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RSCAS 2007/19

**EUROPEAN FORUM 2006 - 2007**

The Effects of Social and Labour Market Policies  
of EU-countries on the Socio-Economic Integration  
of First and Second Generation Immigrants from  
Different Countries of Origin

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**EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE**  
**ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**  
**EUROPEAN FORUM SERIES**

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ISSN 1028-3625

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Printed in Italy  
European University Institute  
Badia Fiesolana  
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)  
Italy

<http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/>  
<http://cadmus.eui.eu>

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## **Abstract**

In this article, we analyse four different dimensions of socio-economic integration of first and second generation immigrants into the labour markets of 13 EU countries and we assess, taking into account a number of individual characteristics, the effects of the countries of origin and the countries of destination on this integration. We find that participation in the labour market, unemployment, occupational status and the chances of reaching the upper middle-class are different, although inter-related, dimensions of the socio-economic integration of immigrants and they work differently for men and women. In the countries of destination, the level of employment protection legislation and the conservative welfare regime affect this integration negatively. Most indicators of national policies aimed at the integration of immigrants have no effects on the socio-economic integration of immigrants. Furthermore, we find a number of origin effects which continue to have an impact on second generation immigrants. Political stability and political freedom in origin countries have positive and negative effects on socio-economic integration. The emigration rate of the origin countries has a negative effect. The higher levels of socio-economic integration amongst immigrants from other EU-countries demonstrates the functioning of the European Union as an integrated labour market. Controlling for individual religious affiliation turns out to be very useful, since we find a number of negative effects of being a Muslim, among both men and women. While individual education is an important predictor of immigrants' labour market outcomes, our findings indicate lower returns on this education in terms of occupational status, indicating a ceiling effect for highly-educated second generation immigrants who cannot translate their qualifications into high-status jobs to the same extent as their native peers.

## **Keywords**

immigration, integration, labour market, European Union, social policy

## 1. Introduction\*

Immigrant integration has received lots of attention in social scientific research, but this has been concentrated on the ‘classical’ immigration countries, most notably the U.S. There, starting with the work of the Chicago School, a theory of assimilation developed according to which it was expected that immigrants would become more like natives over time socio-economically, spatially, socio-culturally and politically. This process of linear assimilation was perceived to occur over the life-course of first generation immigrants and reach near perfection in the second generation, thought to experience largely the same living conditions as their peers born of native parents. However, later waves of immigration from more diverse regions of origin led to a challenge to assimilation theory. Research among different ethnic groups in different urban settings in the U.S. revealed that not all immigrant groups experience upward social mobility after arrival. While this still holds true for some immigrant groups, others were found to face downward assimilation into a socio-economic, but also racially or ethnically defined, underclass, while still other groups were neither incorporated into the middle-class nor into the underclass, instead remaining concentrated in ethnic niches or enclaves. The debate as to whether there is still a general trend of assimilation for all groups or whether there is a process of segmented assimilation at work is still ongoing in the U.S. (Alba & Nee, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Zhou, 1997).

In Europe, the debate about and research into the integration of immigrants is still much more recent, due to the fact that despite continuous population movements throughout the history of the continent and its shifting borders, most Western European countries have just started to acknowledge that they are currently immigration societies. Most Southern European countries, on the other hand, have shifted from being primarily emigrant sending to immigrant receiving societies over the past 30 years. In addition, many European countries are characterized by strong regional divides, which sometimes go together with linguistic and/or ethnic cleavages within states, a factor that renders the integration of immigrants more complex since it is not always clear who the reference category for these newcomers is (Phalet & Kopic, 2005). Moreover, policy approaches to immigrant integration vary greatly between European societies which continue to define themselves as nation-states with heavy ethnic connotations. Germany, for instance, has only recently shifted its naturalization policy from a *jus sanguinis* to a *jus solis* principle, thus hoping to improve the chances of a successful integration of second generation immigrants who, before the reform, were still legally considered non-nationals. France has followed the opposite approach with its policy of non-registration of ethnicity and its comparatively generous granting of citizenship to both foreign- and native-born populations. However, both countries and most of their fellow EU member-states are currently discussing, with the image of the youth riots in the French suburbs still fresh on their minds, whether, and if so, to what extent, the integration of immigrants has been successful in the past and how it can become more successful in the future.

In light of this public debate and the European Union’s goal of defining a common immigration policy, there is a need for comparative research on the integration of immigrants across European societies in order to establish in which countries this integration has been most successful and to identify the policies or other macro-characteristics that enable such successful integration. To be more precise, we want to find out which characteristics, of both the countries of destination and the countries of origin, promote or hamper the integration of immigrants, taking into account their individual characteristics. In this study, we focus on the position of immigrants in the labour market, thus limiting our scope to the socio-economic dimension of integration. We do this not only for

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\* This article is the result of a traineeship of the first author at the European University Institute, and is written within the context of the European Forum 2006/7 of the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies of the EUI, directed by the second author.

practical reasons (our data provides the most information about this dimension of integration and covering more than one dimension is hardly feasible within one article), but also in agreement with a number of scholars who have argued that the socio-economic integration of immigrants is the first step and a precondition for spatial, socio-cultural and political integration (Geddes et al., 2004; Waldenrauch, 2001).

In addition to the differences in policies and other characteristics between the countries of destination, it is expected that the countries of origin also affect immigrants' socio-economic integration. As Kao and Thompson (2003) have argued, differences in religion and cultural values of immigrants lead to different evaluations of achievement, which can partly explain differential outcomes of immigrants coming from different regions of the world. Furthermore, the levels of expected and experienced discrimination in the labour market differ between immigrant groups from different origins, which might partly be due to different levels of 'visibility' of these immigrant groups. However, discrimination does not affect all immigrants in the same way: research into school performance in the U.S. has found that expected discrimination has a discouraging effect on African-Americans (Ogbu, 1991), while providing an incentive for South-Asian Americans to perform even better (Sue & Okazaki, 1990).

While research on immigrant integration in Europe is still limited in comparison to studies conducted in the classical immigrant receiving societies, there are already numerous studies comparing the processes and outcomes of integration between European countries. However, many of them are limited either to a small number of countries of destination or to a small number of immigrant groups (for a recent example, see Böcker & Thränhardt, 2007). Others try to incorporate a larger number of countries of destination, either by analyzing more countries separately (e.g. Heath & Cheung, 2007) or by comparing national statistics (e.g. Werner, 2003). There are several problems with this type of research. Obviously, separate analyses of different countries of destination do not allow for statistical testing across countries, so that the comparison remains on a more abstract, theoretical level. Moreover, the definition of who is an immigrant (and, to make things even more complicated, also the terminology) differs between countries, leaving some doubts as to the usefulness of comparing national statistical data from these various countries. A more serious problem, however, is that comparisons taking into account only one immigrant group in multiple destinations or multiple immigrant groups in one destination do not allow one to disentangle the effects of the country of destination and those of the country of origin on the integration of immigrants. This is a serious drawback, since the composition of immigrant populations varies greatly between European countries. Tables 1 and 2 clearly show the variation in the composition of immigrants, both in terms of their individual characteristics and their distribution across the various countries of origin, across the destination countries under study and in their labour market outcomes. In contrast to the cross-classified multilevel analysis that we perform, a single comparative approach or a study including only a small number of countries of destination cannot establish whether these differential outcomes are due to factors at the individual level or due to macro-characteristics of the country of destination or the country of origin.

Only few studies using such a double comparative multilevel approach have been published, but again, these have suffered from a number of shortcomings, mostly due to problems of data availability. Tubergen's work (2004; Tubergen et al., 2004) on immigrant integration in numerous countries of destination does examine the effects of a number of macro-characteristics of both countries of destination and of origin, but his data only includes first generation immigrants. Although this research has been a great improvement on earlier work, the fact that it does not include the second generation is a serious drawback, since differences between recent arrivals and natives are to be expected and the integration of the first generation can only be studied from a dynamic, longitudinal perspective that assesses immigrants' integration over their life-course. The fate of the second generation, on the other hand, is a much stronger indicator of the degree to which integration is successful. Furthermore, these studies do not exclusively focus on Europe and therefore do not allow for very detailed measures of intra-European differences in immigrant integration.



Similar approaches have revealed significant effects of both country of destination, as well as country of origin, on the school achievement of immigrant pupils (Levels & Dronkers, in press; Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp, 2006). These studies made clear that both the sending and the receiving contexts affect immigrants' socio-economic integration into the countries of destination, and they identified a number of macro-characteristics of both the countries of origin and the countries of destination, such as GDP per capita and religious composition, which affect pupils' achievement.

Kogan (2007) uses an exclusively European focus in her comparison of immigrants' labour market outcomes in the EU-15 countries<sup>1</sup>. She examines the effects of a number of macro-characteristics, especially welfare regimes and the structure of the labour market on immigrants' position in these labour markets. However, her data does not contain information about the exact country of origin of immigrants, which implies that she cannot take into account characteristics of these countries and measure their effects on immigrant integration. In addition, her data also excludes second generation immigrants. A similar problem applies to the research of Dronkers and Wanner (2006) on income differentials between natives and immigrants which is based on data from the first wave of the European Social Survey, plus survey data from Canada and the U.S. Like Kogan, these authors aggregate immigrants into larger regions of origin (they distinguish between immigrants from the first world, second and third world and from former colonies), which makes it impossible to include macro-characteristics of the country of origin.

The second wave of the European Social Survey allows us to overcome these problems, since it provides information about the country of birth of the respondent and of both of his or her parents, thus allowing first and second generations of immigrants to be distinguished and the country of origin to be specified in each case. In the following section, we elaborate on the micro-characteristics of individual immigrants and the macro-characteristics of the countries of origin and destination that we take into account in analyzing labour market outcomes of first and second generation immigrants across 13 EU countries. For both micro- and macro-characteristics we will formulate hypotheses, based on the current literature.

## 2. Data and Measures

We use the second wave of the European Social Survey (Jowell et al., 2005) which contains data, gathered in 2004 and 2005, from more than 45.000 respondents in 23 countries. The main aim of our article is to assess the impact of a number of social and labour market policies of destination countries on the integration of immigrants. We measure the inclusiveness of social policies with the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and, unfortunately, at the time of writing this index was only available for the EU-15 countries. Since data from Italy was not yet available when we performed the analysis, we could only include 14 countries of destination. This number further decreased to 13 because we excluded data from Finland given the low number of immigrant respondents in this country<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, we selected only respondents between the ages of 25 and 60 since this is the period in which most respondents will have completed their education and in which their economic activity is concentrated. Our final sample of 15602 respondents contains 2541 immigrants (1209 male and 1332 female) from 132 different countries of origin.

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1 The EU-15 are those countries who were members of the European Union before the two most recent enlargements in 2004 and 2007.

2 There are only 25 respondents in the Finnish sample who can be properly classified as immigrants and can be assigned a country of origin. However, the refusal rate of the question in which country the respondent was born is significantly higher in Finland than in other survey countries, resulting in a large number of persons for whom we do not know whether they are immigrants or natives. Given the limited information about these respondents, we decided to exclude them from the sample which lowered the number of immigrants in Finland to an unacceptably small number.

We classified respondents as immigrants if one or both parents were born outside the country of destination. Respondents who were born abroad but to two native parents are not classified as immigrants because we assume that these children of expats will be more like the native population than children of mixed marriages and children of first generation immigrants. We used the following decision rules to establish the country of origin: if the respondent and both of his/her parents were born in the same country, this country was classified as the country of origin. If two out of three were born in the same country, this country was used, except if two out of three were natives. If all three were born in different countries, we looked at the language spoken at home. If this corresponded to any of the three possible countries, this country was used. If not, we used the country of birth of the mother, arguing that parental culture is more influential in socialization (rather than using the country of birth of the respondent, which can be a temporary coincidence, especially in the case of these more diverse family backgrounds) and that ‘motherhood is a fact, whereas fatherhood is an opinion’. With this procedure, we can distinguish 132 countries of origin, but many of them contain only few cases. We therefore aggregated countries into regions of origin whenever there were less than 20 immigrants from a certain country of origin using a slightly adapted version of the United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office)<sup>3</sup>. In the end, we distinguish 27 countries of origin and an additional 21 regions of origin, varying in numbers of immigrants from 2 (French Speaking Caribbean) to 209 (Germany). Tables 1 and 2.b, which provide information about the dependent and independent variables per country/region of origin list these countries and regions according to the size of the immigrant group from this country in descending order.

On the one hand, our measurement of immigrant status, which is based on information about the country of birth of respondents and of both of their parents, is much more accurate than taking only nationality (problematic due to differences in naturalization rates across countries and the colonial histories of many immigrants) or country of birth of the respondent (which excludes the second generation) into account (Kogan, 2007). On the other hand, it gives rise to a number of problems, which can be solved neither with the data sets used here, nor with other available cross-national data. A first definitional problem is related to changing national boundaries and is particularly relevant to Europe. Due to the changes in the political frontiers after 1945 (the annexation by Poland of some formerly German territory; the extension of Russia at the expense of Polish territory) and due to the subsequent displacement of large populations, an unknown number of ‘indigenous’ persons are measured as being born outside their country, e.g. a German respondent or his/her parents born in Königsberg (East Prussia) and now living in Germany or a Polish respondent or his/her parents born in Lvov (Ukraine) and now living in Poland. One can argue that by failing to make the distinction between genuine migrants and border changes, we overestimate the number of better-integrated immigrants. At the same time, this failure highlights a conceptual problem in defining an immigrant: for how many generations must a Polish family live in Germany before he/she is no longer considered Polish? This issue also extends to the large number of third country immigrants originating in former European colonies whose grandparents migrated to Europe. Their grandchildren, born in these immigrant receiving countries, are measured as native born. However, typically in these countries this third generation will continue to be considered “immigrants”, especially if they are a ‘visible minority’. Therefore they might still have lower levels of education and labour market outcomes than natives within these countries (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

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3 The adaptations that we made all refer to the Caribbean and the Americas. Here, we did not stick with the strictly geographic distinction that is made by the United Nations, but included information about national languages. In this way, we constructed the new category ‘Caribbean and South America’ with the subcategories ‘Spanish Speaking’, ‘English Speaking’, ‘French Speaking’ and ‘Dutch Speaking’ (due to a sufficient number of immigrants from Brazil, there is no separate category of ‘Portuguese Speaking’). This deviation from the general classification scheme of the UN is justified, in the authors’ view, by the different migration patterns that go along with the different colonial histories which materialize in the languages that are spoken in these regions today.

Given the sampling procedures applied in constructing the data set used here, our data is unlikely to include illegal immigrants, although illegal immigrants are prominent in the popular images of immigrants in highly developed countries, particularly North and Sub Saharan Africans arriving on the Italian island of Lampedusa from Libya or landing on the beaches of southern Spain and the Canary Islands. These illegal immigrants are also important in the labour markets of developed countries, although less visible at the bottom and most vulnerable. One can argue that by failing to include illegal immigrants in surveys, we overestimate the integration of immigrants. Therefore our results should be seen as an indication of the labour market attainments of official immigrants or of those illegal immigrants who have become official by means of such mechanisms as loopholes in the law, general pardons, marriage, or fraud.

## 2.1. Dependent variables

We concentrate our analysis of the socio-economic integration of immigrants on their success in the labour market. Four indicators are used to assess different dimensions of this success or failure. First of all, we analyze the economic activity of immigrants and answer the question whether their labour market participation rates differ from those of natives. The dichotomous variable economic activity includes all respondents who have paid work, be it as employees or as self-employed workers and those who are unemployed and actively searching for a job. Once immigrants enter the labour market, we want to know how successful they are in avoiding unemployment. We classify those respondents as unemployed who are active in the labour market, but not currently employed. Thirdly, for those respondents who succeed in finding paid work, we examine the occupational status of their current job, using the ISEI-scale<sup>4</sup> (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Given the disputed continuous character of this occupational status scale and the lower chances of second generation immigrants of entering the highest occupational class than comparable natives (Tesser & Dronkers, 2007), we also need to analyse more specific barriers within the structure of the labour market. We therefore examine whether respondents succeed in entering the upper middle-class, which we define as those occupations classified as higher and lower controllers in the EGP class categories scheme (Erikson et al., 1979). Table 1 presents an overview of the dependent variables in our analyses for natives and immigrants per country of destination and country/region of origin. In these tables, we present the average outcomes for men and women together, but we separate men and women in the analysis in order to take into account the various interactions that are expected to occur. The occupational status variable had 977 missing values, 812 of which were among immigrants. In order to avoid loss of information due to listwise deletion, we imputed missing values for the ISEI-scale using a regression procedure in which we took into account the immigrant generation, the country of origin, the highest educational level achieved and the respondent's gender.

## 2.2. Independent variables: individual characteristics

Since the process of socio-economic assimilation of immigrants is expected to differ between different generations of immigrants, we distinguish two such generations. First generation immigrants are those who were born outside the country of destination. This group makes up 59.1% of all immigrants in our sample. Second generation immigrants are those who are born in the country of destination, but who have at least one parent who was born outside the country of destination. This group comprises 40.9% of our immigrant sample<sup>5</sup>. *If socio-economic assimilation of immigrants in European societies occurs,*

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4 The European Social Survey assesses occupational status using the 4-digit ISCO-88 scale. Although in general, the diverse measures of occupational status are highly correlated (Bakker & Blee-Booij, 1995), we decided to recode the original variable into the more comprehensive and more widely used ISEI-scale.

5 We also tried to include the so-called '1.5-generation', which consists of individuals who were born outside the country of destination, but who migrated at such a young age that they received most or all of their education in the destination country. A problem in the construction of this category is that the European Social Survey does not provide exact

*the second generation should have more favourable labour market outcomes than the first generation of immigrants.*

Access to and success in the labour market depend, to a large extent, on educational qualifications. Therefore an important individual characteristic to take into account is the highest level of education achieved by the respondent. The European Social Survey provides an internationally comparable measure of this indicator, using the 7-point ISCED-97 (UNESCO, 1997) scale which ranges from 0 (not completed primary education) to 6 (second stage of tertiary education). However, due to a different measurement in the UK, we had to collapse the categories ‘upper secondary’ and ‘post-secondary, non-tertiary’ and the categories ‘first stage of tertiary’ and ‘second stage of tertiary’. This recoding restricts us to a less precise 5-point scale, but is considered the lesser evil by the authors. The alternative would have been to exclude all data from the United Kingdom, which is not desirable given the importance of this country for comparative research on immigration in Europe and, in addition, because of the resulting reduction in the N at the highest level. We also take into account the age of the respondent (linear and quadratic terms<sup>6</sup>), the number of children he/she has and the highest educational level achieved by his/her parents. The latter measure is computed by taking the maximum of the educational level variable of both parents. These are measured with the same ISCED scale and, since there are no country-specific deviations, we keep the original scale, but we remind the reader that the measures of educational level differ between respondents and their parents. We imputed missing values for the highest level of education of the respondent (1146, 211 of which are among immigrants) and his/her parents (556 missing values, 135 of which among immigrants), using the mean of groups sorted according to gender, immigrant status, immigrant generation and country of origin in the case of respondent’s education and immigrant status, country of origin and respondent’s education in the case of parents’ education. We add (stepwise) dichotomous variables which indicate whether these variables are imputed whenever we use the education variables, in order to control for the effect of imputation. *We expect that the higher the respondents’ education and the higher the education of their parents, the better integrated they are socio-economically. With regard to age, we hypothesize that, in general, older immigrants will be better integrated than younger immigrants, but we do not expect this relation to be linear.* It is likely that the age benefit, if it exists, levels off or even turns into a penalty from a certain age on, most likely a few years before retirement.

With regard to the number of children, we expect effects to differ strongly between men and women: while higher numbers of children are likely to reduce female labour market participation and, eventually their occupational status, they might enhance the labour market participation of men, as well as their status. The latter effect is expected both because fathers are under more pressure to provide an income than their childless peers and because employers favour employees who are married and who have a family due to an expected higher loyalty and efficiency in their work.

Furthermore, we include respondents’ religion in this step of the analysis. We use dummies that indicate the religious group the respondent belongs to<sup>7</sup>. In addition, we assess religiosity with a self-classification measure where respondents indicated their degree of religiosity on a 10-point scale ranging from ‘not religious at all’ to ‘very religious’. Lastly, we control for the intensity of religious practice which we assess with a composite measure that includes the answers to the questions ‘How

(Contd.) \_\_\_\_\_

information about the time since migration, since this is measured categorically. Using the maximum of the categories in the survey (which systematically underestimates the age at migration) and selecting all immigrants who had migrated before the age of 14 based on this calculation resulted in a share of 10.8% of all immigrants constituting the 1.5 generation. In light of this small share despite very generous definition, we refrained from analyzing this group of immigrants separately.

6 Where the quadratic terms of age were significant, we tested whether higher order effects of age occurred, but found no significant results.

7 In the multilevel analysis, we use Christians (including Eastern-Orthodox) as a reference category and show the effects of having no religion or being a Muslim. The numbers of affiliates of other religions were too low to be included in the analysis.

often do you attend religious services, apart from special occasions?’ and ‘How often do you pray apart from during services?’. Both questions were answered on a 7-point scale that we reversed so that higher values indicate a higher intensity of religious practice. Including individual religion is not common in the analysis of socio-economic integration of immigrants, but we have two reasons to expect effects in this respect: firstly, the cultural habitus of a religious group might affect labour market outcomes, for example through the differential evaluation of achievement (Kao & Thompson, 2003). Secondly, European societies react differently to different religious groups, the primary example being the approach towards Muslims after 9/11. *We therefore hypothesize that religious affiliation and the extent to which individuals follow the practices of their religious community will affect their socio-economic integration*, but we do not have clear expectations with regard to the signs of the effects for different religious groups.

In the multilevel analyses, which are based exclusively on the immigrant sample, we additionally take into account whether respondents speak a minority language at home, whether they hold the citizenship of the country of destination and whether they are born to one native and one immigrant parent. Based on earlier findings (Levels & Dronkers, 2005), *we hypothesize that immigrants who speak a minority language at home will have less favourable labour market outcomes*. On the contrary, *we expect immigrants who are citizens of their destination country and those second generation migrants who are born to one native and one immigrant parent to have higher levels of socio-economic integration*.

We argue that immigrants from certain countries of origin are likely to be better integrated socio-economically than immigrants from other countries or regions of origin. Therefore, we coded the information according to whether the country of origin is a neighbouring country of the country of destination<sup>8</sup>, whether the country of origin is one of the EU-15 member states (plus the largely comparable countries and silent EU member-states, Switzerland and Norway) and whether the country of origin is a former colony or territory of the country of destination.<sup>9</sup> *We expect immigrants from countries which are part of any of these categories to be better integrated socio-economically than immigrants who come from countries which are less historically and culturally connected to the countries of destination in our analysis*.

### 2.3. Independent variables: macro-characteristics

The main focus of our paper is the question whether, and if so how, indicators on the macro-level, both of the countries of destination and the countries of origin, affect immigrants’ socio-economic integration in the 13 EU countries under study.

With regard to the countries of destination, we use indicators of the policies geared towards immigrant integration, the type of welfare regime, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), the size of the bottom of the labour market, GNI per capita, GINI coefficient, the presence of left-wing parties in government and the net migration rate. As a measure of immigrant integration policies, we use the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes et al., 2004) which has recently been developed for the EU-15 member states. This index contains five dimensions: labour market inclusion, long term residence rights, family reunion, naturalization and anti-discrimination measures. We recoded index scores so that values between -1 and 0 represent less favourable policies on these dimensions, while values between 0 and 1 stand for more favourable policies, i.e. policies that are

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8 We use a liberal definition of neighbouring countries which also includes countries who share sea borders with the country of destination. A list of the matches of neighbouring countries is provided in the appendix.

9 These are, in the first place, countries that have been or still are colonies (for instance India for the UK, the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal). But in the case of Austria, Germany, the UK and Sweden they also included those countries that were a part of their former territories (for example Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia for Austria; Norway for Sweden).

more inclusive of immigrants. The assessment of each country's policies in these areas is based on an ideal, not real, legal framework, which means that the creators of the index made a judgement as to how close certain national policies came to what they consider to be ideal for the integration of immigrants. Next to the five separate dimensions, we include the (unweighted) mean score across these dimensions. *We test the hypothesis that immigrants in countries with a higher score on (one of the dimensions of) the European Inclusion Index are better integrated socio-economically than in countries which score low on this Index.*

Furthermore, we test the effects of different types of welfare regimes of the countries of destination. Based on the classic typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) and the work of other authors (Kogan, 2007), we distinguish between the liberal welfare regime, represented by the United Kingdom and Ireland in our data, which is characterized by market-based social insurance and a lack of active employment measures. The social-democratic welfare regime (represented by Sweden and Denmark in our analysis), which, on the contrary, is characterized by a high standard of universal social insurance for citizens with a strong equalizing objective. In conservative welfare regimes, social insurance is state-based instead of market-based, but, in contrast to the social-democratic welfare regime, there is no aim of equalization of status and class differentials. We classify Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands as countries with conservative welfare regimes. We furthermore distinguish the Southern or Mediterranean welfare regime which is found in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and which shares some commonalities with the conservative welfare regime, but additionally knows a high level of labour market rigidity and rather low levels of welfare benefits (for a more detailed description of the different types of welfare regimes, we refer to Kogan, 2007 and Esping-Andersen, 1990). Following Kogan (2007), who found a positive effect of the liberal welfare state on immigrants' socio-economic integration, we argue that the type of welfare regime should be taken into account when analysing between-country differences in immigrant integration in the labour market. *We expect that the liberal welfare regime has a less closed labour market and social welfare system for outsiders and, as a consequence, increases immigrants' opportunities for a successful socio-economic integration.*

Labour market rigidity might even be more relevant to employment opportunities and ensuing occupational status of immigrants, since more stringent Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is likely to increase the effects of statistical discrimination and the penalty of an outsider status in the labour market that immigrants are likely to experience (Kogan, 2007). EPL data are taken from the OECD's labour market statistics (OECD, 2006). We averaged the available scores from 1990, 1998 and 2003 in order to reach a maximally reliable measure of labour market rigidity. In our data, EPL ranges between 0.65 in the United Kingdom to 3.33 in Greece. *We expect immigrants to be better integrated socio-economically in countries with a more flexible labour market, i.e., in countries with lower scores on Employment Protection Legislation.*

In the same vein, we take into account the size of the bottom of the labour market, defined as the percentage of the employed population that works in an occupation with a status of 30 or lower on the ISEI-scale (see also Kogan, 2007). *We have mixed expectations regarding the effect of this indicator: on the one hand, a larger low-status segment will probably make it easier for immigrants to be active in the labour market. However, it might at the same time restrict their advancement to higher-status jobs.*

We additionally control for the presence of left-wing parties in the government during the past 30 years. Based on the data provided by Beck et al. (2001), we compute a total score for every country assigning a 1 for every year in which the government is exclusively made up of left-wing parties and 0.5 for every year in which a left-wing party takes part in a coalition with one or more centre or right-wing parties. This measure has been used in previous cross-country research on immigrant integration (Tubergen, 2004; Tubergen et al., 2004), but the problem with this indicator is that it is merely a proxy for concrete policies. In the presence of the policy indicators described above, we expect little additional explanatory power of the presence of left-wing parties in the government. *The general*

*expectation is that the presence of left-wing parties in the government promotes the socio-economic integration of immigrants.*

Furthermore, we control for GDP per capita (expressed in purchasing power parity) and the GINI-coefficient of both destination and origin countries. These measures are perceived to be internationally comparable indicators of the economic situation of a country and the degree of (in-)equality of the distribution of wealth within countries. GDP per capita was taken from the CIA World Factbook (2007), which also provides the GINI-coefficient for a number of countries. However, since this source does not cover all countries in our data-set, we used data from the World Bank where these were available. In contrast to the World Factbook which provides the most recent calculation of the GINI-coefficient, the World Bank lists a number of values for different years for most countries. In order to make maximal use of the available information, we calculated the average GINI-coefficient per country across all available measurement points. However, we did not succeed in finding any information about the GINI-coefficient for 20 countries of origin<sup>10</sup>. We also used information about the net migration rate of both countries of destination and origin; this data was again taken from the CIA World Factbook which means that it provides the most recent indication. *We expect that immigrants who come from countries in which these indicators differ only slightly from their countries of destination will be better integrated socio-economically*<sup>11</sup>.

For countries of origin, we also include Kaufmann et al.'s (2005) indicator of political stability which assesses the probability that the current government will be overthrown in the near future. This measure, which is internationally comparable and ranges between -2.5 and + 2.5 due to a standardization procedure, is available for all countries of destination and origin, with the exception of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, we include an index of political freedom and civil rights developed and published for the last 30 years by Freedom House (2006). We recode this 7-point index so that higher values represent higher rates of political freedom. By including these indicators of the political structure of the countries of origin, we hope to distinguish between economic and political immigrants. Because of the political background of their migration, we expect political refugees to have a stronger bond with their country of origin since they might hope to return to this country after a regime change. *We expect immigrants from politically less stable and less free countries to be less well integrated into the labour markets of the countries of destination.*

As a more comprehensive measure of the economic and social development of countries of origin, we use the scale of the 2006 Human Development Index. This index combines information on GDP per capita, education, life expectancy and gender inequality and ranks countries according to these

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10 These are the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Netherlands Antilles, Angola, Aruba, Benin, Brunei, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Haiti, Iceland, Saint Lucia, Libya, Martinique, the Palestinian Territories, Somalia and Syria. Countries of origin with no more than 2 immigrants in our sample were deleted listwise if they had missing values on any of the macro-characteristics. For a number of countries, however, we imputed these values in order to reduce loss of information. For the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, we used the mean of the scores of the Netherlands and Suriname, for Angola we used Mozambique, for the Democratic Republic of the Congo we used the mean of the neighbouring countries, for Cape Verde we used the mean of Portugal and Senegal, for the Faroe Islands and Iceland we used Denmark, for Libya we used Egypt and Tunisia, for Syria we used Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, for Serbia and Montenegro we used Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and for Yugoslavia we used the mean of its successor states.

11 Most of our macro-indicators are measured at only one, fairly recent, time-point. This is not ideal, since a thorough test of our arguments would imply measuring the difference in these macro-indicators between the country of origin and the country of destination at the moment of migration. However, such an accurate measurement is not feasible with the data at hand since they do not specify the time of migration. Furthermore, it is unlikely that all indicators will be available for all the required years, especially taking into account that our sample includes second generation immigrants up to the age of 60, which means that the migration of their parents might have occurred in the early 20th century and at a time when national boundaries were quite different from nowadays.

indicators. Unfortunately, there are also missing values on this indicator for 9 countries of origin<sup>12</sup>. *We expect immigrants from less developed countries (i.e. those with a higher Index-score) to have lower levels of socio-economic integration due to the larger economic and cultural differences between their countries of origin and of destination.*

Lastly, we include a dummy variable for the prevalent religion in the country of origin. A religion was classified to prevail in one country if at least 50% of the population belonged to this religious group (based again on information from the CIA World Factbook); if necessary, different Christian denominations were aggregated in this procedure and a country was classified ‘prevalently Christian’ if more than 50% of the population belonged to any Christian denomination. If less than 50% of the population belonged to a single religious group, the country was classified as having no prevalent religion. The prevalent religion in the country of origin is an indicator of the cultural distance between the country of origin and the country of destination which has been used in comparable research (Tubergen, 2004, Tubergen et al., 2004). *Due to the larger cultural distance, we expect immigrants from non-Christian countries to have less favourable labour market outcomes in the 13 EU countries under study.*

### 3. Individual characteristics and labour market success of immigrants

Figures 1 to 4 provide an overview of the uncontrolled mean scores on labour market participation, unemployment, occupational status and the chances of reaching the upper middle-class of male and female natives and immigrants. These figures immediately make clear that there is considerable variation across the 13 countries of destination in terms of the size and direction of the gaps between natives and immigrants in these four dimensions of labour market outcomes. In addition, we can note clear gender differences in all four dimensions. However, since the mean scores depicted in these figures are not controlled for individual characteristics, it is not clear whether the between-country differences are due to the differential composition of immigrants and natives in the various destination countries or whether they result from processes at the macro-level such as different structures of the labour market or different policy approaches towards the integration of immigrants.

#### 3.1 Comparing the labour market success of male immigrants and natives

In order to investigate this question, we perform a number of OLS regressions separately for both genders. In this way, we aim to get a clear picture of, on the one hand, the effects operating at the individual level and, on the other hand, the relevance of including effects at the macro-level. In these analyses, we use data of both immigrants and natives, the latter being the reference category for the models including immigrant generations. Table 3 displays the effects on labour market participation of males. We see that there are considerable differences between the 13 countries under study (France is the reference category) in terms of labour market participation of the male population. Immigrants of both the first and second generation have lower participation rates, but as the last model shows, the negative effect found in the earlier model does not apply to all immigrants, but only to specific immigrant generations in Belgium, Austria and Greece. Furthermore, we find that immigrants from neighbouring countries participate at higher rates than natives, although they profit less from their education. Our hypotheses regarding education and age are confirmed, since higher scores on these variables go together with higher rates of participation. However, contrary to our expectations, higher parental education leads to lower rates of participation. This points to a problem with this dependent variable, since it is not quite clear which level of labour market participation represents higher socio-economic integration. On the one hand, low participation rates can point to lower suitability of immigrants for the labour markets of the destination countries or the existence of (perceived)

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12 These are Afghanistan, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Serbia and Montenegro, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iraq, Liberia, Martinique and Somalia.



discrimination; on the other hand, especially among women, lower levels of participation can indicate successful integration in the sense that immigrants can afford to be inactive.

The analysis of unemployment therefore might be more revealing since higher unemployment can unambiguously be considered to indicate lower success in the labour market. Table 4 shows that there are far fewer between-country differences in unemployment rates, with the exception of Germany which has higher unemployment and Luxembourg which has lower unemployment than the remaining 11 EU countries. Throughout all models, we find that both first and second generation immigrants are almost twice as likely to be unemployed than their native peers, even after controlling for human capital and other individual characteristics. Not surprisingly, higher levels of education reduce the chance of being unemployed. At the same time, more religious persons are more likely to be unemployed, and Muslims and attendants of other non-Christian religions have unemployment rates which are over twice as high as those of natives. We also find origin and destination effects in this analysis: while immigrants from neighbouring countries are less likely to be unemployed, second generation immigrants in Austria are confronted with an unemployment rate that is three times higher than their native peers, even after controlling for education and religion.

If we look at the occupational status of the employed male population, we find still different effects. In the first model of Table 5, we again observe considerable variation between the European countries under study in terms of their average occupational status, a variation that remains even after controlling for individual characteristics. In line with our expectations, we find that education, parental education and age positively affect occupational status. On the whole, immigrants do not differ from natives in terms of occupational status, but the main effect of the immigrant generations only becomes non-significant after inclusion of the interactions with countries of origin and countries of destination. Hence, it is not true that all immigrants differ from natives with respect to occupational status, but some immigrant groups, namely those originating in the EU-15+ countries and in Asia and those going to Denmark and Ireland do better, while the first generation in particular performs worse than natives in Spain and Greece.

If the progression in occupational status were linear, we should find similar effects in the logistic regression of the probability of reaching the upper middle-class. However, this is only partly true. Table 6 shows that, even after controlling for all significant individual characteristics, first generation immigrants are only 50% as likely as comparable natives to enter one of the highest occupational classes. On the other hand, second generation immigrants are found not to differ significantly from their native peers, once we control for the regions of origin. As in the previous analysis, we find that immigrants coming from the EU-15+ countries perform better, which is due to higher returns on their education. In addition, we observe several significant destination effects, since the first generation is more likely to enter the upper middle-class in France and Ireland, but less likely in Sweden.

### **3.2. Comparing the educational levels of male immigrants and natives**

Although our main focus is on immigrants' success in the labour market, we also analyzed the highest level of education reached by male immigrants, since education is one of the most important determinants of labour market outcomes and educational inequality is likely not only to be reproduced, but to be severely strengthened in the labour market. In Table 11 we observe considerable differences between the 13 countries under study in terms of the average educational level reached. Most of these differences remain after controlling for individual characteristics and the differential composition of the immigrant population. It turns out that male immigrants of the first generation are generally less educated than comparable natives, while there are no significant differences between the second generation and their native peers, with the exception of Greece and Portugal where the second generation demonstrates much lower educational outcomes. As can be expected, parental education has a positive effect on education and so does age, indicating slightly higher levels of education among older men, both natives and immigrants. Interestingly, Christians, with the exception of Eastern

Orthodox, generally have higher levels of education. In addition, we see that first generation immigrants from neighbouring countries are higher educated, as are those from Sub-Saharan Africa and South and South-East Asia. The same holds for first generation immigrants from the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. At the same time, we find that Luxembourg and Greece attract lower educated first generation immigrants.

### 3.3. Comparing the labour market success of female immigrants and natives

Although the integration of female immigrants into the labour markets of various countries of destination is still widely understudied, it is generally assumed that this integration follows quite different processes than that of male immigrants. Our separate analyses highlight these differences, which, in our view, justify the separation in the analysis of both genders. This strategy has the obvious disadvantage that the significance of differences in the effect sizes between men and women cannot be tested, but on the other hand, models including both genders would unavoidably become rather complex and large due to the numerous interactions that occur between gender and many of the explanatory factors.

It is clear that the decision whether or not to participate in the labour market is quite different for men than for women in all countries, but, in addition, we can observe large differences between the 13 EU countries under study in the levels of female labour market participation (see Table 7). Not surprisingly, as Model 1 shows, the economic activity of women is largest in Sweden, directly followed by France. On the contrary, Luxembourg and the Netherlands experience particularly low levels of female labour market participation. We find that female immigrants of the first generation have almost twice the participation rates of female natives, while second generation immigrants do not differ from natives in this respect once we control for individual characteristics. We also find that first generation immigrants have lower returns on their education. This finding is not surprising, but rather points to the general costs of migration due to the limited transferability of human capital. The fact that the second generation of female immigrants does not significantly differ from their native peers in their labour market participation is, however, an important finding which provides some optimism about the level of socio-economic integration of this second generation. On the other hand, this optimistic outlook does not hold for all immigrants in the same way, since Muslim women have only half the participation rates of non-Muslim women. In addition, we find that in contrast to all other countries of destination, first generation female immigrants do not have higher labour market participation rates in Ireland (the main effect of being a first generation immigrant and its interaction with Ireland as a country of destination cancel each other out), a country with a rather low female participation rate in general.

In the following steps, we examine the success of female immigrants once they have entered the labour market. With respect to female unemployment, Model 1 in Table 8 makes clear that the between-country differences are much larger than in the case of males, with Germany and Greece having higher levels of female unemployment, while Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg have much lower levels of female unemployment than all other countries. After controlling for individual characteristics, however, these between-country differences shift and show higher female unemployment rates in Belgium and Germany and lower rates in Austria and Luxembourg. Hence, the favourable position of Ireland and the unfavourable position of Greece are due to the composition of the immigrant and native population in these countries. Where the analysis of labour market participation suggested high levels of integration of female immigrants of the second generation, the examination of unemployment reveals a bleaker perspective. In Models 2-5 of Table 8, we find that female immigrants of the second generation are much more likely to be unemployed than their native peers and the first generation, although immigrants from neighbouring countries have much lower unemployment rates (a finding that also holds for male immigrants). Furthermore, we see that immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have lower returns on their education and it is likely that they experience higher unemployment irrespective of their education, since

belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church can be considered a proxy for coming from this region of origin. However, the significant interaction in model 6 makes clear that the higher unemployment rates of the second generation do not apply to all female immigrants, but only to those originating in Northern Africa. In addition, we find that first generation female immigrants in the Netherlands are more than five times more likely to be unemployed than immigrants in all other countries. These findings highlight again the importance of including both the country of origin and the country of destination in the analysis, since the socio-economic integration of immigrants differs greatly between these contexts and not including them leads to the finding of effects that appear to be general, but are, in reality, specific to certain countries of destination and of origin.

Turning to those female immigrants who do not only participate in the labour market but who actually succeed in finding employment, we find again considerable between-country differences in the average occupational status. Much like in the analysis of unemployment, we see that these between-country differences are strongly affected by the composition of both the native and the immigrant population in the 13 countries under study. Again, it seems in Models 2-5 of Table 9 that especially first generation, but also second generation immigrants generally have jobs of a lower occupational status than their native peers. However, the last model shows that, again, there are no general effects for both of the immigrant generations, but that the differences in occupational status are specific to certain countries of origin and of destination. Interestingly, immigrants from Northern Africa are found to have higher occupational status in both generations, while in the previous analysis we saw that the second generation of this group of immigrants suffers from much higher unemployment. While immigrants from the EU-15 countries and those from West Asia also enjoy generally higher occupational status once they are employed, we also find immigrant penalties in occupational status, especially among the first generations in Spain, Greece and Luxembourg and those coming from Eastern Europe, the former USSR or from Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the second generation of immigrants from neighbouring countries has jobs of a lower status.

A comparison of Table 9, which shows the results of the analysis of occupational status of the employed female population, and Table 10, which shows the chances of entering the upper middle-class (i.e. the highest two classes in the EGP-class scheme), makes immediately clear that progression along the status line is not linear for female immigrants. Instead of finding effects for specific countries or regions of origin, we find mainly differences at the level of the country of destination and, importantly, those groups of immigrants who generally enjoy higher occupational status (those from the EU-15, Northern Africa and West Asia) do not have higher chances of reaching the upper-middle class, indicating a ceiling effect for these groups. The between country-comparison in Model 1 of Table 10 shows that the upper-middle class job segment for women is much larger in the Netherlands and much smaller in Portugal and Greece as well as in Austria than in the remaining countries. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the previously mentioned costs of migration, we find that female immigrants of the first generation, just like their male counterparts, are much less likely to enter the upper middle-class, although they profit more from their education in this respect. The second generation appears to have equal chances compared to natives to reach the highest echelons of the labour market, but, as Model 6 shows, they need to be more educated than their native peers in order to reach the same outcomes. Again, we find significant destination effects, indicating higher levels of accessibility of the most attractive job segment for first generation female immigrants in Belgium and for the second generation in Germany.

### **3.4. Comparing the educational level of female immigrants and natives**

Although our main focus is on immigrants' success in the labour market, we also analyzed the highest level of education reached by female immigrants, since education is one of the most important determinants of labour market outcomes and educational inequality is likely not only to be reproduced, but to be severely strengthened in the labour market. Table 12 shows that the level of education of both native and immigrant women differs greatly between the 13 countries included in our analysis.

However, while the first generation is found to have slightly lower educational levels after controlling for the differential effects of parental education and taking into account origin and destination effects, we find, with some exceptions, no significant differences in educational outcomes between the second generation and natives. Not surprisingly, we find that parental education has a positive effect on the highest educational level achieved, while older women generally attain lower levels of education. More interesting are the effects of religious affiliation: while Roman Catholic, Protestant, other Christian and Jewish women are more educated than their non-religious peers, Islamic women have much lower levels of education. Furthermore, we find a number of significant effects of both the countries of destination and of origin on educational outcomes. While the UK appears to attract higher educated female immigrants, the opposite is true for Luxembourg, France and Portugal. At the same time, first generation immigrants from neighbouring countries and from South-East Asia are higher educated. Moreover, the second generation performs much better in Spain and if their parents came from Northern Africa and Southern Asia.

#### **4. The effects of social and labour market policies on immigrants' labour market outcomes**

The OLS regression analyses presented in section 3 do not take the nested structure of the data into account. However, they make abundantly clear that there are no general 'immigrant effects', but that labour market outcomes of immigrants depend both on the country of origin and on the country of destination. Furthermore, while the previous analyses showed that the socio-economic integration of immigrants differs depending on both the country of destination and the country of origin, they did not allow us to identify and correctly model the factors that lead to these differential outcomes. In order to reach an accurate estimation of the effects of indicators on these higher levels of individual outcomes, a multilevel analysis is needed. We use a cross-classified multilevel model, since the individual immigrants in our data are nested both within countries of origin and within countries of destination, but these two levels crosscut each other instead of being nested within each other. We specified the country of origin as the second level and the country of destination as the third, i.e. variance terms indicated by the letter  $v$  refer to the country of destination and those with the letter  $u$  to the country of origin. Since these two levels are only relevant to immigrants and not to natives, we restrict our multilevel analyses to the immigrant population in our data. This has the advantage that we can now include a number of immigrant characteristics, such as the language spoken at home, whether an immigrant holds the citizenship of the destination country and whether he/she is the child of a mixed marriage between a native and an immigrant. In the joint analysis with natives, these indicators could not be included since their estimation would be dominated by the much larger group of natives for whom they are not applicable. Although we use only immigrants in the multilevel analysis, we include the average score of the native population on the dependent variable in every model as an independent variable, so that we can assess the difference between immigrants and natives.

We build our models as follows: the null-model is not displayed in any of the tables, but we discuss the variance components based on this model in the text. The variance components of the higher levels indicate the relevance of including these levels in the analysis. Although, in general, most variation occurs between individuals, a substantive part might also occur between countries of origin and countries of destination. In the regression analyses of occupational status and education, we can calculate the relative importance of these higher levels, by calculating the share of the variances at the higher levels of the total variance. However, the variance at the individual level is not provided in logistic multilevel regression so that we cannot calculate the intra-class correlations for the models of labour market participation, unemployment and the chances of reaching the upper middle-class. Model 1 contains four characteristics of individual immigrants (second generation, having one native and one immigrant parent, speaking a minority language at home and holding the citizenship of the country of destination) and the mean score of natives on the dependent variable. As a consequence of including the latter independent variable, the intercept can be interpreted as the difference in the dependent

variable of first generation immigrants in comparison to the average outcomes of natives. In the second model, we add the human capital variables and individual religious affiliation, religiosity and the intensity of religious practice. Model 3 further adds interactions between education, our central explanatory variable, and immigrant characteristics. In order to make tables comparable, we included all interactions which had a significant effect on any of the dependent variables. Models 4 and 5 are not displayed in the tables, since in these series of models, we add, one by one, the macro-characteristics to Model 3: those of the destination countries in Models 4a to 4p, and those of the countries of origin in Models 5a to 5k. The effects, their standard errors and the change in  $-2\text{LogLikelihood}$  that results from including these variables are displayed in Tables 13 (for the analysis of male immigrants) and 18 (female immigrants). On the basis of these tests, we include the significant macro-characteristics of the country of destination together in Model 6 and those of the country of origin in Model 7. Model 8 then contains the macro-characteristics of both the country of destination and the country of origin. In Model 9, we add dummies for specific regions of origin. Finally, Model 10 is a reduced model which shows only the significant explanatory variables. In the analyses displayed in the tables, all effects are fixed. However, we tested whether making the immigrant characteristics random for the country of destination or for the country of origin significantly improved the analyses in comparison to the full model (Model 9). This turned out not to be the case, since the resulting variance terms and their covariance with the intercept were non-significant in all cases.

#### **4.1. Multilevel analysis of the labour market success of male immigrants**

##### *4.1.1. Male labour market participation*

Table 14 shows the results of the multilevel logistic regression of labour market participation of male immigrants. Since the intercept is negative and significant in all models, we conclude that first generation immigrants have lower participation rates than male natives and the same holds for the second generation which does not significantly differ from the first, despite all controls. Neither being the child of one native and one immigrant parent, nor the language spoken at home, nor whether or not one holds the citizenship of the destination country affect the labour market participation of male immigrants. Individual education has no significant effect either. However, labour market participation increases with increasing age, but the growth levels off at a certain point. Higher levels of parental education reduce rather than increase immigrants' labour market participation, but here we see the ambiguous nature of the dependent variable labour market participation: while low participation rates might indicate lower suitability of immigrants for the labour markets of the destination countries or that immigrants are discouraged to participate due to (perceived) discrimination, it can also mean that immigrants have already reached a level of socio-economic integration that makes it obsolete for them to participate in the labour market.

When we look at the effects at the macro-level, we see that more favourable naturalization policies tend to increase the labour market participation of male immigrants. At the same time, immigrants in conservative welfare regimes are much less likely to be active in the labour market, while this likelihood increases in more unequal societies (i.e. those who have a higher GINI coefficient). With respect to the countries of origin, we find that immigrants from countries with more immigration are less active, which means at the same time that immigrants from countries with high rates of emigration, i.e. typical labour migrants, participate more. Immigrants from countries with higher rates of political freedom have somewhat lower participation rates. Given the high correlations between this indicator and GDP per capita, this effect can be explained in the same way as the effect of parental education: immigrants from more democratic and wealthier countries can afford to work less or have a higher reservation wage, i.e. they can afford to wait longer before they have to work. However, the finding that immigrants from the EU-15+ countries have higher rates of participation might undermine this line of argumentation. At the same time, we find that immigrants from the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia are participating at higher rates than natives. Even the reduced Model 10

succeeds in explaining practically all of the variance both at the level of the country of origin and of the country of destination. In the null-model, the variance between countries of destination (0.226 with a standard error of 0.122) is larger than that between the countries of origin (0.090 with a standard error of 0.086). Apparently, the inclusion of the mean labour market participation of male natives accounts for a large part of the variance between countries of destination, since this variance is smaller than those between countries of origin in all models shown in Table 14. Differences in immigrants' labour market participation between countries of destination appear to result from the differential composition of the individual characteristics of immigrants in these countries. The largest part of the variance between countries of destination is accounted for by the categories of origin countries added in Model 9, but the macro-characteristics added in Model 7 also account for a considerable part of the variance at this level.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4.1.2. *Male unemployment*

If we examine the unemployment rates of those male immigrants who are active in the labour market, we find that these are much higher, the higher the unemployment among male natives (see Table 15). However, after controlling for individual characteristics, the difference between first and second generation immigrants and natives becomes non-significant, meaning that there is no general immigrant penalty in unemployment rates. While the language spoken at home and citizenship of the destination country do not affect immigrants' unemployment rates, children of trans-national marriages between one native and one immigrant parent are more likely to be unemployed if they are less educated, but not if they are highly educated. Overall, we find only few effects at the individual level. It turns out that those respondents who did not provide information on their parents' education are more often unemployed. Furthermore, Muslims are also confronted with higher unemployment rates.

At the macro-level, we find that immigrants in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime tend to be less often unemployed while those in conservative welfare regimes tend to be more often unemployed. Furthermore, unemployment among male immigrants seems to be slightly higher in wealthier countries of destination. With respect to the countries of origin, it turns out that immigrants from more unequal and politically more stable societies are less often unemployed, while those from less developed societies tend to be somewhat more unemployed. It is not surprising that we find only few and mostly non-significant effects at the macro-level, given the lack of variance at the level of the country of origin (which is also 0.000 with a standard error of 0.000 in the null-model). Between countries of destination, there is some variance in unemployment rates (the variance term in the null-model is 0.182 with a standard error of 0.150), but this is completely accounted for by the differences in the mean unemployment of natives. Nevertheless, we find a strong and significant effect for immigrants coming from neighbouring countries. That they are unemployed less often than other immigrants probably reveals their migration motives, since it is likely that their migration is a consequence of better job opportunities in a neighbouring country. In addition, these might be respondents living in border areas who commute between countries due to discrepancies in the labour and housing market between neighbouring countries.

#### 4.1.3. *Male occupational status*

Turning to the occupational status of employed male immigrants, we observe in Table 16 that the first generation does not differ significantly from natives, with the exception of the last, parsimonious model, where first generation immigrants have higher status positions than natives. The second

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<sup>13</sup> We observe an increase in the variance at the level of the country of origin from the null-model until Model 3, which might appear counter-intuitive, but which indicates that disregarding effects at the individual level leads to an underestimation of the variance at the level of the country of origin.

generation, however, has jobs of a significantly higher status than the first generation, once we control for individual characteristics<sup>14</sup>. Other individual characteristics of immigrants do not influence their occupational status. As we expected, both personal and parental education increase one's occupational status, but age does not have any effect. Contrary to our expectations, higher numbers of children go together with lower occupational status. There are no effects of religious affiliation, but respondents who practise more enjoy higher occupational status, which might be an effect of the social capital that results from being active in a religious community.

Although most (80.4%) of the total variation in this multilevel regression model lies at the individual level and we succeed in accounting for 22.5% of this variance, the null-model shows that the occupational status of immigrants also varies between countries of destination (5.6% of the total variance is located at this level) and between countries of origin (which accounts for 14.0% of the total variance). The macro-characteristics of these countries that we add to our models succeed in explaining practically all of this variance at both of the higher levels. We find that immigrants in countries with a more rigid labour market, i.e. higher levels of employment protection legislation, are more often found in low-status jobs. The same holds for immigrants from more developed countries and for those coming from post-socialist societies<sup>15</sup>.

#### 4.1.4. Male upper middle class

In Table 17, we present the results of the multilevel logistic regression of male immigrants' chances of reaching the upper middle-class. Throughout all models, we find that first generation immigrants have significantly lower chances of reaching the highest occupational classes; for second generation immigrants, the chances are somewhat better, but they are still less likely than natives to enter the upper middle-class. None of the other immigrant characteristics affects the probability of immigrants reaching the highest occupational classes, but both education and parental education have the expected positive effect.

In addition to the effects at the individual level, we find a number of effects at the higher levels. With respect to the countries of destination, we find that more favourable naturalization policies increase the likelihood of male immigrants entering the upper middle-class, while stricter employment protection legislation reduces their chances across all models. Including these explanatory factors accounts for a considerable part of the variance at this level, this has a value of 0.268 (with a standard error of 0.156) in the null-model. Again, we see that disregarding individual differences leads to an underestimation of the variance at the higher level, since the variance component of the country of destination increases once these individual characteristics are controlled for. However, in this as in many other analyses, the variance is larger at the level of the country of origin (0.329 with a standard error of 0.149 in the null-model) and we succeed in explaining practically all of this variance with our macro-indicators. We find that immigrants from more politically stable countries have somewhat smaller chances of entering the upper middle-class while those originating in post-socialist societies are particularly disadvantaged.

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14 The positive main effect for the second generation means that they have higher-status jobs than natives with comparable human capital. Since, however, the uncontrolled average occupational status does not differ significantly between natives and second generation immigrants, it appears that the composition of the second generation in terms of human capital is less favourable than that of the native population.

15 In Models 7 and 8, we observe a significant effect for prevalently Eastern Orthodox countries, which disappears once we include the dummy for the post-socialist countries. This means that it is not the prevailing religion in this case, but the social structure due to the socialist past that affects the outcomes of immigrants from these countries.

#### 4.2. Multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of male immigrants

Table 18 presents the results of the multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of male immigrants. We find no significant differences in the educational level between natives and both first and second generation immigrants. However, in countries where native men have higher levels of education, immigrants are also more educated. Immigrants who speak a language other than the national language at home have much lower levels of education, although this negative effect occurs especially among immigrants with lowly educated parents, while immigrants with highly educated parents profit from their bilingualism. It turns out that those respondents who did not provide information on their parents' education are significantly less educated. Muslims tend to have lower levels of education, but this effect disappears once we control for the macro-characteristics of the origin country. The individual characteristics account for 12% of the variance at this lowest level, which makes up 74.8% of the total variance. 10.5% of the total variance is located at the level of the country of destination, while the country of origin accounts for another 14.7%. Our most parsimonious model succeeds in accounting for all of the variation in immigrants' education that occurs between destination countries and for 75% of the variation that occurs between origin countries. Although holding the citizenship of the destination country does not affect an immigrant's educational level, more favourable naturalization policies positively affect this outcome. In addition, immigrants in countries with a liberal welfare regime (Ireland and the United Kingdom) are more educated. With respect to the countries of origin, we find a small but significant effect of the net migration rate which indicates that typical labour migrants who come from countries with high levels of emigration are somewhat less educated.

#### 4.3. Multilevel analysis of the labour market success of female immigrants

In the multilevel analysis of female immigrants' success in the labour market, we follow the same modelling strategy as described in section 4.

##### 4.3.1. Female labour market participation

First, we examine the participation rates of female immigrants; the results of this multilevel logistic regression are shown in Table 20. Throughout all models, we find that the labour market participation of female natives positively affects the participation rates of female immigrants. However, both first and second generation immigrants have lower rates of labour market participation than their native peers, especially after controlling for individual characteristics. Immigrant characteristics do not play a direct role, but those immigrant women who hold the citizenship of the destination country have higher returns on education in terms of their participation rates. Furthermore, female labour market participation increases with age, but the increase levels off at a certain point. In line with our expectations, we find that the more children a female immigrant has, the less likely she is to be active in the labour market. In addition, Muslim women are significantly less likely to participate in the labour market in their countries of destination.

The null-model shows that there is significant variation in the participation rates of female immigrants between countries of destination (the variance component amounts to 0.282 with a standard error of 0.130). However, this variance is almost completely accounted for by the differences in the participation rates of female natives which are already entered in Model 1. Nevertheless, we find some small effects at this level: while more favourable anti-discrimination legislation tends to decrease the labour market participation of female immigrants, their participation rates tend to be higher in social-democratic welfare regimes and in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. At the level of the country of origin, there does not seem to be any significant variance at the outset (the variance component in the null-model is 0.000 with a standard error of 0.000). However, we do find small significant effects: female immigrants from more unequal societies have slightly higher participation rates, while those from countries with more political rights and higher



GDP per capita have lower participation rates. It is likely that these women from more wealthy and democratic countries can simply afford not to work.

#### *4.3.2. Female unemployment*

When analysing the unemployment of female immigrants, we find far fewer effects. Table 21 shows that while high unemployment among female natives increases unemployment among female immigrants, the latter do not significantly differ from the former once we control for individual characteristics. However, it is not quite clear which of these individual characteristics is most important in affecting female unemployment, since none of the individual level variables are significant.

There is variation both at the level of the country of destination and at the level of the country of origin as the null-model makes clear. The variance components are 0.123 (standard error: 0.179) for country of destination and 0.246 (standard error: 0.376) for country of origin. The variation between countries of destination is completely accounted for by the individual characteristics of their different immigrant populations. Nevertheless, we find that female immigrants in the social-democratic welfare regime are much less likely to be unemployed, while more favourable family reunification policies, stricter employment protection legislation and more inequality all tend to increase unemployment among immigrant women. The variation between countries of origin disappears when we control for the effects of the countries of destination and for GDP per capita and political stability of the countries of origin, which lower unemployment among female immigrants, and the prevalent religion in the country of origin. Here we find that women from both Christian and Islamic countries are more likely to be unemployed, but the effect of coming from an Islamic country is much stronger.

#### *4.3.3. Female occupational status*

In terms of the occupational status of employed immigrant women, Table 22 initially shows no significant differences between immigrants of both generations and natives. However, after including macro-characteristics of both the countries of destination and the countries of origin, immigrant women of both generations are found to have a higher occupational status than their native counterparts. At the same time, we find a strong negative effect of speaking a minority language at home across all models. In line with our expectations, education and parental education positively affect the occupational status of female immigrants. These individual level variables account for 23.8% of the variance at the individual level, which makes up 84.1% of the total variance.

5.3% of the total variance is located at the level of the countries of destination and we succeed in accounting for this variance with our macro-characteristics. We find that immigrant women have higher-status jobs in countries with a conservative welfare regime, but they tend to have lower-status jobs in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime. Just like male immigrants, female immigrants have a lower occupational status in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. The country of origin of female immigrants also has an important influence on their occupational status and accounts for 10.6% of the total variance. In our most complete model, 95.4% of the variance at this level is accounted for, but the largest share is due to individual characteristics. Most origin effects are not significant, but female immigrants from Eastern Orthodox and/or post-socialist countries, as well as neighbouring countries, tend to have lower-status jobs, while those coming from the EU-15+ and former colonies tend to have higher-status jobs.

#### *4.3.4. Female upper middle class*

A quite different picture emerges from the analysis of the chances of female immigrants entering the upper middle-class (see Table 23). When taking into account individual characteristics, we find that first generation immigrant women do not differ from natives in terms of their chances of reaching one

of the highest occupational classes. At the same time, second generation immigrants are more likely to enter the upper middle-class if they have low levels of education, but the higher their level of education, the smaller their advantage in comparison to first generation immigrants. At the same time, education has a positive affect on the chances of all immigrants entering the highest occupational classes.

At the macro-level, we find considerable variation both between countries of destination (the variance component of the null-model is 0.197 with a standard error of 0.127) and between countries of origin (the variance component of the null-model is 0.155 with a standard error of 0.142). Most of the variance between destination countries is accounted for by the average proportion of female natives with occupations in the upper-middle class and individual characteristics. We find a positive effect of more favourable anti-discrimination policies and negative effects of the presence of left-wing parties in the government and the net migration rate. However, none of these effects is significant and it must therefore not be surprising that they account for only 8.1% of the variation between destination countries. All of the variance between countries of origin is accounted for by individual characteristics and we only find very small and non-significant effects at this level. Female immigrants from primarily immigrant sending countries and those from countries with less political freedom and lower rates of development tend to be less likely to enter the upper middle-class.

#### **4.4. Multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of female immigrants**

The results of the multilevel analysis of the highest level of education of female immigrants presented in Table 24 show that there are no significant differences in educational level between native women and immigrants of both generations. At the same time, we find that the level of education of female immigrants is higher in countries where native women also attain, on average, a higher level of education. Where we find effects of the immigrant characteristics, these are negative, which is not in line with our expectations with the exception of speaking a minority language at home. Throughout all models, we find that older women are more educated than younger women, although the age benefit decreases from a certain age. In line with our expectations, parental education has a strongly significant positive effect on the education of female immigrants, but this relationship is less strong for second generation immigrants. Furthermore, we find that Islamic women are less educated and that less educated women have more children than more educated women. These individual characteristics account for 19% of the variation between individuals, which makes up the largest share (73.1%) of the total variance in education between female immigrants. 10.3% of this variation is located at the level of the country of destination, while the country of origin accounts for the remaining 16.6%. Although 97% of the variation between destination countries and 72% of the variation between origin countries is accounted for in our full model (Model 9 in Table 24), we can identify only one significant macro-effect. We find that, in addition to the effect of the Islamic faith at the individual level, coming from a country that is prevalently Islamic negatively affects the highest level of education reached by female immigrants. Our results thus show that there are no general discrepancies in educational level between natives and immigrants, whether in the first or in the second generation, but that Muslim women are seriously disadvantaged in both generations.

### **5. Discussion and conclusion**

Our results reveal some important insights into the socio-economic integration of immigrants from various countries of origin in the 13 European countries that we studied. First of all, we find quite marked differences in the effects on labour market participation, unemployment, occupational status and the chances of reaching the highest segment of the labour market. These four indicators should therefore be regarded as separate, although interrelated, dimensions of socio-economic integration. Any study that is limited to only one of these factors will necessarily give only a partial and therefore biased account of the success of immigrants in the labour markets of their destination countries. For

the same reasons, certain dimensions of immigrants' integration, other than the labour market, might be related to different processes and mechanisms.

In addition, we saw that immigrants' integration processes differ strongly between men and women. These differences might be due to different migration motives, since a part of the female immigrant population may migrate due to family reunification processes or as the future brides of first or second generation immigrants who are already settled in the destination country. Furthermore, just like in the native population of most European countries, labour market participation rates differ considerably between men and women and many of the reasons why women often have lower participation rates than men also affect their outcomes in the labour market once they have entered it. For instance, Muslim women are found to have much lower rates of participation in the labour market, but, in addition, they also have lower levels of education. Since education is one of the central predictors of labour market outcomes, these women are also less likely to avoid unemployment and to enter high-status occupations, net of the negative effects of being a female Muslim.

### **5.1. Religious affiliation**

This example also highlights the importance of religious affiliation for the socio-economic integration of immigrants. While individual religion is not conventionally taken into account in comparable analyses of immigrant integration, our results show that it is certainly worthwhile to include this factor. We found disadvantages specifically for Muslims, even after controlling for human capital, in all of the destination countries that we examined: while Muslim men have significantly higher unemployment rates than non-Muslim immigrants and they tend to have lower returns on education on all of the four different labour market outcomes, Muslim women, as mentioned above, are primarily affected in terms of their participation rates and their education. Although the lower economic activity among immigrant women of Islamic faith might be attributed to more gender-biased task distributions within their ethnic communities, our findings can be explained by two factors. Firstly, it is possible that Muslims have a different religious habitus from non-Muslims that makes them less likely to succeed in the labour market, for instance if one of their religious values (honour) partly contradicts one of the conditions of success in modern capitalism (productivity). However, before drawing any strong conclusions based on a possible religious explanation, it deserves more detailed investigation, for instance with the help of the large variation within the Muslim community (e.g. between Sunnites and Shiites).<sup>16</sup> A second explanation of our result might be discrimination against Muslims, be it direct or indirect, in the labour markets of the 13 EU countries. We are aware that this is a strong claim, but the persistence of the negative effect of being a Muslim after controlling for human capital and especially the lower returns on education that Muslims experience, make this second explanation more plausible.

### **5.2. Citizenship**

While an individual's religious affiliation turns out to be important for labour market success, we found that the question whether or not immigrants hold the citizenship of the destination country does not play any role of significance. The absence of an effect of citizenship is an important finding since it has been argued many times that more generous naturalization policies are beneficial to immigrants' integration into their host societies. The creators of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes et al, 2004) take a similar position when they rate naturalization policies as one of the five policy dimensions which are perceived to be crucial for immigrant integration. Although it is possible that differences in naturalization rates and the ease with which immigrants can adopt the citizenship of the destination country affect other dimensions of immigrant integration, especially the socio-cultural<sup>17</sup>, our analyses have shown that citizenship is not so crucial for their socio-economic

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16 Unfortunately, we cannot take this large variation into account since it is not measured in the European Social Survey.

17 Unfortunately, we cannot investigate this dimension of immigrant integration with the data at hand.

integration. While this finding might be controversial, we are quite confident about its robustness, since we found no cross-country differences in the effects of citizenship despite large variations in naturalization rates between the 13 EU countries that we studied (see Table 2.a. for the differences in naturalization rates of the immigrants in our sample and Tables IV and V in the appendix for the results of the randomization of citizenship).

### 5.3. Origin and destination

Our multilevel analyses made clear that effects at the macro-level, both in the countries of destination and in the countries of origin, have an impact on the socio-economic integration of immigrants. Although individual characteristics are the most important predictors of this integration, we found a number of significant effects that account for the variation in labour market outcomes and educational level between immigrants in different countries of destination and coming from different countries of origin. Throughout most of the analyses, we found more variation between countries of origin than between countries of destination, which highlights the importance of the differences in the composition of the immigrant population that exist between destination countries for the explanation of differential labour market success of immigrants in these countries.

However, our analyses identified only few factors which can account for these variations. The prevalent religion in the country of origin was not found to play a crucial role, with the notable exception of the level of education of female immigrants. This provides little support for the argument that cultural distance, expressed in religious differences between the country of destination and country of origin, is an important predictor of immigrants' integration, at least in socio-economic terms. Our data shows that there is no evidence of a direct "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996) that would govern the relations between societies with different religions, especially the Islamic and the non-Islamic world. However, one can interpret the significant effects of individual Muslim affiliation as evidence of an indirect "clash", either as a consequence of a religious habitus of the Islam or of discrimination against Muslims by Europeans.

### 5.4. Macro-factors of origin countries

Political stability and political freedom in the countries of origin were found to lower the labour market participation rates of both male and female immigrants, but also to lower their unemployment rates. Furthermore, these indicators have a slight negative effect on occupational status and the chances of entering the upper middle-class. As we argued in the introduction, political stability and freedom in the country of origin partly reflect the migration motives of immigrants. Those who come from more unstable and less free countries are more likely to arrive as refugees and this specific group of immigrants usually has less favourable labour market outcomes, due to the less positive selection process<sup>18</sup>, their greater difficulties in adapting to their new environment, possibly resulting from the stressful and traumatic experiences that initiated their migration in the first place or their greater orientation towards their home country (as compared to other migrants). The effect of the net migration rate of the country of origin is another finding that highlights the importance of migration motives for the socio-economic integration of immigrants. We find that immigrants who come from countries with high levels of emigration, (such as e.g. many post-socialist societies or Morocco) are more likely to participate in the labour market, but have lower chances of having high-status jobs. This makes clear that these are typical labour migrants or guest workers, since being active in the labour

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18 There are notable exceptions to this general pattern, e.g. Iranian refugees who generally have very high levels of education. However, based on economists' approaches to migration theory, it is expected that labour migrants are more positively selected since they face a quite different cost-benefit analysis than refugees. While for the latter, the benefit of leaving their country of origin will potentially outweigh all costs, the former have to take the costs of migration in the form of lower transferability of human capital into account when taking the decision whether or not to migrate, which is expected to result in higher emigration rates among individuals with higher levels of human capital.

market of the destination countries is the primary motive of their migration while they often choose occupations which generate financial resources in the short term, but which have lower returns in the long run. In addition, we found that immigrants from more unequal societies have somewhat better labour market outcomes, since a higher GINI coefficient in the country of origin goes together with lower unemployment among males and higher participation rates among females.

### **5.5. Inside or outside the European Union**

Although our explanatory factors at the level of the country of origin can partly explain the differences in the labour market outcomes of immigrants, another part of this variation can be explained by certain types of countries of origin. In general, immigrants originating in the EU-15 countries, Switzerland or Norway have more favourable outcomes, as do immigrants from neighbouring countries. While immigrants from the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have considerably worse outcomes, there are no effects of coming from a former colony or territory of the destination country. Although the found effects, with the exception of the absence of the effect of former colonies, are in line with our expectations, it is not quite clear why the effects of these regions show up even after taking into account important characteristics of the countries of origin, such as GDP per capita. In the case of immigrants from the EU-15+ and from neighbouring countries, a possible explanation for their better outcomes might lie in the fact that the cultural distances between their countries of origin and their countries of destination are quite small which should facilitate their overall integration into the societies of the destination countries. At the same time, the higher success rates of immigrants from the EU-15 can be interpreted as evidence of the functioning of the European Union and the realization of its goals of free movements of capital, goods and persons. The growing integration of national labour markets into a European economic system, the ongoing equalization of the European systems of vocational and higher education and the dismantling of administrative barriers to intra-EU migration are likely to be among the reasons why individuals moving within the European Union have fewer problems integrating into labour markets outside their country of origin.

### **5.6. Integration policies of destination countries**

Even despite the fact that the socio-economic integration of immigrants appears to be influenced more by the characteristics of the countries of origin than by those of the countries of destination, we find a number of effects at the latter level. However, the various dimensions of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index are not among the most powerful explanatory factors. In addition, while the creators of this index argue that higher scores on the five dimensions of this index should promote the integration of immigrants, the found effects are not always positive. Among male immigrants, we find that more favourable naturalization policies increase their labour market participation and education level, whilst reducing their unemployment rates, a finding which supports the argumentation behind the Index. The effects on female immigrants, however, are not in line with this reasoning, since female immigrants are less likely to participate in the labour market in countries which have anti-discrimination legislation considered to be more favourable by the creators of the Index. At the same time, these anti-discrimination measures increase the chances of female immigrants entering the upper middle-class once they participate in the labour market. However, we also find that female immigrants are more likely to be unemployed in countries where the legal process of family reunification is easier. We consciously refrain from characterizing these countries as having more favourable family reunification policies, the term that is used by the authors of the European Inclusion Index, since it turns out that the effects of the various dimensions of this legal Index are not always as favourable in real life as they would seem from a legal point of view.

The meagre results of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index and its five dimensions suggest that differences in the policy approaches towards immigrants between the 13 destination countries do not have a large impact on the socio-economic integration of these immigrants. However,

this does not necessarily mean that policies do not matter, since they may affect other dimensions of immigrant integration not examined here. On the other hand, even the developers of this Index argue that integration into the labour market is a precondition for spatial, socio-cultural and political integration, so we should not expect large effects of different policies when analyzing other dimensions of immigrant integration. An argument in the defence of the usefulness of the Index is, however, that the absence of strong effects in our analyses might be due to little variation on the index scores and the low number of countries of destination included in our analysis. Hence, including more, and more varied, countries of destination in our analysis will allow us to better assess the usefulness of this policy indicator in future research.

### **5.7. Labour market protection in destination countries**

One of the most important factors accounting for the differential labour market outcomes of immigrants in the 13 EU countries is the level of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). We find that in countries with a more rigid labour market, both male and female immigrants have significantly lower occupational status. In addition, male immigrants are less likely to enter the upper middle-class and female immigrants tend to participate less and suffer greater unemployment if the level of EPL is higher. This means that, while high levels of EPL are probably beneficial to the insiders in the labour market who hold high-status jobs, they have the side effect of emphasising the gap between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. The finding that EPL especially prevents immigrants from finding higher-status jobs suggests that a consequence of higher EPL might lie in higher levels of statistical discrimination, since in a more rigid labour market employers take more risks when hiring new employees due to the increased costs of getting rid of an unproductive employee. Since statistical discrimination is hard to prove and difficult to address for policy-makers, a more efficient suggestion to promote equal opportunities for immigrants in European labour markets would be to loosen the Employment Protection Legislation. Although it is understandable that the employed population will not be pleased with the increasing pressure that is put on their employment security, they should understand that this comfortable position for insiders has a number of perverse side-effects which might pose larger problems for society as a whole in the long run than a less secure labour market position. We do not only point to the economic disadvantage of a suboptimal use of the human capital of immigrants, but more specifically to the danger of creating a frustrated immigrant population that cannot translate individual skills into occupational status in the same way as their native peers.

### **5.8. Welfare states and immigrants**

In addition to the characteristics of the labour market, we find that welfare regimes also have a role to play in explaining the success or absence of immigrants in the labour market. In contrast to Kogan (2007), we do not find liberal welfare regimes to have specifically beneficial effects, but our analysis suggests slightly better socio-economic integration of immigrants in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime and lower levels of integration in countries with a conservative or southern welfare regime. To be more precise, both male and female immigrants have lower unemployment rates in the social democratic welfare regime, while men also tend to participate more in these countries. On the contrary, participation rates are lower among male immigrants in the conservative welfare regime, highlighting the objective of this type of welfare state to maintain socio-economic boundaries, in this case between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. At the same time, we find that female immigrants have higher-status jobs in countries with a conservative welfare regime. In the southern welfare regime, participation rates are higher among female immigrants. Given the low levels of social security in the southern welfare regime, the latter finding again highlights the ambiguous character of labour market participation, especially among women, since it is likely that in these countries, women have to participate more out of economic necessity. This argumentation is supported by our finding that female immigrants in the southern welfare regime tend to have a lower occupational status.

### 5.9. Progress of the second generation?

Our previous discussion of the effects of indicators at the macro-level of both the countries of origin and the countries of destination has shown that these higher-level effects are important to take into account when analyzing the socio-economic integration of immigrants across countries. While it is clear that the characteristics of the countries of destination will affect both first generation immigrants and their children (in fact, the second and later generations are likely to be even more influenced by the receiving context), it is not straightforward to assume that the characteristics of the country of destination continue to have effects on the integration of the second generation. However, we found that these macro-processes affect the second generation in the same way as the first, since the effect of belonging to the second rather than the first generation of immigrants does not interact with the country of origin in our analyses of labour market outcomes.<sup>19</sup> This finding highlights the importance of socialization processes within immigrant families, since we assume that it is due to these processes that the countries of origin continue to affect the second generation of immigrants. However, the emergence of trans-national networks in the form of the availability of mass media and affordable travel opportunities to the countries of origin might also be one of the explanations for this persistent influence of the country of origin on the socio-economic integration of second generation immigrants. The question of how exactly this influence is transmitted from the first to later generations of immigrants and at what time, if at all, it will vanish, is certainly an interesting and challenging topic for future research.

The finding of the persistence of the importance of the characteristics of the countries of origin even in later generations of immigrants is important for yet another reason: it makes clear that there is no general process of assimilation taking place among the immigrant generations in Europe. Due to the continuing effects of the country of origin on the second generation, the degree to which immigrants assimilate socio-economically depends on their origin and is therefore not universal. In addition, although we find that the second generation has better labour market outcomes than the first generation in a number of respects, they are still at a disadvantage compared to natives, even after controlling for human capital. This holds especially for their chances of entering the highest occupational classes, which indicates that a certain degree of upward social mobility between immigrant generations is possible, but there is a ceiling effect preventing immigrants from reaching the most desirable positions in the labour markets of European countries. This ceiling effect is even stronger for higher educated female immigrants of the second generation who have lower returns on their education in terms of their chances of entering the upper middle-class.

In light of the current debates about the success or failure of immigrant integration in the EU and the fear of radicalization, especially among Muslim youth, we think that these findings are important and should be taken very seriously by policy-makers and the general public. The lower returns to education of occupational status, and particularly on the chances of reaching the most desirable occupational classes, of second generation immigrants are the most troublesome findings in this respect. These lower returns mean that the gap between natives and second generation immigrants with comparable levels of human capital is widest among the most highly educated immigrants who do not succeed in finding occupations that suit their skills, but have to settle for lower-status jobs while the natives they studied with can more easily translate their qualifications into high-status jobs. We think that these ceiling effects, occurring mainly among the highly-educated second generation, are a topic of great concern, more so than the fact that many second generation immigrants still have less favourable educational and labour market outcomes than natives. Since the gap between natives and second generation immigrants in occupational status is smaller among the less educated, we do not

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<sup>19</sup> However, the effect of belonging to the second generation of immigrants at their highest educational level differs between countries of origin for male immigrants, as does the effect of parental education on female immigrants' education. We will further investigate these random effects in our chapter about educational outcomes of immigrants that is to be published in the book of the European Forum 2006-7.

expect these immigrants to experience the same levels of frustration that are likely to occur among the highly-educated second generation immigrants who appear to always pull the short straw when compared to their native peers. We argue that if social cohesion within European societies is threatened as a consequence of an unsuccessful integration of immigrants, it is due to these unequal outcomes of the highly-educated second generation.



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**Table 1. Dependent variables per country of destination and country of origin (continued on following pages)**

		Country of Destination	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Portu- gal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total	
<b>Natives</b>		<b>N</b>	1155	883	854	903	1425	1174	1277	490	1030	1067	926	969	908	<b>13061</b>	
		<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	58	65	64	78	58	65	58	54	46	69	76	85	75	<b>65</b>	
		<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	7	9	9	8	15	13	5	2	6	12	7	6	7	<b>9</b>	
		<b>Mean ISEI</b>	46.61	46.55	45.78	46.34	46.76	42.52	42.97	46.87	49.50	41.88	44.85	45.78	44.34	<b>45.31</b>	
		<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	15.26	16.16	15.17	15.53	15.96	16.76	16.23	17.56	15.26	15.42	17.12	17.72	16.98	<b>16.62</b>	
		<b>High EGP (%)</b>	42	45	51	53	45	28	42	51	57	25	39	48	43	<b>42</b>	
	<b>Immigr: Country/ Region of Origin</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>N</b>	47	8	20	9	n.a.	1	6	56	38	0	1	17	6	<b>209</b>
			<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	51	75	65	89		0	33	70	24		0	82	67	<b>57</b>
			<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	12	17	0	13		n.a.	0	7	10		n.a.	7	0	<b>7</b>
			<b>Mean ISEI</b>	53.77	38.80	46.23	42.86		n.a.	53.00	49.25	43.78		n.a.	46.43	35.50	<b>47.59</b>
<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>			13.28	19.21	18.51	20.42		n.a.	33.94	18.16	17.69		n.a.	20.68	24.37	<b>18.16</b>	
<b>High EGP (%)</b>			55	40	46	43		n.a.	50	61	44		n.a.	64	25	<b>53</b>	
<b>Portugal</b>		<b>N</b>	0	0	0	19	1	0	0	165	1	n.a.	5	1	2	<b>194</b>	
		<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>				89	0			52	0		100	100	100	<b>57</b>	
		<b>Unemployment (%)</b>				6	n.a.			5	n.a.		0	0	50	<b>5</b>	
		<b>Mean ISEI</b>				38.88	n.a.			32.88	n.a.		40.00	36.00	51.00	<b>34.32</b>	
		<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>				14.83	n.a.			12.45	n.a.		19.09	n.a.	n.a.	<b>13.25</b>	
		<b>High EGP (%)</b>				38	n.a.			10	n.a.		40	0	100	<b>16</b>	
<b>Italy (+San Marino)</b>		<b>N</b>	21	38	1	37	11	2	0	63	7	0	1	0	3	<b>184</b>	
		<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	48	55	100	81	27	0		49	57		100		33	<b>55</b>	
		<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	10	13	0	3	25	n.a.		0	25		0		0	<b>7</b>	
		<b>Mean ISEI</b>	46.33	40.95	59.00	44.57	48.00	n.a.		42.56	40.33		23.00		59.00	<b>44.66</b>	
		<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	12.69	15.20	n.a.	15.91	18.52	n.a.		14.07	21.37		n.a.		n.a.	<b>14.96</b>	
		<b>High EGP (%)</b>	44	25	0	53	67	n.a.		45	33		0		100	<b>43</b>	
<b>France</b>		<b>N</b>	2	37	1	n.a.	4	2	0	77	2	1	3	0	2	<b>131</b>	
		<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	0	49	0		0	0		69	50	100	100		50	<b>59</b>	
		<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	n.a.	14	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.		7	0	100	0		0	<b>10</b>	
		<b>Mean ISEI</b>	n.a.	49.06	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.		47.44	34.00	30.00	57.00		51.00	<b>48.19</b>	
		<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	19.45	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.		16.66	n.a.	n.a.	13.53		n.a.	<b>17.08</b>	
		<b>High EGP (%)</b>	n.a.	39	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.		51	0	100	100		0	<b>48</b>	
<b>Turkey</b>		<b>N</b>	14	9	4	2	36	41	0	1	14	0	0	7	0	<b>128</b>	
		<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	43	100	50	100	39	49		0	36			100		<b>59</b>	
		<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	56	0	50	0	27	24		n.a.	17			0		<b>25</b>	
		<b>Mean ISEI</b>	26.00	34.67	70.00	41.50	42.18	39.06		n.a.	41.80			31.00		<b>38.60</b>	
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	7.62	8.96	n.a.	17.68	13.19	16.72		n.a.	8.41			9.72		<b>14.30</b>		
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	0	0	0	100	27	19		n.a.	40			0		<b>21</b>		
<b>Former Yugo- slavia ( - Slo- venia)</b>	<b>N</b>	41	1	5	6	17	1	0	30	4	0	1	19	0	<b>125</b>		
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	46	100	60	33	100	100		68	25		100	68		<b>62</b>		
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	35	0	0	33	33	0		7	100		0	8		<b>22</b>		
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	41.00	33.00	38.67	65.00	35.83	39.00		31.83	n.a.		56.00	36.42		<b>37.64</b>		
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	14.31	n.a.	11.24	5.66	6.83	n.a.		11.37	n.a.		n.a.	17.24		<b>14.14</b>		
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	35	0	33	100	17	0		17	n.a.		100	17		<b>26</b>		



**Table 1. continued**

	Country of Destination	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Portu- gal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total
<b>Nether- lands</b>	<b>N</b>	4	26	1	1	2	1	2	18	n.a.	0	0	2	1	<b>58</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	25	69	100	100	100	100	50	39				100	100	<b>60</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0	10	0	100	0	0	0	0				0	0	<b>8</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	39.00	45.78	51.00	n.a.	51.50	34.00	48.00	34.71				77.00	51.00	<b>45.50</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	18.86	n.a.	n.a.	19.09	n.a.	n.a.	18.31				11.31	n.a.	<b>15.52</b>
<b>Spanish Speaking Carib- bean &amp; South America</b>	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	0	50	100	n.a.	100	0	100	0				100	100	<b>47</b>
	<b>N</b>	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	33	7	2	<b>49</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>			0	50	0			0	0		70	71	100	<b>63</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>			n.a.	0	n.a.			n.a.	n.a.		9	0	0	<b>6</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>			66.00	39.00	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		30.38	47.40	51.00	<b>35.03</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>			n.a.	100	n.a.			n.a.		15.47	21.13	11.31	11.31	<b>17.37</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>			100	100	n.a.			n.a.		19	60	50	50	<b>31</b>
	<b>N</b>	23	0	0	0	20	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	<b>48</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	65				65	0		0	0			100	100	<b>63</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	7				14	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.			0	0	<b>10</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	43.00				51.00	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.			69.00	25.00	<b>46.91</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	8.16				14.28	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.			n.a.	n.a.	<b>12.90</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	21				58	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.			100	0	<b>39</b>
	<b>N</b>	1	6	0	17	2	0	3	6	1	3	n.a.	2	5	<b>46</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	0	67		82	100		67	100	0	33		100	100	<b>78</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	n.a.	50		14	0		0	0	n.a.	0		50	0	<b>14</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	n.a.	27.00		43.42	50.50		53.00	44.17	n.a.	88.00		33.00	51.60	<b>46.00</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	9.90		17.71	23.33		2.83	13.51	n.a.	n.a.		n.a.	16.06	<b>17.41</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	n.a.	0		33	50		100	50	n.a.	100		0	20	<b>39</b>
	<b>N</b>	12	1	0	1	13	4	0	1	3	0	9	0	0	<b>44</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	58	100		0	62	50		0	33		78			<b>59</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	22	0		n.a.	33	50		n.a.	0		25			<b>27</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	35.14	16.00		n.a.	42.50	16.00		n.a.	56.00		26.17			<b>33.91</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	15.63	n.a.		n.a.	10.15	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.		10.11			<b>14.52</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	29	0		n.a.	50	0		n.a.	100		0			<b>27</b>
<b>Remaining Southern Asia</b>	<b>N</b>	1	0	0	0	1	0	n.a.	1	0	0	1	0	35	<b>39</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	100				0			100			100		77	<b>77</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0				n.a.			0			0		7	<b>6</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	69.00				n.a.			61.00			54.00		44.73	<b>46.45</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.				n.a.			n.a.			n.a.		19.59	<b>19.32</b>
<b>High EGP (%)</b>	<b>N</b>	100				n.a.			100			100		62	<b>65</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	1	1	5	0	3	0	3	0	6	0	1	8	11	<b>39</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	100	100	60		67		67		67		100	88	55	<b>69</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	100	0	33		50		33		40		100	0	17	<b>28</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	16.00	40.50		26.00		46.00		51.67		n.a.	36.71	52.80	<b>42.43</b>
<b>High EGP (%)</b>	<b>N</b>	n.a.	n.a.	34.65		n.a.		4.24		21.83		n.a.	11.61	17.24	<b>17.60</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	n.a.	0	50		0		100		67		n.a.	29	60	<b>48</b>

Table 1. continued

	Country of Destination	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Portu- gal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total
<b>Remain- ing Northern Europe</b>	<b>N</b>	2	0	11	0	2	0	1	4	2	0	0	14	2	<b>38</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	50		82		100		0	75	100			79	0	<b>74</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0		0		0		n.a.	0	50			0	n.a.	<b>4</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	48.00		43.78		44.50		n.a.	64.33	82.00			46.18	n.a.	<b>52.33</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.		21.33		9.19		n.a.	5.77	n.a.		21.11	n.a.	<b>19.78</b>	
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	0		67		50		n.a.	100	100			45	n.a.	<b>59</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>N</b>	0	3	0	30	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	<b>36</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>		33		67				100	100		100			<b>67</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>		50		27				0	0		100			<b>30</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>		40.00		51.25				34.00	43.00		n.a.			<b>49.32</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>		n.a.		13.68				n.a.	n.a.		n.a.			<b>13.40</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>		0		25				0	100		n.a.			<b>53</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>N</b>	17	3	1	0	8	0	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	<b>34</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	53	0	0		88			0	0			100		<b>53</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	20	n.a.	n.a.		14			n.a.	n.a.			50		<b>16</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	41.89	n.a.	n.a.		47.50			n.a.	n.a.			25.00		<b>42.94</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	7.49	n.a.	n.a.		18.25			n.a.	n.a.			n.a.		<b>13.09</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	44	n.a.	n.a.		50			n.a.	n.a.			0		<b>44</b>
<b>Remain- ing Northern Africa</b>	<b>N</b>	1	2	1	15	1	3	0	2	3	0	0	1	3	<b>32</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	100	0	0	87	0	67		50	33			0	67	<b>63</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0	n.a.	n.a.	14	n.a.	0		100	0			n.a.	0	<b>14</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	20.00	n.a.	n.a.	52.08	n.a.	59.50		26.00	44.00			n.a.	60.00	<b>50.21</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15.14	n.a.	13.40		n.a.	n.a.			n.a.	12.73	<b>16.34</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	0	n.a.	n.a.	58	n.a.	100		0	100			n.a.	100	<b>64</b>
<b>Western Asia</b>	<b>N</b>	0	2	0	0	1	6	0	0	4	0	2	11	6	<b>32</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>		100			100	50			50		50	82	100	<b>75</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>		50			0	0			50		0	11	33	<b>24</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>		29.00			16.00	41.33			32.00		59.00	38.00	50.25	<b>40.26</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>		n.a.			n.a.	21.36			n.a.		n.a.	12.41	5.74	<b>14.21</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>		0			0	33			0		100	13	25	<b>21</b>
<b>India</b>	<b>N</b>	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	24	<b>30</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>				100		100				100		50	75	<b>77</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>				100		0				0		0	16	<b>17</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>				n.a.		26.00				21.00		43.00	50.19	<b>45.95</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>				n.a.		4.25				n.a.		n.a.	14.62	<b>16.19</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>				n.a.		0			0		100	56	<b>50</b>	
<b>Remain- ing Eastern Europe</b>	<b>N</b>	5	0	2	0	0	14	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	<b>29</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	20		100			86		0	100	100	100	100	100	<b>76</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	67		0			8		n.a.	0	0	100	0	0	<b>17</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	34.00		53.50			24.27		n.a.	51.00	49.00	29.00	33.00	38.50	<b>33.25</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.		21.92			16.12		n.a.	n.a.	28.28	n.a.	n.a.	17.68	<b>18.87</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	0		50			9		n.a.	100	50	0	0	50	<b>25</b>

Table 1. continued

	Country of Destination	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Portu- gal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total
<b>Indonesia</b>	N	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	27	0	0	0	0	28
	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)			100						52					54
	Unemployment (%)			0						7					7
<b>Norway</b>	Mean ISEI			69.00						55.00					56.00
	Std. Dev. ISEI			n.a.						15.75					15.49
	High EGP (%)			100						77					79
	N	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	16	0	26
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)			38					50				69		58
	Unemployment (%)			0					0				0		0
	Mean ISEI			53.61					51.00				50.45		51.13
	Std. Dev. ISEI			13.67					n.a.				20.53		18.15
<b>South- East Asia</b>	High EGP (%)			67					100				63		60
	N	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	3	5	2	0	4	12	26
	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)		67		100				100	mis	0		100	75	77
	Unemployment (%)		0		0				100	n.a.	n.a.		25	11	10
<b>Western Africa</b>	Mean ISEI		40.40		40.50				51.67				49.67	39.00	43.22
	Std. Dev. ISEI		14.89		21.92				36.00				18.61	19.73	20.61
	High EGP (%)		0		50				33	n.a.	n.a.		33	38	33
	N	0	2	1	2	2	1	2	5	4	0	1	1	5	26
<b>United States</b>	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)		0	100	100	100	100	50	0	75		100	100	80	62
	Unemployment (%)		n.a.	0	50	0	0	0	n.a.	0		0	0	0	6
	Mean ISEI		n.a.	25.00	43.00	27.50	16.00	43.00	n.a.	43.67		30.00	30.00	66.25	42.53
	Std. Dev. ISEI		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.54	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	13.67		n.a.	n.a.	23.74	20.62
<b>Dutch Speaking Carib- bean and South America</b>	High EGP (%)		n.a.	0	100	50	0	100	n.a.	0		0	0	75	47
	N	0	1	0	9	1	1	4	7	0	12	3	0	16	54
	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)		0		67	100	100	75	71		75	100		63	81
	Unemployment (%)		n.a.	29	100	0	100	0	0		0	0		10	14
<b>United States</b>	Mean ISEI		n.a.	38.60	30.00	29.00	n.a.	n.a.	23.80		29.89	21.00		46.00	34.39
	Std. Dev. ISEI		n.a.	12.66	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8.24		12.84	7.07		21.30	16.67
	High EGP (%)		n.a.	20	0	0	n.a.	0	0		0	0		44	16
	N	1	1	1	1	6	3	3	3	2	0	1	0	3	25
<b>United States</b>	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)	0	0	0	0	50	33	33	100	0		100		33	40
	Unemployment (%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	0	0	n.a.		0		0	0
	Mean ISEI	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	45.67	44.00	43.00	58.67	n.a.		52.00		34.00	48.60
	Std. Dev. ISEI	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	17.16	n.a.	n.a.	8.96	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	12.28
<b>United States</b>	High EGP (%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	33	100	100	100	n.a.		100		0	60
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	24
	Lab. Mark. Part. (%)									50					50
	Unemployment (%)									14					14
<b>Carib- bean and South America</b>	Mean ISEI									47.25					47.25
	Std. Dev. ISEI									17.01					17.01
	High EGP (%)									50					50

**Table 1. continued**

	Country of Destination	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total
<b>Remaining Southern Europe</b>	<b>N</b>	5	2	0	1	5	0	2	1	1	0	0	2	5	<b>24</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	80	0		0	60		50	0	100			100	60	<b>58</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0	n.a.		n.a.	25		0	n.a.	0			0	0	<b>7</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	59.25	n.a.		n.a.	54.33		50.00	n.a.	59.00			43.00	63.67	<b>56.07</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	7.27	n.a.		n.a.	20.01		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.			18.38	11.01	<b>12.90</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	100	n.a.		n.a.	67		100	n.a.	100			0	100	<b>71</b>
	<b>N</b>	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	1	13	2	0	0	<b>23</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	0	0			100	0		33	100	85	100			<b>70</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	n.a.	n.a.			0	n.a.		0	0	9	0			<b>6</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	n.a.	n.a.			16.00	n.a.		26.00	60.00	31.90	38.00			<b>33.13</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	n.a.			n.a.	n.a.		n.a.	n.a.	5.70	1.41			<b>9.90</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	n.a.	n.a.			0	n.a.		0	100	0	50			<b>13</b>
	<b>N</b>	6	0	0	5	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	2	<b>22</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	50			80	67			100				100	50	<b>68</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0			20	0			0				0	50	<b>12</b>
<b>Angola</b>	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	50.67			55.00	57.50			48.67				46.50	59.00	<b>53.33</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	0.58			17.94	9.19			23.46				12.02	n.a.	<b>13.47</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	33			75	55			67				50	100	<b>60</b>
	<b>N</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	<b>21</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>								0		65				<b>62</b>
<b>East Asia</b>	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>								n.a.		21				<b>21</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>								n.a.		46.09				<b>46.09</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>								n.a.		18.29				<b>18.29</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>								n.a.		45				<b>45</b>
	<b>N</b>	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	3	0	<b>21</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	100	0	0					50	20		100		67	<b>57</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0	n.a.	n.a.					0	50		0		0	<b>8</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	46.00	n.a.	n.a.					49.00	43.00		45.33		47.25	<b>46.25</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	6.25	n.a.	n.a.					n.a.	n.a.		10.02		20.76	<b>12.05</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	67	n.a.	n.a.					0	0		33		50	<b>50</b>
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>N</b>	0	2	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	12	<b>20</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>		50			100	100					100		50	<b>65</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>		50			0	0					0		14	<b>13</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>		43.00			30.00	26.00					29.00		44.50	<b>36.62</b>
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>		n.a.			n.a.	5.20					0.0		21.42	<b>16.48</b>
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>High EGP (%)</b>		0			0	0					0		17	<b>8</b>
	<b>N</b>	1	1	0	0	7	3	0	3	0	4	1	0	0	<b>20</b>
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	100	0			43	33		67		75	0			<b>50</b>
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	0	n.a.			0	100		0		33	n.a.			<b>27</b>
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	23.00	n.a.			51.00	n.a.		47.00		35.50	n.a.			<b>42.63</b>
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	n.a.	n.a.			19.08	n.a.		31.11		9.19	n.a.			<b>18.96</b>
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	0	n.a.			67	n.a.		50		0	n.a.			<b>38</b>





**Table 1. continued**

	Country of Destination	Austria	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Portu- gal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>N</b>	224	199	80	203	249	188	103	543	189	59	89	216	199	15602
	<b>Lab. Mark. Part. (%)</b>	53	57	58	76	57	65	51	56	40	71	85	84	70	65
	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>	20	20	7	14	23	13	7	4	16	14	12	5	10	9
	<b>Mean ISEI</b>	44.18	42.13	50.09	45.74	42.80	31.91	51.84	41.99	49.03	38.84	34.03	46.10	46.92	45.01
	<b>Std. Dev. ISEI</b>	14.17	16.22	19.23	16.43	15.60	14.41	17.25	16.93	15.89	17.62	16.66	18.64	17.95	16.74
	<b>High EGP (%)</b>	41	34	58	51	37	10	54	36	59	22	26	44	50	42

Source: European Social Survey 2004 (unweighted data)

**Table 2.a. Independent variables per country of destination (natives vs. immigrants)**

Independent Variables		Highest Level of Education*	Age	Highest parental educational level	% belonging to a non-Christian religion **	How religious are you? ***	Intensity of Religious Practice ****	% 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	% 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	% speaking minority language at home	% immigr. With 1 native parent	% immigr. From neighbouring countries	% immigr. From EU-15 countries	% immigr. Holding citizenship of the destination country	% immigr. From former colonies/territories
<b>Austria</b>	Natives	2.36	42.8	2.05	2.4	5.20	2.23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.32	42.6	2.22	13.0	5.16	2.23	44.1	54.9	19.6	50.0	54.9	37.1	75.9	40.2
<b>Belgium</b>	Natives	3.01	42.8	2.69	1.6	4.40	1.13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.81	41.1	2.34	22.6	5.36	1.54	47.7	52.3	18.6	35.2	38.7	61.8	68.8	2.5
<b>Denmark</b>	Natives	3.19	43.6	3.19	1.4	4.09	1.19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	3.19	41.1	3.62	16.3	4.39	1.52	47.5	52.5	15.0	55.0	43.8	41.3	80.0	7.5
<b>France</b>	Natives	2.69	43.3	2.05	0.0 <sup>†</sup>	3.34	0.98	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.55	43.7	1.70	34.0	4.22	1.97	38.9	61.1	13.8	46.8	36.9	44.8	81.3	41.4
<b>Germany</b>	Natives	3.22	43.3	3.40	1.1	3.56	1.31	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	3.00	41.5	2.97	16.9	4.87	2.21	61.4	38.6	27.3	32.9	26.9	14.1	69.9	19.3
<b>Greece</b>	Natives	2.51	42.1	1.44	1.2	6.89	3.23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.43	40.3	1.77	9.0	7.07	3.07	73.4	26.6	29.8	17.6	61.2	6.4	44.1	0.0
<b>Ireland</b>	Natives	2.61	43.5	1.87	0.3	5.75	3.67	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	3.21	40.3	2.82	5.8	4.65	2.85	63.1	36.9	7.8	55.3	67.0	77.7	60.2	0.0
<b>Luxembourg</b>	Natives	2.73	43.9	2.38	1.4	4.01	1.61	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.43	40.4	1.89	7.2	4.52	1.84	69.5	30.4	40.5	22.3	35.0	83.2	31.3	0.0
<b>Netherlands</b>	Natives	2.91	43.7	2.36	1.0	4.65	1.49	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.89	41.5	2.52	13.8	5.41	1.63	59.3	40.7	14.8	41.3	27.5	34.9	77.8	27.0
<b>Portugal</b>	Natives	1.64	42.0	1.07	0.3	4.95	2.53	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	1.68	37.8	1.78	8.5	5.15	2.59	83.1	16.9	18.6	16.9	5.1	6.8	42.4	76.3
<b>Spain</b>	Natives	2.30	41.2	1.37	1.0	4.03	1.61	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.32	37.8	1.62	27.0	5.39	2.67	79.8	11.2	37.1	13.5	21.4	13.3	25.8	37.1
<b>Sweden</b>	Natives	2.80	43.2	2.27	0.8	3.35	0.94	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	3.01	42.5	2.60	7.4	3.70	1.34	54.6	45.4	25.9	34.7	51.4	53.7	81.0	40.3
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Natives	2.73	42.2	2.61	1.2	3.84	1.35	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.10	38.0	3.11	20.6	5.42	2.50	49.5	50.5	19.1	39.7	22.5	29.0	78.9	72.4
<b>Total</b>	Natives	2.67	42.9	2.21	5.1	4.55	2.87	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Immigrants	2.69	41.0	2.32	16.7	4.96	3.01	59.3	40.7	25.1	34.2	38.5	45.7	61.1	23.2

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data

Ταβλε 56.γ Adapted ISCED-97 scale

\*\* This percentage does not include non-religious respondents, but only those who rate themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religion).

\*\*\* 0= Not at all until 10 = Very religious

\*\*\*\* How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions and how often do you pray apart from religious services? 1= Never until 7= Every day

**Table 2.b Independent Variables by Country of Origin (continued on following page)**

Independent Variables Country of Origin	N	Highest Level of Education*	Age	Highest parental educational level	% belonging to a non-Christian religion **	How religious are you? ***	Intensity of Religious Practice ****	% 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	% 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	% speaking minority language at home	% immigr. with 1 native parent	% immigr. from neighbouring countries	% migration from former colony/territory to the (colonial) centre
Germany	209	2.86	43.1	2.89	4.3	4.07	2.50	32.5	67.5	3.8	68.9	76.1	0.0
Portugal	194	1.53	40.0	0.77	9.3	5.59	3.44	87.6	12.4	75.3	2.1	12.4	0.0
Italy (+ San Marino)	184	2.55	43.8	1.53	18.5	5.01	2.71	35.3	64.7	14.7	35.9	58.7	0.0
France	131	3.05	41.8	2.70	1.5	3.53	2.06	56.5	43.5	4.6	44.3	51.1	0.0
Turkey	128	2.06	42.5	1.32	52.3	6.70	4.10	58.6	41.4	42.2	19.5	66.4	0.0
Former Yugoslavia (- Slovenia)	125	2.40	40.5	1.76	28.0	4.68	2.76	76.0	24.0	49.6	12.0	55.2	32.8
United Kingdom	104	3.17	42.2	2.95	5.8	4.52	3.31	58.6	41.4	14.4	56.7	60.6	0.0
Poland	103	3.08	42.6	3.13	6.8	4.43	2.58	57.3	42.7	19.4	38.8	77.7	46.6
Former USSR (- Ukraine & Baltic cntr.)	82	2.90	40.9	2.74	3.7	5.72	3.57	90.2	9.8	39.0	6.1	75.6	0.0
Finland	74	3.05	42.6	2.09	2.7	3.84	2.31	45.9	54.1	14.9	36.5	81.1	95.9
Belgium	73	3.32	42.0	3.04	4.1	4.36	2.44	57.5	42.5	4.1	43.8	49.3	0.0
Morocco	72	2.39	36.5	1.39	82.0	6.28	3.57	65.3	34.7	48.6	20.1	65.3	31.9
Albania	68	2.19	35.5	1.74	19.1	6.41	3.46	98.5	1.5	47.1	4.4	14.7	0.0
Netherlands	58	3.17	41.6	3.07	0.0	4.05	2.58	41.4	58.6	13.8	55.2	63.8	0.0
Western Africa	54	2.64	37.4	2.00	24.1	6.28	4.15	79.6	20.4	29.6	11.1	40.7	63.0
Spanish Speak. Carib. & S. Am.	49	2.76	37.7	2.20	8.2	4.80	3.41	83.7	16.3	16.3	12.2	42.9	67.3
Czech Republic	48	2.96	46.8	3.02	2.1	3.69	2.51	31.2	68.8	4.2	56.3	91.7	47.9
Spain	46	2.61	41.3	1.63	17.4	4.07	2.38	37.0	63.0	15.2	43.5	76.1	0.0
Romania	44	2.48	38.2	2.16	2.3	5.00	3.31	61.4	38.6	36.4	30.0	52.3	0.0
Ireland	39	2.97	39.3	3.23	0.0	4.82	2.87	23.1	76.9	7.7	61.5	87.2	89.7
Remaining Southern Asia	39	2.87	39.9	2.62	48.7	5.82	3.62	87.2	12.8	48.7	15.4	69.2	25.6
Remaining Northern Europe	38	3.32	41.5	3.05	7.9	3.66	2.53	42.1	57.9	10.5	60.5	76.3	10.5
Algeria	36	2.58	41.9	1.56	58.3	4.17	2.03	47.2	52.8	8.3	36.1	80.6	83.3
Hungary	34	2.59	41.3	2.62	2.9	4.88	2.82	23.5	76.5	5.9	67.7	88.2	50.0
Remaining Northern Africa	32	3.03	40.5	3.35	62.5	5.28	3.25	46.9	53.1	18.8	50.0	87.5	50.0
Western Asia	32	2.80	39.3	2.81	34.4	5.69	3.33	75.0	25.0	50.0	9.4	65.6	15.6
India	30	3.03	38.1	2.76	53.3	5.77	4.00	46.7	53.3	30.0	26.7	86.7	80.0
Remaining Eastern Europe	29	2.79	38.5	2.69	0.0	5.83	3.78	72.4	27.6	34.5	17.4	44.8	13.8
Indonesia	28	3.21	45.1	3.57	0.0	5.11	2.23	35.7	64.3	0.0	57.1	100	96.4
Norway	26	2.85	44.9	3.19	0.0	3.81	1.92	30.8	69.2	3.9	57.7	61.5	61.5
Eastern Africa	26	2.46	39.2	2.54	30.8	5.04	3.52	76.9	23.1	30.1	23.1	73.1	38.5
South-East Asia	26	3.35	37.7	2.31	19.2	6.42	4.29	92.3	7.7	23.1	15.4	61.5	15.4
United States	24	3.20	42.2	3.56	8.0	5.00	2.98	52.0	48.0	20.0	64.0	56.0	12.0
Dutch Speak. Carib. & S. Am.	24	2.71	38.0	1.92	12.5	5.50	3.29	62.5	37.5	4.2	25.0	100	100
Remaining Southern Europe	24	3.09	37.5	2.78	0.0	4.88	3.28	58.3	41.7	20.8	41.7	58.3	37.5
Brazil	23	2.17	35.3	1.78	0.0	5.87	3.74	95.6	4.4	17.4	8.7	39.1	56.5

Table 2.b continued

Independent Variables	N	Highest Level of Education*	Age	Highest parental educational level	% belonging to a non-Christian religion **	How religious are you? ***	Intensity of Religious Practice ****	% 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	% 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	% speaking minority language at home	% immigr. with 1 native parent	% immigr. from neighbouring countries	% migration from former colony/territory to the (colonial) centre
Country of Origin													
Switzerland	22	3.00	40.0	3.77	4.6	4.05	2.41	45.4	54.6	9.1	81.8	77.3	0.0
Angola	21	1.90	40.1	1.90	0.0	5.43	3.69	90.5	9.5	4.8	28.6	66.7	95.2
East Asia	21	2.95	37.5	3.14	19.1	4.50	2.40	71.4	28.6	19.1	33.3	57.1	4.8
Pakistan	20	2.21	38.3	1.90	100	6.40	3.73	85.0	15.0	45.0	15.0	70.0	60.0
Ukraine	20	2.60	41.3	2.85	5.0	4.95	3.48	75.0	25.0	30.0	25.0	45.0	0.0
Remaining Western Europe	20	2.95	41.8	2.70	0.0	5.40	2.83	40.0	60.0	5.0	60.0	70.0	0.0
Middle Africa	17	3.41	36.5	4.65	23.5	5.88	3.76	82.3	17.7	17.7	35.3	52.9	23.5
English Speak. Carib. & S. Am.	15	2.62	38.8	2.47	0.0	6.00	3.57	20.0	80.0	6.7	36.7	93.3	93.3
Australia and New Zealand	10	3.20	38.7	3.80	0.0	2.80	2.00	70.0	30.0	10.0	60.0	50.0	60.0
Remaining Northern America	9	3.56	72.8	3.78	0.0	5.89	3.56	66.7	33.3	11.1	33.3	66.7	55.6
Southern Africa	7	3.29	41.8	3.71	14.3	5.00	3.07	71.2	28.8	0.0	71.4	100	28.6
French Speaking Caribbean	2	2.00	34.5	0.50	0.0	4.00	3.25	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	100	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>2541</b>	<b>2.69</b>	<b>41.0</b>	<b>2.32</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>4.96</b>	<b>3.01</b>	<b>59.9</b>	<b>40.1</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>34.2</b>	<b>61.1</b>	<b>23.2</b>

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data

\* Adapted ISCED-97 scale

\*\* This percentage does not include non-religious respondents, but only those who rate themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion (Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, other non-Christian religion).

\*\*\* 0= Not at all to 10 = Very religious

\*\*\*\* How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions and how often do you pray apart from religious services? 1= Never to 7= Every day

<sup>i</sup> Respondents in France did not indicate the religion they belonged to if they classified themselves as being religious (which 58.7% of natives and 60.1% of the immigrants in France did). For natives, we assume that if they are religious, they will belong to a Christian religion, hence the percentage of French natives who belong to a non-Christian religion is estimated to be 0. For immigrants who indicated that they belong to a religion, we imputed this religion using information about the country of origin, religiosity, the intensity of religious practice and the educational level.

**Table 3 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on labour market participation of male immigrants and natives, N=7125**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Austria	.671**	.663**	.617**	.614**	.616**	.668*
Belgium	.637**	.636**	.565***	.570***	.572***	.673*
Denmark	.472***	.457***	.427***	.429***	.428***	.438***
Germany	.445***	.439***	.387***	.393***	.392***	.398***
Greece	1.680**	1.652**	1.545*	1.523*	1.495*	1.561*
Ireland	.775 (n.s.)	.750 (n.s.)	.760 (n.s.)	.760 (n.s.)	.767 (n.s.)	.785 (n.s.)
Luxembourg	.529***	.568***	.510***	.506***	.512***	.494***
Netherlands	.415***	.411***	.354***	.356***	.357***	.360***
Portugal	1.130 (n.s.)	1.092 (n.s.)	1.182 (n.s.)	1.185 (n.s.)	1.212 (n.s.)	1.241 (n.s.)
Spain	1.927***	1.859**	1.762**	1.755**	1.769**	1.808**
Sweden	1.756**	1.748**	1.743**	1.738**	1.741**	1.756**
United Kingdom	1.264 (n.s.)	1.260 (n.s.)	1.135 (n.s.)	1.155 (n.s.)	1.156 (n.s.)	1.164 (n.s.)
First Generation Immigrant		.825 (n.s.)	.774*	.717**	.720**	.798 (n.s.)
Second Generation Immigrant		.755*	.752*	.645**	.644**	.763 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			1.209***	1.205***	1.227***	1.277***
Highest Level of Education Parents			.910***	.907***	.908***	.907***
Age			1.432***	1.434***	1.434***	1.439***
Age <sup>2</sup>			.996***	.996***	.996***	.996***
Origin: Neighbouring Country				1.404*	3.102**	3.954**
Education * Origin. Neighb. Country					.761*	.705**
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Belgium						.264***
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Austria						.457*
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Greece						.191**
Constant	4.473***	4.700***	.005***	.005***	.004***	.004***
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	<b>7262.50</b>	<b>7253.50</b>	<b>6928.00</b>	<b>6918.20</b>	<b>6912.94</b>	<b>6879.23</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$  and \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ .

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.

**Table 4 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on unemployment of male immigrants and natives, N=5658**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
Austria	1.556 (n.s.)	1.614*	1.604 (n.s.)	1.640*	1.409 (n.s.)
Belgium	1.169 (n.s.)	1.189 (n.s.)	1.265 (n.s.)	1.248(n.s.)	1.245 (n.s.)
Denmark	1.274 (n.s.)	1.411 (n.s.)	1.720 (n.s.)	1.748*	1.728 (n.s.)
Germany	2.541***	2.648***	3.401***	3.362***	3.323***
Greece	1.417 (n.s.)	1.478 (n.s.)	1.582 (n.s.)	1.729*	1.931*
Ireland	.747 (n.s.)	.828 (n.s.)	.997 (n.s.)	1.057 (n.s.)	1.055 (n.s.)
Luxembourg	.395**	.302**	.318**	.316**	.302**
Netherlands	.958 (n.s.)	.989 (n.s.)	1.144 (n.s.)	1.137 (n.s.)	1.117 (n.s.)
Portugal	1.163 (n.s.)	1.294 (n.s.)	1.006 (n.s.)	1.011 (n.s.)	1.000 (n.s.)
Spain	.738 (n.s.)	.801 (n.s.)	.685 (n.s.)	.706 (n.s.)	.685 (n.s.)
Sweden	.587 (n.s.)	.594 (n.s.)	.604 (n.s.)	.617 (n.s.)	.609 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	1.056 (n.s.)	1.058 (n.s.)	1.157 (n.s.)	1.144 (n.s.)	1.135 (n.s.)
First Generation Immigrant		2.086***	1.624**	2.002***	2.219***
Second Generation Immigrant		1.944***	1.903***	2.643***	2.170**
Highest Educational Level Achieved			.719***	.721***	.721***
Intensity of Religious Practice			1.089*	1.100**	1.108**
Islam			2.701***	2.447**	2.549**
Other Non-Christian Religions			5.180**	4.865**	4.681**
Origin: Neighbouring Country				.492**	.535*
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.					.324 (n.s.)
* Dest. Greece					
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.					3.102*
* Dest. Austria					
Constant	.076***	.064***	.088***	.081***	.079***
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	<b>3046.13</b>	<b>3015.84</b>	<b>2950.30</b>	<b>2942.06</b>	<b>2932.15</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01 and \*\*\* = p < .001.

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.

**Table 5 Regression coefficients of the effects on the occupational status (ISEI) of the current occupation of male immigrants and natives, N=5257**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Austria	.547 (n.s.)	.611 (n.s.)	1.985*	2.469*	2.444*	2.358*
Belgium	-.137 (n.s.)	-.003 (n.s.)	-3.592***	-3.596***	-3.615***	-3.594***
Denmark	1.260 (n.s.)	1.184 (n.s.)	-5.243***	-5.004***	-5.153***	-5.407***
Germany	.255 (n.s.)	.372 (n.s.)	-7.562***	-7.013***	-7.113***	-7.204***
Greece	-5.306***	-5.054***	-2.818**	-2.194*	-2.213*	-1.640 (n.s.)
Ireland	-5.079***	-5.071***	-4.147***	-3.970***	-3.855***	-4.188***
Luxembourg	-1.492 (n.s.)	-.328 (n.s.)	-1.451 (n.s.)	-2.270*	-2.390*	-2.570*
Netherlands	3.620**	3.791**	.151 (n.s.)	.249 (n.s.)	.235 (n.s.)	.265 (n.s.)
Portugal	-4.882***	-4.780***	4.560***	5.065***	5.381***	5.392***
Spain	-3.089**	-2.871**	1.262 (n.s.)	1.584 (n.s.)	1.702 (n.s.)	2.211*
Sweden	.779 (n.s.)	.909 (n.s.)	-.971 (n.s.)	-.821 (n.s.)	-.756 (n.s.)	-.656 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	-1.300 (n.s.)	-1.145 (n.s.)	-4.039***	-3.507**	-3.405**	-3.437**
First Generation Immigrant		-4.539***	-2.050**	-5.419***	-6.678 (n.s.)	.358 (n.s.)
Second Generation Immigrant		1.719 (n.s.)	1.921*	-2.643*	-2.559*	.287 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			7.619***	7.625***	7.926***	7.955***
Highest Level of Education Parents			1.976***	1.996***	2.0248**	2.023***
Age			.213***	.208***	.212***	.208***
Religiosity			-.233**	-.229**	-.213**	-.219**
Origin: EU15+				6.648***	6.586***	8.101***
Origin: North Africa				5.593**	5.378**	4.578*
Origin: East Asia				15.455*	15.009*	16.397*
Origin: West Asia				4.309*	15.977***	13.985**
Origin: South-East Asia				7.445*	8.116*	7.407*
Education					-1.801**	-2.233***
* 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrant Education					-5.134**	-4.749**
* Origin West Asia						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-6.504**
* Dest. Greece						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-6.133*
* Dest. Spain						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						8.069*
* Dest. Ireland						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						10.674*
* Dest. Denmark						
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.						-5.976**
* Origin EU15+						
Constant	46.006***	46.145***	13.642***	13.470***	12.422***	12.443***
<b>Adjusted R2</b>	<b>.021</b>	<b>.028</b>	<b>.315</b>	<b>.320</b>	<b>.323</b>	<b>.327</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$  and \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ .

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.



**Table 6 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on reaching one of the highest EGP class categories of male immigrants and natives, N=5210**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>
Austria	.606***	.615**	.643***	.648**	.636**	.675*
Belgium	.536***	.538***	.247***	.240***	.238***	.254***
Denmark	.752 (n.s.)	.754 (n.s.)	.305***	.301***	.299***	.318***
Germany	.598***	.612***	.189***	.193***	.193***	.203***
Greece	.270***	.283***	.232***	.237***	.235***	.270***
Ireland	.398***	.403***	.331***	.323***	.317***	.315***
Luxembourg	.596***	.682*	.523***	.460***	.455***	.494***
Netherlands	.907 (n.s.)	.941 (n.s.)	.563**	.566**	.560**	.594**
Portugal	.223***	.228***	.534***	.543***	.529**	.563**
Spain	.420***	.437***	.495***	.496***	.490***	.523***
Sweden	.727*	.742*	.537***	.526***	.522***	.603**
United Kingdom	.590***	.604**	.362***	.369***	.366***	.385***
First Generation Immigrant		.569***	.563***	.427***	.423***	.469***
Second Generation Immigrant		1.358*	1.476**	.955 (n.s.)	.985 (n.s.)	1.106 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			2.901***	2.911***	2.840***	2.825***
Parental Education			1.286***	1.289***	1.287***	1.296***
Age			1.021***	1.021***	1.021***	1.021***
Origin: EU15+				1.992***	.669 (n.s.)	.475 (n.s.)
Education * Origin: EU15+					1.451*	1.537*
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. France						3.238*
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Greece						.099*
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Ireland						5.284*
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Sweden						.350*
Constant	1.283*	1.283*	.020***	.019***	.021***	.020***
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	<b>6856.730</b>	<b>6818.628</b>	<b>5541.482</b>	<b>5528.011</b>	<b>5522.406</b>	<b>5494.075</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01 and \*\*\* = p < .001.

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.

**Table 7 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on labour market participation of female immigrants and natives, N=8313**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Austria	.249***	.249***	.288***	.294***	.292***
Belgium	.371***	.372***	.338***	.338***	.336***
Denmark	.501***	.499***	.439***	.439***	.436***
Germany	.273***	.274***	.246***	.245***	.243***
Greece	.307***	.309***	.386***	.395***	.393***
Ireland	.262***	.261***	.319***	.326***	.339***
Luxembourg	.170***	.179***	.187***	.182***	.178***
Netherlands	.141***	.141***	.133***	.134***	.132***
Portugal	.460***	.458***	.686**	.715*	.718*
Spain	.534***	.535***	.619***	.633**	.630**
Sweden	1.332*	1.341*	1.325*	1.343*	1.327*
United Kingdom	.550***	.551***	.551***	.565***	.562***
First Generation Immigrant		.838*	.876 (n.s.)	1.990**	1.999**
Second Generation Immigrant		1.013 (n.s.)	.990 (n.s.)	.997 (n.s.)	1.029 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			1.293***	1.344***	1.343***
Age			1.119***	1.120***	1.120***
Age <sup>2</sup>			.998***	.998***	.998***
Intensity of Religious Practice			1.101***	1.104***	1.106***
Islam			.528**	.451**	.445**
Education				.743***	.757***
* 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrant					
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation					.419*
* Destination Ireland					
Constant	2.901***	2.934***	.143***	.123***	.123***
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	<b>10847.01</b>	<b>10842.22</b>	<b>10486.26</b>	<b>10467.78</b>	<b>10462.02</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$  and \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ .

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.

**Table 8 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on unemployment of female immigrants and natives, N=4465**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Austria	.483**	.481**	.523*	.538*	.525*	.563 (n.s.)
Belgium	1.257 (n.s.)	1.274 (n.s.)	1.661*	1.692*	1.766*	1.836*
Denmark	.766 (n.s.)	.799 (n.s.)	.965 (n.s.)	.971 (n.s.)	.992 (n.s.)	1.050 (n.s.)
Germany	1.638*	1.667*	2.074***	2.057***	2.036**	2.179***
Greece	1.758**	1.805**	.686 (n.s.)	.759 (n.s.)	.747(n.s.)	.761 (n.s.)
Ireland	.408**	.428**	.564 (n.s.)	.571 (n.s.)	.576 (n.s.)	.601 (n.s.)
Luxembourg	.302**	.270**	.275**	.265**	.305*	.338*
Netherlands	.799 (n.s.)	.814 (n.s.)	.975 (n.s.)	.947 (n.s.)	.933 (n.s.)	.779 (n.s.)
Portugal	1.440 (n.s.)	1.529*	1.23 (n.s.)	1.232 (n.s.)	1.184 (n.s.)	1.250 (n.s.)
Spain	.861 (n.s.)	.899 (n.s.)	.959 (n.s.)	.954 (n.s.)	.945 (n.s.)	1.008 (n.s.)
Sweden	.690 (n.s.)	.697 (n.s.)	.730 (n.s.)	.748 (n.s.)	.751 (n.s.)	.804 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	.635 (n.s.)	.639 (n.s.)	.633 (n.s.)	.619 (n.s.)	.600*	.658 (n.s.)
First Generation Immigrant		1.307 (n.s.)	1.256 (n.s.)	1.462*	1.094 (n.s.)	.964 (n.s.)
Second Generation Immigrant		1.530*	1.532*	2.154**	1.646*	1.425 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			.710***	.711***	.694***	.694***
Age			.844***	.842***	.843**	.841***
Age <sup>2</sup>			1.002***	1.002***	1.002***	1.002***
Roman Catholic			.750*	.753 (n.s.)	.762 (n.s.)	.769 (n.s.)
Eastern Orthodox			2.708*	.2518*	2.519*	2.611*
Origin: Neighbouring Countries				.487*	.519*	.626 (n.s.)
Education					1.198*	1.108 (n.s.)
* Origin Former Colony						
Education					1.331*	1.353*
* Origin East Europe & Ex-USSR						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation						5.326**
* Dest. Netherlands						
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation						3.500*
* Origin North Africa						
Constant	.129***	.120***	11.053**	11.277**	12.009**	11.807*
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	<b>2983.481</b>	<b>2976.822</b>	<b>2903.74</b>	<b>2896.93</b>	<b>2889.29</b>	<b>2878.20</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01 and \*\*\* = p < .001.

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.

**Table 9 Regression coefficients of the effects on occupational status (ISEI) of current occupation of female immigrants and natives, N=4026**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 6
Austria	1.132 (n.s.)	1.150 (n.s.)	4.084***	4.667***	4.476***
Belgium	1.164 (n.s.)	1.204 (n.s.)	-2.196 (n.s.)	-2.044 (n.s.)	-2.143 (n.s.)
Denmark	-.055 (n.s.)	-.179 (n.s.)	-6.059***	-5.676***	-5.708***
Germany	2.883*	2.993*	-2.217 (n.s.)	-1.638 (n.s.)	-1.855 (n.s.)
Greece	-3.232*	-3.137*	-.275 (n.s.)	.368 (n.s.)	1.444 (n.s.)
Ireland	1.839 (n.s.)	1.696 (n.s.)	1.837 (n.s.)	2.233*	2.242*
Luxembourg	-.608 (n.s.)	.818 (n.s.)	2.556*	2.594 (n.s.)	4.466**
Netherlands	2.819*	2.872*	1.361 (n.s.)	1.775 (n.s.)	1.560 (n.s.)
Portugal	-2.699*	-2.928*	6.369***	6.965***	7.107***
Spain	.474 (n.s.)	.425 (n.s.)	4.520***	5.012***	6.278***
Sweden	.031 (n.s.)	.182 (n.s.)	-1.705 (n.s.)	-1.332 (n.s.)	-1.637 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	.055 (n.s.)	.094 (n.s.)	-1.311 (n.s.)	-.808 (n.s.)	-1.003 (n.s.)
First Generation Immigrant		-4.540***	-4.621***	-5.896***	-1.592 (n.s.)
Second Generation Immigrant		-.702 (n.s.)	-1.423 (n.s.)	-3.596**	-1.424 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			6.6.18***	6.638***	6.598***
Highest Level of Education Parents			2.047***	2.113***	2.138***
Parental Education Imputed			-2.427 (n.s.)	-2.458*	-2.715*
Age			n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Age <sup>2</sup>			.001*	.001*	.001 (n.s.)
Origin: EU15+				2.824*	3.922*
Origin: Eastern Europe & Former USSR				-5.972**	5.695 (n.s.)
Origin: North Africa				9.714**	8.321**
Origin: West Asia				6.997**	5.915*
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Spain					-19.483***
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Greece					-11.484***
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm. * Dest. Luxembourg					-9.439***
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation * Origin East Europe & Ex-USSR					-14.627**
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation * Origin Sub-Saharan Africa					-6.307*
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation * Origin Neighbouring Cntr.					-5.876**
Constant	44.761***	45.151***	22.085***	21.410***	21.488***
<b>Adjusted R2</b>	<b>.010</b>	<b>.015</b>	<b>.254</b>	<b>.259</b>	<b>.272</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$  and \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ .

The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant.

**Table 10 Regression coefficients (exp (b)) of the effects on reaching the highest EGP class categories of female immigrants and natives, N=3978**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
Austria	.695*	.697*	1.258 (n.s.)	1.265 (n.s.)	1.274 (n.s.)
Belgium	.955 (n.s.)	.955 (n.s.)	.589**	.587**	.545**
Denmark	1.232 (n.s.)	1.230 (n.s.)	.700*	.705*	.700*
Germany	.842 (n.s.)	.848 (n.s.)	.516***	.527***	.486***
Greece	.339***	.344***	.378***	.384***	.383***
Ireland	1.146 (n.s.)	1.140 (n.s.)	1.098 (n.s.)	1.109 (n.s.)	1.104 (n.s.)
Luxembourg	.771 (n.s.)	.842 (n.s.)	1.055 (n.s.)	1.111 (n.s.)	1.148 (n.s.)
Netherlands	1.751**	1.762**	1.615*	1.631*	1.631*
Portugal	.382***	.381***	1.311 (n.s.)	1.326 (n.s.)	1.322 (n.s.)
Spain	.785 (n.s.)	.790 (n.s.)	1.078 (n.s.)	1.105 (n.s.)	1.101 (n.s.)
Sweden	.888 (n.s.)	.879 (n.s.)	.744 (n.s.)	.749 (n.s.)	.752 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	.871 (n.s.)	.872 (n.s.)	.919 (n.s.)	.916 (n.s.)	.919 (n.s.)
First Generation Immigrant		.757*	.660*	.154**	.138**
Second Generation Immigrant		.1028 (n.s.)	.924 (n.s.)	1.443 (n.s.)	1.472 (n.s.)
Highest Educational Level Achieved			2.788***	2.707***	2.716***
Parental Education			1.237***	1.253***	1.260***
Age			1.010*	1.009*	1.009*
Education				1.566*	1.573*
* 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Immigrants					
Education					.803*
* 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Immigrants				.844 (n.s.)	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.					8.505*
* Dest. Belgium					
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.					3.150*
* Dest. Germany					
Constant	.947 (n.s.)	.959 (n.s.)	.020***	.021***	.021***
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	<b>5301.336</b>	<b>5296.376</b>	<b>4420.435</b>	<b>4410.375</b>	<b>4398.341</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01 and \*\*\* = p < .001.

The effects of the dummies for missing values for education and parents' education are not included since they are not significant.

**Table 11 Regression coefficients of the effects on Education of male immigrants and natives, N= 7152**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Austria	-.157*	-.156*	-.364***	-.362***	-.364***	-.366***
Belgium	.377***	.382***	.114 (n.s.)	.117 (n.s.)	.121*	.121*
Denmark	.556***	.551***	.113 (n.s.)	.117 (n.s.)	.120 (n.s.)	.127*
Germany	.680***	.683***	.214***	.224***	.225***	.220***
Greece	-.040 (n.s.)	-.031 (n.s.)	.073 (n.s.)	.061 (n.s.)	.055 (n.s.)	.122*
Ireland	-.050 (n.s.)	-.051 (n.s.)	-.178**	-.182**	-.190**	-.184**
Luxembourg	.086 (n.s.)	.133*	-.109 (n.s.)	-.089 (n.s.)	-.081 (n.s.)	-.001 (n.s.)
Netherlands	.403***	.409***	.175**	.168**	.164**	.168**
Portugal	-.921***	-.919***	-.901***	-.915***	-.936***	-.926***
Spain	-.309***	-.303***	-.351***	-.355***	-.363***	-.365***
Sweden	.156*	.161**	-.037 (n.s.)	-.037 (n.s.)	-.047 (n.s.)	-.045 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	.259***	.265**	-.023 (n.s.)	-.041 (n.s.)	-.042 (n.s.)	-.047 (n.s.)
First Generation Immigrant		-.177***	-.077 (n.s.)	-.201***	-.415***	-.389***
Second Generation Immigrant		.050 (n.s.)	.053 (n.s.)	-.076 (n.s.)	-.060 (n.s.)	.024 (n.s.)
Parents' Educational Level			.248***	.244***	.234***	.236***
Parents Educational Level Imputed			-.291***	-.295***	-.305***	-.302***
Age			.021*	.021*	.021*	.021*
Age <sup>2</sup>			.000**	.000**	.000**	.000**
Roman Catholic			.175***	.173***	.170***	.179***
Protestant			.174***	.172***	.173***	.181***
Other Christian Religion			.279***	.272***	.267***	.258***
Islam			-.172*	-.146 (n.s.)	-.120 (n.s.)	-.095 (n.s.)
Intensity of Religious Practice			.019*	.019*	.020*	.022**
Origin: Neighbouring Country				.195**	.171**	.062 (n.s.)
Origin: Sub-Saharan Africa				.427**	1.058***	1.164***
Origin: South Asia				.329*	.304*	.307*
Origin: South-East Asia				.456*	.423*	.369 (n.s.)
Parents' Education					.102***	.080***
* 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						
Parents' Education					-.229***	-.251***
* Origin Sub-Saharan Africa						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-.271**
* Dest. Luxembourg						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-.497**
* Dest. Greece						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						.322**
* Origin Neighbouring Cntr.						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						.191 (n.s.)
* Origin Former Colony						
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						.380*
* Origin Eastern Europe & Ex-USSR						
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.						-.480*
* Dest. Greece						
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.						-1.208**
* Dest. Portugal						
Constant	2.609***	2.616***	1.793***	1.808***	1.853***	1.798***
<b>R2</b>	<b>.129</b>	<b>.131</b>	<b>.267</b>	<b>.269</b>	<b>.271</b>	<b>.275</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* = p &lt; .05, \*\* = p &lt; .01 and \*\*\* = p &lt; .001.

The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant.

**Table 12 Regression coefficients of the effects on Education of female immigrants and natives, N=8362**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Austria	-.441***	-.440***	-.546***	-.546***	-.546***	-.555***
Belgium	.332***	.323***	.090 (n.s.)	.091 (n.s.)	.094 (n.s.)	.084 (n.s.)
Denmark	.488***	.491***	-.011 (n.s.)	-.012 (n.s.)	-.004 (n.s.)	-.015 (n.s.)
Germany	.370***	.373***	-.108*	-.108*	-.091 (n.s.)	-.102 (n.s.)
Greece	-.279***	-.275***	-.107*	-.109*	-.113*	-.132*
Ireland	.004 (n.s.)	.008 (n.s.)	-.048 (n.s.)	-.050 (n.s.)	-.053 (n.s.)	-.066 (n.s.)
Luxembourg	-.278***	-.278***	-.419***	-.417***	-.404***	-.319***
Netherlands	.118*	.121*	-.052 (n.s.)	-.052 (n.s.)	-.052 (n.s.)	-.064 (n.s.)
Portugal	-1.112***	-1.107***	-.957***	-.959***	-.967***	-.960***
Spain	-.414***	-.409***	-.357***	-.359***	-.364***	-.388***
Sweden	.197**	.199**	.053 (n.s.)	.054 (n.s.)	.054 (n.s.)	.036 (n.s.)
United Kingdom	.010 (n.s.)	.011 (n.s.)	-.295***	-.297***	-.299***	-.344***
First Generation Immigrant		-.005 (n.s.)	.007 (n.s.)	.001 (n.s.)	-.192**	-.113 (n.s.)
Second Generation Immigrant		.050 (n.s.)	-.003 (n.s.)	-.010 (n.s.)	.001 (n.s.)	-.060 (n.s.)
Parents' Educational Level			.274***	.273***	.262***	.262***
Parents Educational Level Imputed			-.212***	-.212***	-.211***	-.222***
Age			.031**	.031**	.031**	.032***
Age <sup>2</sup>			-.001***	-.001***	-.001***	-.001***
Roman Catholic			.152***	.153***	.149***	.145***
Protestant			.269***	.268***	.269***	.269***
Islam			-.494***	-.493***	-.466***	-.543***
Jewish			.706*	.709*	.706*	.735*
Other Christian Religion			.181**	.181**	.186**	.183**
Intensity of Religious Practice			.019**	.019**	.019**	.019**
Origin: North America				.426*	.336 (n.s.)	.380 (n.s.)
Parents' Education * 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.					.091***	.060**
Parents' Education * Origin East Europe & Ex-USSR 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.					-.071*	-.060*
* Dest. UK 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						.321*
* Dest. Luxembourg 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-.296**
* Dest. France 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-.359*
* Dest. Portugal 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						-.432*
* Origin Neighbouring Cntr. 1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Imm.						.168*
* Origin South-East Asia 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.						.816*
* Dest. Spain 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.						.473*
* Origin North Africa 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Imm.						.606*
* Origin South Asia						
Constant	2.718***	2.713***	1.748***	1.753***	1.786***	1.785***
<b>R2</b>	<b>.143</b>	<b>.143</b>	<b>.313</b>	<b>.313</b>	<b>.315</b>	<b>.318</b>

Source: European Social Survey, 2004 (unweighted data)

Note: Significant coefficients are marked with \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01 and \*\*\* = p < .001.

The effect of the dummy for missing values on education is not included since it is not significant.

**Table 13 Macro-characteristics in the five multi-level regressions of male immigrants: Coefficients, standard errors and improvement in model fit**

		<b>Labour market participation</b>	<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>Occupational status (ISEI)</b>	<b>High EGP</b>	<b>Education</b>
<b>Destination</b>	<b>EII: Labour market inclusion</b>	<b>-0.356</b> (0.257) <i>2.10</i>	<b>-0.120</b> (0.447) <i>4.091</i>	<b>0.645</b> (3.044) <i>0.045</i>	<b>0.104</b> (0.582) <i>2.070</i>	<b>0.134</b> (0.134) <i>0.954</i>
<b>Effects</b>	<b>EII: Long-term residence rights</b>	<b>-0.339</b> (0.347) <i>0.76</i>	<b>0.022</b> (0.537) <i>0.279</i>	<b>-2.531</b> (3.913) <i>0.417</i>	<b>-0.572</b> (0.714) <i>-17.753</i>	<b>0.077</b> (0.174) <i>0.181</i>
	<b>EII: Family reunification</b>	<b>-0.190</b> (0.357) <i>0.37</i>	<b>0.016</b> (0.559) <i>0.275</i>	<b>-3.643</b> (3.942) <i>0.837</i>	<b>-0.463</b> (0.742) <i>-7.419</i>	<b>0.269</b> (0.170) <i>2.279</i>
	<b>EII: Naturalization</b>	<b>-0.569</b> (0.465) <i>6.23</i>	<b>0.575</b> (0.915) <i>1.003</i>	<b>2.692</b> (4.843) <i>0.272</i>	<b>1.406</b> (0.867) <i>30.204</i>	<b>0.548</b> (0.190) <i>6.644</i>
	<b>EII: Anti-Discrimination</b>	<b>-0.262</b> (0.173) <i>1.19</i>	<b>-0.043</b> (0.303) <i>3.277</i>	<b>1.774</b> (2.049) <i>0.717</i>	<b>0.324</b> (0.402) <i>21.338</i>	<b>0.133</b> (0.094) <i>1.767</i>
	<b>EII: Total index score</b>	<b>-0.490</b> (0.342) <i>2.43</i>	<b>-0.016</b> (0.551) <i>0.443</i>	<b>0.515</b> (3.828) <i>0.018</i>	<b>0.211</b> (0.727) <i>6.486</i>	<b>0.260</b> (0.165) <i>2.284</i>
	<b>Liberal welfare regime</b>	<b>-0.260</b> (0.478) <i>0.01</i>	<b>0.126</b> (0.799) <i>-1.928</i>	<b>5.011</b> (5.049) <i>0.852</i>	<b>1.832</b> (0.745) <i>9.866</i>	<b>0.325</b> (0.110) <i>7.381</i>
	<b>Social-democratic welfare regime</b>	<b>0.489</b> (0.294) <i>1.88</i>	<b>-0.391</b> (0.481) <i>10.607</i>	<b>3.173</b> (2.883) <i>1.170</i>	<b>-0.219</b> (0.561) <i>4.458</i>	<b>0.070</b> (0.132) <i>0.271</i>
	<b>Conservative welfare regime</b>	<b>-0.542</b> (0.250) <i>8.68</i>	<b>0.297</b> (0.303) <i>16.866</i>	<b>-2.753</b> (2.795) <i>0.917</i>	<b>-0.199</b> (0.509) <i>-1.666</i>	<b>-0.170</b> (0.089) <i>3.002</i>
	<b>Southern welfare regime</b>	<b>0.314</b> (0.345) <i>2.29</i>	<b>-0.258</b> (0.399) <i>4.143</i>	<b>-2.906</b> (3.525) <i>0.577</i>	<b>0.570</b> (0.750) <i>-1.921</i>	<b>-0.166</b> (0.154) <i>1.137</i>
	<b>Employment Protection Legislation</b>	<b>0.136</b> (0.212) <i>0.65</i>	<b>0.261</b> (0.281) <i>-5.908</i>	<b>-3.918</b> (1.657) <i>4.409</i>	<b>-0.766</b> (0.306) <i>27.868</i>	<b>-0.100</b> (0.058) <i>2.760</i>
	<b>Size of the bottom of the labour market</b>	<b>0.027</b> (0.023) <i>0.01</i>	<b>0.029</b> (0.035) <i>4.576</i>	<b>0.234</b> (0.320) <i>0.422</i>	<b>0.003</b> (0.050) <i>0.035</i>	<b>0.018</b> (0.009) <i>2.902</i>
	<b>GDP per capita in 1000 ppp</b>	<b>0.000</b> (0.010) <i>0.01</i>	<b>0.012</b> (0.020) <i>10.481</i>	<b>0.101</b> (0.133) <i>0.550</i>	<b>0.027</b> (0.030) <i>-17.211</i>	<b>0.005</b> (0.006) <i>0.786</i>
	<b>GINI coefficient</b>	<b>0.031</b> (0.026) <i>7.98</i>	<b>-0.030</b> (0.038) <i>8.517</i>	<b>0.012</b> (0.311) <i>0.001</i>	<b>0.030</b> (0.056) <i>19.052</i>	<b>0.013</b> (0.012) <i>1.118</i>
	<b>Presence of Left-wing parties in government</b>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.035) <i>0.02</i>	<b>-0.026</b> (0.036) <i>-0.262</i>	<b>-0.307</b> (0.254) <i>1.376</i>	<b>-0.014</b> (0.044) <i>32.342</i>	<b>-0.010</b> (0.012) <i>0.750</i>
	<b>Net migration rate</b>	<b>0.000</b> (0.032) <i>0.02</i>	<b>0.042</b> (0.064) <i>9.561</i>	<b>-0.051</b> (0.437) <i>0.014</i>	<b>0.040</b> (0.083) <i>-15.491</i>	<b>0.008</b> (0.019) <i>0.150</i>
<b>Origin Effects</b>	<b>GDP per capita in 1000 ppp</b>	<b>0.001</b> (0.008) <i>0.01</i>	<b>-0.033</b> (0.014) <i>17.909</i>	<b>0.192</b> (0.055) <i>11.839</i>	<b>0.018</b> (0.008) <i>1.595</i>	<b>0.000</b> (0.002) <i>0.007</i>
	<b>GINI coefficient</b>	<b>0.003</b> (0.005) <i>0.20</i>	<b>-0.015</b> (0.009) <i>13.117</i>	<b>0.032</b> (0.038) <i>0.714</i>	<b>-0.001</b> (0.006) <i>0.018</i>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.002) <i>1.200</i>
	<b>Net migration rate</b>	<b>-0.059</b> (0.029) <i>13.27</i>	<b>-0.020</b> (0.051) <i>4.971</i>	<b>0.152</b> (0.224) <i>0.456</i>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.005) <i>3.526</i>	<b>0.002</b> (0.001) <i>1.082</i>
	<b>Political stability</b>	<b>-0.019</b> (0.011) <i>3.65</i>	<b>-0.333</b> (0.156) <i>102.461</i>	<b>-0.041</b> (0.102) <i>0.163</i>	<b>-0.009</b> (0.005) <i>18.178</i>	<b>0.000</b> (0.002) <i>0.098</i>
	<b>Political freedom</b>	<b>-0.018</b> (0.005) <i>21.86</i>	<b>0.019</b> (0.010) <i>11.287</i>	<b>-0.058</b> (0.043) <i>1.791</i>	<b>0.011</b> (0.008) <i>6.556</i>	<b>-0.001</b> (0.002) <i>0.082</i>
	<b>Civil rights</b>	<b>-0.004</b> (0.011) <i>0.62</i>	<b>0.008</b> (0.025) <i>2.667</i>	<b>-0.089</b> (0.90) <i>0.978</i>	<b>-0.200</b> (0.074) <i>3.073</i>	<b>-0.020</b> (0.024) <i>0.680</i>
	<b>Status of political freedom</b>	<b>0.038</b> (0.027) <i>0.01</i>	<b>0.030</b> (0.032) <i>11.498</i>	<b>-0.263</b> (0.145) <i>2.134</i>	<b>-0.011</b> (0.027) <i>0.112</i>	<b>-0.006</b> (0.010) <i>0.385</i>
	<b>Human Development Index</b>	<b>0.001</b> (0.002) <i>0.42</i>	<b>0.008</b> (0.003) <i>15.156</i>	<b>-0.028</b> (0.016) <i>3.074</i>	<b>-0.001</b> (0.002) <i>-6.102</i>	<b>0.001</b> (0.001) <i>0.817</i>
	<b>Prevalently Christian country</b>	<b>0.009</b> (0.190) <i>0.01</i>	<b>-0.358</b> (0.320) <i>4.303</i>	<b>1.665</b> (1.411) <i>1.340</i>	<b>0.267</b> (0.235) <i>-8.718</i>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.081) <i>0.001</i>
	<b>Prevalently Eastern-Orthodox country</b>	<b>0.045</b> (0.314) <i>0.13</i>	<b>0.242</b> (0.458) <i>0.736</i>	<b>-5.865</b> (2.228) <i>6.684</i>	<b>-0.600</b> (0.411) <i>6.972</i>	<b>-0.129</b> (0.128) <i>0.985</i>
	<b>Prevalently Islamic country</b>	<b>-0.179</b> (0.232) <i>0.01</i>	<b>-0.172</b> (0.369) <i>-3.622</i>	<b>-0.435</b> (1.731) <i>0.062</i>	<b>-0.327</b> (0.300) <i>-12.012</i>	<b>0.016</b> (0.097) <i>0.027</i>

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data

Note: Every cell contains the following information: the size of the coefficient is printed in bold letters; standard errors are given in brackets, while the gain in -2 LogLikelihood that results from including the specific indicator is given in italics.



**Table 14 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of labour market participation of male immigrants  
N=1188 (table continues on following page)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean labour market participation of male natives	<b>6.098</b> (1.079)	<b>6.160</b> (1.112)	<b>6.178</b> (1.116)	3.529 (1.955)	<b>5.640</b> (1.101)	3.088 (1.900)	2.032 (1.883)	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	-0.004 (0.196)	0.083 (0.208)	0.082 (0.208)	0.134 (0.209)	0.127 (0.208)	0.186 (0.210)	0.122 (0.210)	
One native, one immigrant parent	-0.129 (0.195)	-0.102 (0.205)	-0.083 (0.503)	-0.075 (0.505)	-0.049 (0.505)	-0.043 (0.507)	-0.132 (0.512)	
Speaking minority language at home	0.116 (0.184)	0.148 (0.198)	0.255 (0.454)	0.320 (0.456)	0.371 (0.453)	0.425 (0.455)	0.340 (0.447)	
Citizenship of the destination country	0.098 (0.178)	0.108 (0.185)	0.111 (0.186)	0.081 (0.187)	0.054 (0.186)	0.023 (0.187)	0.108 (0.190)	
Age		<b>0.392</b> (0.062)	<b>0.391</b> (0.062)	<b>0.402</b> (0.062)	<b>0.408</b> (0.063)	<b>0.419</b> (0.063)	<b>0.423</b> (0.064)	<b>0.427</b> (0.061)
Age <sup>2</sup>		<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.005</b> (0.001)
Highest level of education		-0.133 (0.075)	0.152 (0.110)	0.157 (0.111)	0.174 (0.111)	0.178 (0.111)	0.162 (0.112)	
Education imputed		0.364 (0.358)	0.368 (0.359)	0.004 (0.425)	0.350 (0.356)	0.012 (0.418)	-0.025 (0.425)	
Parental education		<b>-0.133</b> (0.049)	<b>-0.134</b> (0.049)	<b>-0.145</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.138</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.150</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.142</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.125</b> (0.042)
Parental education imputed		0.322 (0.349)	0.331 (0.352)	0.309 (0.352)	0.329 (0.352)	0.307 (0.354)	0.300 (0.358)	
Number of children		0.078 (0.060)	0.078 (0.060)	0.077 (0.060)	0.071 (0.061)	0.070 (0.061)	0.091 (0.061)	
No religion		-0.175 (0.183)	-0.171 (0.184)	-0.182 (0.183)	-0.166 (0.184)	-0.177 (0.184)	-0.129 (0.184)	
Islam		-0.490 (0.265)	-0.427 (0.576)	-0.431 (0.573)	-0.432 (0.576)	-0.439 (0.573)	-0.086 (0.583)	
Religiosity		0.007 (0.031)	0.007 (0.031)	0.008 (0.031)	0.013 (0.031)	0.015 (0.031)	0.022 (0.031)	
Intensity of religious practice		-0.043 (0.057)	-0.032 (0.057)	-0.027 (0.058)	-0.033 (0.057)	-0.016 (0.058)	-0.026 (0.058)	
Education * One native, one immigrant parent			-0.007 (0.158)	-0.018 (0.159)	-0.018 (0.159)	-0.031 (0.160)	-0.027 (0.160)	
Education * Speaking minority language at home			-0.042 (0.158)	-0.052 (0.158)	-0.069 (0.158)	-0.077 (0.159)	-0.044 (0.156)	
Education * Islam			-0.027 (0.214)	-0.022 (0.213)	-0.010 (0.215)	-0.003 (0.214)	-0.005 (0.213)	

**Table 14 continued**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
EII: Naturalization				0.147 (0.573)		0.149 (0.554)	0.567 (0.583)	<b>0.870</b> (0.413)
Destination: Conservative welfare regime				-0.546 (0.303)		-0.548 (0.293)	<b>-0.693</b> (0.293)	<b>-0.924</b> (0.201)
Destination: GINI coefficient				0.025 (0.027)		0.020 (0.027)	0.043 (0.027)	<b>0.051</b> (0.022)
Origin: Net migration rate					<b>-0.063</b> (0.029)	<b>-0.061</b> (0.029)	<b>-0.085</b> (0.030)	<b>-0.091</b> (0.029)
Origin: Political freedom					<b>-0.019</b> (0.005)	<b>-0.019</b> (0.005)	<b>-0.016</b> (0.005)	<b>-0.017</b> (0.005)
Origin: EU15+							<b>0.605</b> (0.272)	<b>0.612</b> (0.191)
Origin: Neighbouring countries							0.248 (0.200)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							0.085 (0.222)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							<b>0.672</b> (0.248)	<b>0.716</b> (0.225)
Constant	<b>-3.723</b> (0.842)	<b>-10.956</b> (1.639)	<b>-11.014</b> (1.653)	<b>-9.675</b> (2.023)	<b>-10.839</b> (1.653)	<b>-9.425</b> (2.001)	<b>-9.781</b> (2.007)	<b>-7.879</b> (1.455)
$V_{0kl}$	0.010 (0.034)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.031)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)
$U_{0jkl}$	0.134 (0.092)	0.146 (0.099)	0.144 (0.098)	0.115 (0.086)	0.089 (0.080)	0.064 (0.072)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
-2LogLikelihood	1338.67	1202.69	1203.06	1190.15	1167.49	1155.75	1137.81	1139.62

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 15 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of unemployment of male immigrants, N=799 (table continues on next page)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean unemployment of male natives	<b>13.626</b> (3.226)	<b>16.276</b> (3.551)	<b>16.378</b> (3.584)	<b>16.362</b> (5.213)	<b>13.813</b> (3.764)	<b>15.486</b> (5.329)	<b>12.954</b> (5.858)	<b>13.947</b> (3.386)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	0.008 (0.364)	0.003 (0.368)	0.024 (0.369)	-0.004 (0.371)	0.035 (0.373)	0.011 (0.374)	0.029 (0.380)	
One native, one immigrant parent	0.175 (0.350)	0.286 (0.373)	<b>1.945</b> (0.892)	<b>1.936</b> (0.897)	<b>2.216</b> (0.903)	<b>2.242</b> (0.920)	<b>2.370</b> (0.928)	<b>2.112</b> (0.787)
Speaking minority language at home	0.341 (0.312)	0.169 (0.328)	-0.223 (0.844)	-0.279 (0.848)	-0.251 (0.871)	-0.309 (0.871)	-0.466 (0.878)	
Citizenship of the destination country	0.192 (0.316)	0.330 (0.337)	0.256 (0.340)	0.253 (0.356)	0.214 (0.349)	0.144 (0.373)	0.142 (0.381)	0.096 (0.310)
Age		-0.164 (0.122)	-0.175 (0.124)	-0.185 (0.125)	-0.187 (0.125)	-0.201 (0.127)	-0.223 (0.129)	
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	
Highest level of education		-0.220 (0.136)	0.016 (0.222)	-0.005 (0.224)	0.050 (0.223)	0.018 (0.226)	0.030 (0.230)	0.044 (0.169)
Education imputed		0.134 (0.428)	0.120 (0.433)	0.191 (0.642)	0.156 (0.445)	0.275 (0.672)	0.274 (0.758)	
Parental education		-0.001 (0.096)	-0.001 (0.094)	0.006 (0.097)	-0.006 (0.094)	-0.013 (0.098)	-0.021 (0.099)	
Parental education imputed		<b>1.203</b> (0.425)	<b>1.092</b> (0.439)	<b>1.085</b> (0.445)	<b>1.175</b> (0.444)	<b>1.160</b> (0.450)	<b>1.222</b> (0.457)	<b>1.036</b> (0.423)
Number of children		0.170 (0.106)	0.203 (0.107)	0.204 (0.108)	0.203 (0.110)	0.197 (0.111)	0.192 (0.113)	
No religion		-0.114 (0.343)	-0.164 (0.347)	-0.120 (0.359)	-0.167 (0.349)	-0.137 (0.358)	-0.090 (0.324)	
Islam		0.527 (0.388)	<b>1.856</b> (0.917)	<b>1.870</b> (0.920)	1.765 (0.941)	1.738 (0.940)	<b>1.904</b> (0.958)	<b>1.746</b> (0.865)
Religiosity		0.024 (0.058)	0.014 (0.059)	0.016 (0.060)	-0.010 (0.060)	-0.006 (0.060)	0.002 (0.061)	
Intensity of religious practice		0.113 (0.102)	0.098 (0.103)	0.091 (0.103)	0.105 (0.104)	0.099 (0.105)	0.101 (0.105)	
Education * One native, one immigrant parent			<b>-0.617</b> (0.297)	<b>-0.603</b> (0.299)	<b>-0.650</b> (0.296)	<b>-0.639</b> (0.298)	<b>-0.638</b> (0.303)	<b>-0.604</b> (0.267)
Education * Speaking minority language at home			0.178 (0.299)	0.200 (0.300)	0.164 (0.308)	0.181 (0.308)	0.196 (0.308)	
Education * Islam			-0.576 (0.376)	-0.584 (0.369)	-0.649 (0.377)	-0.661 (0.378)	-0.689 (0.375)	-0.491 (0.343)

**Table 15 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Destination: Social-Democratic Welfare Regime				-0.229 (0.674)		-0.063 (0.704)	-0.056 (0.735)	
Destination: Conservative Welfare Regime				0.174 (0.575)		0.216 (0.592)	0.134 (0.648)	
Destination: GDP per capita in 1000 ppp				0.004 (0.031)		0.015 (0.032)	0.010 (0.033)	
Origin: GINI coefficient					<b>-0.019</b> (0.009)	<b>-0.018</b> (0.009)	-0.013 (0.010)	
Origin: Human Development Index					0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	
Origin: Political stability					-0.221 (0.229)	-0.239 (0.249)	-0.153 (0.252)	
Origin: EU15+							0.328 (0.725)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							-0.573 (0.378)	<b>-0.803</b> (0.303)
Origin: Former colony/territory							-0.055 (0.392)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							0.698 (0.506)	
Constant	<b>-3.606</b> (0.358)	-0.334 (2.484)	-0.512 (2.543)	-0.413 (2.706)	0.138 (2.659)	-0.090 (2.853)	0.118 (3.011)	<b>-3.582</b> (0.539)
$V_{0kl}$	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
$U_{0jkl}$	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
-2LogLikelihood	120.117	11.541	-42.7346	-60.2713	-132.611	-152.51	-120.198	1.536

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 16 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of current occupational status (ISEI) of male immigrants, N=799 (table continues on following page)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Mean ISEI of male natives	0.641 (0.488)	0.126 (0.437)	0.131 (0.440)	0.109 (0.382)	0.045 (0.422)	0.102 (0.363)	0.135 (0.271)	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	2.976 (1.699)	<b>3.297</b> (1.489)	<b>3.208</b> (1.483)	<b>3.329</b> (1.473)	2.856 (1.478)	<b>3.069</b> (1.466)	<b>2.924</b> (1.454)	<b>2.492</b> (1.058)
One native, one immigrant parent	1.087 (1.629)	-0.629 (1.438)	-1.636 (3.618)	-1.567 (3.623)	-1.829 (3.615)	-1.567 (3.617)	-2.375 (3.613)	
Speaking minority language at home	<b>-4.467</b> (1.507)	-1.226 (1.331)	3.967 (3.055)	3.768 (3.027)	4.543 (3.021)	4.201 (2.951)	4.841 (2.950)	
Citizenship of the destination country	-0.422 (1.581)	-0.593 (1.379)	-0.288 (1.379)	-0.447 (1.369)	0.447 (1.397)	0.156 (1.395)	0.160 (1.367)	
Age		0.501 (0.481)	0.499 (0.478)	0.479 (0.478)	0.524 (0.476)	0.495 (0.476)	0.425 (0.473)	
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	
Highest level of education		<b>6.522</b> (0.515)	<b>7.404</b> (0.747)	<b>7.303</b> (0.747)	<b>7.448</b> (0.743)	<b>7.377</b> (0.743)	<b>7.086</b> (0.736)	<b>6.609</b> (0.498)
Education imputed		0.015 (3.617)	0.673 (3.623)	-6.708 (4.396)	0.325 (3.518)	-6.578 (4.179)	<b>-7.063</b> (2.945)	
Parental education		<b>0.994</b> (0.346)	<b>0.943</b> (0.345)	<b>0.889</b> (0.344)	<b>0.976</b> (0.342)	<b>0.923</b> (0.340)	<b>0.992</b> (0.336)	<b>1.0560</b> (0.327)
Parental education imputed		<b>-6.905</b> (2.334)	<b>-6.332</b> (2.335)	<b>-6.462</b> (2.329)	<b>-6.571</b> (2.317)	<b>-6.627</b> (2.309)	<b>-7.274</b> (2.291)	<b>-7.278</b> (2.297)
Number of children		<b>-0.857</b> (0.421)	<b>-0.912</b> (0.420)	<b>-0.903</b> (0.420)	<b>-0.873</b> (0.420)	<b>-0.871</b> (0.420)	<b>-0.978</b> (0.415)	
No religion		0.543 (1.312)	0.665 (1.305)	0.693 (1.301)	0.544 (1.299)	0.538 (1.293)	0.314 (1.250)	
Islam		-1.621 (1.903)	4.913 (4.292)	4.389 (4.212)	5.162 (4.248)	4.803 (4.157)	2.844 (4.221)	
Religiosity		-0.168 (0.223)	-0.130 (0.221)	-0.117 (0.222)	-0.136 (0.221)	-0.128 (0.220)	-0.057 (0.217)	
Intensity of religious practice		0.664 (0.403)	0.658 (0.401)	0.675 (0.401)	0.517 (0.402)	0.561 (0.403)	0.680 (0.399)	<b>0.849</b> (0.301)
Education * One native, one immigrant parent			0.294 (1.129)	0.238 (1.130)	0.135 (1.126)	0.042 (1.127)	0.249 (1.120)	
Education * Speaking Minority language at home			-1.989 (1.060)	-1.922 (1.057)	<b>-2.074</b> (1.052)	-1.963 (1.043)	-1.873 (1.037)	
Education * Islam			-2.615 (1.567)	-2.500 (1.552)	-2.507 (1.543)	-2.500 (1.527)	-2.102 (1.529)	

**Table 16 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Employment Protection Legislation				<b>-3.895</b> (1.670)		<b>-3.653</b> (1.574)	<b>-3.325</b> (1.159)	
Origin: Human Development Index					-0.025 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.023)	<b>-0.036</b> (0.013)
Origin: Political Freedom					-0.202 (0.155)	-0.238 (0.145)	0.077 (0.155)	
Origin: Prevalently Eastern-Orthodox					<b>-5.772</b> (2.178)	<b>-5.628</b> (2.115)	-0.587 (2.415)	
Origin: EU15+							0.362 (2.428)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							1.716 (1.303)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							1.648 (1.389)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							<b>-7.161</b> (2.154)	<b>-7.282</b> (1.364)
Constant	14.829 (22.217)	3.566 (21.651)	0.439 (21.778)	12.189 (19.964)	6.895 (21.049)	13.826 (18.892)	11.155 (15.572)	<b>22.142</b> (2.337)
$V_{0kl}$	9.459 (6.553)	8.291 (5.113)	8.155 (5.145)	5.116 (3.663)	7.879 (4.733)	4.975 (3.284)	0.000 (0.000)	4.677 (3.190)
$U_{0jkl}$	21.561 (9.329)	7.790 (5.315)	10.424 (5.842)	4.909 (4.358)	3.927 (4.279)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
$E_{0ijkl}$	233.324 (12.813)	179.196 (9.664)	175.295 (9.520)	178.824 (9.552)	177.237 (9.447)	180.283 (9.091)	178.360 (8.925)	182.453 (9.199)
-2LogLikelihood	6687.651	6454.947	6445.348	6440.966	6434.200	6429.868	6409.321	6438.884

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 17 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of reaching one of the higher EGP class categories of male immigrants, N=799 (table continues on following page)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Mean EGP high of male natives	2.994 (1.667)	1.394 (2.179)	1.306 (2.185)	2.083 (1.678)	1.554 (2.078)	2.305 (1.616)	1.942 (1.678)	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	<b>0.457</b> (0.225)	<b>0.778</b> (0.254)	<b>0.801</b> (0.256)	<b>0.837</b> (0.260)	<b>0.785</b> (0.259)	<b>0.806</b> (0.260)	<b>0.801</b> (0.265)	<b>0.942</b> (0.182)
One native, one immigrant parent	0.060 (0.215)	-0.164 (0.242)	1.230 (0.754)	1.311 (0.776)	1.100 (0.759)	1.197 (0.777)	1.133 (0.782)	
Speaking minority language at home	<b>-0.767</b> (0.213)	-0.403 (0.241)	0.571 (0.850)	0.688 (0.885)	0.564 (0.860)	0.650 (0.889)	0.622 (0.886)	
Citizenship of the destination country	0.113 (0.214)	0.092 (0.241)	0.119 (0.245)	0.151 (0.251)	0.176 (0.249)	0.220 (0.253)	0.260 (0.266)	
Age		0.043 (0.088)	0.042 (0.088)	0.031 (0.091)	0.040 (0.089)	0.027 (0.091)	0.026 (0.092)	
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	
Highest level of education		<b>1.074</b> (0.113)	<b>1.351</b> (0.187)	<b>1.400</b> (0.196)	<b>1.350</b> (0.188)	<b>1.390</b> (0.196)	<b>1.384</b> (0.196)	<b>1.109</b> (0.142)
Education imputed		0.114 (0.686)	0.106 (0.686)	-1.606 (0.720)	0.166 (0.389)	-1.471 (0.683)	-1.312 (0.741)	<b>-1.894</b> (0.756)
Parental education		<b>0.159</b> (0.060)	<b>0.158</b> (0.060)	<b>0.165</b> (0.062)	<b>0.165</b> (0.061)	<b>0.174</b> (0.062)	<b>0.181</b> (0.063)	<b>0.161</b> (0.058)
Parental education imputed		-0.546 (0.416)	-0.582 (0.421)	-0.685 (0.428)	-0.598 (0.423)	-0.704 (0.428)	-0.746 (0.430)	
Number of children		-0.045 (0.073)	-0.047 (0.074)	-0.047 (0.075)	-0.057 (0.074)	-0.058 (0.075)	-0.056 (0.076)	
No religion		-0.119 (0.232)	-0.111 (0.233)	-0.127 (0.234)	-0.150 (0.234)	-0.160 (0.234)	-0.163 (0.236)	
Islam		-0.368 (0.370)	0.159 (1.223)	0.080 (1.329)	0.091 (1.257)	0.039 (1.154)	0.106 (1.381)	
Religiosity		-0.024 (0.041)	-0.024 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.041)	-0.025 (0.042)	-0.025 (0.042)	
Intensity of religious practice		0.069 (0.074)	0.070 (0.074)	0.082 (0.076)	0.066 (0.074)	0.075 (0.077)	0.081 (0.077)	
Education * One native, one immigrant parent			-0.463 (0.238)	<b>-0.503</b> (0.244)	-0.437 (0.240)	-0.480 (0.246)	-0.466 (0.246)	
Education * Speaking minority language at home			-0.302 (0.265)	-0.325 (0.274)	-0.288 (0.268)	-0.303 (0.275)	-0.282 (0.274)	
Education * Islam			-0.168 (0.387)	-0.176 (0.412)	-0.179 (0.397)	-0.193 (0.421)	-0.202 (0.424)	

**Table 17 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
EII: Naturalization Policy				<b>1.780</b> (0.691)		<b>1.686</b> (0.668)	1.265 (0.714)	1.372 (0.761)
Employment Protection Legislation				<b>-0.782</b> (0.314)		<b>-0.757</b> (0.302)	<b>-0.685</b> (0.323)	<b>-0.812</b> (0.289)
Destination: Presence of left-wing parties in government				-0.034 (0.040)		-0.029 (0.037)	-0.027 (0.039)	
Origin: Political Stability					-0.009 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.005)	
Origin: Prevalently Eastern Orthodox countries					-0.628 (0.418)	-0.628 (0.439)	-0.281 (0.498)	
Origin: EU15+							0.076 (0.345)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							-0.032 (0.251)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							-0.121 (0.272)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							-0.625 (0.367)	<b>-0.723</b> (0.274)
Constant	<b>-1.783</b> (0.737)	<b>-6.151</b> (2.023)	<b>-7.001</b> (2.095)	<b>-5.095</b> (2.131)	<b>-6.870</b> (2.085)	<b>-5.024</b> (2.114)	<b>-5.028</b> (2.156)	<b>-2.228</b> (0.815)
$V_{0kl}$	0.154 (0.107)	0.349 (0.185)	0.347 (0.185)	0.078 (0.074)	0.283 (0.162)	0.053 (0.062)	0.063 (0.067)	0.140 (0.101)
$U_{0jkl}$	0.210 (0.129)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.026 (0.107)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
-2LogLikelihood	1001.22	696.942	678.112	576.586	649.929	554.139	561.371	652.828

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.



**Table 18 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of highest level of education of male immigrants, N=1188**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean education of male natives	<b>0.766</b> (0.195)	<b>0.612</b> (0.134)	<b>0.606</b> (0.132)	<b>0.730</b> (0.119)	<b>0.597</b> (0.135)	<b>0.728</b> (0.118)	<b>0.753</b> (0.123)	<b>0.668</b> (0.110)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	0.115 (0.087)	0.107 (0.082)	0.101 (0.082)	0.099 (0.081)	0.102 (0.082)	0.099 (0.081)	0.097 (0.082)	
One native, one immigrant parent	-0.073 (0.086)	<b>-0.173</b> (0.080)	-0.174 (0.122)	-0.185 (0.122)	-0.184 (0.123)	-0.196 (0.122)	-0.205 (0.123)	
Speaking minority language at home	<b>-0.264</b> (0.082)	<b>-0.168</b> (0.076)	<b>-0.323</b> (0.113)	<b>-0.330</b> (0.112)	<b>-0.319</b> (0.112)	<b>-0.327</b> (0.112)	<b>-0.312</b> (0.113)	<b>-0.416</b> (0.100)
Citizenship of the destination country	-0.009 (0.081)	0.061 (0.074)	0.056 (0.074)	0.066 (0.073)	0.060 (0.074)	0.072 (0.073)	0.070 (0.074)	
Age		0.011 (0.025)	0.012 (0.025)	0.008 (0.025)	0.012 (0.025)	0.008 (0.025)	0.010 (0.025)	
Age2		0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	
Parental education		<b>0.247</b> (0.018)	<b>0.223</b> (0.025)	<b>0.222</b> (0.025)	<b>0.224</b> (0.025)	<b>0.223</b> (0.025)	<b>0.223</b> (0.025)	<b>0.234</b> (0.019)
Parental education imputed		<b>-0.283</b> (0.127)	<b>-0.300</b> (0.127)	<b>-0.313</b> (0.127)	<b>-0.296</b> (0.127)	<b>-0.307</b> (0.127)	<b>-0.307</b> (0.127)	<b>-0.302</b> (0.127)
Number of children		-0.025 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.023)	
No religion		-0.041 (0.072)	-0.043 (0.072)	-0.041 (0.071)	-0.043 (0.072)	-0.039 (0.071)	-0.039 (0.071)	
Islam		<b>-0.240</b> (0.110)	<b>-0.308</b> (0.150)	<b>-0.294</b> (0.148)	-0.283 (0.152)	-0.267 (0.150)	-0.280 (0.155)	
Religiosity		-0.011 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.112)	-0.010 (0.012)	
Intensity of religious practice		-0.013 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.022)	
Parental education * One native, one immigrant parent			0.007 (0.037)	0.009 (0.037)	0.008 (0.037)	0.011 (0.037)	0.010 (0.037)	
Parental education * Speaking minority language at home			0.078 (0.041)	<b>0.084</b> (0.041)	0.077 (0.041)	<b>0.083</b> (0.041)	<b>0.085</b> (0.041)	<b>0.100</b> (0.038)
Parental education * Islam			0.051 (0.058)	0.046 (0.058)	0.050 (0.058)	0.046 (0.058)	0.048 (0.058)	
EII: Naturalization policies				0.357 (0.206)		0.384 (0.206)	0.365 (0.225)	<b>0.425</b> (0.189)
Destination: Liberal welfare regime				0.473 (0.252)		0.491 (0.252)	0.466 (0.259)	<b>0.262</b> (0.107)

**Table 18 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Employment Protection Legislation				0.108 (0.113)		0.119 (0.113)	0.118 (0.118)	
Origin: GINI coefficient					-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	
Origin: Net migration rate					0.001 (0.001)	<b>0.002</b> (0.001)	<b>0.002</b> (0.001)	<b>0.002</b> (0.001)
Origin: EU15+							-0.052 (0.119)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							0.092 (0.095)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							0.037 (0.100)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							-0.103 (0.108)	
Constant	0.714 (0.539)	0.573 (0.610)	0.635 (0.608)	-0.023 (0.694)	0.718 (0.621)	0.013 (0.698)	-0.051 (0.722)	0.361 (0.313)
Vokl	0.040 (0.027)	0.010 (0.011)	0.010 (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	0.011 (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Uojkl	0.165 (0.042)	0.064 (0.024)	0.058 (0.023)	0.055 (0.021)	0.057 (0.023)	0.055 (0.021)	0.053 (0.021)	0.046 (0.020)
E0ijkl	0.930 (0.042)	0.822 (0.036)	0.822 (0.036)	0.818 (0.036)	0.820 (0.036)	0.817 (0.036)	0.817 (0.036)	0.835 (0.036)
-2LogLikelihood	3412.956	3206.288	3200.872	3188.099	3198.777	3185.569	3183.502	3202.425

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 19 Macro-characteristics in the five multi-level regressions of female immigrants:  
Coefficients, standard errors and improvement in model fit**

		Labour market participation	Unemployment	Occupational status (ISEI)	High EGP	Education
Destination Effects	EII: Labour market inclusion	<b>-0.251</b> (0.207) <i>3.960</i>	<b>0.297</b> (0.505) <i>-0.090</i>	<b>-1.035</b> (2.914) <i>0.126</i>	<b>0.229</b> (0.369) <i>39.897</i>	<b>-0.016</b> (0.152) <i>0.011</i>
	EII: Long-term residence rights	<b>-0.091</b> (0.296) <i>5.230</i>	<b>1.058</b> (0.676) <i>9.295</i>	<b>1.427</b> (3.501) <i>0.163</i>	<b>0.340</b> (0.423) <i>27.069</i>	<b>-0.129</b> (0.185) <i>0.478</i>
	EII: Family reunification	<b>-0.329</b> (0.284) <i>3.710</i>	<b>1.361</b> (0.849) <i>21.245</i>	<b>1.693</b> (3.694) <i>0.210</i>	<b>0.087</b> (0.445) <i>9.168</i>	<b>-0.081</b> (0.195) <i>0.172</i>
	EII: Naturalization	<b>-0.184</b> (0.317) <i>0.250</i>	<b>-0.090</b> (0.820) <i>0.317</i>	<b>3.467</b> (4.655) <i>0.535</i>	<b>0.297</b> (0.587) <i>28.910</i>	<b>0.196</b> (0.236) <i>0.681</i>
	EII: Anti-Discrimination	<b>-0.224</b> (0.142) <i>6.390</i>	<b>0.226</b> (0.370) <i>-2.153</i>	<b>1.998</b> (2.029) <i>0.951</i>	<b>0.316</b> (0.237) <i>95.180</i>	<b>0.050</b> (0.104) <i>0.222</i>
	EII: Total index score	<b>-0.368</b> (0.278) <i>4.400</i>	<b>0.660</b> (0.679) <i>1.515</i>	<b>1.898</b> (3.575) <i>0.279</i>	<b>0.402</b> (0.442) <i>60.478</i>	<b>0.009</b> (0.189) <i>0.003</i>
	Liberal welfare regime	<b>-0.255</b> (0.296) <i>1.300</i>	<b>-0.592</b> (1.149) <i>4.958</i>	<b>2.188</b> (4.325) <i>0.252</i>	<b>0.483</b> (0.542) <i>10.335</i>	<b>0.261</b> (0.127) <i>3.881</i>
	Social-democratic welfare regime	<b>-0.365</b> (0.260) <i>5.540</i>	<b>-5.296</b> (2.434) <i>128.108</i>	<b>0.239</b> (2.890) <i>0.007</i>	<b>-0.299</b> (0.301) <i>-0.811</i>	<b>0.008</b> (0.157) <i>0.003</i>
	Conservative welfare regime	<b>-0.124</b> (0.158) <i>0.000</i>	<b>0.304</b> (0.435) <i>5.335</i>	<b>4.834</b> (2.489) <i>3.585</i>	<b>0.341</b> (0.250) <i>-27.642</i>	<b>-0.154</b> (0.085) <i>2.581</i>
	Southern welfare regime	<b>0.459</b> (0.187) <i>10.320</i>	<b>0.295</b> (0.447) <i>1.947</i>	<b>-8.190</b> (2.448) <i>8.421</i>	<b>-0.795</b> (0.460) <i>-41.841</i>	<b>0.021</b> (0.170) <i>0.015</i>
	Employment Protection Legislation	<b>0.238</b> (0.130) <i>6.260</i>	<b>0.686</b> (0.405) <i>22.641</i>	<b>-3.034</b> (1.638) <i>2.958</i>	<b>-0.467</b> (0.238) <i>31.772</i>	<b>-0.060</b> (0.066) <i>0.800</i>
	Size of the bottom of the labour market	<b>0.006</b> (0.015) <i>0.680</i>	<b>-0.060</b> (0.042) <i>8.727</i>	<b>-0.302</b> (0.250) <i>1.380</i>	<b>-0.063</b> (0.026) <i>-62.346</i>	<b>0.014</b> (0.011) <i>1.464</i>
	GDP per capita in 1000 ppp	<b>-0.010</b> (0.007) <i>1.970</i>	<b>-0.035</b> (0.021) <i>2.504</i>	<b>0.159</b> (0.150) <i>1.066</i>	<b>-0.021</b> (0.021) <i>20.871</i>	<b>-0.001</b> (0.007) <i>0.406</i>
	GINI coefficient	<b>0.030</b> (0.017) <i>4.540</i>	<b>0.090</b> (0.041) <i>21.646</i>	<b>0.060</b> (0.330) <i>0.033</i>	<b>0.024</b> (0.037) <i>5.611</i>	<b>0.016</b> (0.012) <i>1.684</i>
	Presence of Left-wing parties in government	<b>0.034</b> (0.019) <i>5.510</i>	<b>0.005</b> (0.056) <i>-0.485</i>	<b>-0.134</b> (0.305) <i>0.191</i>	<b>-0.042</b> (0.036) <i>41.400</i>	<b>0.005</b> (0.013) <i>0.155</i>
Net migration rate	<b>-0.009</b> (0.029) <i>0.010</i>	<b>-0.143</b> (0.082) <i>-5.022</i>	<b>-0.032</b> (0.529) <i>0.004</i>	<b>-0.063</b> (0.051) <i>36.339</i>	<b>0.004</b> (0.022) <i>0.035</i>	
Origin Effects	GDP per capita in 1000 ppp	<b>-0.012</b> (0.006) <i>7.280</i>	<b>-0.045</b> (0.016) <i>62.619</i>	<b>0.031</b> (0.060) <i>0.265</i>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.009) <i>0.053</i>	<b>0.008</b> (0.003) <i>6.591</i>
	GINI coefficient	<b>0.026</b> (0.005) <i>40.490</i>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.013) <i>1.159</i>	<b>0.004</b> (0.054) <i>0.005</i>	<b>0.003</b> (0.007) <i>-4.745</i>	<b>0.002</b> (0.002) <i>0.861</i>
	Net migration rate	<b>0.000</b> (0.025) <i>-2.290</i>	<b>0.015</b> (0.058) <i>0.362</i>	<b>-0.062</b> (0.247) <i>0.063</i>	<b>0.022</b> (0.010) <i>189.153</i>	<b>0.021</b> (0.011) <i>3.420</i>
	Political stability	<b>-0.008</b> (0.007) <i>-0.016</i>	<b>-0.462</b> (0.169) <i>166.716</i>	<b>0.004</b> (0.081) <i>0.003</i>	<b>0.006</b> (0.006) <i>-19.106</i>	<b>-0.001</b> (0.003) <i>0.037</i>
	Political freedom	<b>-0.029</b> (0.005) <i>43.800</i>	<b>0.001</b> (0.015) <i>0.326</i>	<b>-0.054</b> (0.069) <i>0.621</i>	<b>-0.013</b> (0.010) <i>17.377</i>	<b>0.001</b> (0.002) <i>0.052</i>
	Civil rights	<b>-0.042</b> (0.012) <i>22.410</i>	<b>-0.186</b> (0.088) <i>84.001</i>	<b>-0.106</b> (0.147) <i>0.506</i>	<b>-0.042</b> (0.077) <i>8.917</i>	<b>0.001</b> (0.004) <i>0.092</i>
	Status of political freedom	<b>-0.041</b> (0.040) <i>-0.175</i>	<b>-0.144</b> (0.151) <i>18.329</i>	<b>0.152</b> (0.437) <i>0.120</i>	<b>-0.047</b> (0.123) <i>1.212</i>	<b>-0.022</b> (0.018) <i>1.622</i>
	Human Development Index	<b>0.001</b> (0.003) <i>-2.780</i>	<b>0.009</b> (0.004) <i>25.474</i>	<b>0.009</b> (0.018) <i>0.250</i>	<b>-0.001</b> (0.003) <i>14.622</i>	<b>-0.002</b> (0.001) <i>6.780</i>
	Prevalently Christian country	<b>-9.081</b> (0.181) <i>-2.060</i>	<b>-0.661</b> (0.344) <i>21.728</i>	<b>-0.118</b> (1.556) <i>0.006</i>	<b>0.085</b> (0.246) <i>-1.217</i>	<b>0.091</b> (0.075) <i>1.470</i>
	Prevalently Eastern-Orthodox country	<b>-0.131</b> (0.221) <i>-2.620</i>	<b>0.539</b> (0.500) <i>8.811</i>	<b>-3.621</b> (2.437) <i>2.077</i>	<b>-0.333</b> (0.412) <i>-30.448</i>	<b>0.113</b> (0.108) <i>1.077</i>
Prevalently Islamic country	<b>-0.041</b> (0.211) <i>-2.080</i>	<b>1.070</b> (0.369) <i>26.874</i>	<b>2.010</b> (2.067) <i>0.933</i>	<b>0.061</b> (0.336) <i>-1.011</i>	<b>-0.298</b> (0.099) <i>8.856</i>	

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

Note: Every cell contains the following information: the size of the coefficient is printed in bold letters; standard errors are given in brackets, while the gain in -2LogLikelihood that results from including the specific indicator is given in italics.

**Table 20 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of labour market participation of female immigrants, N=1285 (table continues on next page)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Mean labour market participation of female natives	<b>3.242</b> (0.378)	<b>3.436</b> (0.409)	<b>3.421</b> (0.412)	<b>3.520</b> (0.479)	<b>3.249</b> (0.421)	<b>3.394</b> (0.489)	<b>3.372</b> (0.498)	<b>3.250</b> (0.395)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	0.214 (0.175)	0.180 (0.184)	-0.257 (0.429)	-0.289 (0.428)	-0.345 (0.434)	-0.373 (0.434)	-0.287 (0.437)	
One native, one immigrant parent	-0.239 (0.172)	-0.334 (0.182)	-0.355 (0.185)	-0.322 (0.187)	-0.280 (0.190)	-0.279 (0.192)	-0.246 (0.193)	
Speaking minority language at home	-0.226 (0.157)	-0.071 (0.166)	-0.138 (0.168)	-0.131 (0.171)	-0.188 (0.171)	-0.183 (0.174)	-0.203 (0.176)	
Citizenship of the destination country	0.071 (0.152)	0.138 (0.160)	<b>0.746</b> (0.379)	-0.688 (0.380)	-0.621 (0.384)	-0.581 (0.385)	-0.526 (0.389)	<b>-0.813</b> (0.321)
Age		<b>0.266</b> (0.058)	<b>0.270</b> (0.059)	<b>0.275</b> (0.059)	<b>0.280</b> (0.059)	<b>0.282</b> (0.060)	<b>0.276</b> (0.060)	<b>0.270</b> (0.058)
Age <sup>2</sup>		<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)
Highest level of education		0.086 (0.064)	-0.132 (0.086)	-0.120 (0.086)	-0.100 (0.088)	-0.096 (0.088)	-0.069 (0.090)	-0.119 (0.079)
Education imputed		-0.218 (0.237)	-0.158 (0.240)	-0.043 (0.385)	-0.209 (0.245)	-0.188 (0.389)	-0.348 (0.404)	
Parental education		-0.056 (0.042)	-0.058 (0.043)	-0.054 (0.043)	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.047 (0.044)	
Parental education imputed		-0.425 (0.291)	-0.421 (0.291)	-0.368 (0.294)	-0.413 (0.299)	-0.367 (0.300)	-0.390 (0.301)	
Number of children		<b>-0.218</b> (0.049)	<b>-0.223</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.215</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.223</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.219</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.216</b> (0.050)	<b>-0.226</b> (0.050)
No religion		0.050 (0.159)	0.038 (0.161)	0.096 (0.163)	0.026 (0.163)	0.065 (0.165)	0.088 (0.166)	
Islam		<b>-0.626</b> (0.265)	<b>-0.660</b> (0.264)	<b>-0.585</b> (0.267)	<b>-0.889</b> (0.275)	<b>-0.816</b> (0.278)	<b>-0.677</b> (0.295)	<b>-0.858</b> (0.260)
Religiosity		-0.045 (0.028)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.042 (0.028)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.033 (0.029)	
Intensity of religious practice		0.001 (0.049)	0.005 (0.049)	0.026 (0.051)	0.038 (0.051)	0.050 (0.052)	0.051 (0.052)	
Education * 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant			0.158 (0.140)	0.171 (0.140)	0.215 (0.143)	0.222 (0.143)	0.195 (0.144)	
Education * Citizenship of the destination country			<b>0.326</b> (0.128)	<b>0.328</b> (0.128)	0.245 (0.130)	0.252 (0.130)	0.239 (0.131)	<b>0.347</b> (0.109)
EII: Anti-discrimination legislation				-0.221 (0.150)		-0.187 (0.153)	-0.213 (0.159)	

**Table 20 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Destination: Southern welfare regime				0.443 (0.224)		0.276 (0.232)	0.406 (0.244)	
Destination: Employment Protection Legislation				0.021 (0.162)		-0.012 (0.163)	-0.039 (0.164)	
Origin: GDP per capita in 1000 ppp					-0.010 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.010)	
Origin: GINI coefficient					<b>0.016</b> (0.006)	<b>0.015</b> (0.006)	<b>0.015</b> (0.006)	<b>0.017</b> (0.005)
Origin: Political freedom					<b>-0.017</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.016</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.018</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.015</b> (0.007)
Origin: EU15+							0.287 (0.282)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							-0.268 (0.167)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							0.240 (0.178)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							0.087 (0.209)	
Constant	<b>-1.693</b> (0.210)	<b>-6.510</b> (1.242)	<b>-6.012</b> (1.255)	<b>-6.573</b> (1.298)	<b>-6.558</b> (1.307)	<b>-6.858</b> (1.343)	<b>-6.922</b> (1.355)	<b>-6.792</b> (1.234)
$V_{0kl}$	0.001 (0.016)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
$U_{0jkl}$	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
-2LogLikelihood	1750.45	1675.41	1661.21	1644.65	1603.08	1595.64	1595.66	1629.85

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 21 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of unemployment of female immigrants, N=564 (table continues on following page)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean unemployment of female natives	-0.684 (0.857)	-0.802 (0.801)	-0.799 (0.800)	2.722 (3.921)	-0.462 (0.792)	3.849 (3.963)	1.753 (3.816)	<b>5.590</b> (2.844)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	-0.245 (0.433)	-0.226 (0.448)	-0.497 (1.108)	-0.282 (1.100)	-0.051 (1.109)	0.032 (1.132)	0.028 (1.151)	
One native, one immigrant parent	-0.541 (0.447)	-0.567 (0.471)	-0.572 (0.472)	-0.496 (0.464)	-0.506 (0.477)	-0.500 (0.476)	-0.389 (0.488)	
Speaking minority language at home	-0.357 (0.433)	-0.550 (0.451)	-0.556 (0.452)	-0.420 (0.451)	-0.604 (0.450)	-0.486 (0.457)	-0.606 (0.467)	
Citizenship of the destination country	0.199 (0.394)	0.469 (0.420)	0.554 (0.946)	0.446 (0.971)	0.712 (0.969)	0.574 (0.999)	-0.540 (1.021)	
Age		-0.062 (0.157)	-0.062 (0.158)	-0.064 (0.128)	-0.044 (0.159)	-0.033 (0.161)	-0.033 (0.162)	
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	
Highest level of education		0.104 (0.165)	0.092 (0.238)	0.129 (0.249)	0.217 (0.253)	0.216 (0.257)	0.221 (0.269)	
Education imputed		-0.943 (0.785)	-0.938 (0.786)	-0.981 (1.175)	-1.076 (0.800)	-1.157 (1.207)	-0.901 (1.241)	
Parental education		-0.172 (0.114)	-0.171 (0.114)	-0.137 (0.114)	-0.146 (0.113)	-0.133 (0.116)	-0.167 (0.120)	
Parental education imputed		-0.132 (0.810)	-0.129 (0.808)	-0.150 (0.795)	-0.298 (0.799)	-0.251 (0.806)	-0.368 (0.811)	
Number of children		0.066 (0.105)	0.061 (0.106)	0.064 (0.105)	0.037 (0.104)	0.047 (0.105)	0.043 (0.107)	
No religion		0.115 (0.405)	0.117 (0.406)	0.137 (0.410)	0.107 (0.408)	0.166 (0.414)	0.223 (0.416)	
Islam		0.718 (0.601)	0.706 (0.604)	0.770 (0.623)	0.109 (0.634)	0.267 (0.682)	0.489 (0.706)	
Religiosity		0.087 (0.075)	0.087 (0.075)	0.076 (0.076)	0.073 (0.076)	0.067 (0.077)	0.065 (0.078)	
Intensity of religious practice		0.109 (0.130)	0.107 (0.130)	0.136 (0.133)	0.128 (0.133)	0.151 (0.136)	0.117 (0.139)	
Education * 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant			0.094 (0.351)	0.012 (0.349)	-0.009 (0.351)	-0.067 (0.357)	-0.064 (0.365)	
Education * Citizenship of the destination country			-0.030 (0.319)	0.002 (0.331)	-0.129 (0.329)	-0.066 (0.341)	-0.070 (0.350)	
EII: Family reunification policy				0.801 (0.940)		0.320 (0.992)	0.887 (1.115)	

**Table 21 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Destination: Social-democratic welfare regime				-3.265 (2.892)		-3.655 (2.918)	-2.305 (2.702)	<b>-4.862</b> (2.214)
Destination: Employment Protection Legislation				0.106 (0.424)		-0.045 (0.434)	0.044 (0.444)	
Destination: GINI coefficient				0.053 (0.047)		0.029 (0.050)	0.050 (0.052)	
Origin: GDP per capita in 1000 ppp					-0.029 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.033)	
Origin: Political Stability					-0.216 (0.222)	-0.175 (0.227)	-0.264 (0.244)	
Origin: Prevalently Christian countries					0.323 (0.518)	0.493 (0.549)	0.794 (0.580)	
Origin: Prevalently Islamic countries					0.718 (0.493)	0.684 (0.500)	<b>1.091</b> (0.540)	<b>1.012</b> (0.330)
Origin: EU15+							0.241 (0.835)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							-0.312 (0.459)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							0.128 (0.434)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							1.013 (0.524)	
Constant	<b>-2.128</b> (0.342)	-1.280 (3.234)	-1.249 (3.268)	-4.048 (3.677)	-1.935 (3.322)	-3.744 (3.830)	-5.184 (3.920)	<b>-3.176</b> (0.361)
$V_{0kl}$	0.100 (0.168)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
$U_{0jkl}$	0.192 (0.369)	0.292 (0.363)	0.285 (0.361)	0.032 (0.293)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
-2LogLikelihood	110.195	26.7176	25.2529	-84.2354	-121.435	-180.577	-200.365	-68.8765

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 22 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of current occupational status (ISEI) of female immigrants  
N=564 (table continues on following page)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean ISEI of female natives	0.826 (0.664)	0.459 (0.482)	0.446 (0.481)	-0.760 (0.499)	0.372 (0.453)	-0.816 (0.490)	-0.956 (0.499)	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	-1.805 (2.153)	-0.685 (1.860)	6.209 (4.448)	5.149 (4.431)	6.313 (4.441)	5.330 (4.421)	6.383 (4.443)	
One native, one immigrant parent	1.475 (2.142)	0.307 (1.858)	0.241 (1.853)	0.129 (1.860)	0.006 (1.854)	-0.143 (1.860)	-0.048 (1.880)	
Speaking minority language at home	<b>-6.229</b> (2.115)	<b>-4.246</b> (1.824)	<b>-4.286</b> (1.822)	<b>-4.574</b> (1.817)	<b>-4.038</b> (1.828)	<b>-4.353</b> (1.824)	<b>-4.358</b> (1.825)	<b>-5.038</b> (1.627)
Citizenship of the destination country	1.390 (2.080)	0.538 (1.814)	-4.234 (4.164)	-5.384 (4.138)	-3.660 (4.164)	-4.729 (4.141)	-4.132 (4.131)	
Age		-0.456 (0.641)	-0.470 (0.639)	-0.473 (0.637)	-0.492 (0.640)	-0.502 (0.638)	-0.556 (0.637)	
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	
Highest level of education		<b>7.130</b> (0.665)	<b>7.039</b> (0.952)	<b>6.629</b> (0.942)	<b>7.093</b> (0.946)	<b>6.737</b> (0.937)	<b>6.905</b> (0.940)	<b>7.257</b> (0.648)
Education imputed		3.439 (3.552)	3.254 (3.516)	-1.374 (3.843)	2.774 (3.316)	-1.773 (3.764)	-3.356 (3.800)	
Parental education		<b>1.073</b> (0.438)	<b>1.075</b> (0.437)	<b>1.022</b> (0.433)	<b>1.061</b> (0.435)	<b>1.023</b> (0.431)	<b>1.159</b> (0.437)	<b>1.164</b> (0.420)
Parental education imputed		-2.237 (3.173)	-2.138 (3.165)	-1.723 (3.144)	-2.124 (3.162)	-1.788 (3.140)	-2.003 (3.135)	
Number of children		-0.328 (0.546)	-0.295 (0.545)	-0.435 (0.546)	-0.259 (0.544)	-0.388 (0.545)	-0.416 (0.544)	
No religion		-1.987 (1.623)	-2.039 (1.619)	-1.967 (1.623)	-2.074 (1.614)	-2.000 (1.618)	-1.807 (1.626)	
Islam		-5.081 (3.354)	-4.812 (3.353)	-5.409 (3.330)	-5.291 (3.357)	-5.811 (3.325)	-5.022 (3.249)	
Religiosity		-0.392 (0.305)	-0.361 (0.305)	-0.491 (0.303)	-0.386 (0.304)	-0.512 (0.302)	-0.496 (0.302)	
Intensity of religious practice		0.101 (0.537)	0.133 (0.536)	-0.087 (0.534)	0.111 (0.535)	-0.120 (0.533)	-0.142 (0.534)	
Education * 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant			-2.336 (1.371)	-2.096 (1.365)	-2.355 (1.379)	-2.134 (1.363)	-2.455 (1.370)	
Education * Citizenship of the destination country			1.678 (1.332)	1.759 (1.323)	1.570 (1.331)	1.610 (1.322)	1.509 (1.325)	
Destination: Conservative welfare regime				3.569 (2.283)		3.788 (2.235)	4.197 (2.241)	<b>3.927</b> (1.507)



**Table 22 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Destination: Southern welfare regime				-5.269 (3.147)		-4.616 (3.113)	-3.968 (3.249)	
Employment Protection Legislation				-1.864 (1.765)		-1.952 (1.721)	-2.157 (1.702)	<b>-2.647</b> (1.021)
Origin: Prevalently Eastern Orthodox countries					-3.621 (2.436)	-3.597 (2.398)	-2.400 (2.815)	
Origin: EU15+							1.778 (2.212)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							-2.577 (1.734)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							1.442 (1.668)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							-1.321 (2.197)	
Constant	5.723 (30.604)	10.804 (25.780)	11.746 (25.801)	75.717 (27.850)	15.971 (24.843)	<b>79.039</b> (27.513)	<b>85.576</b> (28.028)	<b>24.801</b> (3.267)
$V_{0kl}$	13.387 (9.183)	5.468 (4.500)	5.456 (4.466)	0.000 (0.000)	4.369 (3.945)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	1.144 (2.690)
$U_{0jkl}$	24.070 (13.056)	5.319 (7.171)	4.945 (7.062)	4.865 (6.370)	3.273 (6.647)	2.734 (5.840)	1.609 (5.504)	5.584 (7.112)
$E_{0ijkl}$	275.961 (18.713)	209.423 (13.833)	208.557 (13.763)	207.661 (13.596)	209.696 (13.760)	208.788 (13.568)	208.276 (13.473)	211.965 (13.941)
-2LogLikelihood	4821.321	4636.586	4633.484	4622.299	4631.407	4620.141	4615.927	4637.638

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 23 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level logistic regression of reaching one of the highest EGP class categories of female immigrants, N=564 (table continues on next page)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean highest EGP of female natives	<b>4.127</b> (1.411)	2.064 (1.354)	1.967 (1.323)	1.292 (1.902)	2.327 (1.456)	1.662 (2.031)	1.648 (2.079)	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	-0.162 (0.259)	0.038 (0.306)	<b>2.506</b> (1.074)	<b>2.583</b> (1.088)	<b>2.706</b> (1.089)	<b>2.773</b> (1.102)	<b>2.808</b> (1.095)	<b>2.528</b> (0.865)
One native, one immigrant parent	0.251 (0.257)	0.348 (0.302)	0.298 (0.298)	0.287 (0.300)	0.250 (0.303)	0.245 (0.305)	0.211 (0.311)	
Speaking minority language at home	-0.436 (0.263)	-0.364 (0.308)	-0.383 (0.319)	-0.358 (0.322)	-0.390 (0.321)	-0.368 (0.324)	-0.319 (0.329)	
Citizenship of the destination country	0.114 (0.249)	-0.016 (0.294)	-1.182 (1.111)	-1.270 (1.115)	-1.222 (1.102)	-1.289 (1.110)	-1.276 (1.104)	
Age		-0.067 (0.107)	-0.081 (0.107)	-0.078 (0.108)	-0.066 (0.108)	-0.061 (0.109)	-0.053 (0.109)	
Age <sup>2</sup>		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	
Highest level of education		<b>1.200</b> (0.136)	<b>1.346</b> (0.232)	<b>1.322</b> (0.236)	<b>1.389</b> (0.236)	<b>1.367</b> (0.241)	<b>1.370</b> (0.241)	<b>1.653</b> (0.200)
Education imputed		0.097 (0.409)	0.023 (0.389)	-0.129 (0.384)	0.097 (0.431)	-0.040 (0.402)	-0.128 (0.418)	
Parental education		0.076 (0.068)	0.077 (0.068)	0.083 (0.069)	0.076 (0.069)	0.081 (0.069)	0.078 (0.070)	
Parental education imputed		-0.372 (0.568)	-0.333 (0.560)	-0.382 (0.563)	-0.417 (0.569)	-0.463 (0.573)	-0.489 (0.574)	
Number of children		0.061 (0.092)	0.066 (0.093)	0.057 (0.095)	0.081 (0.094)	0.067 (0.096)	0.072 (0.097)	
No religion		0.182 (0.254)	0.203 (0.254)	0.227 (0.259)	0.189 (0.258)	0.206 (0.262)	0.159 (0.265)	
Islam		-0.551 (0.718)	-0.482 (0.747)	-0.529 (0.742)	-0.413 (0.751)	-0.453 (0.747)	-0.547 (0.753)	
Religiosity		-0.037 (0.051)	-0.031 (0.051)	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.039 (0.052)	-0.042 (0.052)	-0.047 (0.053)	
Intensity of religious practice		-0.110 (0.091)	-0.113 (0.092)	-0.113 (0.093)	-0.122 (0.094)	-0.125 (0.095)	-0.119 (0.095)	
Education * 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant			<b>-0.759</b> (0.315)	<b>-0.774</b> (0.319)	<b>-0.799</b> (0.318)	<b>-0.815</b> (0.321)	<b>-0.824</b> (0.320)	<b>-0.669</b> (0.260)
Education * Citizenship of the destination country			0.366 (0.328)	0.376 (0.330)	0.385 (0.327)	0.393 (0.331)	0.389 (0.330)	
EII: Anti-discrimination policy				0.236 (0.312)		0.257 (0.321)	0.183 (0.331)	

**Table 23 (continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Destination: Presence of left-wing parties in government				-0.041 (0.035)		-0.041 (0.037)	-0.038 (0.037)	-0.052 (0.029)
Destination: Net migration rate				-0.027 (0.069)		-0.035 (0.071)	-0.027 (0.071)	
Origin: Net migration rate					0.020 (0.011)	0.019 (0.011)	0.019 (0.011)	<b>0.020</b> (0.009)
Origin: Political Freedom					-0.014 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.019 (0.012)	
Origin: Human Development Index					-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	
Origin: EU15+							-0.472 (0.406)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							0.183 (0.285)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							0.091 (0.277)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							-0.465 (0.363)	
Constant	<b>-2.228</b> (0.674)	-3.534 (2.349)	-3.661 (2.398)	-2.656 (2.531)	-4.023 (2.445)	-2.996 (2.915)	-2.858 (2.626)	<b>-4.915</b> (0.794)
$V_{0kl}$	0.088 (0.084)	0.030 (0.062)	0.016 (0.056)	0.000 (0.000)	0.042 (0.086)	0.007 (0.053)	0.000 (0.000)	0.038 (0.065)
$U_{0jkl}$	0.136 (0.141)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
-2LogLikelihood	765.958	668.536	763.414	646.627	574.772	510.604	505.209	564.185

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.

**Table 24 Coefficients (and standard errors) of the multi-level regression of highest level of education of female immigrants, N=1285 (table continues on next page)**


	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Mean education of female natives	<b>0.824</b> (0.177)	<b>0.692</b> (0.145)	<b>0.693</b> (0.141)	<b>0.687</b> (0.126)	<b>0.672</b> (0.149)	<b>0.693</b> (0.131)	<b>0.675</b> (0.128)	<b>0.686</b> (0.147)
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants	-0.072 (0.089)	-0.044 (0.079)	0.051 (0.120)	0.054 (0.120)	0.026 (0.120)	0.028 (0.120)	0.038 (0.120)	
One native, one immigrant parent	0.028 (0.088)	<b>-0.157</b> (0.078)	-0.140 (0.078)	-0.135 (0.078)	<b>-0.161</b> (0.078)	<b>-0.156</b> (0.078)	<b>-0.158</b> (0.078)	
Speaking minority language at home	<b>-0.244</b> (0.083)	-0.142 (0.073)	-0.141 (0.073)	-0.138 (0.073)	-0.135 (0.074)	-0.133 (0.074)	-0.135 (0.074)	
Citizenship of the destination country	<b>-0.156</b> (0.081)	-0.034 (0.072)	0.086 (0.112)	0.083 (0.112)	0.115 (0.112)	0.108 (0.112)	0.105 (0.112)	
Age		<b>0.098</b> (0.024)	<b>0.097</b> (0.024)	<b>0.096</b> (0.024)	<b>0.093</b> (0.024)	<b>0.093</b> (0.024)	<b>0.093</b> (0.024)	<b>0.090</b> (0.024)
Age2		<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)
Parental education		<b>0.269</b> (0.017)	<b>0.316</b> (0.026)	<b>0.314</b> (0.026)	<b>0.309</b> (0.026)	<b>0.307</b> (0.026)	<b>0.305</b> (0.027)	<b>0.286</b> (0.018)
Parental education imputed		-0.181 (0.117)	-0.175 (0.117)	-0.165 (0.117)	-0.182 (0.117)	-0.169 (0.117)	-0.174 (0.117)	
Number of children		<b>-0.075</b> (0.019)	<b>-0.073</b> (0.019)	<b>-0.072</b> (0.019)	<b>-0.071</b> (0.019)	<b>-0.071</b> (0.019)	<b>-0.069</b> (0.019)	<b>-0.077</b> (0.019)
No religion		-0.077 (0.068)	-0.072 (0.068)	-0.073 (0.068)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.067 (0.068)	
Islam		<b>-0.525</b> (0.121)	<b>-0.506</b> (0.121)	<b>-0.519</b> (0.120)	<b>-0.324</b> (0.136)	<b>-0.336</b> (0.136)	<b>-0.367</b> (0.137)	<b>-0.348</b> (0.132)
Religiosity		<b>-0.026</b> (0.012)	<b>-0.024</b> (0.012)	-0.023 (0.012)	-0.023 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.012)	
Intensity of religious practice		-0.019 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.021)	
Parental education * 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants			-0.038 (0.036)	0.041 (0.036)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.036)	<b>-0.054</b> (0.018)
Parental education * Citizenship of the destination country			-0.050 (0.036)	-0.050 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.048 (0.036)	-0.046 (0.036)	
Destination: Liberal welfare regime				0.183 (0.140)		0.126 (0.146)	0.100 (0.142)	
Destination: Conservative welfare regime				-0.088 (0.096)		-0.058 (0.099)	-0.048 (0.095)	
Destination: GINI coefficient				0.002 (0.012)		0.013 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	

**Table 24 (continued)**


	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
Origin: GDP per capita in 1000 ppp					0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)	
Origin: Net migration rate					0.017 (0.013)	0.016 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	
Origin: Human Development Index					0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	
Origin: Islamic country					<b>-0.249</b> (0.113)	<b>-0.222</b> (0.113)	<b>-0.232</b> (0.117)	<b>-0.315</b> (0.100)
Origin: EU15+							-0.176 (0.140)	
Origin: Neighbouring countries							-0.058 (0.091)	
Origin: Former colony/territory							-0.062 (0.093)	
Origin: Post-socialist countries							-0.157 (0.115)	
Constant	0.780 (0.478)	-0.989 (0.627)	-1.105 (0.623)	-1.156 (0.779)	-0.934 (0.652)	-1.356 (0.814)	-1.183 (0.795)	-1.119 (0.622)
Vokl	0.026 (0.021)	0.019 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.005 (0.008)	0.020 (0.014)	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	0.021 (0.014)
Uojkl	0.194 (0.043)	0.067 (0.022)	0.060 (0.021)	0.058 (0.021)	0.066 (0.022)	0.064 (0.022)	0.062 (0.021)	0.068 (0.023)
E0ijkl	0.952 (0.041)	0.768 (0.033)	0.768 (0.033)	0.770 (0.033)	0.757 (0.032)	0.759 (0.032)	0.758 (0.032)	0.768 (0.033)
-2LogLikelihood	3732.779	3392.761	3387.077	3382.276	3373.949	3369.402	3365.444	3393.915

Source: European Social Survey (2004), unweighted data.


**Figure 1 Differences in labour market participation between male and female natives and immigrants in the 13 EU countries**




**Figure 2 Differences in unemployment between male and female natives and immigrants in the 13 EU countries**



**Figure 3 Differences in occupational status (ISEI) of male and female natives and immigrants in the 13 EU countries**



**Figure 4 Differences in reaching the highest EGP class categories of male and female natives and immigrants in the 13 EU countries**



## Appendix

**Table I. Countries of Origin classified as Neighbouring Countries per Country of Destination**

<b>Country of Destination</b>	<b>Neighbouring Countries</b>
Austria	Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia
Belgium	France, The Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom
Germany	Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, The Netherlands, United Kingdom
Denmark	Germany, Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom
Spain	Portugal, France, Morocco
Finland	Sweden, Norway, Russian Federation, Estonia
France	Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
United Kingdom	Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway
Greece	Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Cyprus
Ireland	United Kingdom
Luxembourg	Belgium, Germany, France
The Netherlands	Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom
Portugal	Spain
Sweden	Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland



**Table II Correlations (Pearson's R) between the macro-indicators of the countries of origin, N=132**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
<b>1 Christian</b>	1										
<b>2 Islamic</b>	-.571**	1									
<b>3 Eastern Orthodox</b>	-.278**	-.169	1								
<b>4 Other non-Christian</b>	-.373**	-.226**	-.110	1							
<b>5 GDP per capita</b>	.373**	-.291**	-.055	-.109	1						
<b>6 GINI coefficient</b>	.032	.104	-.266**	.077	-.378**	1					
<b>7 Net migration rate</b>	-.025	-.049	-.060	.144	.271**	-.119	1				
<b>8 Political stability</b>	.368**	-.318**	-.052	-.062	.649**	-.337**	-.014	1			
<b>9 Human Development Index</b>	-.378**	.341**	-.091	.149	-.818**	.427**	-.266**	-.670**	1		
<b>10 Political rights</b>	-.521**	.526**	-.052	.089	-.681**	.252**	-.086	.617**	.725**	1	
<b>11 Civil rights</b>	-.518**	.508**	-.061	.116	-.723**	.281**	-.102	.653**	.741**	.969**	1
<b>12 Political freedom</b>	-.523**	.520**	-.049	.100	-.633**	.212*	-.092	.594**	.691**	.977**	.960**

**Table III Correlation (Pearson's R) between the macro-indicators of the countries of destination, N=13**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
<b>1 EII: Labour market inclusion</b>	<b>1</b>													
<b>2 EII: Long-term residence</b>	<b>.705**</b>	<b>1</b>												
<b>3 EII: Family reunification</b>	<b>.654*</b>	<b>.842**</b>	<b>1</b>											
<b>4 EII: Naturalization</b>	<b>.551</b>	<b>.555*</b>	<b>.698**</b>	<b>1</b>										
<b>5 EII: Anti-Discrimination</b>	<b>.850**</b>	<b>.577*</b>	<b>.674*</b>	<b>.524</b>	<b>1</b>									
<b>6 EII: Total</b>	<b>.913**</b>	<b>.846**</b>	<b>.875**</b>	<b>.716**</b>	<b>.891**</b>	<b>1</b>								
<b>7 Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	<b>-.030</b>	<b>-.260</b>	<b>-.072</b>	<b>.296</b>	<b>.130</b>	<b>-.001</b>	<b>1</b>							
<b>8 Social-Democratic Welfare Regime</b>	<b>-.171</b>	<b>-.154</b>	<b>-.273</b>	<b>-.441</b>	<b>-.118</b>	<b>-.232</b>	<b>-.182</b>	<b>1</b>						
<b>9 Conservative Welfare Regime</b>	<b>-.056</b>	<b>.248</b>	<b>.244</b>	<b>.095</b>	<b>-.105</b>	<b>.066</b>	<b>-.395</b>	<b>-.395</b>	<b>1</b>					
<b>10 Southern Welfare Regime</b>	<b>.238</b>	<b>.062</b>	<b>.007</b>	<b>.011</b>	<b>.114</b>	<b>.121</b>	<b>-.234</b>	<b>-.234</b>	<b>-.507</b>	<b>1</b>				
<b>11 EPL</b>	<b>.210</b>	<b>.432</b>	<b>.342</b>	<b>-.024</b>	<b>.054</b>	<b>.232</b>	<b>-.840**</b>	<b>-.041</b>	<b>.170</b>	<b>.564</b>	<b>1</b>			
<b>12 GDP per capita</b>	<b>-.427</b>	<b>-.465</b>	<b>-.289</b>	<b>.134</b>	<b>-.473</b>	<b>-.408</b>	<b>.132</b>	<b>.014</b>	<b>.324</b>	<b>-.508</b>	<b>-.666**</b>	<b>1</b>		
<b>13 GINI coefficient</b>	<b>.044</b>	<b>.050</b>	<b>.210</b>	<b>.175</b>	<b>.263</b>	<b>.164</b>	<b>.467</b>	<b>-.322</b>	<b>-.480</b>	<b>.444</b>	<b>-.076</b>	<b>-.567*</b>	<b>1</b>	
<b>14 Net migration rate</b>	<b>-.493</b>	<b>-.566*</b>	<b>-.354</b>	<b>.045</b>	<b>-.549</b>	<b>-.493</b>	<b>.128</b>	<b>-.164</b>	<b>.279</b>	<b>-.299</b>	<b>-.647*</b>	<b>.935**</b>	<b>-.413</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>15 Presence of Left-Wing Parties in Government</b>	<b>-.210</b>	<b>.226</b>	<b>-.017</b>	<b>-.196</b>	<b>-.183</b>	<b>-.089</b>	<b>-.433</b>	<b>.398</b>	<b>-.164</b>	<b>.224</b>	<b>.514</b>	<b>-.234</b>	<b>-.010</b>	<b>-.252</b>

**Table IV Variance components of the multilevel models for male immigrants with random effects**

	Randomized indicator	Country of Destination	Covariance with the intercept	Country of Origin	Covariance with the intercept
<b>Labour market participation</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	/	/	0.144 (0.155)	0.000 (0.000)
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.099 (0.113)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	/	/	0.052 (0.058)	-0.167 (0.168)
<b>Unemployment</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	Does not converge	n.a.
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	/	/	/	/
<b>ISEI</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	/	/	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	One native, one immigrant parent	/	/	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	/	/	/	/
<b>High EGP</b>	Intercept	0.063 (0.067)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	/	/
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	/	/	/	/
<b>Education</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.053 (0.021)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.003 (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	0.160 (0.066)	-0.160 (0.051)
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	/	/	0.112 (0.082)	0.047 (0.028)
	Citizenship	0.077 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.036)	0.053 (0.055)	-0.109 (0.052)
	Parental education	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	/	/

Note: In a number of cases, models did not converge after randomization. These are indicated with a bar, since no estimates of the variance components are available in these cases.

**Table V Variance components of the multilevel models for female immigrants with random effects**

	<b>Randomized indicator</b>	<b>Country of Destination</b>	<b>Covariance with the intercept</b>	<b>Country of Origin</b>	<b>Covariance with the intercept</b>
<b>Labour market participation</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.317 (0.269)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	/	/
<b>Unemployment</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	/	/
	Education	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<b>ISEI</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	1.609 (5.504)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	/	/
	One native, one immigrant parent	5.272 (7.037)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	/	/	/	/
<b>High EGP</b>	Intercept	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.	0.000 (0.000)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	/	/	/	/
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.227 (0.269)	0.000 (0.000)	/	/
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Education	/	/	/	/
<b>Education</b>	Intercept	0.004 (0.007)	n.a.	0.062 (0.021)	n.a.
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	0.006 (0.017)	0.002 (0.009)	0.095 (0.055)	-0.099 (0.040)
	One native, one immigrant parent	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Minority language	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
	Citizenship	/	/	0.016 (0.043)	-0.070 (0.042)
	Parental Education	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.012 (0.005)	-0.056 (0.018)

Note: In a number of cases, models did not converge after randomization. These are indicated with a bar, since no estimates of the variance components are available in these cases.

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