whether it is merely the pragmatic politics of the crisis and a turn towards humanitarian frames. Hence, looking into the changing framing of the immigration issue is an important avenue for further research.

Overall, our research leads us to conclude that the refugee crisis provided momentum for radical right parties, as they consistently managed to exert pressure on other parties, however mostly in terms of immigration salience rather than regarding positions. As this effect plays out quite similarly in all three countries, we argue that – despite the differences between our cases – radical right parties play a functionally equivalent role during crises in different contexts. When they are provided with a favorable political opportunity structure, they will raise attention to immigration and move their competitors to do so, too: Ultimately, nothing attracts a crowd of parties as quickly as a crisis.

5 A Contagious Zeitgeist? The Diffusion of Populism in the European Parliament

Introduction

Ever since Mudde (2004) anecdotally showed that the political mainstream in the UK and Flanders increasingly used populist rhetoric since the 1990s, the 'populist zeitgeist' has become a catchphrase in political science research. Despite the increased use of the term and of related phrases – such as populist diffusion or contagion – empirical evidence of this zeitgeist is scarce. While a multitude of studies has sought to investigate the existence of a populist zeitgeist, the findings are conflicting at best.

A broad array of scholars has studied *programmatic* spill-over effects from populist to mainstream parties, i.e. whether mainstream parties are adjusting to populist radical right parties' programmatic orientation. While this is certainly an important question, I argue that it does not fully tap into the concept of a populist zeitgeist. Since populism is increasingly defined in ideational terms, i.e. without any fixed policy profile, scholars should study populist contagion not in substantive terms but rather as *discursive contagion*.

This article is concerned with the use of populist discourse by populist and non-populist parties. It aims at disentangling the possible existence of a zeitgeist and a more specific contagion, which can be traced back to the behaviour of populist actors. Specifically, I argue that previous scholarship falls short considering one or several implications of studying a populist zeitgeist. First, studies often focused at too narrow time frames to establish whether populist communication increased and to determine the role populist parties played in this process. Second, while many studies use the label "populist", they are in fact concerned with the *programmatic contagion* that these parties exert on mainstream parties. This type of contagion is, however, largely independent from the fact that a party is populist but is contingent on the host ideology of the populist party. If we are interested in the spill-over effect that populist parties might cause, we should rather look at what I call *discursive contagion*, i.e. whether mainstream parties increasingly use populist discourse. Thirdly, I argue for a more systematic analysis of this possible increase of populist discourse that allows for differentiating between a more vague zeitgeist and a contagion fueled by populist parties and mainstream parties' reactions to these.

In this chapter, I use the terms populist rhetoric, discourse, and communication style interchangeably. These terms describe the content and style of parties' appeals, which are in turn seen as the manifestation of the underlying ideology of the parties. Populist communication is hence an expression of populist (thin) ideology. Thus, parties' communi-

cation strategies are suitable empirical material to identify whether a party adheres to populist ideology. The populist thin ideology in turn, is defined using Mudde's (2004, 543) influential definition of populism as "as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volontè gènèrale* (general will) of the people."

This article is structured as follows: First, I present previous studies and their findings on the existence of a populist zeitgeist. Next, I conceptualize my understanding of this zeitgeist and formulate expectations and hypotheses based on populism and contagion theory. Third, I describe my data, my conceptualization and measurement of populist discourse and my empirical strategy. After presenting my descriptive and explanatory findings, I interpret the results and close the chapter with concluding remarks.

A haunting populist zeitgeist?

The broad strand of literature on populist contagion and on the existence of a populist zeitgeist may be divided in three sets of studies: studies on populism in the media and public debate, studies on programmatic contagion, and studies on discursive contagion.

A first set of studies is in quest of a more general populist zeitgeist, studying populism in the media and public debate, rather than focusing on populism's impact on mainstream parties and party competition. Some scholars deem the increased media populism as results of structural changes: for instance, Plasser and Ulram (2003) stress media commercialization as a root, while Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) hold media tabloidization responsible. Other works assess how the success of populist parties drive this increase in media populism (e.g. Hameleers and Vliegenthart 2019; Mazzoleni 2008; Rooduijn 2014).

Second, studies that focus on the programmatic influence populist parties may exert on mainstream parties. Most of these studies focused solely on radical right or anti-immigrant parties, e.g. Bale (2003), van Spanje (2010), others include the term "populist" in their work (for instance Schumacher and Kersbergen (2016)). This broad literature strand often builds on Meguid (2005, 2008) whose work is tailored for assessing how mainstream parties deal with challenger parties and specifically the issues "owned" by these challenger parties. This short summary already points towards one problem present in contemporary scholarship on populist contagion: The need to distinguish between *programmatic* and *discursive contagion*. The first one is concerned with the question of whether mainstream parties adopt issues and issue positions of populist parties, i.e. programmatic features of populism's host ideology. The latter one, however, focuses on the adoption of a populist

discourse, which is not “thick” like the host ideology, but thin, i.e. it can be perceived as discursive feature rather than a fixed policy orientation.

The third group of studies is concerned with the use of populist discourse across different parties and time, thus chasing the notorious zeitgeist and possibly also its roots (for instance Zulianello, Albertini, and Ceccobelli 2018; Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug 2014; Manucci and Weber 2017). Not all studies mention this phrase, but they share the expectation that the use of populist discourse is ever increasing. This is often combined with the assumption that there is a populist contagion, i.e. that populist parties and their success drive this trend. Even though, many of these contributions claim to study the expansion of populist discourse, conflation of populism with a radical right host ideology is common. Another frequent trait of this literature strand is – instead of studying diffusion of populism over time – to employ a rather static research design. This means to assess how populist communication is distributed across politicians from different camps at a given point in time or focusing on a very short time frame, hence providing a “snapshot” rather then studying a potential increase of populism.

Perhaps due to the use of manifold empirical material, methods, as well as the focus on different geographical areas, parties and time periods, previous scholarship’s findings diverge vastly, the studies present conflicting evidence for a expansion of populist discourse across different types of parties and over time. The next sections present a selection of studies that find a) no indications of mainstream parties’ use of populist discourse, b) show that radical left and radical right parties use populist discourse, and c) suggest the existence of a populist zeitgeist.

Zulianello, Albertini, and Ceccobelli (2018) find little evidence for the existence of a populist zeitgeist based on their analysis of 83 populist and non-populist party leaders’ Facebook posts in twenty-six Western and Latin American countries. However, they only study a short time frame of 26 months assessing whether parties traditionally defined as non-populist use populist communication to a similar extent as populist parties. Their definition of populist communication includes “non-elite out-groups” which is understood as “exclusionary conception of ‘the people,’ defined in ‘negative terms’ through the horizontal comparison with the so-called ‘dangerous others’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008), particularly immigrants, ethnic, or religious minorities.” This definition is, however, prone to conflate populism with the nativism, which often serves as its host ideology. Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) hand-coded content analysis of TV programs analyzes the use of populist rhetoric by six Belgian parties from 1999 to 2001. While both populist and mainstream parties appealed to ‘the people’ (hence in line with findings of March’s demoticism (2017) and in line with chapter 3 of this dissertation) the use of “complete

populism" is solely a characteristic of the Vlaams Blok. This "complete populism" is understood as people-centrism, anti-elite references, and rhetorical exclusion of out-groups - hence also introducing a marker of the nativist host ideology to the authors' understanding of populism. Bos and Brants (2014) hand-coded analysis of Dutch media outlets and talk shows covers the election campaigns of 1994 to 2012 showing that a populist zeitgeist comes in waves, but a linear trend is mostly absent. Mainstream parties follow their populist competitors particularly in mimicking a populist style - defined as emphasizing leadership skills and installing a sense of crisis - and ideas - defined as anti-elitism and people-centrism - in some of their communication. Bracciale and Martella (2017) analyze the twitter posts of five Italian political leaders from 2015 to 2016, claiming that mainstream parties rarely use people-centrism and anti-elitism in the twitter posts. By far the most systematic and comprehensive assessment of a populist zeitgeist (Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug 2014) finds little contagion of mainstream parties in reaction to populist parties' success. The study covers election manifestos from five Western European countries over a period from 1988 to 2008. Manucci and Weber's Manucci and Weber (2017) findings strongly suggest that there is no increase of populism in parties' manifestos and the news media five Western European countries from 1970 to 2010. Their findings imply that populism in manifestos is a rather cyclical phenomenon which might become central to politics and then fade again. Newspapers seem to even curb - rather than reflect - the periodical expansion of populism.

In their hand-coded study of Facebook and twitter posts of 29 parties from five Western countries over the course of three months in 2015, Ernst et al. (2017) show that populism is mostly used by politicians of the edges of the political spectrum, i.e. the radical left and the radical right, rather than by centrist politicians. In Southern European countries, they rather find a linear increasing trend of the use of populist communication from the left to the right. Rooduijn and Akkerman's (2017) hand-coded analysis of party manifestos of 32 parties in five Western European countries from 1989 to 2008 shows that it is less the left-right position rather than the radicalness of parties that determines their use of populist rhetoric. Similarly, Bernhard and Kriesi's (2019) analysis indicates a prevalence of populist appeals among radical left and radical right parties compared to their centrist competitors. Their study also draws on a hand-coding approach and analyses press releases covering national elections in 11 European countries between 2012 and 2015. For the US American context, Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) show that populist claims are rather used by "outsider" presidential candidates, who are further away from the "center of power." These findings are very well in line with the analyses presented in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Unlike the studies discussed above, some previous work has provided empirical indication

for a populist zeitgeist among mainstream parties. Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) use both a qualitative content analysis and a dictionary approach for their analysis of populist communication in party manifestos across two to three elections from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. While "the usual suspects" use populism to a larger extent than mainstream parties, the latter are nevertheless not immune to using populist communication. Even though their study covers a longer time span, the authors do not discuss the possible increase of populist communication over time. In her study of Swiss political communication in parliament debates and committees as well as talk shows from 2001 to 2004, Cranmer (2011) shows that – even though the Swiss People's Party uses this style most consistently – the Christian-Democrats use populist rhetoric more than any other party in the Swiss party system.

The populist zeitgeist: definition and expectations

These previous studies of a populist contagion or zeitgeist, have generally used two different conceptualizations. Studies that are concerned with a short period under study, apply a rather static understanding of a populist zeitgeist, i.e. they consider their hypotheses confirmed once they find indication for the use of populist discourse among mainstream parties.The question of whether this is a new phenomenon which developed recently is usually not addressed. Other studies use a more dynamic approach towards the study of a populist zeitgeist and engage with longer time frames. For these studies, a populist zeitgeist is confirmed, once they find an expansion of the use of populism over time, regarding different types of parties. The more dynamic studies can be again distinguished into two sets: first, studies which use descriptive evidence, and second, studies that try to systematically model the specific contagion effect caused by populist parties (for instance Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug (2014)).

The term *zeitgeist* is defined as "the general intellectual, moral, and cultural climate of an era" (Merriam Webster 2020). The term *populist zeitgeist* was first coined by Mudde (2004), he argues "that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies" (542). The main thesis of the article is that mainstream parties adapt both strategies and issues brought up by populist radical right parties, introducing this zeitgeist. In his conclusion, Mudde (2004, 563) states:

> *When explicitly populist outsider groups gain prominence, parts of the establishment will react by a combined strategy of exclusion and inclusion; while trying to exclude the populist actor(s) from political power, they will include populist themes and rhetoric to try and fight off the challenge.*

This first part of Mudde's definition already points towards the first characteristic of a populist zeitgeist: the inherent need of a preceding contagion by a populist actor. This is different to other approaches that employ a more loose understanding of this zeitgeist, which might be driven by factors external to party competition, i.e. changes in the media system and the like. This understanding also implies that the increase of mainstream parties' use of populist rhetoric is not enough to prove this contagion. Mudde also explicitly states that this "populist outsider groups gain prominence" indicating that a populist actor needs to succeed – in some undefined regard – in order to be able to exert contagion on mainstream actors. This article aims to investigate the expansion of populism in two regards: first, investigating whether there is an increase in the use of populist discourse among different types of parties, and second, assessing whether this possible expansion can be traced back to determinants following from the theoretical accounts on populist contagion. Hence, the first hypothesis simply reads as:

H1: The use of populist rhetoric increases over time.

Alternatively, one could argue that populist discourse among mainstream parties follows less a linear increase and but rather mirrors cyclical up-and-downs. This matches descriptives evidence, for instance by Manucci and Weber (2017) and Bos and Brants (2014). Manucci and Weber (2017, 331) argue – building on Canovan's (1999) argument of populism as "perennial possibility" in democracies – that populism is "a 'natural' component of the public discourse." An absence of a drastic increase of populist discourse in mainstream parties' political communication would indicate, however, that we do not witness a shift in the role of populism. Thus, rather than a populist zeitgeist, populism is "just a regularly occurring shadow cast of democracy" itself (Canovan 1999, 3). Based on this I hypothesize:

H2: The use of populist rhetoric follows cyclical up-and-downs.

Regardless of whether we find support for a populist zeitgeist, i.e. a rather linear upward trend, or cyclical fluctuations, the question of the drivers of these developments remains. One potential explanation is built into Mudde's (2004, 563) argumentation, as he states "This dynamic will bring about a populist Zeitgeist, [...] like the one we are facing today, which will dissipate as soon as the populist challenger seems to be over its top." This argument is tested by most studies that systematically assess a possible populist contagion, findings are however mixed. Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug (2014) find no effects of populist success or mainstream parties' losses on the use of populist discourse by the latter. However, existing scholarship often focused on short time periods tied to election campaigns, thus rather providing "snap-shot" insights. The time periods before elections are not "normal times" and might increase the pressure for mainstream parties to react to

their populist challengers. Furthermore, election outcomes might increase the number of populists in parliaments and hence drive mainstream parties adoption of populist discourse. In order to test whether these moments of pressure and populist success drive non-populist parties' contagion, I propose the following hypothesis:

H3: When a populist challenger gains influence or is at risk of gaining influence in a political system, the established parties will adopt its discourse style.

Several authors have argued that different types of parties from different ideological camps react adopt populist rhetoric to a varying extent. Some authors (e.g. Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug 2014) claim that mainstream left parties are more prone to adopt the style of left-wing populist, while mainstream right parties will more likely follow right-wing populists as they respectively face more direct competition from the populist parties at the more proximate fringe of the political system. This argument follows a Downsian logic and is hence tailored for programmatic party competition rather than for an investigation of discursive contagion. Meguid's modified theory of spatial competition would also allow parties further away from the populist competitor to react to this competition by taking an accomodative or adversial stance. Transferred to the study of populist contagion, this would imply that mainstream left parties may adopt the populist rhetoric of populist radical right parties as well. As populist radical right parties were more successful than their equivalent in the last decades, I argue, following van Spanje's (2010) finding regarding programmatic contagion, that both left and right mainstream parties have an incentive to adapt their rhetoric of right-wing populists.

H4a: Both mainstream left and right parties adopt a populist discourse.

H4b: This effect is particularly strong, when radical-right populists gains influence in a political system.

Data

The data for the following analyses are measures of populist discourse developed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. My novel approach to identifying populist discourse combines several assumptions and steps. My main premise is that references to the people and to the elites require a moral framing in order to qualify as populist. In chapter 3, I have argued that – while this moral divide is theoretically well established – quantitative measures of populism have often not taken this framing into account. Furthermore, I develop separate measures for anti-elitism and people-centrism in order to detect patterns of their usage across actors. In more practical terms, I first identify plain, unframed references to the two separate groups and select a window of eight words around each reference. These "snippets" are

then used for an automated frame analysis. In order to spot morally-charged frames, i.e. positive for the people and negative for the elites, I developed *frame dictionaries* containing words which signal moral framing. In section 3 in chapter 3, I extensively validate my approach against a hand-coded gold-standard and comparing it to other dictionaries.

The measure itself is applied to a set of speeches given in the European Parliament from 2000 – 2013[24]. The original corpus, provided by Cross and Greene (2016), includes only speeches translated into English, which amount to 78 percent of the whole population of speeches. I reduce the size of the corpus a bit more by removing short speeches and speeches on foreign policy as my populism measure is often biased for this type of text. This results in a sample of 174605 speeches, with speech acts given by 1697 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) over the course of 14 years. The mean number of speeches per month is 1149.

The decision to study the European Parliament does not only result from practical reasons such as the availability of a high number of speeches translated to English, but also from substantive considerations. As I have argued in chapter 3, section 3, parliaments represent a conservative test for the use of populist discourse. Furthermore, the European Parliament provides us with a multitude of populist and non-populist parties from different party families, a characteristic that most national party systems lack. Hence, I argue that this provides us with an ideal testing ground for more general hypotheses on a populist zeitgeist.

Figure 5.1 shows the number of speeches held in each month from 2000 to 2013. Each dot represents the number of speeches held in a given month, while the line shows the smoothed trend. The vertical lines denote when European Parliament elections were held. For most of the period of observation, the number of speeches seems quite balanced up until 2010, when an sharp increase of speeches happens which peaks in 2012. After this peak, the monthly number of speeches stabilizes at a level similar to 2010. This drastic rise in speeches does not stem from a trend to shorter, but a larger number of speeches. Figure 6.5 in the appendix shows a very consistent but very slows reduction in speech length. However, panel B of the graph shows that also the number of total words increases. This indicates that there was indeed a period of heightened activity in the EP, which happened around the Great Recession and the Euro crisis[25].

[24]The full corpus includes also some months from 1999 and 2014. These were removed in my analyses, as they to not translate to whole quarters and my analyses is based on quarterly data.

[25]While the European Parliament has changed its policy regarding translation of speeches in the last decades, the peak in 2012 and the following sharp decline seem not to be related to these policy changes.



Figure 5.1: Monthly count of speeches in the European Parliament

Results

Descriptive findings

The first necessary step of my empirical analyses is to investigate if we in fact witness a quantitative expansion of populist discourse. Figure 5.2 presents descriptive findings regarding the use of populist discourse in the European Parliament. Panel A shows the use of anti-elite rhetoric, while panel B depicts the occurrence of people-centrism. Finally, panel C combines both measures. All graphs follow a logic of comparing parties which are conventionally defined as non-populist with parties which are *a priori* defined as populist based on a data set developed by Rooduijn et al. (2019). While the measures developed in chapter 3 indicate whether anti-elitism or people-centrism was used in an individual speech, the data were aggregated to quarterly basis for the sake of this chapter. Hence, each individual dot in the graph represents the share of speeches that included anti-elitism (panel A), people-centrism (panel B), or at least one of the two measures (panel C) in a given quarter. The triangles denote populist actors, while the round dots represent the share of populism among all non-populist actors. The lines in figure 5.2 show the smoothed trends for the measures, where the dashed line represents populist actors. While outliers were used to estimate the smoothed curve, the y-axis are truncated at 5 percent for panel A and at 1 percent in panel B and C in order to established readability of the graphs. The timing of European Parliament elections is again signaled by dashed, vertical lines.

As already discussed in chapter 3, section 3, instances of populist discourse are rather rare among all actors. Anti-elitism is a particularly scarce phenomenon, especially for non-populist actors. Parties conventionally defined as populist use anti-elitism to a larger

extent. Most striking is however, that we do find no indication for a linear trend but rather a cyclical development. Right after the elections in 2004, populist discourse increased. In regard to the use of people-centrism, non-populist and populist actors differ even less, as already discussed in 3, section 3. Interestingly, the small peaks in the the usage of people-centrism reflect the peaks in the use of anti-establishment rhetoric. Eventually, the combined measure mirrors mostly what the first two panels in figure 5.2 have shown: no signs of a linear increase of populist rhetoric in the EP (H1), rather short peaks, which seem to slightly confirm cyclical ups-and-downs (H2) at least for parties that are generally defined as populist. Even during these maximum values, the overall level of populism remains low. Mainstream parties do not seem to expand their use of populist discourse at all.

Regression analyses

After presenting a descriptive assessment on the existence of a populist zeitgeist, I turn to a regressional analyses of my data inspired by the research design of Bos and Brants (2014) and Rooduijn, Lange, and Brug (2014). My data differ from those used in previous studies in one important regard: the time unit. Both above mentioned studies draw on material collected during election campaigns and do hence not allow for a close, high-pace investigation of the development of populist discourse over time. As the European Parliament meets once a month for a four-day plenary session, I decided to aggregate my speech level data to quarterly basis. This aggregation level strikes the balance between two important considerations: First, the desire to study changes in the use of populist discourse in a close time frame and second, aggregating to quarters ensure that we have continuous observations for most actors with not too many gaps in the time series. As I am interested in whether different parties take up a populist discourse over time, my analyses are located on a party-quarter level. The average level of quarters observed per party is 25.

The dependent variable of all regression models is the percentage of populist speeches a party held in a given quarter relative to all speeches in this quarter of the respective party. This means that I use the combined measure of anti-elitism and people-centrism (depicted in panel C of figure 5.2), thus defining a speech as populist when at least one of the two core features appears in it. The parties that I define as "at risk" of being affected by populist discourse are parties which are usually not seen as populist. Hence, the parties considered in my regression analysis are all parties which were not classified as populist by Rooduijn et al. (2019). While the introduction and several other chapters in this dissertation have questioned the usefulness of defining a set of populist parties *a*



Figure 5.2: Mean monthly share of populist discourse over time

priori I draw on this categorization for two main reasons. First, I am interested in the behaviour of parties that are not externally defined as populist and – more importantly – do not consider themselves as such. And second, I aim to investigate how these parties react when threatened by populist challengers. While these populist parties might not use the label as self-attribution, in media and political debate the battle lines are often uncontested and clear.

In order to test my hypotheses H1 to H4b, I use a broad array of independent variables (IVs). As I am mainly concerned with the impact of other parties' level of populist discourse on parties' behaviour, my main independent variables are the general level of populist discourse among all parties in the EP (excluding the party in question), the level among populist parties, and the level among populist radical right parties. These IVs are included as concurrent variables and as first lag, in order to assess the time-dimension of a possible contagion. Additionally, my models include several control variables. First, I use the left-right measurement provided by ParlGov (2016), in order to asses whether there is indeed a increase of populism on the right side of the ideological spectrum. I also included the squared term of this measure allowing for a u-shaped relationship, which would confirm studies showing that populism is stronger on the radical fringes of the party landscape (Ernst et al. 2017; Bernhard and Kriesi 2019; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). This might not only be true for the levels of populist actors employ, but also for how sensitively they react to a populist zeitgeist or pressure from populist parties. In order to operationalise the increasing presence and power of populist actors in include two variables. First, the number of MEPs belonging to a populist party in a given quarter and second the number of speeches held by these MEPs in a quarter. Additionally, I add two binary variables, one indicating the quarter in which an election happened, and one for the quarter following an election. In order to test whether mainstream and non-mainstream parties react differently to the behaviour and pressure of populist parties, I run an additional set of models, only including center left and center right parties. I categorize parties as center left and center right using the party family variable from the ParlGov (2016) data set.

My modelling strategy mirrors the regression approach taken in chapter 4. As the two chapters aim to study diffusion effects, one with a focus on programmatic contagion and this one concerning a populist zeitgeist, taking similar approaches are particularly valuable. As in chapter 4, I use Arellano-Bond models (1991) which are dynamic panel models. This allows to take the auto-regressive component of the DV into account by adding the lagged DV as independent variables without running into endogeneity problems. This is made possible by using deeper lags of the DV as instruments for endogenous lags of the DV as Arellano-Bond models assume that first-order lag of the dependent variable is serially

correlated to the DV. For the second-order lag, however, the assumption is that there is no second-order serial correlation. This assumption was tested and is fulfilled (see table 6.15 in the appendix), hence the models will provide unbiased estimate. Additionally, I use robust standard errors in order to account for for hetreoskedasticity in the residual distribution.

Table 5.1: Regression results for the level of populist discourse among non-populist parties

VARIABLES	(1) all	(2) all	(3) all
Populist discourse (lag 1)	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Populist discourse (lag 2)	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
General level: populist discourse	0.41*		
	(0.23)		
General level: populist discourse (lag 1)	0.02		
	(0.30)		
Populists: Populist discourse		-0.19**	
		(0.07)	
Populists: Populist discourse (lag 1)		-0.12**	
		(0.06)	
Radical right populists: Populist discourse			-0.04
			(0.03)
Radical right populists: Populist discourse = L,			0.00
			(0.02)
Party's left-right position	-1.78	-1.58	-1.69
	(1.12)	(1.01)	(1.07)
Party's left-right position (squared)	0.37	0.33	0.35
	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Number of populist MEPs	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Percent of speeches by pop. parties	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
quarter of election	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
after after election	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-1.84	-1.56	-1.69
	(1.36)	(1.21)	(1.28)
Observations	5,197	5,197	5,197
Number of partyid	203	203	203

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 5.1 shows the results of three regression models including the three different independent variables for all non-populist parties in my sample. Table 5.2 includes the same models, however, only considering center left (models 1 – 3) and center right (models 4 – 6) parties. For the first models of each sample the main IV is the overall level of populist

Table 5.2: Regression results for the level of populist discourse among CR and CL parties

VARIABLES	(1) CL	(2) CL	(3) CL	(4) CR	(5) CR	(6) CR
Populist discourse (lag 1)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Populist discourse (lag 2)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
General level: populist discourse	0.22			0.08		
	(0.25)			(0.34)		
General level: populist discourse (lag 1)	0.04			0.15		
	(0.41)			(0.52)		
Populists: Populist discourse		-0.04			-0.20	
		(0.08)			(0.13)	
Populists: Populist discourse (lag 1)		-0.08			0.02	
		(0.08)			(0.09)	
Radical right populists: Populist discourse			-0.02			-0.02
			(0.03)			(0.04)
Radical right populists: Populist discourse (lag 1)			-0.01			0.06
			(0.04)			(0.04)
Number of populist MEPs	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Percent of speeches by pop. parties	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
quarter of election	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
quarter after election	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.02**	0.04***	0.03***	0.03*	0.05***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,163	1,163	1,163	1,863	1,863	1,863
Number of partyid	41	41	41	68	68	68

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

discourse across all parties excluding the party in question, the second models uses the populists' level of populist discourse, while the third column includes only the level of populist discourse by radical right populist parties.

In the models including all parties in table 5.1 and the models including center right parties (last three columns of table 5.2, both the first and the second order lag of the dependent variables are statistically significant in all three models. These coefficients are all negative, which indicates that a party's current level of populist discourse is negatively dependent on the level in the last two previous quarters, i.e. the last half year. While positive coefficients would indicate that there is a linear increasing (or decreasing) trend, the negative significance suggest a statistical relationship that points towards a cyclical fluctuation, in line with H2 and the findings from the descriptive analysis. For the models including only center left parties (models 1 –3 in table 5.2) these coefficients are not significant.

Next, I turn to the findings for the three main independent variables. For the models including all parties, the concurrent general level of populist discourse among all parties seems to have a positive impact on a party's level of populist discourse. For populists' level of populist discourse, I find an opposite, statistically significant effect. For populist radical right parties' level of populist rhetoric, there is no indication for a statistical association. For both center left and center right parties none of these IVs are statistically significant.

In substantive terms, these findings provide only very limited support for hypothesis H3. Non-center, non-populist parties parties seem to react in positive terms to the general level of populist speech, i.e. a "populist zeitgeist" which is driven by diverse actors, and hence employ more populist rhetoric themselves. On the other hands, it does not seem that populist parties manage to drive parties. The negative coefficient in model 2, table 5.1 rather indicates that non-center, non-populist parties tone down populist discourse in reaction to populist radical right parties' increased populist discourse. For both center left and center right parties, there is no indication for such an effect, hence, H4a and H4b are rejected.

The variables for populist success, i.e. the number of speeches held by populist politicians and the number of populists MEPs, are not significant in any of the models presented above. Hence, neither populist parties' behaviour, i.e. the content of their speeches, nor their success, i.e. representation and activity in the EP, seem to drive non-populist parties behaviour in the EP.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I studied the diffusion of populist discourse in the European Parliament in order to assess whether the often described populist zeitgeist takes place in this arena. For my empirical analyses, I used measures of populist discourse developed in chapter 3 of this dissertation which are applied to speeches held by MEPs from 2000 to 2013. The descriptive evidence speaks against the existence of such a zeitgeist. While we see a small difference between parties conventionally defined as populist and non-populist, we find little indication of an increase of populist rhetoric in the EP and hence have to reject the hypothesis of an encompassing populist zeitgeist. For populist parties, however, the level of populist discourse seems to follow waves as we cyclically witness peaks in their use of populist speech. The next step of the analysis aimed at a more systematic understanding of the dynamics at play. Aggregating the measures of populist discourse to a quarterly level, I used regression analyses in order to study whether non-populist actors follow trends in the use of populist discourse. For the main explanatory variables, I distinguished between a) the general level of populist discourse in the EP, b) the extent to which populist parties employ a populist rhetoric, and c) the level of populist rhetoric used by radical right populists. The regression analyses indicate that populist actors' populist rhetoric does not drive increased levels of populist rhetoric among non-populist parties. For non-populist, non-center parties, rather the opposite seems to be the case, i.e. they tone down populism when populist parties' increase their level of populist discourse. However, the general level of populism, i.e. the level to which all parties in the EP employ populist rhetoric, affects non-populist non-mainstream parties and drives them to use more populism in their EP speeches. While this might be a small indication for a populist zeitgeist, the actual fluctuation of populism is low.

6 Conclusion

This dissertation focuses on populist radical right parties' programmatic and discursive contagion of mainstream parties in Europe. In the single chapters, I have studied this possible phenomenon from different perspectives in order to develop a comprehensive research framework.

Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive meta-study of the field of populism research which assessed whether scholars are "sitting on separate tables" due to three possible divides which are rooted in a) the different host ideologies under analysis, b) different geographical foci, and c) methodological differences. We argue that – similar to public debate and media reporting – scholars often emphasize populism and omit the centrality of the host ideologies for populist parties. In our analyses, we first rely on the abstracts of all 884 Political Science articles published in peer-reviewed journals from 2004 to 2018. Using a Wordfish model to scale them across one dimension, we show how divided the research field is: One pole is typified by a focus on the Global South, a left-wing host ideology and the use of qualitative methods, while a focus on Western countries, a radical-right host ideology and quantitative methods are located on the other side of the spectrum. These findings are further supported in our second step, a hand-coded analysis of a random sample of peer-reviewed articles. Our results show that populism is often used as a label to describe the radical right party family without being used in the studies' argumentation. Examples from our sample show how academics often base their theoretical expectations on host ideologies, while claiming that the phenomenon under study is populism. This chapter sets the stage for the following parts of the dissertation as it provides evidence for a conflation of populism and host ideologies in scholarly literature and emphasizes the need distinguish more clearly between the these concepts.

Next, in chapter 3, I argue for the need of a theoretically sound and empirically valid measurement of populist discourse. This is especially crucial if we aim to study whether parties adopt a populist discourse over time, i.e. when studying the populist zeitgeist. I base my measurement on the moral distinction between the people and the elites and develop a novel two-step dictionary approach. After applying my approach to all speeches held in the European Parliament from 1999 to 2014, I validate my measures carefully against a hand-coded gold standard and compare their performance to other populism dictionaries. While the accuracy is not sky-rocketing, my dictionaries outperform previous approaches and are hence a valuable tool for identifying populist discourse.

The last two chapters study the programmatic and discursive contagion separately. Chapter 4 assessed how radical right parties influenced mainstream parties' emphasis and positions

on immigration during the refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. We find that immigration was a highly salient issue in all three countries during the crisis, while parties rarely alter their positions. Most importantly, we show that mainstream parties' attention to immigration is not only affected by the crisis itself but significantly driven by radical right parties' behaviour. Thus, we provide empirical evidence for a programmatic contagion in terms of salience that is even independent from disruptive events such as the refugee crisis. Even though the crisis effect vanishes and general immigration salience decreases to pre-crisis levels, radical right parties still manage to drive mainstream parties' issue attention. Hence, salience contagion is already in place before the refugee crisis and continues to exist in the post-crisis period. Regarding programmatic contagion in terms of positions, we find great disparities between parties and countries. Most parties' positions are rather stable. We find little evidence that parties took more negative stances on immigration during the refugee crisis. In Germany, the FDP, and the CSU shift to a more negative position. For some other parties, we actually find the opposite: The Greens and the Social democrats in Switzerland, as well as the ÖVP in Austria became more pro-immigration during the crisis. In a regression framework, the radical rights' impact on parties is rather limited and we only find consistent evidence for such an effect in Germany where on average parties have seemingly taken a more adversarial stance towards the radical right. We suspect this may be due to the institutionalization of the radical right competitor: Unlike the well-established radical right parties in Austria and Switzerland, the AfD constituted a new challenge to German parties and hence sparked more drastic reactions.

The last chapter studied the discursive contagion, i.e. the existence of a populist zeitgeist. Using the measures of populist discourse in the European Parliament, developed in chapter 3, I find little to no indication for such a zeitgeist. The descriptive evidence shows that the general level of populist discourse is rather stable at a low level over the course of the 15 years under study. This is true for both parties conventionally defined as non-populist and populist. For the latter group, the level of populist discourse seems to follow waves with small cyclical up-and-downs. Aggregating the measures of populist discourse to a quarterly level, I run regression analyses in order to assess trends in the use of populist discourse. I include three main independent variables a) the general level of populist discourse in the EP, b) the extent to which populist parties employ a populist rhetoric, and c) the level of populist rhetoric used by radical right populists. My findings indicate that populist actors' populist rhetoric does not drive increased levels of populist rhetoric among non-populist parties. For non-populist, non-center parties, i.e. parties on the fringes of the political spectrum, rather the opposite seems to be the case, i.e. they tone down populism

when populist parties' increase their level of populist discourse. However, the general level of populism, i.e. the level to which all parties in the EP employ populist rhetoric, affects non-populist, non-centrist parties and drives them to use more populism in their EP speeches. While this might be a small indication for a populist zeitgeist, the actual fluctuation of populism is low.The lack of populist contagion might also stem from the limitations of chapter 5. First, the European Parliament is certainly a very technical arena and mainstream parties' language outside of the EP might be more prone to a contagion with populist discourse. This points towards the need to adapt the existing dictionary approach and to apply it to other kinds of political texts, for instance press releases or campaign speeches. Second, a next step of analysis would zoom into the month in which we witness peaks in populist discourse by populists and study the other parties' reactions in a more in-depth, qualitative manner.

Apart from developing a new measurement of populist discourse and contributing to our knowledge on populist radical right parties' impact on other parties, this dissertation aimed to show the value of text-as-data methods for studying dynamics in party competition. Chapter 4 and 5 both use data resulting from text-as-data methods, i.e. dictionaries and Wordscores. Automatization comes with the obvious advantage of a reduction in labour- and time-intensive human coding. This allows for creating more high-pace, continuous data sets on parties' issue salience, programmatic positions, and rhetoric in small time units. Unlike many previous studies, which draw on data coming from election campaigns, hence only using "snapshots" every couple of years, monthly data allows political scientists to assess more immediate reactions of parties to external stimuli, such as other parties' behaviour.

The choice of empirical material also implies limits to media-based studies which often report extensive contagion effects. Our study of mainstream parties' immigration salience and positions shows that heightened attention to immigration issues petered out towards the end of the refugee crisis, while related media-based studies do not find such a decrease. This serves as indication that political science scholars should reflect more on the role of media bias. While parties toned down their emphasis on these issues in press releases, the media seemed to over-proportionally report on mainstream parties' stances on immigration. This might lead to an overestimation of programmatic contagion. Using temporally relatively coarse data on election campaigns on the other hand might lead to an underestimation of a contagion effect as parties seem to react quite swiftly to their competitors. This does not only apply to studies of (nativist) programmatic contagion, but to studying the populist zeitgeist as many previous studies have focused on empirical material tied to election campaigns. While text-as-data methods do not enable us to over-come these limitations

present in previous studies, they also offer a way to study discursive and programmatic contagion parallel in future studies.

The substantive findings of chapter 3 also show that people-centrism and anti-elitism rarely co-occur in the same EP speech. This leaves room for discussion about the need for these features to be present within the same text in order to qualify as populist. Furthermore, my findings show that actors conventionally categorized as populist are more prone to use both features across their speeches than mainstream party parliamentarians. Hence, we can conclude that "populist is what populist does." Additionally, my findings show that populist discourse is more seldom used by centrist parties (in line with Ernst et al. 2017; Bernhard and Kriesi 2019; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). The use of populism by mainstream parties points towards March's (2017, 290) findings of "demoticism (i.e. closeness to 'ordinary' people without this antagonistic identity)" as a common trait of mainstream parties' rhetoric. This adds an additional layer to the study of a populist zeitgeist, as it seems that mainstream parties may not be able to adapt all features of populism due to their established positions of power.

Lastly, I aim to reflect on the interaction between host ideologies and populism. While chapter 2 has emphasized the need for researchers to distinguish conceptually between these two characteristics of parties in their research, our recommendation is to move to studying how they mutually interact. This is mirrored by the research agenda that follows from chapter 4 and 5: to study discursive and programmatic contagion in connection with each other. In both of these contexts, a firm conceptual distinction can result in more sound findings, as it allows for studying concepts in interaction.

While the indications for a populist zeitgeist are limited, I am convinced that we need a theoretical account on how discursive contagion – also beyond populist contagion – works and whether and where it differs from the mechanisms of programmatic contagion. This would pave the way for a conceptually clear assessment of the consequences of populist discourse and its host ideologies separately. Most scholarly work that aimed at studying the populist zeitgeist have based their theoretical expectations on theories tailored for mainstreams parties' reactions in terms of salience and policy positions (often drawing on Meguid 2005, 2008) hence often conflating programmatic and discursive contagion. Additionally, while we can distinguish between parties' reactions in terms of salience and position in the one case, populist contagion is rather uni-dimensional. Thus, further theoretical innovation is necessary in order to provide us with a deeper understanding of parties' incentives to follow a populist discourse.

Despite the limitations of the fifth chapter and even though the last two papers have

studied different time frames, cases, and empirical material, my findings suggests rather strong programmatic contagion in terms of salience while discursive contagion seems to be completely absent. This seems to point towards parties being more prone to fall for programmatic contagion rather than a populist zeitgeist. Regarding this relationship, Mudde already proposed a hypothesis in his 2004 article (563):

> *While mainstream political parties may not imitate populist parties in their policies, mainstream politicians do imitate populist politicians in their rhetoric, and not only during election campaigns.*

While he argues that programmatic contagion is set to happen mostly during election campaigns, discursive contagion may also take place in normal times. However, I believe this argument is somehow contrary to his prerequisite that populist challengers have to "gain prominence" as they might be most threatening to mainstream parties in phases before elections. Furthermore, the quote above implies that discursive contagion is of "softer", lower threshold quality than programmatic contagion and hence might happen more easily and more often. The findings of this dissertation, however, point towards the opposite. However, further research should study both types of contagion in the same context in order to make reliable claims on the different levels of contagion in comparison. A further interesting aspect is how programmatic and discursive contagion might interact or be conditional on each other. My plea for different research approaches to studying the consequences of populism and host ideologies lays groundwork in this direction.

References

Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2016. "Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact." *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 417–36.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2019. "Parties' Policy Adjustments in Response to Changes in Issue Saliency." *West European Politics*, June.

Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research." *The American Political Science Review* 95 (3): 529–46.

Afonso, Alexandre. 2015. "Choosing Whom to Betray: Populist Right-Wing Parties, Welfare State Reforms and the Trade-Off Between Office and Votes." *European Political Science Review* 7 (2): 271–92.

Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove. 2014. "How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters." *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (9): 1324–53.

Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. 2008. "Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre." In *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, 1–11. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1988. "Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 21 (4): 828–42.

Alonso, Sonia, and Sara Claro da Fonseca. 2012. "Immigration, Left and Right." *Party Politics* 18 (6): 865–84.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. 1994. "Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58 (3): 335–57.

Arellano, Manuel, and Stephen Bond. 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations." *The Review of Economic Studies* 58 (2): 277–97.

Armony, Ariel C., and Victor Armony. 2005. "Indictments, Myths, and Citizen Mobilization in Argentina: A Discourse Analysis." *Latin American Politics & Society* 47 (4):

27–54.

Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002.” *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 259–75.

———. 2015. “The Afd: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?” *West European Politics* 38 (3): 535–56.

Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective.” *Political Studies* 64 (1): 88–104.

———. 2017. “Measuring Populist Discourse with Semantic Text Analysis: An Application on Grassroots Populist Mobilization.” *Quality & Quantity* online first: 1–23.

Bakker, Bert N., Matthijs Rooduijn, and Gijs Schumacher. 2016. “The Psychological Roots of Populist Voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany.” *European Journal of Political Research* 55 (2): 302–20.

Bale, Tim. 2003. “Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe’s Bipolarising Party Systems.” *West European Politics* 26 (3): 67–90.

Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. 2010. “If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe.” *Political Studies* 58 (3): 410–26.

Bale, Tim, Paul Taggart, and Paul Webb. 2006. “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Populism and the Power Inquiry.” *The Political Quarterly* 77 (2): 195–203.

Benoit, Kenneth, Kohei Watanabe, Haiyan Wang, Paul Nulty, Adam Obeng, Stefan Müller, and Akitaka Matsuo. 2018. “Quanteda: An R Package for the Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data.” *Journal of Open Source Software* 3 (30): 774.

Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. 2015. “The Afd and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?” *German Politics* 24 (2): 154–78.

Bernhard, Laurent, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2019. “Populism in Election Times: A Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries in Western Europe.” *West European Politics* 42 (6): 1188–1208.

Bernhard, Laurent, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Edward Weber. 2015. “The Populist Discourse of the Swiss People’s Party.” In *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*,

edited by Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas, 125–39. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Berrios, Ruben, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern. 2011. “Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin America: Economics and Political Ideology.” *Review of International Political Economy* 18 (5): 673–97.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 2002. “Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies.” In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, edited by Yves Meny and Yves Surel, 197–213. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Bonikowski, Bart, and Noam Gidron. 2016. “The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Rhetoric, 1952-1996.” *Social Forces* 94 (4): 1593–1621.

———. 2018. “Populism in Legislative Discourse: Evidence from the European Parliament, 1999-2004.” *Working Paper*.

Bonikowski, Bart, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Eric Kaufmann, and Matthijs Rooduijn. 2019. “Populism and Nationalism in a Comparative Perspective: A Scholarly Exchange.” *Nations and Nationalism* 25 (1): 58–81.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Rens Vliegenthart. 2007. “Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content.” *Electoral Studies* 26 (2): 404–17.

Bordignon, Fabio, and Luigi Ceccarini. 2013. “Five Stars and a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics.” *South European Society and Politics* 18 (4): 427–49.

Bornschier, Simon. 2015. “The New Cultural Conflict, Polarization, and Representation in the Swiss Party System, 1975–2011.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 21 (4): 680–701.

Bos, Linda, and Kees Brants. 2014. “Populist Rhetoric in Politics and Media: A Longitudinal Study of the Netherlands.” *European Journal of Communication* 29 (6): 703–19.

Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2018. “From the Euro to the Schengen Crises: European Integration Theories, Politicization, and Identity Politics.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 25 (1): 83–108.

Bracciale, Roberta, and Antonio Martella. 2017. “Define the Populist Political Communication Style: The Case of Italian Political Leaders on Twitter.” *Information, Communication & Society* 20 (9): 1310–29.

Bremer, Björn, and Julia Schulte-Cloos. 2019. “Restructuring British and German Party Politics in Times of Crises.” In *Restructuring European Party Politics in Times of Crises*,

edited by Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2017a. "Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (8): 1191–1226.

———. 2017b. "Why Populism?" *Theory and Society* 46 (5): 357–85.

Buzalka, Juraj. 2018. "Post-Peasant Memories: Populist or Communist Nostalgia." *East European Politics and Societies* 32 (4): 988–1006.

Caiani, Manuela, and Donatella della Porta. 2011. "The Elitist Populism of the Extreme Right: A Frame Analysis of Extreme Right-Wing Discourses in Italy and Germany." *Acta Politica* 46 (2): 180–202.

Cammack, Paul. 2000. "The Resurgence of Populism in Latin America." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19 (2): 159–61.

Canovan, Margaret. 1981. *Populism.* San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

———. 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy." *Political Studies* 47 (1): 2–16.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. 1979. *Dependency and Development in Latin America.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. 2017. "Framing Exclusion in the Public Sphere: Far-Right Mobilisation and the Debate on Charlie Hebdo in Italy." *South European Society and Politics* 22 (3): 345–64.

Chykina, Volha, and Charles Crabtree. 2018. "Using Google Trends to Measure Issue Salience for Hard-to-Survey Populations." *Socius* 4 (January).

Cleen, Benjamin De, and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2017. "Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism." *Javnost - the Public* 24 (4): 301–19.

Cleen, Benjamin De, Jason Glynos, and Aurelien Mondon. 2018. "Critical Research on Populism: Nine Rules of Engagement." *Organization* 25 (5): 649–61.

Cooper, Harris M. 1982. "Scientific Guidelines for Conducting Integrative Research Reviews." *Review of Educational Research* 52 (2): 291–302.

Cowsey, Jasin. 2017. "Emmanuel Macron: A Populist Eruption from the Liberal Centre."

New Statesman, Autumn.

Cranmer, Mirjam. 2011. “Populist Communication and Publicity: An Empirical Study of Contextual Differences in Switzerland.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 17 (3): 286–307.

Cross, James, and Derek Greene. 2016. “Replication Data for: Exploring the Political Agenda of the European Parliament Using a Dynamic Topic Modeling Approach.” *Havard Dataverse* doi:10.7910/DVN/LVHLZK (August).

Dacombe, Rod. 2018. “Systematic Reviews in Political Science: What Can the Approach Contribute to Political Research?” *Political Studies Review* 16 (2): 148–57.

Daigneault, Pierre-Marc, Steve Jacob, and Mathieu Ouimet. 2014. “Using Systematic Review Methods Within a Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science: Challenges and Lessons Learned from Practice.” *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 17 (3): 267–83.

Dancygier, Rafaela, and Yotam Margalit. 2019. “The Evolution of the Immigration Debate: Evidence from a New Dataset of Party Positions over the Last Half-Century.” *Comparative Political Studies.*

De Cleen, Benjamin, Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu, and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2019. “The Potentials and Difficulties of Transnational Populism: The Case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (Diem25).” *Political Studies* 0 (0): 1–21.

De la Torre, Carlos. 2000. *Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience.* Athens: Ohio University Press.

De la Torre, Carlos. 2016. “Populism and the Politics of the Extraordinary in Latin America.” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21 (2): 121–39.

———. 2017. “Populism in Latin America.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy.

Decker, Frank. 2016. “The ‘Alternative for Germany:’ Factors Behind Its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-Wing Populist Party.” *German Politics and Society* 34 (2): 1–16.

Deegan-Krause, Kevin, and Tim Haughton. 2009. “Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia.” *Politics & Policy* 37 (4): 821–41.

Denyer, David, and David Tranfield. 2009. “Producing a Systematic Review.” In *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Research Methods*, edited by David A. Buchanan and

Alan Bryman, 671–89. London: Sage.

Di Tella, Torcuato S. 1965. "Populism and Reforms in Latin America." In *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, edited by C. Véliz, 47–74. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1997. "Populism into the Twenty-First Century." *Government and Opposition* 32: 187–200.

Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards. 1991. *Macroeconomic Populism in Latin America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow. 2016. "Parliaments and Governments Database (Parlgov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies." *Development Version.*

Dunn, Kris. 2015. "Preference for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties Among Exclusive-Nationalists and Authoritarians." *Party Politics* 21 (3): 367–80.

Economist, The. 2018. "Dancing with Danger - Europe's Populists Are Waltzing into the Mainstream." *The Economist*, February.

Elchardus, Mark, and Bram Spruyt. 2016. "Populism, Persistent Republicanism and Declinism: An Empirical Analysis of Populism as a Thin Ideology." *Government and Opposition* 51 (1): 111–33.

Engesser, Sven, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel. 2017. "Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology." *Information, Communication & Society* 20 (8): 1109–26.

Ernst, Nicole, Sina Blassnig, Sven Engesser, Florin Büchel, and Frank Esser. 2019. "Populists Prefer Social Media over Talk Shows: An Analysis of Populist Messages and Stylistic Elements Across Six Countries." *Social Media + Society* 5 (1): 1–14.

Ernst, Nicole, Sven Engesser, Florin Büchel, Sina Blassnig, and Frank Esser. 2017. "Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter Across Six Countries." *Information, Communication & Society* 20 (9): 1347–64.

European Commission. 2018. *Public Opinion in the European Union Report.*

Fennema, Meindert, and Wouter Van Der Brug. 2003. "Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-Immigrant Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 1999." *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (1): 55–76.

FORS, ZDA. 2018. *VOTO - Surveys on the Swiss Popular Votes, 2016 - 2018.* FORS - Centre of expertise in the social sciences, Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau (ZDA),

University of Zurich. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne.

Geers, Sabine, and Linda Bos. 2017. "Priming Issues, Party Visibility, and Party Evaluations: The Impact on Vote Switching." *Political Communication* 34 (3): 344–66.

Germani, Gino. 1978. *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Gerwien, Tilman. 2017. "Martin Schulz – Der Nette Populist." *Stern*, January.

Gidron, Noam, and Bart Bonikowski. 2013. "Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda." Weatherhead Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004; Weatherhead Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004.

Goodwin, Matthew. 2017. "European Populism Is Here to Stay." *The New York Times*, 20.

Grabbe, Heather, and Nadja Groot. 2014. "Populism in the European Parliament: What Implications for the Open Society?" *The International Spectator* 49 (4): 33–46.

Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. "Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96 (5): 1029–46.

Grande, Edgar, Tobias Schwarzbözl, and Matthias Fatke. 2018. "Politicizing Immigration in Western Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 0 (0): 1–20.

Granka, Laura. 2013. "Using Online Search Traffic to Predict Us Presidential Elections." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46 (2): 271–79.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2019. *The Reshaping of West European Party Politics: Agenda-Setting and Party Competition in Comparative Perspective.* First edition. Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Simon Otjes. 2017. "A Hot Topic? Immigration on the Agenda in Western Europe." *Party Politics*, August.

Greussing, Esther, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2017. "Shifting the Refugee Narrative? An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe's 2015 Refugee Crisis." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43 (11): 1749–74.

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. "Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts." *Political Analysis* 21

(3): 267–97.

Haidt, Jonathan, and Jesse Graham. 2007. "When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions That Liberals May Not Recognize." *Social Justice Research* 20 (1): 98–116.

Haidt, Jonathan, and Craig Joseph. 2005. "The Moral Mind: How Five Sets of Innate Intuitions Guide the Development of Many Culture-Specific Virtues, and Perhaps Even Modules." In *The Innate Mind*, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen P Stich, 367–91. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hameleers, Michael, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2019. "The Rise of a Populist Zeitgeist? A Content Analysis of Populist Media Coverage in Newspapers Published Between 1990 and 2017." *Journalism Studies* 0 (0): 1–18.

Hameleers, Michael, Linda Bos, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2017. "'They Did It': The Effects of Emotionalized Blame Attribution in Populist Communication." *Communication Research* 44 (6): 870–900.

Harteveld, Eelco, Joep Schaper, Sarah L. De Lange, and Wouter Van Der Brug. 2018. "Blaming Brussels? The Impact of (News About) the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes Towards the Eu and National Politics." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*.

Havlík, Vlastimil, and Petr Voda. 2018. "Cleavages, Protest or Voting for Hope? The Rise of Centrist Populist Parties in the Czech Republic." *Swiss Political Science Review* 24 (2): 161–86.

Hawkins, Kirk A, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. "The Ideational Approach to Populism." *Latin American Research Review* 52 (4).

Hawkins, Kirk A. 2009. "Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies*, February.

———. 2010. *Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, Kirk A., and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. "What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can't." *Swiss Political Science Review* 23 (4): 526–42.

Henley, Jon. 2018. "How Populism Emerged as an Electoral Force in Europe." *The Guardian*, 20.

Hofstra, Bas, Vivek V. Kulkarni, Sebastian Munoz-Najar Galvez, Bryan He, Dan Juraf-

sky, and Daniel A. McFarland. 2020. “The Diversity-Innovation Paradox in Science.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 117 (17): 9284–91.

Hopkins, Daniel J, and Gary King. 2010. “A Method of Automated Nonparametric Content Analysis for Social Science.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 229–47.

Hosu, Ioan, and Mihnea S Stoica. 2017. “Romania: From Institutional to Personal Political Conflict. Mainstream Political Discourse on the Eve of the Refugee Crisis.” *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, no. 20.

Hutter, Swen, and Theresa Gessler. 2019. “Design, Methods, and Cross-Validation.” In *European Party Politics in Times of Crises*, edited by Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2018. “Restructuring the Party Systems in North-Western Europe. Six Countries Compared.” *Conference: 2017: Europe’s Bumper Year of Elections, Proceedings.*

———, eds. 2019. *European Party Politics in Times of Crises.* Cambridge University Press.

Ignazi, Piero, and Colette Ysmal. 1992. “Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe.” *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (1): 1–2.

Ionescu, Ghița, and Ernest Gellner. 1969. *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics.* Macmillan.

Ivaldi, Gilles, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, and Dwayne Woods. 2017. “Varieties of Populism Across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 23 (4): 354–76.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2008. “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (1): 3–23.

Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. 1987. *News That Matters.* University of Chicago Press.

Jagers, Jan, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2007. “Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties’ Discourse in Belgium.” *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (3): 319–45.

Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. 2008. “The (Not Always Sweet) Uses of Opportunism: Post-Communist Political Parties in Poland.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41 (4):

421–42.

Jasper, James M. 1992. "The Politics of Abstractions: Instrumental and Moralist Rhetorics in Public Debate." *Social Research* 59 (2): 315–44.

Jung, Jae-Hee. 2019. "The Mobilizing Effect of Parties' Moral Rhetoric." *American Journal of Political Science* forthcoming.

Kahler, Miles. 2018. "Global Governance: Three Futures." *International Studies Review* 20 (2): 239–46.

Kessel, Stijn van. 2015. *Populist Parties in Europe. Agents of Discontent?* Basingstoke.

Klüver, Heike, and Iñaki Sagarzazu. 2016. "Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? Political Parties, Voters and Issue Attention." *West European Politics* 39 (2): 380–98.

Krieckhaus, Jonathan. 2006. "Democracy and Economic Growth: How Regional Context Influences Regime Effects." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (2): 317–40.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2014. "The Populist Challenge." *West European Politics* 37 (2): 361–78.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Matthias Brunner, and François Lorétan. 2016. *Standardisierte Umfragen VoxIt 1981-2016.* Université de Genève - Faculté Des Sciences de La Société - SdS - Département de Science Politique et Relations Internationales, Universität Zürich - Philosophische Fakultät - Institut Für Politikwissenschaft - IPZ - Lehrstuhl Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, FORS - Centre de Compétences Suisse En Sciences Sociales. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Hoeglinger, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wueest. 2012. *Political Conflict in Western Europe.* Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Swen Hutter, Argyrios Altiparmakis, Endre Borbáth, Simon Bornschier, Björn Bremer, et al. 2020. "PolDem-National Election Campaign Dataset."

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey, eds. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.* Cambridge University Press.

Laclau, Ernesto. 1978. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory.* London: Verso.

———. 2005. *On Populist Reason.* London: Verso.

Laméris, Maite D., Richard Jong-A-Pin, and Harry Garretsen. 2018. "On the measurement

of voter ideology." *European Journal of Political Economy* 55 (C): 417–32.

Laver, Michael, and John Garry. 2000. "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 619–34.

Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data." *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 311–31.

Lefkofridi, Zoe, Markus Wagner, and Johanna E. Willmann. 2014. "Left-Authoritarians and Policy Representation in Western Europe: Electoral Choice Across Ideological Dimensions." *West European Politics* 37 (1): 65–90.

Levitsky, Steven, and James Loxton. 2013. "Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes." *Democratization* 20 (1): 107–36.

Lowe, Will. 2008. "Understanding Wordscores." *Political Analysis* 16 (4): 356–71.

Lowndes, Joseph. 2016. "White Populism and the Transformation of the Silent Majority." *The Forum* 14 (1): 25–37.

Lubbers, Marcel, and Marcel Coenders. 2017. "Nationalistic Attitudes and Voting for the Radical Right in Europe." *European Union Politics* 18 (1): 98–118.

Mader, Matthias, and Harald Schoen. 2018. "The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters' Responses in Germany." *West European Politics* 0 (0): 1–24.

Malová, Darina, and Branislav Dolný. 2016. "Economy and Democracy in Slovakia During the Crisis: From a Laggard to the EU Core." *Problems of Post-Communism* 63 (5-6): 300–312.

Manucci, Luca, and Edward Weber. 2017. "Why the Big Picture Matters: Political and Media Populism in Western Europe Since the 1970s." *Swiss Political Science Review* 23 (4): 313–34.

March, Luke. 2017. "Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19 (2): 282–303.

Mazzoleni, Gianpetro. 2008. "Populism and the Media." In *Twenty-First Century Populism:The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, 49–64. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro. 2003. "The Media and the Growth of Neo-Populism in Contemporary Democracies." In *The Media and Neo-Populism. a Comparative Analysis*, edited by

Mazzoleni Gianpietro, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield, 1–20. London: Praeger.

McGann, Anthony J., and Herbert Kitschelt. 2005. "The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss Svp and Austrian Fpö." *Party Politics* 11 (2): 147–71.

Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. "Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 347–59.

Meguid, Bonnie M. 2008. *Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press.

Mellon, Jonathan. 2013. "Where and When Can We Use Google Trends to Measure Issue Salience?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46 (2): 280–90.

Meny, Yves, and Yves Surel. 2002. "The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, edited by Yves Meny and Yves Surel, 1–21. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Meyer, Sarah, and Sieglinde Rosenberger. 2015. "Just a Shadow? The Role of Radical Right Parties in the Politicization of Immigration, 1995–2009." *Politics and Governance* 3 (2): 1–17.

Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. 2000. *Par Le Peuple, Pour Le Peuple: Le Populisme et Les démocraties*. Paris: Fayard.

Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. 2002. "The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, 1–24. Palgrave.

Milne, Richard. 2019. "Danish Populists' Support Collapses but Their Policies Live on." *Financial Times*, June.

Moffitt, Benjamin, and Simon Tormey. 2014. "Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style." *Political Studies* 62 (2): 381–97.

Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.

Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 541–63.

———. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2010. "The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy." *West European Politics* 33 (6): 1167–86.

———. 2016. "Introduction to the Populist Radical Right." In *The Populist Radical Right:*

A Reader, edited by Cas Mudde, 1–10. London: Routledge.

———. 2017a. "Populism: An Ideational Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 28–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2017b. "Why Nativism, Not Populism, Should Be Declared Word of the Year." *The Guardian* 7.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2012. "Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis." In, edited by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 1–26. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. "Exclusionary Vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America." *Government and Opposition* 48 (2): 147–74.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. "Populism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, edited by Michael Freeden and Marc Stears, 493–512. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2018. "Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda." *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (13): 1667–93.

Muddiman, Ashley, Shannon C. McGregor, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2018. "(Re)Claiming Our Expertise: Parsing Large Text Corpora with Manually Validated and Organic Dictionaries." *Political Communication* 0 (0): 1–13.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2017. *What Is Populism?* Penguin UK.

Narotzky, Susana. 2016. "Between Inequality and Injustice: Dignity as a Motive for Mobilization During the Crisis." *History and Anthropology* 27 (1): 74–92.

Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge University Press.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Wendy M. Rahn. 2016. "Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667 (1): 189–206.

Orasan, Constantin. 2001. "Patterns in Scientific Abstracts." In *Proceedings of Corpus Linguistics 2001 Conference*, 433–43. Citeseer.

Ost, David. 2015. "Stuck in the Past and the Future: Class Analysis in Postcommunist

Poland.” *East European Politics and Societies* 29 (3): 610–24.

Ostaijen, Mark van, and Peter Scholten. 2014. “Policy Populism? Political Populism and Migrant Integration Policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam.” *Comparative European Politics* 12 (6): 680–99.

Ostiguy, Pierre. 2017. “A Socio-Cultural Approach.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 73–100. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O’Mahony, Jane. 2009. “Ireland’s Eu Referendum Experience.” *Irish Political Studies* 24 (4): 429–46.

Panizza, Francisco. 2005. *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy.* London: Verso.

Pauwels, Teun. 2011. “Measuring Populism: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in Belgium.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21 (1): 97–119.

Pei, Shaohua. 2017. “White Supremacism and Racial Conflict in the Trump Era.” *International Critical Thought* 7 (4): 592–601.

Petticrew, Mark, and Helen Roberts. 2006. *Producing a Systematic Review.* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Plasser, Fritz, and Peter Ulram. 2003. “Striking a Responsive Chord: Mass Media and Right-Wing Populism in Austria.” In *The Media and Neo-Populism*, edited by Gianpetro Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, and B. Horsfield, 21–44. London: Praeger.

Posner, Paul W. 2016. “Laboring Under Chávez: Populism for the Twenty-First Century.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 58 (3): 26–50.

Reungoat, Emmanuelle. 2010. “Anti-EU Parties and the People: An Analysis of Populism in French Euromanifestos.” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11 (3): 292–312.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2003. “Social Correlates of Party System Demise and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 45 (3): 35–57.

———. 2006. “Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America.” *Comparative Politics* 38 (2): 127–48.

Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2014. “The Mesmerising Message: The Diffusion of Populism in Public Debates in Western European Media.” *Political Studies* 62 (4): 726–44.

———. 2015. “The Rise of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe.” *European View*

14 (1): 3–11.

———. 2018. “What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties.” *European Political Science Review* 10 (3): 351–68.

———. 2019. “State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and Less Focus.” *European Journal of Political Research* 58 (1): 362–72.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. 2017. “Flank Attacks: Populism and Left-Right Radicalism in Western Europe.” *Party Politics* 23 (3): 193–204.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. “Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis.” *West European Politics* 34 (6): 1272–83.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, Sarah L de Lange, and Wouter van der Brug. 2014. “A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe.” *Party Politics* 20 (4): 563–75.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, Stijn Van Kessel, Caterina Froio, Andrea Pirro, and Sarah L de Lange. 2019. *The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe*. http://www.popu-list.org.

Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal. 2012. “The Ambivalence of Populism: Threat and Corrective for Democracy.” *Democratization* 19 (2): 184–208.

Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. 2017a. “Populism: An Ideational Approach.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 1–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2017b. “Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 1–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ruedin, Didier. 2013. “Obtaining Party Positions on Immigration in Switzerland: Comparing Different Methods.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 19 (1): 84–105.

Ruedin, Didier, and Laura Morales. 2017. “Estimating Party Positions on Immigration: Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Different Methods.” *Party Politics*, 1–12.

Ryan, Timothy J. 2014. “Reconsidering Moral Issues in Politics.” *The Journal of Politics* 76 (2): 380–97.

———. 2017. “No Compromise: Political Consequences of Moralized Attitudes.” *American*

Journal of Political Science 61 (2): 409–23.

Rydgren, Jens. 2008. "Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (6): 737–65.

———. 2011. "A Legacy of 'Uncivicness'? Social Capital and Radical Right-Wing Populist Voting in Eastern Europe." *Acta Politica* 46 (2): 132–57.

Saffon, Maria Paula, and Juan F. González-Bertomeu. 2017. "Latin American Populism: An Admissible Trade-Off Between Procedural Democracy and Equality?" *Constellations* 24 (3): 416–31.

Schulte-Cloos, Julia. 2018. "Do European Parliament Elections Foster Challenger Parties' Success on the National Level?" *European Union Politics* 19 (3): 408–26.

Schulte-Cloos, Julia, and Tobias Rüttenauer. 2018. "A Transformation from Within? Dynamics of Party Activists and the Rise of the German AfD." In *Conference: "2017: Europe's Bumper Year of Election"*. Florence, European University Institute.

Schulz, Anne, Philipp Müller, Christian Schemer, Dominique Stefanie Wirz, Martin Wettstein, and Werner Wirth. 2017. "Measuring Populist Attitudes on Three Dimensions." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*.

Schumacher, Gijs, and Kees van Kersbergen. 2016. "Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?" *Party Politics* 22 (3): 300–312.

Schwemmer, Carsten, and Oliver Wieczorek. 2019. "The Methodological Divide of Sociology –Evidence from Two Decades of Journal Publication." *Sociology* forthcoming.

Scrinzi, Francesca. 2017. "Caring for the Elderly in the Family or in the Nation? Gender, Women and Migrant Care Labour in the Lega Nord." *West European Politics* 40 (4): 869–86.

Seeberg, Henrik Bech. 2017. "How Stable Is Political Parties' Issue Ownership? A Cross-Time, Cross-National Analysis." *Political Studies* 65 (2): 475–92.

Serôdio, Paulo M. 2018. "Web-Scraping R Code for Web of Science."

Sides, John. 2006. "The Origins of Campaign Agendas." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 407–36.

Siliverstovs, Boriss, and Daniel S. Wochner. 2018. "Google Trends and Reality: Do the Proportions Match?: Appraising the Informational Value of Online Search Behavior:

Evidence from Swiss Tourism Regions." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 145 (January): 1–23.

Slapin, Jonathan B, and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2010. "Look Who's Talking: Parliamentary Debate in the European Union." *European Union Politics* 11 (3): 333–57.

Slapin, Jonathan B., and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2008. "A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (3): 705–22.

Stanyer, James, Susana Salgado, and Jesper Strömbäck. 2016. "Populist Actors as Communicators or Political Actors as Populist Communicators. Cross-National Findings and Perspectives." In *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, edited by Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck, and Claes H. de Vreese, 353–64. New York, NY: Routledge.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, and Anton Jäger. 2017. "Accomplishments and Limitations of the 'New' Mainstream in Contemporary Populism Studies." *European Journal of Social Theory*, August, 547–65.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, and Giorgos Katsambekis. 2019. "The Populism/Anti-Populism Frontier and Its Mediation in Crisis-Ridden Greece: From Discursive Divide to Emerging Cleavage?" *European Political Science* 18 (1): 37–52.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Nikos Nikisianis, and Thomas Siomos. 2017. "Populism, Anti-Populism and Crisis." *Contemporary Political Theory*, August.

Stavrakakis, Yannis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianis, and Thomas Siomos. 2016. "Contemporary Left-Wing Populism in Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in Chávez's Venezuela." *Latin American Politics and Society* 58 (3): 51–76.

Surel, Yves. 2019. "How to Stay Populist? The Front National and the Changing French Party System." *West European Politics* 0 (0): 1–28.

Syed, Shaheen, and Marco Spruit. 2017. "Full-Text or Abstract? Examining Topic Coherence Scores Using Latent Dirichlet Allocation." In *2017 Ieee International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics (Dsaa)*, 165–74. IEEE.

Taggart, Paul. 1995. "New Populist Parties in Western Europe." *West European Politics*

18 (1): 34–51.

———. 2000. "Populism: Concepts in the Social Sciences." *Philadelphia: Open*.

Teperoglou, Eftichia, and Emmanouil Tsatsanis. 2011. "A New Divide? The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems." *West European Politics* 34 (6): 1207–28.

Thesen, Gunnar, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2017. "Priming, Issue Ownership, and Party Support: The Electoral Gains of an Issue-Friendly Media Agenda." *Political Communication* 34 (2): 282–301.

Toomey, Michael. 2018. "History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary'." *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 26 (1): 87–108.

Traber, Denise. 2015. "Disenchanted Swiss Parliament? Electoral Strategies and Coalition Formation." *Swiss Political Science Review* 21 (4): 702–23.

Udris, Linards. 2012. "Is the Populist Radical Right (Still) Shaping the News? Media Attention, Issue Ownership and Party Strategies in Switzerland." *Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. NCCR Working Paper 53, University of Zurich*, 1–30.

Urbinati, Nadia. 2019. "Political Theory of Populism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (1): 111–27.

Van Der Brug, Wouter, and Joost van Spanje. 2009. "Immigration, Europe and the 'New' Cultural Dimension." *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (3): 309–34.

van Spanje, Joost. 2010. "Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties' Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe." *Party Politics* 16 (5): 563–86.

Vreese, Claes H. de, Frank Esser, Toril Aalberg, Carsten Reinemann, and James Stanyer. 2018. "Populism as an Expression of Political Communication Content and Style: A New Perspective." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 23 (4): 423–38.

Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere, and Michiel Nuytemans. 2009. "Issue Ownership Stability and Change: How Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues Through Media Appearances." *Political Communication* 26 (2): 153–72.

Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere, and Anke Tresch. 2012. "The Associative Dimension of Issue Ownership." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (4): 771–82.

Walgrave, Stefaan, Anke Tresch, and Jonas Lefevere. 2015. "The Conceptualisation and

Measurement of Issue Ownership." *West European Politics* 38 (4): 778–96.

Watanabe, Kohei. 2018. "Newsmap - a Semi-Supervised Approach to Geographical News Classification," *Digital Journalism* 6 (3): 294–309.

"Web of Science." 2012.

Wellings, Ben. 2010. "Losing the Peace: Euroscepticism and the Foundations of Contemporary English Nationalism: Euroscepticism and the Foundations of Contemporary English Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 16 (3): 488–505.

Weyland, Kurt. 2001. "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics." *Comparative Politics* 34: 1–22.

———. 2017. "Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 48–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiles, Peter. 1969. "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine." In *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, 166–79. New York: Macmillan.

Zulianello, Mattia, Alessandro Albertini, and Diego Ceccobelli. 2018. "A Populist Zeitgeist? The Communication Strategies of Western and Latin American Political Leaders on Facebook." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 23 (4): 439–57.

Appendix

Appendix A Chapter 2

Publications over time



Figure 6.1: Number of articles published per year from WoS

Publications by journal

Table 6.1: Numbers of articles on populism per journal, more than 10 articles from 2004 to 2018

Journal	Frequency
Party Politics	26
Swiss Political Science Review	26
West European Politics	26
Political Studies	25
Government And Opposition	23
Journal Of Democracy	20
Acta Politica	18
Comparative European Politics	18
Political Quarterly	18
Democratization	17
Electoral Studies	16
European Journal Of Political Research	16
Politics	16
Politologicky Casopis-Czech Journal Of Political Science	15
Comparative Political Studies	14
Latin American Perspectives	14
Nation	14
South European Society And Politics	14
International Political Science Review	12
Latin American Politics And Society	12
Chinese Political Science Review	11
East European Politics And Societies	11
Politics And Governance	11
Other	491

Features of Wordfish model

Table 6.2: Selection of top negative and positives features

Negative features			Positive features		
feature	beta	psi	feature	beta	psi
south	-5.175606	-9.007002	pvv	3.717670	-8.760765
correa	-4.771791	-9.361565	sp	3.080083	-8.418340
liberty	-4.352071	-8.623926	svp	3.054352	-7.028353
african	-4.097244	-7.810256	anti-immigrant	2.485673	-5.658462
land	-4.063990	-8.029830	attitudinal	2.235504	-6.386863

Table 6.2: Selection of top negative and positives features *(continued)*

Negative features			Positive features		
feature	beta	psi	feature	beta	psi
accumulation	-4.059982	-8.509481	men	2.220890	-5.989475
revolutionary	-3.882283	-8.252186	accounting	2.194332	-7.111583
africa	-3.759696	-7.021445	controlling	2.190928	-6.007731
capitalist	-3.637385	-7.500102	center-right	2.186934	-6.512411
venezuela's	-3.558153	-7.795487	educated	2.105009	-5.406894
thaksin	-3.451805	-6.895606	predictors	2.077203	-6.345999
rafael	-3.442295	-7.924089	multilevel	2.074113	-6.592695
thaksin's	-3.314915	-7.058700	panel	1.990269	-6.217580
universal	-3.279575	-7.416885	turnout	1.981192	-5.916670
thai	-3.224634	-7.477358	unemployment	1.969654	-6.305372
regulatory	-3.184697	-7.173281	rightist	1.951864	-6.161855
socialism	-3.113271	-6.711930	determinants	1.936816	-6.034835
marxist	-3.012857	-7.537446	male	1.934171	-6.136399
republicanism	-2.971852	-6.609451	preferences	1.931171	-4.340337
venezuelan	-2.958528	-7.285602	cues	1.925996	-5.924013
un	-2.953816	-7.279600	estimate	1.869380	-6.632146
writings	-2.804580	-7.091805	messages	1.829029	-4.927128
chinese	-2.791069	-6.564202	regression	1.827570	-6.237290
turmoil	-2.747450	-7.203448	prr	1.807997	-4.284948
reproducing	-2.711431	-7.159242	contextual	1.780799	-5.553911
coup	-2.711107	-6.283376	immigrants	1.740416	-4.696860
reading	-2.689745	-6.950438	swiss	1.667037	-4.670987
visions	-2.590456	-6.542825	cynical	1.658031	-6.345629
autonomous	-2.548873	-6.780932	dutch	1.651563	-4.139987
morales	-2.533463	-6.608509	attitudes	1.646651	-2.963538
commercial	-2.517589	-6.743894	individual-level	1.633414	-5.284090
caribbean	-2.473377	-6.537785	adds	1.608122	-6.281246
investment	-2.419401	-5.855937	expert	1.597312	-5.931003
hegemonic	-2.396763	-5.303709	considerably	1.578179	-6.060934
management	-2.378739	-6.428121	sample	1.571168	-5.764428

Table 6.2: Selection of top negative and positives features *(continued)*

Negative features			Positive features		
feature	beta	psi	feature	beta	psi
again	-2.313737	-6.508211	belgium	1.526043	-5.708276
paradigm	-2.303859	-5.986222	statements	1.499918	-5.809820
revolution	-2.288375	-5.498770	sweden	1.487169	-4.744529
marginalized	-2.279981	-6.182485	extant	1.487140	-5.948466
embodied	-2.253103	-6.440081	voting	1.465552	-3.170952

Results for two-dimensional scaling



Figure 6.2: Results for two-dimensional scaling/correspondence analysis (CA)

Impact factors of hand-coded sample



Figure 6.3: Density of sample and population of political science papers

List of hand-coded articles

[1] Alexandre Afonso. Choosing whom to betray: populist right-wing parties, welfare state reforms and the trade-off between office and votes. *European Political Science Review*, 7(2):271–292, May 2015.

[2] Guy Aitchison. Three Models of Republican Rights: Juridical, Parliamentary and Populist. *Political Studies*, 65(2):339–355, June 2017.

[3] Benjamín Arditi. Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan. *Political Studies*, 52(1):135–143, March 2004.

[4] Tim Bale, Paul Taggart, and Paul Webb. You can't always get what you want: Populism and the power inquiry. *The Political Quarterly*, 77(2):195–203, 2006.

[5] Ruben Berrios, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern. Explaining hydrocarbon nationalization in Latin America: Economics and political ideology. *Review of International Political Economy*, 18(5):673–697, December 2011.

[6] Hajo G. Boomgaarden and Rens Vliegenthart. Explaining the rise of anti-immigrant parties: The role of news media content. *Electoral Studies*, 26(2):404–417, June 2007.

[7] Fabio Bordignon and Luigi Ceccarini. Five stars and a cricket. beppe grillo shakes italian politics. *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4):427–449, 2013.

[8] Simon Bornschier. The New Cultural Conflict, Polarization, and Representation in the Swiss Party System, 1975–2011. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 21(4):680–701, 2015.

[9] Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse. From the euro to the schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1):83–108, 2018.

[10] Juraj Buzalka. Post-peasant Memories: Populist or Communist Nostalgia. *East European Politics and Societies*, 32(4):988–1006, November 2018.

[11] Manuela Caiani and Donatella della Porta. The elitist populism of the extreme right: A frame analysis of extreme right-wing discourses in italy and germany. *Acta Politica*, 46(2):180–202, Apr 2011.

[12] Pietro Castelli Gattinara. Framing Exclusion in the Public Sphere: Far-Right Mobilisation and the Debate on Charlie Hebdo in Italy. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(3):345–364, July 2017.

[13] Carlos de la Torre. Populism and the politics of the extraordinary in Latin America. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 21(2):121–139, May 2016.

[14] William M. Downs. There Goes the Neighbourhood? The 'Americanisation' of Elections, with Evidence from Scotland's Parliament. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 65(4):758–777, 2011.

[15] Albert W. Dzur. Democracy's "Free School": Tocqueville and Lieber on the Value of the Jury. *Political Theory*, 38(5):603–630, October 2010.

[16] Laura Grindstaff. Culture and Popular Culture: A Case for Sociology. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 619(1):206–222, September 2008.

[17] Vlastimil Havlík and Petr Voda. Cleavages, protest or voting for hope? the rise of centrist populist parties in the czech republic. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 24(2):161–186, 2018.

[18] Paul Hockenos. Central europe's right-wing populism. the eu's neoliberal economic reforms have undermined public faith in democratic politics. *The Nation*, 2010.

[19] Ioan Hosu and Mihnea S Stoica. Romania: From institutional to personal political conflict. mainstream political discourse on the eve of the refugee crisis. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, (20), 2017.

[20] Aida A. Hozić and Jacqui True. Brexit as a scandal: gender and global trumpism. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2):270–287, March 2017.

[21] Andrew Hughes Hallett. Are independent central banks really as conservative as they like to pretend? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 24(1):239–248, March 2008.

[22] Gilles Ivaldi, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, and Dwayne Woods. Varieties of Populism across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4):354–376, 2017.

[23] Krzysztof Jasiewicz. The (not always sweet) uses of opportunism: Post-communist political parties in Poland. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 41(4):421–442, December 2008.

[24] John Judis. Kevin phillips, ex-populist: Elite model. *The New Republic*, 2006.

[25] Miles Kahler. Global Governance: Three Futures. *International Studies Review*, 20(2):239–246, June 2018.

[26] Jonathan Krieckhaus. Democracy and Economic Growth: How Regional Context Influences Regime Effects. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(2):317–340, April 2006.

[27] Maite D. Laméris, Richard Jong-A-Pin, and Harry Garretsen. On the measurement of voter ideology. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 55(C):417–432, 2018.

[28] Steven Levitsky and James Loxton. Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. *Democratization*, 20(1):107–136, January 2013.

[29] Joseph Lowndes. White Populism and the Transformation of the Silent Majority. *The Forum*, 14(1):25–37, 2016.

[30] Darina Malová and Branislav Dolný. Economy and Democracy in Slovakia during the Crisis: From a Laggard to the EU Core. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 63(5-6):300–312, November 2016.

[31] Ben Margulies. Exchange: Nativists are Populists, Not Liberals. *Journal of Democracy*, 29(1):141–147, January 2018.

[32] Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey. Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style. *Political Studies*, 62(2):381–397, June 2014.

[33] Jane O'Mahony. Ireland's eu referendum experience. *Irish Political Studies*, 24(4):429–446, 2009.

[34] David Ost. Stuck in the Past and the Future: Class Analysis in Postcommunist Poland. *East European Politics and Societies*, 29(3):610–624, August 2015.

[35] Shaohua Pei. White Supremacism and Racial Conflict in the Trump Era. *International Critical Thought*, 7(4):592–601, October 2017.

[36] Paul W. Posner. Laboring Under Chávez: Populism for the Twenty-first Century. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 58(3):26–50, 2016.

[37] Camil Alexandru Pârvu. Populism, Cosmopolitanism and the Reconfiguration of Contemporary Politics. *Analele Universităţii din Bucureşti. Seria Ştiinţe Politice*, XVIII(1):103–119, 2016.

[38] Matthijs Rooduijn. What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review*, 10(3):351–368, August 2018.

[39] Jens Rydgren. A legacy of 'uncivicness'? Social capital and radical right-wing populist voting in Eastern Europe. *Acta Politica*, 46(2):132–157, April 2011.

[40] Maria Paula Saffon and Juan F. González-Bertomeu. Latin American populism: An admissible trade-off between procedural democracy and equality? *Constellations*, 24(3):416–431, 2017.

[41] Francesca Scrinzi. Caring for the elderly in the family or in the nation? Gender, women and migrant care labour in the Lega Nord. *West European Politics*, 40(4):869–886, July 2017.

[42] Yannis Stavrakakis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Nikos Nikisianis, and Thomas Siomos. Contemporary Left-wing Populism in Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in Chávez's Venezuela. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 58(3):51–76, 2016.

[43] John Stone and Ioanna Christodoulaki. Nebulous nationalism: Walker Connor in an era of rising populism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 24(3):513–518, 2018.

[44] Iris Stucki, Lyn E. Pleger, and Fritz Sager. The Making of the Informed Voter: A Split-Ballot Survey on the Use of Scientific Evidence in Direct-Democratic Campaigns. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 24(2):115–139, 2018.

[45] Eftichia Teperoglou and Emmanouil Tsatsanis. A New Divide? The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems. *West European Politics*, 34(6):1207–1228, November 2011.

[46] Michael Toomey. History, nationalism and democracy: myth and narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'illiberal Hungary'. *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations*, 26(1):87–108, 2018.

[47] Denise Traber. Disenchanted Swiss Parliament? Electoral Strategies and Coalition Formation. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 21(4):702–723, 2015.

[48] Mark van Ostaijen and Peter Scholten. Policy populism? Political populism and migrant integration policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. *Comparative European Politics*, 12(6):680–699, November 2014.

[49] Adele Webb. In Praise of Democratic Ambivalence. *Democratic Theory*, 5(2):17–36, December 2018.

[50] Ben Wellings. Losing the peace: Euroscepticism and the foundations of contemporary English nationalism: Euroscepticism and the foundations of contemporary English nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 16(3):488–505, June 2010.

Appendix B Chapter 3

Number of hits of base ditionaries

Table 6.3: Frequency of keywords for people and elite dictionaries

People	Count	Elite	Count
total	**183980**	**total**	**13967**
people	74047	banks	5725
citizens	57482	politicians	4049
the public	9988	establishment	729
population	8570	elite	681
family	8336	politician	583
taxpayers	5653	circles	345
europeans	5140	mafia	345
families	4763	bosses	239
peoples	4004	eurocrats	236
citizen	3227	political class	153
taxpayer	1050	elites	109
residents	902	europhile	104
resident	643	europhiles	91
populations	124	eurocracy	83
ordinary person	43	financiers	65
man on the street	8	elitist	59
		apparatchiks	44
		oligarchy	37
		ruling class	34
		oligarchs	26
		eurocrat	24
		eurocratic	24
		political classes	24
		cronies	22
		financier	22
		oligarchic	20

Note:
For the elite dictionary, only the 25 most-occuring keyword are depicted.

Example for snippets

Table 6.4: Example for snippets

Pre	Keyword	Post
to speak out for the growing number of	**people**	who have disappeared and to remember the suffering
third to visibly label the clothing of all	**citizens**	from Central and Eastern Europe . We should
initiative , I hope that the follow-up of	**citizens**	’ requests will also be handled with equally
and come forward with proposals and put the	**citizens**	first and it is not ugly or insulting
. Therefore we must determine reference points in	**the public**	finance policy which would help to reconcile the
financial institutions , but also for their own	**people**	.
is called Macedonia , whether that suits some	**people**	or not , and we must finally start
order to provide the best possible service to	**citizens**	. First of all , we call upon
print or audio or electronic format . Blind	**people**	, the visually impaired and those with reading
taxpayers ’ money is spent . The more	**people**	are exposed to the workings of the EU
able to defend the interests of	**hard-working**	Dutch taxpayers yesterday .
. You are elected by the people to	**defend**	democracy . What do the selected

Accuracy of measurement

Table 6.5: Classification Accuracy

	My approach	**Bonikowski & Gidron**	**Rooduijn & Pauwels**	**References to groups**
Sensitivity	0.66	0.49	0.49	0.51
Specificity	0.84	0.61	0.72	0.94
Pos Pred Value	0.82	0.50	0.83	0.98
Neg Pred Value	0.68	0.60	0.34	0.29
Precision	0.82	0.50	0.83	0.98
Recall	0.66	0.49	0.49	0.51
F1	0.73	0.49	0.61	0.67
Prevalence	0.53	0.44	0.73	0.83
Detection Rate	0.35	0.21	0.36	0.42
Detection Prevalence	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
Balanced Accuracy	0.75	0.55	0.61	0.72
Overall Accuracy	0.74	0.56	0.55	0.58

Appendix C Chapter 4

Dictionaries

Note: * represents a wild-card that may include no or several letters. ? is a wildcard that includes exactly one letters.

Pauwels (2011)

marokk*, türk*, allocht*, asyl*, halal*, kopftuch*, illega*, immigr*, islam*, koran, muslim*, ausländ*,

Ruedin and Morales (2017)

toleran, migrant*, minarett, minderheit*, moschee, islam*, heimatland, jihad*, multikultur*, muslim*, nation*, missbrauch, *heimisch*, assimil*, einbürger*, asylum*, grenze, *genehmigung, burka, rasse, christlich, rassi*, bürger*, radikal, kultur*, flüchtl*, brauch*, religiös, deport*, *zusammenführung, diskrimi*, scharia, vielfalt, ethni*, zuflucht, extremis*, synagoge, ausländ*, terroris*, betrug, tradition*, halal, traumatisier*, kopftuch, unauthorisiert, unterkunft, menschlich*, einigkeit, identität, *schleier, illegal*, western, immigr*, xenophob*, einheimisch*, integrat*, interkulturell*, interrassisch, invasion

small dictionary

immigr*, *migrat*, *migrant*, migrier*, *einwander*, zuwander*, zugewander*, eingewander*, *fl?chtling*, asyl*, gefl?cht*, obergrenz*, drittstaat*, sans-papiers, integrationspolit*, integrationsgesetz*, integrationspotenzial*, staatsb?rgerschaft*, *einb?rger*,ausschaff*, ausl?nder*, inl?nder*, ?berfremd*

Classifier Accuracy for Austria, Germany and Switzerland

For all dictionaries we present two different results: One including all press releases with a single dictionary match, the other with a minimum threshold of two matches. This should theoreticlaly help in excluding press releases that merely mention migration or migrants in passing without excluding too many short but relevant articles.

For creating the classifier, we need to use a part of our data set as training data. Thus, the classifier is only evaluated on a smaller number of press releases. We evaluate the dictionaries against the full hand-coded sample to get a more precise evaluation, however, results also hold on the smaller test set used to evaluate the SVM classifier.

We evaluate the following identification strategies:

- GH: dictionary developed in this paper, with threshold (T) and without
- RP: dictionary developed by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), with threshold (T) and without
- RM: dictionary developed by Ruedin and Morales (2017), with threshold (T) and without
- SVM: Support Vector Machine

Table 6.6: Classification Accuracy Germany

	GH-T	**GH**	**RP-T**	**RP**	**RM-T**	**RM**	**SVM**
Sensitivity	0.75	0.9	0.52	0.68	0.82	0.90	0.75
Specificity	0.98	0.9	0.92	0.84	0.66	0.41	0.96
Overall Accuracy	0.95	0.9	0.87	0.82	0.69	0.48	0.93
Balanced Accuracy	0.86	0.9	0.72	0.76	0.74	0.66	0.86

Table 6.7: Classification Accuracy Austria

	GH-T	**GH**	**RP-T**	**RP**	**RM-T**	**RM**
Sensitivity	0.79	0.88	0.58	0.75	0.88	0.96
Specificity	0.96	0.93	0.97	0.89	0.63	0.41
Overall Accuracy	0.95	0.93	0.95	0.89	0.64	0.44
Balanced Accuracy	0.88	0.90	0.77	0.82	0.75	0.69

Table 6.8: Classification Accuracy Switzerland

	GH-T	**GH**	**RP-T**	**RP**	**RM-T**	**RM**
Sensitivity	0.87	0.87	0.67	0.73	0.93	1.00
Specificity	0.96	0.92	0.94	0.82	0.35	0.11
Overall Accuracy	0.96	0.91	0.92	0.81	0.41	0.20
Balanced Accuracy	0.92	0.89	0.81	0.78	0.64	0.56

Arellano Bond Tests

Table 6.9: Arellano-Bond tests for autoregressive lags

Salience			Position		
Order	z	Prob > z	Order	z	Prob > z
1	-3.3199	0.0009	1	-3.4171	0.0006
2	-1.0164	0.3094	2	-1.2251	0.2269

Robustness checks for regressions

Table 6.10: Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration including lag for main IV

	(1) all	(2) AT	(3) DE	(4) CH	(5) center-right	(6) before	(7) during	(8) after
RRP's salience of imm.	0.16***	0.32***	0.06	0.23***	0.10*	0.22**	0.15***	0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)
RRP's salience of imm. (lag 1),	0.02	-0.10**	-0.02	0.12**	-0.02	0.11**	0.05	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
center-right					0.00			
					(0.00)			
center-right * RRP's salience of imm.					0.14**			
					(0.06)			
center-right * RRP's salience of imm. (lag 1)					0.10**			
					(0.05)			
asylum applications (N)	1.03***	0.84*	1.30***	1.06	1.09***	2.89*	-1.08**	-1.23
	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.90)	(0.32)	(1.56)	(0.54)	(2.31)
polls RRP	-0.04	0.23	-0.28***	1.37***	0.06	-0.50	-0.20	0.18
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.38)	(0.19)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.33)
public salience	3.04***	3.41***	4.08***	0.64	3.16***	7.13	3.31***	20.60***
	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.83)	(0.62)	(0.58)	(8.74)	(0.66)	(6.59)
salience of immigration (lag 1)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
salience of immigration (lag 2)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	9.44***	0.00	12.62***	-8.53	8.08**	19.25**	17.19***	6.06
	(2.99)	(3.85)	(1.03)	(6.91)	(3.14)	(8.15)	(5.96)	(7.85)
Observations	646	209	299	138	646	286	188	172
Number of parties	14	4	6	4	14	13	14	13

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 6.11: Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration by country

	(1) AT	(2) DE	(3) CH
RRP's salience of imm.	0.19***	-0.01	0.15***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)
center-right	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
center-right* RRP's salience of imm.	0.18*	0.14*	0.12**
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)
asylum applications (N)	0.98**	1.25***	0.98
	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.87)
polls RRP	0.25	-0.19	1.28***
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.36)
public salience	3.50***	4.32***	1.08**
	(0.78)	(1.09)	(0.49)
salience of immigration (lag 1)	✓	✓	✓
salience of immigration (lag 2)	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.51	12.23***	-0.64
	(4.25)	(0.85)	(4.30)
Observations	209	299	138
Number of parties	4	6	4

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.12: Regression results for mainstream parties' position immigration including lag for main IV

	(1) all	(2) AT	(3) DE	(4) CH	(5) center-right	(6) before	(7) during	(8) after
RRP's position on immigration	0.00	0.14	-0.08***	0.04	0.02	-0.06	0.16**	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)
RRP's position on immigration (lag 1),	-0.02	-0.12	-0.03	-0.12	-0.06	-0.04	-0.12	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)
center-right					0.00			
					(0.00)			
center-right * RRPs' position					-0.04			
					(0.06)			
center-right * RRPs' position (lag 1)					0.11			
					(0.07)			
asylum applications (N)	0.00	0.02**	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04***	-0.20
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.17)
polls RRP	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
public salience	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.13	-0.00	0.45
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.28)	(0.01)	(0.31)
position on immigration (lag 1)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
position on immigration (lag 2)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Constant	0.12	0.21	0.10	-0.43	0.13	0.23	0.31***	0.36
	(0.08)	(0.29)	(0.11)	(0.43)	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.33)
Observations	646	209	299	138	646	286	188	172
Number of parties	14	4	6	4	14	13	14	13

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 6.13: Regression results for mainstream parties' position immigration by country

	(1) AT	(2) DE	(3) CH
RRP's position on immigration	0.24**	-0.08*	-0.07
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.12)
center-right	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
center-right*RRPS' position	-0.18***	-0.01	0.25*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.13)
asylum applications (N)	0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
polls RRP	0.00	-0.01	0.03
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)
public salience	0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
position on immigration (lag 1)	✓	✓	✓
position on immigration (lag 2)	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.33	0.10	-0.38
	(0.29)	(0.13)	(0.39)
Observations	209	299	138
Number of parties	4	6	4

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Party Positions

Table 6.14: Average and Stability of party positions

Party	Avg. Position	SD	POLCON I	POLCON II
Austria				
FPÖ	-0.78	0.10	-0.80	-0.74
Green Party	0.41	0.25	1.00	1.00
NEOS	0.42	0.37	1.00	1.00
OVP	-0.06	0.20	-0.33	-0.81
SPÖ	0.17	0.17	0.43	0.00
Germany				
AfD	-0.95	0.33	-0.33	-1.00
CDU	0.08	0.22	0.44	-0.12
CSU	-0.25	0.39	NA	NA
FDP	-0.24	0.22	1.00	-0.56
Green Party	0.48	0.27	1.00	1.00
Left Party	0.18	0.20	0.00	1.00
SPD	0.22	0.35	1.00	0.59
Switzerland				
CVP	-0.02	0.20	0.00	-0.07
FDP	0.02	0.25	-0.20	0.00
Green Party	0.10	0.34	1.00	0.05
SPS	0.25	0.34	0.86	0.85
SVP	-0.49	0.24	-1.00	-0.77

Robustness checks

Google Trend Data



Figure 6.4: Google Trends for four topics related to immigration

Appendix D Chapter 5



Figure 6.5: Total and average number of words per month

Arellano Bond Tests

Table 6.15: Arellano-Bond tests for auto-regressive lags

DV			
Order	z	Prob > z	Order
1	-7.1839	0.0000	
2	1.7817	0.0748	