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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU)

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do
Governments Want? Country Report - Greece

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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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Natalia Tellidou

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Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU) is a Horizon 2020 funded research project aimed at contributing concretely to the current debate on the 'Future of Europe' by assessing, developing and testing a range of models and scenarios for different levels of integration among EU member states. InDivEU begins from the assumption that managing heterogeneity and deep diversity is a continuous and growing challenge in the evolution of the EU and the dynamic of European integration.

The objective of InDivEU is to maximize the knowledge of Differentiated Integration (DI) on the basis of a theoretically robust conceptual foundations accompanied by an innovative and integrated analytical framework, and to provide Europe's policy makers with a knowledge hub on DI. InDivEU combines rigorous academic research with the capacity to translate research findings into policy design and advice.

InDivEU comprises a consortium of 14 partner institutions coordinated by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, where the project is hosted by the European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP). The scientific coordinators of InDivEU are Brigid Laffan (Robert Schuman Centre) and Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zürich).

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**Integrating
Diversity in the
European Union**

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Abstract

Two main questions regarding differentiated integration (DI) in Greece are the focus of the report, how salient was DI for Greek governments and what positions Greek governments have on DI. First, the salience analyses show that differentiated integration (DI) was a low salience issue in Greece during most of the years in this analysis. Parliamentary debates were the most likely arena for discussions on DI. By contrast, references to DI in government programmes, prime minister speeches and European Council statements were sometimes relevant. Second, the positions of Greek governments with regard to DI were determined by considerations of how Greece was positioned regarding EU membership before and after the economic crisis. Before the crisis, as a member of the eurozone and following EU policies and directives in the fields of defence, taxation and justice and security, Greece belonged to core Europe. During the crisis, Greek governments, especially the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government, were concerned that this approach jeopardised the Greek path to recovery and would ultimately hurt the national interest. This dilemma made the Greek position highly context-dependent and pragmatic: the expressed desire to remain at the 'core of Europe' did not always correspond with actual policy choices.

Keywords

Greece, economy and debt, core Europe, defence, sea policies and migration

Summary of Results

I. Salience

The salience analyses show that differentiated integration (DI) was a low salience issue in Greece during most of the years in this analysis. Two key findings emerge. First, salience peaked around certain key events in which demand- and supply-side factors converged. On the supply side, treaty changes and the debate on the Future of Europe were key drivers of salience. On the demand side, concrete issues (i.e. the economy and debt) and strategic considerations (i.e. the position of Greece in the eurozone) drove salience. Second, most references to DI occurred at the concrete level of specific instances of DI, while the salience of DI models changed from the ‘multi-end points’ model in 2008 to a balance between the two models after 2015. During the debates on the Future of Europe (i.e. in 2017) there was again an increase in ‘multi-end points’ Europe references. Parliamentary debates were the most likely arena for discussions on DI. By contrast, references to DI in government programmes, prime minister speeches and European Council statements were sometimes relevant.

II. Position

The positions of Greek governments with regard to DI during the period under investigation were determined by considerations of how Greece was positioned regarding EU membership before and after the economic crisis. Before the crisis, as a member of the eurozone and following EU policies and directives in the fields of defence, taxation and justice and security, Greece belonged to core Europe. Hence, this was a common position shared among all the parties. During the crisis, Greek governments, especially the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government, were concerned that this approach jeopardised the Greek path to recovery and would ultimately hurt the national interest. This dilemma made the Greek position highly context-dependent and pragmatic: the expressed desire to remain at the ‘core of Europe’ did not always correspond with actual policy choices.

Regarding DI models, with the Future of Europe debate on the agenda, Greek governments occasionally debated the position of Greece in the EU. While until 2017 governments rejected the idea of a two-speed or two-tier Europe in contexts in which they feared for Greece’s EU (i.e. eurozone) membership or sought access to EU financial assistance (i.e. the ESM), more recently they have embraced the ‘multi-end points’ model. Regarding DI mechanisms, Greek governments perceived the enhanced co-operation in the Lisbon Treaty as a potential chance for Greece to be able to push some issues (i.e. defence, the economy, sea policies and migration) up the EU agenda. As for instances of DI, it was debated more intensely around important political junctures, such as the economic crisis and the EU response to it, agriculture issues, migration policy, human rights violations and lastly enlargement and environment issues closely linked to the sea and energy.

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1. Introduction

This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Greek government discourse in 2008, 2012 and 2017-2020. It also probes into the position of Greek governments on the issue of DI in the same time period.

The report distinguishes three levels of abstraction in government discourse on DI. **First**, two different models of DI are distinguished at the conceptual level. On the one hand, the ‘multi-speed EU’ model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. On the other hand, the ‘multi-end EU’ model depicts DI as a potentially permanent feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can ‘pick and choose’ to adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities. **Second**, the analysis focuses on mechanisms of DI. On the one hand, the enhanced cooperation mechanism allows a limited group of MSs – under certain conditions – to pursue deeper integration without having to involve all MSs. On the other hand, the ‘opt-out’ mechanism allows MSs to refrain from participating in common policies. In short, enhanced cooperation allows a MS to integrate more than other MSs, while ‘opt-outs’ allow a Member State to integrate less than other MSs. **Finally**, the analysis looks at various instances of differentiated policies and policy fields. A total of twenty-one instances are included in the analysis. They are grouped in four different categories: (a) instances of enhanced cooperation, (b) instances of opt-out policy fields, (c) instances of inter se agreements and (d) instances of external agreements. Inter se agreements are agreements which EU Member States conclude outside the framework of the European Union. External agreements are agreements between the EU and non-EU states.

The results are based on an analysis of various government documents: (a) government programmes, (b) prime minister speeches, (c) prime minister European Council statements and (d) parliamentary debates. The analysis proceeds from the more general (i.e. government programmes) to the more specific (i.e. Council statements/parliamentary debates). Further details are provided in Appendix 1.

The salience of DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances is assessed by counting key words in the above-mentioned documents (Appendix 2). The assumption is that the more a government talks about DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, the analysis of parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks. Regarding the government’s position, the results are based on a manual attitude analysis of parliamentary debates. To this end, references to DI key words in parliamentary debates were manually coded as negative, neutral or positive.

Regarding the particularities of the Greek case three main issues arise. First, the issue of the Greek language. Greek has acute accents and cases resulting in key words with 2 or 3 different alternative spellings and accents. In addition, Greek syntax allows parts of speech like adverbs to split specific two-word key phrases in this project. For these reasons, I chose to repeat the key words that fall in these two categories with all the possible alternations. For example, an alternation because of an accent is ‘à la carte’ Europe, which can take the forms *α λά καρτ*, *αλά καρτ*, *α λα καρτ* and *à la carte*. While an example of separated key words is ‘enhanced cooperation’ (*ενισχυμένη συνεργασία*), which was tricky and often separated or slightly altered. Appendix 2 contains the translated key words for the Greek case.

Second, regarding the collection of documents, certain coding decisions were made: (a) the inaugural prime minister speeches after elections are the government programmes; and (b) the PM closing speeches in programme debates are the prime minister speeches. This is because in the Greek parliament the leader of the elected party that receives the most votes leads the government and hence presents the government programme in his first speech during the first plenary session after the election. The debate with the other parties follows for three days. At the end of the procedure, the leader of the majority party is the last to receive the floor and this is followed by the vote to support the formation of the government.

Last, parliamentary debates in committees could not be retrieved since the majority are only available in video format, making it impossible to search for DI key words. The solution was to look at the plenary sessions. In plenary sessions, debates tend to be broader than in parliamentary committees, where issues are dealt with in detail. Additionally, members of parliament avoid discussing technical issues in plenary sessions since these debates receive all the media coverage and the language tends to be simplistic. This can explain why DI models were more frequently mentioned while DI mechanisms and DI instances are not so frequent, with the sole exception of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which became salient during the economic crisis.

Moreover, the collection was limited to the years 2008, 2012, 2017-2020, when key events at the EU level (i.e. treaties, the debate on the Future of Europe) took place and increased the chance of being discussed in the Greek parliament.¹ In total, 914 documents were manually searched as the search repository did not support searches for specific key words. It is worth mentioning that even though all the years of the Greek economic crisis are not covered in this selection, an accurate picture can be drawn because of the inclusion of 2012, which was the peak of the Greek crisis when Nea Dhmokratia was in power, and 2017-2019, when SYRIZA-ANEL was in government. In addition, all the government programmes, debates and PM speeches in 2004-2019 were included to analyse the salience of key DI words.

The second section of the report details the results of the salience analysis. The third section details the results of the position analysis.

2. How salient was DI for Greek governments?

2.1 Government programmes

In a first step, Greek government programmes in 2004-2019 were analysed to gauge the salience of DI with regard to domestic political visions. Eight programmes were analysed, including the 2011 coalition government of Nea Dhmokratia (ND), PASOK and LAOS after the resignation of PM Papandreou, and the other 2004-2019 governments (specifically the ND government in 2004, the ND government in 2007, the PASOK government in 2009, the ND, PASOK and DIMAR coalition government in 2012, the January 2015 SYRIZA and ANEL coalition government, the September 2015 SYRIZA and ANEL coalition government and the 2019 ND government). The computer-assisted word count analysis showed that government programmes refer only once to key words associated with DI models, specifically in 2011 for European concentric circles. Moreover, there were no mentions of DI mechanism or DI instances in these government programmes.

To evaluate how much Greek governments actually debated DI in their government programmes, and if the key words failed to capture references to DI, two additional analyses were conducted. First, a computer-assisted word count analysis was used to assess whether governments refer to EU-related issues and with what frequency in their programmes. This analysis showed that EU-related issues were central in any mention of people (λαός) and somewhat central regarding economic issues, with the exception of 2015 (Appendix 3). In the first 2015 government we see that the EU and economic issues were mentioned relatively equally, while in the second government six months later the distance between economic issues and the EU tripled. In fact, this puzzling observation is a result of the intense round of negotiations that the SYRIZA-ANEL government attempted with the EU over a new EU/IMF memorandum of understanding. In the second government a new EU-led deal had already been signed after a dramatic end with a last minute Greek referendum on the proposed EU economic deal and the issue was no longer salient.

¹ This period was also chosen because time restrictions did not allow more comprehensive research.

Second, a qualitative analysis of the government programmes was conducted. This analysis showed that there were indirect mentions of DI instances (i.e. the ESM, the fiscal compact and security and defence policy) in six documents. However, the speeches touched on these economic and defence issues only lightly, with slightly neutral to negative connotations for economic issues and slight positive connotations for defence. Obviously, Greece sought more solidarity on security issues from her EU partners since the Arab Spring revolutions could affect its security with its neighbours. Concerning economic issues and the 2015 elections, there was an indirect reference to economic issues after the first election and no reference whatsoever, either direct or indirect, after the second election. Interestingly, in his speech PM Tsipras mentioned ‘united Europe’ only at the beginning of his speech and only once.

In the 2004, 2007 and 2009 government programmes, the EU was only related to two main enlargement issues. The first was the possible enlargement with Turkey, which Greece supported if it respected the democratic values of the EU, and second, the ongoing enlargement in the western Balkans and Greece’s role in the negotiations. In fact, in 2003 Greece had initiated the Thessaloniki Summit about EU relations with the western Balkans, where guidelines regarding the enlargement process were discussed.

The first mention regarding the crisis came in 2009, when PM Papandreou mentioned that the Greek stability and convergence programme would ensure Greece’s position in the EU after its recent defamation regarding its transparency over public expenditure. In particular, the budget deficit exceeded 3% in 2007 and it was predicted that in 2009 it would reach 3.7%. In 2012, PM Samaras assured in many instances that Greece would continue to be part of the EU and the eurozone, responding to scenarios over a possible Grexit. As already mentioned regarding 2015, in the February government programme PM Tsipras said that the EU should reflect what the treaties mention on issues of democracy, equality and solidarity. However, in the October 2015 government programme he only mentioned ‘united Europe’ and refrained from any criticism of the EU but only of European elite powers. In both these programmes the EU was often related to the EU/IMF memorandum of understanding (μνημόνιο) for Greece and negotiations (διαπραγμάτευση) (Appendix 4).

Similarly, the issue of migration received only a brief indirect mention in 2012, while in 2015 PM Tsipras called for a European synchronisation of policies to create a common European migration policy that would respect human rights.

In sum, the quantitative and qualitative analyses of government programmes support the view that DI was a low salience issue during most of the period observed. In addition, the salience of EU-related issues was mostly driven by domestic politics (i.e. the economy) and somewhat by external European political junctures (i.e. enlargement, migration).

2.2 Key prime minister speeches

In the next step, various types of prime minister speeches in different contexts and venues were analysed. To begin with, the first speeches of new prime ministers after elections and the subsequent parliamentary debates were analysed to assess whether DI was a salient political issue in the domestic arena (Figure 3). The word count analysis showed that even though DI key words were rare, EU-related issues were raised with the highest numbers of mentions in the 2009 and 2012 PM first speeches and the 2018 EU Parliament PM speech. In the two first instances, the economic crisis in Greece was the main topic and the prevailing argument was that Greece wanted to remain in the eurozone and in the EU. Regarding the 2018 speech, the topic was the Future of Europe, which I discuss in the next paragraph. Similarly, the analysis of prime minister speeches in the national and European parliaments on the occasion of taking over the presidency of the Council of the European Union showed no use of DI key words. Unsurprisingly, however, EU-related issues appeared with high frequency as did economic issues in most of the years (Appendix 5).


Regarding the European Union’s White Paper on the Future of the European Union, the position of the Greek government changed quite spectacularly. To begin with, in 2017 after an EU council, PM Tsipras clearly adopted a position of “those who want more do more.”² He talked about the importance of deepening cooperation in the area of social standards. Later that year, a heated debate between the Government and the opposition on the official position of Greece in the Future of Europe debate led Minister Katrougalos to slightly reposition the government stance, avoiding, however, talking about a ‘two-speed’ Europe but instead arguing that Greece should stay in the core of the EU. In a subsequent address to the Greek citizens in 2018 the PM, along with the French President, highlighted that the EU should aim for:

1. a eurozone with a common budget for all the Member States
2. a democratic EU that promotes social rights

These priorities seem to align with the fifth scenario in the White Paper of “doing much more together” rather than the third scenario. This puzzling observation can be explained by the fact that SYRIZA has had different positions on the EU compared with the two main parties, ND and PASOK, which reaffirmed Greece’s position in the EU until 2015 when SYRIZA came into power. However, the government’s position changed from 2017 to 2018, which might also be to do with internal processes in the party.

Last, a comparison was made between the PM first speeches and the subsequent debates. The debates, which are circled in blue in Figure 1, show that discussion of DI was relatively salient in 2011, 2015 and 2019. To begin with, for the ‘multiple end points’ DI model we see that ‘core Europe’, ‘à la carte’ and ‘concentric circles’ were frequently mentioned in the debates in 2009 and 2011, while the most frequent mentions of ‘core Europe’ were in the debate in 2007. For the ‘multi-speeds’ DI model, we can observe that it was frequently mentioned after 2015. This observation builds on the fact that the two mainstream parties up until 2015, PASOK and ND, positioned the country as part of core Europe. The SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government seems to have introduced two-speed Europe into the debate. Regarding DI mechanisms, there are no mentions of either enhanced cooperation or opt-outs. However, concerning DI instances we see that the ESM, the Fiscal compact and Pesco were mentioned in some debates. Of course, the ESM received the most attention in 2012, 2015 and 2019. The Fiscal compact only received attention after the first election in 2015 and Pesco only in 2019.

Figure 1 - DI in PM speeches and the subsequent debates



key words: core, esm, two-speeds, à la carte*, à la carte*, multi speed*, core*, à la carte*, fiscal compact*, stability mechanism*, concentric circles, Pesco

² I discuss this point more in the second section on the position of the Greek government and opposition on the Future of Europe.

Next, holistic grading was used to validate these results. To this end, government programmes, prime minister speeches and the subsequent parliamentary debates between 2002 and 2018 (n=30) were carefully read and a score between 0 (no reference to DI) and 2 (direct/central reference to DI) was assigned to each document. Due to the low number of documents and the subjectivity involved in assigning a holistic score to a document, the results should not be interpreted literally but instead they provide a rough approximation of the salience of DI. The overall salience score for all the documents is 1.2, which corresponds to a high salience of DI. To begin with, government programmes and PM first speeches have a rather low salience as was also evident in the quantitative analysis. In fact, government programmes have 0.5 salience and PM first speeches 0.66. The general medium high salience is observed in the debates and speeches in the EP and on the Future of Europe. The results so far suggest three conjectures. First, DI was a high salience issue most of the time in government debates. Of course, this is closely linked to the economic crisis in Greece. Second, DI was debated to a lesser extent compared to economic issues related to other important political issues, such as agriculture, migration policy and energy policy. Third, references to DI were more likely to occur in political debates in parliament than in PM speeches or government programmes. This shows a tendency for the opposition to bring up issues related to DI rather than the government.


2.3 Parliamentary debates

Next, the analysis focused on parliamentary (committee) debates in 2008, 2012 and 2017-2020.³ Manual counts of key words in each parliamentary plenary session document were used as data. As before, three sets of key words were used. At the level of DI models, plotting the frequency of key words over time (Figure 2) shows several things. First, DI was a low salience issue throughout the entire period, with a total of 88 references and never more than 26 references a year. Second, the salience of DI models varied significantly over time, with no clear trend. However, the years under analysis cannot illustrate a complete picture of DI key words over time. Third, peaks in salience appear to correspond mainly to Treaty changes (2008: Lisbon), the economic crisis in Greece (2012) and debates on the Future of Europe (2017), but again this is only observed in the limited time period. Finally, the figure shows that the salience of DI was lowest in 2018.⁴

³ The Greek case had to be limited to this period. For further information, see the section on the particularities of the Greek case.

⁴ In addition to conceptual DI key words, the report also searched for the key phrase ‘future of Europe.’ Debates on the FoE did not frequently occur in plenary sessions. After a question was posed by the opposition party regarding the FoE debate, the president of the parliament concluded the first round of talks by assigning the debate to be discussed further by a specific parliamentary committee. Of course, comparing only 6 years of DI key words from the 39 years that Greece has been a member of the European Community and the EU cannot present a full picture of the salience of DI in Greece (Appendix 8).

Figure 2 - The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates




The next question was whether there was variation in the salience of particular key words and whether these words corresponded to particular events/time periods. Breaking down the total of all the key words for DI models in the entire period studied shows several things. First, some key words were more frequent than others. In particular, ‘multi-speed Europe’ and ‘core Europe’ account for almost two thirds of all the references to conceptual key words. Second, the two key words respectively relate to the ‘multiple speeds’ and ‘multiple end points’ models of DI. In fact, the share of the two DI models (adding up the key words for each model) shows a clear preference for ‘multiple end points,’ with 68%, while ‘multiple speeds’ receives only 21%. Third, breakdowns in three different peak years show that the distribution of conceptual key words varied significantly across peak years: 39% of the key words in 2017 belong to the ‘multi-speed’ model and 39% to ‘multi end points.’ For 2008 the corresponding figure is 65% for ‘multi-speed.’ One possible explanation of this discrepancy in less than a decade is that the position of Greece in Europe changed significantly during the economic crisis. Interestingly, both the peaks have a connection with a treaty change (Lisbon I) and the debate on the Future of Europe. Furthermore, in the year 2012 the ‘multiple end points’ model was salient while after 2018 the same model takes the lead again but with a smaller difference to the ‘multi-speed’ model (Appendix 7). Regarding this puzzling observation, a tentative idea, since the analysis cannot point to any specific explanation, is that Greece as part of the European Community from 1981 positioned itself as part of core Europe. In addition, as was mentioned before, the two main parties that were elected as governments up until 2015 were PASOK and ND. For them, the position of Greece remained similar throughout the years and only seemed to come under scrutiny during the economic crisis. From the analysis this can only be spotted in 2012 and 2008. Unfortunately, we cannot see the more relevant years for this possible change since from 2013 to 2016 Greece underwent the peak of a political and economic crisis. Essentially, a new party, SYRIZA, that positioned ideologically more towards the left than PASOK, won twice the elections in 2015 and was able to form coalition governments with ANEL, a new party as well, that positioned more towards the right than ND. Moreover, in 2015 Greece underwent two general elections (January and September 2015) and a referendum on economic issues (July 2015). After the referendum SYRIZA lost its majority in the parliament because of a party split that changed considerably its internal dynamics and slightly decreased its left radicalism.

Next, the analysis moved from the level of DI models to the level of specific DI mechanisms, namely ‘enhanced co-operation’ and ‘opt-outs.’ Both are differential integration mechanisms, but while enhanced co-operation is driven by a preference for more integration, opt-outs are driven by a preference for less. The distribution of references to DI mechanisms over time (Figure 3) shows, first, that DI

mechanisms were debated less intensely than the conceptual key words, with a total of 34 references to DI mechanisms and up to 15 references a year. Second, the peak years are the same as those for DI models. In particular, the highest peaks were in 2008, 2017 and also 2019 (Appendix 9).


Figure 3 - The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates



A breakdown by DI mechanisms shows that 65% of the references were to opt-outs and 35% to enhanced co-operation. Moreover, the peak years show interesting variations. The 2008 peak is situated in the context of the Lisbon I referendum, which explains the greater focus on the question of opt-outs. The 2017 peak shows a greater focus on opt-outs, which was in the context of the debate on the FoE.


Next, the analysis moves from the level of DI mechanisms to the level of specific DI instances. First, the focus is on enhanced co-operation. For the analysis, enhanced co-operation was broken down into six instances (Figure 4). Pesco is included here, even though it is not formally an instance of enhanced co-operation. A temporal analysis of the aggregated enhanced co-operation DI instances showed that Greek governments hardly referred to any of the six instances before 2019. In that year the number of references was higher than in the previous years, with 19 references connected to the European public prosecutor. The peak in 2017 stemmed from references to Pesco.

Figure 4 - The salience of instances of enhanced co-operation



Regarding opt-outs, the analysis focused on EU policies for which at least one Member State has an opt-out. While the total of 22 references to these policies is relatively low (Figure 5), they indicate the salience of debates on opting out of a particular policy field. However, Greece has not had any opt-out. The peak for Schengen and EMU seems to be linked with the economic crisis and discussion of a Grexit.


Figure 5 - Breakdown of opt-out policy fields 2008, 2012, 2017-2020 (n=22)



Finally, the analysis moves from instances of internal DI to instances of external DI, such as inter se agreements and association agreements. Inter se agreements are international agreements among EU Member States, allowing them to circumvent the institutional constraints of the community method. The analysis included five inter se agreements. A temporal analysis (Figure 6) of the aggregated key words showed that they appeared in Greek parliamentary debates in all the years studied. Overall, the most frequent key words related to the 'European Stability Mechanism' (76%), the 'Prum convention' (18%) and the 'Fiscal Compact' (4%), all of which were clearly related to the eurocrisis. Unfortunately, regarding the Prum convention, the limited number of years under analysis cannot explain if it was a salient issue or not since the comparison with the other DI instances does not cover a large part of the economic crisis, in which other DI instances might have received more mentions. Discussions on inter se agreements in the Greek parliament dramatically peaked in 2017, when the key phrase 'European Stability Mechanism' appeared 63 times and the 'Fiscal compact' appeared 3 times. Neither the dramatic increase in 2017 nor the fact that well over 80% of the key words in the category of inter se agreements


relate to the eurocrisis point to any meaningful conclusions. It could be that very high levels of politicisation were driven by the functional pressures of the eurocrisis but the empirical analysis does not support this view.

Figure 6 - The salience of instances of inter se agreements



Four instances of external association agreements were included in the analysis. Figure 7 shows that 50% of the key word references were to the EEA, making it by far the most salient external association agreement. Moreover, dividing the agreements into two market-centred ones (EEA and customs union) and one mixed agreement (Euromed), they stand in a 78/22 relation. Finally, regional differences in salience emerge: (1) the Eastern Partnership is hardly salient at all, (2) the southern agreements (Euromed and the Turkish customs union) are more salient, and (3) the EEA agreement is by far the most salient.

Figure 7 - Breakdown of external association agreements – 2008, 2012, 2017-2020 (n=18)



2.4 European Council statements by prime ministers

In a final step, the analysis turns to twenty-two prime minister post-European Council press statements between 2012 and 2020. In these statements, the prime ministers informed the Greek citizens about the agendas and results of European Council meetings. Subsequently, journalists could address the prime

minister with questions. As such, these statements were used as sources of information on the intersection between domestic and European politics in which prime ministers were most likely to formulate clear positions on EU membership and European integration. Overall, the European Council statements confirm the previous findings. Several results stand out. The frequency of Council statements increased slightly from 2015 onwards. This resonates with the 2015 elections and the start of negotiations with the EU on the Greek economic programme. The increased frequency of Council statements also coincides with a rise in ‘changing the EU’ rhetoric (Appendix 10).

Moreover, key words referring to DI models were often used in Council statements from 2016 to 2018, pointing more to the ‘multi-end points’ model than the ‘multi-speed’ model. In contrast, key words for DI mechanisms were very rarely used, with the exceptions of 2012 and 2017, in which the enhanced cooperation mechanism was mentioned referring to talks on the Treaty and the FoE. It is worth pointing out that ‘opt-out,’ which was salient in the parliamentary debates, was never mentioned in the Council statements. Next the analysis moved to key words for DI instances. Overall, they appeared relatively often, particularly the ESM in 2016-2018 and the Single Resolution Mechanism in 2012-2014. It is worth pointing out that the key phrase ‘European Public Prosecutor,’ which was highly salient in parliamentary debates, was never referred to in Council statements. At the same time, the three inter se agreements which were salient in parliamentary debates do not appear in the Council statements at corresponding times (2012-2014). Finally, when distinguishing between prime ministers’ statements and the journalists’ questions, it turns out that it was the prime minister who always referred to key word for DI models. This happened on some occasions that the journalists were allowed to ask questions. Mostly, the PM made his speech and did not receive any questions.

3. What positions do Greek governments have on DI?

This section presents the positions of different Greek governments regarding DI. It is based on an analysis of parliamentary debates, government programmes and debates, PM speeches in parliament and PM Council statements. The section is divided in two subsections. The first subsection provides a quantitative overview of the distribution of positive, neutral and negative statements regarding DI models and DI mechanisms. The second subsection reconstructs different government positions on DI based on a qualitative assessment of selected statements (bold highlights added by the author). The qualitative section is structured chronologically to assess the impact of context on the various governments’ positions.

3.1 Quantitative overview of government positions

Regarding DI models, the analysis of parliamentary (committee) debates shows that assessments of the two models are rather **neutral** and characterised by **uncertainty** (Tables 1 and 2). Four observations stand out. First, the neutral assessment of DI applies to both DI models. Second, there is a significant difference between assessments of DI by government parties and by opposition parties, with the opposition parties taking a more negative position on the ‘multi-speed’ model. Third, while the overall assessment of DI is somewhat neutral, a substantial share of the statements made in parliamentary debates on the ‘multi-end’ model are positive. These positive statements predominantly endorse the view that Greece is part of ‘core Europe.’ This view is supported by the observation that most of the debates took part during the economic crisis and the position of Greece in Europe was frequently discussed. Fourth, the aggregate number of assessments changed over time, indicating that context matters. While the Lisbon Treaty referendum in 2008 triggered the fewest references to DI models, with the ‘multi-end points’ model getting positive assessments, assessments in the 2017+ debate on the Future of Europe were more neutral.

Figure 8 - Position on multi-speed Europe (two-speed + multi-speed)

(n = 12)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government	0	2	0
Opposition	5	3	2
2008	0	0	0
2012	1	0	0
2017-2020	4	5	2

Figure 9 - Position on multi-end Europe (two-tier + a la carte)

(n = 37)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government	2	10	8
Opposition	2	11	4
2008	1	0	4
2012	0	4	1
2017-2020	3	17	7

Assessments of the two DI models lean rather positively towards ‘multi end points,’ while there are some more negative instances for ‘multi-speed Europe.’ It seems that the opposition talks about the ‘multi-speed Europe’ model more often than the government. Neutral instances of ‘multi-speed Europe’ seem to relate to the fact that the key words were mentioned while criticising the position of the government and not while talking about how a specific DI model affects Greece.

Regarding DI mechanisms, the position of Greek governments was positive for ‘enhanced cooperation’ and neutral for ‘opt-out.’ Enhanced co-operation was an issue in the period after 2017. In that period, it was discussed positively by the government as an ideal way to move forward with other states that are willing to do so. The question of opting out from common European policies was neutral and seemed to have more of a negative than positive assessment in the debates and the speeches.

Figure 10 – Position on enhanced co-operation

(n = 12)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n = 11)	0	0	11
Opposition (n = 1)	0	1	0
2008	0	0	0
2012	0	1	2
2017-2020	0	0	7

Figure 11 - Position on "opt-outs"

(n = 18)	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government (n = 4)	3	5	2
Opposition (n = 8)	3	5	0
2008	3	3	0
2012	0	0	0
2017-2020	3	7	2

Overall, Greek governments were more neutral with regard to DI models than with regard to DI mechanisms.

3.2 *Qualitative assessment of government positions*

The qualitative analysis supports the view that Greek governments perceived DI predominantly in a neutral and slightly positive way in the period under investigation. This assessment ultimately derives from the governments understanding Greek EU membership as a means of economic modernisation and improved international political influence. This understanding of EU membership suggests that there was much domestic demand for more integration, particularly with regard to economic and defence policy. On the one hand, this understanding of EU membership justified the participation by Greece in EU policies even if they created inequalities that the domestic economy was not suited for and resulted in a prolonged economic crisis. On the other hand, enhanced co-operation with other Member States was seen as providing a chance to promote Greek influence in the EU. Therefore, Greek governments accepted the ‘multi-end points’ DI model in order to secure Greek political influence in the EU and financial assistance from it. The Future of Europe debate pushed the Greek government to re-evaluate the nature of its EU membership and to adopt a more positive attitude to enhanced co-operation in defence and security policy.

3.2.1 2008 – The Lisbon Treaty

In 2008, while the Lisbon Treaty debate was not mentioned as such, there were debates that touched on the ‘multi-end points’ model and the ‘opt-out’ DI mechanism in the parliament.

The government’s position

The government declared the position that Greece is part of ‘core Europe’ especially in matters of security and defence. As the Minister of Defence stated, “But it is a country that has spent and is spending significant sums on defence and with some inherent advantages. It belongs to the European Union and is even considered by many to belong to the so-called hard core.”⁵

Furthermore, on market competition, in a discussion on the constitutional review in which the European Commission ruled that a paragraph was inconsistent with what had been established in the European framework, Mr. Panagiotis Panagiotopoulos mentioned that Greece should respect the EU guidelines and not be part of an opt-out:

“As Minister of Labour I have seen the UK fighting to extend the validity of the opt-out, the famous individual employment contract. I have seen it. I have suffered it. I was a member of the Council of Ministers of the European Union and Mr. Molyviatis, the then fellow Foreign Minister, was leaving the room because he was repeatedly called by Mr. Jack Straw, his counterpart, who asked him, ‘What position will Greece take on opting out?’ ‘Why is Greece behaving like this on opting out?’ Be careful, we are talking about a decision for which Great Britain is one of the few countries that implements this regime. What does opt-out mean? Essentially, the abolition of the collective agreement and the possibility for the employee to conclude an individual employment contract with the employer, below the limits of collective agreements. **This means the abolition of collective bargaining in Europe.**”⁶

⁵ Original in Greek: “Όμως είναι μια χώρα, που έχει δαπανήσει και δαπανά σημαντικά ποσά για την άμυνα και με ορισμένα εγγενή πλεονεκτήματα. Ανήκει στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και μάλιστα θεωρείται από πολλούς ότι ανήκει στον αποκαλούμενο σκληρό πυρήνα.”

⁶ Original in Greek: “Εγώ έχω δει το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο ως Υπουργός Εργασίας να δίνει μάχες για να παρατείνει τη διάρκεια ισχύος του Opt-out, της περιφημής ατομικής σύμβασης εργασίας. Το έχω δει, το έχω υποστεί. Ήμουν μέλος του Συμβουλίου Υπουργών Εργασίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και έβγαινε από την αίθουσα ο κ. Μολυβιάτης, ο τότε συνάδελφος Υπουργός των Εξωτερικών, γιατί τον έπαιρνε επανειλημμένως τηλέφωνο ο κ. Τζακ Στρο, ο ομόλογός του και

Specifically, we can see his negative position on a possible opt-out in his follow-up statement:

“If the Karamanlis Government did not exist, then together with the governments of the French Goliaths, the Spanish Socialists – they are practically, Mr. President, in the European Council of Ministers of Labour – the Belgian Coalition Government and the Government of Cyprus. Luxembourg's creation of the so-called ‘blocking minority’ and the cessation of these issues would have extended opt-out clauses across the European continent.”⁷

The opposition's position

The opposition parties also seem to perceive Greece as part of ‘core Europe’ and criticised the government’s policies on social rights, specifically on same-sex couples. Here, a member of parliament, Mr. Panagiotis Sgouridis from Pasok, comments on it:

“And to be clear, unfortunately this pact [in Greece] on free cohabitation does not include same-sex couples. In France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, there are provisions and laws that allow this [same-sex couples]. We **are at the core of the European Union** and we believe that our tradition is something that is not in line with that.”⁸

Unfortunately, the rest of the conversation continued in the parliamentary committee and it was not possible to retrieve the transcripts.

3.2.2 2012 – The Financial Crisis: the Financial Transaction Tax and the Fiscal Compact

In 2012, Greece was already in economic crisis and PM Papandreou had resigned from his post. The second economic adjustment programme was signed in this year.

The government's position

The coalition of parties that created the Papadimos government – Pasok, ND and Dimokratiki Aristera – still supported the position of Greece in the eurozone as part of ‘core Europe,’ as is illustrated in this comment from ND:

“Colleague, we know that the road is uphill. With optimism, I appreciate, and with a plan that we will walk with. And we will walk it with the help and constructive contribution of all Greek women and all Greeks, but in the hard core of the eurozone.”⁹

Mr. Evangellos Venizelos, also pointed out the urgency of the crisis and the change in the EU:

“Nothing is self-evident anymore, nothing is acquired. The so-called European acquis has been affected by its hard core. And this does not concern – I repeat – just or mainly Greece, it concerns

του έλεγε, «τι θέση θα πάρει η Ελλάδα στο Opt-out», «γιατί η Ελλάδα συμπεριφέρεται έτσι στο Opt-out». Προσέξτε, μιλάμε για μια απόφαση για την οποία η Μεγάλη Βρετανία είναι από τις ελάχιστες χώρες, που εφαρμόζει το καθεστώς αυτό. Τι σημαίνει Opt-out; Ουσιαστικά η κατάργηση της συλλογικής συμβάσεως και η δυνατότητα του εργαζομένου να συνάπτει με τον εργοδότη ατομική σύμβαση εργασίας, κάτω από τα όρια των συλλογικών συμβάσεων. Αυτό σημαίνει την κατάργηση ουσιαστικά των συλλογικών συμβάσεων στην Ευρώπη.”

⁷ Original in Greek: “Εάν δεν υπήρχε η Κυβέρνηση Καραμανλή μαζί τότε με τις κυβερνήσεις των γκολικών της Γαλλίας, των σοσιαλιστών της Ισπανίας –υπάρχουν πρακτικά, κύριε Πρόεδρε, στα Ευρωπαϊκά Συμβούλια Υπουργών Εργασίας- με την Κυβέρνηση Συνασπισμού του Βελγίου, με την Κυβέρνηση της Κύπρου, με την Κυβέρνηση του Λουξεμβούργου να δημιουργήσουν τη λεγόμενη «blocking minority» και να σταματήσουν αυτά τα θέματα, θα είχαν επεκταθεί οι ρήτρες του opt-out σε ολόκληρη την ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο.”

⁸ Original in Greek: “Και για να γίνω σαφέστερος, δυστυχώς αυτό το σύμφωνο για την ελεύθερη συμβίωση δεν περιλαμβάνει τα ομόφυλα ζευγάρια. Στη Γαλλία, στη Γερμανία, στο Βέλγιο, στην Ολλανδία, στη Νορβηγία, στη Δανία, υπάρχουν διατάξεις και νομοθετήματα όπου αυτό το πράγμα επιτρέπεται. Εμείς βρισκόμαστε στο σκληρό πυρήνα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και θεωρούμε ότι η παράδοσή μας είναι κάτι το οποίο δεν συνάδει με το να μην προχωρήσουμε σε κάτι τέτοιο.”

⁹ Original in Greek: “Κύριε συνάδελφε, γνωρίζουμε ότι ο δρόμος είναι ανηφορικός. Με αισιοδοξία, εκτιμώ, και με σχέδιο ότι θα τον περπατήσουμε. Και θα τον περπατήσουμε με την αρωγή και την εποικοδομητική συνεισφορά όλων των Ελληνίδων και όλων των Ελλήνων, μέσα, όμως, στο σκληρό πυρήνα της Ευρωζώνης.”

all the Member States of the European Union and in particular the eurozone. It's not just about countries that are part of a programme or are in the lobby of support and adjustment programmes. And these countries are unfortunately many and among them are big and strong countries.”¹⁰

The government also received criticism from members of the ND party, as is shown by Ms. Mpakogianni discussing the handling of bondholders in Greece. However, she also pointed to the position of Greece in the core of Europe even during the crisis.

“And the Government, which unfortunately has no significant task to highlight, risks giving arguments to those who are turning both against the country's European orientation and against Greece's participation in the hard core of the eurozone. Proof of this, Mr. Minister – and I am sorry that the Prime Minister is not here, because for me it is a major issue of moral order – the issue of bondholders, natural person bondholders, who trusted the Greek state, who trusted the Greek state, who put what they have and don't have in Greek bonds, who did not go to deposit the one hundred thousand that they had in the banks or possibly abroad and these people are today literally mocked, Mr. Minister. I say this because Juncker's statements to the eurogroup last Monday night proved that the PASOK-New Democracy government had not entered into this negotiation so that it could secure individuals and not, of course, speculative hedge funds.”¹¹

We also see enhanced cooperation as something that Greece is regarding as positive. In one of the Prime Minister's post-EU Council statements, he says:

“We have a trend, which today exists in Europe and which I hope will quickly become a reality, towards a common unified European tax policy for companies. We have an enhanced partnership, which has already been proposed, 11 countries. Greece is one of the first to have a tax on financial transactions. So that the product of this tax is given to countries with the greatest needs.”¹²

Obviously, Greece expected that the gains from such a unified European tax could be much more than the losses. In any case, companies that still had their business in Greece were severely affected during the crisis and were forced to either close or move to neighbouring countries. In the end, Konstantinos Markopoulos from ND also criticised ‘multi-speed’ Europe and discussed how Greece and the EU could change from this crisis:

“History is a relentless judge of everything. I am not your judge, nor are you mine. This is temporary. History will not write for us. History will write about whether Greece escaped the grip of the crisis,

¹⁰ Original in Greek: “Τίποτα δεν είναι πια αυτονόητο, τίποτα δεν είναι κεκτημένο. Έχει θιγεί στον σκληρό του πυρήνα το λεγόμενο ευρωπαϊκό κεκτημένο. Και αυτό δεν αφορά –επαναλαμβάνω- μόνη ή κυρίως την Ελλάδα, αφορά το σύνολο των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και ιδίως της Ευρωζώνης. Δεν αφορά μόνο τις χώρες που είναι ενταγμένες σε πρόγραμμα ή βρίσκονται στον προθάλαμο της ένταξης σε προγράμματα στήριξης και προσαρμογής. Και οι χώρες αυτές είναι δυστυχώς πολλές και μεταξύ αυτών χώρες μεγάλες και ισχυρές.”

¹¹ Original in Greek: “Η δε Κυβέρνηση, η οποία δυστυχώς δεν έχει κανένα σημαντικό έργο να αναδείξει, κινδυνεύει να δώσει επιχειρήματα σε εκείνους που στρέφονται και εναντίον του ευρωπαϊκού προσανατολισμού της χώρας αλλά και εναντίον της συμμετοχής της Ελλάδος στον σκληρό πυρήνα της Ευρωζώνης.

Απόδειξη τρανή, κύριε Υπουργέ –και λυπάμαι που δεν είναι εδώ ο Πρωθυπουργός, διότι για εμένα είναι μείζον θέμα ηθικής τάξεως- το θέμα των ομολογιούχων, των φυσικών προσώπων ομολογιούχων, οι οποίοι εμπιστεύθηκαν το ελληνικό κράτος, οι οποίοι εμπιστεύθηκαν την ελληνική πολιτεία, οι οποίοι έβαλαν ό,τι έχουν και δεν έχουν σε ελληνικά ομόλογα, οι οποίοι δεν πήγαν να καταθέσουν τα εκατό χιλιάδικα που είχαν στις τράπεζες ή ενδεχομένως στο εξωτερικό και αυτοί οι άνθρωποι βρίσκονται σήμερα στην κυριολεξία εμπαιγμένοι, κύριε Υπουργέ.

Το λέω αυτό, διότι οι δηλώσεις Γιούνκερ στο Eurogroup το βράδυ της περασμένης Δευτέρας απέδειξαν ότι η συγκυβέρνηση ΠΑΣΟΚ - Νέας Δημοκρατίας δεν είχε προχωρήσει σε μία τέτοιου είδους διαπραγμάτευση, ώστε να μπορέσει να διασφαλίσει τα φυσικά πρόσωπα και όχι βεβαίως τα κερδοσκοπικά hedge funds. Υπάρχει πάρα πολύ μεγάλη διαφορά ανάμεσα στους μεν και στους δε. “

¹² Original in Greek: “Έχουμε μια τάση, η οποία σήμερα υπάρχει στην Ευρώπη και η οποία ελπίζω να γίνει γρήγορα πραγματικότητα, για μια κοινή ενοποιημένη φορολογική ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική για τις εταιρίες. Έχουμε μια ενισχυμένη συνεργασία, η οποία ήδη έχει προταθεί, 11 χώρες μέσα, είναι και η Ελλάδα από τις πρώτες, για να υπάρχει φόρος επί των χρηματοπιστωτικών συναλλαγών. Ωστε, το προϊόν αυτό του φόρου να δοθεί στις χώρες που έχουν τις μεγαλύτερες ανάγκες.”

whether it knelt down and bowed down, whether you realised the vision of the Greek people for the true Europe of solidarity or whether you satisfied the interest-bearing Europe of two speeds, the north and the south, that is, if you have served against the interests of the country.”¹³

The opposition's position

During this period the opposition criticised the benefits of a possible enhanced cooperation, as did Mr. Karathanosopoulos, KKE, in one of his speeches:

“At the same time, the agreement itself confirms the fact through the possibility of enhanced cooperation between Member States in a group of at least nine Member States that will be able to proceed with individual political and economic cooperation agreements, setting the conditions for a European Union, a multi-speed Europeanisation depending on particular interests and economic strength. The result of these measures and the new treaty on fiscal stability will be an increasingly cheap labour force, will be galley working conditions in order to simply shield competitiveness and support the profitability of monopoly groups.”¹⁴

3.2.3 2017-2020: The Future of Europe

The government's position

In 2017, the debate on the Future of Europe was present in the Hellenic parliament and in prime minister speeches. This statement after the EU Council is an example:

“However, I stressed the need not to talk about a multi-speed Europe, but about a Europe of many options. It cannot be our vision of a very conservative view of the Europe of the strong, the hard core, and some others who will follow. Of course, those of us who want to deepen our cooperation – political and social deepening of our cooperation – cannot stand still, because some people choose à la carte Europe, that is, participation in the good, but where there is an obligation to give to not want to give, such as to refugees, where some countries refuse solidarity. I therefore prioritise the debate on the evolution of Europe in the direction of strengthening social convergence and social cohesion. I spoke of the need for all of us to open our papers, but also to make it clear to those countries that feel threatened that they will be at second or third speed, that we are not talking about exclusions, that we are not talking, if you will, about divisions or exceptions for countries from the current existing European integration institutions, i.e. the eurozone or Schengen, but that instead we are talking about the possibility for those who wish to proceed to an even deeper unification of cooperation and joint action. I said that this, in order to proceed properly, has two conditions. The first condition is that this whole discussion takes place and that the decisions be taken within the framework of the European Treaties and in particular in accordance with Article 20 of the Treaty of Lisbon. We cannot bypass European conditions or, even worse, overcome them in the absence of the people, in the absence of the citizens. So there is a framework for doing all this. Second, the condition, I have already said it, I think, that these enhanced partnerships should be open, without

¹³ Original in Greek: “Η ιστορία είναι αμείλικτος κριτής των πάντων. Δεν είμαι εγώ κριτής δικός σας, ούτε εσείς δικός μου. Αυτό είναι πρόσκαιρο. Η ιστορία δεν θα γράψει για μας. Η ιστορία θα γράψει για το αν η Ελλάδα ξέφυγε από τη μέγερη της κρίσης, αν γονάτισε και αν έσκυψε, αν εσείς υλοποιήσατε το όραμα των Ελλήνων πολιτών για την πραγματική Ευρώπη της αλληλεγγύης ή αν ικανοποιήσατε την τοκογλυφική Ευρώπη των δύο ταχυτήτων, του Βορρά και του Νότου, εάν υπηρέτησατε δηλαδή ενάντια στα συμφέροντα της χώρας.”

¹⁴ Original in Greek: “Ταυτόχρονα η ίδια η συμφωνία επιβεβαιώνει το γεγονός μέσα από τη δυνατότητα ενισχυμένης συνεργασίας ανάμεσα στα κράτη μέλη σε μια ομάδα εννέα τουλάχιστον κρατών-μελών που θα μπορούν να προχωρήσουν σε επιμέρους συμφωνίες πολιτικής και οικονομικής συνεργασίας διαμορφώνοντας τις συνθήκες και τις προϋποθέσεις για μια Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, για μια ευρωζώνη πολλαπλών ταχυτήτων ανάλογα με τα ιδιαίτερα συμφέροντα και την οικονομική ισχύ.

Το αποτέλεσμα αυτών των μέτρων και της νέας συνθήκης για τη δημοσιονομική σταθερότητα θα είναι η ολοένα και πιο φτηνή εργατική δύναμη, θα είναι οι συνθήκες εργασιακής γαλέρας με σκοπό απλά και μόνο να θωρακιστεί η ανταγωνιστικότητα και να στηριχθεί η κερδοφορία των μονοπωλιακών ομίλων. “

exclusions and exceptions. I have given you, I think, a very broad framework of what has been discussed and I am open to your questions.”¹⁵

However, there seems to also be a slightly different approach to which DI model Greece belongs to on the issue of the eurozone, as the Minister of Finance, Mr. Stathakis, commented:

“So, with the closing of the political agreement, we turn the page. Completion of the second assessment now paves the way for a visible passable field in which the country can, under normal circumstances, return to a path of development. Our task is to mobilise all the forces that are many today and we hope that they will multiply in the future, that within the European Union want to keep the country at its core and facilitate the Greek economy to be on a path of strong economic and social development and justice, recognising the great cost that Greek society has paid over the past seven years.”¹⁶

The debate on the position of Greece in the EU seemed to continue in 2018, and the Prime Minister clarified his position in a Council statement and his speech on the Future of Europe to the citizens:

“It is clear that these forces, which do not want European solutions, have brought to our borders our European cooperation, our operation at the highest level of 28, at the level of leaders. In this context, all the others agreed that we should not be left behind because some people do not want us all to move forward together. And we have agreed to move forward with a network of partnerships to ensure that flows are managed on terms that protect the Schengen Agreement and allow the fairest possible distribution of burdens.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Original in Greek: “Τόνισα, όμως, την ανάγκη να μη μιλάμε για την Ευρώπη των πολλών ταχυτήτων, αλλά για την Ευρώπη των πολλών επιλογών. Δεν μπορεί να είναι όραμά μας μια πολύ συντηρητική αντίληψη περί της Ευρώπης των ισχυρών, του σκληρού πυρήνα, και κάποιων άλλων οι οποίοι θα ακολουθούν. Βεβαίως ούτε μπορούμε να συνεχίσουμε, όσοι επιθυμούμε να προχωρήσουμε στην εμβάθυνση της συνεργασίας μας – πολιτική και κοινωνική εμβάθυνση της συνεργασίας μας -, να μένουμε στάσιμοι, επειδή κάποιοι επιλέγουν την à la carte Ευρώπη, δηλαδή τη συμμετοχή στα καλά, αλλά εκεί όπου υπάρχει η υποχρέωση να δώσεις να μη θέλεις να δώσεις, όπως για παράδειγμα στο προσφυγικό, όπου κάποιες χώρες αρνούνται την αλληλεγγύη.

Έθεσα λοιπόν ως προτεραιότητα τη συζήτηση για την εξέλιξη της Ευρώπης στην κατεύθυνση της ενίσχυσης της κοινωνικής σύγκλισης και της κοινωνικής συνοχής. Μίλησα για την ανάγκη να ανοίξουμε όλοι τα χαρτιά μας, αλλά και να ξεκαθαρίσουμε προς τις χώρες εκείνες που αισθάνονται την απειλή ότι θα βρεθούν σε μια δεύτερη ή τρίτη ταχύτητα, ότι δε μιλάμε για αποκλεισμούς, ότι δε μιλάμε, αν θέλετε, για διαιρέσεις ή για εξαιρέσεις χωρών από τις σήμερα υφιστάμενες θεσμικές δομές ευρωπαϊκής ολοκλήρωσης, δηλαδή την ευρωζώνη ή το Schengen, αλλά ότι αντιθέτως μιλάμε για τη δυνατότητα όσοι το επιθυμούν να προχωρήσουν σε ακόμα βαθύτερη ενοποίηση της συνεργασίας και της κοινής τους δράσης.

Είπα ότι αυτό, για να προχωρήσει σωστά, έχει δύο προϋποθέσεις. Η πρώτη προϋπόθεση είναι όλη αυτή η συζήτηση να διεξαχθεί και οι αποφάσεις να παρθούν εντός του πλαισίου των ευρωπαϊκών συνθηκών και ειδικότερα σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 20 της Συνθήκης της Λισαβόνας. Δεν μπορούμε να παρακάμπτουμε τις ευρωπαϊκές συνθήκες ή ακόμα χειρότερα να τις υπερβαίνουμε ερήμην των λαών, ερήμην των πολιτών. Υπάρχει λοιπόν το πλαίσιο για να γίνουν όλα αυτά. Δεύτερον, η προϋπόθεση, την είπα ήδη νομίζω, αυτές οι ενισχυμένες συνεργασίες να είναι ανοικτές, χωρίς αποκλεισμούς και εξαιρέσεις. Σας έδωσα, νομίζω, ένα ευρύτατο πλαίσιο για το τι συζητήθηκε και είμαι ανοικτός στις ερωτήσεις σας.”

¹⁶ Original in Greek: “Με το κλείσιμο, λοιπόν, της πολιτικής συμφωνίας γυρίζουμε σελίδα. Η ολοκλήρωση της δεύτερης αξιολόγησης ξεκαθαρίζει πλέον τον δρόμο για ένα ορατό, βατό πεδίο μέσα στο οποίο η χώρα μπορεί υπό κανονικές συνθήκες να επιστρέψει σε τροχιά ανάπτυξης. Καθήκον μας είναι η συστράτευση όλων των δυνάμεων, που σήμερα είναι πολλές και ελπίζουμε να πληθύνουν στο μέλλον, που μέσα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση θέλουν και να διατηρήσουν τη χώρα στον σκληρό πυρήνα και να διευκολύνουν την ελληνική οικονομία να βρεθεί σε μία τροχιά ισχυρής οικονομικής ανάπτυξης και κοινωνικής δικαιοσύνης, αναγνωρίζοντας το μεγάλο κόστος, που έχει πληρώσει η ελληνική κοινωνία τα επτά αυτά χρόνια.”

¹⁷ Original in Greek: “Είναι σαφές ότι οι δυνάμεις αυτές που δεν θέλουν ευρωπαϊκές λύσεις έφεραν στα όριά της την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία μας, τη λειτουργία μας στο υψηλότερο επίπεδο των 28, στο επίπεδο των ηγετών. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, όλοι οι υπόλοιποι συμφωνήσαμε ότι δεν πρέπει να μείνουμε πίσω επειδή κάποιοι δεν θέλουν να προχωρήσουμε όλοι μαζί. Και συμφωνήσαμε να προχωρήσουμε σε ένα πλέγμα συνεργασιών, προκειμένου να διασφαλίσουμε τη διαχείριση των ροών με όρους που να προστατεύουν τη Συμφωνία Σένγκεν και να επιτρέπουν την όσο το δυνατόν πιο δίκαιη κατανομή των βαρών.”

“Europe's democratic restart should be based on economic and monetary union, the organic unity of which largely determines the viability of the European project as a whole. And organic unity cannot exist as long as it remains only monetary, but not economic union. That is, as long as, in the end, it is not transformed into a political union. Organic unity cannot exist as long as the current unprecedented economic and social deviation within it lasts. And between Member States and national societies. A divergence that is clearly in line with the European Union's statutory goals for balanced growth, full-time employment and social progress. This means that the eurozone should quickly be transformed from an institution of enhanced cooperation to an institution of enhanced solidarity.”¹⁸

In line with this, the issues of security and policing received attention again, as the economic crisis was not monopolising the agenda of parliamentary debates. In one of his speeches in the parliament PM Tsipras said:

“At the same time, we discussed and agreed to strengthen our cooperation in the field of border protection at the police level, but also with the establishment of the European Coast Guard and Border Guard, and also with the completion of the Return Regulation and the upgrade of the Asylum Service.

At the same time, in the field of security, we have agreed on measures to strengthen our cooperation and to address international terrorism and cyber-attacks. In particular, on the refugee issue, we agreed to strengthen our cooperation with the countries of transit and origin by looking forward to the EU-Arab summit to be held in Egypt in early 2019. An initiative that Greece, together with Cyprus, has supported and continues to support, recognising Egypt's crucial role in controlling refugee and migration flows from North Africa to Europe.”¹⁹

In 2019, ND won the election and formed the government. In his first speech, Prime Minister Mitsotakis stated:

“We do not believe in a multi-speed Europe. This only leads to the rise of populism and nationalism. We believe in a Europe that goes together, that applies common rules of law and of course a Europe that gives prospects for its enlargement, especially in our neighbourhood, in the western Balkans. That is why we have always supported and continue to support Turkey's European path, even if it has been held accountable by Turkey itself, which has shown neither good neighbourly relations nor recognition of European Union Member States nor, of course, behaviour, which it displays in Cyprus, especially these days and with these statements, insulting even the memory of the thousands of dead in the Cypriot invasion.”²⁰

¹⁸ Original in Greek: “Η δημοκρατική επανεκκίνηση της Ευρώπης να έχει ως αφετηρία την οικονομική και νομισματική ένωση, η οργανική ενότητα της οποίας προσδιορίζει, σε μεγάλο βαθμό, και τη βιωσιμότητα του ευρωπαϊκού εγχειρήματος συνολικά. Και οργανική ενότητα δεν μπορεί να υπάρξει όσο παραμένει μόνο νομισματική, αλλά όχι και οικονομική ένωση. Δηλαδή όσο, εν τέλει, δεν μετασχηματίζεται και σε πολιτική ένωση. Οργανική ενότητα δεν μπορεί να υπάρξει όσο διαρκεί η σημερινή, χωρίς προηγούμενο, οικονομική και κοινωνική απόκλιση στο εσωτερικό της. Και ανάμεσα στα κράτη-μέλη αλλά και στις εθνικές κοινωνίες. Μια απόκλιση, που βρίσκεται σε προφανή διάσταση με τους καταστατικούς στόχους της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για ισόρροπη ανάπτυξη, πλήρη απασχόληση, και κοινωνική πρόοδο. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η Ευρωζώνη θα πρέπει γρήγορα να μετατραπεί από θεσμό ενισχυμένης συνεργασίας σε θεσμό ενισχυμένης αλληλεγγύης.”

¹⁹ Original in Greek: “Παράλληλα, συζητήσαμε και συμφωνήσαμε για την ενίσχυση της συνεργασίας μας στον τομέα της προστασίας των συνόρων σε αστυνομικό επίπεδο, αλλά και με καθιέρωση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ακτοφυλακής και Συνοριοφυλακής, αλλά και για την ολοκλήρωση του Κανονισμού Επιστροφών και την αναβάθμιση της Υπηρεσίας Ασύλου.”

“Παράλληλα, στον τομέα της ασφάλειας συμφωνήσαμε σε μέτρα για την ενίσχυση της συνεργασίας μας και για την αντιμετώπιση της διεθνούς τρομοκρατίας και των κυβερνοεπιθέσεων. Κυρίως, στο προσφυγικό, συμφωνήσαμε την ενίσχυση της συνεργασίας μας με χώρες διέλευσης και προέλευσης προσβλέποντας και στη Σύνοδο Ε.Ε-Αραβικών Χωρών που θα λάβει χώρα στην Αίγυπτο στις Αρχές του 2019. Μια πρωτοβουλία που η Ελλάδα μαζί με την Κύπρο στήριξε και στηρίζει σταθερά, αναγνωρίζοντας τον κρίσιμο ρόλο που διαδραματίζει η Αίγυπτος για τον έλεγχο των προσφυγικών και μεταναστευτικών ροών από τη Βόρεια Αφρική προς την Ευρώπη.”

²⁰ Original in Greek: “Εμείς δεν πιστεύουμε σε μία Ευρώπη πολλών ταχυτήτων. Κάτι τέτοιο οδηγεί μόνον στην άνοδο του λαϊκισμού και του εθνικισμού. Πιστεύουμε σε μία Ευρώπη που πηγαίνει μαζί, που εφαρμόζει κοινούς κανόνες δικαίου και βέβαια μία Ευρώπη που δίνει προοπτικές για τη διεύρυνσή της, ιδιαίτερα στη γειτονιά μας, στα Δυτικά Βαλκάνια. Γι' αυτό

The opposition's position

The debate on which DI model Greece positioned itself was also brought up by the opposition parties. Mr. Mistotakis, ND, stated his party's position:

“The camps in Greek society are now clear. On the one hand, there are the proponents of liberal democracy, those who see the presence of Greece at the core of Europe as a non-negotiable office. And on the other hand, there are various heterogeneous forces, proponents of ethno-populism, who imagine other paths for the country and take courage from some of those who predict the end of a united Europe.”²¹

This is very much in line with the ND position that Greece belongs in the core of Europe. The other forces he mentions is mainly SYRIZA, which indeed as the analysis has shown proposed a different path for the EU. However, when PM Tsipras publicly announced his position in his Future of Europe speech he seemed to embrace a more united EU rather than anything else. The opposition criticised the government for not having a clear position on which kind of Europe, ‘multi-speed’ or ‘multi-end points,’ as Mr. Maniatis, Dhmo kratiki Simpratazi, said:

“And because the big issue next weekend in Europe will be the celebration of the sixty years of the Treaty of Rome, we from this position from the official steps of the Greek parliament, as a Democratic Alliance, want to state that we completely disagree with their Europe. Multi-speed, which is one of the scenarios, perhaps the most prevalent, but also the Europe of so-called multiple options proposed by Mr. Tsipras. So the first and foremost thing that the Greek government has to do is to tell us which Europe it will fight for, and not to say that the Prime Minister is listening with interest to the multi-speed Europe debate.”²²

This issue was also brought up by another leader, of the opposition party To Potami:

“In the face of this possibility of a multi-speed European Union, at least in our view, the view of the official opposition, the Greek government has chosen to back down and is working involuntarily or voluntarily to effectively isolate Greece within the European family. What makes me have such a view? The many and different, I would say, positions of the government on issues concerning the general position of our country in the large European family and of course how it handled, from the past until today, different events. We must finally understand that for issues concerning the future of the country – and it was rightly pointed out earlier that they exceed the constitutional time of a government – no government or faction in government has the right to bind and mortgage the future development concerning the country and its participation in the European Union. Because, obviously, to this day, there has been no dialogue anywhere. The Prime Minister must therefore clarify: does the Greek government agree on a new multi-speed Europe? How can he rule out such

και πάντοτε στηρίζαμε και στηρίζουμε τον ευρωπαϊκό δρόμο της Τουρκίας, έστω και αν αυτός έχει μπει στον πάγο με ευθύνη της ίδιας της Τουρκίας, η οποία δεν επιδεικνύει ούτε σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας ούτε αναγνώρισης κρατών-μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ούτε βεβαίως με τη συμπεριφορά την οποία επιδεικνύει στην Κύπρο, ιδιαίτερα αυτές τις μέρες και με αυτές τις δηλώσεις, προσβάλλοντας ακόμα και τη μνήμη των χιλιάδων νεκρών της κυπριακής εισβολής.”

²¹ Original in Greek: “Τα στρατόπεδα στην ελληνική κοινωνία είναι πια ξεκάθαρα. Από τη μία βρίσκονται οι υπέρμαχοι της αστικής δημοκρατίας, αυτοί που θεωρούν την παρουσία της Ελλάδος στον σκληρό πυρήνα της Ευρώπης ως ένα αδιαπραγμάτευτο αξίωμα. Και από την άλλη είναι διάφορες ετερόκλητες δυνάμεις, υπέρμαχοι του εθνολαϊκισμού, που φαντασιώνονται άλλους δρόμους για τη χώρα και παίρνουν κουράγιο κάποιοι από αυτούς που προβλέπουν το τέλος της ενωμένης Ευρώπης.”

²² Original in Greek: “Και επειδή το μεγάλο θέμα του επόμενου Σαββατοκύριακου στην Ευρώπη θα είναι ο εορτασμός των εξήντα ετών από τη Συνθήκη της Ρώμης, εμείς από τη θέση αυτή από το επίσημο Βήμα του ελληνικού Κοινοβουλίου, ως Δημοκρατική Συμπράταξη θέλουμε να δηλώσουμε ότι διαφωνούμε απολύτως και με την Ευρώπη των πολλών ταχυτήτων που είναι ένα από τα σενάρια, ίσως το επικρατέστερο που έχει προταθεί, αλλά και με την Ευρώπη των δήθεν πολλαπλών επιλογών που προτείνει ο κ. Τσίπρας.

Άρα το πρώτο και κύριο που πρέπει να κάνει η ελληνική Κυβέρνηση, είναι να μας πει για ποια Ευρώπη θα παλέψει και όχι να λέει ο Πρωθυπουργός ότι ακούει με ενδιαφέρον τη συζήτηση για την Ευρώπη των πολλών ταχυτήτων.”

a possibility, if he disagrees? After all, in such a scheme of differentiated cooperation, under what conditions will Greece be able to participate in the hard core of the European Union?”²³

In sum, as the qualitative analysis on the position of Greece on DI has shown, there was a change with the SYRIZA-ANEL government, especially regarding the DI model Greece seems to adopt. Before the crisis, Greece supported the ‘multiple end points’ model and being at the core of Europe. This was reflected in statements by ND and PASOK when they were either in government or in opposition. At a turning point during the crisis and with the arrival of a left-wing party in Government, SYRIZA, we have seen that there was a debate about which DI model Greece should adopt. Initially, SYRIZA argued for the ‘multi-end points’ model. However, in important PM speeches SYRIZA seemed to adopt a more positive stance towards a united EU rather than a specific DI model. It seems that a ‘multi-speed’ EU also collided with the interests of the government since during the 2015 negotiations a main line of criticism of other EU Member States was that they were keen on Greece leaving the eurozone, even for a brief time. This seemed to push SYRIZA to adopt the ‘multi end points’ DI model for a brief period. However, this was later changed to not a DI model but a more EU model. The 2019 election brought the ND into government and the argument that Greece belongs to the core of Europe to the forefront again.

²³ Original in Greek: “Μπροστά σ’ αυτό το ενδεχόμενο μιας Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης πολλών ταχυτήτων, τουλάχιστον κατά τη δική μας άποψη, την άποψη της Αξιωματικής Αντιπολίτευσης, η ελληνική Κυβέρνηση έχει επιλέξει την όπισθεν και εργάζεται ακούσια ή εκούσια για την ουσιαστική απομόνωση της Ελλάδος μέσα στην ευρωπαϊκή οικογένεια.

Τι με κάνει να έχω μια τέτοια άποψη; Οι πολλές και διαφορετικές, θα έλεγα, θέσεις της Κυβέρνησης απέναντι σε ζητήματα που αφορούν τη γενικότερη θέση της χώρας μας στη μεγάλη ευρωπαϊκή οικογένεια και βεβαίως το πώς η ίδια χειρίστηκε, από το παρελθόν μέχρι σήμερα, διαφορετικά γεγονότα.

Πρέπει, επιτέλους, να καταλάβουμε ότι για ζητήματα, τα οποία αφορούν στο μέλλον της χώρας –και σωστά επισημάνθηκε νωρίτερα ότι ξεπερνούν τον συνταγματικό χρόνο μίας κυβέρνησης- καμμία κυβέρνηση ή καμμία παράταξη που βρίσκεται στην κυβέρνηση δεν έχει το δικαίωμα να δεσμεύει και να υποθηκεύει τη μελλοντική εξέλιξη που αφορά στη χώρα και στη συμμετοχή της στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Γιατί, προφανώς, μέχρι σήμερα που μιλάμε, διάλογος δεν υπήρξε ποθενά.

Οφείλει, λοιπόν, ο κύριος Υπουργός να ξεκαθαρίσει: Συμφωνεί η ελληνική Κυβέρνηση για μία νέα Ευρώπη πολλών ταχυτήτων; Πώς θα μπορεί να αποκλείσει ένα τέτοιο ενδεχόμενο, εάν διαφωνεί;

Τελικά, σε ένα τέτοιο σχήμα διαφοροποιημένων συνεργασιών, υπό ποιες προϋποθέσεις θα μπορεί η Ελλάδα να συμμετέχει στον σκληρό πυρήνα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης;”

Appendices

Appendix 1 Overview of the documents collected and the corresponding years


	Category of document	Years collected
1	Government programmes	2004, 2007, 2009, 2011(interim government) 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2019
2	First speeches (and parliamentary debates)	2004, 2007, 2009, 2011(interim government) 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2019
3	European Council Presidency speeches (and parliamentary debate) a. In the National Parliament b. in the European Parliament	2014
4	Future of Europe speeches (and parliamentary debates) a. in the European Parliament b. for citizen consultation	2018
5	Prime Minister European Council Statements	2012-2020
6	Parliamentary (committee) debates	2008, 2012, 2017-2020*

*the project aims to cover a bigger time frame, but some alternations needed to be made for the Greek case due to access issues. There is more information in the paragraph addressing the particularities of the case.

Appendix 2 DI models in Greek


Γενικές ΔΕ	ΔΕ μοντέλα			
	Διαφορετικών ταχυτήτων	Διαφορετικών τελικών προορισμών		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • διαφοροποίηση ενοποίησης 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ευρώπη δύο ταχυτήτων • Ευρώπη πολλών ταχυτήτων • Πρόθυμη συνεργασία, συνασπισμός των προθύμων 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Μεταβλητής γεωμετρίας • Σκληρός πυρήνας • Ευρώπη δύο επιπέδων • Ομόκεντροι ευρωπαϊκοί κύκλοι • αλά καρτ ευρώπη 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Το μέλλον της Ευρώπης 				
ΔΕ μηχανισμοί	ΔΕ περιπτώσεις		← Περισσότερο / λιγότερο ενοπιή →	Εσωτερικές ΔΕ
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ενισχυμένη συνεργασία • (additionally προωθημένη ενοποίηση) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ρώμη III • Ενιαίο δίπλωμα ευρεσιτεχνίας • Περιουσιακές σχέσεις των συζύγων • Φόρος επί των χρηματοπιστωτικών συναλλαγών • Ευρωπαϊκή Εισαγγελία • (resco) Μόνιμη διαρθρωμένη συνεργασία 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Εξαίρεση, • (additionally επιλογή μη συμμετοχής, ρήτρα εξαίρεσης) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schengen, Σενγκεν • Οικονομική και Νομισματική Ένωση (ONE) • Πολιτικές Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας (additionally Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική Άμυνας και Ασφάλειας) • Χώρος ελευθερίας, ασφάλειας και δικαιοσύνης • Χάρτης θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων • Χάρτης κοινωνικών δικαιωμάτων 			
<p>Διακυβερνητικές συνθήκη μεταξύ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ</p> <p>[NO KEY WORD]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Διασυννοριακή συνεργασία (additionally απόφαση Prum) • Ευρωπαϊκός μηχανισμός σταθεροποίησης (ESM) • Ευρωπαϊκό Δημοσιονομικό Σύμφωνο • Ενοποιημένη Δικαστικής αρχής για τα διπλώματα ευρεσιτεχνίας • Ενιαίος μηχανισμός εξυγίανσης 		???	Εξωτερικές ΔΕ
<p>Συμφωνίες μεταξύ κρατών μελών της ΕΕ και τρίτων κρατών</p> <p>[NO KEY WORD]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ευρωπαϊκός Οργανισμός περιβάλλοντος • Τελωνειακή ένωση με Τουρκία • Ανατολική Συνεργασία (ανατολική εταιρική σχέση) • Ευρωμεσογειακής συνεργασίας (euromed) 		Περισ	

Appendix 3 The salience of EU-related issues in government programmes (relative word frequencies)




key words: government, polit*, Greece*, social*, econ*, people*, eu*, eu*, cultu*

Appendix 4 Economic crisis, negotiations and the EU




key words: Greece, memorandum of understanding*, eu*, eu*, negotiation*, memorandum of understanding*

Appendix 5 The salience of EU-related issues in PM first speeches (relative word frequencies)




key words: Greece, political*, government*, social*, econ*, people*, eu*, culture*, eu*

Appendix 6 Economic crisis, negotiations and the EU in PM speeches




key words: Greece, negotiation*, MoU*, eu*, eu*

Appendix 7 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – breakdown by key word




- Differentiated integration ■ Coalition of the willing ■ Two-speed Europe
- Multi-speed Europe ■ Variable Geometry ■ Core Europe
- Two-tier Europe ■ Concentric circles ■ A la carte


Appendix 8 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – relative to the FOE debate



Appendix 9 The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates – breakdown by DI mechanism



Appendix 10 DI instances in Council statements



*key words: esm, single resolution mechanism, à la carte, core, core, enhanced, European organisation, ESM, multi-speed

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