
Inga Vinogradnaitė and Ramūnas Vilpišauskas
The Politics of Differentiated Integration:  

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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU) is a Horizon 2020 funded research project aimed at contributing concretely to the current debate on the ‘Future of Europe’ by assessing, developing and testing a range of models and scenarios for different levels of integration among EU member states. InDivEU begins from the assumption that managing heterogeneity and deep diversity is a continuous and growing challenge in the evolution of the EU and the dynamic of European integration.

The objective of InDivEU is to maximize the knowledge of Differentiated Integration (DI) on the basis of a theoretically robust conceptual foundations accompanied by an innovative and integrated analytical framework, and to provide Europe’s policy makers with a knowledge hub on DI. InDivEU combines rigorous academic research with the capacity to translate research findings into policy design and advice.

InDivEU comprises a consortium of 14 partner institutions coordinated by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, where the project is hosted by the European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP). The scientific coordinators of InDivEU are Brigid Laffan (Robert Schuman Centre) and Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zürich).

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Abstract
The report discusses the attitude of the Lithuanian policy-makers (parliament, president, government) towards differentiated integration during the period from Lithuania’s accession into the EU in 2004 till 2020. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative analysis of official speeches, documents and parliamentary debates, it concludes with several observations. First, the salience of differentiated integration in Lithuania has been limited with a notable exception of ending opt-outs from eurozone and the Schengen area, also to some extent the promotion of closer relations between the EU and its eastern partners. The assessment of ‘different-speeds’ and ‘different-tiers’ Europe is negative, though both models seem to be often confused in political discourse. Meanwhile, attitude towards mechanisms and concrete instances of differentiated integration is more nuanced and pragmatic, often depending on costs and benefits and political sensitivities of Lithuania joining them.

Keywords
Lithuania, EU, differentiated integration, ‘different-speeds’, enhanced co-operation, opt-outs.
Summary of Results

I. Salience

The analysis shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) models and mechanisms has been low and mentions of them in parliamentary debates have often been rather vague or conceptually confusing. However, several instances of DI were relatively salient during the early years of Lithuania’s EU membership. The temporary discriminatory opt-outs from the eurozone and Schengen area were particularly often referred to in government programmes and some speeches by key foreign policymakers. There was also a peak in mentioning particular instances of DI during the eurozone crisis, when Lithuania was adopting EU legal rules and preparing for the introduction of the euro. References to the importance of closer integration among eastern neighbours, in particular Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, have also been regularly made in government programmes and in key speeches by policymakers on the future of Europe.

II. Position

In the run-up to accession to the eurozone and the Schengen area, the temporary discriminatory opt-outs were regarded negatively as something to be ended as soon as possible. Joining the core group of the most integrated EU Member States was motivated mostly by geopolitical concerns and was seen as a priority in the country’s European policy. However, the government position and parliamentary debates on new initiatives for enhanced co-operation and DI models show a more reserved approach to participating in DI, which has been most often based on assessments of costs and benefits in terms of economic effects and political sensitivity. In other words, DI mechanisms such as enhanced co-operation and opt-outs from new integration initiatives are treated positively by both the government and the opposition. However, a qualitative analysis of statements shows that often the meaning of these terms varies depending on the context, and references to DI mechanisms and particularly DI models often actually describe the difference between powerful and weak Member States rather than a differentiation of rules. ‘Two-speed’ or ‘several-speed’ Europe is sometimes conflated with ‘two-tier’ or ‘several-tier’ Europe, and both DI models are viewed negatively or sometimes in a neutral way. Generally, there are indications of a tension between the desire to be part of the core of the EU and at the same time cautiousness that this might go too far in the direction of federalisation. However, if the prospect of a ‘two-tier’ Europe became real, the tension would most likely be resolved by reluctantly opting to join the core of the EU Member States.
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1. Introduction


The report distinguishes three levels of abstraction in government discourse on DI. First, two different models of DI are distinguished at the conceptual level. On the one hand, the ‘multi-speed EU’ model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all the Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. On the other hand, the ‘multi-end EU’ model depicts DI as a potentially permanent feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can ‘pick and choose’ to adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities. Second, the analysis focuses on DI mechanisms. On the one hand, the enhanced co-operation mechanism allows a limited group of MSs – under certain conditions – to pursue deeper integration without having to involve all the MSs. On the other hand, the ‘opt-out’ mechanism allows MSs to refrain from participating in common policies. In short, enhanced co-operation allows a MS to integrate more than other MSs, while ‘opt-outs’ allow a Member State to integrate less than other MSs. Finally, the analysis looks at various instances of differentiated policies and policy fields. A total of twenty-one instances is included in the analysis. They are grouped in four different categories: (a) instances of enhanced co-operation, (b) instances of opt-out policy fields, (c) instances of inter se agreements and (d) instances of external agreements. Inter se agreements are agreements which EU Member States conclude outside the framework of the European Union. External agreements are agreements between the EU and non-EU states.

The results are based on an analysis of various government documents (Appendix 1). Six document categories were selected to cover a broad spectrum of venues and government actors. From the more abstract-programmatic to the more specific, the report looks at what government programmes say about DI, at what prime ministers say about DI and at parliamentary debates on DI. The materials for the analysis were selected by taking into account the nature of the Lithuanian semi-presidential system. Both the cabinet and the president are important actors in setting the foreign policy agenda. According to the Lithuanian Constitution, the president is the head of state (HS) and is responsible for formulating the country’s foreign policy and implementing it together with the government. Before the Lisbon Treaty limited representation of each EU Member State to one head of state and government at European Council meetings, the president and the prime minister either used to coordinate their participation, with the former taking part when security and foreign policy issues were discussed and the latter when economic and social issues were more prominent on the European Council agenda, or sometimes both being present. In 2009, the newly elected President D. Grybauskaitė decided that only she should represent Lithuania at EU Summits. This newly established tradition was afterwards continued by President G. Nausėda, who was elected in 2019. There is no tradition in Lithuania for the president or prime minister to make a pre-European Council statement in the parliament (lith. Seimas). Meetings with the members of the Committee on European Affairs take place, albeit behind closed doors. As a rule, the Lithuanian position on different items on the European Council agenda is presented to the Committee members by government officials and advisors to the president. The press office of the president issues press releases which describe the agenda, priorities and results of European Council meetings. The press releases from 2004 to 2020 were included in the analysis to capture the position of the president concerning DI. Another source of data on the salience of DI for Lithuanian governments was parliamentary debates. The Lithuanian parliament is a ‘working parliament’ (vs. ‘talking parliament’); much of the discussion takes place in committees. However, transcripts of the meetings of the relevant committee (the Committee on European Affairs) are not available. Instead, the transcripts of plenary debates from January 2004 to May 2020 (n=1873) were analysed. Finally, three more strategic documents on Lithuanian European policy were added to the corpus: the 2004 resolution by the Parliament “Concerning the directions of Lithuanian foreign policy after Lithuania became a full-
fledged member of NATO and the EU”; the Lithuanian EU policy strategy for 2008-2013 entitled “More Europe in Lithuania and more Lithuania in Europe!”; and the Lithuanian EU policy strategy for 2015-2020 entitled “A Growing and Secure Lithuania in an Effective European Union.”

The salience of DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances is assessed by counting key words in the above-mentioned documents (Appendix 2). The assumption is that the more a government talks about DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, the analysis of parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks. To enhance the reliability of the findings, the key word counts were triangulated with a close reading of selected key documents.

Many of the key words do not have an established translation in Lithuanian, and sometimes an ‘unofficial’ version is used (for example, ‘Fiscal compact’ is sometimes referred to as ‘taupymo paktas’ (literally ‘the pact of savings’)). These terms have also been employed to search for references to DI models, mechanisms and instances (they are identified in the notes section). Because of the nature of Lithuanian syntax, which allows words to be combined in different orders, to ensure that as many references as possible were captured the authors used the search terms, which delivered a number of irrelevant references. All the results were reviewed, and only the relevant references were selected for further quantitative analysis.

An additional comment should be made on the reliability of the research results: while holistic grading helps to validate the quantitative tools in the case of government programmes, such validation is not feasible in the case of parliamentary debates. A closer look at the parliamentary debates which contained at least one of the conceptual key words shows that not all the cases when DI mechanisms or instances were discussed were captured in the quantitative analysis. The implication is that DI mechanisms and DI instances might have been discussed slightly more often in parliament than the results of the quantitative analysis indicate.

However, when a debate on a DI instance is officially on the parliamentary agenda, the probability that a key word will be used at least once is close to 1. Therefore, we conclude that the quantitative analysis has captured the salience of DI for the ruling coalition, which controls the parliament’s agenda. Regarding the government’s position, the results are based on a manual attitude analysis of parliamentary debates. To this end, references to DI key words in parliamentary debates were manually coded as negative, neutral or positive. The second section of the report details the results of the salience analysis. The third section details the results of the position analysis.

2. How salient is DI for the Lithuanian government?

2.1 Government Programmes

A computer-assisted word count analysis of the government programmes from 2004 to 2016 highlighted:

- Only two references to DI models (in 2008 and 2012), indicating that DI is sufficiently important for the government to state its position regarding DI although not important enough for it to elaborate on it;
- No references to DI mechanisms: enhanced co-operation was mentioned in 2008 and 2012. However, this was regarding Nordic-Baltic Co-operation (NB8);
- Limited references to DI instances. However, all the references were either to the temporary opt-outs such as joining the eurozone and Schengen, or the Eastern Partnership, which reflects two major Lithuanian concerns: a) joining the core of Europe and b) security and Russia.
Additional analysis, namely computer-assisted word count analysis to assess whether governments refer to EU-related issues at all in their programmes, highlighted that the relative frequencies of the key words EU (lith. ES) and Europ* are lower than the relative frequencies of Lithuania(n) (lith. – lietuv*) and state (lith. - valstyb*) but higher than the frequency of references to other significant political subjects such as nation, society, NATO and Russia. EU-related issues are somewhat salient for Lithuanian governments.

In addition, Figure 1 reveals that the salience of EU-related issues was fairly stable over time, with a significant decrease in 2016, which could be explained by the achievement of Schengen and eurozone membership before 2016 and the relative significance of domestic policy issues such as health care and family policies in the election programme of the main ruling coalition parties (2016-2020), Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union.

**Figure 1 - The salience of EU-related issues in the government programmes**

To supplement the quantitative analysis of the government programmes, an additional close reading of the documents was conducted. This showed that in the government programmes general EU-related issues such as economic convergence, active European policies, in particular completion of infrastructure integration (energy, transport) projects within the EU single market, and good neighbourly relations dominated. In terms of DI instances, accession to the eurozone and the Schengen area, i.e. ending the discriminatory opt-outs left over from the time of EU accession, and advocating for closer relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours (countries that in 2009 became eastern partners) dominated the programmes. It should be noted that the first attempt to access the eurozone as soon as possible, i.e. after two years of membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, which Lithuania joined soon after accession to the EU in 2004, failed due to excessive inflation. Lithuania joined the eurozone in 2015 as a last step to exit from the economic and financial crisis, with every government since 2004 declaring the fast introduction of the euro to be its priority. In December 2007, the country joined the Schengen area.

The programme of the 2008-2012 coalition government declared in particular that Lithuania would apply a selective policy towards further deepening integration within the EU by supporting integration in those areas where it would advance Lithuania’s infrastructure integration and reduce its vulnerability to external risks (i.e. energy, transport, finance, border control), but would not support further integration in those areas which were socially sensitive or could reduce the competitive advantages of the Lithuanian economy (i.e. taxation policy) (point 164). It also stressed the importance of closer co-operation between Baltic and Nordic countries in the EU and NATO (point 187). Additionally, closer co-operation between the EU and its eastern neighbours was underlined, with a special section devoted to this subject in most government programmes. The programme of the 2012-2016 coalition government had a specific provision which stated that the government did not support an EU consisting of stronger core Member States and a poor periphery (point 506). The programmes of the two coalition governments...
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(2008-2012 and 2012-2016) mentioned the importance of the EU Baltic Sea region strategy. The programme of the 2016-2020 coalition government mentioned the importance of equality of the EU Member States and expressed support for a Union of strong nation states (introductory part). Finally, it should be noted that at the time of finalising this report, a draft programme of a newly formed centre-right coalition government after the parliamentary elections in October 2020 was presented to the parliament for the approval. In addition to traditional attention given to the importance of closer cooperation between the EU and its eastern partners, it dedicated a separate paragraph to the discussion of the core Europe (point 24.2.1). It stated that Lithuania should focus on cooperation with Germany and France, because the importance of the core increased after the UK left the EU and the effectiveness of the EU will depend on the ability of the core to find compromises between EU’s North and South, also with other emerging poles. If these compromises are not found, the EU model of ‘different speeds' might return to the EU’s agenda, therefore, it is in Lithuania’s strategic geopolitical interest to remain in the core of the EU.

2.2 Presidential speeches

- The computer-assisted DI-related word count analysis of presidential speeches from 2004 to 2019 (categories 2-4, Appendix 1) showed that:
  - Only one reference was made to DI models – in 2019 (the first and so far the only speech analysed in this report by current President G. Nausėda). No references to DI mechanisms and a few references to DI instances were made;
  - References to DI instances replicate the pattern described above, with the most frequent examples referring to the Schengen area, the Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone), the Common Security and Defence Policy and the Eastern Partnership, with the Fiscal Compact and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) being mentioned in the address to the European Parliament by President D. Grybauskaitė in 2013.

Additional analysis highlighted the diminishing salience of EU-related questions in the first speeches: D. Grybauskaitė and G. Nausėda referred to Europe significantly less than V. Adamkus (Appendix 4). A similar pattern was found in the annual presidential addresses. Figure 2 shows that President V. Adamkus (2004-2009) referred to Europe-related questions more than President D. Grybauskaitė (2009-2019) (with the exception of her address in 2013, when Lithuania had the presidency of the European Council, and her last annual address in 2019).

Figure 2 - The salience of EU-related issues in presidents’ annual addresses
Next, holistic grading was used to validate these results. To this end, government programmes and president speeches between 2004 and 2019 (n = 30) were carefully read, and a score between 0 (no reference to DI) and 2 (direct/central reference to DI) was assigned to each document. Assuming that references to DI include references to models, mechanisms and instances, the average salience score for all the documents was 0.82. Several observations should be made in this respect. First, the direct references to DI were all related to concrete instances such as Lithuania’s accession to the eurozone and the Schengen area, closer integration of eastern partners in the EU and further enlargement of the EU. The indirect references were related to a vaguely defined EU core and periphery, most often implying existing economic differences between EU Member States. This also explains why the salience of DI in the government programmes and president speeches is high before accession to the eurozone and the Schengen area.

2.3 Parliamentary Debates

Next, the analysis focused on parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019. Computer-assisted counts of key words at the level of DI models showed (Figure 3):

- A low salience of DI, with only 48 references during the period 2004-2020;
- The salience varied over time;
- Two peaks can be observed: one in 2004 (n=11) and one in 2018 (n=9).

The higher numbers of references to DI models in 2004 and 2018 can probably be explained by the accession of Lithuania to the EU in 2004 (when the draft treaty establishing the Constitution of Europe was finalised) and the debate on the future of Europe which was held in the Lithuanian Parliament in 2018.

Figure 3 - The salience of conceptual keywords in parliamentary debates

Another question was whether there were variations in the salience of particular key words and whether particular key words corresponded to particular events/time periods. The analysis showed that some conceptual key words were not used at all, while some key phrases such as ‘two-speed Europe’ and ‘core Europe’ were used more often than other key words. However, five of the eight references to ‘two-tier Europe’ were made in 2008, when no other conceptual key words were used (Appendix 4). It may be inferred that members of parliament (MPs) do not see a conceptual difference between the two DI
models of ‘an EU of multiple-speeds’ and ‘an EU of multiple end points’ and tend to use those key words which feature more prominently in the media and academic debates in a particular moment.

The analysis also investigated whether debates on differentiated integration were driven by more general debates on the ‘future of Europe.’ To this end, we compared the aggregated conceptual key words to the key phrase ‘future of Europe.’ The result shows that debates on the future of Europe in 2004-2007 were not accompanied by extensive debates on DI. Moreover, the number of references to DI increased in 2008 when the debate on the future of Europe was no longer salient (the references to DI in 2008 were made when the parliament debated the ratification of the Lisbon treaty). The slightly higher salience of DI in 2018 corresponds to the renewed debate on the future of Europe (Appendix 5).

The analysis then moved from DI models to DI mechanisms. Here, the findings are that

- DI mechanisms were debated more intensely than DI models;
- Two peaks can be observed – in 2004 and 2018 (Figure 4 and Appendix 6);
- Opt-outs were discussed more often (Figure 4), with the exceptions of 2012 and 2013, when both opt-outs and enhanced co-operation were mentioned with similar frequencies (although rarely).

**Figure 4 - The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates**

Moving from DI mechanisms to DI instances, the analysis of specific instances of enhanced co-operation (Figure 5) showed:

- They are mentioned extremely rarely (n=16);
- A closer look at the context shows that these instances were when the government brought a related question to the Parliament (when laws had to be amended or the Lithuanian candidacy for an official position had to be approved).
Figure 5 - The salience of instances of enhanced co-operation (n=16)

However, as mentioned in the first part of the report, the key words do not capture all the references to DI instances, as can be seen from the following exchange between A. Stancikienė, an opposition MP, and J. Bernatonis, the Minister of Justice, on matrimonial property regimes (2016.03.22):

A. Stancikienė (MSNG). [...] Could you explain, why, if you are guided by our Constitution, in Brussels you do not oppose it when European norms are mandatorily forced upon Lithuania. I mean the transposition into Lithuanian law of these norms, which are related to gay family property relations, when gay families are registered in other EU countries? [...]  

J. Bernatonis (LSDPF). [...] I want to say that you do not have information about our position. Our position was as we presented in the Committee for European Affairs. Lithuania does not participate even now, when these questions are dealt with in the form of enhanced co-operation, which was signed by a number of states. Besides, you are misled about the decisions which were proposed [...] We wait till these states [Poland and Hungary] will debate these issues, we will see what proposals there will be, and then, if our mandate is revised by the Committee for European Affairs and the government, we will represent our position accordingly.¹

The absence of references to instances of enhanced co-operation might indicate both low salience for the government and high salience for the opposition. Therefore, the government chooses not to pay a political price for pushing proposals for Lithuania to join particular instances of enhanced-co-operation.

Next, the analysis focused on specific instances of opt-out policy fields. The findings are that opt-out policy fields were mentioned considerably more often, with several peaks: in 2005-2008, 2012 and 2014-2015 (Figure 6).

**Figure 6 - The salience of instances of opt-out policy fields (n=602)**

![Graph showing the salience of instances of opt-out policy fields](image)

The two most debated instances are Schengen and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, the key phrase ‘Economic and Monetary Union’ appears to capture only part of the salience of this policy field, as a comparison with the key word ‘eurozone’ revealed (Figure 7, left-hand panel). If we merge the two key phrases, monetary union/eurozone appears the most salient opt-out policy field (Figure 7, right-hand panel).

**Figure 7 - The salience of the keywords “‘Economic and Monetary Union’” vs “‘Eurozone’”**

![Graph showing the salience of keywords](image)
An analysis of specific instances of inter se agreement policy fields (Figures 8) showed that:

- Three peaks were observed: in 2012, 2014 and 2016;
- The most debated instances were the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact. In this case, the reasons for political attention being given to these instances were external events such as the management of the eurozone crisis and the migration crisis, together with the introduction of the euro in Lithuania in 2015 (see Appendix 7 for an overview including additional alternative key words for ‘Fiscal Compact’ and ‘ESM’).
- The number of references to the Unified Patent Court leads to a misleading conclusion concerning the salience of this DI instance. The number is relatively high only because the minister who presented the relevant agreements for the Parliament’s ratification repeated the title of the agreement many times in his introductory speech. The number, therefore, reveals more about the rhetoric of the speaker than about the salience of the question.

**Figure 8 - The salience of instances of inter se agreements 2004-2020 (n=166)**

The analysis of specific instances of external association agreements (Figures 9) showed that:

- Three peaks can be observed: in 2004, 2008 and 2013-2016;
- The most debated issues are the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Eastern Partnership;
- Again, the numbers mislead concerning the salience of Euromed. In the majority of cases, Euromed was referred to when the Parliament had to decide on the composition of the Seimas Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, which was a mere formality. Only twice during the period were references to Euromed used in a substantial debate.
2.4 European Council Statements

The analysis of the European Council statements showed that:

- Conceptual key phrases (‘two-speed Europe’) were mentioned only at the end of 2019, when President G. Nausėda referred to the undesirable prospect of a ‘two-speed Europe’ if the proposal by the Finnish EU Council presidency on the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 was accepted, implying that it would contribute to an economic divergence of rich and poor EU Member States due to insufficient funding being allocated to cohesion and direct payments to farmers in Lithuania. This represents another case of a conceptually vague use of a DI model;

- Enhanced co-operation was mentioned more often than opt-outs.

Thematic dynamics:

- The most frequent substantial words (that is, not including words and phrases such as ‘head of state,’ ‘president’ etc.) referred to economics (ekonomi* – 540), energy (energ* – 407), migration (migra* – 199), finance (finans* – 374), United Kingdom (karalyst* – 146) and security (saugum* – 275). These indicate which issues among those debated in the European Council the institution of the President considered to be the most salient (or at least the most important for the domestic audience in Lithuania).

- Several periods can be distinguished with regard to salient topics (Figure 13): energy (2005-2008), finance (2008-2012), energy (2012-2014), migration (2015-2018) and finance (2019-2020). Security was constantly on the agenda, although it tended to re-emerge in certain periods, for example 2012-2014 (in relation to energy security).
2.5 Strategic Documents

Contrary to the authors’ expectations, the analysis of the strategic documents (Lithuanian EU Strategy) produced only one reference to DI models. This is surprising considering that the European policy strategies were prepared by diplomats and other public administration professionals who deal with EU policies in their daily work and know the EU vocabulary. In 2015, it was stated that “Lithuania’s interest is for solidarity among EU members states to be enhanced in various areas of EU policy (there cannot be à la carte solidarity).”

This result supports the authors’ conclusion that there was a low salience of DI for the Lithuanian government, except in instances such as eliminating discriminatory opt-outs from joining the eurozone and the Schengen area and promoting closer integration in the EU among eastern neighbours (and sometimes enlargement of the EU into the Balkan countries).

3. The governments’ positions on DI

This section presents the positions of the different Lithuanian governments and oppositions regarding DI. It is based on an analysis of parliamentary debates in 2004-2020. The period mentioned in the guidelines was expanded because of the number of references to DI, which was too small to reach valid conclusions about the positions of various political actors.

The section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection provides a quantitative overview of the distribution of positive, negative and neutral statements regarding DI models and DI mechanisms. The second subsection provides a more detailed description of the governments’ positions based on a qualitative analysis of statements (full speeches) which contained the key words associated with DI models and mechanisms.

3.1 Quantitative overview of government positions

Regarding DI models (Figures 11 and 12), the analysis of parliamentary debates shows that assessments of the two DI models differ. The assessment of multi-speed Europe is negative, while the assessment of multi-end Europe is more neutral. However, it is not entirely clear whether politicians are aware of the difference between these two models or choose the terminology randomly (mostly likely). The two most outspoken politicians in the sample used the key words related to the two models as synonyms and

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2 Lietuva suinteresuota, kad būtų stiprinamas ES valstybių narių solidarumas įvairių ES srūčių politikoje (negali būti solidarumo a la carte).
usually they implied negative attitude implying a risk for Lithuania to turn into a permanent economic and geopolitical periphery of the EU.

Several observations stand out. First, both the government and the opposition have a negative attitude to multi-speed Europe. Second, while the government’s assessment of multi-end Europe is neutral, the assessment of this DI model by the opposition varies. Third, neutral references to core Europe usually describe the state of affairs as seen by politicians in the following way: that there is a group of states which together comprise the core of Europe and decide on the direction and speed of integration. Fourth, the variation in the opposition’s assessments is related to party ideology. Non-neutral assessments of multi-end Europe are voiced by those politicians who treat a deepening of integration as being at odds with sovereignty and who prefer more decisions to be made at the national level. In 2008-2011, politicians from the Liberal Democratic party (later renamed ‘Order and Justice’) expressed a positive attitude to ‘two-tier’ Europe, while at the same time Order and Justice was the most Eurosceptical of the parliamentary parties. Differential integration was considered a means to preserve the sovereignty of the nation because it enables every state to choose the extent to which and in which areas it wants to integrate. In 2016, negative assessments of differentiated integration came mainly from the Christian democratic wing of the conservative party (‘Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats’). These politicians advocated for both full-fledged participation by Lithuania in the EU and more independence for the country to decide on its policies.

![Figure 11 - Position on multi-speed Europe (two-speed + multi-speed)](chart11)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>(n = 17)</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
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<td>Government (n=12)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Opposition (n=5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2019</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 12 - Position on multi-end Europe (core Europe + two-tier)](chart12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n = 16)</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government (n=5)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition (n=11)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2019</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding DI mechanisms (Figures 13 and 14), the analysis of parliamentary debates shows that the assessment of the two DI mechanisms is somewhat **positive**:

- A variety of types of opt-outs were debated, but it is not clear to what extent members of Parliament were aware of the difference between permanent opt-outs, temporary derogations and other DI mechanisms;
- In the speeches by government representatives, a neutral assessment of opt-outs dominated;
- The representatives of the present ruling coalition more often give a positive assessment of opt-outs. The same is true of the opposition. Negotiating for opt-outs and obtaining them is construed as a positive sign of an active and responsible government;
- Enhanced co-operation is assessed positively by both the government and opposition.

However, several important notes of caution regarding the interpretation of these results should be made. As has been mentioned, members of parliament often use terms such as ‘opt-out’ and ‘enhanced co-operation’ to refer to different phenomena, including not only different DI mechanisms but also sometimes phenomena not related to DI, and can refer to regional co-operation forums such as Baltic-Nordic 6 or closer co-operation between the EU and some third country. In such cases they were coded as neutral and should not affect the positive or negative assessments. Moreover, sometimes they refer to different modes of implementing EU legal norms which are not instances of DI. Additionally, the fact that government representatives referred twice as much to opt-outs could be related to formal statements which are made on Lithuania’s status as an EMU member with temporary derogation from EMU membership when some convention is presented for ratification. Again, this is the reason why the opt-outs in such speeches are neutrally assessed. Finally, positive assessments of opt-outs by members of the ruling coalition could be related to their motivation to underline the role of Lithuania as an active EU member and point to unwillingness to pay the price for participation in a new integration project which is not acceptable to Lithuania. Sometimes opt-outs negotiated by other EU countries are viewed positively and contrasted with the modest achievements of Lithuania.

Enhanced co-operation is also viewed positively by the government, including the prime minister and the opposition, which is most likely to be linked to the possibility to choose whether to participate in the particular instance depending on the perceived balance of costs and benefits for Lithuania.

**Figure 13 - Position on enhanced co-operation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n =25)</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government (n =21)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition (n =4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2019</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 14 - Position on "opt-outs"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong> (n =54)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong> (n =27)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2019</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, the quantitative analysis of positions reveals a contradictory position regarding DI among the Lithuanian political elite: while differentiated integration, especially Europe of ‘different speeds’, is consistently assessed negatively, the Lithuanian government has a rather positive attitude to both enhanced co-operation and opt-outs. The most likely explanation has to do with the negative assessment of discriminatory temporary opt-outs and the use of DI terminology to refer to differences in economic development among the EU Member States, while positive assessments are usually linked to recent instances of enhanced co-operation that for economic or politically sensitive reasons the Lithuanian elite prefers the country to stay outside of. This is also confirmed by a shift in positions over time – initially after joining the EU up to 2016, most of the political elite preferred deeper integration and to end the temporary opt-outs; since 2016, more positive positions on DI mechanisms such as enhanced co-operation emerge.

3.2 Qualitative assessment of government positions

3.2.1 2004-2007: The first years of membership and the Constitution of Europe

The government’s position

Several parliamentary debates on the EU, including the debate on the Constitution for Europe were organised during the first three years of Lithuania’s EU membership. However, neither ruling MPs nor opposition MPs used DI-related key words. The use of these key words related exclusively to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. Valionis, an experienced diplomat. In his statements he expressed the position of the senior diplomatic corps and civil servants who were most active during the process of Lithuania’s accession to the EU. He referred to the ‘core of Europe’ and ‘two-speed’ Europe. He presented the ‘two-speed’ scenario as the most likely scenario if the Constitution for Europe was rejected, potentially leading to the formation of different classes of EU Member States and leading to what he described as the destruction of united Europe. On 4 May 2004, during the presentation of the prospects for the inter-government conference on the Constitution for Europe, he maintained:3

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3 Šių metų pradžioje Prancūzijos prezidento Zako širako ir Vokietijos kanclerio Gerchardo Šrioderio iniciuota diskusija „Dviejų greičių Europa“. Ji atkreipė visų dėmesį į tai, kokią kainą gali tekti sumokėti už konstitucinio projekto nesėkmę. Šių šalių lyderiai įspėjo, jei išsiplėtusi Europos Sąjunga nereformuos savo sprendimų priėmimo procedūrų, integracija gali sulėtėti ir aptarti blokuojančios mažumos įtaka. Tuomet Europos branduolys būtų priverstas teikti atskirus bendradarbiavimo formatus, atsirastų valstybių diferenciacija į skirtą klases ir kartu vieną Europos destrukciją. Toks scenarijus buvo pateikiamas kaip alternatyva, jei dėl Konstitucijos nebūtų susitarta. (A. Valionis, užsienio reikalų ministras, 2004.05.04)
“At the beginning of this year, President of France Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder initiated the discussion on ‘Two-speed Europe.’ It attracted everyone’s attention to the fact that we might have to pay for the failure of the constitutional project. The leaders of these countries warned that if the enlarged European Union does not reform its decision-making procedures, integration can slow down and become hostage to a blocking minority. In such a scenario, the core of Europe would be forced to propose separate formats of co-operation leading to the differentiation of states into different classes and the destruction of the united Europe. This scenario was presented as an alternative to the failure to agree on the Constitution [for Europe]” (Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Valionis, 2004.05.04).

Such a scenario of a ‘two-speed’ Europe was regarded as a threat to Lithuania, mostly because of geopolitical concerns related to the recent history of occupation and Lithuania’s unfinished integration in the EU. The importance of geopolitical concerns is illustrated by another speech by minister A. Valionis, which he made during the presentation to the parliament of the draft Law on the Constitution for Europe:

“The Treaty on the Constitution for Europe is a monumental act of European integration. The further development of Europe depends on whether it is ratified or not in all the Member States of the European Union. (…). But I am sure of one thing – we can have no illusions that if one or several countries do not ratify the Treaty we could continue living under the current founding Treaties as if nothing has happened. Europe is not going to stand still, like until now, the search for the best forms of participation in world politics, of organising the ambitious interests of dynamic states will continue. Call it advanced structured co-operation, ‘two-speed’ Europe or Europe of concentric circles, but in such a geopolitical situation as Lithuania is in, we must strive to be part of this project of enhanced co-operation. Therefore, we have the euro, we have Schengen on our most urgent agenda, we have those ideas which a couple of decades ago looked like distant dreams. I believe that we will manage to avoid such dramatic choices and that the Constitutional Treaty for one Europe is the best and the right way” (Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Valionis, 2004.11.05).

Importantly, he mentioned different models of DI, referring in particular to ‘two-speed’ Europe and a Europe of concentric circles, equating them in terms of their potential negative impact on Lithuania due to its geopolitical situation. Moreover, it is in this context of geopolitical concerns that he justified a fast accession to the eurozone and Schengen area and the need to play an active role in the EU.

Finally, in response to a question by a Member of Parliament asking why he tried to avoid admitting that ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would lead to the creation of a “large confederate state with very strong features of federation,” minister A. Valionis argued that if ratification failed it would be naïve to think that we would continue to live under the Treaty of Nice. He stated that in such a scenario differentiated integration would take place, and most likely Lithuania could get stuck in “the second speed or second wave” and would remain in the periphery of the EU:


“It is naïve and childish to think that we will continue to live under the Nice Treaty adopted in December 2000 in the case that some state does not ratify this Constitutional Treaty. In such a case, and this seems to me like a very realistic prospect, we will have, as I say, two-speed, or two-wave, or some other type of Europe. It is time to start thinking about our place and role in potential new structural changes. I am convinced that if Lithuania becomes part of a second speed or second wave, it will remain in the periphery of European Union. Lithuania has to put all its efforts into the analysis of all the opportunities and go hand in hand with the most progressive states” (Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Valionis, 2004.11.05).

Later, after the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in the referendums in the Netherlands and France, minister A. Valionis repeated his warnings that because of the stalled ratification process debates on the prospects of a ‘two-speed’ Europe would intensify again and this was not in the interests of Lithuania, which faced the risk of being left outside the core and that “decisions could be made without us.” Although this might refer simply to the need to be part of the decision-making process on important issues which affect Lithuania’s interests, in the context of previous references to the geopolitical situation this statement could be linked to memories of the history of occupation, when, after the Second World War, decisions on the future European order were made in the absence of the Baltic States (and other central and eastern European countries), which were occupied by the Soviet Union.

“Now that ratification of the Constitution for the European Union will drag on for at least several years, we start seeing even more clearly that this Constitution can be and already is useful. It is obvious that the rejection of this document in the referendums does not mean the continuation of the current status quo for a long time. Now a ‘period of reflection’ is taking place and the need for the European Union to respond to the current objective challenges and even subjective questions is strongly felt. It is also important that those countries which rejected the Constitution for the European Union are also actively taking part in this discussion. Discussions about ‘two-speed Europe’ have intensified again, which is not good for us because there is a possibility that we will be left out and that decisions could be made without us. In this sense the Constitution was a useful document because it reflected a complex compromise among all 25 Member States. We can clearly see that the Constitution for the European Union remains the guide to further integration” (Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Valionis, 2005.10.20).

To sum up, during the first years of EU membership, the consensus among Lithuania’s political and diplomatic elite was that differentiated integration posed a threat to the country’s strategic goal set in the aftermath of regaining its independence in 1990 to become part of the most important security and economic institutions in Europe. This strategic goal was to a large extent driven by geopolitical concerns. Fresh memories of the Soviet occupation and growing uncertainty about Russia’s foreign policy after Vladimir Putin came to power in the early 2000s provided additional incentives to remain suspicious about ideas of a ‘two-speed’ Europe, especially before Lithuania ended its opt-outs in terms of eurozone and Schengen area membership, which did not depend on the country’s choice but on its ability to meet compulsory criteria.

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The opposition’s position

It is interesting that the mainstream parliamentary opposition did not criticise this position of the government. This has most likely to do with a relatively strong consensus among the main parliamentary parties that Lithuania had to become a ‘full-fledged and active member’ of the EU, which was once again reiterated on the occasion of Lithuania’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, when the Parliament adopted a resolution on new foreign policy priorities for Lithuania. Moreover, the voters’ lack of interest in the seemingly technical debates on DI could have also been an additional factor explaining the absence of a divergence of the views of the ruling coalition and the opposition in the country.

3.2.2 2008-2009: the Lisbon Treaty

The government’s position

In spring 2008, the draft Law on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty amending the European Union Treaty and European Community Treaty was debated. However, no representatives of the ruling coalition of social-democratic and social-liberal parties mentioned DI models in their speeches.

The opposition’s position

A reference to DI was only explicitly made by an opposition member from the Liberal-Democratic party (which later changed its name to Order and Justice), J. Veselka. He argued that the Lisbon Treaty established a “two-tier Europe: elitist Europe and provincial Europe.” Therefore, in order not to remain in the provincial Europe, Lithuania should reorient its foreign policy from the focus on co-operation with the United States (USA) to more co-operation with Germany. It seems that his criticism was mostly driven by a critical approach to the USA and the traditional strategic orientation of Lithuania to rely in its security policy on the transatlantic alliance and the USA in particular. However, he positively assessed the two-tier Europe model and saw the elitist Europe as a group of Member States that based their policies on deliberations and negotiations, maintaining that he only objected to the country’s policy, which was pushing Lithuania to the periphery.7

3.2.3 2011-2014: EU Council presidency, introduction of the euro and the Fiscal Compact

The government’s position

There are very few references to DI models during this period, which complicates the reconstruction of the position of the ruling coalitions. However, both the members of parliament who referred to DI models in their speeches were heads of important parliamentary committees and members of the two centre-right ruling coalition parties.

On 3 November 2011, when the draft resolution on Lithuania’s European Council presidency was debated, the head of the Social Affairs and Labour Committee, R. J. Dagys (member of the Homeland

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7 Trečia. Sparčiai iš inercijos išispėtusi Europos Sąjunga susiduria su sprendimų priėmimo problema, nes pasirodė, kad realiai Europos Sąjunga susidėda iš dviejų lygių. Viena Europos Sąjungos valstybių dalis nori kurti, tobulinti Europos Sąjungos ateičių, niekam nenori savo vertybių priminti karinėmis priemonėmis, neskirsto pasaulio automatiškai į blogą ir gerą, nori turėti nuosavą socialinį, ekonominį, politinį modelį, nenori paklusti kokiom nors vienam pasaulio centrui, pagrindinį dėmesį nori skirti deryboms ir susitarimams. Aš tai vadinu elitinę Europą. Yra ir kita Europos Sąjungos dalis, kuri labai nori atsireiškinti už praeitį, kuri nemokama savarankiškai spręsti savo problemų, kuri neva aiškiakai žino, kas pasaulioje amžinai bloga ar amžinai geruolai, kuri visada pasiryžusi eiti paskui pagrindinį pasaulio poną ir įgula priimeti kitoms valstybėms savo vertybes, nenori kurti ateities, nepasiekia revanšo už praeitį. Tačiau tai pateikė nieko žinomiems nėra Europos. Lisabonos sutarties ne skirsto automatiškai Europos į elitinę ir užkampio, bet leidžia kiekvienai valstybei pasirinkti, ar nori būti elitine Europą ir kurti ateitį, ar kibti į praeitį ir būti užkampiu. Tai yra tautos pasirinkimas. (J. Veselka, Seimo narys, frakcija „Tvarka ir teisingumas (liberalai demokratai)“, 2008.05.08)
Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats at the time), presented a proposal to include a provision on compensation for the expenses for the education of a qualified labour force to those EU Member States from which labour migrates to other Member States in order to ensure the sustainable growth and competitiveness of the countries of origin. In response to criticism of his proposal from his party colleagues, he responded with references to ‘two-tier’ Europe, the migration of qualified labour to Germany and the need to establish mechanisms which could compensate for the creation of an “unequal Europe.”

Such a use of DI key words indicates that some members of the parliament associate them with a fragmented and unequal Europe in which Lithuania’s interests are ignored and the country is relegated to ‘second-class’ membership in economic and social terms.

Meanwhile, the head of the Budget and Finance Committee, K. Glaveckas, a member of the Liberal Movement, referred not to ‘two-tier’ Europe but to ‘two-speed’ Europe. During a debate on the requirements of EU financial discipline and their impact on Lithuania’s system of budget planning and implementation on 26 April 2012, he maintained:

“But at the same time we cannot ignore and cannot fail to mention that those rules in a sense are applied in a way with double standards (as the minister mentioned). Initially, we used to speak about ‘two-speed’ Europe, which was Western Europe and Eastern Europe, while now we seem to be making another differentiation between rich strong powerful influential Europe – Germany, France, Italy and other eurozone members – and those other recent newcomers, non-eurozone members that are in a more complicated situation. The application of double standards like this, at least their initial interpretation, when Spain exceeded (…) the procedure but no sanctions were applied to it while Hungary suffered severely, it seems, being fined 0.5 billion euro, because of violating its obligations…” (Member of Parliament K. Glaveckas, Liberal Movement, 2012.04.26).

By saying this, he implied that the EU institutions followed a policy of double standards by being more accommodating towards eurozone countries such as Spain when it violated fiscal discipline rules than towards non-eurozone members such as Hungary, which was punished.

On 12 June 2012, the draft Law on the ratification of the amendment to Article 136 of the Treaty of the European Union, which was related to the stability mechanism applicable to those Member States which had the euro as their currency, adopted on 25 March 2011 by a decision of the European Council 2011/199/EU, was debated in Lithuania. On this occasion, K. Glaveckas presented his motives for voting. He urged other members of the parliament to vote for the law, referring to the “existing situation in Europe characterised as ‘two-speeds Europe’ with a growing divergence between the eurozone and non-eurozone members.” In his view, the adoption of common EU rules on fiscal discipline was needed.

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9 *Bet kartu mes negalime nežiūrėti ir negalime nepaminėti, kad tos taisyklevės tam tikra prasme (tą ministrė minėjo) kol kas taikomos dviem standartais. *I pradžių mes kalbėjomė apie dviejų greičių Europą, kad yra Vakarų Europa, Ryto Europa, o dabar, atrodo, pjaūvi daromus kiek kitu aspektu tai yra turtinga, stipri, galima, įtakinga Europa: Vokieta, Prancūzija, Italia ir kitos, ir tos euro zonas šalys, ir kitos atėjusios ne euro zonas šalys, kurios situacija yra kiek sudėtingesnė. Ir taisyklių, kaip tik toks dviejų standartų taikymas, bent jau pirminis toks jų interpretavimas, kai Ispanija viršijo (…) procedūrą, bet iš esmės jai nebuvo pritaikytos koks nors priemonės, o Vengrija netgi skaudžiai nukentėjo, atrodo, 0,5 mlrd. eurų apimtimi, dėl savo įsipareigojimų nevykdymo…* (K. Glaveckas, Seimo narys, Liberalų sąjūdžio frakcija, 2012.04.26)
in order for Lithuania not to diverge too much from the eurozone group and to prevent “the destruction of everything we have been striving for in the last eight years.”

In these statements, the negative attitude to DI reflected the concern that Lithuania might permanently stay outside the core of EU Member States if it did not comply with the rules adopted by the core. In this case, the core was associated with the eurozone members.

The opposition’s position

It should be noted that after the parliamentary election in Autumn 2012 the Liberal Movement became an opposition party. However, its position with regard to ‘two-speed’ Europe did not change. It continued to view it negatively, at the same time accepting it as a fact and a motivation for Lithuania to become part of the core “because of the evident benefits associated with full-fledged EU Member State status.” For example, on the occasion of the adoption of the draft law on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania, the Deputy Chair of the Committee on European Affairs, P. Auštrevičius, argued that “the euro was not only a currency and a symbol of fiscal union, it was also a symbol of a geopolitical deeper core, a European Union core” and that the history of contemporary times confirmed “that we should be part of the core”: “Dear colleagues, let’s be open to ourselves: the litas [Lithuania’s national currency, which was replaced by the euro] has fulfilled its historical mission. Our national respectable and currently functioning currency the litas brought Lithuania to the euro, to Europe. Now we have entered a new stage, we should move on and not stop. Those states which are members of the European Union and join the eurozone are doing so deliberately. They want to deepen their co-operation. Those which are afraid of deeper fiscal economic political co-operation inside the European Union are essentially Europessimists, I would even say, Euroskeptics. They think that what we already have is enough. A. Kubilius is right, the euro is not just a currency or a symbol of fiscal union, it is also a symbol of a geopolitical deeper core, the core of the European Union. Doesn’t today’s history prove that we need to be in the core and not stand near the eastern border and wait to see where the wind blew from?” (Member of Parliament P. Auštrevičius, Liberal Movement, 2014.04.17).

A different position was expressed by the members of the Order and Justice party. For example, its member E. Klumbys argued against amendments to the Statute of the Parliament (the latter were supported by P. Auštrevičius on the basis that they established the procedures for checking compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). E. Klumbys maintained that the amendments represented “one more step on the road to the restriction of our rights” and that in reality a European

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Union of “several tiers” already existed and that “troubles faced by southern Europe, where people did not put enough efforts into work, would be transmitted to the northern part of Europe.”12

3.2.4 2016-2019: The Future of Europe

The government’s position

After the autumn 2016 parliamentary election, a new ruling coalition was formed around the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, a party which prioritised domestic political issues and has been relatively indifferent to debates on the EU. In May 2019, a newcomer to politics, G. Nausėda, was elected Lithuanian President. The parliamentary debates and positions of key foreign policymakers like the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during this period indicate a continuity in the negative attitude to ‘two-speed’ or ‘several-speed’ Europe. The negative position was based on the assumption that it could potentially lead to disintegration of the EU or could be used as a tool for core EU Member States to marginalise smaller new members.

For example, on 9 November 2017 members of parliament debated a draft resolution proposed by MP P. Gražulis on successful reforms implemented in Poland, which was meant to express Lithuania’s support for the Polish Government in the case that the EU institutions tried to apply sanctions on Poland. On this occasion, a member of the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union faction, P. Urbšys, expressed his support for the draft resolution, referring to “some European states, which like to call themselves old Member States and treat themselves as superior with respect to other European Union states … and set a different speed of European Union development.” He continued that “sometimes it seemed that in order to please Brussels we were ready to sacrifice our sovereignty and our identity, being afraid, God forbid, to defend and express our solidarity with those who represent a different position.”13

On 22 November 2018, a debate on the future of the European Union took place. It was started by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, L. A. Linkevičius. In his speech he maintained that “we were speaking about many speeds, Europe of many speeds, or Europe of two speeds” and that the government’s position was that “Europe already had many speeds, definitely not just two, but more speeds.” He mentioned examples such as the eurozone of 19 Member States, 22 EU Member States belonging to NATO, 22 EU Member States being part of the Schengen area and 23 EU Member States being members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “to which Lithuania was proud to be accepted recently.” His intention was to underline that different existing speeds did not

12 Gerbiamieji kolegos, iš tikrujų šios pataisos realiai yra dar vienas žingsnis į mūsų teisų apribojimą ir supančiojimą. Turbūt Europoje yra nedaug valstybių, kurios gali pasiųsti taip, kaip vaikas pasielgė slovakai, kurie nepabūgo, būdami paskutiniai, pasakyti „ne“ tam beprotiškam keliui, kuria eina Europa. Ir antra, atsižvelkime į tai, kad realiai yra egzistuoja kelii lygių Europos Sąjungą, dabar kol kas dar formaliai tai nepripažįstama, bet visos belgės, kurios formuojasi pietinėje Europos dalyje, kur žmonės iš tikrujų nelabai persitėgina dirbti, visi tai persiūdo šiaurinė Europos dalį. Tai mes būkime atsargūs ir nelįskime į tą peklą, kurį dėl noro įsiteikti Briuseliui mes esame pasirengę paaukoti ir savo suverenitetą, ir savo tapatybę. (E. Klumbytė, Seimo narys, frakcija „Tvarka ir teisingumas“, 2011.10.13)

13 Mes ašiškai matome, kad Europos Sąjungos ateitis priklauso nuo įvairių valstybių pozicijos. Mes matome tai, kad kai kurios Europos valstybės, kurios save leidžia pavadinti senbuvėmis ir kurios laiko save virš kitų Europos Sąjungos valstybių… nustatyti atitinkamo greičio Europos Sąjungos vystymą. Antras dalykas yra tai, kad viš delto mato Europos Sąjungą su išlydymomis nacionalinėmis valstybėmis, su išlydymomis savo tapatybėmis. Mes tada pagalvokime, ar mums, Lietuva, yra naudinga tokia Lenkijos poziūris Europos Sąjungą? Vis dėlto už tai, kad kiekviena valstybė išsaugoti savo suverenitetą, kiekviena valstybė išsaugoti savo nacionalinę tapatybę, kiekvieną tapatybę turėti teisę į savo savitą kultūrą, į savaitą tradicijas. Man atrodo, susitarime, kad tai Lietuva yra naudinga. Ar Lietuva yra naudinga, kad šalia esanti tokia didelė kaimynė taptų izoliuota nuo Europos Sąjungos valstybių?
“present a problem, they could even be helpful” but “we should not engage too much in these games of multiple speeds since the vector could be eccentric, not consolidating.”

On 12 July 2019 in his inaugural speech, President G. Nausėda mentioned ‘two-speed’ Europe. Although his reference was rhetorical or metaphorical, it had negative connotations. He stated that “most of us have a feeling that in the process of progressing ahead we forgot something important: why statistics move separately from people’s emotions, how discussing ‘two-speed’ Europe we failed to notice that we created a ‘two-speed Lithuania.’” This reference could be interpreted either as a symbol of divergences in economic development in provincial Lithuania and the capital Vilnius, or as too much focus on European policy priorities at the expense of domestic ones, or both (it should be noted that this reference was coded neutral because of its vague meaning).

The opposition’s position

At the same time, it should be noted that during this period the centre-right party Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, which was traditionally supportive of deeper integration, revealed a stronger internal divergence of opinions with regard to DI models. On the occasion of the adoption of the draft resolution on the consistency and continuity of Lithuania’s foreign, security and defence policy in 2016-2020, a representative of the Christian-democratic wing of the party, A. Ažubalis (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), stated that “we also had challenges at the continental level: the danger of disintegration of the European Union, the resistance of France and Germany to the free trade agreement with the United States of America. And at the regional level we faced a situation when Visegrad states were sincerely fighting the states of the core. The situation was serious indeed.”

On 13 June 2017, when a draft resolution was proposed by a member of the opposition, the liberal A. Armonaitė, on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union, another member of Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, L. Kasčiūnas, argued that unrealistic ambitions to establish a European federation led the UK to vote for Brexit. He said that “constant talk about our need for political union, a European superstate federal entity, in some way led those states that were more cautious with regard to European integration to consider this project much more carefully, which eventually led traditional British Euroscepticism to become a political programme.” He continued that “it was Brits who always resisted the formation of the European Union core and periphery” and that they were much more attuned to Lithuanian security dilemmas.


15 Tačiau kodėl tada daugelio mūsų nepatikėdama jausmus, kad nuolat verždamiesi pirmyn pamiršome kažką svarbų; kodėl statistika ir žmonių savijauta žengia skyriumi; kaip, kalbėdami apie dviejų greičių Europą, nepastebėjome, jog sukūrėme dviejų greičių Europos ryšių? (G. Nausėda, prezidentas, 2019.07.12)


On 22 November 2018, during a debate on the future of the European Union, L. Kasčiūnas defended the Polish vision of a “Europe of nations” maintaining that this vision represented an “alternative to the idea of “two-speed, core or federal Europe.” In this debate, an alternative approach to the concept of core Europe was presented by A. Armonaitė, who saw being part of the core as an opportunity to express a critical position on centralisation of the EU. She urged filling the void left in the EU by the exiting UK, which was the state which used to express inconvenient truths, and stated that “we, Lithuania, had to be and see ourselves in the core of the European project. We should be more united with the Benelux states, with Nordic countries, because Brexit means that this alternative opinion, this opinion which often was about integration without the creation of additional bureaucracy, had to be voiced.”

These divergent views of the future of Europe within the ruling coalition as well as within the opposition and particular parties became particularly evident when the parliament tried to draft a common position on the future of the EU. Different groups of the members of the Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs prepared three different draft positions, with no single position adopted in the end. The positions on DI models played only a marginal role in these debates. When, finally, in September 2020 both parliamentary Committees adopted a joint opinion on assessing the proposals for the Future of Europe and Lithuania’s interests, it stressed the importance of preserving the unity of the EU. While Member States can take advantage of the possibility of enhanced co-operation, the process must be transparent and open for other countries to join later. Acknowledging that not all EU members were taking part in some integration initiatives (such as eurozone and the Schengen area), it declared that if Europe of ‘different speeds’ gathered pace, it would increase the marginalisation of European countries, making convergence more difficult. Therefore, priority should be given to including all Member States into common processes.

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To sum up, in parliamentary debates the positions taken by the government and by the opposition with respect to DI models were most often negative. ‘Two-speed’ Europe was seen as a threat to Lithuania, first of all because of its recent historical experience and geopolitical threats. When these references were used metaphorically to refer to a division between powerful and weak EU states rather than differentiation of EU rules, they also carried a negative meaning. Meanwhile, references to mechanisms and instances of DI were more nuanced, often depending on particular cases.
### Appendices

#### Appendix 1 Overview of the documents analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of document</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Parliament debates</td>
<td>2004-2020</td>
<td>Documents with one of the following key phrases: two speed Europe, multi-speed Europe, core Europe, two-tier Europe, enhanced co-operation, opt-out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 To capture the **position of the government**, government programmes were analysed:
- 2004: by the coalition government led by Prime Minister A. M. Brazauskas (Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party);
- 2006: by the coalition government led by Prime Minister G. Kirkilas (Lithuanian Social-democratic Party);
- 2008: by the coalition government led by Prime Minister A. Kubilius (Homeland Union – Lithuanian Conservative Party);
- 2012: by the coalition government led by Prime Minister A. Butkevičius (Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party);
- 2016, by the coalition led by Prime Minister S. Skvernelis (Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union).

22 To capture the **position of the president**, the following types of speeches were analysed:
- Inaugural speeches by the president at the swearing-in ceremony in the parliament in 2004 (by V. Adamkus), 2009 and 2014 (by D. Grybauskaitė) and 2019 (by G. Nausėda);
- Annual ‘state of the nation’ addresses by the president (delivered yearly in 2005-2019);
- Three speeches by the president were added to the corpus which addressed the issues of the future of Europe and Lithuanian foreign policy ("The new foreign policy of Lithuania" delivered by Acting President A. Paulauskas in May 2004; “The Future of Europe from a Lithuanian perspective” delivered by V. Adamkus in October 2005; and “Completing Europe: Integration with Neighbours and Engagement with Russia” delivered by V. Adamkus in February 2008).
## Appendix 2 Translation of the key phrases used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key phrase</th>
<th>Lithuanian Translation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DI models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated integration</td>
<td>Diferencijuota integracija</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-speed Europe</td>
<td>Dviejų greičių Europa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-speed Europe</td>
<td>Skirtingų greičių Europa, Kelių greičių Europa, Daugelio greičių Europa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the willing</td>
<td>Norinčiųjų koalicija</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable geometry</td>
<td>Kintamos geometrijos Europa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Europe</td>
<td>Brandošios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-tier Europe</td>
<td>Dviejų pakopų Europa, Dviejų lygių Europa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentric circles</td>
<td>Kuglavimą susitvarka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>à la carte</td>
<td>Selekti integralią, integraciją a la carte</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future of Europe</td>
<td>Europos ateitis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DI mechansims</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhanced co-operation</td>
<td>Glauduišnis bendradarbiavimas, TVirtesnis bendradarbiavimas, Sustiprintas bendradarbiavimas, Stipresnis bendradarbiavimas</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>opt-out</td>
<td>Išimtys, Išlygos</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DI instances – enhanced co-operation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rome III</td>
<td>Glauduišnis bendradarbiavimas dėl skryrybų nuostatų, Rome III, tarptautų nuostatų, sustiupis bendradarbiavimas, stipresnis bendradarbiavimus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary patent</td>
<td>Vieningas patentas, bendro galiojimo patentas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matrimonial property regimes</td>
<td>Tarptautinių santuokų nuosavybės režimas, porų turtų, sutos, turtų</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Transaction Tax</td>
<td>Finansinių sandorių mokestis, Finansinių transakcijų mokestis</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Public Prosecutor</td>
<td>Europos prokuroras</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pesco</td>
<td>Pesco, Nuolatinis struktūruotas bendradarbiavimas</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DI instances – opt-out policy fields</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schengen</td>
<td>Sengenas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
<td>Ekonominė ir pinigų sąjunga, Eurozona</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Defence Policy</td>
<td>Saugumo ir gynybos politika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
<td>Laisvės, saugumo ir teisingumo erdvė</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Charter of Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>Pagrindinių teisių chartija</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Charter</td>
<td>Socialinė chartija</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DI instances – inter se agreements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prüm Convention</td>
<td>Prumo konvencija, Priumo konvencija</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Stability Mechanism</td>
<td>Europos stabulumo mechanizmas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal Compact</td>
<td>Fiskalinės drausmės paktas/sutartis, taupymas pakto, Fiskalinės drausmės paktas/sutartis, Fiskalinės drausmės įstatymas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Patent Court</td>
<td>Viebingo patento teismas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DI instances – external agreements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Resolution Mechanism</td>
<td>Vieningos bankų pertvarkos mechanizmas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
<td>Europos ekonominė erdvė</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Union + Turkey</td>
<td>Muitų sąjunga + Turkija</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
<td>Rytų partnerystė, Rytų kaimynystė</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed</td>
<td>Euromed, Sąsiaukų Viduržemiu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 Salience of EU-related issues in presidents’ first speeches

Appendix 4 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – breakdown by key words

Appendix 5 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – relative to the FOE debate

Appendix 6 The salience of DI mechanisms (enhanced co-operation: blue; opt-outs: orange) in 2004 and 2018

![Pie charts showing the salience of DI mechanisms in 2004 and 2018](chart1)

Appendix 7 The salience of inter se agreements with additional alternative key words relating to the Fiscal Compact and ESM

![Bar chart showing the salience of inter se agreements](chart2)
Appendix 8 The salience of instances of external association agreements plus ‘neighbourhood policy’

![Graph showing the salience of instances of external association agreements plus ‘neighbourhood policy’ from 2004 to 2020.]

- 2020-2004
- n=441
- TOTAL / year
- Neighbourhood policy

- European Economic Area: 39%
- Customs union + Turkey: 22%
- Eastern Partnership+Neighbourhood policy: 37%
- Euromed: 2%
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