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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU)

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do
Governments Want? Country Report – Finland

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The objective of InDivEU is to maximize the knowledge of Differentiated Integration (DI) on the basis of a theoretically robust conceptual foundations accompanied by an innovative and integrated analytical framework, and to provide Europe's policy makers with a knowledge hub on DI. InDivEU combines rigorous academic research with the capacity to translate research findings into policy design and advice.

InDivEU comprises a consortium of 14 partner institutions coordinated by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, where the project is hosted by the European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP). The scientific coordinators of InDivEU are Brigid Laffan (Robert Schuman Centre) and Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zürich).

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Abstract

The results show that differentiated integration (DI) is a very low-salience issue in Finland. It has mainly appeared in parliamentary debates but almost never in government programmes, Prime Minister (PM) speeches or European Council statements. The salience of DI models has been highest during a few specific debates in the parliament. In general, Finnish politicians emphasised that the optimal solution in European integration would be to have all states on board but differentiated integration can be an option in order to move forward in certain fields. Finland has wanted to remain in core Europe and participate in all significant integration projects, including most forms of differentiated integration. During the period analysed since 2004, participation in the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seem to be the only DI instances that some politicians opposed. Usually, it has seemed self-evident that Finland is involved in new initiatives. In the case of PESCO, the Finnish government even took some credit for the launch of cooperation.

Keywords

differentiated integration, European Union, Finland, PESCO, enhanced cooperation

Summary of Results

I. Salience

The results show that differentiated integration (DI) is a very low-salience issue in Finland. It has mainly appeared in parliamentary debates but almost never in government programmes, Prime Minister (PM) speeches or European Council statements. The salience of DI models has been highest during a few specific debates, such as the Council presidency debate in 2006 and when discussing Prime Minister Juha Sipilä's announcement of changes in Finnish foreign and security policy and in European Union policy on 31 May 2017. Specific instances of DI have been mentioned more often than DI in general, but the instances have rarely been discussed in relation to DI. Treaty changes do not seem to have had an impact on salience, but the Future of Europe debate starting in 2017 may have resulted in more debate on DI in the Finnish Parliament. DI terms are very technical and do not have commonly used Finnish translations, which has made it difficult to find debates on DI. Simultaneously, the lack of references illustrates that DI is not a politically salient issue in Finland.

II. Position

In the period analysed, the government positions were mainly neutral. In general, Finnish politicians emphasised that the optimal solution would be to have all states on board but differentiated integration can be an option in order to move forward in certain fields. Finland has wanted to remain in core Europe and participate in all significant integration projects, including most forms of differentiated integration. During the period analysed since 2004, participation in the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seem to be the only DI instances that some politicians opposed. Usually, it has seemed self-evident that Finland is involved in new initiatives. In the case of PESCO, the Finnish government even took some credit for the launch of cooperation. This is remarkable for a non-NATO country which was initially wary of some aspects of the European Union (EU)'s Common Security and Defence Policy.

Politicians have not discussed DI models very often, except for the idea of a multi-speed Europe. The approaches to multi-speed integration have been mainly positive or neutral, since it allows moving forward with integration even when not everyone wants to participate. However, it has been considered important that DI remains open for all states to join at later stages. Enhanced cooperation and opt-outs have only been discussed in a few instances, perhaps because Finland itself does not have any opt-outs. With regard to DI instances, they have usually been viewed somewhat positively by both government and opposition parties. For example, PESCO was only opposed by one party, the Left Alliance.

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1. Introduction

This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Finnish government discourse between 2004 and 2019. It also probes into the position of Finnish governments on the issue of DI in selected peak-salience years (2006-2008, 2012-2014, 2017-2020).

The report distinguishes three levels of abstraction in government discourse on DI. **First**, two different models of DI are distinguished at the conceptual level. On the one hand, the ‘multi-speed EU’ model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. On the other hand, the ‘multi-end EU’ model depicts DI as a potentially permanent feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can ‘pick and choose’ to adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities. **Second**, the analysis focuses on DI mechanisms. On the one hand, the enhanced cooperation mechanism allows a limited group of MSs – under certain conditions – to pursue deeper integration without having to involve all the MSs. On the other hand, the ‘opt-out’ mechanism allows MSs to refrain from participating in common policies. In short, enhanced cooperation allows a MS to integrate more than other MS, while ‘opt-outs’ allow a Member State to integrate less than other MSs. **Finally**, the analysis looks at various instances of differentiated policies and policy fields. A total of twenty-one instances are included in the analysis. They are grouped in four different categories: (a) instances of enhanced cooperation; (b) instances of opt-out policy fields; (c) instances of inter se agreements; and (d) instances of external agreements. Inter se agreements are agreements which EU Member States conclude outside the framework of the European Union. External agreements are agreements between the EU and non-EU states.

The results are based on an analysis of various government documents (Appendix 1). The material analysed includes government programmes, Prime Minister speeches, Prime Minister European Council statements and parliamentary debates, and they were analysed in this order.

The salience of DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances is assessed by counting key words (Appendix 2) in the above-mentioned documents. The assumption is that the more a government talks about DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, analysis of parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks.

Since Finland has two official languages, all the key words were searched in the repository of the Finnish Parliament with both Finnish and Swedish equivalents. The key words were searched with the stem of the word, as both languages may have small variations at the end of the word depending on the conjugation of the word. The main problem encountered in the search was that the Finnish and Swedish equivalents are rarely used in political debates, perhaps due to their technicality. Sometimes, only one part of the key word was used in the search, such as ‘differentiated,’ which might have been used in connection with a word other than ‘integration.’ For some key phrases, both the acronym and the longer version were searched.

Regarding the government’s position, the results are based on a manual attitude analysis of parliamentary debates. To this end, references to DI key words in parliamentary debates were manually coded as negative, neutral or positive. The second section of the report details the results of the salience analysis. The third section details the results of the position analysis.

2. How salient is DI for Finnish governments?

2.1 Government programmes

Finnish government programmes from 2007 to 2019 were analysed using the English translations of the programmes. The computer-assisted analysis showed that none of the DI models were mentioned in the programmes and neither did they contain references to DI mechanisms (enhanced cooperation or opt-outs). There were only a few references to specific DI instances.

Regarding EU topics and DI instances, the computer-assisted analysis showed that Schengen was mostly discussed in the 2007 government programme, but also came up in the 2011 and 2019 programmes. However, none of the programmes referred to Schengen as a form of DI or discussed opt-outs. PESCO, in turn, only came up in the 2019 government programme, which is understandable given that it was only launched in 2017. Overall, there were very few references to DI instances. Although it seems that the 2017 government programme had the highest relative frequency of key words (see Appendix 3), it only contained one sentence that referred to Schengen: “Efforts will be made to intensify cooperation within the Schengen area to make it possible to file visa, work and residence permit applications with the consulate or embassy of any Schengen country.” PESCO, in turn, was only referred to in three consecutive sentences in the 2019 government programmes, and was cited as “a key project for the defence dimension of the EU.”

The key word count analysis further illustrated that the EU was often mentioned in the programmes, even more often than educational and social issues, for example (Appendix 4). The EU was most salient in the 2011 government programme, which was also the only government programme that had a specific reference to differentiated integration: “The government will consider projects with differentiated integration case by case. As a rule, Finland will continue to take part in the Union’s key projects as much as possible.” The government of the time was led by the pro-EU Coalition Party, but its term in office was preceded by an election that revolved around the management of the eurozone crisis and saw the Eurosceptic Finns party multiply its vote share. What is to be noted with regard to the two most recent government programmes is that they are identical. The second was issued after a change of Prime Minister.

These results were verified by a close reading of the respective documents. This qualitative analysis of the government programmes illustrated that even though there were some references to specific instances of differentiated integration, DI as such was only referred to in the 2011 government programme, as was mentioned above. It is not very surprising that DI was not discussed in the 2010 government programme, since it was only a four-page government statement by the new Centre Party leader and Prime Minister ahead of the 2011 election.

As was stated above, the EU in general was discussed in all the programmes. The 2007 programme of the government led by the Centre Party stated that “Finland is a proactive Member State of the European Union, functioning at the core of the Union’s reform process.” The EU was often referred to in the programme, but the section devoted to EU policy only filled one page of the 73-page document. At the time of the publication of the programme in spring 2007, the future of EU reform was somewhat unclear, as the constitutional treaty had been rejected and the new reform treaty had not yet been drafted. This may at least partly explain why the government did not discuss EU affairs at greater length.

The 2011 Coalition Party-led government, in turn, devoted approximately three pages of its 160-page programme to “Policy on Europe.” This government too emphasised that Finland is a proactive and “dynamic” Member State in the EU. In line with Finland’s long-standing position, the government emphasised the importance of the community method, arguing that it offers “the best means of securing stable and balanced operation of the Union and democracy.” Given that the programme was published in the midst of the financial crisis in spring 2011, and following an electoral battle in which the management of the eurozone crisis was a major issue, it paid much attention to eurozone issues. As a

member of the eurozone, Finland had a strong interest in protecting the euro. On the other hand, the government also referred to “Finland’s stricter line on how the eurozone’s financial crises are to be managed.” This meant, among other things, the collateral that only Finland demanded from both Greece and Spain in exchange for its participation in the bailout packages prepared for those countries. This stricter line was particularly pushed for by the Social Democratic Finance Minister, as the Social Democrats had lost a number of seats to the populist Finns party in the 2011 election and it also wanted to appeal to the more Eurosceptic voters. The 2011 government programme had the most references to the financial market, to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (Appendix 3).

The 2014 programme was again a short six-page programme due to the change of Prime Minister. It was a one-year government before the 2015 election and its programme was largely based on the 2011 government programme. There was only one sentence in the programme devoted to the EU: “Finland will contribute to the development of an [sic] EU recovering from economic crisis and to the next EU Commission work programme, with the priorities being competitiveness that supports economic growth, an improvement in employment and a Social Europe.”

While the 2015 centre-right government in power at the time, consisting of the Centre Party, the Finns Party and the Coalition Party, discussed EU affairs in its programme, it did so with a less pro-integrationist tone than its predecessors: “The European Union must focus on the most essential issues; it is not necessary to deepen integration in all policy areas.”

The 2019 government programme, in turn, put more emphasis on the EU. Eight pages were devoted to “Policy on Europe.” The programme defined five different objectives related to strengthening the EU and its role in different policy areas, the first one calling for “a strong, united and well-functioning EU.” Differentiated integration was not discussed, but the government stated that decision-making would primarily be based on the community method and that Finland was willing to examine “the feasibility of expanding the use of qualified decision-making in the Council.” The second objective was to develop the EU into “a global climate leader,” the third to make the Union “socially sustainable and egalitarian” and the fourth to ensure that the EU is “economically sustainable,” including by completing the Banking Union. In addition to the Banking Union, the programme also refers to other instances of differentiated integration, such as PESCO and Schengen under the fifth objective, which is a “safe and secure EU.” The programme declares that “Finland will contribute actively to the development of defence cooperation within the EU.” This is in line with the previous government’s position on PESCO and European defence cooperation.

In sum, differentiated integration seems to be a low-salience issue, although diverse EU matters were discussed in all the government programmes. Since 2011, government programmes have usually dealt with eurozone issues, Schengen is referred to in some of the programmes (although not in relation to opt-outs) and PESCO is mentioned in the most recent programmes. Finnish governments therefore seem to pay attention mainly to instances of differentiated integration in which the country is involved.

2.2 Key speeches by Prime Ministers

In the next step, speeches by Prime Ministers were analysed. The author looked at the first speeches of each Prime Minister in the Finnish Parliament and the first speeches during the Finnish presidencies of the EU Council in 2006 and 2019 in the Finnish and European parliaments. Differentiated integration was only discussed in the 2006 Council presidency speech and the subsequent debate in the Finnish Parliament. The 2006 presidency speech in the Finnish Parliament outlined that enhanced cooperation between certain groups of countries may be possible and necessary but emphasised that the Union should remain as united as possible and the Member States should be equal.

The Prüm Convention was mentioned eight times in the same speech, as the government parties and even the largest opposition party expressed support for participating in the Convention, which Finland

had not yet joined at the time. The government issued a proposal to join the Prüm Convention in March 2006, with the opposition Greens and the Left Alliance criticising the proposal (and eventually voting against it in February 2007). Only seven EU Member States were involved in establishing the Prüm Convention, and these two opposition parties criticised Finland for joining an already agreed arrangement among a few countries outside the EU structures. ‘Differentiate’ (*eriytyä*) was mentioned five times in the debate and eurozone (*euroalue*) three times. The eurozone was the only DI instance that was also mentioned in the 2019 presidency debate. Schengen, in turn, was referred to twice in the 2006 debate, where Schengen and the eurozone mainly served as examples of other DI instances in which Finland had participated, thus legitimating its participation in the Prüm Convention (Appendix 5). Turning to the first speech by the PM in the European Parliament during the Finnish Council presidency, there was one reference to opt-outs. However, differentiated integration as such was not discussed.

These results were verified through a close reading and holistic grading of the respective government programmes and speeches.¹ This test confirmed that the overall salience was very low, with a score of 0.214. The average of the positions in the three documents that had direct references to DI was 0.667, which is between negative and neutral. DI only came up in the 2011 government programme, in the 2006 presidency speech and in the subsequent debate in the Finnish Parliament. The conclusion that can be drawn at this point is that the salience of DI concepts was very low in all the material, but there were more references to specific instances of DI. In these documents, DI was more often mentioned in parliamentary debates than in speeches, and the only peak during the entire period was observed in 2006, mostly related to the preparation to join the Prüm Convention.

2.3 Parliamentary debates


Next, the author focused on the analysis of parliamentary debates from at least 2004 to 2020.² In some cases, key words were counted from 1994 onwards (Finland joined the European Union in 1995). The use of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates is visible in Figure 1. We can observe that conceptual key words related to DI models have been practically non-existent in parliamentary debates. We can see that 2017 was the absolute peak year, with multi-speed Europe coming up in several debates, but most references were made in a single debate held on 31 May 2017 after the Prime Minister’s announcement on EU policy as a result of the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe. Still, the fact that multi-speed Europe was referred to only fourteen times during the peak year suggests that concepts related to DI are very rarely discussed in the Finnish Parliament.

The low salience of DI is also reflected in the fact that the concepts do not have established translations and are not part of everyday political debate, even though politicians might *de facto* discuss differentiated integration. ‘Multi-speed Europe’ and ‘core Europe’ were the main key phrases used in the 2017 debates, together with a couple of references to ‘coalition of the willing’ and ‘Europe à la carte’. The figure illustrates that salience has been low throughout the period from 1994 onwards. Finland has usually considered it important to join instances of DI, even though it has emphasised that unity is always the preferred option and such instances must remain open to all willing Member States in all stages of development.

¹ Each document (n=28) was carefully read and scored between 0 (no reference to DI) and 2 (direct reference to DI). In addition, the position of the documents was evaluated as either 0 (negative), 1 (neutral) or 2 (positive).

² The data were gathered in March 2020.

Figure 1 - The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates




Over the entire period, ‘multi-speed Europe’ and ‘core Europe’ were the most often recurring key phrases, covering more than two thirds of all the conceptual key words. ‘Multi-speed Europe’ corresponds to the ‘multiple speeds’ model of DI and ‘core Europe’ belongs to the ‘multiple end points’ model. The peak-year breakdown illustrates that there was variation in the key words across the years 2003, 2017 and 2000. Whereas the most references in 2017 concerned ‘core Europe’ (n=16), almost an equally high number of references to ‘multi-speed Europe’ were found. However, in 2000 and 2003 not many references to ‘core Europe’ were made and the majority of the conceptual key words referred to multi-speed Europe. Interestingly, ‘differentiated integration’ as such was not mentioned in the 2017 or 2000 debates, but in 2003 there was one reference. While the ‘multiple speeds’ model has been salient throughout the period, the ‘multiple end points’ model has become more salient in recent years.

Next, the author checked whether there is a correspondence between the use of conceptual DI key words and debates on the ‘Future of Europe’ (FoE). This analysis showed two peaks: 2017 and 2012. Judging from the qualitative analysis, the 2017 debate on DI in the Finnish Parliament was to a large extent triggered by the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe, which was released in early March 2017 and discussed in the Finnish Parliament on 31 May 2017 after the Prime Minister’s announcement on foreign and security policy and EU policy. The 2012 peak in the FoE debate is probably attributable to debates on the future of the euro in the midst of the euro crisis (Appendix 7). Next, the author looked at specific DI mechanisms, namely enhanced cooperation and opt-outs (Figure 2). In Finland, opt-outs were barely mentioned and mainly with reference to the Irish and British opt-outs from certain fields. Enhanced cooperation was not much discussed either, but there were some references.³ In particular, there was a peak in the debate on enhanced cooperation in 2003 with 18 mentions. This was probably related to the Nice Treaty, which entered into force in 2003 and mainstreamed the procedure for enhanced cooperation. Overall, ‘enhanced cooperation’ or ‘opt-out’ were mentioned only 100 times in parliamentary debates. The breakdown into DI mechanisms clearly

³ While enhanced cooperation is a specific term in EU jargon, the Finnish and Swedish translations “tiiviimpi yhteistyö/fördjupat samarbete” are used in many other contexts and do not always refer to enhanced cooperation in the EU but to closer cooperation between any actors. Therefore, it was necessary to make sure that the references were made to the EU context.

shows that the vast majority of references dealt with enhanced cooperation; there were only 11 references to opt-outs in Finnish parliamentary debates.⁴

Figure 2 - The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates



Finally, the author looked at specific DI instances. When looking at instances of enhanced cooperation, the pattern becomes very clear (Figure 3). On the one hand, instances of enhanced cooperation show very low salience. On the other hand, more than three quarters of the references are related to PESCO, a project for which Finnish politicians took partial credit. PESCO was established in December 2017, and 2017 was unsurprisingly the peak year for references to it (28 of 39 references). The Financial Transaction Tax was also referred to a few times. Interestingly enough, the European Public Prosecutor was mentioned a few times in the early 21st century, in 2002 and 2006, when the constitutional treaty providing the basis for the prosecutor was being prepared. However, no references to the European Public Prosecutor were made in parliamentary debates after that. No other instances of enhanced cooperation were mentioned in parliamentary debates either, such as to the unitary patent or matrimonial property regimes.

⁴ Again, we need to remember that there is no established translation in Finnish for opt-out, which is why the English term 'opt-out' was used in the search. Other formulations of the concept of opt-out in Finnish are too complex to yield any results in the search in parliamentary debates.

Figure 3 - The salience of instances of enhanced cooperation in parliamentary debates



Regarding instances of opt-outs from different policy fields, we can observe in Figure 4 that these policy fields have been fairly often discussed during the past 16-year period. However, since Finland has not opted out from any policy field, the discussions did not relate to opt-outs (and even less so to the possibility of Finland opting out). Because only 11 references to opt-outs were made during the period, the opt-outs by the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland were also rarely referred to. Figure 4 illustrates that most references were made to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This related particularly to the financial crisis and the politicisation of the bailout packages in Finland, especially in the 2011 parliamentary election and in the subsequent parliamentary term. Security and Defence Policy was also fairly often referred to, highlighting the Finnish interest in advancing EU defence cooperation and in the establishment of PESCO. The Social Charter and Schengen were referred to from time to time, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights also came up a few times. However, perhaps also due to the clumsy formulation in Finnish and Swedish, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice was mentioned only nine times in parliamentary debates during the sixteen years analysed.

Figure 4 - Salience of opt-out policy fields






Figure 5 shows that inter se agreements peaked in 2012, when there were a total of 148 references to the European Stability Mechanism in Finnish parliamentary debates. This is again due to the financial crisis and the establishment of the ESM in late 2012. As was discussed above, the Prüm Convention aroused quite an active debate during its peak year 2006, when the Finnish government issued its proposal to join the Convention. The Prüm Convention also came up relatively often in the years immediately following the Finnish accession to the Convention in 2007, but no references were made after 2016. The Fiscal Compact was mostly discussed in 2012, when the government proposal on the compact was debated in the Parliament. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), in turn, had its peak in 2014, when the mechanism entered into force, but there have only been very few references to the SRM in other years. Finally, the Unified Patent Court (UPC) was only mentioned once in 2015 when the government proposal on approving the UPC agreement gained consent in Parliament. There was no debate on the proposal and the only reference to the UPC in plenary was in the presentation speech by the chair of the Commerce Committee, after which the Parliament approved the proposal.

Figure 5 - The salience of instances of inter se agreements in parliamentary debates



Finally, the analysis focused on four instances of external association agreements. Of these, the European Economic Area (EEA) accounted for 99 per cent of all mentions. The Eastern Partnership was mentioned eight times, Euromed three times and the Customs Union with Turkey only once. Figure 6 shows that external association agreements mostly referred to the EEA, concerning, e.g., the free movement rights of EEA nationals. One of the topics discussed was migration from outside EU/EEA countries, and a law was passed in 2016 obliging all higher education institutions to charge students coming from outside EU/EEA countries a tuition fee. Debates have also been held on the difficulties in recruiting employees from outside EU/EEA countries.

Figure 6 - Salience of external association agreements



2.4 European Council statements and government reports

The final step was to look at Prime Minister European Council statements between 2004 and 2020. Finnish Prime Ministers do not regularly make such statements, but nine of them were found in which the Prime Minister informed the parliament about the results of certain European Council meetings. Before and after the meetings of the European Council, the Prime Minister consults the Grand Committee of the Finnish Parliament on the issues on the agenda, but these statements are not publicly available. However, in these nine cases, the Prime Minister also made a public announcement to the entire Parliament.⁵ The use of DI key words was not very frequent in post-Council statements. We can observe that core (*ydin*) Europe was only used in 2010 and multi-speed (*eritahtinen*) Europe appeared in both the statements made in 2017. However, several instances of DI were discussed (Appendix 8). Overall, differentiated integration does not seem to be a key issue as such. Finland has been eager to join almost all instances of differentiated integration and DI has not caused much debate.

Last, this report looks at a range of other EU policy documents (group 7 in Appendix 1). These documents discussed DI surprisingly often. ‘Differentiate’ (*eriytyä*) was mentioned in the 2009, 2013 and 2018 reports, ‘multi-speed’ (*eritahti*) was referred to in 2009 and ‘enhanced’ (*tiiviimpi*) cooperation’ appeared in 2013 and 2018 reports. The 2013 report even referred to opt-outs and opt-ins, and mentioned permanent structured cooperation, which also came up in the 2017 and 2018 strategies. Schengen, in turn, was discussed in all strategies after the so-called migration crisis.

In terms of DI, the 2013 report was perhaps the most interesting one, as it included a separate 2-page section entitled “United Union,” which dealt with DI. It described three forms of DI with examples: 1) sector-specific cooperation with a smaller group of Member States (euro and Schengen), 2) opt-out models (Justice and Home Affairs) and 3) enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation (Matrimony, the Patent and the Financial Transaction Tax). Furthermore, the European Stability Mechanism, Euro Plus and the Fiscal Compact were mentioned as arrangements outside EU structures.

⁵ The latest statement was made on 22 November 2017 on current EU matters, including PESCO. Another statement was made in May 2017 about the Commission’s Future of Europe scenarios, and this was the parliamentary debate with the strongest focus on DI in the entire period. It seems that the Prime Minister provides such statements only on very important topics. The statements focused on Ukraine in 2014, on economic matters discussed at a summit in 2011, on the European stability package in 2010, on the results of the inter-governmental conference (Lisbon) in 2007, on current EU matters after a summit in Lahti in 2006, on the Northern Dimension in 2005 and on the summit agreeing on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004.

However, the approach to DI seems to have been consistent: unity is preferred, but DI arrangements open to all Member States may be used if necessary.

3. What positions do Finnish governments have on DI?

This section presents the positions of Finnish government and opposition parties on DI. It is based on parliamentary debates in 2006-2008, 2012-2014 and 2017-2020. The first subsection provides a quantitative overview of government and opposition positions divided into positive, negative and neutral statements. The second subsection consists in a qualitative assessment of statements by government and opposition politicians during the three periods with direct quotations (bold highlights by the author) and the original versions in footnotes. The qualitative analysis is chronologically structured.

3.1 Quantitative overview of government positions

The quantitative analysis regarding DI models shows that Finnish politicians have a rather positive or neutral approach to multi-speed Europe and coalitions of the willing, in which Finland has usually participated (Figures 7 and 8 below). The government is slightly more positive than the opposition, and the opposition mainly made neutral statements with regard to multi-speed Europe. When it comes to multi-end Europe, the situation is more divided, since there is a slightly higher number of negative statements than positive ones. In 2017, the negative statements by the opposition usually dealt with PESCO, which the opposition did not believe would take Finland into the core of Europe. Positive statements usually outlined that Finland wants to enter the core of Europe, but negative statements considered that there is a core Europe making decisions which Finland has little chance of influencing. Being in the core appeared positive and remaining outside was negative.

Figure 7 – Position on multi-speed Europe (multi-speed + coalition of the willing)

(n = 27)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government	3	3	6
Opposition	3	9	3
2006-2008	2	0	0
2012-2014	2	2	0
2017-2020	2	10	9

Figure 8 – Position on multi-end Europe (core Europe + à la carte)

(n = 22)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government	3	2	2
Opposition	6	3	6
2006-2008	1	1	2
2012-2014	1	0	0

Regarding DI mechanisms, the salience was very low (Figures 9 and 10 below). Enhanced cooperation was considered more positive by the government, which also referred to opt-outs in a neutral or positive manner. Some opposition politicians considered opt-outs negative in advancing legislative processes. Finland does not have any opt-outs, but it is active in enhanced cooperation instances. Both mechanisms aroused little debate during the periods analysed. In 2006-2008, enhanced cooperation was discussed

with regard to the Prüm Convention, and since 2017 there has been some debate on PESCO and the FoE.

Figure 9 – Position on enhanced co-operation

(n = 13)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n=8)	1	2	5
Opposition (n = 5)	4	1	0
2006-2008	2	2	1
2012-2014	2	0	2
2017-2020	1	1	2

Figure 10 - Position on "opt-outs"

(n = 6)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n = 3)	0	1	2
Opposition (n = 3)	2	1	0
2006-2008	0	2	0
2012-2014	0	0	1
2017-2020	2	0	1

3.2 Qualitative assessment of government positions

The qualitative analysis confirms the rather neutral approach to DI. Politicians usually mention that DI may sometimes be necessary but one should always aim at having all Member States on board. The three periods that were looked at in this section show that the debate on DI has often related to specific DI instances, but the Commission's White Paper on the Future of Europe in spring 2017 also initiated a more principled debate on DI and the Finnish approach to it. Most debate has been caused by the Prüm Convention and PESCO, which were both opposed by the Left Alliance in the Finnish Parliament. The Green Party also objected to Finland joining the Prüm Convention but has been positive towards PESCO. The incumbent government, which includes both parties, affirms a positive stance on PESCO in its government programme. In the Finnish case it is interesting that its Nordic neighbours, Sweden and Denmark, have been much more reluctant to join different integration projects or forms of DI. Neither are part of the eurozone, Denmark has opt-outs from key integration fields and has not joined the Prüm Convention, of which Sweden only became a member in 2013. Finland therefore stands out as the Nordic country that is most interested in participating in DI instances.

3.2.1 2006-2008 – The Prüm Convention and the Lisbon Treaty

Instead of only analysing the year 2008, the period from 2006 to 2008 was included in the analysis since Finnish politicians held a vivid debate especially on the Prüm Convention in 2006, when Finland also held the Council presidency. Towards the end of the period, the Lisbon Treaty also came up in debates on DI.

The government's position

Finland held the Council presidency during the second half of 2006, and Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) sometimes made principled statements on DI. For example, in the debate on 21 June 2006 on the upcoming Council presidency, Vanhanen defined the line that characterised the Finnish approach to DI throughout the period: DI is possible, but all Member States must remain equal. There was also some

debate on an interview with former Commission President Jacques Delors in the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs (*Ulkopolitiikka*), which the Prime Minister and many MPs referred to. Delors had stated that the enlarged Union should differentiate more, but Finnish politicians thought that all Member States were interested in all fields, “and that is how it should be.” PM Vanhanen recalled that all Member States had joined the Rapid Reaction Force (EU Battlegroups), but in fact Malta and Denmark remained outside. We can observe that the Prime Minister had a slightly negative approach to enhanced cooperation as he wanted all Member States to be involved:

“**Enhanced cooperation** among certain groups of countries is of course possible, and it may sometimes even be necessary. However, it is absolutely essential that one does not deliberately create members of **two or several tiers**. All the Member States of the Union must be equal also in the future.”⁶

“Perhaps the core message in the article on former Commission President Delors related to the assessment that the Union should differentiate in the future. With this **enhanced cooperation**, it is possible, but I have not heard a single proposal on the fields where this could take place, and I have not heard that there could be fields in which not everyone was interested. The previous time a serious debate in this regard was held related to the improvement of the Union’s crisis management capability. In the early phase of this debate, we heard addresses that those who are in a way capable of cooperating would form this. When we took practical actions, isn’t it so that all are practically involved, also in the Rapid Reaction Force. **And that is how it should be**” (Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre), 21.6.2006).⁷

This general government approach also came up in the debate on 8 November 2006 on the government proposal on the approval of the Prüm Convention. Justice Minister Leena Luhtanen (Social Democratic Party) stated that the Prüm Convention had not been prepared in accordance with the Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation but intergovernmentally, which was contrary to the general objectives of Finnish EU policy. However, she considered that this derogation from the Finnish line of promoting EU-level preparation was justified due to the benefits received from participation:

“A few words on the relation of the Prüm Convention to the general objectives in Finnish EU policy. We declared in our statement [by the Ministry of Justice] that the Prüm Convention has not been prepared in accordance with the provisions in the EU Treaties concerning **enhanced cooperation but intergovernmentally**, and this is where this preparation diverts from the general principles of Finnish EU policy. Because of this, the Ministerial Committee on EU Affairs, among others, has discussed and processed this issue several times, but has considered that the benefit received from joining the Convention in terms of promoting international cooperation by law enforcement authorities is greater than the possible damage caused by activities that are contrary to the principle assumed in Finnish EU policy” (Justice Minister Leena Luhtanen (SDP), 8.11.2006).⁸

⁶ Joidenkin maaryhmien tiiviimpi yhteistyö on toki mahdollista, ja se saattaa toisinaan olla jopa välttämätöntäkin. On kuitenkin aivan olennaista, ettei unioniin tahallaan synnytetä kahden tai useamman kerroksen jäseniä. Kaikkien unionin jäsenvaltioiden on tulevaisuudessakin oltava tasavertaisia.

⁷ *Komission entisen puheenjohtajan Delorsin mielenkiintoisen artikkelin ehkä ydinsanoma liittyi tähän arvioon siitä, että unionin pitäisi tulevaisuudessa eriytyä. Siihenhän on tämän tiiviimmän yhteistyön kautta mahdollisuus olemassa, mutta en ole juuri kuullut ainuttakaan esitystä siitä, millä aloilla tämä voisi tapahtua, varsinkaan, että löytyisi sellaisia aloja, joista kaikki itse asiassa eivät olisi kiinnostuneita. Edellisen kerranhan vakava tähän suuntaan oleva keskustelu liittyi unionin kriisinhallintavalmiuksien parantamiseen. Sen keskustelun alkuvaiheessa käytettiin puheenvuoroja siitä, että ikään kuin yhteistyöhön kykenevät muodostaisivat tämän. Sitten kun asiassa siirryttiin käytännön toimiin, onkohan niin, että kaikki ovat käytännössä mukana tässä, myös nopean toiminnan joukoissa. Ja näinhän sen pitää ollakin.*

⁸ *Muutama sana tästä Prümin sopimuksen suhteesta vielä Suomen EU-politiikan yleisiin tavoitteisiin. Tästähän totesimme lausunnossamme sen, että Prümin sopimusta ei todellakaan ole valmisteltu EU:n perustamissopimusten tiiviimpää yhteistyötä koskevien määräysten mukaisesti vaan hallitustenvälisesti, ja tässä tietysti tämä valmistelu poikkeaa Suomen EU-politiikan yleisistä tavoitteista. Tästä johtuen muun muassa EU- ministerivaliokunta on keskustellut ja käsitellyt tätä asiaa useaan kertaan, mutta se on katsonut niin, että sopimukseen liittymisestä saatava hyöty lainvalvontaviranomaisten kansainvälisen yhteistyön edistämiseksi on suurempi kuin mahdollinen Suomen omaksuman EU-politiikan periaatteen vastaisesta toiminnasta aiheutuva haitta.*

In the same debate, the Minister of the Interior from the same party also defended Finnish participation and considered that participating in the Prüm Convention took Finland into the core of internal security in the EU: “Finland reacting so fast has brought us among the **core and leading countries** in internal security” (Interior Minister Kari Rajamäki (SDP), 8.11.2006).⁹

A member of a small government Party (the Swedish People’s Party, SFP), however, was sceptical about Finland being able to reach the European core. She considered that decisions would be in the hands of the G6 group of Ministers of the Interior of the largest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK), and would have preferred the issue to be decided in the Justice and Home Affairs Council:

“But what I think is our common concern is that one says that by joining this Convention we reach the **core of decision-making**. Unfortunately, I do not believe it. We who follow EUObserver have been able to observe that at the end of October the six largest Member States of the EU discussed this agenda for Justice and Home Affairs and it was publicly stated on several occasions that it is the forum where one decides what goes forward and what does not” (MP Astrid Thors (SFP), 8.11.2006).¹⁰

The subsequent debate in which DI key words came up was when Prime Minister Vanhanen gave his first speech after the inauguration of his second cabinet on 24 April 2007. He again referred to Finland being in the core of the Union’s reform and stated that the government would support a reform of the Treaties on the basis of the negotiated Constitutional Treaty. Finland ratified the Constitutional Treaty in December 2006 despite the fact that the French and Dutch citizens had rejected the Treaty in their mid-2005 referenda. Vanhanen also referred to the Union as an economic, political and security community: “Finland is a proactive and active Member State of the European Union, operating in the **core of the Union’s reform**” (Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre), 24.4.2007).¹¹

On 10 April 2008, Prime Minister Vanhanen presented the government proposal on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. He did not take a stance on DI but just mentioned that the Treaty included provisions on enhanced cooperation: “Compared to the Constitutional Treaty, the **Lisbon Treaty** includes strengthened provisions on the emergency brake concerning Justice and Home Affairs and **on enhanced cooperation**, but these specifications do not change the basic solutions” (Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre), 10.4.2008).¹²

Astrid Thors, who in 2006 had criticised Prime Minister Vanhanen for his unclear line concerning European cores, had become Migration and Europe Minister by 2008. This time she answered an MP’s question (see the next section) on Ireland and the UK’s opt-outs, emphasising that they did not jeopardise what was agreed in common: “You [MP Kiuru] also presented a very difficult question on the impact of **Ireland and the UK’s opt-outs**. They can have an impact in the sense that they **postpone** the time when these issues that are part of Justice and Home Affairs come under the supervision of the Courts of Justice of the European Communities” (Migration and Europe Minister Astrid Thors (SFP), 10.4.2008).¹³

⁹ *Se, että Suomi reagoi näin nopeasti, on nostanut meidät aivan sisäisen turvallisuuden ytimen ja kärkimaiden joukkoon.*

¹⁰ *Mutta se, mikä mielestäni on yhteinen huolestumme, on se kun sanotaan, että liittymällä tähän sopimukseen päästään päätöksenteon ytimeen. Valitettavasti en usko sitä. Me, jotka seuraamme EUobserveria, olemme voineet todeta, että lokakuun lopulla EU:n kuusi suurinta jäsenvaltiota keskustelivat tästä oikeus- ja sisäasioiden asialistasta ja tässä on julkisesti ja monessa yhteydessä todettu, että se on se foorumi, jossa päätetään, mikä menee eteenpäin ja mikä ei.*

¹¹ *Suomi on aloitteellinen ja aktiivinen Euroopan unionin jäsenmaa, joka toi- mii unionin uudistamisen ytimessä.*

¹² *Perustuslakisopimukseen verrattuna Lissabonin sopimus sisältää vahvistettuja säännöksiä oikeus- ja sisäasioita koskevasta hätäjarrusta sekä tiiviimmästä yhteistyöstä, mutta nämä tarkennukset eivät muuta perusratkaisuja.*

¹³ *Esititte myöskin erittäin vaikean kysymyksen, miten Irlannin ja brittien opt-outit vaikuttavat. Ne voivat vaikuttaa siinä mielessä, että ne siirtävät sitä, milloin nämä asiat, jotka kuuluvat oikeus- ja sisäasioihin, tulevat Euroopan yhteisöjen tuomioistuimen valvottaviksi.*

The final mention of DI by a government party representative in 2008 was in the same debate when an MP presenting the group speech of the Coalition Party supported Finland being in the core of the Union's reform. He used a formulation very similar to Prime Minister Vanhanen's first speech quoted above, calling for Finland to be "active and reactive, a Member State that operates in the **core of the Union's reform**" (MP Eero Akaan-Penttilä (Coalition), 10.4.2008).¹⁴ It seems that at least the government parties of the time shared this vision of Finland's role.

The opposition's position

Interestingly, it seems to be the Prime Minister and other ministers and representatives of government parties that brought up DI in parliamentary debates in the first period. As has already been mentioned, the Left Alliance and the Greens voted against Finland's participation in the Prüm Convention, but this was rarely done with reference to DI. The debate on the Finnish EU presidency in 2006 was one instance in which an opposition MP seemed to refer to enhanced cooperation and a coalition of the willing, even though these concepts lack clear translations in Finnish:

"If one develops more models resembling the Prüm Convention, when one makes intergovernmental agreements, I claim that this contributes to whittling away at the European Union. It can be that on some issues certain countries can launch **enhanced cooperation**, if not everyone is **willing**, but it must not be the main rule. The main rule should be strengthening communality" (MP Outi Ojala (Left), 21.6.2006).¹⁵

The other reference by an opposition representative was in a question by MP Krista Kiuru to whom Minister Thors answered in the quotation referred to above. MP Kiuru did not take a stance on DI, but wanted to know what the effects of the Lisbon Treaty were, including Ireland and the UK's opt-outs:

"I myself believe that the Lisbon Treaty is necessary and it would now be important to think about the issues open to interpretation, for which I would like to hear the minister's stance. First of all, will Slovakia's December ratification decision impact the schedule? How does the Finnish government approach the issue of representation when the Council for General Affairs and External Relations is split in two? Who will be the Finnish representative in these councils and what sort of a role will these councils have? Then I would like to ask: What do these **opt-outs** received by the Irish and the Brits mean in practice?" (MP Krista Kiuru (SDP), 19.4.2008).¹⁶

3.2.1 2012–2014 – The financial crisis and little debate on differentiated integration

There was not much debate about DI in Finland in 2012, which is interesting in the sense that in this period many measures regarding the eurozone were adopted. However, Finnish politicians did not discuss them in relation to DI, but it did come up mainly in 2013 and 2014.

The government's position

On 2 May 2012, there was a debate on how the Lisbon Treaty had impacted Common Foreign and Security Policy. The parliament's Committee for Foreign Affairs had a critical view of the EU's external

¹⁴ *aktiivinen ja aloitteellinen, jäsenmaa, joka toimii unionin uudistamisen ytimessä.*

¹⁵ *Jos yhä enemmän kehitetään Prümin sopimuksen tyypisiä malleja, jolloin tehdään hallitustenvälisiä sopimuksia, niin väitän, että se omalta osaltaan nakertaa Euroopan unionia. Voi olla, että joissakin asioissa tietyt maat voivat lähteä nopeampaan etenemiseen, jos kaikki eivät ole halukkaita, mutta se ei saa olla pääsääntö. Pääsääntönä pitää olla yhteisöllisyyden vahvistaminen.*

¹⁶ *Itse uskon ainakin, että Lissabonin sopimusta tarvitaan, ja sopimuksessa nyt olisi tärkeintä pohtia vielä niitä avoimia tulkittavia asioita, joihin haluaisin nyt ministerinkin kannan. Ensinnäkin, tuleeko tämä Slovakian joulukuinen ratifiointipäätös vaikuttamaan tähän aikatauluun? Miten sitten suhtautuu Suomen hallitus tähän edustukseen, kun ulkosuhteiden ja yleisten asioiden neuvosto jakautuu kahtia? Kuka Suomesta jatkossa edustaa näissä neuvostoissa, ja minkälainen rooli näillä neuvostoilla tulee olemaan? Sitten kysyisin vielä: Mitä nämä irlantilaisien ja brittien saamat opt-outit käytännössä tarkoittavat?*

action in its report issued to the parliament. MP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, chair of the Grand Committee dealing with EU affairs, considered that the Union was operating normally, although the financial crisis dominated the media. She also deemed it important to have a clear position on a multi-speed Europe:

“But these decisions on the measures that are proposed are also important to take into account in their entirety because there will be **multi-speed development** in different sectors, and what is Finland’s position in this new kind of Europe? I am happy that we are seeking legitimacy in the EU’s operation, but my view was a bit different to the committee report’s on the EU’s internal state” (MP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri (SDP), 2 May 2012).¹⁷

The debates in which DI came up in 2013 and 2014 were the preliminary and the actual debates on the government report on EU policy issued in 2013. For example, an MP from the Coalition party stated in the preliminary debate on 19 June 2013 that “Finland’s possibilities to influence are only safeguarded with **enhanced cooperation** and active participation.”¹⁸ In the actual debate after committees had issued their reports and statements on 12 February 2014, the Prime Minister from the same party noted that “We need **enhanced cooperation** also in controlling the EU borders and in tackling international criminality.”¹⁹

The opposition’s position

The chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Timo Soini (Finns party), presented a report by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 2 May 2012 which had a critical approach to the state of affairs of European Union external relations. The committee considered that Finland should assess the added benefit of PESCO since multi-speed development was likely in security and defence policy:

“The Committee considers that Europe must take more responsibility for its security. Pressure for cooperation is increased by the reduction in defence budgets and the shift of US interest towards Asia and the apparent willingness to transfer regional responsibility for security towards Europe. The Committee deems that Finland should assess the added value of structured cooperation and the need to participate in the changing security environment since **multi-speed development** is also likely in security and defence policy” (MP Timo Soini (Finns), 2 May 2012).²⁰

A similar reference was made by a Centre MP in a debate on influence in the future European Commission programme: “The Foreign Affairs Committee has noted these issues and the Committee has stated that the EU has become, through political compromises, a community the current operation of which is characterised by **multi-speed** operation and emphasis on national interests.”²¹

¹⁷ *Mutta nämä toimenpidepäätökset, mitä tässä esitetään, on kyllä myös tärkeitä ottaa kokonaisuudessa huomioon, sillä eritahtista kehitystä tulee useillakin sektoreilla, ja mikä on se Suomen asemointi tällaisessa uudenlaisessa Euroopassa, siitä olen iloinen, että legitimeettiä täälläkin haetaan EU:n toimintaan, mutta minun käsitykseni oli hieman eri kuin valiokunnan mietinnön tästä EU:n sisäisestä tilasta*

¹⁸ *Suomen vaikutusmahdollisuudet turvataan vain tiiviillä yhteistyöllä ja aktiivisella osallistumisella.*

¹⁹ *Tarvitsemme tiiviimpää yhteistyötä myös EU:n rajojen valvonnassa ja kansainvälisen rikollisuuden torjunnassa.*

²⁰ *Valiokunta katsoo, että Euroopan on otettava yhä enemmän vastuuta omasta turvallisuudestaan. Yhteistyöpaineita lisäävät puolustusbudjettien pieneneminen ja Yhdysvaltojen kiinnostuksen siirtyminen Aasiaan ja ilmeinen halu siirtää alueellista turvallisuusvastuuta Eurooppaan. Valiokunta katsoo, että Suomen tulee arvioida rakenteellisen yhteistyön lisäarvoa ja osallistumistarvetta muuttuvassa turvallisuusympäristössä, koska myös turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikassa eritahtinen kehitys on todennäköistä.*

²¹ *Ulkoasiainvaliokunta on huomauttanut näistä asioista, ja ulkoasiainvaliokunta totesikin, että EU:sta on tullut poliittisten kompromissien kautta yhteisö, jonka nykyistä toimintaa kuvaa eritahtisuus ja kansallisten intressien korostuminen.*

3.2.3 2017-2020: PESCO, Brexit and the Future of Europe

The government's position

In recent years, the Prime Minister and other ministers have been vocal about DI, especially before the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation. On 8 March 2017, Prime Minister Sipilä (Centre Party) discussed PESCO in the debate on the Finnish White Paper on defence policy:

“I think it is extremely important to reach a consensus at a high level with all the EU countries, including on Permanent Structured Cooperation. But it can include modules where there is **differentiated development** so that **willing Member States** participate in this differentiated development. The committees in question have received an e-letter which describes these titles and what they include. We constantly work at the level of officials to reach these contents, because we aim to make decisions at the June European Council” (Prime Minister Juha Sipilä (Centre), 8.3.2017).²²

In March 2017, PM Sipilä also presented his process chart on the EU's future, which he introduced to other EU leaders in a 10 March 2017 informal meeting. An English translation of the description of the process can be found in Appendix 9.

The most vivid debate on DI in the entire period analysed was on 31 May 2017, when the government also discussed the different scenarios presented by the Commission in its White Paper on the Future of Europe. For example, the Prime Minister presented the Finnish stance on differentiated integration, which was very similar to that presented by Prime Minister Vanhanen more than ten years before:

“The European Union should be primarily developed by cherishing unity. If necessary, **multi-speed advancement in the Union** is also possible. In these situations too, Treaty provisions must be adhered to and the doors must be kept open for all Member States and at all stages of development. Finland participates in all essential EU projects when it is justifiable in terms of our national interest and influence. Discretion is always case-specific, and so far Finland has participated in all of these” (Prime Minister Juha Sipilä (Centre), 31.5.2017).²³

Prime Minister Sipilä presented several other views on DI in the same debate. One issue discussed was the allegedly differing views of the three government parties: the Centre, the Coalition Party and the Finns party. A member of the Finns party declared that the views of the parties were not that different since the Centre Party had also declared that it did not accept a federalist development. A few weeks after the debate, the Finns party voted on a new chair of the party, which resulted in the party splitting in half: a more radical wing became an opposition party and a more moderate wing remained in the government under the new party name, “Blue Reform.”

The subsequent debate on PESCO was held on 22 November 2017 in conjunction with the Prime Minister's announcement on current EU issues. The Prime Minister again outlined the Finnish position on DI, which he claimed had become the EU's common line:

“The middle way line we promoted not only became Finland's but entire Europe's line. We have paved the way for the EU to develop as a united and more effective community that focuses on the

²² *Minusta se on äärimmäisen tärkeää, että päästään yltäasolla tästä kaikkien EU-maiden kanssa yhteisymmärrykseen, myöskin pysyvistä rakenteellisesta yhteistyöstä. Mutta sitten tämän sisällä voi olla moduleja, joissa on eriytyvääkin kehitystä sillä tavalla, että halukkaat jäsenmaat osallistuvat tähän eriytyvään kehitykseen. Asianomaiset valiokunnat ovat tästä saaneet E-kirjeen, jossa on kerrottu nämä otsikot ja mitä niiden alla on. Me teemme koko ajan virkamiestyönä syventävää työtä näitten sisältöjen aikaansaamiseksi, koska kesäkuun Eurooppa-neuvostossa on tarkoitus sitten tehdä asiasta päätöksiä.*

²³ *Euroopan unionia on kehitettävä ennen kaikkea yhtenäisyyttä vaalien. Tarvittaessa unionissa voidaan kuitenkin edetä myös eritahtisesti. Niissäkin tilanteissa on noudatettava perussopimusten määräyksiä ja pidettävä ovet auki kaikille jäsenvaltioille ja kehityksen kaikissa eri vaiheissa. Suomi on mukana kaikissa olennaisissa EU-hankkeissa silloin, kun se on maamme edun ja vaikutusvallan kannalta perusteltua. Harkinta tehdään aina tapaus- kohtaisesti, ja tähän saakka Suomi on kaikissa näissä ollut mukana.*

essential. **We permit multi-speed development** when certain preconditions are fulfilled. **Finland is currently involved in all the models of multi-speed development.** Decisions on participation are always made individually, starting with the common interest of both Finland and the Union. Development in which a small group of countries makes decisions is not in the interest of the European Union or of Finland. In the latest European Council, on a tight schedule we gathered a group of eight countries to defend a united Europe. With the lead of President of the European Council Tusk, this also became the commonly accepted line” (Prime Minister Juha Sipilä (Centre), 22.11.2017).²⁴

Interestingly, there was one event in which a member of a government party proposed that Finland should have an opt-out related to the implementation of the Working Time Directive. An MP from the Blue Reform party regarded it as essential for healthcare in a debate on 3 October 2018 on the government proposal for the Working Time Act: “In order to be able to ensure certain special health care services in the future, Finland should also permit the use of a so-called limited **opt-out**. It means that one could deviate from the maximum working times in the **Working Time Directive** with an agreement between the employer and employee with the preconditions mentioned in the directive” (MP Lea Mäkipää (Blue Reform), 3.10.2018).²⁵

The latest reference to DI by a government party was in December 2018, when an MP considered Brexit a reason for enhanced cooperation on defence. She also stated that enhanced cooperation would not mean a European army: “There has even been a debate on establishing a European army, but in practice the proposed **enhanced cooperation** will probably mean common exercises by national defence and military forces, joint material procurement and a common industrial policy” (MP Pia Kauma (Coalition), 12.12.2018).²⁶

The opposition's position

As is visible in the tables presented at the beginning of this section, the opposition has been more vocal on DI in recent years. In the debate on the White Paper on Defence Policy in March 2017 referred to above, an MP from the Greens deemed it positive that Finland was involved in the European core: “I was also pleased to hear the Prime Minister tell how strongly Finland has committed to developing a **common defence policy of the EU**. It is important that we are strongly involved in all these **cores**” (MP Johanna Karimäki (Greens), 8.3.2017).²⁷

On 28 April 2017, two Social Democratic MPs took up DI in a debate on a government proposal on the European Small Claims Procedure and the European order for payment procedure. They called for a general debate on the Future of Europe already before the scheduled debate on 31 May, in the light of the Commission's five scenarios. They wanted to know if Finland wanted to be in the core of Europe and if there could be multi-speed integration, and used several conceptual key words:

²⁴ *Ajamastamme keskitien linjasta ei tullut vain Suomen vaan koko Euroopan yhteinen linja. Olemme raivanneet tietä, jota kulkien EU voi kehittyä yhtenäisenä, entistä tehokkaampana, olennaiseen keskittyvänä yhteisönä. Sallimme eritahtisen kehityksen tiettyjen reuna ehtojen täytyessä. Suomi on tällä hetkellä mukana kaikissa eritahtisen kehityksen muodoissa. Päätökset niihin menosta teemme aina yksitellen lähtökohtana sekä Suomen että unionin yhteinen etu. Kehitys, jossa pienellä maajoukolla tehtäisiin päätöksiä, ei ole Euroopan unionin eikä Suomen etu. Viime Eurooppa-neuvostossa kokosimme nopealla aika- taululla kahdeksan maan joukon puolustamaan yhtenäistä Eurooppaa. Tämä tuli Eurooppa-neuvoston puheenjohtajan Tuskin johdolla myös yhteisesti hyväksytyksi toimintalinjaksi.*

²⁵ *Jotta tietyt erikoissairaanhoidopalvelut voidaan jatkossa turvata, tulisi myös Suomessa sallia rajattu niin sanotun opt-out-järjestelmän käyttö. Siinä työaikadirektiivin enimmäistyöaajoista saadaan poiketa työnantajan ja työntekijän välisin sopimuksin direktiivissä määritellyn reunaehdoin.*

²⁶ *On puhuttu jopa eurooppalaisen armeijan perustamisesta, mutta käytännössä ehdotettu tiiviimpi yhteistyö tulee todennäköisesti tarkoittamaan kansallisvaltioiden puolustus- ja sotilasvoimien yhteisiä harjoituksia, yhteisiä materiaalihankintoja sekä yhteistä teollisuuspolitiikkaa.*

²⁷ *Pidin hyvänä myös sitä, kun pääministeri kertoi, kuinka vahvasti Suomi on sitoutunut EU:n yhteisen puolustuspolitiikan kehittämiseen. On tärkeää, että olemme mukana vahvasti kaikissa näissä ytimissä.*

“In addition, what I have thought of a lot is this comprehensive debate, whether we enter all the **cores** and how deeply and in which fields and whether there can be **multi-speed development** and so on” (MP Pia Viitanen (SDP), 28.4.2017).²⁸

“Namely, one could think that now that the Commission has published its roadmap alternatives, these five alternatives on developing the Union, and if we chose one alternative, this Europe of **concentric circles**, where one could choose how deep cooperation one wants, that would also impact the legislative proposals such as the current one under debate. This means that one does not have to take the whole **à la carte** list at once but one could choose which choices to use from the **à la carte** list. [...] It is possible that some of the countries in the **Economic and Monetary Union**, for example Germany and France, would take the route of **enhanced cooperation** to which MP Viitanen referred to before” (MP Eero Heinäluoma (SDP), 28.4.2017).²⁹

The debate these MPs had waited for arrived on 31 May 2017. Whereas the government spoke mainly through the Prime Minister (the debate was based on an announcement by the Prime Minister), various opposition MPs took the opportunity to present their views on differentiated integration in their group presentations. They insisted on Finnish influence and were worried that some countries would steer integration too heavily:

“It is important to anticipate future developments. If integration shifts towards **multi-speed Europe**, Finland will have to aim to **influence at all the tables**” (MP Jutta Urpilainen (SDP), 31.5.2017).³⁰

“During Lipponen’s term as Prime Minister, we actively found our way to the **core Europe**. We understood that we can be more together. We need this understanding again. Finnish EU policy is not guided by process mapping or by flirting with **EU exit** on the government’s side. We cannot drift like driftwood, we need to actively influence the EU” (MP Krista Mikkonen (Greens), 31.5.2017).³¹

“In Finland’s active EU policy, Germany has had and still has an important role. The leader of Finnish EU policy, Prime Minister Sipilä, has expressed his satisfaction with our vision of the Union’s future being **consistent with that of Germany** and with both countries having a similar approach to the possibilities of deepening **multi-speed cooperation in certain fields** (MP Stefan Wallin (SFP), 31.5.2017).³²

“The model of deepest integration will not pass in the Member States. That is why the Commission promotes a combination of different scenarios and especially scenario number three in which the so-called **willing countries** advance faster than others in integration. The top of the federalist development will inevitably be formed by a **coalition of several euro countries led by Germany**

²⁸ *Samoin se, mikä itseäni valtavasti on mietityttänyt, on juuri tämä keskustelu kokonaisuudessaan, menemmekö niihin ytimiin ja kuinka syvälle ja millä osa-alueilla, ja voiko olla eritahtista kehitystä ja niin pois päin.*

²⁹ *Nimittäin tämän voi ajatella näinkin, että kun nyt komissio on julkistanut omat reittikartta- vaihtoehtonsa, nämä viisi vaihtoehtoa unionin kehittämisestä, niin jos niistä valittaisiin yksi vaihtoehto, tämä eri kehien Eurooppa, jossa on mahdollisuus valita, kuinka syvälliseen yhteistyöhön lähtee, niin sillä olisi vaikutus myös tämäntyyppisiin, nyt käsitellyssä oleviin lakiehdotuksiin. Eli ei ole pakko ottaa sitä koko à la carte -listaa kerralla, vaan sieltä à la carte -listalta voi todellakin tehdä valintoja, mitä haluaa käyttää. [...] Siinähan on koko ajan auki se kehitys, että osa talous- ja rahaliiton maista, esimerkiksi Saksa ja Ranska, lähtisivät tiiviimmän yhteistyön kehittämisen tielle, johon vähän tässä edellä edustaja Viitanenkin puuttui.*

³⁰ *Tulevan kehityksen ennakointi on tärkeää. Mikäli integraatio liukuu kohti eritahtista EU:ta, Suomen on pyrittävä vaikuttamaan kaikissa pöydissä.*

³¹ *Lipposen pääministerikaudella hakeuduimme aktiivisesti Euroopan ytimeen. Ymmärsimme, että yhdessä voimme olla enemmän. Tätä ymmärrystä tarvitaan jälleen. Suomen EU-politiikkaa ei johdeta prosessikaavioilla eikä hallituksen sisäältä EU-erolla flirttailemalla. Emme voi ajalehtia kuin ajopuu, meidän on aktiivisesti vaikutettava EU:n suuntaan.*

³² *Suomen aktiivisessa EU-politiikassa Saksalla on ollut ja on tärkeä rooli. Suomen EU-politiikan johtaja, pääministeri Sipilä, on ilmaissut tyytyväisyytensä siitä, että meidän näkemyksemme unionin tulevaisuudesta on saksalaisten kanssa yhtenevä ja että molemmat maat suhtautuvat samoin eritahtisen yhteistyön syventämisen mahdollisuuksiin eräillä alueilla.*

and France. This is what it is about when one promotes multi-speed integration and more qualified majority voting (MP Sari Essayah (Christian Democrats), 31.5.2017).³³

After a couple of weeks, on 15 June 2017, there was a debate on the Annual Report of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council supervising the Bank of Finland. An MP from the Social Democrats concerned over shared responsibility took up the issue of DI with regard to EMU:

“And when it comes to this economic side, this came up a bit already in the question hour when Minister Terho was asked whether something has been agreed, when there is a constant debate in Europe on the future of EMU and whether the future will lead to **enhanced cooperation**, more towards shared responsibility for debts, for example, towards a more shared finance policy. Major questions, but I do not support this development where we strongly enter these **cores**” (MP Pia Viitanen (SDP), 15.6.2017).³⁴

In a debate on current EU issues announced by the Prime Minister on 22 November 2017, a few opposition politicians took the opportunity to criticise the unclear approach to DI and the lack of leadership in Finnish EU policy:

“You, Prime Minister, simultaneously talked about unity and gave your support for **multi-speed development**” (MP Tytti Tuppurainen (SDP), 22.11.2017).³⁵

“A central question in this debate is national sovereignty and maintaining it. You use big words about tables where decisions are made and **cores are to be entered**. But the fact is that we have an infinitesimal role in deciding the direction of the EU” (MP Jani Mäkelä (Finns), 22.11.2017).³⁶

The last debate in which DI was referred to was held on 7 March 2019 and concerned an oral question to the Prime Minister on improving the situation of nurses. This was another case in which opt-outs were discussed with regard to the Working Time Directive, this time from a negative perspective, claiming opt-outs make it difficult to pass legislation:

“I must say that while it was in the European Parliament this Working Time Directive was in a sort of permanent stalemate. This means that one stated in different ways that it did not move forward because Member States had so many so-called **opt-outs which related to this Working Time Directive**. For example, **the UK systematically opted out** from the entire Union, but already at the time it stated on these working time provisions that they do not apply to it” (MP Sari Essayah (Christian Democrats), 7.3.2019).³⁷

Opposition politicians generally called for a clear Finnish stance on the future of Europe and DI. At the same time, they expressed certain doubts about whether Finland was in the core of Europe and able to influence the development of the EU. There were fears that if DI became more common it would mean

³³ *Syvimmän integraation malli ei toki mene jäsenvaltioissa läpi. Siksi komissio ajaa eri skenaarioiden yhdistelmää ja erityisesti skenaariota numero kolme, jossa niin kutsutut halukkaat maat etenevät yhdyntymisessä muita nopeammin. Liittovaltiokehityksen kärjeksi muodostuu väistämättä Saksan ja Ranskan johtama useiden euromaiden koalitio. Tästä on kyse, kun ajetaan eritahtisuutta ja lisääntyviä määränenemmistöpäätöksiä.*

³⁴ *Ja nyt mitä tulee sitten tähän talouspuoleen, niin tähän tuli jo hieman siellä kyselytunnilla esille, kun ministeri Terholta kysyttiin tätä, onko nyt sovittu jotain sitten siihen liittyen, kun Euroopassa nyt kuitenkin koko ajan käydään keskustelua Emun tulevaisuudesta ja siitä, mennäänkö tulevaisuudessa myös tässä suhteessa tiiviimpään yhteistyöhön, enemmän kohti yhteisvastausta veloista, esimerkiksi kohti yhteisempää finanssipolitiikkaa. Valtavan isoja kysymyksiä, ja itse en kannata tämänkaltaista kehitystä, että mennään tällaisiin ytimiin vahvasti mukaan.*

³⁵ *Te, pääministeri, samaan aikaan sekä puhutte yhtenäisyydestä että annoitte tukenne unionin eritahtiselle kehitykselle.*

³⁶ *Keskeinen kysymys tässä keskustelussa on kansallinen suvereniteetti ja sen säilyttäminen. Täällä puhutaan suuria pöydistä, joissa päätetään, ja ytimistä, joihin mennään. Mutta tosiasia on se, että me päätämme kuitenkin häviävän pieneltä osin, mikä on EU:n suunta.*

³⁷ *täytyy sanoa, että Euroopan parlamentissa ollessani tämä työaikadirektiivihän oli tällainen ”kestojumi”. Elikk se siis milloin missäkin muodossa aina todettiin, että se ei vain mene eteen- päin, koska jäsenvaltioilla oli niin paljon erilaisia, [Puhemies koputtaa] niin sanottuja opt-outteja, jotka liittyivät tähän työaikadirektiiviin. Esimerkiksi Iso-Britanniaan nyt tietenkin järjestelmällisesti opt-outasi itsensä kokonaan koko unionista, mutta jo siihen aikaan näistä kaikista työaikasääntelyistä totesivat, että eivät koske [Puhemies koputtaa] heitä.*

that large Member States would have even more power, whereas Finland could lose influence in these fields. Furthermore, opposition politicians called for open debates about the future of the EU. The Finns party warned of a more federalist EU and the Christian Democrats were concerned about Finland's dwindling powers in the EU. At the other end of the spectrum, the Social Democrats and the Greens pursued more active EU debates and advocated more active participation.

4. Conclusion

Overall, DI was not a very salient topic in Finland, but all the governments usually at some point brought up the Finnish stance of supporting uniform integration, where DI may be used if necessary and if it is open to all the Member States. It was usually the Prime Minister who discussed DI on the government side, and the opposition included certain active politicians who wanted to express their stance on a specific DI instance. DI debates usually dealt with specific DI instances, and the only more principled debate on DI was held on 31 May 2017, after the Prime Minister's announcement on EU policy reflecting the Commission's White Paper on the Future of Europe published that spring.

Appendices


Appendix 1 Overview of the documents analysed

	Category of document	Time period	Details
1	Government programmes	2004-2020	2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2019 x 2 (same programme with a different PM)
2	First speeches and parliamentary debate	2004-2020	The first speech after the election of each PM in parliament and the subsequent debates (years same as above).
3	European Council presidency speeches and parliamentary debates a. in the Finnish Parliament b. in the European Parliament	2004-2020	21.6.2006 (Finnish Parliament) 5.7.2006 (European Parliament) 26.6.2019 (Finnish Parliament) 17.7.2019 (European Parliament)
4	Future of Europe speeches and parliamentary debates a. in the European Parliament b. for citizen consultations	2017-2020	- PM speech in the European Parliament on the 'Future of Europe' on 31 Jan 2019 - PM speech on the citizen consultation on the 'Future of Europe' on 31 Aug 2018
5	Prime Minister European Council Statements	2004-2020	All post-Council statements by PMs in the Finnish Parliament: 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2017 x 2
6	Parliamentary debates	2006-2008 2012-2014 2017-2020	Documents with one of the following key words: multi-speed Europe, coalition of the willing, core Europe, à la carte, enhanced cooperation, opt-out
7	Government EU Policy Reports and EU Influence Strategies	2004-2020	EU Policy Reports 2009 and 2013, EU Influence Strategies 2016, 2017 and 2018


Appendix 2 Translations of the key words used

Key word	Finnish Translation	Swedish Translation	Notes
Differentiated integration	eriytyvä integraatio	differentierad integration	
Future of Europe	Euroopan tulevaisuus	Europas framtid	Sometimes 'EU's future'
DI Models: Different Speed			
Coalition of the willing	halukkaiden koalitio	koalition av villiga	Sometimes 'a group of willing states' etc.
Two-speed Europe	kahden nopeuden Eurooppa	Europa med två hastigheter	
Multi-speed Europe	eritahtinen Eurooppa	Europa i flera hastigheter	Often used as 'multi-speed development'
DI Models: Different Endpoints			
Variable geometry	muuttuva geometria	variabel geometri	
Core Europe	Euroopan ydin	kärn-Europa	Often discussed as 'cores' which Finland wants to join
Two-tier Europe	kahden kerroksen Eurooppa	tudelat Europa	
Concentric circles	Samankeskiset kehät	koncentriska cirklar	
à la carte	à la carte	à la carte	
DI Mechanisms			
Enhanced cooperation	tiiviimpi yhteistyö	fördjupat samarbete	The Finnish and Swedish concepts were also used in many other contexts
opt-out	opt-out	opt-out	Does not have an established translation
DI Instances – Enhanced cooperation			
Pesco	PRY/pysyvä rakenteellinen yhteistyö	Pesco/permanenta strukturerade samarbete	
Rome III	Rome III	Rome III	
Unitary patent	yhtenäispatentti	enhetligt patent	
Matrimonial property regimes	aviovarallisuussuhteet	makars förmögenhetsförhållanden	
Financial Transaction Tax	finanssitransaktiovero	skatt på finansiella transaktioner	
European Public Prosecutor	Euroopan syyttäjä	europaisk åklagare	
DI Instances – Opt-out			
Schengen	Schengen	Schengen	
Economic and Monetary Union	talous- ja rahaliitto/EMU	Ekonomiska och monetära unionen/EMU	
Security and Defence Policy	turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka	säkerhets- och försvarspolitik	Used also in national contexts
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice	Vapauden, turvallisuuden ja oikeuden alue	område med frihet, säkerhet och rättvisa	
Charter of Fundamental Rights	perusoikeuskirja	stadga om de grundläggande rättigheterna	
Social Charter	sosiaalinen peruskirja	sociala stadgan	
DI instances – inter se agreements			
Prüm Convention	Prümin sopimus	Prümkonventionen	
European Stability Mechanism	Euroopan vakausmekanismi	Europeiska stabilitetsmekanismen	
Fiscal Compact	finanssipoliittinen sopimus	finanspakt	
Single Resolution Mechanism	kriisinhallintamekanismi	resolutionsmekanism	
Unified Patent Court	yhdistetty patenttitoimisto	enhetlig patenttdomstol	
DI Instances – external integration			
European Economic Area	Euroopan talousalue/ETA	Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet/EES	
Customs Union + Turkey	tulliliitto + Turkki	tullunion + Turkiet	
Eastern Partnership	itäinen kumppanuus	östligt partnerskap	
Euromed	Euromed/Barcelonan prosessi	Euromed/Barcelonaprocessen	


Appendix 3 The salience of specific EU-related issues and DI instances in government programmes (relative word frequencies)



Appendix 4 The salience of EU-related issues in government programmes (relative word frequencies)




Appendix 5 Prime Minister Council presidency speeches and subsequent debates in the national parliament in 2006 and 2019




Key words: Prüm (Prüm), differentiate (eriytyä), eurozone (euroalue), Schengen (Schengen), enhanced cooperation (tiiviimpi yhteistyö).


Appendix 6 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – breakdown by key word



Appendix 7 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – relative to the FoE debate




Appendix 8 DI instances (instances of enhanced cooperation and opt-out) in Council statements



Key words: security policy (turvallisuuspolitiikka), transaction tax (transaktiovero), Permanent Structured Cooperation (pysyvä rakenteellinen yhteistyö), Charter of Fundamental Rights (perusoikeuskirja).

Appendix 9 Process chart of the Future of Europe by Prime Minister Juha Sipilä presented at the informal meeting of EU leaders on 10 March. Translated from the Finnish version available at <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9501051>.



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