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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Integrating Diversity in the European Union (InDivEU)

The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do
Governments Want? Country Report - The Netherlands

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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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The objective of InDivEU is to maximize the knowledge of Differentiated Integration (DI) on the basis of a theoretically robust conceptual foundations accompanied by an innovative and integrated analytical framework, and to provide Europe's policy makers with a knowledge hub on DI. InDivEU combines rigorous academic research with the capacity to translate research findings into policy design and advice.

InDivEU comprises a consortium of 14 partner institutions coordinated by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, where the project is hosted by the European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP). The scientific coordinators of InDivEU are Brigid Laffan (Robert Schuman Centre) and Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zürich).

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**Integrating
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Abstract

This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Dutch government discourse between 2004 and 2020. It also studies the positions of Dutch government and opposition parties on the issue of DI in selected peak-salience years (2008, 2012, 2017-2019). A multi-method analysis of parliamentary debates, speeches by the PM and government programmes demonstrated that differentiated integration (DI) is a low salience issue in Dutch politics. Our analysis of the positions of Dutch government and opposition parties demonstrated that, at first sight, both sides seem to share a position vis-à-vis DI. That is, they take a rather neutral position on multi-speed EU, leaning more to the negative side.

The salience of DI somewhat increased from the European crisis onwards (after 2010). Then, Dutch representatives most commonly referred to a coalition of the willing (DI model), enhanced co-operation (DI mechanism) and Schengen (DI instance). Whenever enhanced co-operation was mentioned, it was commonly referred to in a unitary sense (i.e. all the MSs should increase co-operation). The Brexit referendum sparked another debate on DI which was particularly focussed on an à la carte EU.

Keywords

Differentiated integration, the Netherlands, Europe, Multi-speed Europe, government discourse.

Summary of Results

I. Salience

A multi-method analysis of parliamentary debates, speeches by the PM and government programmes demonstrated that differentiated integration (DI) is a low salience issue in Dutch politics. The salience of DI somewhat increased from the European crisis onwards (after 2010). Then, Dutch representatives most commonly referred to a coalition of the willing (DI model), enhanced co-operation (DI mechanism) and Schengen (DI instance). Whenever enhanced co-operation was mentioned, it was commonly referred to in a unitary sense (i.e. all the MSs should increase co-operation). The low salience of DI is possibly the result of the large dependence of the Netherlands on the internal market and the euro. The Brexit referendum sparked another debate on DI which was particularly focussed on an à la carte EU.

II. Position

Our analysis of the positions of Dutch government and opposition parties demonstrated that, at first sight, both sides seem to share a position vis-à-vis DI. That is, they take a rather neutral position on multi-speed EU, leaning more to the negative side. When it comes to a coalition of the willing, this was more positively framed, especially among government parties. An in-depth analysis of statements demonstrated two things. First, there was some divergence among the coalition parties on the desirability of DI. While a coalition partner (CDA) presented itself as a strong advocate of a two-speed EU, the largest party (VVD) saw DI as only a secondary option because a more unitary solution including all MS was preferred. This position remained stable over the years. Among the opposition parties, representatives of the Greens and the far-right pushed for DI as a way to act faster (on environmental and immigration policy).

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| <i>1. Introduction</i> | 1 |
| <i>2. How salient is DI for Dutch governments?</i> | 2 |
| 2.1 Government Programmes | 2 |
| 2.2 Speeches by prime ministers | 3 |
| 2.3 Parliamentary Debates | 5 |
| 2.4 European Council Statements | 9 |
| <i>3. What positions do Dutch governments have on DI?</i> | 9 |
| 3.1 Quantitative overview of government positions | 10 |
| 3.2 Qualitative assessment of government positions | 11 |
| 3.2.1 2008 | 11 |
| 3.2.2 2012 and 2013 | 12 |
| 3.2.3 2016-2020 | 14 |
| <i>Appendices</i> | 17 |

List of Figures

| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 1 - The salience of DI in government programmes (relative word frequencies) | 2 |
| Figure 2 - The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates | 5 |
| Figure 3 - The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates | 6 |
| Figure 4 - The salience of instances of enhanced co-operation in parliamentary debates..... | 7 |
| Figure 5 - The salience of opt-out policy fields in parliamentary debates | 7 |
| Figure 6 - The salience of instances of inter se agreements in parliamentary debates | 8 |
| Figure 7 -The salience of instances of external association agreements in parliamentary debates | 8 |
| Figure 8 - DI models, mechanisms & and instances in council statements..... | 9 |
| Figure 9 – Position on multi-speed Europe (two-speed + multi-speed) | 10 |
| Figure 10 - Position on multi-end Europe (Core EU + Coalition of the willing) | 10 |
| Figure 11 - Position on enhanced co-operation | 10 |

1. Introduction

This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Dutch government discourse between 2004 and 2020. It also studies the positions of Dutch government and opposition parties on the issue of DI in selected peak-salience years (2008, 2012, 2017-2019).

The report distinguishes three levels of abstraction in government discourse on DI. **First**, two different models of DI are distinguished at the conceptual level. On the one hand, the ‘multi-speed EU’ model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all the Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. On the other hand, the ‘multi-end EU’ model depicts DI as a potentially permanent feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can ‘pick and choose’ to adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities. **Second**, the analysis focuses on DI mechanisms. On the one hand, the enhanced co-operation mechanism allows a limited group of MSs – under certain conditions – to pursue deeper integration without having to involve all the MSs. On the other hand, the ‘opt-out’ mechanism allows MSs to refrain from participating in common policies. In short, enhanced co-operation allows a MS to integrate more than other MSs, while ‘opt-outs’ allow a Member State to integrate less than other MSs. **Finally**, the analysis looks at various instances of differentiated policies and policy fields. A total of twenty-one instances are included in the analysis. They are grouped in four different categories: (a) instances of enhanced co-operation, (b) instances of opt-out policy fields, (c) instances of inter se agreements and (d) instances of external agreements. Inter se agreements are agreements which EU Member States conclude outside the framework of the European Union. External agreements are agreements between the EU and non-EU states.

The results are based on an analysis of various government documents. As is shown in Appendix 1, six document categories were selected to cover a broad spectrum of venues and government actors. The report looks at what government programmes say about DI, at what prime ministers say about DI and at parliamentary debates on DI. The report covers the upper and lower chambers of the Dutch parliament and speeches by Dutch prime ministers and heads of state in the European Parliament. The Netherlands constitute a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. The government, made up of the king (or queen) and the cabinet ministers, holds the legislative power (together with the States General). In general, the king refrains from politics (but see his EP speech as an exception), although he has to co-sign every law to make it valid. As the chair of the cabinet, the prime minister is the leading political figure in Dutch politics. The Dutch parliament (formally known as the States General of the Netherlands) is made up of the House of Representative (the second chamber) and the Senate (the first chamber). Both chambers discuss and review the actions of the cabinet. Hence, we include debates in both chambers in the analysis.

The salience of DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances is assessed by counting key words in the above-mentioned documents (Appendix 2). The assumption is that the more a government talks about DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, the analysis of parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks. To enhance the reliability of the findings, the key word counts were triangulated with a close reading of selected key documents. Regarding the government’s position, the results are based on a manual attitude analysis of parliamentary debates. To this end, references to DI key words in parliamentary debates were manually coded as negative, neutral or positive using QDA Miner software.

The second section of the report details the results of the salience analysis. The third section details the results of the position analysis.


2. How salient is DI for Dutch governments?

In line with the other country reports, we distinguish between three levels of abstraction to assess the salience of DI in Dutch government discourse. We differentiate between DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances using a combination of methods (i.e. computer-assisted word counts, manual word counts, close reading and holistic grading).¹ Moreover, we analysed four types of documents: a) government programmes, (b) various types of prime minister speeches, (c) prime minister European Council statements and (d) parliamentary debates. In the following paragraphs, we assess the salience of DI in each document type.

2.1 Government Programmes

First, we assess Dutch government programmes from 2002-2020 for references to DI (7 in total). These programmes were drafted by four cabinets headed by the Christian Democrats (CDA) and three cabinets headed by the conservative liberal party (VVD). The computer-assisted word count analysis demonstrated that, on average, the salience of DI is rather low (see Figure 1).² Government programmes almost never mention DI key words. There were no references to DI models, but there was some mentioning of DI mechanisms and DI instances, although very limited.³

Figure 1 - The salience of DI in government programmes (relative word frequencies)



Translations of search terms (from right to left): Schengen, European stability mechanism, monetary union, enhanced co-operation, opt-out, European security and defence policy, area of freedom, safety and security, enhanced co-operation (different translation)

Regarding DI mechanisms, in the programmes there are some references to enhanced co-operation in the EU. Nonetheless, it is always referred to in a more unitary sense, i.e. the EU should work more closely with the current composition of EU Member States. This became apparent in the holistic reading of the documents. In 2012, the coalition agreement mentioned the possibility for a country to leave a mutual agreement (such as the EU, Schengen or the eurozone).⁴ It referred to differentiation through opt-outs from existing legislation for certain Member States. This indirect/marginal reference to DI was also the result of a holistic reading of the government programme.

¹ Given that the salience of DI in the Dutch debate is very low, the holistic grading showed basically no results. Therefore, we primarily focus on the computer-assisted word count in combination with a close reading of the documents.

² The online programme Voyant was used for the computer-assisted word count.

³ Note that whenever opt-out was mentioned in coalition agreements (see Figure 1), it did not refer to opt-outs in the EU but rather opt-outs from national policies for certain groups of individuals.

⁴ "It must be possible to withdraw from the joint arrangement (Schengen, eurozone, European Union) by mutual agreement" (2012 government programme).

With respect to DI instances, the Schengen area was the most frequent topic, especially in 2010. Then, the programme referred to Schengen in relation to the possible accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the area and the necessary criteria.⁵ There were also some references to Monetary Union (especially in 2010), the European Stability Mechanism (in 2012) and the Area of freedom, security and justice (in 2004).

In sum, the quantitative analysis of government programmes demonstrated that DI was not a salient issue between 2002 and 2020. A holistic reading of the programmes confirmed this and allowed us to contextualise some of the references found.

2.2 Speeches by prime ministers

Second, we also analysed various types of prime minister speeches in different contexts and venues. These include the first speeches of prime ministers delivered after a coalition agreement, speeches by the prime minister on the occasion of the Netherlands taking over the presidency of the Council of the European Union and the Future of Europe speeches.

The first speeches given by the prime minister after a coalition agreement included no references to DI mechanisms, instances or models. This is in line with our previous analysis of the government programmes, which demonstrated that DI was a low salience issue. However, this does not mean that the European Union was not salient at all in these speeches. To understand how often and from which angle prime ministers referred to European matters we conducted a quantitative word count of more general references to the EU.⁶ In 2002 the EU was more commonly discussed in relation to immigration policy, defence policy and country borders (Appendix 3). A close reading of the speeches found that the necessity of international collaboration was stressed, with the cabinet pushing for a common European asylum and immigration policy and an improvement in European security and defence policy.⁷ Hence, again, the rhetoric seems to be more one of unitary integration than differentiation.

After 2007, we see an increase in the relative frequency of the phrase ‘European crisis’ in the first speeches. In the same period, there were several references to the European economy. A close reading of the speeches allowed us to contextualise these references. When the prime minister referred to a European crisis, he stressed the dependence of the Netherlands on the internal market and the importance of a stable euro.⁸ Hence, it appears that the EU was a salient topic in these first speeches, especially during the European debt crisis. Differentiated integration more specifically was not a salient topic in the first speeches. This observation was also confirmed by the qualitative analysis using a holistic reading to code the relative salience of DI.

⁵ “In a European context, the government is committed to ensuring that the Schengen evaluation of Romania and Bulgaria and the biennial progress reports on corruption and legal reform are involved in these countries. If these reports show that they do not meet the strict criteria, the Netherlands does not support full accession of Romania and Bulgaria to Schengen and the lifting of internal border controls in the EU, and Bulgaria and Romania will not be admitted to Schengen” (2010 government programme).

⁶ The search terms for the EU were: government*, people*, Netherlands*, eu*, social*, econ*, cultu*, polit constitution*, enlargement*, crisis*, migration*, defence*, Brexit*, future of europe*. Note that each reference was also manually checked in the document to ensure that the reference was indeed related to the EU.

⁷ “A number of issues do not lend themselves to a national approach, but will need to be resolved more broadly. In the coming years, for example, the cabinet will strongly focus on a common European asylum and immigration policy. Discussion on minimum sentences and drug policy also requires attention. The fight against terrorism must be fought internationally. Improving security also requires a cross-border approach. The strengthening of the European common security and defence policy must be continued” (First Speech by PM Balkenende in 2002).

⁸ “The economy is in severe weather worldwide and certainly in Europe. The Netherlands, with its open and international economy, is being hit hard. A well-functioning European internal market and a stable euro are extremely important for the prosperity of our country” (First Speech by PM Balkenende in 2002).

Next, we move to the speeches given by the prime minister in the national and European parliaments on the occasion of the Dutch taking over the presidency of the Council of the European Union (in the second half of 2004 and in the first half of 2016). Here, we also include two speeches delivered by the head of state in the European Parliament (Queen Beatrix in 2004 and King Willem-Alexander in 2016). The relative frequency of DI references is shown in Appendix 4. There are no references to DI models but the speeches do refer to DI mechanisms and DI instances (although again this is limited). In terms of DI mechanisms, the speeches often refer to enhanced co-operation (using the Dutch terms ‘nauwere samenwerking’ and ‘betere samenwerking’). There was a peak in references to enhanced co-operation in the speech delivered by the King in 2016. A close reading of the speech nonetheless demonstrated that these references refer to the EU as a whole, thereby opting for more co-operation in a unitary sense rather than focussing on a group of countries.⁹ There is one exception in the speech by Queen Beatrix in 2004 in which she stated that “*To be able to function effectively, the Union needs to have clear-cut powers in a number of areas. In other areas, where success is less dependent on the bundling of powers, it may prove useful, by way of counterweight, to leave more room for governments, local authorities and the citizens themselves to find their own solutions either at the national level or at the regional level.*”¹⁰ Enhanced co-operation is therefore referred to with both a unitary and a differentiated meaning. This reference was picked up by a holistic reading of the documents.

Among DI instances, we see a few references to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Schengen area and the customs union. When discussing the area of freedom, security and justice in the 2016 presidency programme, there is an indirect reference to external DI: “*The migration crisis reveals several flaws in the European area of freedom, security and justice and calls for action. It is now a matter of effectively guarding Europe’s external borders, improving the direct reception of refugees in Europe and the region and sharing the burden fairly. The countries of the western Balkans and Turkey are also severely affected by the current migration crisis. More regional co-operation with these (potential) candidate countries is needed to meet this challenge.*” When Schengen was mentioned, it was also referred to in a positive sense stating that the area should be strengthened and protected.¹¹

In addition, we studied the frequency of EU-related issues appearing in these EC presidency speeches. As can be expected, these frequencies were quite high (Appendix 5). Most commonly, the EU was referred to in relation to the economy, but also in combination with defence co-operation and migration problems.

Last in the category of prime minister speeches, we also analysed the two Future of Europe speeches delivered in 2008 by PM Balkenende and in 2018 by PM Rutte. The quantitative word count did not find any references to DI key words in the first speech but there were several references to EMU and Schengen in the 2018 speech (Appendix 6). A close reading of these speeches confirmed the absence of DI references in the 2008 speech but found an indirect reference to an à la carte EU, a DI model, in the 2018 speech. PM Rutte stated that “Europe isn’t a menu you can pick and choose from [...] when you’re in, you’re all the way in.” This quotation followed a more general statement on the necessity of enhanced co-operation across all the EU Member States. Thus, there was a negative reference to a DI model in 2018.

⁹ “*Why is it important for us to continue to work together? We give the answer ourselves every day. Virtually all the major challenges we are dealing with call for better co-operation. The control of refugee flows. The fight against human trafficking, terrorism and crime. Improving our energy supply. Climate change management. Enabling economic growth and new jobs for the more than 22 million Europeans who are out of work. And also strengthening our position as a moral beacon against the powers that threaten freedom. We need each other for all these tasks*” (2016 Speech in the EP by Willem Alexander).

¹⁰ In the Dutch translation, the regional level is referred to as the EU regions.


¹¹ “The threat of unravelling the Schengen area has been adequately brought to an end; more border controls within the Schengen area could significantly impede the free movement of persons and goods, affecting in particular border workers and international road transport” (2016 Letter to the parliament on the EC presidency).

2.3 Parliamentary Debates

In a third step, we focus on parliamentary debates (in both the first and the second chambers) from 2004 to 2020. Here, we used manual counts of key words in repositories of parliamentary debates rather than computer-assisted word counts. Once again, we focus on DI models, DI mechanisms and DI instances.

We start with the most general level of key words, that is, DI models. We plot the frequency of these key words over time (see Figure 2). Overall, DI was a low salience issue in these years with only 161 references in total between 2004 and 2020 and an average of 9.47 references a year. There are three peaks in the relative salience of DI models. In the first decade of the 21st century, the salience of DI models in Dutch parliamentary debates was very low. We see a first peak in references to general DI concepts in 2012, when the EU was busy dealing with the consequences of the financial crisis. In May 2012, a majority in the second chamber voted in favour of the European Stability Mechanism. We see a second peak in 2014, the year of the European elections. A third and largest peak is observed in 2016, when the Brexit referendum took place.

Figure 2 - The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates




We now take a closer look at which key words were used in Dutch parliamentary debates to refer to DI models. As becomes clear from Figure 2, in the whole period MPs most commonly used the term ‘coalition of the willing’ to refer to differentiated integration. Also popular were the terms ‘two-speed Europe’ and ‘multiple-speed Europe.’ 12% of the references to DI models consisted of references to an ‘à la carte EU.’ In contrast, we find that ‘variable geometry’ and ‘concentric circles’ were not often used in the Dutch debate when discussing Europe. When zooming in on the largest peak in references to DI models in 2016, a somewhat different picture is revealed (Appendix 7). After the Brexit referendum, a particularly popular concept was ‘à la carte Europe,’ which was used in about 51% of the references to DI models. Again, ‘coalition of the willing’ (22%) and ‘core Europe’ (11%) were also popular.

Next, the report focuses on the question of whether debates on DI occurred within wider debates on the ‘Future of Europe’ (FoE). To this end, we compare the frequency of the conceptual DI key words with the key phrase ‘Future of Europe.’ When we compare the references to DI models with more general references to the future of the EU, we cannot observe a clear pattern (Appendix 8). While the salience of DI models was low in the first decade of the 21st century, there was some discussion on the future of Europe in the years 2005 to 2007. This is around the same time as the Dutch referendum on the EU constitution in the summer of 2005, which was rejected by 61% of the voters. The Lisbon treaty

was discussed and approved in the Dutch parliament in the summer of 2008, probably resulting in the peak in FOE salience. A second peak in FOE salience can be observed in the years 2012 and 2013, at the height of the European debt crisis. A third peak is observed in 2017, which is the year when Future of Europe debates also took place and the EU was dealing with the aftermath of the Brexit referendum.


In a second step in our salience analysis of Dutch parliamentary debates, we focus on references to DI mechanisms (in particular, opt-outs and enhanced co-operation). Between 2004 and 2020 there were 683 references to DI mechanisms in total, of which a large majority (79%) referred to enhanced co-operation (relative to 21% for opt-outs). Figure 3 shows the number of references to DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates over time. While there are few references to DI on average, we see a peak in 2008. As was previously mentioned, in the summer of 2008 the Dutch government debated and approved the Lisbon treaty. Also in this year, the great majority of mentions of DI mechanisms referred to enhanced co-operation (84% of 135 references) rather than opt-outs.

Figure 3 - The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates




Interestingly, when we focus specifically on DI instances rather than general terms for DI mechanisms we find a somewhat different pattern. We first discuss instances of enhanced co-operation (Figure 4). We observe a particular peak in 2016. This peak was particularly driven by a debate on the European Public Prosecutor (accounting for 99% of the references to instances of enhanced co-operation in that year). In 2017, there was discussion in parliament on the Pesco agreement, also resulting in a relative peak in the salience of DI instances. Over the whole period, these two instances account for the great majority of the references to enhanced co-operation DI instances. In 2007, there was also some discussion on the Unitary Patent (12% of the references), while in 2009 and in 2015 the Dutch parliament debated the Financial Transaction Tax.

Figure 4 - The salience of instances of enhanced co-operation in parliamentary debates



Next, we focus on specific instances of opt-outs being mentioned in Dutch parliamentary debates (Figure 5). 90% of the references to opt out instances regarded the Schengen Area. There was a particular peak in references to Schengen in 2015. During this year the EU was dealing with a large refugee crisis, which was challenging the Schengen area. In November the same year the Dutch Minister of Finance, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, was sceptical about the future of the area and in an interview with the Dutch FT even suggested reducing Schengen to a smaller number of countries. There was also much debate in the first and second chambers on the Schengen agreement.


Figure 5 - The salience of opt-out policy fields in parliamentary debates



In a last step on DI instances, the analysis moves from instances of internal DI to instances of external DI, including inter se agreements and association agreements. We first discuss inter se agreements (Figure 6), which are international agreements among EU Member States allowing them to circumvent


the institutional constraints of the community method. As Figure 10 shows, there were very few references to instances of inter se agreements in the period between 2004 and 2020. Half of them regarded the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). References to the ESM were particularly high during the European debt crisis in 2012. In addition, there was also some debate on the Prum convention, particularly in 2007, and some references to the Single Resolution Mechanism in 2013.

Figure 6 - The salience of instances of inter se agreements in parliamentary debates



References to external integration were even more difficult to observe in Dutch parliamentary debates (Figure 7). Between 2004 and 2020 only 33 references to instances of external integration were observed. These references particularly stem from debates on the customs union (in 2019) and on Euromed (in 2006).


Figure 7 -The salience of instances of external association agreements in parliamentary debates



2.4 European Council Statements

In a final step in this salience analysis, we turn to prime minister European Council statements in parliament between 2007 and 2020. Figure 8 shows the frequencies of references to DI models, mechanisms and specific instances. Starting with the most general category, our computer-assisted word count was unable to observe any references to DI models. There were, however, references to DI mechanisms and DI instances. As in the parliamentary debates, the prime ministers stressed enhanced co-operation in parliament (see the orange bar), particularly in 2008, 2012 and 2017. In 2009, there were also some references to opt-outs. However, references to opt outs particularly peaked in the Council statements in the year 2017. Last, moving to specific DI instances, the statements commonly referred to EMU, especially at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis (2011-2013) and also more recently in 2019. In addition, many of the references to DI instances regarded the Schengen area, especially in 2007, 2012 and 2016. In the most recent years, we also observe some references to the European Stability mechanism.

Figure 8 - DI models, mechanisms & and instances in council statements



Translation of search terms (from left to right): Schengen, Economic and monetary union, Pesco, European stability mechanism, Enhanced co-operation, Single resolution mechanism, Customs union, opt-out.

Taken together, from our computer-assisted and manual word counts we find that DI was a low salience issue in Dutch politics between 2004 and 2020. DI was almost completely absent from Dutch government programmes (with one exception). In speeches, prime ministers also rarely referred to DI. Whenever the EU was discussed it was commonly in an economic context. Whenever speeches or debates mentioned DI instances, they most commonly referred to the Schengen area. In parliament, the financial crisis and the Brexit referendum sparked debates on the future of Europe. The crisis led to discussion on the possibility of enhanced co-operation and a coalition of the willing, while the referendum resulted in debate on an à la carte Europe. Whenever enhanced co-operation was mentioned, it was often referred to in a unitary sense (i.e. all MSs increase co-operation).

3. What positions do Dutch governments have on DI?

This section presents the positions of Dutch governments on DI. To grasp these positions, we conducted an analysis of parliamentary debates using both qualitative and quantitative methods. First, a quantitative overview will be presented of the distribution of positive, neutral and negative statements regarding DI models and Di mechanisms. Second, using a qualitative assessment of selected documents, various government positions will be described in more detail.

3.1 Quantitative overview of government positions

In the salience analysis, we found that although the salience of DI was low, the key phrases most commonly used were a ‘two-speed’ or ‘multi-speed’ EU, a ‘core Europe,’ a ‘coalition of the willing’ and ‘enhanced co-operation.’ For the years 2008, 2012 and 2017-2020, we coded the framing of statements made by representatives of opposition or governments parties. Starting with a ‘multi-speed’ or ‘two-speed’ EU, we find that references were more common in 2008 and 2012 than in the recent three years (Figure 9). The majority of the statements (15 in total) refer to these key words in a neutral way, although some MPs also expressed a negative position on a ‘multiple speed’ EU, most notably ones in opposition parties. Positive views on a ‘two-speed’ or ‘multi-speed’ Europe were rare, but were expressed by representatives of both opposition and government parties.

Figure 9 – Position on multi-speed Europe (two-speed + multi-speed)

| (n = 15) | Negative | Neutral | Positive |
|------------|----------|---------|----------|
| Government | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| Opposition | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| 2008 | 3 | 5 | 0 |
| 2012 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| 2017-2020 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Moving to our second group of DI key words, we find that Dutch government parties took a particularly favourable stance on a ‘core Europe’ or a ‘coalition of the willing’ (Table 10). Opposition parties did not mention this DI model very often, but when they did they also expressed a positive position. In line with the salience analysis, we find that references to these key words were more present between 2017 and 2020.

Figure 10 - Position on multi-end Europe (Core EU + Coalition of the willing)

| (n = 10) | Negative | Neutral | Positive |
|------------|----------|---------|----------|
| Government | 0 | 2 | 6 |
| Opposition | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 2008 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 2012 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 2017-2020 | 0 | 1 | 6 |

Concerning ‘enhanced co-operation’ (Figure 11), we were only able to retrieve a limited number of statements in which MPs directly referred to enhanced co-operation as a DI mechanism. We retrieved five statements in total for government parties, of which four expressed a clear positive stance on enhanced co-operation. The single statement we found by a representative of an opposition party also expressed a positive position. We were unable to find any direct statements that indicated a position on opt-outs.

Figure 11 - Position on enhanced co-operation

| (n = 6) | Negative | Neutral | Positive |
|------------|----------|---------|----------|
| Government | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Opposition | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2008 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 2012 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 2017-2020 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

3.2 Qualitative assessment of government positions

In the second part of our analysis of government positions on DI, we present and analyse a series of statements on DI. These statements are presented in chronological order and we focus specifically on the years 2008, 2012 and 2017-2020. The purpose of this second part is to get a better understanding of the party positions and framing of DI in Dutch parliamentary debates. That said, the occurrence of our DI key words in Dutch parliamentary debates remained limited, thus restricting our analysis.

3.2.1 2008

The Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty sparked a discussion in the Netherlands on the desirability of a two-speed Europe. While the Dutch government was in favour of the Treaty, it was exploring options to include Ireland in the treaty while catering to its wishes. One of the government parties, the Christian party, expressed a strong negative stance on a two-speed Europe and stressed the necessity of unitary integration.

“If Europe is a Union of political communities, then the Union's ambitions should be in step with this. My party is **struggling with a multi-speed Europe** which is based on **strengthened co-operation**. The government's replies suggest that **enhanced co-operation is a last resort if the Union as a whole is unable to achieve its goals**. Or enhanced co-operation – say, **leading group formation** – depends on the interpretation of those objectives and that always implies a political judgment.

The possibility of enhanced co-operation can therefore indeed create a leading group that wants to go further than the rest in some areas. If this concerns co-operation to implement commonly agreed policy, for example the implementation of the Petersberg tasks, then there is still something to be envisaged, but **a Europe of different policy speeds is quite different**” (Kuiper (CU), opposition party, 07.07.2008, first chamber).¹²

In other words, DI is only seen as a last resort when the Union as a whole is unable to achieve its goals. However, these goals are subject to political judgement. In response, another government party argued that a multi-speed EU already existed and that it had its benefits.

“Enhanced co-operation is not new, because this opportunity was **already included in the Maastricht Treaty**. Do you agree with me that **enhanced co-operation has helped Europe move forward**? I am thinking of European Monetary Union. Such co-operation has taken other Member States in tow and they are now often very happy” (Van der Linden (CDA), government party, 07.07.2008, first chamber).¹³

To which the former representative replied:

“Good examples of this can indeed be given. My group has always been **cautious about the idea of leading group formation**. So today I want to hear how the instrument can be used. My group

¹² “Wanneer Europa een Unie is van politieke gemeenschappen, dan zouden de ambities van de Unie daarmee in de pas moeten lopen. Mijn fractie houdt moeite met een Europa van verschillende snelheden, waarvoor in de bepaling van de versterkte samenwerking een grondslag wordt geboden. In de antwoorden van de regering wordt gesuggereerd dat versterkte samenwerking een laatste redmiddel is als de gehele Unie haar doelstellingen niet weet te realiseren. Of versterkte samenwerking – zeg:

kopgroepvorming – ontstaat, is afhankelijk van de interpretatie van die doelstellingen en dat impliceert altijd een politiek oordeel. Door de mogelijkheid van versterkte samenwerking kan dus wel degelijk een kopgroep ontstaan die op onderdelen verder wil dan de rest. Gaat het hier om samenwerking om uitvoering te geven aan gemeenschappelijk overeengekomen beleid, bijvoorbeeld de uitvoering van de Petersbergtaken, dan is daarbij nog wel iets voor te stellen, maar een Europa van verschillende beleidsinhoudelijke snelheden is iets heel anders.”

¹³ “Versterkte samenwerking is niet nieuw, want deze mogelijkheid was al in het Verdrag van Maastricht opgenomen. Bent u het met mij eens dat juist versterkte samenwerking Europa vooruit heeft geholpen? Ik denk dan aan de Europese Monetaire Unie. Dergelijke samenwerking heeft andere lidstaten op sleeptouw genomen en daarmee zijn zij nu vaak erg blij.”

would not want it to be a way of pushing the entire Union in a certain direction if it is not possible to decide on a common course. We want to prevent a pushy leading group from setting the agenda” (Kuiper (CU), opposition party, 07.07.2008, first chamber).¹⁴

In sum, it was seen as an instrument to move forward. However, for which goals it should be used remained to be debated. The speed of integration should not be determined by a leading group. The Dutch Prime-minister responded:

“With regard to the idea of a **multi-speed Europe**, I would just like to say that the **Treaty has created opportunities for this**, which have, incidentally, not been used at all, or have been used little, while involving closer co-operation with a number of institutional safeguards. **The Netherlands has always regarded this closer co-operation in the Treaty as an instrument that will ultimately always have to lead to progress with the entire Union**” (Rutte (VVD), Prime Minister, 07.07.2008, first chamber).¹⁵

Thus, DI is only seen as a temporary solution for further integration among all the EU Member States.

3.2.2 2012 and 2013

The sovereign debt crisis and the ESM sparked another discussion on the state of the EU and the possibility of a two-speed Europe. A similar view to that in 2008 was expressed by members of the government parties: in favour of a two speed EU but only if it was necessary to move forward.

“I’ve always been a **strong advocate of multiple speeds** if standing still means going backwards. We want to move forward. We need to serve the public interest. It is in the national interest to ensure that we also collaborate in Europe in a way that shows that there is perspective in solving the major issues we have. If that leads to a strengthening of the eurozone and if there are certain countries that say they would rather not take part in it – I will talk about that in a moment – then so be it. That is unfortunate, **but I do not think that we should let the weakest link set the pace**” (Van der Linden (CDA), government party, 26.06.2012, first chamber).¹⁶

In the same debate, a representative of the opposition party stated:

“[...] it is becoming increasingly clear that the route of a permanent emergency fund does not offer a sustainable solution to a drifting monetary system and entails major risks for the Dutch state and the Dutch economy. If the problems in countries such as Spain and Italy become unsustainable, the emergency fund will certainly not suffice and the Netherlands will be dragged into a downward spiral of unprecedented magnitude. There are risks in this pyramid scheme that we cannot overlook. The greatest risk is that all of Europe will be caught in an uncontrollable fall. The point is not to use an unfocused monetary ‘big bazooka’ but to build dam walls to prevent the dike from breaking. These dam walls **make it possible to separate economies that are structurally underperforming from economies that are moving towards future-proofing and sustainability. A two-speed Europe, a split eurozone.** That is the alternative that must be brought up here and weighed against

¹⁴ “Daarvan zijn inderdaad goede voorbeelden te geven. Mijn fractie heeft zich altijd gereserveerd opgesteld tegenover het idee van kopgroepvorming. Ik wil vandaag dan ook horen hoe het instrument ingezet kan worden. Mijn fractie zou namelijk niet willen dat het een methode is om de hele Unie een bepaalde richting op te dwingen als men niet kan besluiten tot een gezamenlijke koers. Wij willen voorkomen dat een drammerige kopgroep de agenda gaat bepalen.”

¹⁵ “Over de gedachte van een Europa van meerdere snelheden wil ik slechts opmerken dat daarvoor in het verdrag mogelijkheden zijn geschapen, die overigens nog niet of nauwelijks zijn gebruikt, waarbij een nauwere samenwerking met een aantal institutionele waarborgen is omkleed. Nederland heeft die nauwere samenwerking in het verdrag steeds beschouwd als een instrument dat uiteindelijk steeds zal moeten leiden tot voortgang met de voltallige Unie.”

¹⁶ “Ik ben altijd een heel sterke voorstander geweest van meerdere snelheden als stilstand achteruitgang betekent. Wij willen vooruit. Wij hebben het belang van de burgers te dienen. Het nationaal belang is juist om ervoor te zorgen dat wij in Europa ook zodanig samenwerken dat wij kunnen laten zien dat er perspectief is in het oplossen van de grote vraagstukken die wij hebben. Als dat leidt tot versterking van de eurozone en als er bepaalde landen zijn die zeggen dat zij dat liever niet meemaken – ik kom daarover dadelijk nog te spreken – dan zij dat zo. Dan is dat jammer maar ik vind niet dat wij het tempo moeten laten bepalen door de zwakste schakel.”

the ESM proposal. Both proposals cost a lot of money. But the first route covers risks, the second makes them **manageable**. We deeply regret that the government has not fully elaborated on the latter alternative” (Ester (CU), opposition party, 26.06.2012, first chamber).¹⁷

A year later, a report on the future of EMU by EC president Van Rompuy came out and it was discussed in a parliamentary debate in the first chamber. Common themes in this debate were the possibility of opt-outs and a two-speed Europe. A representative of one of the government parties opened the debate by stating:

“In reality, we note progress along the lines of Van Rompuy's proposals cannot be achieved with all the Member States. **Without a two-speed approach, the European project seems doomed to stagnate**. Current visions, ambitions and objectives are too divergent. [...] **The possibility of enhanced co-operation allows for the creation of a leading group**. What is the objection to starting the enhanced co-operation procedure for the eurogroup?” (Van der Linden (CDA), government party, 26.02.2013, first chamber).¹⁸

To this, the Prime minister responded:

“You can say that Europe is a **Europe of many speeds**. We have the Europe of **Schengen**, the Europe of the **eurozone** and the Europe of the **patent** all at once. These are all different Europes. At the same time, it is the policy of this cabinet to ensure that we continue to view Europe in an integrated manner as far as possible, that the integrity of the Union at the forefront is paramount. In this sense, the government shares the view of the Council of State that **divergence between eurozone and non-eurozone countries should be avoided as much as possible**, partly because of the importance of the internal market” (Rutte (VVD), government party, 26.02.2013, first chamber).¹⁹

He also added:

“We also believe it is important that communal ideas in the European Union have ample room. **We are not fans of inter-government arrangements. The Fiscal Compact**, which was drawn up two years ago, in December 2010, and on which decisions were taken in March 2011, **is a sub-optimal solution** in our view. Rather, **we prefer solutions at the community level**, if necessary through enhanced co-operation rather than inter-government” (Rutte (VVD), government party, 26.02.2013, first chamber).²⁰

¹⁷ “In de tweede plaats wordt steeds duidelijker dat de route van het permanente noodfonds geen duurzame oplossing biedt voor een op drift geraakt monetair systeem en grote risico's met zich meebrengt voor de Nederlandse Staat en de Nederlandse economie. Als de problemen in landen als Spanje en Italië onhoudbaar worden, is het noodfonds zeker niet voldoende én wordt Nederland meegesleurd in een neerwaartse spiraal van ongekende omvang. Er zijn risico's in dit piramidespel die wij niet kunnen overzien. Het grootste risico is dat heel Europa wordt meegeslept in een onbeheersbare val. Het gaat er niet om, een ongerichte monetaire "big bazooka" in te zetten, maar om damwanden te slaan om te voorkomen dat de dijk doorbreekt. Die damwanden maken het mogelijk economieën die structureel onder de maat presteren, te scheiden van economieën die de slag naar toekomstbestendigheid en duurzaamheid maken. Een Europa van twee snelheden; een gesplitste eurozone. Dat is het alternatief dat hier op tafel moet komen en moet worden afgewogen tegen het ESM-voorstel. Beide voorstellen kosten veel geld. Maar de eerste route dekt risico's af, de tweede maakt ze beheersbaar. Wij betreuren het zeer dat het kabinet dit laatste alternatief niet volwaardig heeft uitgewerkt.”

¹⁸ “In de realiteit, zo stellen wij vast, is vooruitgang langs de lijnen van de voorstellen van Van Rompuy niet met alle lidstaten te bereiken. Zonder een tweesnelhedenbenadering lijkt het Europese project gedoemd te zijn om te stagneren. Daarvoor lopen de visies, de ambities en de doelstellingen te ver uiteen. Daarvan getuigt ook de speech van Cameron. De mogelijkheid van versterkte samenwerking biedt openingen voor het vormen van een kopgroep. Wat is erop tegen om voor de Eurogroep de procedure van versterkte samenwerking in werking te stellen?”

¹⁹ “Je kunt zeggen dat Europa het Europa is van zeer veel snelheden. Wij hebben het Europa van Schengen, het Europa van de eurozone en dadelijk het Europa van het patent. Dat zijn allemaal verschillende Europa's. Tegelijkertijd is het de politiek van dit kabinet om ervoor te zorgen dat wij Europa zo veel mogelijk integraal met elkaar blijven bekijken, dat de integriteit van de Unie vooropstaat. In die zin deelt het kabinet de mening van de Raad van State dat divergentie tussen eurozonelanden en niet-eurozonelanden zo veel mogelijk vermeden moet worden, onder meer vanwege het belang van de interne markt.”

²⁰ “Wij vinden het ook belangrijk dat het communautaire gedachtegoed in de Europese Unie ruim baan heeft. Wij zijn geen liefhebber van intergouvernementele arrangementen. Het Fiscal Compact dat twee jaar geleden, in december 2010, tot

Therefore, there seemed to be somewhat divergence among the governing parties in their positions vis-à-vis a two-speed Europe. The debate also touched on the government programme and noted that it should be possible to change an EU treaty to allow countries to opt out from existing regulations (see footnote 4 on page 2 of this report). The PM clarified that he was not an advocate of opt-outs, but:

“a treaty change may be necessary at some point, for example to allow a country to withdraw from common arrangements. Currently, a country can, under the Lisbon Treaty, cancel its subscription to the Union if it chooses to do so, but cannot leave the eurozone. We believe this should be possible. **A country must have the option to leave Schengen**, the eurozone and other common arrangements. That requires a treaty change. It may very well be that the UK will then attempt to enforce opt-outs in the context of the treaty change. In this scenario, it will be the case that **we are opposed to all kinds of specific arrangements between countries and the Union**” (Rutte (VVD), government party, 26.02.2013, first chamber).²¹

3.2.3 2016-2020

In the last period in our analysis, DI was discussed in Dutch parliamentary debates in relation to three issues: the Schengen area, immigration policy and the CETA agreement. To set the scene, in 2016 the Dutch King gave a speech in the EP stressing the necessity of continued European co-operation.

“Why is it important for us to continue to work together? We give the answer ourselves every day. Virtually **all the major challenges we are dealing with call for better co-operation**. The control of refugee flows. The fight against human trafficking, terrorism and crime. Improving our energy supply. Climate change management. Enabling economic growth and new jobs for the more than 22 million Europeans who are out of work. And also strengthening our position as a moral beacon against the powers that threaten freedom. **We need each other** for all these tasks” (King Willem-Alexander, 15.05.2016, European parliament).²²

In 2018, there was another debate in the first chamber on the possibility of a two-speed Europe. The Minister for Foreign affairs expressed a clear position:

“We have been asked how the government views a multi-speed Europe. This is of course already the case in a number of areas. This applies to EMU and it applies to the Schengen area. **It is generally a second choice as it is better to agree with the whole European Union area than with some of them, but practice has indicated that it can work well in a number of situations**” (Blok (VVD), Minister for Foreign Affairs, 04.10.2018, first chamber).²³

stand is gekomen en waarover in maart 2011 besluitvorming heeft plaatsgevonden, is wat ons betreft een suboptimale oplossing. Liever oplossingen communautair, desnoods via het middel van de versterkte samenwerking, in plaats van intergouvernementeel.”

²¹ “... een verdragswijziging kan op een gegeven moment nodig zijn, bijvoorbeeld om het voor een land mogelijk te maken om uit gemeenschappelijke arrangementen te treden. Op dit moment kan een land op basis van het Lissabonverdrag wel het lidmaatschap van de Unie opzeggen als het daarvoor zou kiezen, maar niet de eurozone verlaten. Wij vinden dat dit zou moeten kunnen. Een land moet ervoor kunnen kiezen om Schengen, de eurozone en andere gemeenschappelijke arrangementen te verlaten. Dat vraagt een verdragswijziging. Het kan heel goed zijn dat het VK dan zal pogen om opt-outs af te dwingen in het kader van de verdragswijziging. Daarvoor zal gelden dat wij ertegen zijn dat er allerlei specifieke arrangementen komen tussen landen en de Unie.”

²² “Waarom is het belangrijk dat we samen blijven optrekken? Het antwoord daarop geven we iedere dag zelf. Bij vrijwel alle grote opgaven waarmee we te maken hebben, klinkt de roep om betere samenwerking. Beheersing van vluchtelingenstromen. Bestrijding van mensenhandel, terrorisme en criminaliteit. Verbetering van onze energievoorziening. Beheersing van de klimaatverandering. Het mogelijk maken van economische groei en nieuwe banen voor de ruim 22 miljoen Europeanen die zonder werk zitten. En ook: versterking van onze positie als moreel baken tegen de machten die de vrijheid bedreigen. Bij al deze opgaven hebben wij elkaar nodig.”

²³ “Er is gevraagd hoe het kabinet aankijkt tegen een Europa van meerdere snelheden. Op een aantal terreinen is dat natuurlijk het geval. Dat geldt voor de EMU en dat geldt voor het Schengengebied. Het is over het algemeen een tweede keuze, omdat het mooier is om met het hele Europese Uniegebied tot overeenstemming te komen dan met een deel daarvan, maar de praktijk heeft aangegeven dat het in een aantal situaties goed kan werken.”

Therefore, the position of the Dutch government appears very similar to that in 2012-2013. A multiple-speed Europe already existed and had been shown to work in certain cases, but the preferred option was unitary integration across all the MSs.

In the same year, a representative of a far-right party actually proposed a coalition of the willing with non-EU MSs as an efficient solution to the migration problem and as an alternative to Brussels:

“[...] there is a difference between Europe, the continent, and the EU, the institutions. Indeed, no one is against collaboration with other European countries. Non-European countries could also help with their fleet blockade and so on. That just has nothing to do with the EU. What is against **enforcing a concrete result as soon as possible by setting up a coalition of the willing** together with a number of other countries with the Netherlands to unilaterally, multilaterally, bilaterally, in all possible ways, act and tackle this problem? Why always meet in Brussels?” (Baudet, (FvD), opposition party, 21.06.2018, second chamber).²⁴

To this, the PM responded:

“Well, there is nothing wrong with that. In 2016, the Netherlands and Germany made such an agreement with Turkey. However, when this can be fitted into an EU framework, then this is of course always preferable to other constructions. In itself there is nothing to it, only this specific solution sounds a bit hysterical” (Rutte (VVD), government party, 21.06.2017, second chamber).²⁵

Thus, enhanced co-operation is perceived as an option, but it is again a less preferable solution than an EU-wide policy.

Last, the possibility of a coalition of the willing was also mentioned in debates on the CETA agreement and environmental policies in 2017 and 2012. In both cases, it was framed as a measure to act faster. Given that the statements were part of a lengthier plea on environmental policy, there was no clear response to the coalition of the willing in either debate.

“We must make every effort to rapidly tighten the European emissions trading system so that the minimum price for CO₂ is finally brought to an effective level. **If that is not possible in the short term at the European level, the Netherlands will have to work on it with a leading group of neighbouring countries, a coalition of the willing.** Waiting is not an option. I understand that the VVD is now in favour of this. Maybe we can make an appointment here today” (Dik-Faber (CU), opposition party, 25.01.2017, second chamber).²⁶

“Why not, I ask again, stand on the barricades and together with **a progressive coalition of the willing**, noting that there are broader shared concerns, make sure that we **raise the bar now**,

²⁴ “Er is namelijk een verschil tussen Europa, het continent, en de EU, de instituties. Inderdaad, niemand is tegen samenwerken met andere Europese landen. Ook niet-Europese landen zouden mee kunnen helpen met zo'n vlootblokkade enzovoorts. Dat heeft alleen niets met de EU te maken. Wat is er nou op tegen om nu zo snel mogelijk een concreet resultaat af te dwingen door als Nederland, samen met een aantal andere landen, een coalition of the willing op te zetten om unilateraal, multilateraal, bilateraal, in alle mogelijke verbanden, op te treden en dit probleem aan te pakken? Waarom altijd maar dat vergaderen in Brussel?”

²⁵ “Nou, daar is niks op tegen. In 2016 hebben Nederland en Duitsland de afspraak met Turkije gemaakt. Uiteindelijk kon dat worden ingepast in een EU-kader, wat natuurlijk altijd preferabel is boven andere constructies. Op zichzelf is er niets op tegen, alleen klinkt deze specifieke oplossing, zo zeg ik nogmaals, wat hysterisch.”

²⁶ “We moeten alles in het werk stellen om het Europese emissiehandelssysteem snel aan te scherpen, zodat de minimumprijs voor CO₂ eindelijk op een effectief niveau komt te liggen. Als dat op korte termijn niet mogelijk is op Europees niveau, moet Nederland er maar zelf met een kopgroep van buurlanden, een coalition of the willing, voortvarend mee aan de slag gaan. Afwachten is geen optie. Ik heb begrepen dat de VVD hier nu ook voorstander van is. Misschien kunnen we hier vandaag afspraken overmaken.”

especially with a view to the future in this fast-changing world?” (Jetten (D66), government party, 12.2.2020, second chamber).²⁷

All in all, our analysis of the positions of the Dutch government and opposition parties on DI shows a general consensus. That is, they took a rather neutral position on a multi-speed EU, leaning more to the negative side. When it comes to a coalition of the willing, this was more positively framed, especially among government parties. The in-depth analysis of statements by MPs has demonstrated that there was, in fact, some variation between government parties on the desirability of DI. While one coalition partner (CDA) presented itself as a strong advocate of a two-speed EU, the largest party (VVD) saw DI as only a secondary option. A unitary or communal solution including all the MSs was always preferred. This position of the VVD remained stable over the years. Among the opposition parties, representatives of the greens and the far-right pushed for DI as a way to act faster (on environmental and immigration policy).

²⁷ “Waarom nu niet, zo vraag ik nogmaals, op de barricades en samen met een progressieve coalition of the willing, constaterende dat er breder gedeelde zorgen zijn, ervoor zorgen dat we de lat nu hoger leggen, juist met het oog op de toekomst in die snel veranderende wereld?”

Appendices

Appendix 1 Overview of the documents analysed


| | Category of document | Analysed documents | Comments |
|----------|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| 1 | Government programmes | 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2017 | Coalition agreements for all years, additional government programmes for 2004 and 2007 and appendices for 2010 and 2012. |
| 2 | First speeches | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26/7/2002 • 7/7/2006 • 26/10/2010 • 13/11/2012 • 1/11/2017 | First speeches delivered by the PM to the second chamber |
| 3 | Council presidency PM speeches | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beatrix: 26/10/2004 • Programme: 7/1/2016 • Rutte: 20/1/2016 • Willem-Alexander: 25/5/2016 • Letter: 7/7/2016 | One speech by a PM (2016) and a corresponding programme. In addition, 2 speeches delivered by the Dutch head of state (Queen Beatrix in 2004; King Willem-Alexander in 2016). Also a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the presidency. |
| 4 | Future of Europe speeches | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PM Balkenende: 23/5/2007 • PM Rutte: 13/6/2018 | |
| 5 | PM European Council Statements | 165 pre- and post-Council statements by the PM in the second chamber (2007-2020) | |
| 6 | Parliamentary (committee) debates | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For salience: 2004-2020 • For position: 2008, 2012, 2017-2019 | The repository included all the debates in the first and second chambers and various parliamentary committees |

Appendix 2 Overview of the Dutch key words used

| General DI | DI Models | |
|--|--|--|
| | Different Speed | Different End Points |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gedifferentieerde integratie | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Europa van twee snelheden, tweesnelhedenbenadering een Europa van verschillende snelheden coalition of the willing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> variabele geometrie Kern-Europa/ Europese Kern concentrische cirkels + eu Europese Unie à la carte, cafeteria model |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Toekomst van Europe | | |


| DI Mechanisms | DI Instances |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nauwere samenwerking, betere samenwerking Verstekte samenwerking | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rome iii octrooi met eenheidswerking, gemeenschapsoctrooi Huwelijksvermogensstelsels toepasselijk recht Belasting op financiële transacties de Europese officier van justitie / Europese openbare aanklager (pesco) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> opt-out (opt out) <p>[ATTENTION: broad key word → count carefully!]</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> schengen economische en monetaire unie Europees veiligheids- en defensiebeleid, ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid charter of fundamental rights / het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie/EU (?) Sociale bepalingen |
| <p>intergouvernementele verdragen tussen EU MS</p> <p>[NO KEY WORD]</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verdrag van Prüm Europees Stabiliteitsmechanisme Europese begrotingsunie (EBU) Europese Octrooirechtbank/ Gemeenschappelijk octrooigerecht (Unified Patent Court” single resolution mechanism / Gemeenschappelijk Afwikkelmechanisme (GAM) |
| <p>Overeenkomsten tussen EU/MS en derde Staten</p> <p>[NO KEY WORD]</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> eea / Europees Milieuaagentschap, Europees economische ruimte Douane-unie Oosterlijke partnerschap euromed |

Appendix 3 The salience of EU-related issues in first speeches (relative word frequencies)




Translations of search terms (from left to right): Europe Netherlands, Europe borders, European defence policy, European crisis, European economy, European immigration policy

Appendix 4 The salience of DI in EC presidency speeches (relative word frequencies)




Translations of search terms (from left to right): enhanced co-operation, enhanced co-operation (different translation), customs union, Area of freedom, security and justice, Single resolution mechanism, Schengen.

Appendix 5 The salience of EU-related issues in EC presidency speeches (relative word frequencies)




Translations of search terms (from left to right): European* Netherlands, European* economy, European* defence co-operation, European* migration problems

Appendix 6 The salience of DI in Future of Europe speeches (relative word frequencies)




Translations of the search terms (from left to right): Monetary Union, Schengen.

Appendix 7 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – breakdown by key words



Appendix 8 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates – relative to FOE debates



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