




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Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU)

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do
Governments Want? Country Report – Germany

Lukas Nagel

European University Institute

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU) is a Horizon 2020 funded research project aimed at contributing concretely to the current debate on the 'Future of Europe' by assessing, developing and testing a range of models and scenarios for different levels of integration among EU member states. InDivEU begins from the assumption that managing heterogeneity and deep diversity is a continuous and growing challenge in the evolution of the EU and the dynamic of European integration.

The objective of InDivEU is to maximize the knowledge of Differentiated Integration (DI) on the basis of a theoretically robust conceptual foundations accompanied by an innovative and integrated analytical framework, and to provide Europe's policy makers with a knowledge hub on DI. InDivEU combines rigorous academic research with the capacity to translate research findings into policy design and advice.

InDivEU comprises a consortium of 14 partner institutions coordinated by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, where the project is hosted by the European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP). The scientific coordinators of InDivEU are Brigid Laffan (Robert Schuman Centre) and Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zürich).

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**Integrating
Diversity in the
European Union**

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Abstract

This report analyses the salience and position of the German government concerning differentiated integration in the European Union. The report employs a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse government programs, speeches of the prime minister and parliamentary debates. The results of the salience analysis show that differentiated integration is sparsely mentioned by the German government. It occurs most frequently in parliamentary debates, where it is discussed on a concrete level and concerns instances and mechanisms of differentiated integration. The results of the position analysis show that the German government and opposition parties take a very similar stance that encourages homogenous European legislation in reference to Germany's historical role and responsibility in Europe. However, when the parliament discusses a specific issue that is in one of the parties' or Germany's general interest, mechanisms of differentiated integration are embraced as a way to move forward. This stance can be summarized as homogenisation if possible, DI if necessary.

Keywords

European Union, Germany, differentiated integration

Summary of Results

I. Salience

The salience analyses show that differentiated integration (DI) has been a low salience issue in Germany during the last two decades. These decades coincided with EU-wide negotiations during the eurozone and refugee crises. There was a focus primarily on economic and foreign policy issues. Parliamentary debates were the most likely arena for discussions on DI. By contrast, references to DI in government programmes, prime minister speeches and European Council statements were rare.

II. Position

The position of German governments with regard to DI during the period under investigation was determined by a wish to preserve unity within the EU while also allowing stalemates to be overcome and the 'national interest' to be served. This is manifested in the fact that DI was generally viewed very negatively but references to specific policies, as in the context of enhanced cooperation, were viewed much more positively. German position-taking on DI usually focused on DI demands by other countries. This concerned most notably the United Kingdom and Brexit, which were viewed negatively. When the debate focused on a specific policy it usually concerned a topic which was in Germany's interest. This might explain why general discussions were more negative while specific ones were rather positive. Interestingly, there is very little difference in the positioning of government and opposition parties. This may be illustrative of a deep historical commitment to a strong unity on the European continent on the part of the German political elite.

The German government supported differentiated integration through being a co-founder of Schengen cooperation in 1985, through being a sponsor of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and through its participation in enhanced cooperation, as for example in divorce law. However, its position is generally more supportive of inclusive cooperation than differentiated integration within the EU. The position of the German government can be summarised as homogenisation if possible, DI if necessary. Germany's historical role and responsibility in Europe is often referenced in this regard. The German governments under the leadership of German chancellor Angela Merkel (incumbent from 2005 to the present) have embodied this position. Under her leadership, Germany's mediating role finding common interests among Member States and focusing especially on the EU and euro stability has been combined with a more pronounced concerted European foreign policy. DI is seen as a tool that can move things forward if broader agreement cannot be reached. Accordingly, it is favoured by the German government if it serves to push forward its own political agenda. In general, references to DI are largely used to criticise the way in which it might create inequality and weaken the EU by dividing it.

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1. Introduction

This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in German government discourse between 2004 and 2020. It also probes into the position of German governments on the issue of DI in selected peak-salience years (2008, 2012, 2017-2020).

The report distinguishes three levels of abstraction in government discourse on DI. **First**, two different models of DI are distinguished at the conceptual level. On the one hand, the ‘multi-speed EU’ model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. On the other hand, the ‘multi-end EU’ model depicts DI as a potentially permanent feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can ‘pick and choose’ to adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities. **Second**, the analysis focuses on DI mechanisms. On the one hand, the enhanced cooperation mechanism allows a limited group of MSs – under certain conditions – to pursue deeper integration without having to involve all MSs. On the other hand, the ‘opt-out’ mechanism allows MSs to refrain from participating in common policies. In short, enhanced cooperation allows a MS to integrate more than other MSs, while ‘opt-outs’ allow a Member State to integrate less than other MSs. **Finally**, the analysis looks at various instances of differentiated policies and policy fields. A total of twenty-one instances are included in the analysis. They are grouped in four different categories: (a) instances of enhanced cooperation, (b) instances of opt-out policy fields, (c) instances of inter se agreements and (d) instances of external agreements. Inter se agreements are agreements which EU Member States conclude outside the framework of the European Union. External agreements are agreements between the EU and non-EU states.

The results are based on an analysis of various government documents. Six document categories were selected to cover a broad spectrum of venues and government actors. The material analysed includes government programmes, Prime Minister speeches, Prime Minister European Council Statements and parliamentary debates, and they were analysed in this order. Appendix 1 provides an overview of all the documents analysed. Note, that in this appendix *time period* is the period for which documents were searched and *details* specifies the dates for which documents were found.

The salience of DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances is assessed by counting key words in the above-mentioned documents (Appendix 2). The assumption is that the more a government talks about DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, the analysis of parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks. The translated key words were searched with all the possible variations of syllable separation in German cases (nominative, accusative, dative, genitive), synonyms, upper-case and lower-case spelling, plural and singular. In the case that more general key words were used in the search, their relation to the EU was checked by using close reading. To enhance the reliability of the findings, the key word counts were triangulated with a close reading of selected key documents.

Regarding the government’s position, the results are based on a manual attitude analysis of parliamentary debates. To this end, references to DI key words in parliamentary debates were manually coded as negative, neutral or positive using QDA Miner software. The second section of the report details the results of the salience analysis. The third section details the results of the position analysis.

2. How salient is DI for the German government?


To assess the salience of DI in German government discourse, a range of methods (i.e. computer assisted word counts, manual word counts, close reading, holistic grading) were employed to analyse (a) government programmes, (b) prime minister speeches, (c) prime minister European Council statements

and (d) parliamentary debates. The analysis proceeded from the more general (i.e. government programmes) to the more specific (i.e. council statements/parliamentary debates). This allowed for assessment of the degree that DI was referred to and at which level of abstraction DI was mentioned, from general models to concrete instances. In general, three levels of abstraction – DI models, DI mechanisms, DI instances – were distinguished.

2.1 Government Programmes

In a first step, German government programmes from 2004 to 2020 were analysed to gauge the salience of DI in domestic politics. The computer-assisted word count analysis showed that government programmes did not include any of the key words associated with DI models or references to DI mechanisms (enhanced cooperation/opt-outs). Moreover, the documents included very limited references to specific DI instances. As a result, two additional analyses were conducted to obtain an overview of references to DI in German government programmes. First, computer-assisted word count analysis was used to assess whether governments refer to EU-related issues in their programmes. Figure 1 provides the results of this analysis and shows that the overall salience of EU mentions (measured as the relative word frequency in government programmes) does not follow a clear pattern over time. However, it can be seen that the EU is quite frequently mentioned in comparison to other topics in the government programmes of political parties. In Figure 1 the dark green line illustrates all mentions of the term ‘EU.’ Note, that this excludes terms like ‘European Union,’ ‘Europe’ and ‘European.’ Nonetheless, ‘EU’ is one of the most frequently mentioned terms compared to common issues for political parties such as ‘social policy,’ ‘social economy,’ ‘education’ and ‘education policy’.


Figure 1 - The salience of EU-related issues in government programmes (relative word frequency)



Translation: social*, EU, education*, culture*, tax*, education

Figure 2 delves deeper into specific EU-related issues and DI instances. Overall, the figure shows that very few DI instances, models or mechanisms could be found. The highest frequency count is for ‘Pesco,’ with 4 instances. This may relate to the German government’s aim to build EU capacity in the area of foreign policy following Brexit and amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Figure 2 - The salience of specific EU-related issues and DI instances in government programmes (relative word frequencies)




Translation: Pesco, financial transaction tax, fiscal compact, Schengen, eastern partnership, enhanced cooperation, single resolution mechanism, customs union

2.2 Prime Minister Speeches

In the next step, various types of prime minister speeches were analysed. First, the frequency of all key words in the first speech of prime ministers in the national parliament (Bundestag) was analysed to identify the most frequent words. Second, these key words were used for an analysis that differentiated between the debate following the first speech and the prime minister's speech itself. As in the previous analysis of government programmes, the word count analysis demonstrates no use of key DI words. Furthermore, despite the overall frequent references to the EU, Figure 3 shows that only very limited references to DI mechanisms and instances were made. In the speeches by the prime minister, here the German Chancellor, there are specific EU-related mentions that focus primarily on issues relating to European and Monetary Union and foreign policy, such as Pesco and Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, when it comes to the discussions which followed these speeches, the salience of specific EU-related issues was very limited, and related primarily to the financial transaction tax, Pesco and economic and monetary union.


Figure 3 - The salience of specific EU-related issues and DI instances in first speeches by the prime minister (relative word frequencies)



Translation: economic and monetary union, Pesco, financial transaction tax, eastern partnership, single resolution mechanism, common security and defence policy, charter of fundamental rights

In Figure 4, an analysis of prime minister speeches in the national parliament on the occasion of taking over the presidency of the Council of the European Union is presented. Neither the prime minister's speech in parliament, the subsequent discussion in parliament or the prime minister's speech in the European Council contained any references to conceptual key words, DI mechanisms or instances. However, the discussion subsequent to the prime minister's speech in the EU Council showed references to DI, such as Europe at two-speeds and core Europe.

Figure 4 - The salience of specific DI models and instances in the European Council speech by the prime minister and the subsequent speech in parliament (relative word frequencies)




Translation and absolute frequency: Future of Europe (2), two-speed Europe (1), Core Europe (1), Schengen (1), rest (0)

2.3 European Council statements by the Prime Minister

Finally, Figure 5 provides an overview of the pre- and post-Council press statements made by the German Chancellor, in this case Angela Merkel, before and after council meetings. These press statements are found on the German Chancellor’s homepage. As Figure 5 shows, the pre- and post-Council statements by the chancellor were analysed and they include some references to DI instances. These references seem to coincide with developments in the EU integration process, such as the relatively high number of mentions of the fiscal pact in 2010. Overall, economic-related issues dominate.

Figure 5 - Pre- and post-Council statements by the prime minister



Translation: economic and monetary union, fiscal compact, financial transaction tax, European stability mechanism, customs union, eastern partnership, common security and defence policy, single resolution mechanism


Next, holistic grading was used to validate these results. To this end, government programmes, prime minister speeches and the subsequent parliamentary debates between 2002 and 2020 were carefully read and a score between 0 (no reference to DI) and 2 (direct/central reference to DI) was assigned to each document. Due to the low number of documents and the subjectivity involved in assigning a holistic score to a document, the results should not be interpreted as precise scores but instead they provide a rough approximation of the salience of DI. The overall salience score for all the documents is 0.5, indicating a low level of DI salience. There were exceptions to this pattern of low salience, such as the future of Europe debate (1,25). When it comes to the overall holistic ratings in the German case, two important caveats need to be made that illustrate the difficulty of coding. First, almost all the references to DI were indirect. In government programmes and in speeches by the prime minister there are often very broad non-specific references to DI. For example, Chancellor Merkel embraced diversity, tolerance and dynamic cooperation in a 2007 European Council speech. However, in most speeches she talks about the negative influence of national decision-making that is not coordinated with the rest of Europe and emphasises a need for homogenisation. This is always done in a vague manner which leaves much room for interpretation. Second, many contradictions exist within single documents. This happens

particularly when a general favouring of homogenisation is expressed but then specific differentiated integration projects (e.g. Pesco) are embraced in the subsequent paragraph.

2.4 Parliamentary debates

In the next step, the author focused on a salience analysis of parliamentary debates from 2004 to 2020. Figure 6 shows that conceptual references to DI peaked in 2019, 2011 and 2008. All the peaks were mainly caused by the key phrases ‘coalition of the willing’ and ‘two-speed Europe.’ However, these key phrases were used in different contexts and cannot be attributed to a specific issue for which they were used regularly. Most probably, the peak in 2008 was triggered by the financial crisis. Similarly, the rise in 2011 and 2012 might be related to the euro crisis and the rise in 2015-2019 may be to do with the Brexit referendum. Overall, the salience was low, with a median of four references a year. Next, the author broke down the key words by year and by peak. It became apparent that ‘coalition of the willing’ was most frequently mentioned overall. Furthermore, ‘two-speed Europe’ and ‘core Europe’ were second most mentioned (see Figure 6 and Appendix 3).


Figure 6 - The salience of conceptual keywords in parliamentary debates



Subsequently, the report focuses on the question of whether debates on differentiated integration occurred in the context of more general debates on the ‘future of Europe’ (FoE). To this end, the aggregate frequency of the conceptual key words was compared with the frequency of the key phrase ‘future of Europe.’ The debate on the FoE peaked in 2012-2013 and 2017 (Appendix 4). The generally higher frequency of FoE in relation to conceptual key words shows that abstract rhetoric is rare in German parliamentary debates. Nonetheless, the conceptual key words and FoE seem to follow a similar trend. This indicates that the peaks might be explained by the same events that drove the frequencies in Figure 6. The general application of the key words to many different issues supports this observation.


The analysis then moved from conceptual key words (DI models) to DI mechanisms. The breakdown of DI mechanisms shows that ‘opt-out’ was overall mentioned more frequently than ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Figure 7). However, in 2012 there was almost no mention of ‘opt out’ and ‘enhanced cooperation’ made up almost all the references to DI mechanisms. Notably, in 2014 this trend completely reversed itself and ‘opt out’ made up almost all the references, while ‘enhanced cooperation’ practically vanished from debates (Appendix 5).

Figure 7 - The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates




Finally, the author looked at specific instances of DI. In the context of enhanced cooperation, the most frequently discussed policies in parliamentary debates related to Pesco, Matrimonial Property Regimes and the European Public Prosecutor (Figure 8). Together they make up 77% of the total key words that were included for enhanced cooperation. However, these issues were discussed only in very specific time intervals: Pesco in 2017-2019, Matrimonial Property Regimes in 2008-2011 and the European Public Prosecutor in 2014. Therefore, these topics should be seen as examples of topics that drove enhanced cooperation in specific time periods and not as recurring general topics that drive enhanced cooperation.

Figure 8 - The salience of instances of enhanced cooperation in parliamentary debates




From Figure 9 it becomes apparent that the vast majority of parliamentary discussions relating to opt-outs concerned Schengen. The second most frequently discussed topic relating to opt-outs was Economic and Monetary Union. These make up 77% of the total key phrases that were included for opt-out.

Figure 9 - Salience of opt-out policy fields




In Figure 10 a strong peak of inter se agreements in 2012 can be observed. This peak is solely caused by discussions about the Fiscal Compact (86%) and the European Stability Mechanism (14%). There are no references to either key phrase before 2011. This is most likely to be due to the start of the euro crisis in this time period and the more frequent discussion of related issues. Their salience remained high until 2014 and peaked once more in 2018.

Figure 10 - The salience of instances of inter se agreements in parliamentary debates



Finally, a breakdown of instances that relate to external agreements shows that two thirds of all external DI references related to the Eastern Partnership (Figure 11). Furthermore, a fifth of the references referred to the European Economic Area.

Figure 11 - The salience of instances of external agreements in parliamentary debates

In summary, the frequency of DI conceptual key words, mechanisms and instances seems to peak around key events, such as the financial crisis in 2008, the eurozone crisis around 2011/12 and Brexit in 2015-2020. The analysis of prime minister speeches and government programmes has shown that while the EU is a frequent topic of national concern, DI does not seem to attract the same attention. Furthermore, the pre- and post-EC statements reveal a primary interest in economic DI policies. Finally, the analysis of parliamentary debates showed that the conceptual key phrases ‘coalition of the willing’ and ‘two-speed Europe’ were the most frequent terms to refer to DI. The most frequently discussed mechanisms were opt-outs and enhanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation mainly referred to matrimonial property rights, Pesco and the European public prosecutor. On the other hand, opt-out mainly referred to Schengen and economic and monetary union. Generally, inter se agreements were mainly concerned with financial issues in 2012, such as the fiscal compact and the European stability mechanism. However, external DI was overwhelmingly concerned with the Eastern partnership and, probably related to this, the European economic area.

3. What positions do German governments have on DI?

This section presents the positions of German government and opposition parties on DI. It is based on parliamentary debates in 2008, 2012 and 2017–2020. The first subsection provides a quantitative overview of government and opposition positions divided into positive, negative and neutral statements. The second section includes a qualitative assessment of statements by government and opposition politicians during the three periods with direct quotations (bold highlights by the author) and the original version in footnotes. The qualitative analysis is chronologically structured.

3.1 Quantitative overview of government positions

An interesting observation from Figures 12-15 is that government and opposition parties take similar positions when it comes to DI. The German government position only changed very little when the first Merkel government was formed in 2005, although it replaced the more left-wing government including social democrats and Greens. The conservative CDU/CSU was part of every subsequent government and with the exception of 2009-2013 always formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Party. Therefore, the government and the opposition parties have remained stable since 2005. One could expect this stable ideological divide to manifest itself in positions on DI, yet the opposite is the case. Government and opposition parties take almost the same position (when we take a certain margin of

error in consideration) concerning specific DI models and mechanisms. This might be explained by a common historical understanding of Germany in relation to the EU and the German adherence to keeping European countries together.

Figure 12 - Position on multi-speed Europe (two-speed + coalition of the willing)

(n = 25)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n=18)	8	1	9
Opposition (n=6)	3	2	2
2008	5	1	0
2012	2	0	2
2017-2020	4	2	9

Figure 13 - Position on multi-end Europe (two-tier + a la carte)

(n = 20)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n=9)	7	1	1
Opposition (n=11)	9	1	1
2008	4	1	1
2012	1	1	0
2017-2020	11	0	1

Figure 14 - Position on enhanced co-operation

(n = 47)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n = 24)	0	19	12
Opposition (n = 23)	1	10	5
2008	1	1	0
2012	0	15	11
2017-2020	0	13	6

Figure 15 - Position on "opt-outs"

(n = 10)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n = 9)	4	4	1
Opposition (n = 1)	1	0	0
2008	0	2	0
2012	1	0	0
2017-2020	4	2	1

Another interesting observation is that the most references are made to enhanced cooperation, followed by multi-speed Europe. Interestingly, in 2017-2020, most references are made to multi-end Europe (two-tier + a la carte), which is viewed very negatively. Additionally, it can be observed that enhanced cooperation and multi-speed DI are connotated rather positively while opt-outs and multi-end DI are seen rather negatively.

3.2 *Qualitative assessment of government positions*

The qualitative analysis confirms the observation that the government and the opposition parties take very similar positions on DI. Furthermore, this more in-depth analysis carves out some of the difficulties that arose in the quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis makes it clear that the positions of the German government and opposition on a multi-speed Europe are overall neutral, but their positions on a multi-end Europe are very negative. Furthermore, the positions of the German government and opposition are very positive concerning enhanced cooperation but very negative concerning opt-out regulations. There are three main reasons for this. First, the key phrases ‘opt-out’ and ‘à la carte’ were almost exclusively mentioned with reference to Brexit. Because all the parties in the German parliament took a very hard stance during the Brexit negotiations, opt-outs and cherry picking à la carte were evaluated very negatively. Second, when the debate moved towards a multi-end discussion it became much more general, while when enhanced cooperation or two-speed Europe were mentioned it was mostly in a more specific policy context. While in general discussions about DI, the government and opposition took negative positions when it came to specific policies or context discussions, these same actors would be much more positive concerning DI. Third, when the debate became more general it was usually focused on DI demands by other countries (e.g. Brexit), while when the debate was more specific it usually concerned a topic which was in Germany’s or one of the parliamentary parties’ interest. This might explain why general discussions were more negative while specific discussions were rather positive.

3.2.1 2008 – The Lisbon Treaty

Of nine references to DI in 2008, seven were to the Lisbon Treaty, which made it the predominant topic of discussion. Of the seven references to the Lisbon Treaty, six were made by the government and one by the opposition. The references were always either negative or neutral. In most references, the Lisbon Treaty was seen as a catalyst for DI. As such, it was perceived predominantly as dangerous concerning its potential to divide the EU:

“The **[Lisbon] Treaty** also offers the possibility to act in concert, given that an agreement with everyone cannot be found. For this reason, the **enhanced cooperation** instrument was created. All the Member States have to agree to enable the use of this instrument by a group of Member States. However, I want to make it clear that it must not become the norm to use enhanced cooperation concerning all important issues. On the contrary, we must put our efforts into trying to establish common positions” (Angela Merkel, Prime Minister, CDU, National Parliament, 24.04.2008).¹

Perceiving DI as a force that may potentially divide Europe may be rooted in a historical understanding that Germany has concerning its position in the European Union. Accordingly, to uphold unity and peaceful relations among European Member States is still a very important objective of German foreign policy. However, unity and peaceful relations should also be put to use to tackle upcoming challenges:

“In this situation, discussions about a **two-speed Europe or core Europe** are not helpful. To avoid any misunderstandings, I do not think this discussion leads anywhere and is even reckless to a certain extent because you cannot have an enlarged EU and as soon as the first difficulties arise say ‘Now we are going to create a **core Europe.**’ This means that reaching unity in Europe, as hard as it might be, is not an end in itself but a high good instead. This has always guided my actions. Not only on days in which we commemorate Europe as a great peace project and as an answer to centuries of

¹ Der Vertrag bietet auch eine Handhabe für den Fall, dass wir uns einmal nicht einig sind, wenn wir gemeinsam handeln wollen. Deshalb gibt es das Instrument der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit. Allerdings müssen alle Mitgliedstaaten zustimmen, dass eine Gruppe dieses Instrument nutzt. Ich sage allerdings auch: Es darf nicht der normale Weg sein, dass wir in allen wichtigen Fragen nur die verstärkte Zusammenarbeit suchen. Vielmehr müssen wir uns schon bemühen, gemeinsame Positionen auszuarbeiten.

war and enmity but also concerning the challenges of our time and generation that arise in the face of globalisation (..)” (Angela Merkel, Prime Minister, CDU, National Parliament, 19.06.2008).²

This perception of Germany’s position in the EU may also explain the predominant agreement that the opposition has with the government despite their ideological differences:

“Prime Minister (Angela Merkel), you have firmly rejected a **two-speed Europe**. (..) We strongly support that you are saying: ‘We stick with the Lisbon Treaty.’ Because the Treaty is an improvement. The Treaty makes Europe more democratic, transparent, efficient and able to act” (Dr. Guido Westerwelle, Opposition Leader, FDP (liberal), National Parliament, 19.06.2008).³

This agreement can not only be inferred from statements made by the opposition but is also confirmed by the reactions of other parties to these statements. For example, the previous statement by Westerwelle (FDP, liberal) was applauded by the Left Party (Die Linke, a far-left party) which is highly unusual given the strong disagreement between the FDP and Linke that normally prevails. In addition, the statements by Merkel (CDU, conservative) were applauded by a broad spectrum of parties.

3.2.2 2012 – the Financial Transaction Tax, ESM, Rom III

Financial Transaction Tax

The Financial Transaction Tax is overall mentioned twenty-three times in relation to enhanced cooperation. In most of these cases enhanced cooperation is embraced as a mechanism that allows the implementation of the tax despite disagreement by other Member States. Therefore, the mechanism is mentioned over and over in a favourable context. However, statements that judge the value of the mechanism in itself are rarely found.

These favourable mentions of enhanced cooperation as a means to an end are consistent in the government and opposition parties:

“The government advocates the [financial transaction] tax internationally and at the European level in the form of a **coalition of the willing** within the European Commission. At this point, I would like to emphasise my appreciation (..) about the sustainable growth and occupation agreement between the opposition and the government which includes the introduction of the financial transaction tax and the mutual adoption of the fiscal compact. Meanwhile, the government has filed a request for **enhanced cooperation** concerning a financial transaction tax and submitted it to the European Commission” (Patricia Lips, Government, CDU, Member of Parliament, 28.06.2012).⁴

² Deshalb helfen uns in dieser Situation Diskussionen über ein Europa der zwei Geschwindigkeiten bzw. über ein Kerneuropa nicht weiter. Damit wir uns nicht missverstehen: Ich halte diese Diskussionen ohnehin für nicht zielführend und zum Teil auch für fahrlässig denn man kann nicht eine erweiterte Europäische Union haben und zugleich bei der ersten Schwierigkeit immer sofort sagen: Nun gestalten wir ein Kerneuropa. Das heißt, die Geschlossenheit Europas, so mühsam zu erreichen sie auch immer sein mag, ist kein Selbstzweck, sondern ein hohes Gut. Das hat mich geleitet, und das wird mich immer leiten nicht nur an Jahrestagen, an denen wir dieses großartigen Europas als Friedenswerk und Antwort auf jahrhundertelange Kriege und Feindschaften gedenken, sondern eben auch als Herausforderung für unsere Generation und für unsere Zeit, in der wir uns bei der Gestaltung der Globalisierung wieder zu bewähren haben und in der Europa die richtige Antwort auf die Herausforderungen in einer globalen Welt ist.

³ Frau Bundeskanzlerin, Sie haben sehr vehement ein Europa der zwei Geschwindigkeiten abgelehnt. (..) Wir unterstützen es ausdrücklich, dass Sie sagen: Wir halten am Lissabon-Vertrag fest. Denn er verbessert das, was ist. Europa wird durch diesen Vertrag demokratischer, transparenter, effizienter und handlungsfähiger.

⁴ Nichtsdestotrotz setzt sich die Bundesregierung international und jetzt auf europäischer Ebene gegenüber der Kommission dafür ein, mit einer Koalition der Willigen hier zur Einführung einer solchen Steuer zu kommen. Ich will an dieser Stelle also ausdrücklich betonen, dass ich es unabhängig vom Thema dieses Antrags grundsätzlich sehr begrüße, dass Regierung und Opposition in ihrem Pakt für nachhaltiges Wachstum und Beschäftigung in dieser Woche zu einer Einigung gekommen sind, die die Einführung der Transaktionssteuer einschließt, und dass wir den für Europa so zentralen Fiskalpakt einvernehmlich verabschieden werden. Die Bundesregierung hat den hierzu vereinbarten Antrag an die Europäische

“As the Green Party, we fight at all levels to ensure that the wealthy contribute more to common welfare, that subsidies for environmentally harmful behaviour are abolished and taxes on environmentally harmful products are increased. The success of negotiations concerning the financial transaction tax is a first sign of change that leads to a contribution by those that caused the crisis in the first place. In addition, however, there is also a need for the introduction of asset levies throughout Europe to reduce debt, which could be coordinated as **enhanced cooperation**” (Lisa Paus, Katja Dörner and Sven-Christian Kindler, Opposition, Green Party, Members of Parliament, 29.06.2012).⁵

The wide agreement on the necessity of a financial transaction tax and acceptance of enhanced cooperation as a means to meet this end continued until 2018. However, due to the lengthy process to adopt the tax a certain degree of frustration about the mechanism can be noticed. This critique was mild and mainly put forward by the Left Party (Linke):

“Ladies and Gentlemen, of course it would be best if a comprehensive tax could still be agreed on through the mechanism of **enhanced cooperation**. However, in the case that this is not possible, Germany should advance with a comprehensive financial transaction tax. Cooperation partners can then be found in bilateral agreements” (Jörg Cezanne, Opposition, Linke, National Parliament 09.11.2018).⁶

However, this critique by the Left Party was contested by other opposition parties, which further emphasised the generally strong and broad acceptance of the mechanism:

“Five years ago, the negotiations started in all seriousness. It is not true that nothing happened. This can be seen especially in your wonderful, really well put, brief inquiry about this topic. The negotiations have continued for five years and at a working level in the context of enhanced cooperation huge progress has been made” (Lisa Paus, Opposition, Grüne, National Parliament, 09.11.2018).⁷

Looking at the argumentation of the opposition, one can observe that its strong agreement with the implementation of the financial transaction tax drives its acceptance of enhanced cooperation as a mechanism. For the Green Party this tax was important to tax what it perceives as environmentally harmful actions and it agreed with the Left Party (Linke) that the tax should target the wealthy to contribute to the creation of a welfare state. This is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, enhanced cooperation was seen as a potentially dangerous tool that might enhance the European divide in the Lisbon Treaty. On the other hand, it was now used to leverage Germany’s national interest in the face of marginal European agreement on the financial transaction tax. This shows how specific issues that find large support in parliament are pushed forward despite Germany’s general interest in forming a homogenous EU.

Kommission zur verstärkten Zusammenarbeit zur Einführung einer Finanztransaktionsteuer inzwischen auf den Weg gebracht.

⁵ Als Grüne kämpfen wir auf allen Ebenen dafür, dass Vermögende und Besserverdienende stärker an der Finanzierung des Gemeinwesens beteiligt werden, dass Subventionen auf ökologisch schädliches Verhalten abgebaut werden und Steuern auf Umweltverbrauch erhöht werden. Bei der Beteiligung der Krisenverursacherinnen und -verursacher an den Kosten zeichnet sich mit dem Verhandlungserfolg bei der Finanztransaktionsteuer ein erstes Umschwenken an. Zusätzlich braucht es aber auch die Einführung von Vermögensabgaben europaweit zum Abbau der Schulden, die als „Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit“ koordiniert werden könnte.

⁶ Meine Damen und Herren, es wäre natürlich am besten, wenn eine umfassende Steuer im Rahmen der Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit noch vereinbart werden könnte. Wenn das aber nicht möglich sein sollte, dann sollte Deutschland mit einer umfassenden Finanztransaktionsteuer vorangehen. Partner dafür sollten dann in der zwischenstaatlichen Zusammenarbeit gesucht werden.

⁷ Es ist fünf Jahre her, dass begonnen wurde, ernsthaft zu verhandeln. Es ist eben nicht nichts passiert. Das zeigt gerade Ihre wunderbare, wirklich sehr gute Kleine Anfrage zu dem Thema. Seit fünf Jahren wird verhandelt, und auf Arbeitsebene ist im Rahmen der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit tatsächlich sehr viel erreicht worden.

European Stability Mechanism

The same trend can be observed in parliamentary discussion on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), where its concrete implementation in the sense of differentiated integration and enhanced cooperation seem to be favoured by both the opposition and government:

“I stand for a Europe of fatherlands, a confederation of states, which, with its free internal market and enhanced cooperation is able to maintain an area of peace, justice, security and democracy. I do not stand for a federal state in which profits are privatised, losses are socialised and debts and risks are dealt with by mutualising them, with Germany taking the primary responsibility. The ESM is the beginning of the end of a solidary and equal euro. That is why I firmly reject it” (Veronika Bellmann, Government, CDU/CSU, National Parliament, 29.06.2012).⁸

“I hear and read in the investigative report – I like the tone of the paper – that we finally need a **core Europe** to advance (with the ESM) and that we want to approach Mister Macron for this reason” (Manuel Sarrazin, Opposition, Green Party, National Parliament, 18.01.2018).⁹

Rome III

The Rome III legislation was talked about very neutrally in the parliament. Most statements either make a neutral observation or explain how Rome III works in relation to enhanced cooperation. Of five statements in 2012 only one can be interpreted as positive:

“A proposal for a regulation submitted in 2006 to establish the international jurisdiction of courts in divorce proceedings and proceedings relating to legal separation and marriage annulment did not receive the necessary support from all Member States in the Council. As a result, 14 Member States, including Germany, decided to engage in an enhanced cooperation concerning divorce and legal separation – the so-called Rome III Regulation. The Regulation has overcome the partly considerable differences that existed in the legal systems of the individual Member States with regard to divorce law, and particularly concerning the conflict-of-law regulation” (Stephan Thomae, FDP, Opposition Party, National Parliament, 08.11.2012).¹⁰

3.2.3 2017 – Economic and Monetary Union, Brexit

Economic and Monetary Union

In the parliamentary discussion about the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU, agreement between the government and opposition to reject a two-speed EU prevailed. However, in the government, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU, centre-right) seem to have taken a more demanding and more homogenisation-driven stance:

⁸ Ich stehe für ein Europa der Vaterländer, einen Staatenbund, der mit seinem freien Binnenmarkt und der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit ein Raum des Friedens, des Rechts, der Sicherheit und der Demokratie bleiben soll. Ich stehe nicht für einen Bundesstaat, in dem Gewinne privatisiert, Verluste sozialisiert, Schulden und Risiken mit Deutschland als Hauptverantwortungsträger vergemeinschaftet werden. Der ESM ist der Anfang vom Ende eines solidarischen und gleichberechtigten euro pas. Deshalb lehne ich ihn entschieden ab.

⁹ Ich höre immer und lese auch im Sondierungspapier – der Ton des Sondierungspapiers gefällt mir –, wir brauchen endlich Kerneuropa, um voranzugehen, und wollen Herrn Macron die Hand reichen. Aber das Erste, was hier dann kommt, ist: Die Rechtsgrundlage, um konkret beim ESM mehr zu machen und ihn zu europäisieren, ist uns nicht recht; Artikel 352 AEUV ist dafür nicht geeignet.

¹⁰ Ein im Jahr 2006 vorgelegter Verordnungsvorschlag, mit dem die internationale Zuständigkeit von Gerichten in Scheidungsverfahren und Verfahren, die die Trennung ohne Auflösung des Ehebandes sowie die Ungültigkeit der Ehe betreffen, fand im Rat nicht die nötige Unterstützung aller Mitgliedstaaten. Daraufhin wurde von 14 Mitgliedstaaten, zu denen auch Deutschland gehört im Rahmen der sogenannten ROM-III-Verordnung eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit im Bereich des auf die Ehescheidung und Trennung ohne Auflösung des Ehebandes anzuwendenden Rechts beschlossen. Mit der Verordnung sind die zum Teil beträchtlichen Unterschiede, die in den Rechtsordnungen der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten zum Scheidungsrecht, gerade beim Kollisionsrecht, bestanden, überwunden worden.

“A Two-class society? I’m saying no, we don’t want that. But if a project that is part of an **enhanced cooperation** – which the euro is – has special problems, then we cannot say that we will not solve these problems because not everyone has joined in yet” (Angela Merkel, Prime Minister, CDU/CSU, National Parliament, 18.10.2012).¹¹

“The consequence of the election of Donald Trump, Brexit, Erdogan, Syria and international terrorism has to be: We need a strong Europe. Europe must become more autonomous. The Scandinavian countries are called on to assume more responsibility in this regard. Finland, which has also adopted the euro, has a clearly pro-European attitude. Sweden could introduce the euro, but does not want to do so yet. Denmark has not adopted the euro either, and also has many **opt-out** clauses in the European treaties. Norway has held two referenda on EU membership. In both cases, the people rejected membership” (Johann Wadephul, Government, CDU/CSU, National Parliament, 01.06.2017).¹²

In contrast, the Social Democrats (SPD) promoted a more solidary and welfare-oriented approach that rejected the focus on security issues in favour of social redistribution:

“We in the SPD are clearly in favour of the further development of the European Union as a whole and of the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union. The Union must not be reduced to its internal market and cooperation on security issues. We firmly reject this. Just as we defend the four fundamental freedoms against the British in the Brexit negotiations, we defend them for the future of the remaining 27 EU members. We want to move towards an Economic and Monetary Union of joint action, towards a social Europe with common social standards instead of social dumping, and towards more worker rights at the European level. We want to strengthen families, ensure participation in prosperity and social justice, not only in Germany but in the whole of Europe” (Norbert Spinrath, Government, SPD, National Parliament, 09.03.2017).¹³

The Left Party (Linke) emphasised this approach even more strongly and called for more solidarity. In fact, it stated that the government’s approach did not lead to rejection of a two-speed Europe at all but did the opposite instead:

“The fact that a European finance minister is free of any parliamentary control does not bother Macron or Mrs Merkel. But it bothers the Linke. Macron wants a special budget for investments to stabilise the economy, but only in the eurozone. That – as we have learned – comes down to a **core Europe**. A core Europe, dear Lambsdorf, a **two-speed Europe**, and it will ensure more labour migrants from non-euro countries such as Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. If you really want that, I have to say this has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with solidarity and the idea of cohesion” (Dr. Diether Dehm, Opposition, Linke, 07.06.2018).¹⁴

¹¹ Zweiklassengesellschaft? Ich sage: Nein, das wollen wir nicht. Aber wenn ein Teil in der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit und so etwas ist ja der euro spezielle Probleme hat, dann können wir doch nicht sagen: Diese Probleme lösen wir nicht, weil noch nicht alle dabei sind.

¹² Die Konsequenz aus der Wahl Donald Trumps und dem Brexit, aus Erdogan, Syrien und dem internationalen Terrorismus muss lauten: Wir brauchen ein starkes Europa. Europa muss für sich sorgen können. Die skandinavischen Länder sind hier gefordert, mehr Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Eine klar pro-europäische Haltung vertritt Finnland, das auch den euro eingeführt hat. Schweden könnte den euro einführen, möchte es aber bisher nicht. Auch Dänemark hat den euro nicht eingeführt und zudem eine Menge Opt-out-Regelungen bei den europäischen Verträgen. Norwegen hat zwei Volksabstimmungen zum EU-Beitritt durchgeführt. In beiden Fällen hat die Bevölkerung dagegen votiert.

¹³ Wir als SPD-Fraktion sprechen uns klar für eine Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Union in Gänze aus, für eine Vollendung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Die Union darf sich eben nicht auf den Binnenmarkt und die Zusammenarbeit in Sicherheitsfragen reduzieren. Diesem Szenarium erteilen wir eine ganz klare Absage. So, wie wir die vier Grundfreiheiten bei den Austrittsverhandlungen gegen die Briten verteidigen, verteidigen wir sie für die zukünftig verbleibende EU der 27. Wir wollen hin zu einer Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion mit echtem gemeinsamem Handeln, zu einem sozialen Europa mit gemeinsamen Sozialstandards statt Sozialdumping, zu mehr Arbeitnehmerrechten auch auf europäischer Ebene. Wir wollen Familien stärken, Teilhabe am Wohlstand sichern und soziale Gerechtigkeit nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch in Europa.

¹⁴ Aber dass ein europäischer Finanzminister jeglicher parlamentarischer Kontrolle entzogen ist, stört weder Macron noch Frau Merkel. Aber es stört Die Linke. Macron will ein Sonderbudget für konjunkturstabilisierende Investitionen, aber nur in der Euro-Zone. Das läuft – das wir Herrn gelernt – auf ein Kerneuropa hinaus. Ein Kerneuropa, lieber Lambsdorf, ein

Brexit

In the context of the Brexit negotiations, à la carte Europe and opt-out were referred to exclusively negatively by both the government and the opposition parties. There was a clear agreement that European membership must offer economic advantages and that the four freedoms of the EU (movement of goods, capital, services and labour) were not attainable without this membership:

“We have repeatedly emphasised it, and rightly so: the internal market is not an à la carte menu, its four freedoms are indivisible, and that includes the free movement of persons, which is a core defining feature of Europe. London understood that too.” [Applause from the SPD and from members of the CDU/CSU and *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*]. (Sigmar Gabriel, Foreign Minister, Government, SPD, National Parliament, 30.03.2017).¹⁵

“The question then arises: What should the prospective relationship between Great Britain and the EU look like? We know what to reply: No Europe à la carte! No cherry-picking! And we know: EU membership must always have an added value” (Detlef Seif, CDU/CSU, Government, National Parliament, 27.04.2017).¹⁶

Later the debate included the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice as a good that is exclusively available to EU members. Again, the government and opposition were in agreement.

“Especially with regard to trade, the four fundamental freedoms of the European Union apply and include the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. These (freedoms) must not be weakened. If we soften our stance in this regard, we’ll end up in a cherry picking scenario which would catch up with us at the end of the day, just as we have already experienced, by analogy, the opt-outs that were made in order to reach an agreement with Great Britain, but which have all caught up with us in the end. We must not make this mistake a second time” (Gunther Krichbaum, CDU/CSU, Government, National Parliament, (12.09.2018)).¹⁷

In summary, the position of German governments on DI is a compromise between trying to maintain the ability to form a political consensus, serving Germany’s ‘national interest’ and keeping policies in the EU as homogenous as possible. This is reflected in the fact that the opposition and government take a generally negative stance on DI. However, specific policies that are in the interest of one of Germany’s parties are evaluated positively. Furthermore, general references to DI have focused mostly on demands by other countries and especially by the United Kingdom in the context of Brexit. However, when the debate focused on specific issues, they mainly concerned policies that were in favour of Germany’s interest or those of one of its political parties. Finally, Germany’s historical role and responsibility in Europe is often referenced regarding its position. Accordingly, keeping the EU undivided and harmonious is a core German government objective and its position can be summarised as homogenisation if possible, DI if necessary.

Europa in zwei Geschwindigkeiten und sorgt für mehr Arbeitsmigranten aus Nicht-Euro-Ländern wie Polen, Ungarn und Bulgarien. Wenn Sie das alles wollen, kann ich Ihnen nur sagen: Das hat mit Zusammenhalt, mit dem Kohäsionsgedanken nichts, aber auch gar nichts zu tun.

¹⁵ Wir haben es immer wieder zu Recht betont: Der Binnenmarkt ist kein à la carte Menu, seine vier Freiheiten sind unteilbar, und hierzu gehört die Personenfreizügigkeit, die Europa ausmacht. Das hat auch London verstanden. (Beifall bei der SPD sowie bei Abgeordneten der CDU/CSU und des BÜDNISSES 90/ DIE GRÜNEN).

¹⁶ Es stellt sich dann die Frage: Wie kann das zukünftige Verhältnis zwischen Großbritannien und der EU überhaupt aussehen? Die Formulierungen kennen wir: Kein Europa à la carte! Kein Rosinenpicken! Und wir wissen: Die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union muss immer einen Mehrwert haben.

¹⁷ Gerade im Hinblick auf den Handelsbereich gelten die vier Grundfreiheiten der Europäischen Union einschließlich der Jurisdiktion des Europäischen Gerichtshofes. Diese dürfen nicht aufgeweicht werden. Würden wir eine Aufweichung zulassen, könnte es zu einer Rosinenpickerei kommen, die uns am Ende des Tages einholen würde, genauso wie wir es analog schon einmal mit den Opt-outs erlebten, die gemacht wurden, um Einigkeit mit Großbritannien hinzubekommen, die uns aber am Ende alle eingeholt haben. Diesen Fehler dürfen wir kein zweites Mal machen.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Overview of the documents analysed

	Category of document	Time period	Repositories	Details
1	Government programmes <i>Translation:</i> Regierungsprogrammen (nicht Wahlprogrammen), Koalitionsvereinbarung	2004-2020	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung ¹⁸ (Political Foundation, FDP, liberal party) Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung ¹⁹ (Political Foundation, CDU, mid-right, conservative party)	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
2	First speeches (and parliamentary debate) <i>Translation:</i> Regierungserklärung	2004-2020	Bundestag Plenarprotokolle ²⁰ (Parliamentary protocols)	2005, 2009, 2013, 2018
3	European Council Presidency speeches (and parliamentary debate) a. In the National Parliament b. in the European Parliament	2004-2020	Bundestag Plenarprotokolle (Parliamentary protocols) Europäischer Rat ²¹ (European Council)	2007
4	Future of Europe speeches (and parliamentary debates) a. in the European Parliament b. for citizen consultation	2017-2020	EU Parliament ²² (European Parliament) Citizen consultation: Bundestag Plenarprotokolle (Parliamentary protocols)	2018
5	Prime Minister European Council Statements	2004-2020	Homepage der Bundeskanzlerin ²³	2009-2019
6	Parliamentary (committee) debates	2008, 2012, 2017-2020	Bundestag Plenarprotokolle	2008, 2012, 2017-2020

¹⁸ <https://www.fes.de/bibliothek/koalitionsvereinbarungen-der-spd-auf-bundesebene>

¹⁹ <https://www.kas.de/de/web/geschichte-der-cdu/koalitionsvertraege>

²⁰ <https://pdok.bundestag.de/>

²¹ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20070117+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//DE&language=DE#creitem4>


²² <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-dr-angela-merkel-1550156>

²³ <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/866576!search>


Appendix 2 Translations of the key words used

Keyword	German Translation	Notes
DI models (conceptual key words)		
Differentiated integration	Differenzierte Integration, Flexible Integration, Flexible europäische Integration, Differenzierte europäische Integration, Differenzierte Integrationsprozesse, Flexible Integrationsprozesse, F/D -schritte, homogene I., einheitliche I.	No reference found for any of those synonyms.
Coalition of the willing	Koalition der Willigen	
Two-speed Europe	Europa der zwei Geschwindigkeiten, Europa der unterschiedlichen Geschwindigkeiten	No hits for: Europa zweier Geschwindigkeiten, Europa der verschiedenen Geschwindigkeiten (Although they are used in academic texts)
Multi-speed Europe	Europa der mehreren Geschwindigkeiten	
Variable geometry	Variablen Geometrie	
Core Europe	Kerneuropa	
Two-tier Europe	Zweiklasseneuropa	
Concentric circles	Konzentrische Kreise	
à la carte	à la carte	
Future of Europe	Zukunft Europas	Sometimes 'EU's future'
DI mechanisms		
Enhanced cooperation	Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit	Also used in many other contexts
opt-out	opt-out	The English word is used
DI instances (enhanced cooperation)		
Pesco	Pesco	The English word is used
Rome III	Rom III	
Unitary patent	Einheitspatent, Europäisches Patent mit einheitlicher Wirkung, einheitliches Patent,	
Matrimonial property regimes	Güterstand, Güterrecht	
Financial Transaction Tax	Finanztransaktionssteuer (FTS), Finanztransaktionsteuer	Oftentimes written grammatically wrong as "Finanztransaktionsteuer"
European Public Prosecutor	Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft	
DI instances (opt-out policy fields)		
Schengen	Schengen	
Economic and Monetary Union	Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion	
Security and Defence Policy	Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik	
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice	Raum der Freiheit, Sicherheit und des Rechts	
Charter of Fundamental Rights	Charta der Grundrechte der EU, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, EU-Grundrechtcharta,	
Social Charter	Sozialcharta	
DI instances (inter se agreements)		
Prüm Convention	Prümer Vertrag	
European Stability Mechanism	Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus	
Fiscal Compact	Fiskalpakt	
Single Resolution Mechanism	Einheitlicher Bankenabwicklungsmechanismus, Einheitlicher Abwicklungsmechanismus	
Unified Patent Court	(Einheitliches) Patentgericht	
DI instances (external agreements)		
European Economic Area	Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum	
Customs Union + Turkey	Zollunion + Türkei	
Eastern Partnership	Östliche Partnerschaft, Partnerschaft mit dem Osten	
Euromed	Euromed, Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft, Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft	


Appendix 3 The frequency of conceptual key words in 2011 and 2019



Appendix 4 The Future of Europe Debate vs conceptual key words in parliamentary debates



Appendix 5 The frequency of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates in 2012 and 2014



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