With whom should they make the pact?

Preconditions for pacted transitions

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates why some attempts at pacted transitions from non-democratic rule fail while others succeed. Using a mixed-methods design, the research determines the composition and characteristics of opposition organizations that enable pacting. The thesis draws on a data set compiled by the author comparing forty-five attempts at negotiations that resulted in three different outcomes: (1) an agreement was concluded, but one of the parties failed to comply with its provisions; (2) an agreement was concluded, and the parties followed through on the terms (successful negotiations), but it did not lead to democratization, and (3) an agreement was concluded, leading to democratization (a successful pact leading to democratization). The QCA analysis shows that almost always, only those negotiations that include an opposition with strong organizational capacity succeed and end up with democratization. In addition to the existing theoretical explanation that pacted transitions only happen in party regimes, my analysis shows that the strong organizational power of the opposition can be drawn from trade unions or the Church participating in negotiations, even if the initial regime is personalistic. All negotiations that included trade unions ended up with democracy. Likewise, all attempts at negotiations where the Church was present never failed, even if they did not always lead to democratization. The two paired comparisons using the most similar design approach show the two ways in which attempts at a pact can succeed (or fail). One path—shown by the paired comparison of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions during the Arab Spring) —indicates that the presence of a strong trade union can facilitate a successful pacted transition even when the rest of the opposition is poorly organized. The second path — exemplified through a paired comparison of the Ukrainian revolutions of 2004 and 2014 — indicates how the organizational capacity of the opposition movement can determine different outcomes even when the society and the interactions of actors are identical.

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Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms

All-Ukrainian Union "**Fatherland**" (Ukr. Vseukrayinske Obyednannya Batkivshchyna)—an opposition political party formed by Timoshenko in 1999. It was the second power in the Our Ukraine coalition in 2014. From 2012 to 2014, it was led by Arsenii Yatsenuk, who replaced the party's arrested leader. It took almost 25% of the votes and assumed the plurality of seats in the parliament (later lost) at the 2012 elections.

April 6 Youth Movement—a large Egyptian opposition movement founded in 2008.

AUF—All-Ukrainian Alliance "**Freedom**" (Ukr. Vseukrainskoe Obiedinenie "Svoboda")—s right-wing party created in 1991. It won 10% of the votes during the 2012 elections just before the Euromaidan and had 20,000 members in 2015. It was never successful either before or after the Euromaidan. It took 1.7% of the votes together with the "Right Sector" in 2015 and .4% in the 2006 elections.

Citizens' Party "**PORA**" (in Russian, "It's Time!")—a youth opposition movement created just before the 2004 protests. It was purportedly in receipt of funds from USAID. The party later split into the radical Black Pora and the electoral Yellow Pora groups, and both slowly faded within a few years.

CNPR (French acronym for Conseil National de protection de la revolution) or Council for the Protection of the Revolution. Tunisian body that was created just after the revolution by the UGTT to unite every opposition force that is not included in the government. Created on January 15, 2011, it was wound up after the creation of ISROR on February 18, 2011.

Constitutional Assembly (Egypt)—a temporary constitution-making body that was controlled by SCAF. It did not enjoy parliamentary rights and the right to form a government. Created by SCAF and approved by a referendum on March 13, 2011.

Constitutional Assembly (Tunisia)—temporary popularly elected body in Tunisia from 2011 to 2014 that at the same time shared the parliamentary functions (including the appointment of the government) with the function of constitution writing.

EFITU—Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions, Egyptian rival labor organization, created in a bottom-up way during the revolution in 2011, technically illegal. Sometimes is abbreviated as EFUT.

EFTU—Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions, the leading Egyptian labor organization, was created top-down in 1957 and was dependent on the regime. Sometimes is abbreviated as EFUT.

FJP (Freedom and Justice Party)—the Egyptian Islamist party, de facto Muslim Brotherhood. The name is used because the MB is officially banned in Egypt. In this chapter, I always call it the Muslim Brotherhood for the sake of simplicity.

ISROR (French acronym for *Instance Superieure por la realisation des objectifs de la revolution, de la reforme politique et de la transition democratique*) High Authority for Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition. This UGTT-led negotiated body developed a roadmap for the Tunisian transition, the elections for the Constitutional Assembly, and the institutional design for the transition period. IT consisted of the RCD elites and opposition members and was formed on February 18, 2011, and ceded its authority to the new Constitutional Assembly on November 22, 2011.

Maspero Massacre—a SCAF-led massacre on October 9–10, 2011, against Coptic protesters, resulting in the deaths of twenty-four people and about 200 injuries.

MB—The Muslim Brotherhood, or The Society of the Muslim Brothers, the international Islamist party of Egyptian origin created in 1928, assumed power in Egypt between 2011 and 2013.

MTI (En Nahda, Al Nahda, Ennahda, or Renaissance)—Tunisian Islamist party with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It dominated the Constitutional Assembly and the government of Tunisia from 2011 to 2013.

National Dialogue (Tunisia)—the second round of Tunisian negotiations between the Quartet and the Troika between 26.10.2013 and 26.01.2014.

NSF (Egypt)—The National Salvation Front, MB-led alliance of thirty-five political parties created 22.11.2012.

Our Ukraine—People Self-Defense Blok (Ukr. Blok Nasha Ukrayina-Narodna Samooborona)—centrist opposition umbrella alliance created by Yuschenko in 2001. It is an alliance of "Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists; Forward Ukraine!; Liberal Party of Ukraine; Party of Christian-Popular Union; Popular Movement of Ukraine; Reforms and Order Party;

Republican Christian Party; Solidarity; Youth Party of Ukraine" (Sager 2009, 597). It had 23.6% in 2002. Later its popularity started to fade.

Quartet—a tactical alliance of the UGTT with Tunisian Association of Human Rights, Lawyers" Association, and UTICA. It was created on July 26, 2013.

Rabaa massacre—a mass killing committed by the SCAF on August 14, 2013, against pro-MB protesters after the coup d`etat that led to the deaths of 2,000 people and a further 4,000 people injured.

RCD (a French acronym for Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique), Democratic Constitutional Rally—Ben Ali`s ruling party that was created in 1988 and was banned in March 2011.

SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces)—a small council of senior Egyptian officers which is to be called in times of crisis. The current SCAF was established by Mubarak before the revolution and came to power by overthrowing him.

SSIS (State Security Investigations Service) Egyptian secret service before 2011.

Troika (Ukraine)—when I refer to the Troika in this chapter, I mean the alliance of Yatsenuk, Tyahnibok, and Klitchko (see below).

Troika government (Tunisia)– the joint government formed by the Ennahda, Ettakatol, and CPR after the Constitutional Assembly was elected.

UDAR (in Russian means "stroke") Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms (Ukrainski Demokratichni Alians za Reformi),—opposition party, created in 2005 though named differently. From 2010 was renamed and led by ex-boxer Vitalii Klitchko, had about 10,000 members, and later achieved 13% of the votes within a big alliance in 2015.

UGTT (French acronym for Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail)—the main Tunisian trade union, which has existed since 1920.

Glossary of Personalities

Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi—Egyptian political leader. Occupied important positions under Mubarak`s rule, served as the head of the ruling SCAF body from February 11, 2011. He was elected as the president of Egypt on June 8, 2014.

Abdessalemm Jrad—the president of the Tunisian UGTT from 2000 to 2011 and was relatively loyal to the regime until the last moment.

Ahmed Shafik—former Egyptian military marshal, member of the Mubbarak`s elite, appointed as a prime minister from January 29, 2011, until March 3, 2011.

Andrey Shevchenko—Ukrainian MP from "Fatherland" since 2012, the Vice-Chair of The Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Human Rights, National Minorities and International Relations. After 2015—Ukrainian ambassador to Canada.

Arsenii Yatsenuk—Ukrainian minister of Economy in 2005, minister of foreign affairs in 2007, 2007-2008—the Speaker of Ukrainian Parliament, since 2012 the head of "Fatherland" (after Timoshenko was imprisoned), after Maidan in 2014—prime Minister of Ukraine.

Belgacem Ayari—openly rebellious Tunisian UGTT unionist, used to head a Ben Arous brunch.

Ben Ali (Zine El Abidine)—Tunisian leader from 1987 to 2011.

Chokri Belaid—Tunisian left-wing politician, an opponent of Ben Ali, leader of Democratic Patriots` Movement, which was a part of a Popular Front.

Habib Attig—pro-government Tunisian UGTT unionist, the RCD member, used to lead a Ben Arous branch.

Habib Bourguiba—Tunisian leader from 1950 to 1987.

Hosni Mubarak (Muhammad El Sayed)—Egyptian leader from 1981 until February 2011.

Houcine Abassi—Tunisian relatively anti-regime UGTT unionist that used to lead a regional branch before a revolution and became the president of the UGTT During the Tabarka congress in 2011.

Mehdi Jomaa—Tunisian prime minister from January 29, 2014. Before—Minister of Industry of the Troika government.

Mohamed Brahmi—Tunisian left-wing politician, an opponent of Ben Ali, leader of People`s Movement which was a part of a Popular Front.

Mohamed Ghannouchi—Tunisian ben Ali`s prime minister from 2000 to 2011, the head of the interim government from his departure until February 27, 2011.

Mohamed Morsi Issa Al-Ayyat—the head of the MB between 2011 and 2012, Egyptian president between 2012 and 2013.

Oleg Parubii—the commandant of both the Maidan 2004 and the Euromaidan 2013-2014. The founder of the "National-Socialist Party of Ukraine," which was later renamed "Freedom." "National-Socialist Party of Ukraine" was often convinced of being a paramilitary organization. Member of "Freedom" in 2004; Member of "Fatherland" in 2013. MP since 2012; MP in Lviv several times.

Oleg Tyahnibok—the head of a right-wing Freedom party since 2004; MP since 2012.

Oleg Yatsenko—the head of Pora! movement in 2004; before that, he was a political activist. Personalities:

Victor Medvedchuk—the head of the President's Administration from 2002 to 2005. (Note—This position in post-Soviet presidential politics means "the chief of the executive" and overlaps with the role of prime minister.) He was the most influential person from the ruling elites after Kuchma during the Orange Revolution. He is known to have close ties with Putin.

Victor Yanukovitch—the president of Ukraine from 2010 to 2014, the prime minister of Ukraine from 2006 to 2007, and from 2002 to 2005. In the past—the governor of Krarkov.

Vitalii Klitchko—a professional boxer who started a political career in 2007, became an MP and the leader of the UDAP party since 2012, the mayor of Kyiv since 2014. In 2007 unsuccessfully led the Yellow Pora movement.

Yulia Timoshenko—one of the two leaders of the Orange Revolution, Prime Minister of Ukraine from 2005 to 2007. Deputy Prime Minister in 2000. The leader of the most important opposition party "Fatherland," since 1999. She was jailed by Yanukovitch in 2011, and the

conditions of her imprisonment were that bad that she could not walk when she was freed in 2014.

Introduction

Successful pacted transitions—those led by negotiations between the ruling elites and the opposition[2] —were once argued to be the most effective way toward democracy (O'Donnell et al., 2013, 1986; Colomer, 2000; Huntington, 1993a; Karl, 1990; Linz & Stepan, 1996b; Stradiotto & Guo, 2014). However, the concept of pacted transition comes from the early wave of studies of regime change—"transitology"—that assumed every serious attempt at building democratic institutions ends up with democratization. Therefore, while successful pacted transitions attracted the attention of scholars, there has been far less analytical attention paid to the numerous cases where attempts at pacts failed, or democratization did not follow. For instance, attempts to negotiate pacts broke down in some cases and finished in violence (e.g., Ukraine in 2014). In other cases, seemingly successful pacted transitions brought about only turnover of leadership but not democratization (e.g., Nepal in 2008).

Why do attempts at pacts fail? Relatedly, what are the preconditions for a successful pacted transition? Whereas there is abundant literature on which types of non-democracies are likely to end up with pacted transition (Geddes et al., 2014, 2018a; Linz & Stepan, 1996b), little has been written about which types of opposition organizations are more likely to facilitate successful pacting. This dissertation analyzes the composition and characteristics of the organizations representing the opposition during pacted transitions in order to uncover what determines the success or the failure of negotiations and subsequent democratization.

The main argument of this dissertation is that a successful pacted transition either occurs as a result of trade union involvement in the negotiations or in a regime that permits some degree of pluralism (i.e., a party dictatorship). In those settings, the established opposition party must be present to ensure a successful outcome, while the mediation of the Church in the negotiations does ensure their success but not democratization afterward. In other words, only those opposition movements that have high organizational capacity—that is, a capacity for credible

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[1] Translation from Spanish by Linz & Stepan (1996a, p. 94)

[2] See full definition on page 10.

commitment and credible threat (which can be achieved in several ways)—can negotiate pacted transitions.

Different organizations facilitate negotiations in their ways. Trade unions can survive in those authoritarian contexts where opposition parties are already banned. Having an established practice to bargain with the state in the economic realm, they are also good at organizing dialogue on political matters. At the same time, strikes are more dangerous to the regime than protests because of their ability to harm the country's economy instead of just occupying the streets. The Church can also survive in almost any political setting and, leveraging its symbolic authority, can play an important mediator role when the political crisis becomes too violent. Finally, established political parties are beneficial to pacted transitions when they come from a relatively pluralist party or military dictatorships. However, even if they are supported neither by the Church nor a trade union, these political parties alone should have enough organizational capacity to persuade the leaving leader that he will not be prosecuted in the future, which is only possible in highly liberalized party autocracies.

Knowing the exact preconditions for pacted transitions helps bridge the gap between the structure-based and agency-based theories of democratization. Pacted transitions are more likely to lead to democratic outcomes than any other mode of regime change (see, among many others, Geddes et al., 2018b; Stradiotto & Guo, 2014). At the same time, the preconditions for pacts seem potentially demanding but also favorable for democratization, even though no study formulates and tests those preconditions.[3] If the preconditions for pacts turn out to be demanding, it is arguably not the interactions of actors (i.e., pacts per se) that foster democratization via pacted transitions. The success of pacts might merely be a consequence of the presence of strong opposition organizations. If the preconditions for pacts are not demanding and successful pacts are likely to happen despite the weak organizational capacity of the opposition, then it is agency that makes pacts so effective.

This thesis applies a mixed-methods research design. The first part presents a mid-N QCA analysis of historical attempts to negotiate pacted transitions backed with conventional statistical analysis. In the second part, the results of the QCA analysis are further elaborated through two case studies. In so doing, the thesis draws on a unique database of forty-five successful and failed attempts at pacts, covering all countries in which an attempt at a pacted

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[3] Except for those that say that pacted transitions happened only from certain categories of political regimes.

transition was made since 1974. Cases are selected based on the presence of attempts to negotiate a solution to a political crisis, which generally implies the terms of exit for the incumbent elites. The results are also supported and tested further with more conventional statistical analysis that reveals the linear connection between the size of a trade union involved in pacting and a further increase in the level of democracy.

The QCA analysis shows that whenever trade unions are present, successful negotiations and democratization follow. However, neither the QCA nor any statistical methods allow us to establish the causality behind the variables. Therefore, the causal mechanisms and possible alternative explanations are elaborated further with qualitative methods. The two paired comparisons—Ukraine in 2004 and 2014; and Tunisia in 2010-2013 and Egypt in 2011-2013—compare attempts at pacts in the societies that are very similar. However, a significant factor differed in each pair and led to entirely divergent outcomes. In the North African pair, the case study demonstrates why and how the presence of a strong independent trade union in Tunisia was the most critical factor of its success. In the Ukrainian pair, the explanation lies in the organizational capacity of particular movements. Namely, the analysis shows that the 2014 movement was too decentralized to negotiate. At the same time, of course, there was another crucial case-specific factor: the stakes were higher in 2014.

The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter presents an overview of the debate between voluntarist scholars and scholars of modernization, the theories on modes of regime change, and, particularly, pacted transitions, and, finally, the preconditions for pacted transitions. It also outlines the research question. Then, it discusses possible ways to conceptualize and operationalize the organizational capacity of the opposition and the way that is chosen in this research. It then details the theoretical expectations and hypotheses.

The second chapter presents my database and research design. It touches on the operationalization and calibration of variables and then shows how the data was collected. Finally, it discusses research design—namely, a combination of QCA and case studies. The third chapter is the core of this dissertation—the QCA analysis. It presents a truth table and analyses of necessity and sufficiency. The QCA shows that it is sufficient for successful negotiations and democratization to have a trade union involved in negotiations or that they take place in a party regime that has established opposition parties or an independent Catholic Church. The results of the QCA analysis are further elaborated with regression analysis and t-

tests. The analysis yields a result that the stronger the trade union is, the more significant the increase in the level of democracy that follows.

Chapters 4 and 5 are the two paired case studies of Tunisia and Egypt and two Ukrainian Maidans. Chapter 4 shows how the participation of a strong trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) in Tunisia helped to organize negotiations and solve three political crises and how Egypt clearly lacked this power. Chapter 5 shows how the vertical, hierarchical organization of the 2004 protests ensured successful negotiations that failed in 2014 because of the decentralized network structure of the protest. The conclusion summarizes the results of this thesis, discusses the contributions to the existing literature, and, finally, points the prospects for further research.

Chapter 1.
Theory, research question, and argument

This chapter reviews the theories on pacted transitions, formulates the research question, and outlines the theoretical expectations and hypotheses. The first part details the treatment of pacted transitions in the literature on democratization. In so doing, it touches upon the debate between structure and agency in regime change, namely, between "transitology" and modernization theories. It then summarizes the various understandings of pacted transitions and the concepts of modes of regime change these definitions come from. Finally, it summarizes the preconditions for pacted transitions in the existing literature and stresses the gaps.

The second part of the chapter spells out my hypotheses: first, how the presence of observed organizations is expected to facilitate negotiations; second, what characteristics are expected to facilitate pacting, and for which of them the data is available.

1.1.   State of the art: Pacted transitions in the literature

1.1.1. "Transitology" versus modernization theory

Why are some countries democracies while others are not? Depending on where answer for this question is sought for, the democratization scholarship remains divided between the structuralist and agency-centric traditions. For the former, political regimes are mostly predetermined by economic development, whereas for the latter, actors' actions play a central role in the choice over a country's political regime even when the preconditions are absent. The general structuralist argument is that the modernization process—the spread of urbanization, literacy, mass education, and the emergence of mass media, the change in class structure, and so on—increases the likelihood states will democratize (Inglehart, 2018a; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1999; Vanhanen, 2003). According to this logic, poor, undeveloped countries are prone to be autocratic, while their wealthy, developed counterparts are very likely to be ruled in a polyarchic way. In contrast to the modernization approach, the "transitologists" argue that at least part of the "regime decision" also depends on the interactions and choices of actors—for instance, over the mode of regime change.

The ideas of the structuralist approach date back to nineteenth-century social theory. In modern political science, it was first implemented by Lipset. In his pathbreaking article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy" (1959), he showed the correlation between economic development and democracy. Dividing countries into two categories— democratic and non-democratic — he then compared numerous indicators of their economic development and culture, starting with the number of cars per capita and finishing with religion. His argument expanded beyond mere economic development. For instance, he argued that the Catholic and Orthodox Christian religions, as well as Islam, are counter-productive for democratization. While it was truly pathbreaking and influential, Lipset's work was criticized for its failure to specify causal mechanisms and ex-post determinism.

Fifteen years after this paper was published, ironically, it was exactly the Catholic Church that changed its policy and started to promote democratization across Southern Europe, Latin America, and, eventually, Eastern Europe. For instance, the Catholic Church played a significant role in democratizing Portugal, Spain, and Poland. Most of the "Latin American Stable Dictatorships" that had once been considered too backward to democratize followed. It turned out that in certain conditions, the choices of actors were crucial for the political regime.

The avalanche of authoritarian breakdowns began in 1974, democratizing numerous countries that were once thought to be incompatible with democracy. The breakdown of military regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America in the late 1970s was later followed by the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the collapse of its satellites regimes, starting with communist dictatorships of the Warsaw Pact and finishing with the pro-communist regimes in Central Africa.

Drawing on these numerous transition cases, an entire branch of literature emerged to describe and analyze those processes. O'Donnell and colleagues (1986) were the first to systematically compare the different typical scenarios in which authoritarian regimes collapsed—that is, the modes of regime change. They noticed that cooperative transitions, as opposed to confrontational and violent revolutions, more often lead to successful democratization. Huntington (1993b) noticed that societies learn from each other and that the example of democratization in one country can inspire new transitions in neighboring ones. Many other works that have described choices of actors had followed. Rejecting the determinism of modernization theories, these studies could provide some guidelines to democratic activists.

Thus, by the 1990s, the consensus appeared to be that democratization in fact required no social and economic prerequisites and, indeed, that most if not all countries would eventually democratize.(Fukuyama, 1989).

However, many countries failed to democratize. The main problem in transitology studies is that contrary to theoretical expectations, most authoritarian breakdowns have not led to democratization (Bunce, 1995; Geddes, 1999a). I discuss the problems of this approach in detail in the following sections. Moreover, those countries that did not democratize were also less economically developed. The choices actors make are important, but they mostly play a role within structural limits.

More contemporary modernization theories have hewed close to the initial assumptions made by Lipset while specifying more closely causal mechanisms. From any point of view, it is now an established fact that a level of democracy is a function of GDP per capita (Boix, 2011). GDP per capita is connected with many variables, and therefore, many theories exist that explain this connection with different causal mechanisms, from cultural attitudes to economic inequality and social classes. For instance, Inglehart (2018b) connects economic growth with individualistic values of self-expression that lead to demands for democracy and eventually to democratization. Vanhanen (1997, 2003) has connected the distribution of the means of production and literacy in a country—what he calls power resources—with its level of democracy. Przeworski (1999) claims that democratic stability is connected with economic prosperity and equality. For Putman (1994) it is social capital—the density of the civil society organizations—that ensures the proper functioning of democracy. Though the explanatory mechanisms are different, in general, the original direction has not changed much from 1959—processes of economic development, such as industrialization and urbanization, are also beneficial for democratization.

At the same time, the problems inherent in the modernization approach—namely, ex-post determinism and numerous outliers—remain. The first is an assumption that the countries that are non-democratic now will hardly democratize later, and therefore all the features that distinguish them are claimed to lead to autocracy. The outliers of these theories are the states that have reached a certain level of development (such as China and Russia) but have not actually democratized and the states that have democratized despite being underdeveloped (such as Ghana and Mongolia). In these cases, the explanations exist at lower levels of aggregation, such as actors and their iterations.

The contemporary voluntaristic scholarship also embeds some structural prerequisites. Although the interactions of actors can vary, the theories assume certain preconditions need to be fulfilled before negotiations even begin. For instance, according to some theories, elites start to negotiate over democratization only when inequality decreases, and thus the costs of maintaining autocracy exceed the costs of democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009; Rosendorff, 2001). In addition, the literature that analyses different modes of regime change now requires certain preconditions for each of those modes going that far that can also require a particular type of incumbent regime (Geddes et al., 2018b; Linz & Stepan, 1996b). Therefore, the current trend is to integrate the structural and actor levels into one explanatory model.

1.1.2. What is a pacted transition?

The actor-centric theories of regime change share one pivotal concept—the pacted transition. As opposed to bottom-up revolutions or transitions imposed by the elites, a pact is considered to be the most plausible (albeit not the only) path to democratization. In different theories, the concept of pacted transition has taken different names: cooperative transition, pact, transplacement, transition by agreement, and the like. The understanding of pacted transition that is more or less common for all the theories is a regime change driven by an agreement between the leaders of the opposition and regime elites that touches upon at least the procedure of transfer of power (but can also sometimes be that extensive that it includes constitution writing). Classifications of modes of regime change from which pacted transitions come about are also numerous. This section compares the understandings of pacted transitions most commonly presented in the literature and summarizes them in Table 1.1.

The classic typology is offered by O'Donnell and colleagues (1986) and specifies four modes of regime change. Transitions are divided using two scales—the driver (regime elites or the opposition) and the degree of cooperation between regime elites and the opposition (cooperation or confrontation). This results in different modes of regime change: "(1) reform; (2) revolution; (3) pacted; and (4) imposed" (Schmitter, 2014, p. 7, citing O'Donnell et al. 1986). For O'Donnell and colleagues, *reform change* occurs when a protest movement demands liberalization, eventually forcing the regime to democratize, while *revolutions* refer to the physical displacement of elites. Moreover, *pacted transitions* are driven by negotiations between elites and the opposition. Finally, *imposed transitions* are initiated and undertaken by the government alone without the participation of the masses or opposition groups.

Other classifications are different mostly in their fragmentation of modes of regime change. The number of modes of regime change depends on the number of actors and the number of steps they make. One of the simplest versions has two actors that play once resulting in three modes of regime change , starting from the one imposed by regime elites and finishing with a revolution (Casper & Taylor, 1996). Adam Przeworski (1999) further divides regime elites and the opposition into moderates and radicals, thus ending up with four actor types. Joseph Colomer (2000) offers the most complex classification that indicates six actor types—three from the opposition and three from the government. These actors negotiate through various steps across different games played in multiple scenarios. Also, classifications vary in what preconditions are needed for a pacted transition to take place, from absolutely no preconditions in extreme cases (Colomer, 2000; Huntington, 1993b; Stradiotto & Guo, 2014) to a specific type of incumbent regime[4] (Geddes, 1999b; Linz & Stepan, 1996b). In general, the theories would require a certain level of pluralism within the elite bloc and the existence of an opposition (O'Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1999). The chapter devotes a section below to this debate. Again, Table 1.1 summarizes the various understandings of pacted transitions: the labels given to different types of transitions, the number and names of actors initiating and participating in these transitions, and, finally, the preconditions for those transitions (with a separate column for liberalization criterion).

The concept of pacted transition was later criticized, first, for lacking the criteria that can help understand whether a transition belongs to one mode of regime change or another (Bunce, 1995, p. 113). Second, the idea of pacted transition is vulnerable to concept stretching: every transition includes negotiations *within* the regime elite (Geddes, 1999c, p. 5; Przeworski, 1999, p. 80), and that is why one could ascribe the "pact" label to virtually *any* transition, if not guided by criteria that are far stricter than those from the early transitology literature. For instance, Rosendorff (2001) goes so far as to lump together the concepts of "democratization" and "pact," thereby understanding elite pacts on democratization as a natural continuation of the elites' desire to democratize and assuming a pact to be the only route to democracy. Geddes (1999c, p. 5) solved this problem by distinguishing between the two understandings of pacts depending on who signs them—one implies two *competing groups* within the elite bloc; the other suggests any elite agreements struck among any group of elites.

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[4] Although, these two theories are less actor centric.

This thesis adopts a definition of pacted transitions adapted from O'Donnell and colleagues (1986) for the following reasons. First, this work is central in the transitology literature, and every new "transitology" theory is derived from this understanding of the concept, developing more elaborated or simplified classifications and, consequently, definitions, with the original definition still retaining its central stance. Second, unlike all other definitions, this one offers us the tools to distinguish between a "pacted transition" and one that is merely cooperative, without a pact (a "reform," in their terms) by pointing out the explicit character of negotiations. This concept is thus easier to operationalize, as it allows us to look for the instances of negotiations while avoiding arbitrary judgments on how cooperative a transition is. This way, I take care of the difficulty of distinguishing between the different modes of regime change.

In *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, O'Donnell and colleagues (1986, p. 37) define pacted transition from non-democratic rule as "an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it." Taking the above-mentioned critique into account, I narrow down a "select set of actors" to both "elites-in-government and elites-in-opposition" to exclude agreements merely *within* the opposition or *within* the ruling elites, which are of course immanent to any regime change. To avoid arbitrary judgments, I understand the explicit character as an occurrence of both elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition sitting in the same room. Therefore, my understanding is: pacted transitions are transitions from the non-democratic rule that are led by (1) explicit negotiated agreements among (2) elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition that are (3) rule-setting and based on (4) mutual "vital interest" guarantees.[5]

1.1.3. Why are only successful attempts at pacts studied?

There is an inherent bias in the "transitology" tradition that means it has overlooked negative cases. Much is written on *successful attempts* at pacted transitions that have produced democratic results. Strikingly, attempts at negotiating transitions that eventually failed are much less analyzed. Most democratizations in which attempts at negotiations failed at some point are treated as revolutions as if the actors never even attempted to pursue a cooperative strategy. Those transitions that did not lead to democracy are not considered instances of

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[5] Vital interests are personal freedom, safety, and property rights.

regime change and are only studied outside the "transitology" paradigm. This section elaborates on why this is the case.

Author	Name	Who initiates	Who participates[6]	Preconditions	How many times	Liberalization stage
O'Donnell et al. 1986	Pacted transition	Opposition groups	(1) militaries & social notables (2) leaders of opposition parties (3) centralized class associations sharing a high degree of consensus about macroeconomic goals."	After liberalization, "competing groups are interdependent, in that they can neither do without each other nor unilaterally impose their preferred solution."	At least three moments (1)military (2)political (3)economic	+
Huntington, 1993	Transplacement	Moderates from opposition	Moderates from elites and opposition	-	-	-
Przeworski, 1999	Negotiated transition, sometimes—democracy with guarantees	Elites (reformists)	Reformists & moderates	After liberalization	Many	+
Linz & Stepan, 1996	Reforma pactada—ruptura pactada	Elites (civilian leaders)	Four players—moderates and radicals from elites and opposition	Post-totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Moderates from the elites should have some freedom to negotiate. Moderates from the opposition need "a degree of continued organizational presence."	Many—strategical and tactical negotiations	-
Casper & Taylor, 1996	Compromise path (facilitating strategy, cooperation)	Elites (Defender)	Defender and Challenger	Ruler knows that it will lose power anyway	One	+[7]
Geddes, 1999	Pacts	In military regime—elites; in single-party—both.	Between *contending* elites (implicitly elites and opposition)	Military or single-party regime. In military regime—split between the elites; in single-party regime – exogenous shock.	One	-
Rosendorff, 2001	Negotiated transition	Elites	Elites	No growth, flattened income distribution	One	-
Colomer, 2001	Transition by the agreement	Elites (moderate soft-liners)	Moderate soft-liners and moderate opposition	-	Many	+
Stradiotto & Guo, 2010, 2014	Cooperative transition	Elites & Opposition	Elites & Opposition	-	One	-

Table 1.1 Different approaches to modes of regime change

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[7] Three stages—namely (1) critical juncture, (2) sorting out, and (3) deal cutting.

The early voluntaristic branch of the studies of regime change was criticized for two things—selection on the dependent variable and the "electoralist fallacy." It selected cases based on the occurrence of successful democratic transitions and compared those transitions among themselves. This approach made a great deal of creating sensible categorizations of modes of regime change. At the same time, it overlooked those political crises and contentious actions that *did not remove authoritarian leaders*, or where such leaders were removed, it *did not lead a country to democrac*y. Therefore, no matter whether it is a pacted transition or any other mode of regime change, little attention was paid to the negative scenarios. The "electoralist fallacy" (Bunce, 1995; Geddes, 1999a) is another bias of this branch of literature on transitions that emerged from the very narrow definition of democracy and democratization that has essentially taken it for granted that whenever democratic institutions are established, democratization happens. For instance, Huntington (1993b, pp. 6–7) adhered to an abridged version of Schumpeter's definition of democracy. This potentially could lead scholars to overlook those cases of pacted transitions that were successful at bringing about the *façade* of democratic institutions but eventually did not lead to democracy.

In the contemporary literature in the field, it is also common to identify attempted democratizations in the country-year data sets through the rapid increase in levels of democracy. In other words, most of those studies tend to consider only those cases where an increase in the level of democracy was above a certain threshold (Treisman, 2020a, 2017; Guo & Stradiotto, 2014; Stradiotto & Guo, 2010a; Rosendorff, 2001). Although this approach does not yield unplausible results per se, it leaves little room to study less successful attempts at democratization— among them, failed attempts at pacted transitions. At the same time, recent studies of authoritarian regimes that are not focused on democratization, and, therefore, do not select on the instances of an increase in the level of democracy, sometimes point out that there are instances when attempted negotiations failed, for instance, in Congo in 1992 and Togo in 1991 (Geddes et al., 2018b, p. 208).

Therefore, agency-focused studies of democratization have concentrated chiefly on successful cases of democratization. Unfortunately, this has left many transitions where the actors failed to democratize understudied. At the same time, having the data on actors in failed attempts at democratization (and in failed negotiation attempts) would allow for a systematic comparison with more successful cases. Closing this gap will enrich our knowledge of democratization.

1.1.4. Pacted transitions and democratic outcomes

Societies that undergo pacted transitions from authoritarian rule are known to have excellent chances of democratization. The explanations behind this phenomenon vary. Early "transitologists" (see, e.g., Casper & Taylor, 1996; Huntington, 1993b; O'Donnell et al., 1986, and many others) see the reason for the success of such transitions in the path dependency they create. Pacted transitions provide the most efficient and the least violent path toward democracy because they level the playing field, exclude radicals, and help forestall violence. Contemporary scholars of regime change connect the mode of regime change with the type of authoritarian regime in question, and pacted transitions happen in those autocratic regimes that are anyway likely to be followed by democracy (Geddes et al., 2018b; Linz & Stepan, 1996b).

In their famous *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule,* O'Donnell and colleagues (2013, 1986) argue that elite-led transitions—pacted and imposed—are the easiest route to achieve democratization, and that "[pacts] enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy." (2013, pp. 42–45, 1986). Pacts help avoid the dominance of a single actor and prevent violence as changes are adopted In the situation of a pact, "competing groups are interdependent," and by negotiating, they can come to a solution that is the second-best option for every actor but does not allow any of them to dominate. That is why pacts help to level the playing field for further competition. Also, by reaching a formal agreement, pacted transitions help make a roadmap to follow. Having the guarantees that such a roadmap offers in mind, the actors involved in a pact are interested in limiting the potential that one or more actors will turn to violence to achieve their desired outcomes.

This idea is supported by Munk and Leff (1997) and by Huntington in his *Third Wave* (1993b). In addition, Joseph Colomer (2000) argues that "transitions by agreement" are the best and the safest way of democratization, which can lead to democratic results even when some preconditions for democracy are not favorable.

Przeworski (1999) describes the disadvantages of the non-pacted modes of regime change. He writes that although pacts make democratic transitions "more problematic and longer," more radical modes of regime change—"transitions by extrication" in the author's terms—can give too much influence to a certain actor or social group, and, most dangerously, to the military. Later, this can undermine democracy. Huntington (1993) suggests that negotiating and reaching compromise is the very essence of every democratization. For him, as well as for

Przeworski, the main advantage of the pacted transition is that it helps exclude radical forces because the regime elites will never agree to negotiate with them. On the contrary, in noncooperative modes of regime change, after the incumbent regime collapses suddenly, it leaves a power vacuum. This causes a struggle within the opposition that can eventually bring more radical forces to power.

For those theories that connect modes of regime change with regime types, pacted transition is merely a confounding variable. In other words, pacting does not foster democratization per se but is rather one of the consequences of a favorable type of incumbent regime. Geddes (1999; 2018) does not test whether the presence of pacts fosters further democratization, but she argues that military and single-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to be followed by democracy. At the same time, these regimes are more likely to end up with pacted transitions— but the negotiated character of the transition appears to be just a confounding variable. Therefore, she does not test its pure effect. Linz and Stepan (1996) have a similar stance: those regimes that are likely to be followed with democracy also end up in pacted transitions. At the same time, they do not write that a pacted transition is necessarily the better way to achieve democracy.

Guo and Stradiotto (2014; 2010a) provide quantitative analysis and conclude that the mode of regime change influences the results of transitions. They argue that pacted transitions are more likely to end up with democracy, whereas imposed and revolutionary ones tend to bring more autocratic results. The empirical observations support this argument. During the twentieth century, pacted transitions were both numerous and successful in terms of their outcomes.[8] Whereas on average, only 30% of the attempts at democratization during the Third Wave led to democratic outcomes (Geddes, 1996), most of the pacted transitions from authoritarian rule ended up with democracy. More precisely, within this list of twenty-six pacted transitions offered by Stradiotto and Guo,[9] only one (Malaysia) remained a closed autocracy, and six (Fiji,

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[8] According to the data, provided by Stradiotto and Guo (2014), twenty-six pacted transitions occurred during the twentieth century: Albania (in 1992), Benin (1991), Bolivia (1982), Botswana (1966), the Central African Republic (1993), the Dominican Republic (1978), Fiji (1970), Finland (1917), Hungary (1990), India (1950), Madagascar (1992), Malawi (1994), Malaysia (1957), Moldova (1991), Mongolia (1992), Nepal (1990), the Netherlands (1917), Nicaragua (1990), Poland (1989), Slovenia (1991), South Africa (1994), Sri Lanka (1948), Sweden (1917), Trinidad (1962), Uruguay (1985), and Zambia (1991).

[9] The definition offered by Stradiotto and Guo is different from mine. Therefore, their cases of pacted transitions do not necessarily overlap with mine.

Madagascar, Nepal, Albania, Central African Republic, and Zambia) failed to consolidate into full democracies, according to V-Dem data. Again, in all cases except for Malaysia, pacted transitions brought about significant increases in the level of democracy.

The literature has developed three main arguments about the shortcomings of pacts. The first holds that, by their nature, pacts are oligarchic vehicles that can potentially serve undemocratic purposes. The second contends they can slow down the transition process, while the third argues they may limit the inclusiveness of a new regime. More concretely, according to O'Donnell and colleagues, a pact per se is an undemocratic vehicle: "[modern pacts] are typically negotiated among a small number of participants representing established (and often highly oligarchical) groups or institutions" (2013, p. 43), and it is somewhat a paradox that pacts facilitate democracy because they can "alter power relationships" (2013, p. 43). Linz and Stepan (1996a, pp. 56–61) hold the same position, arguing that pacts have different purposes, producing varying consequences, even if they are unintended. Indeed, they may even exclude some actors from the playing field, leading to undemocratic outcomes. Przeworski writes that pacts can slow or even freeze the process of democratization, making it "more problematic and longer" (Przeworski, 1999, p. 81). Finally, Casper and Tailor (1996) also argue that those transitions where both sides behave too cooperatively and conflict is entirely absent can lead to a limited democracy (in their terms, to a "democratic installation" without a "democratic consolidation").

To sum up, pacted transitions are argued to be the best and the safest (although not necessarily the fastest) way to achieve democracy, and most of the critique concerns the character of a pact, not its outcome. The empirical evidence supports these theoretical expectations. At the same time, one must keep in mind that any pacted transition stems from a paradox. A small number of elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition negotiate an outcome in an undemocratic way—excluding both citizens and many other political actors from the decision-making process—but in a way that helps *avoid violence* and *agree new democratic power relationships*.

1.1.5. The preconditions for pacted transitions

The connection between the character of opposition organizations and the mode of regime change is understudied by democratization scholars. In the earlier literature, the requirements for the opposition were sometimes posed but were never tested. In the later scholarship, the presence of an opposition is always understood as a part of a "regime" bundle.

While the regime change scholarship generally emphasizes the role of agency over structural conditions in transition processes, some authors still stress the *presence of preconditions for pacted transitions*. These requirements can be divided into two groups—those that are based merely on agency (i.e., previous events), the "liberalization" argument, and those that present more "structural" arguments about the incumbent regime's type (see summary Table 1.1). While it is hard to operationalize liberalization, there is a lot of room to research what features of the "type of the regime" bundle allow for pacted transitions. This section will introduce an overview of these arguments and present their conceptual advantages and shortcomings. The preconditions required from elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition will also be presented.

The early wave of studies of regime change asserted that the opposition would need some degree of achieved development before pacting could occur (Casper & Taylor, 1996; Colomer, 2000; O'Donnell et al., 1986). Nevertheless, this requirement never assumed a central place in such theories, being neither operationalized nor tested empirically. In addition, this opposition requirement has its roots in the "liberalization" argument. Most of the theories[10] have assumed that a certain phase of liberalization, "the process of redefining and extending rights" (O'Donnell et al., 2013, p. 6), always precedes pacted transitions to democracy (Colomer, 2000; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2005; Karl, 1990; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1999). During this phase, the mass public understands that protest activity is no longer repressed, opposition organizations can achieve some degree of development, and elite actors secure certain freedoms (Casper & Taylor, 1996; Colomer, 2000; O'Donnell et al., 1986).

Later this argument was found problematic mainly because, in reality, some regime breakdowns happen without a liberalizing phase (Bunce, 1995; Geddes, 1999a), while other regimes exploit the limited existence of opposition parties to maintain autocratic stability (Boix & Svolik, 2013; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2005). Second, this argument assumes that every society has the potential to develop strong civil society organizations as soon as restrictions are lifted. However, not all countries are developed enough to have a vibrant civil society, even if one is allowed in principle. Third, the degree of liberalization "is not […] measurable according to a common scale for all cases" (O'Donnell et al., 2013, p. 9).

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[10] Except for Casper and Tailor (1996), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Rosendorff (2001).

More recent scholarship on pacted transitions understands the existence of the opposition as a built-in feature of the regime. In a nutshell, leaders of more personalistic and deinstitutionalized regimes are less incentivized and less likely to negotiate their exit (Geddes et al., 2018a; Linz & Stepan, 1996b). Leaders in more depersonalized non-democracies—party dictatorships, including their post-totalitarian subtypes and military dictatorships—are known to be more pluralistic both within the elites and the opposition (ibid.). In the most recent studies, where regimes are understood as a continuous scale between military and personalistic, personalization decreases the chances a regime will end up with a pacted transition. In contrast, more institutionalized party dictatorships are very likely to have a pacted transition (Geddes et al., 2018a, p. 212).

Barbara Geddes argues that military and single-party regimes are more likely to negotiate their exit. The main causal mechanism is political elites' incentives. Power may not be the primary goal for military officers—they are also chasing corporate military gains or the furtherance of their military careers. Therefore, officers are likely to cede power to civilians if it helps them achieve subsidiary goals (Geddes, 1999c, pp. 11–16; Geddes et al., 2018a). In single-party regimes, party cadres are interested in staying in office, and they can do so even after democratization, especially if the party has guarantees it can participate in subsequent free and fair elections (Geddes, 1999c, pp. 24, 25). That is why the elites-in-power of both kinds of regimes are interested in negotiating exit. This approach offers very specific preconditions—connected with motivation—that are impossible to analyze separately from the regime type.

As mentioned, Linz and Stephan (1996b, p. 61) argue that specific conditions are required to make pacts possible. As long as a pact occurs among moderates from the government and moderates from the opposition, there are two requirements. First, moderates from the government group should have some freedom to negotiate. Second, "the moderates in the opposition need a degree of continued organizational presence, power and followers in the polity to play their part in the negotiation pacts" (1996b, p. 61). These conditions can only be met in "post-totalitarian" or "authoritarian" regimes; they never exist in "totalitarian" and "sultanistic" ones.

Also, some literature provides specific requirements pertaining to elites-in-power that enable pacted transition. Rosendorff (2001) claims that elites should have certain economic incentives to initiate pacted transitions. Concretely, they are likely to negotiate when the level of inequality is decreasing, when economic growth is stagnating or when the cost of maintaining

the status quo exceeds the cost of toleration. Linz and Stepan (1996a) also assume that the elites have some degree of internal pluralism such that moderates are given ample scope to run the negotiations. Geddes (Geddes et al., 2018b) writes, again, that there should be incentives for the regime elites—military or party members—to negotiate transitions. Such incentives guarantee that incumbent elites will not be excluded from the new system, but it might also be a chance for parties to win subsequent free and fair elections. Casper and Tailor (1996) note that the elites-in-power[11] must feel sure that they will lose power anyway.

While the criterion of opposition organizational capacity has been mentioned in the existing literature, it has only ever been in passing and has never been tested empirically. The reason is the theoretical design: the liberalization argument neither allows for any operationalization nor does it account for structure, and a regime type argument does not allow (or require) these criteria to be tested separately. Instead, regime type theories analyze the entire regime bundle.

To sum up, the literature highlights different requirements enabling pacted transitions. One branch bases its arguments on prior conditions (i.e., liberalization), while the other branch concentrates on the nature of the incumbent regime. The common point of those theories is that to make a pacted transition possible, the opposition needs to acquire a certain degree of organizational capacity. At the same time, elites should be heterogeneous and incentivized enough to surrender office peacefully. Nevertheless, the existing research has never operationalized or tested the preconditions regarding the opposition in pacted transitions.

1.2.   Research question

1.2.1. Why is it important to analyze the preconditions for pacted transitions?

Pacted transitions require at least two things—a high degree of pluralism among elites in the incumbent regime and significant organizational capacity within the opposition. Moreover, echoing the modernization theories, this high organizational capacity of the opposition might reflect a high level of social capital, which is beneficial for democratization regardless of the mode of regime change. Thus, what remains uncertain here is the origin of these democratic outcomes—is it agency per se or the high organizational capacity of the opposition that enables these pacted transitions? To approach this question, one needs, first, a more precise

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[11] The "Defender" actor in the authors' terms.

understanding and operationalization of the organizational capacity of the opposition, and, second, an empirically based knowledge of the extent to which the opposition should be organized to enable the negotiated transition.

The operationalization of structural preconditions for pacted transitions can help bridge modernization and voluntaristic theories of regime change. The argument that a certain regime type is more likely to end up with pacted transitions and to democratize comes very close to the structural argument. However, it is still impossible to build it into the modernization branch of theories of democracy. The fact that a country has one or another type of non-democratic regime does not necessarily mean that it is more (or less) developed and, consequently, more or less likely to be democratic. However, the preconditions for the organizational capacity of the opposition steer close to the concept of social capital and, thus, to modernization theories.

In many cases, the bundle category of regime type is unable to predict the mode of regime change, whereas the organizational capacity of the opposition provides a plausible explanation. For instance, in Egypt in 2011-2013, the regime was somewhat close (see below) to what (Geddes et al., 2014) call military dictatorship and was therefore likely to end up with a pacted transition. Nevertheless, the weakness and the internal divisions of the opposition allowed military elites to abandon the results of negotiations. Eventually, the Egyptian transition ended with a coup d'état. On the other hand, in Geddes' (ibid.) understanding, the pre-2011 Tunisian regime was closer to a personalist dictatorship, and therefore, elites were less likely to negotiate. Nevertheless, strong trade unions, professional associations, and civil society organizations made a pacted transition possible in Tunisia.

Categorization omits a part of reality, which in this case implies that a regime may, in fact, embody different party, personalistic, and even military dictatorship characteristics *at the same time*. For instance, the above-mentioned Egyptian regime exhibited characteristics of all three types. Some of the latest studies in the field also unpack the "regime type" variable and delve into the characteristics of a regime. For example, in their most recent book, Geddes et al. (2018a) describe a regime's probability of undergoing a pacted transition and take into account not the regime type but the *degree of regime personalization*, where less personalized regimes are more likely to negotiate a pact. Thus, they create dummy variables to account for a civilian or military origin of dictatorship instead of lumping them together into a categorical variable. Another example of unpacking the "regime type" variable in the field is a study by Wright and Escriba-Folsch (Wright & Escribà-Folch, 2012), which shows that the existence of

authoritarian opposition parties and parliaments helps ensure a better post-office fate for dictators—in contrast to regimes that lack these institutions. My research takes another step in this direction by unpacking what is understood by "opposition"—in terms of its presence and organizational capacity—rather than relying on the "regime" category.

Against the backdrop of this discussion, my **research question** is the following:

> *What sets and features of opposition organizations account for the success and failure of attempts at pacted transitions?*

1.3. Argument: expectations for features of the opposition organizations

1.3.1. Characteristics of opposition organizations

In the opposition camp, very few organizations are interested in negotiations even though all of them would benefit from democratization. According to most texts in the mainstream transitology paradigm (Colomer, 2000; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Przeworski, 1999), the opposition is divided between "moderates" and "radicals." Additionally, Casper and Taylor (1996) point to the "Mass Public" actor. Let us assume these three players—"moderates," "radicals," and "mass public"—exist inside the opposition camp.

They have different preferences. The preference of most of the people on the streets—the "mass public" — is to establish democracy and punish the dictator while keeping violence as low as possible. The preference of a democratic movement and its leadership—"moderates"—is, first, to secure its position after democratization, second, to achieve democracy, and third, to keep the level of violence as low as possible. The organization itself has little or no interest in punishing the dictator, especially if this punishment increases the transaction costs of achieving democracy. Small organizations in these huge alliances share the same goal as the whole movement—first, securing their positions, and second, achieving democracy. However, they are not likely to be represented in a pact. In addition, some of the stakeholders in the opposition alliance—namely its radical flanks—"radicals," prefer first to secure their position in a new regime, second—to punish incumbent elites, and only in a third-place—to establish a democracy.

Thus, each of the actors above is interested (to a greater or lesser extent) in the principal fruit of the pacted transition—democratization. At the same time, only those organizations and leaders are interested in achieving it through negotiations that are actually present during these negotiations—that is, the "the moderates." How do the others react when the leaders of the democratic movement, the "moderates," start to negotiate? The very essence of any pacted transition is to exclude radicals (within both the government and the opposition) from the negotiations. Huntington once formulated this as follows: "You get your radicals under control, and we will control ours" (1993b, p. 160). In fact, due to a limited number of participants in these pacts—from 3 to 300, but typically around 30 (Paffenholz et al., 2017, p. 31)—small organizations, even if they are moderate, might also not make it to negotiations. The radical opposition, being aware that it will be excluded from the pact and the authoritarian leader will avoid punishment, will resist the negotiation initiative as much as possible, persuading the others that any negotiation with incumbent elites is an act of collaboration. For instance, in Ukraine in 2014, the radical wings of the opposition—the Right Sector and some of Maidan`s field commanders—fiercely rejected the agreement signed between the president and the opposition. In Poland in 1989, after the first round of Magdalenca talks, Fighting Solidarity, the radical wing of the Solidarity movement, strongly opposed the very idea of further negotiations. People on the streets are also generally not happy when their leaders are negotiating with autocratic elites. For instance, in Ukraine in 2014, the opposition leaders were forced to beg forgiveness from the crowd for the mere fact of shaking hands with the president.

Despite all the participants of a democratic movement sharing a common goal (i.e., to establish democracy), only its leaders—those represented during the talks—are actually interested in negotiations with incumbent elites. And thus, some institutional power and symbolic authority over the opposition movement are needed to persuade its members that pacting with authoritarian elites is better than a forceful solution. More than that, the leaders of a democratic movement must persuade the incumbent elites that they will keep their promises. This task is easier to accomplish if there is a record of previous negotiations with autocratic elites. Therefore, being able to do negotiations with incumbent elites requires opposition organizations to have certain characteristics.

The democratization literature has developed a set of opposition organizational characteristics that make them capable of participating in a pacted transition. Thus, the opposition should have "sufficient strength"(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 168) and "a degree of continued, organizational presence" (ibid.) Another argument requires the opposition to be "unified" to participate in

negotiations because unity helps it resist repression and be a better counterpart in the later stages (Friedheim, 1993, pp. 494–495; Jenkins, 1983). These arguments come very close to the more modern understanding of organizational capacity, which "determines whether regulations are enforced, revenues are collected, benefits are distributed, and programs are completed" (Ting, 2009).

Also, these arguments follow the same direction. To make the negotiations possible, the opposition needs sufficient organizational capacity to offer credible commitments and make credible threats. To be capable of credible commitments requires that the opposition convince incumbents that it will hold to its promises—persuading the masses to stop violence, lifting sieges of government buildings, or ensuring that the incumbent is not prosecuted after leaving office—once the pact is settled. Likewise, the capacity to make credible threats allows the opposition to persuade incumbents that it will follow through on actions that will likely harm them—namely, mobilizing mass-scale protests, organizing nationwide strikes or eventually prosecuting or sanctioning incumbents once they depart from office.

1.3.2. Types of opposition organizations

By definition, negotiated transitions involve two counterparts among the political elite—those who rule and those who are in opposition (Casper & Taylor, 1996; Colomer, 2000; Geddes, 1999a; Geddes et al., 2014, 2018a; Huntington, 1993a; Linz & Stepan, 1996b; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1999; Stradiotto & Guo, 2010b, 2014). Among those who represent the opposition, the presence of *political parties, trade unions,* and *the Catholic Church* are expected to benefit the success of negotiations and the chances of subsequent democratization. Among the ruling elites, the leaders of party and military dictatorships are expected to contribute to the success of the negotiations and the chances of subsequent democratization.

Political parties in authoritarian regimes, if they are permitted and can participate in parliament, are known to increase the chances of incumbent elites negotiating exit guarantees and to foster further democratization (Wright & Escribà-Folch, 2012, p. 40). However, since parties are present in virtually every pact, it is impossible to test how their absence would affect the negotiations. Consequently, this analysis only focuses on their continued organizational presence instead.

Trade unions can create space for a protest that can delegitimate the regime and foster the democratic transition (Collier, 1999, p. 165). Moreover, at the stage of negotiations, trade

unions can help increase contestation by forcing the incumbent to allow left-wing parties (ibid.) Also, the "proletarianization" argument in the literature says that trade unions are especially active during certain stages of economic development when labor becomes strong (Collier, 1999; Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Rueschemeyer and colleagues go even further, arguing that the reason underlying the correlation between modernization and democratization is that the former begets an industrial working class, which is the most consistent proponent of democracy. That argument, however, is mainly associated with the first wave of democratization.

Trade unions tend to endure for quite a long time, sometimes for many generations, and thus often have a long legacy of existence even under authoritarianism. Their participation in transitions shows that they manage to preserve at least part of their bottom-up origins. In this sense, trade unions have experience in negotiating solutions to enduring conflicts with the state. During the regime's collapse, this legacy ensures the political elites that the trade union's promises are credible. In addition, having existed for decades (potentially), trade unions have leaderships that are less personalized and more institutionalized. This depersonalization of the opposition movement is expected to work precisely as the depersonalization of the regime`s leadership (see below). In addition, they tend to have a very subordinated, hierarchical structure that makes them capable of credible commitment.

Depersonalization and hierarchical organization are even more valid for the Catholic Church. During the transitions of the Third Wave, it was frequently the case that the Church participated in round tables.[12] Traditionally avoiding association with opposition movements, the Church's position shifted during the Second Vatican Council in 1965, and it started to promote democracy in those parts of the world where Catholic congregations lived under authoritarian rule (Mantilla, 2010). Nowadays, the Catholic Church is understood as an important mediator that increases the chances that the negotiated outcomes are, in fact, implemented (Paffenholz

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[12] In my research, the representatives of Islam participated in negotiations on three occasions. The two actors from the Islamic world who participated in pacting and are religious, Mohamed Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 2011-2013 and Ayatollah Khomeini's National Front in Iran 1978-1979, are considered as political parties because they were striving for political power and offices. Neither country ended up with democratization. In addition, Imams participated in negotiations in Sudan in 1985. But there, the new regime only lasted for four years. Additionally, they did not seem to play much a role. I believe that it is due to the decentralized and at the same time personalized character of Islam that it has never facilitated negotiations.

et al., 2017). What makes it different from any other religious organization is Catholicism's centralized and hierarchical character that ensures its credible commitment.

Speaking of the ruling elites, the literature argues that the leaders of party and military regimes are more likely to negotiate their exit (Geddes et al., 2018b). First, in bureaucratized dictatorships, it is very hard to attribute policies or actions in a bureaucratized dictatorship to one particular institution or actor. Thus, it is unlikely that party members or military officers will be punished after the autocratic breakdown. The same is not the case for a personalist dictator. Second, party and military cadres are likely to preserve their jobs after the regime collapses. If a party of an incumbent regime is allowed to participate in democratic elections, party bureaucrats can avoid losing their jobs. Third, bureaucratized regimes normally allow for more pluralism both within the elites and within the opposition. Thus, each of the three opposition actors is more likely to participate in negotiations in party regimes.

1.3.3. Problems measuring the characteristics of opposition organizations

The literature on parties, social movements, and trade unions does seek to measure their organizational capacity. Yet, none of those measurements applies straightforwardly to this research because of the inherent diversity of non-democratic regimes. First, the literature on political parties normally operationalizes their capacity with votes earned during elections (Hale, 2015; Tavits, 2008). However, this assumes some degree of free and fair elections in the incumbent regime, which is obviously not the case in dictatorships. Second, the extent to which some elements of elections are present in these regimes varies dramatically. Therefore, it is impossible to compare them with each other. The literature on social movements measures the organizational capacity through the ability to mobilize people and resources, with a trade-off between the two (Della Porta & Diani, 2011). Although the number of people on the streets can be measured, it is unclear in many cases whether they were mobilized by organizations or came on their own. For instance, in both Egypt (in 2011-2013) and Ukraine (2013-2014), most of the people were brought onto the streets by friends and relatives (Onuch, 2014; Warkotsch, 2014, p. 176). Moreover, there exists no data on the quantity of resources—such as money, offices, or employees—that would cover the whole sample of countries. Finally, the number of formal members does not reflect party strength because not all parties have mass membership.

Unlike with parties, the strength of trade unions can be measured via membership. Although the established trade unions also have the same problem with losing popularity and ability to mobilize when they become too institutionalized, as social movements do, each of the trade unions that participated in negotiations organized major strikes before the regime breakdown and therefore was not co-opted into the regime.

Social movements theories suggest that the protest movements might not have any organizational form when they emerge, but after the initial wave fades, with time, they either disappear or turn into organizations (Della Porta & Diani, 2011). Those organizations might have less support, but they normally have resources—cadres, offices, and money—instead. Therefore, this research considers parties' organizational existence, which is approximated by the age of the oldest party that participated in the negotiations.

Since the existing theories mostly explain both occurrences of pacted transition and subsequent democratization with the *incumbent regime type*, it is also included in the analysis. This condition, first, controls for ruling elites` will to negotiate because Geddes and colleagues (2018a) expect ruling elites to be willing to negotiate in party regimes rather than in personalistic ones. Second, this will show whether moving from a party regime overlaps with high opposition organizational capacity.

To sum up, I claim that the opposition movement's solid organizational capacity of can be reached when it includes *established parties* participating in the pact, *trade unions,* and *the Catholic Church*. In line with the literature, *party* and *military regimes* are also expected to contribute to the probability of successful negotiations.

Therefore, in the next chapters, I will test the following hypotheses.

> **Hypothesis 1:** the presence of strong organizations fosters the success of negotiations and subsequent democratization. Three types of organizations contribute in this sense:
>
> > a) Trade unions
> >
> > b) The Catholic Church
> >
> > c) Established opposition parties.
>
> **Hypothesis 2:** the type of the initial authoritarian regime is crucial for the outcome of the transition.

Chapter 2.

Research design and data collection

This chapter describes the research design and data. It is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the methods: namely, a combination of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and case studies for the most typical cases. It discusses the choice of the fuzzy-set QCA method supplemented with statistical analysis. It then describes the methodology applied in the qualitative case studies of Ukraine, Tunisia, and Egypt and the hierarchy between the levels of aggregation. The second part is devoted to the database on successful and failed attempts at pacting created for the QCA and quantitative analysis. It presents the unit of analysis, the choice of dependent and independent variables (conditions and outcomes, in the language of QCA), and the procedure used to collect the data. Then it introduces the instructions employed in the data collection process—namely, the coding rules for successful and failed attempts at pacts, the search procedures for the cases, the rules for the exclusion of cases, and finally, the bias implied by the adopted design.

As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, this research aspires to tease out what sets and features of opposition organizations account for the success and failure of attempts at pacted transitions. First, I expect the organizational capacity of established opposition parties—that is, those older than five years, as opposed to newborn ones—to facilitate the success of negotiations attempt and further democratization. Second, considering trade unions, they are likely to survive the time of the authoritarian regime and then turn against the dictator when the regime collapses. Thus, their long experience of negotiations with the regime makes their commitment to incumbent elites more credible, whereas their leadership is less dependent on a personality. Finally, religious organizations, especially the Catholic Church, are known to successfully mediate the negotiations.

2.1. Methods

To support my argument and test these hypotheses, I adopt a research design that combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Namely, I first employ QCA and regression analysis to show which organizations are present in successful and failed attempts at pacts. To do this, I

collected data on the organizations that participated in forty-five pacting attempts. Then, the pathways to success and failure of an attempt at pact that result from QCA analysis and statistical analysis are expanded further with case studies.

2.1.1. QCA and regression analysis

In Chapter 3, I will present the results of the QCA and quantitative analysis. I use fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). The choice of Boolean methods—and, therefore, the fsQCA analysis—is determined by the logic of my argument, which implies *equifinality*. I expect that there might be different constellations of organizational features that give the opposition a high organizational capacity and lead to similar outcomes. In addition, my argument assumes *conjunctural causation*— namely, that combinations of explanatory factors matter. The logic of QCA analysis is well-equipped in teasing out these combinations. More than that, the available mid-N data set of forty-five observations and the dichotomous character of most of my variables do not allow for the full power of more conventional regression analysis. In addition, my negative outcome cases are skewed toward the more well-known ones, and this problem is less serious for set methods. The analysis of sufficiency from the QCA family compares positive outcome cases with each other while only using negative outcome cases to calculate the consistency scores, which partially mitigates this problem. In my research, the QCA analysis reveals the sufficient and necessary conditions that determine the two outcomes of interest: (1) further democratization and (2) failure of negotiations.

In the statistical analysis part, the main finding of the QCA analysis—the effect of the presence of a trade union during the negotiations—is investigated further with regression models and t-tests. The statistical analysis seeks to test (1) whether the effects of membership of trade unions are a mere result of economic development and (2) the character of the connection between the participation of a trade union and democratization. In addition, use the regression models that copy the two pathways from QCA. Then, the pathways to successful negotiations are elaborated further with case studies. I will first discuss the case studies and then describe the database used for QCA and statistical analysis.

2.1.2. Case studies

Neither the QCA nor any other known method of mid-N analysis allows us to build an inductively determined causality. In addition, the mid-N analysis does not show the relevant mechanisms at play—that is, it cannot demonstrate *exactly how* the participation of trade

unions or other opposition organizations helped reach the agreement and then supported democratization. In other words, the QCA analysis alone cannot guarantee that it is the organizational capacity of the opposition and not other, more structural, or procedural factors responsible for the successes of pacts and further democratization. Therefore, after the arguments are supported with the QCA analysis, they are further elaborated with more conventional statistical analysis and, most importantly, with the two extensive qualitative case studies.

Chapters 4 and 5 detail the case studies and shed light on the causal mechanisms offered in the QCA model. The case studies are used to unpack causal mechanisms in "well-explained" cases and also to check for alternative explanations that cannot be operationalized in a quantitative way, such as the independence of organizations from the state or the presence of charismatic leadership. I undertake two paired comparisons (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 151–181; Rohlfing, 2012; Tarrow, 2010) with a most similar systems design. Tarrow argues that this method has some limitations, but most of them can be solved by combining paired comparison with statistical analysis (Tarrow, 2010, p. 250).[13]

The first pair sheds light on the failed attempts to negotiate a pact in Egypt and Tunisia`s successful pact. Concerning the results of QCA analysis, both cases are most typical—one is not a part of a solution formula and has a negative outcome, while the other is a part of a solution formula and has a positive outcome. Despite similar historical and cultural heritages, levels of economic development, political regimes, the same sets of opposition organizations— and even almost identical sequences of events—the negotiations failed in one case and were successful in another. The QCA reveals that the difference lies in the participation of a strong trade union in the Tunisian negotiations. The presence of the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) gave the Tunisian opposition movement the vital capacity to negotiate, and the case study illustrates precisely when and how it intervened. At the same time, the analysis reveals many case-specific variables, such as the strength of military factions in Egypt, that, together with the high militancy of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (as opposed to its Tunisian counterpart the Ennahda), ruled out the option of a compromise solution between the two.

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[13] Tarrow (2010, p. 250) calls it a strategy of "expanding methodological plurality."

The second pair compares two Ukrainian attempts to negotiate a solution for the two political crises in the years 2004 and 2014. Since the events happened in the same country within the same political regime, all structural variables, including the opposition organizations, are the same. Regarding the results of QCA analysis, in both cases, the set and characteristics of organizations proved not sufficient for successful negotiations, but neither was failure necessary. Thus, both are Individually Irrelevant cases (IIR) for the results of the analysis of sufficiency (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013).

The case study shows that the difference lies in the variable not included in the QCA analysis but still relevant to my explanatory model— namely, the *organizational capacities of the two particular movements*. The 2004 movement was organized in a top-down way and was therefore hierarchically subordinated to one leader. In contrast, the 2014 movement was a network that emerged spontaneously that was not subordinated to anyone and also failed to negotiate a pact. The case study shows the process of the collapse and success of negotiations. It indicates at which points the 2004 movement demonstrated credible commitment and credible threat and at which points the 2014 movement failed to do this.

2.2. Data collection

The QCA and quantitative analysis parts of this research use a database of attempts at pacted transitions that I have collected. This section describes the database, first in terms of variables and unit of analysis, and second vis-à-vis the procedure used to identify and code the cases. The complete list of variables is in the Codebook in the Appendix, while the database is published in an open access repository (Iakovlev, 2021) in two parts. The first is a database, and the second is a collection of my text descriptions of the processes in each of the transitions.

2.2.1. Outcome variables, calibration, and unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is an attempt at pacted transition—namely, an episode where, amid a major political crisis, elites-in-power explicitly initiate negotiations with opposition forces, and at least one round of negotiations occurs. The universe of cases of interest includes all the attempts at pacted transitions since 1974 (Huntington, 1993a). The outcome[14] is the result of an attempt at pacted transition—whether it is a *successful pact* with subsequent

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[14] The QCA vocabulary speaks of "conditions" and "outcomes" instead of the more conventional notion of "dependent" and "independent" variables employed in statistical analysis.

democratization, a *pact without democratization*, or a *failed attempt at negotiations*. Again, my understanding of a pacted transition, adopted from O'Donnell and colleagues, is a transition from non-democratic rule that follows (1) negotiated agreements among (2) elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition that are (3) rule-setting and based on (4) mutual "vital interest" guarantees.[15] If it leads to democratization, it is coded as a *successful pacted transition.* If it does not lead to democratization (i.e., the rule-setting (part 3 of the definition) component is weak or absent), the case is coded as a *pact without democratization*. If the negotiations collapse because either the incumbent or the opposition does not hold to its promises—in other words, significant guarantees on vital interests (part 4 in the definition) were not delivered either by elites-in-power or elites-in-opposition after the pact was signed—the case is coded as a *failed attempt at negotiations.* Figure 2.1 summarizes the episodes of a pact and its outcomes.

This thesis does not have a separate section on calibration because three out of five variables—namely, the success and failure of negotiations, the presence of trade unions, and the Church—do not require calibration. On the other hand, two variables out of five—the age of the oldest party and the increase in the level of democracy—require calibration. Furthermore, in both cases, the decision on calibration was not problematic because cases fall into two logical categories.

The level of democracy is operationalized by the Liberal Democracy index of V-Dem that ranges from 0 to 1. In QCA analysis, it is treated as a fuzzy variable and calibrated accordingly. A.10 increase in this democracy index three years after the pact is concluded is coded as partial inclusion, whereas a.15 increase is understood as full inclusion (i.e., democratization). Although these thresholds seem rather low at first glance, they are very demanding because they reflect a very short time span (i.e., three years). Every country in the data set that passed a.15 threshold has later completely democratized (see Table 2.1 on calibration below). Some of those with a.10 increase in the first three years may have later backslid, such as Ukraine, which experienced backsliding in 2010 after democratization in 2004. However, these backslides resulted from an explicit event in which a leader perverted already established democratic practices and were not directly connected with the earlier pacted transition. Since the outcome falls into several categories and the extent of democratization is important, it is treated in QCA analysis as a fuzzy outcome.

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[15] I add the second criterion on the presence of both elites and opposition actors in order to exclude those cases when the negotiations happened only within the opposition or within the ruling elites.

Figure 2.1. Outcomes of attempts at pacts.

Table 2.1. The calibration decisions.

Variable	Cutoff points	Reasoning
Democratization (Fuzzy)	.10;.15 (points on 0 to 1 scale 3-yearly increase of democracy score)	Every country with a .10 increase democratized, some of the backslid later; no country above .15 increase backslid.
Established opposition party (Crisp) (Age of the party)	5 (years age)	An organization had been created when a regime started to collapse or has long organizational roots.

2.2.2. Conditions and calibration

Data has been collected on the organizational capacity of parties, unions, and Catholic Church. Established parties are operationalized by their *age* based on the *Political Parties of The World* encyclopedia (Day et al., 1996; Day & Degenhardt, 1984; Day & Degenhardts, 1980; Sagar, 2009; Szajkowski, 2005). Parties older than five years count as established (see Table 2.1 and the discussion on p. 24). They fall into two types: (1) those that were created as the regime started to open up, or its foundations began to fracture, normally even after the mass protest that would eventually overthrow the regime started, and (2) those that have a long history of coexistence with a regime and became what Della Porta and Diani (2011) call organizations rather than movements. The parties fall into two types, and there is no intermediate category. Therefore, the crisp set approach is used. Membership and age of the trade unions that participated in pacted transitions is based on the *Trade Unions of The World* encyclopedia (Blackburn, 2015; Harper, 1987, 2005). The presence of the Catholic Church, is coded based on the case material.

The *regime type* variable is based on the GWF data set (Geddes et al., 2014). Using several assumptions and pursuing QCA-friendliness, I dichotomized it into two categories—party/military and personalistic/hybrid. Since military and party dictatorships are known to affect the mode of regime change in the same way (ibid.), I have merged these categories. I collapsed the "monarchy" type of regime with the "personalist" category, although, of course, they have different types of legitimacy. Four regimes were coded as "democracy" in the GWF data set —namely, Albania (in 1997), Ukraine (2004 and 2014), and Kenya (2008). I treated them as competitive authoritarian regimes because although they had facade elections, none were regular, free, and fair (i.e., conducted on an even playing field). Competitive authoritarian regimes tend to have super-presidential constitutions, which leads to the inherently high level of patronalism—that is, "the personalized" (as opposed to impersonal, institutionalized, organizational) "exchange of concrete rewards and punishments" (Hale, 2015, p. 22) and low state capacity. I have lumped competitive authoritarian regimes with the personalist/hybrid category.

2.2.3. Data collection procedure

The cases where at least the negotiations were successful were collected in four steps. In the first step, potential cases were identified based on existing databases. In the second step, each

case was individually checked with the existing literature to see whether it fits the criteria of pacted transition used in this analysis. In the third step, the data on organizations was collected. For the first step, I first identified the cases that were coded as pacted transitions in the existing databases: Stradiotto and Guo (2010b, 2014), the GWF data set (Geddes et al., 2014), Daniel Treisman (2017, 2020a, 2020b), and the "What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?" report (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Because the definitions of pacted transitions employed in these databases were different from mine, each case had to be manually checked for the fact of negotiations. In addition, I searched for those cases that include typical consequences of a pacted transition. For instance, I manually checked those cases where the authoritarian leader was not prosecuted after losing power, looking for the facts of explicit negotiations.

During the second step, for each case identified in these databases, I analyzed in detail two or three most cited academic papers or books[16] to check whether negotiations really took place and whether a case did not fall under the exclusion rules (see below). Those sources normally also mention the organizations and personalities that represented the opposition in negotiations. During the third step, after identifying the cases that fit the definition of a pacted transition, I collected information on the organizations that participated in the negotiations analyzing the existing academic literature.

The procedure for the first two steps was more complicated with the failed attempts at pacts— those where the incumbent or the opposition did not deliver on their promises. I have checked the cases of regime change that are coded as revolutions in the existing databases. It was frequently the case that those political crises that ended up with a forceful solution had initially included an attempt at negotiations. Typically, these attempts were later forgotten or only briefly mentioned in the literature. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) database offers a second way to check major political crises that did not lead to an authoritarian breakdown and see whether they included attempts at negotiations that failed. Among about five dozen checked cases, nine revolutions and political crises turned out to include a failed attempt at a pact.

2.2.4. Selection bias

My research design has a built-in selection bias toward more prominent and more successful pacts. Since there is no scholarship on failed pacting attempts, the field has tended to miss those

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[16] A list of sources can be found in the Codebook in the Mendeley repository (Iakovlev, 2021).

cases of failed pacts where negotiations took place but are not mentioned (or even poorly mentioned) in the existing literature in English. Moreover, some cases where the pact was successful but not explicit enough might also be excluded. As a result, the database skews toward the most prominent and well-known cases of failed negotiations in countries with relatively large populations. The solution could be a large-scale research project that employs regional or even country experts, but this goes beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis.

Most importantly, one can expect some kind of preliminary negotiations to occur often between elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition. Whether or not these grow into more explicit negotiations depends on their initial success. Therefore, those negotiations that failed at the very early stage are impossible to identify. It is most likely that the number of serious discussions between authoritarian leaders and opposition representatives worldwide between 1974 and today would be far higher than 45.

2.2.5. Exclusion rules

An attempt at pacting should meet several requirements to be included in the analysis. First, the subject of negotiations is democratization, not a civil war or gaining independence. Second, both elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition should be present in the negotiations. Third, the negotiations should not be commanded by a foreign power, and fourth, they should take place inside the country. Finally, they have an explicit character, which means that the counterparts are present in the same room. The following section presents the explicit description of these criteria.

Negotiations do not necessarily take place only to resolve the issue of democratization and peaceful transfer of power to the opposition after a political crisis. They can also help to settle the issues of peace agreements after a civil war and the issues of independence or decolonization. These cases are not included in the sample. When there is too much foreign influence, to the extent that a transition was commanded, which happens mostly with French colonies, the case is excluded (i.e., the Central African Republic, Fiji, Comoros).

I exclude cases of *independence* and *decolonization*. First of all, in most of these cases, negotiations took place outside of the relevant country. Second, the situation is complicated by issues different from the peaceful transfer of power from elites to the opposition. Third, it is hard to distinguish between elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition in such cases. Fourth, in such cases, foreign influence often overwhelms.

If negotiations took place *outside the country*, the case is excluded. For instance, negotiations about El Salvador's future in 1992 took place in Geneva, and the decision on Fiji`s independence in 1970 was made in London. In such cases, success or failure of the negotiations depends more on international and less on internal actors.

Both *elites-in-power* and *elites-in-opposition* must be present in negotiations.[17] If there are no *elites-in-opposition* actors in a pact (i.e., those political elites who were not taking any offices in the incumbent regime do not participate in negotiations), the case is excluded. One such case is the aforementioned Fiji, where the UK government directed the transition, and none of the people who participated in the pact belonged to the opposition. Likewise, if there are no *elites-in-power* (i.e., those political elites occupying office in the incumbent regime) participating in negotiations, which thus only occur among the opposition, the case is excluded.

Negotiations are expected to have a more or less *explicit and formalized character* to be analyzed as an attempt at a pacted transition. While it is too much to expect every attempt at a pacted transition to end up with a publicly available formal document, one can still require the representatives of the counterparts to be present in the same room during the moment of negotiations. That is why transitions in which elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition were not present in the same room during the negotiations are excluded. For instance, in the wake of the 1989 revolution in Romania, the National Salvation Front (NSF), a military-led body, came to power after overthrowing the pro-Communist regime in early 1990. The NSF then refused to step down and transfer power to civilians, which resulted in protests and the Timisoara proclamation. Some limited, mostly *façade* negotiations are mentioned in the literature (Shafir, 1990). The NSF managed to stay in power after the 1990 elections. However, the opposition was represented only partially, and the NSF and the most important representatives were never sitting in one room. Thus, the Romanian case is not treated as an attempt at a pacted transition in my project.

Transitions that have a cooperative character but do not include explicit negotiations are not understood as pacted transitions. If there are *no negotiations mentioned in the available academic literature*, reports, and newspapers, the case is excluded even if a transition looks cooperative. Some transitions are *cooperative but not negotiated*—at least, explicitly.

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[17] The theoretical justification can be found in the first chapter, in the section "What is a pacted transition?"

Examples are Indonesia (in 1999), Thailand (1992), and Ghana (2000). In these cases, the ruling party ceded power peacefully but without any negotiations as such.

The reasons why certain cases are excluded often overlap. For instance, in the case of El Salvador, in 1992, negotiations to resolve the civil war took place outside of the country and were largely dominated by the US. Thus, the case is excluded for three reasons. The cases excluded due to the inexplicit character or lack of negotiations are Romania (in 1990), Mexico (2000), Indonesia (1999), Thailand (1992), and Ghana (2000). The cases excluded because the two-player game was interrupted by external actors or the question at hand was not regime transition are Moldova (in 1991), the Central African Republic (1993), Fiji (1970), Botswana (1966), El Salvador (1992), and Comoros (1990).

My understanding of the successful pacted transition neglects the levels of violence as long as it did not lead to a civil war before a pact. In my understanding, even if the phase preceding the negotiations is violent, what really matters is the negotiated character of the power transfer. For instance, in Tunisia in 2012, the transition had a revolutionary character, with the dictator Ben Ali being forced to resign and flee the country on January 14 due to mass protests connected with violence. Nevertheless, Mohamed Ghannouchi, a former prime minister under Ben Ali, managed to form a cabinet that started negotiations with the opposition. In the end, the transfer of power from Ghannouchi's regime was negotiated. For this reason, I understand this case as an example of a successful pacted transition. My position thus contradicts most existing theories, which would treat the Tunisian transition as a revolutionary one due to the initial violence that characterized it. Two cases with the same level of violence as in Tunisia— Ukraine in 2014 and Egypt in 2011—are coded as failed pacted transitions because the negotiations ultimately failed and violence continued. However, had these negotiations succeeded and led to a peaceful transfer of power, the cases would be coded as successful pacted transitions despite the initial spread of violence.

2.2.6. Variation among pacted transitions

The attempts at pacted transitions in my database vary by the extent to which the incumbent and the opposition control the situation, by the extent the incumbent and the opposition are represented in negotiations, by the extent of what is discussed, by the extent of how the foreign powers intervened, and by the scale of violence and contention. This section introduces the borderline cases of the maximum extent of the deviation from my understandings.

Albania in 1990 is an example of negotiations that were controlled entirely by the incumbent. In this case, Ramiz Alia, Albanian authoritarian leader, completed a round of negotiations with students, acceding to almost all their demands, but nevertheless maintained full control of the situation in the country. The opposite situation where it is difficult to say whether the incumbent had already entirely lost by the time negotiations began is Georgia in 2003. After a day of severe anti-government protests and Russia's sudden decision to withdraw its support for (then president) Eduard Shevardnadze, Igor Ivanov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, gave an encouraging speech to the protesters. After that, Ivanov deliberately brought Shevardnadze and then opposition leader Mikhail Saakashvili to negotiate the terms of exit. In this case, with the Kremlin openly supporting the opposition, one could say that Shevardnadze was effectively on the way out. The Polish case in 1989 is most neutral in this regard. Had the character of contention between the Solidarity movement and the ruling party become completely noncooperative and violent, it is impossible to guess which side would have prevailed. One case that has been excluded from the database because the incumbent did not control the situation is Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The ousted President Bakiev started the negotiations only after he had fled the country.

The scope of the issues negotiated during a pact varies from complete constitution-making to the mere clarification of the terms of exit. In the Visegrad countries in 1989, the number of matters discussed was all-embracing, in some cases even covering detailed aspects of the new institutional structure down to the rules for municipal elections. On the other extreme, the failed negotiations in Ivory Coast in 2011 merely included the terms of President Laurent Gbagbo's exit. Besides, this case is on my borderline of the tolerated foreign influence. Although the pressure by the UN was severe and the country eventually ended up with direct military intervention, Gbagbo still managed to behave independently.

Although both the opposition and the incumbent should be present during the negotiations, they can be represented unevenly. In 1989, the negotiations in Czechoslovakia were heavily dominated by the opposition, with the prime minister, Ladislav Adamec, being present only briefly four days out of ten. There is no direct evidence that Togo's dictator—Gnassingbé Eyadema— showed up to an (eventually failed) attempt at negotiations in 2006, but he sent delegates. However, there is the other extreme of an underrepresented opposition. In Spain in 1977, the ruling Adolfo Suarez seemed to have had a perfect grip on the selection of organizations that participated in pacting. As a result, Spanish trade unions, although extremely

strong, did not participate in the Spain`s main event of negotiations known as the Moncloa pact.

The amount of contention resolved by pacts varies drastically from a very comfortable coexistence to mass violence with thousands of victims. In 1993, bottom-up pressure was almost absent in Mongolia, but a pact was still negotiated between the established Communist Party and a newborn opposition with almost no contention involved. In Ukraine in 2014, by the time negotiations had started, not only was Kyiv, the country's capital, but also the main squares in the large cities in the west of the country, were covered with thick smoke as the protesters that occupied them were burning tires and throwing firebombs at the police.

2.2.7. Data

Among the forty-five attempts at pact I have collected, twenty-nine were successful and led to democratization, nine failed (meaning that the negotiations collapsed). In the remaining seven cases, while negotiations turned out to be successful, democratization did not follow (see Table 2.1). None of the countries with failed negotiation attempts experienced full democratization afterward. In the analysis of democratization, the cases of failed attempts at pacts are lumped together with and treated as those of non-democratization—therefore, I analyze sixteen cases of non-democratization.

Political parties, in my sample of forty-five negotiations, participate in every pact with only two exceptions. Trade unions are represented in sixteen negotiations, while religious organizations are present in fourteen cases (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: The excerpt of the calibrated database of forty-five attempts at pacts.

Country	Year	Negotiations failed	Democratization (calibrated, fuzzy value)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization (calibrated, fuzzy value)	TU	The Church	Party/military dictatorship
Albania	1992	0	0	.53	0	1	0
Albania	1997	0	.07	.53	0	0	0
Argentina	1983	0	1	.97	1	0	1
Bangladesh	1990	1	.51	.01	0	0	0
Benin	1991	0	.98	.97	1	1	0
Bolivia	1982	0	1	.97	1	1	1
Brazil	1985	0	1	.97	1	1	1
Bulgaria	1990	0	1	.97	1	0	1
Czechoslovakia	1990	0	1	.97	0	1	1
Comoros	2001	0	.94	.53	0	0	0
Congo DRC	1992	1	0	.01	0	1	0
Dominican Rep.	1978	0	.98	.97	0	1	0
Ecuador	1979	0	1	.97	1	0	1
Egypt	2013	1	.06	.01	0	0	1
Georgia	2003	0	1	.97	0	0	0
Greece	1974	0	1	.97	0	0	1
Hungary	1989	0	1	.97	1	1	1
Iran	1979	0	.01	.53	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	2000	1	.97	.05	0	1	0
Ivory Coast	2011	1	.01	.01	0	0	0
Kenya	2008	0	.07	.53	0	0	0
Madagascar	1992	0	1	.97	1	1	0
Malawi	1994	0	1	.97	0	1	0
Mali	1991	0	1	.97	1	0	0
Mongolia	1993	0	1	.97	0	0	1
Myanmar	1988	1	0	.01	0	0	1
Nepal	2006	0	1	.53	0	0	0
Nepal	1990	0	.38	.53	0	0	0
Nicaragua	1990	0	.98	.97	0	0	1
Peru	1980	0	1	.97	1	0	0
Poland	1989	0	1	.97	1	1	1
Slovenia	1990	0	1	.97	1	1	1
South Africa	1994	0	1	.97	0	0	1
South Korea	1987	0	1	.97	1	1	1
Spain	1977	0	1	.97	0	0	1
Sudan	1985	0	.42	.53	1	0	0

Taiwan	1990	0	.12	.53	0	0	1
Togo	1991	1	.03	.01	0	0	0
Togo	2006	1	.02	.01	0	0	0
Tunisia	2011	0	1	.97	1	0	1
Ukraine	2004	0	.98	.97	0	0	0
Ukraine	2014	1	0	.01	0	0	0
Uruguay	1984	0	1	.97	1	0	1
Yemen	2011	0	0	.53	0	0	0
Zambia	1991	0	.95	.97	1	1	1

2.3.   Summary

This dissertation adopts a mixed-methods design. Its core part consists of QCA and statistical analysis of mid-N data. Namely, my research uses the database that was collected for this research. It describes organizations that participated in forty-five attempts at pacted transitions since 1974. The results of the analysis are further elaborated with case studies. The next chapter will present the QCA and statistical analysis of the data described in this chapter.

Chapter 3.
The role of opposition organizations in pacted transitions to democracy

This chapter presents the fuzzy-set and crisp set QCA analysis. First, it introduces the analysis of necessity performed separately for my two outcome variables: first, crisp set analysis for the success or failure of negotiations; then, fuzzy-set analysis for democratization after a successful pact. Second, it provides the fuzzy-set analysis of sufficiency for the joint variable that combines successful negotiations and further democratization. Third, it supplements the findings from the QCA with statistical analysis.

The QCA part shows that the presence of a trade union during the negotiations is sufficient for democratization, while the absence of a trade union in negotiations is necessary for both failed negotiations and non-democratization. In addition, party and military dictatorships with established opposition parties and the Church involved also negotiate successful pacted transitions even without trade unions. The t-test shows that the effect caused by trade unions is not a mere result of a higher level of economic development. Countries that have trade unions in negotiations do not have significantly higher levels of GDP per capita. The regression analysis reveals a very robust *linear relationship* between the share of the population with trade union membership and the increase in the level of democracy that follows in the three years after the transition.

All the analyses were performed using R (version 4.0.2) and RStudio (version 1.3.1056) software with the QCA, SetMethods, and venn packages for the QCA analysis (Dusa, 2019, 2020; Oana et al., 2020). For the statistical analysis, the arm, aod, and car packages were used (Fox & Weisberg, 2019; Gelman & Su, 2020).

3.1. QCA analysis

The QCA analysis is organized as follows. I start with necessity because knowing this allows for the exclusion of contradictory directional expectations in the analysis of sufficiency. I first present the analysis of necessity for failed negotiation attempts or successful negotiations

(independently of whether they lead to democratization or not). Second, I analyze the necessity for an occurrence of democratization after successful pacts—that is, cases where negotiations went successfully. Third, I present the analysis of sufficiency for the joint variable that merges the (non-)occurrence of democratization and the (non-)failure of negotiations.

3.1.1. Analysis of necessity: The success or failure of attempts at negotiation

Necessity implies that whenever the outcome is present, the condition is also present. Necessity (or at least necessity that is not tautological) occurs very rarely in reality. Therefore, most of the conditions illustrated in the full table of necessity in the text (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) are not necessary. Conventionally, conditions that pass the consistency threshold of .9, which implies that fewer than 10 percent of cases are contradictory—i.e., the condition is present, but the outcome is absent—can be stated as necessary (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Since this occurs very rarely in reality, only those conditions that have a high consistency score are discussed in the text. Unlike in conventional quantitative methods, one can still claim the necessity even with lower consistency scores if one provides a justification as to why the outliers seem to be irrelevant (ibid.).

Only one condition is necessary for the attempt at negotiations to fail (see Table 3.1), even though it is trivial. The absence of a trade union in the room is fully necessary for the collapse of negotiations, with a consistency score of 1. A statement of sufficiency can be inferred from this, which suggests that whenever a trade union is present, the attempt at negotiations succeeds. The coverage score for this condition is .32. This means that the number of cases with no trade union in the room is much larger than the number of cases with failed attempts at pacts, even though a trade union is absent whenever there is a failed attempt. This indicated the trivialness of the condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 145–147), so this condition is not very relevant, especially considering the skewed character of the data at hand. In line with that, RoN parameter that indicates the trivialness of necessity [18](Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 233–235) is also quite low at .47.

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[18] There are two types of trivialness of necessity: "first, X is much bigger than Y; second, X and Y are close to being constants." [18](Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 146) RoN accounts for the second type of trivialness.

Table 3.1. Analysis of necessity for the (non-)failure of an attempt at negotiations with consistency, coverage, and relevance of necessity values, all conditions are included. The outcome is a crisp failure of negotiations. Notes: FAIL—a failed attempt at negotiations; ~FAIL—a successful attempt at negotiations.

	Consistency		Coverage		RoN	
Conditions	FAIL	~FAIL	FAIL	~FAIL	FAIL	~FAIL
TU is present	.11	.48	.06	.94	.61	.96
TU is *not* present	**1**	.47	.32	1	.47	1
Party dictatorship	.22	.50	.10	.9	.58	.93
Personalistic dictatorship	.78	.50	.28	.72	.52	.74
Catholic Church is present	.22	.36	.13	.86	.69	.94
Catholic Church is *not* present	.78	.63	.23	.68	.40	.70
Established opp. party is present	.55	.64	.19	.82	.43	.77
Established opp. party is *not* present	.44	.36	.24	.77	.68	.88

3.1.2. Analysis of necessity: Democratization

The necessity analysis that tests the condition of democratization (see Table 3.2 in the Appendix) shows that for democratization *not to happen*, the trade unions should be *absent*. The absence of a trade union in the room is fully necessary for the successful negotiations that did not lead to democratization with the consistency score of .95, which means that in all cases where a trade union is present, the initial success of negotiations is also followed by full democratization. The coverage score for this condition is .53, which means that among those countries that did not have a trade union in negotiations, more than half ended up having the outcome that the country undertook successful negotiations but did not end up with democratization.

The coverage score for this condition is .32, which means that the number of cases with the absence of trade union in the room is twice as large as the number of cases without

democratization, even though whenever there is no democratization, the trade union is absent. This indicates the trivialness of the condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 145–147). The RoN parameter is relatively low at .59. Therefore, this condition is somewhat trivial.

Two conditions—lacking a religious organization in negotiations and transitioning from a personalistic dictatorship—do not pass the threshold of .9, scoring about .85 and .75. This means that the statement of necessity is wrong in a quarter of cases. For both conditions, those multiple outlying cases do not seem to be exceptional. For instance, as many as nine countries coded as personalistic dictatorships still had at least limited democratization.[19] Therefore, there are no grounds to accept the necessity of the two conditions. Moreover, the other conditions do not appear to be necessary for democratization.

Table 3.2. Analysis of necessity for the (non-)occurrence of democratization as a result of a pact with consistency, coverage, and relevance of necessity values, the outcome is a fuzzy increase in democracy score. Notes: DEM—democratization.

	Consistency		Coverage		RoN	
Conditions	DEM	~DEM	DEM	~DEM	DEM	~DEM
TU is present	.57	.07	.95	.06	.97	.61
TU is *not* present	.43	**.94**	.47	.53	.55	.59
Party dictatorship	.53	.25	.87	.19	.81	.61
Personalistic dictatorship	.45	.75	.53	.47	.63	.60
Catholic Church is present	.42	.15	.86	.14	.93	.70
Catholic Church is *not* present	.58	**.85**	.59	.41	.55	.46
Organizations older than 5 years	**.74**	.39	.79	.21	.74	.44
No organizations older than 5 years	.26	.61	.45	.55	.75	.79

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[19] Namely, Benin (in 1991), Comoros (2001), the Dominican Republic (1978), Georgia (2003), Ivory Coast (2000), Madagascar (1992), Malawi (1994), Mali (1991), Nepal (2006), Peru (1980), and Ukraine (2004).

3.1.3. Analysis of sufficiency: A joint fuzzy-set test of the success or failure of negotiations and subsequent democratization

The two outcomes (i.e., the success of negotiations and further democratization) are two consecutive stages of the same process—an *attempt at pacted transition*. As the analysis of necessity has shown, they are affected by similar conditions in the same direction. Therefore, the two outcomes are merged in the section with sufficiency analysis to avoid tautology in the first place (the two models are mostly similar if conducted on two separate outcomes). When I test for democratization (occurring as a result of a pact) alone, I thus make no distinction between the cases of successful negotiations but no democratization and the cases of failed negotiations. Creating the combined variable allows me to "partially include" cases with successful negotiations and no democratization that would be coded as "full exclusion" otherwise. On top of that, the number of negative cases that are failed negotiation attempts (9 cases) and successful negotiations without democratization (7 cases) is limited (see the cases in Tables 2.2 and A2.1). Since the negative outcome cases are used in the analysis of sufficiency to calculate consistency scores and my data is skewed toward positive outcomes, merging different sorts of negative outcomes in one model while partially accounting for the difference solves this problem.

To undertake a sufficiency analysis, I first create and then logically minimize the truth table (TT) rows (see Table 3.3). Each TT row is a possible combination of conditions, and the cases fall into TT rows depending on their membership in conditions. Since I have four conditions, sixteen combinations are possible. Each combination–row has one outcome—either 0 or 1. These combinations of conditions can be minimized (for instance, by omitting redundant conditions) to tease out the comprehensible pathways. Each row has a consistency score — namely, the percent of case members that fit the outcome. During the minimization, a consistency threshold needs to be set, which is to say that we have to accept a certain percent of outlying cases before we can claim that belonging to a certain combination of conditions can still be accepted as sufficient for an outcome. I stick to the lowest conventional threshold of .75 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), which implies that I accept up to one-quarter of outliers. The borderline is indicated in a table. The rationale behind these decisions is based on case-specific peculiarities and is discussed in detail together with the robustness tests in the Appendix. Therefore, cases below the line have more than a quarter of failed attempts or several successful negotiations that did not lead to democratization.

Table 3.3: The truth table for the combined fuzzy outcome of both success of negotiations and democratization.

Trade union	Catholic Church	Party/ Military regime	Established Opposition Party	Outcome	Number of cases	Consistency	Cases
1	1	1	1	1	6	.97	Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Hungary (1989), Poland (1989), South Korea (1987), Zambia (1991)
1	0	1	1	1	4	.97	Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Ecuador (1979), Tunisia (2011)
0	1	1	0	1	1	.97	Czechoslovakia (1990)
1	0	1	0	1	1	.97	Uruguay (1984)
1	1	0	0	1	1	.97	Madagascar (1992)
1	1	0	1	1	1	.97	Benin (1991)
1	1	1	0	1	1	.97	Slovenia (1990)
1	0	0	1	1	3	.83	Mali (1991), Peru (1980, Sudan (1985)
0	0	1	1	1	5	.78	Egypt (2013), Greece (1974), Nicaragua (1990), South Africa (1994), Spain (1975)
0	1	0	1	0	3	.67	the Dominican Republic (1978), Ivory Coast (2000), Malawi (1994)
0	0	0	0	0	8	.51	Comoros (2001), Georgia (2003), Iran (1979), Kenya (2008), Nepal (1990), Togo (1991), Togo (2006), Ukraine (2004)
0	0	1	0	0	3	.51	Mongolia (1990), Myanmar (1988), Taiwan (1990)
0	0	0	1	0	6	.27	Albania (1997), Bangladesh (1990), Ivory Coast (2011), Nepal (2006), Ukraine (2014), Yemen (2011)
0	1	0	0	0	2	.27	Albania (1992), Congo DRC (1992)
0	1	1	1	?	0	-	
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	

To reach a short, comprehensible result, a truth table should be minimized. In the minimization process, the different combinations of conditions that lead to positive outcomes are compared to tease out the solution that "is expressed in a more parsimonious yet logically equivalent manner" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 9). In this process, an analysis should deal with logical remainders—the theoretically possible combinations of conditions (or TT rows) that have no matching cases in the empirical world and whose outcomes are therefore unknown. However, in the minimization process, one can make simplifying assumptions on their outcome—or refrain from doing so.

There are three ways of minimizing truth tables. The complex solution makes no simplifying assumptions made on where logical remainders lead at all. This leads to the most precise yet possibly cumbersome result. An intermediate solution is based on manually set directional expectations that generally derive from theories and the analysis of necessity. Finally, in a parsimonious solution, simplifying assumptions are automatically made to lead to the shortest result. In my case, the parsimonious way of minimization is equivalent to the intermediate one. Both simplifying assumptions made by the computer simulation and my directional expectations are always set to 1. In other words, each of my conditions is expected to lead to the outcome, successful pact, and democratization, as it comes from theory (see the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2), while the same simplifying assumption is needed for the most parsimonious outcome.

In the graphical form, the truth table is presented in Figure 3.1. Each oval-shaped figure indicates the presence of a particular condition—the presence of a trade union, the Catholic Church, party regime, and established opposition party. Each constellation of the conditions leads to a specific outcome. The outcomes are indicated with different fills. Vertical stripes stand for successful negotiations plus further democratization. No fill (white) is failed negotiations and no democratization. Finally, question marks indicate that the data for this constellation is absent.

The whole condition of the presence of a trade union is filled with vertical lines, which implies that democratization has happened in all of the cases where it was present in negotiations. However, cases with trade unions are always located in the constellations, including other factors contributing to successful negotiations. It is never the case that trade unions are present alone—the upper-left part of the shape corresponding to trade unions indicates a question mark. However, a second constellation where democratization almost always occurred can be seen outside of the trade union oval; in the party dictatorship, it comes together with established parties or the Church.

The solution formula for the fuzzy truth table in the analysis of sufficiency (see Table 3.4) suggests that democratization follows in two general ways. First, countries democratize whenever trade unions are present during the negotiations. Second, they democratize when the initial regime is a party dictatorship (rather than personalistic) combined with one of the two favorable factors: established opposition parties or the Catholic Church. The sufficiency scores are as high as.95,.975, and.91, meaning virtually no cases deviate from this explanation. The coverage of this model (a close analog of R^2 in regression analysis) is.68, which means that the model explains 68% of the cases where the outcome—democratization—has occurred, whereas 32% remain unexplained.

Figure 3.1. Venn diagram of constellations of various conditions that affect failed, successful negotiations and democratization as a result of the pact.[20]

□ Failed attempt at negotiations ◿ Successful negotiations but no democratiz.
■ Successful attempt at negotiations + democratization ? No data

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[20] Here and further TU stands for a Trade union present in negotiations; PARTY REGIME stands for initial a Party Regime type of initial dictatorship, CHURCH stands for representative of the Catholic Church present in negotiations, and ESTABLISHED PARTY stands for Established opposition party present in negotiations.

Table 3.4: The parsimonious solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both success of negotiations and a democratic outcome, covS—coverage, covU—unique coverage, overlapping cases with trade unions and party regimes are marked with *italics*.

Solutions	Pathway	Consistency	covS	covU	Covered cases
Trade union	I	.949	.523	.175	Mali (1991), Peru (1987). Uruguay (1984), Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Ecuador (1979), Tunisia (2011), Madagascar (1992), Benin (1991), Sudan (1985), *Bulgaria (1990), Argentina (1983), Ecuador (1979), Uruguay (1984), Bolivia (1982), Poland (1989), Brazil (1985), Hungary (1989), Slovenia (1990), South Korea (1987), Zambia (1991)*
Party Regime and the Catholic Church	II	.975	.253	.032	Czechoslovakia (1990), Slovenia (1990), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Hungary (1989), Poland (1989), South Korea (1987), Zambia (1991)
Party regime and Established opposition party	II	.910	.443	.127	Egypt (2013, Greece (1974), Nicaragua (1990), South Africa (1994), Spain (1975), Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Ecuador (1979), Tunisia (2011), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Hungary (1989), Poland (1989), South Korea (1987), Zambia (1991)
Whole model		.914	.68		

In other words, the model shows two pathways toward successful pacted transition: through the trade unions (I) and from party dictatorships (II). These two pathways are marked with numbers in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.4. They are not mutually exclusive, and do, in fact, overlap in eleven cases. Obviously, trade unions are more likely to emerge and sustain in a less restrictive, more institutionalized, and bureaucratized context (i.e., a party regime).

Nevertheless, just having a trade union in negotiations, even if deriving from a personalistic dictatorship, is sufficient for successful democratization through the pact. Neither the trade union nor party dictatorship ever occurs alone. In most cases, the trade unions occur together with the constellation of almost every other condition possible. Speaking of the regime, party

dictatorships in my database are always accompanied by at least one more favorable condition, which is not surprising as these regimes provide a less restrictive context and allow for the opposition. Military dictatorships only result in successful negotiations and democratization when the other conditions are present: an established political party, a Church, or a trade union. The three military dictatorships that did not have any of these three conditions—Egypt in 2013, Myanmar (1988), and Taiwan (1990)—did not manage to negotiate or democratize.

Table 3.5. Summary of the final solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both success of negotiations and a democratic outcome

	Solution formula	No solution formula
Successful negotiations and democratization	Argentina (1983), Benin (1991), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Bulgaria (1990), Czechoslovakia (1990), Comoros (2001), Ecuador (1979, Greece (1974), Hungary (1989), Madagascar (1992), Mali (1991), Nicaragua (1990), Peru (1980), Poland (1989), Slovenia (1990), South Africa (1994), South Korea (1987), Spain (1975), Tunisia (2011), Uruguay (1984), Zambia (1991).	Bangladesh (1990), the Dominican Republic (1978), Georgia (2003), Malawi (1994), Mongolia (1990), Nepal (2006), Ukraine (2004).
Successful negotiations but no democratization	Sudan (1985).	Albania (1992), Albania (1997), Kenya (2008), Nepal (1990), Taiwan (1990), Yemen (2011).
Failed attempt at negotiations	Egypt (2013).	Congo DRC (1992), Iran (1979), Ivory Coast (2000), Ivory Coast (2011), Myanmar (1988), Togo (1991), Togo (2006), Ukraine (2014).

To sum up, this analysis shows that the same variable—the presence of a trade union in negotiations—is sufficient both for the success of negotiations and for the subsequent democratization. Its absence, therefore, is a necessary condition for the collapse of negotiations and democratization. But, at the same time, it is not the only pathway, and many party or military dictatorships that have resilient churches or established opposition parties (or both) also democratize through a pact.

3.2. Post-QCA statistical tests on trade unions

Continuing the findings of the QCA analysis, this section will unpack the possible reasons why trade unions are associated with successful pacts. Namely, it will test the effect of the presence of the trade unions on democratization while controlling for economic development. As the QCA analysis has shown, the presence of a trade union in negotiations is sufficient both for successful negotiations and subsequent democratization. However, the cause and the character of this effect remain uncertain. Is it the presence of trade unions per se fostering democratization, or is there a confounding variable (namely, economic development)? The following section tests this argument.

I offer and test two possible explanations for why trade unions lead to democratic outcomes. Hypothesis 3 suggests that countries with trade unions participating in pacts are more economically developed and therefore are structurally more likely to democratize, which, in turn, explains the democratic gain from the presence of a trade union. My hypothesis 4 is that the larger the membership of a trade union (union density) that participates in the pact, the greater the subsequent increase in the level of democracy. This echoes the proletarianization argument of Rueschemeyer and colleagues (1992), which contends that democratization is more likely when organized labor is strong. In contrast, I argue that the *agency mechanism* can explain the democratizing effect—trade unions always pose a credible threat and provide a credible commitment to their counterparts in negotiations. If the presence of a trade union in negotiations causes a fixed increase in the level of democracy, but this gain does not gradually increase with the size of the trade union, then it means that this effect stems from the actor level.

First and foremost, the quantitative methods are useful in testing these hypotheses because of their correlational, probabilistic logic as opposed to the deterministic logic of QCA. This logic allows better testing of the hypotheses that address *differences in degree* as opposed to *differences in kind,* which is the precise question raised in this section. In addition, the variables GDP per capita and between the size of membership of the negotiating trade union lack clear, logical categories. Hence, they are hard, albeit not impossible, to calibrate. More than that, multiple regression allows us to control for particular variables to rule out their effects, as I do in Table 3.5 and, especially, in Table 3.6. Finally, supporting the findings of the QCA with the different family method (Table 3.6) serves as a robustness test.

To elaborate further on the results of the QCA analysis, I use the following statistical methods. First, I employ a t-test to check the economic difference between the countries that have and do not have a trade union included in negotiations. Second, I perform a regression analysis to test whether there is a linear connection between the size of membership of the negotiating trade union and the increase in democratization.

Economic development differences do not explain the success of negotiations and subsequent democratization in countries with a trade union involved. The t-test shows a lack of statistically significant difference between the means of the two groups of countries. Although, on average, countries in which trade unions are present during the negotiations are slightly more developed economically (US$4,420 versus US$3,905 GDP per capita), the standard deviation is considerable, especially within the countries with trade unions. Therefore, this difference between the two samples is statistically non-significant, with a p-value as high as .65 (t = -.46; df = 33.73).[21] In any event, the slight difference of US$500 hardly explains the strong effect of the presence of trade unions.

The regression analysis shows almost a perfect linear relation between the membership in trade unions represented in a pact and an increase in the level of democracy (see Table 3.6). Each additional 1% of the population involved in trade unions increases the level of democracy by 2.8% in the first three years after the negotiations alone. Furthermore, the trade union effect caused does not decrease when the control variable—GDP per capita—is introduced to the model, which demonstrates that the presence of a trade union produces an effect that is *not dependent on economic development*.

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[21] However, one should bear in mind that p-statistics are prone to show low significances when applied to small samples, such as the one of this paper with 45 cases.

Table 3.6. The regression table with OLS parameters and standard errors with the increase in the level of democracy, the share of the population with membership in trade unions that participate in pacts (cases without trade unions in negotiations are coded as 0), and GDP per capita.

	Dependent variable:				
	Increase in democracy level, V-Dem liberal democracy index				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Party regime		14.943*	20.256*	14.111*	8.473
		(7.019)	(9.273)	(5.597)	(6.630)
The Church		−2.561		−1.241	−1.039
		(7.659)		(5.612)	(5.523)
Party regime: the Church		12.452			
		(11.359)			
Established organization			8.944	3.422	3.268
			(7.362)	(5.713)	(5.621)
Party regime: established organization			−2.409		
			(11.562)		
Trade Union	20.732**			14.669*	16.073*
	(6.309)			(5.507)	(6.274)
GDP per capita PPP					0.001
					(0.001)
Constant	14.334**	14.740**	8.809	8.827·	5.378
	(4.595)	(5.509)	(3.483)	(4.940)	(5.359)
Observations	45	45	45	45	45
R^2	0.248	0.269	0.260	0.359	0.395
Adjusted R^2	0.230	0.216	0.206	0.295	0.318
Residual Std. Error	18.097	18.271	18.380	17.317	17.036
F Statistic	14.175**	5.030**	4.808**	5.609**	5.103**
	(df = 1; 43)	(df = 3; 41)	(df = 3; 41)	(df = 4; 40)	(df = 5; 39)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.7. The regression table with OLS parameters and standard errors indicating the covariates of democratization as a result of a pact.

	Dependent variable:	
	Increase in democracy level, V-Dem liberal democracy index	
	(1)	(2)
share of population in the TU	2.683**	2.775**
	(0.886)	(0.810)
GDP per capita PPP		0.002**
		(0.001)
Constant	17.044**	7.665.
	(3.372)	(4.328)
Observations	45	45
R^2	0.176	0.328
Adjusted R^2	0.157	0.296
Residual Std. Error	18.943 (df = 43)	17.307 (df = 42)
F Statistic	9.180** (df = 1; 43)	10.257** (df = 2; 42)
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Regression analysis (see Table 3.7) on the extent of democratization in three years after the negotiations copies the QCA model[22] except for controlling for GDP and not dichotomizing the increase in the level of democracy. Model 1 copies Pathway I in the QCA analysis, while Models 2 and 3 copy Pathway II in the QCA analysis. Moreover, Model 4 copies the entire solution formula, and Model 5 adds controls for GDP to Model 4. Regression analysis confirms the previous argument based on QCA. The presence of a trade union or a preceding party regime almost guarantees further democratization. At the same time, the trade union variable explains democratization better than the incumbent regime one. The presence of the latter adds 20% to democratization in three years (p=.0005) (see Models 3, 4, 5), as opposed to a preceding party/military regime, which also adds 20%, albeit with lower statistical significance (p=.039) (see Models 2, 3, 4, and 5). In addition, the model that uses the TU variable has a lower AIC (392 as opposed to 395). The effect of economic development that is fully statistically significant in Table 3.4 is not statistically significant in Table 3.6 (p=.13). The other variables

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[22] For the sake of similarity with my QCA models, I violate the assumption on multicollinearity and use variables that control for a political regime and a trade union in the same models, even though they are associated with each other (Chisq=4.59, p=.03). Thus, the R-square estimates in Models 4 and 5 should be treated with caution.

in the database produce a very small positive effect, which is statistically insignificant; they even have no effect when aggregated into an index.[23] Estimates of these models are relatively strong, with R^2 ranging from 25 to 40% and low p-values.

To sum up, the countries that bring trade unions into the negotiations are not richer than those that do not. The effect caused by their presence is clearly not dependent on the country's economic development. At the same time, the share of a country's population involved in a trade union that participates in the negotiations has a positive linear relationship with the degree of democratization in the subsequent three years (see Table 3.6). Therefore, the effect of trade unions has no direct connection with a "modernization" explanation and is caused by the direct influence of these organizations. In addition, although the scope of countries that have a trade union partially overlaps with those that derive from a party/military regime, the regression models have shown that the explanation through a trade union explains the further democratization better.

The regression analysis generally supports the results of the QCA analysis. At the same time, it helps control for economic development and check the character of the connection between the variables—and thus, to investigate the findings even further. The first difference between the two methods is that according to the regression analysis, the configurative logic of the party/military regime condition—namely, that it should lead to democratization when either the established opposition party or the Church is present during the pact—is not important. Second, the regression analysis allowed me to show that not only the presence of trade unions but also their strength is important. The larger trade unions are, the larger increase in the level of democracy that follows.

3.3. Concluding discussion: Organized labor and successful pacts

The main and the most robust result of the analysis is that the presence of a trade union alone is sufficient both for democratization and for the success of negotiations. Therefore, the lack of a trade union is necessary for the failure of negotiations. In addition, the negotiations can only fail when the Catholic Church is absent. Since there is no significant difference between the economic development in the countries with and without trade unions, modernization

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[23] This is not shown in Table 3.7

theories cannot explain this effect. Therefore, this effect is most likely caused by the organizational capacity of trade unions.

Also, trade unions were present in only half of the successful pacted transitions. The other half of the successful pacts were negotiated in those settings that allowed for the high organizational capacity of the opposition. Normally, those were party-based dictatorships permitting the presence of opposition parties, and those opposition parties were strong enough to provide a credible threat and a credible commitment. Alternatively, in many party dictatorships, the Church has preserved enough independence and strength to mediate the negotiations. In addition, there are rare instances of successful negotiations in societies that had none of these characteristics.

Given that trade unions in the analyzed countries have shown themselves durable enough to survive the autocratic regime and, at the same time, resilient and significant enough to be represented during the negotiations, they would most probably also persist after the autocratic collapse. Therefore, their existence is far more robust and less dependent on leadership than that of political parties. It is especially relevant for the period after the collapse of autocracy when parties that have been in the opposition for decades are suddenly exposed to free and fair elections, a drastic change in the agenda, and the necessity to participate in government. Thus, party volatility in the new democracies may be overwhelming.

Trade unions are less vulnerable to this problem. The trade unions will, in all likelihood, continue after the fall of the regime and thus retain their capacity to make credible threats—the ability to start strikes. This strength helps ensure that the counterparts in negotiations do not renege on their promises right after the negotiations. Moreover, the prolonged status of trade unions as crucial meditators helps prevent any one power from becoming dominant and changing the rules of the game in its favor. Therefore, it might be the case that trade unions help ensure credible commitments and provide a credible threat that ensures politicians abide by their agreements in earlier stages *and* ensures democratization later in the first years after the collapse of an incumbent regime.

This argument, however, goes beyond the QCA or quantitative analysis and requires delving into cases where trade unions participated in negotiations. What steps do trade unions take to produce this result? Moreover, is there an alternative explanation for those cases that lie beyond the trade unions? Do they remain active in a country's political life in the first years of a new

fragile democracy? The next chapter answers these questions using a pair of Arab Spring transitions.

Also, some of the real word cases remained unexplained by the QCA model—namely, those are the cases that do not have the conditions of the solution formula for sufficiency. Those unexplained cases still undergo attempts at negotiations—sometimes with success and sometimes with failure. Chapter 5 deals with a pair of Ukrainian revolutions. In both cases, the regime was closer to a personalist dictatorship, and neither the trade unions nor the Church was present during the negotiations. In those two cases, the attempts to negotiate a pact with established parliamentary parties that led the anti-government protests ended up differently—with the failure of an attempt at negotiations in one case and successful negotiations in another. The models presented in this chapter fall short of explaining that difference because the conditions are the same and are not in the solution formula. The case study aims to find the reason for this difference in outcomes—is it the ability to make credible threats and credible commitments that is not captured by the solution formula, or is it something else?

Chapter 4.
A successful pact in Tunisia and a failed attempt at negotiations in Egypt

4.1. Introduction

This chapter compares two attempts at pacted transitions, Egypt (2011-2013) and Tunisia (2010-2014). The two transitions started in a very similar way, with a popular uprising forcing two leaders to resign—one was arrested, and the other managed to flee the country. Both countries had relatively equal levels of development and relatively similar political regimes, and both attempted a pacted transition from authoritarian rule during the Arab Spring. Thus, a Constitutional Assembly was to be formed, with the task of writing a new constitution, and the procedure of its formation had to be negotiated. Further, both countries had to decide about the legalization of formerly prohibited Islamist parties. In both cases, the Islamist parties have revealed some authoritarian aspirations.

However, the outcomes of these two transitions are quite different. Tunisia had two rounds of negotiations at different stages, and both rounds succeeded. The first happened after the Tunisian authoritarian leader fled the country because of protests. His prime minister negotiated with the country`s main trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), via a platform called Instance Superieure por la realisation des objectifs de la revolution, de la reforme politique et de la transition democratique (ISROR),[24] which eventually provided a roadmap for the further transition. The second round of negotiations helped overcome a 2013-14 crisis, when the strong, the UGTT-led alliance of trade unions, the so-called Quartet, successfully ran a National Dialogue with the government. In Egypt, however, every attempt at negotiations has failed. Although the agreements were constantly being signed, none of the counterparts have complied with them, and each demonstrated authoritarian aspirations.

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[24] The French acronym for Instance Superieure por la realisation des objectifs de la revolution, de la reforme politique et de la transition democratique.

This chapter argues that the UGTT`s organizational capacities involved in the negotiated solution of political crisis explain the difference between the Tunisian successful pacted transition and the Egyptian failed attempts at negotiation.

Tunisia is the typical case for the QCA model presented in Chapter 3. In contrast, Egypt deviates, having an established political party and a military regime but still failing to negotiate a pact. Pathway I suggests that having a trade union involved in negotiations is sufficient for successful negotiations and further democratization. This explanatory model stands especially strong for these two cases. The participation of a trade union was the major difference between the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions. At the same time, other characteristics that could possibly explain the outcome were similar (see Table 4.2).

Therefore, the case study aims to shed light on the mechanisms at play, illustrating at which exact points the intervention of the UGTT was vital for Tunisian democracy-building and to demonstrate where the Egyptian failed attempt at democratization was missing organizational capacity.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I explain the research design arguing why and by which variables Tunisia and Egypt are most similar to each other and why the existing theories of democratization struggle to explain these outcomes. Second, I present the structure of the opposition organization in the two countries. The following three sections provide a paired comparison of the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions divided into three periods: first, during the collapses of old regimes, second while re-establishing the constitution in the early stages after the authoritarian breakdowns, and, finally, the crises of 2013. For each of those three periods, I first present the sequence of events in Tunisia, then the sequence of events in Egypt, and then summarize the differences. The last section summarizes and discusses the findings.

4.2.   Dependent variables

I compare the attempted pacted transitions of Tunisia and Egypt because, among my cases, they are the most similar to each other. As this section will show, their societies, incumbent regimes, the structure of the opposition, and even the sequences of events and very close, while one of the cases is typical for my QCA model and illustrates of one its solution formulas while another is deviant—it has a solution but does not have an outcome. Those are completely

different: in the Egyptian case, the results of numerous attempts at negotiations have never been implemented, and the transition ended with a coup d'état and a military dictatorship, whereas Tunisia has experienced successful negotiations and subsequent democratization (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. The character of regime change and subsequent democratization in Tunisia and Egypt.

Outcome	Tunisia	Egypt
Negotiations fail	no	yes
Democratization	yes	no

4.3.   Independent variables

4.3.1. Similar societies

Egypt and Tunisia, two Muslim Arab countries that are almost neighbors, share historical and cultural backgrounds. Both are located in the MENA region; both face the Mediterranean Sea and are relatively close to Europe. After being a part of the Ottoman Empire, they share the legacy of being European (French in Tunisia and British in Egypt) protectorates from the 1880s to the 1950s. After gaining independence, both became autocratic for the second part of the twentieth century. In both cases, there was a long-lasting dictator who ruled throughout the long part of a post-colonial period and a stable institutionalized autocratic regime. The transitions in the two countries happened in the same year—therefore, the geopolitical background was similar.

From a modernization perspective (see the discussion in Chapter 1), the two societies had similar chances at democratization. Tunisian economy is richer, with the GDP per capita being slightly higher than 4 thousand US$ per capita as opposed to the Egyptian GDP that was slightly less than 3 thousand US$ per capita (see Table 4.2 for this and all further indicators mentioned in this paragraph). Thus, these countries could be both democratic or autocratic.[25] The Human Development Index is the same in the two countries; CO_2 emissions that approximate the level

of industrialization are also on the same level. The life expectancy is four years greater in Tunisia. At the same time, Tunisia has a slightly higher inequality, as is reflected in its Gini index. Therefore, according to those explanations that derive from inequality, Egypt had slightly higher chances of democratization. The emancipative and secular values of the citizens that affect democratization (Inglehart 2018) are also similar in the two countries. In other words, the modernization paradigm is unable to explain the striking difference in the outcomes.

According to the theories that explain the mode of regime change with the type of their incumbent dictatorship, both regimes shared very high chances of successfully pacting. Both regimes before their revolutions could be characterized as party-based in the terms of Geddes and colleagues (2012, 2018b), although there was a strong military component in Egypt (Geddes et al., 2018b, p. 98). In the GWF database, the Egyptian regime is coded as party-military-personalistic. Party-military regimes are even more likely to negotiate their exit than their civilian party counterparts (ibid.), while the personalistic regimes are, of course, less likely to do so.

However, these two cases are not typical for the theory because most of the processes of their transitions happened after the old authoritarian leaders were ousted; and the power was taken by collective decision-making bodies. In other words, the opposition never negotiated with the incumbent regimes that ruled the country before. Instead, after the political leaders lost their offices, in both cases, the collective decision-making bodies that were created by the former dictators (i.e., the RCD and the SCAF, espectively) remained in power and started to bargain with the opposition. Therefore, their regimes can be characterized as even less personalistic than they used to be before the revolution. Therefore, according to the theory of Geddes and

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[25] Przeworski and Limongi (1997) claim that the democratization is guaranteed with GDP higher than 6 thousand US$ per capita and is highly unlikely with the GDP lower than 2 thousand US$ per capita.

colleagues, both regimes had relatively good perspectives for pacted transitions and democratization.

In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, attempts at pacted transitions in this study vary by the extent the incumbent and the opposition control the situation, the incumbent and the opposition are represented in negotiations, what is discussed, how the foreign powers intervened, and by the scale of violence and contention. In this sense, the cases of Tunisia and Egypt stay within the middle of this variation and are relatively close to each other. The only exception is that in Egypt, the incumbent`s control over who represented the opposition in negotiations was much higher.

In fact, the two cases are so similar to each other that their comparison suffers an endogeneity problem, as we know that revolutionaries learn from each other (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, they learn in a different sequence. In the first stage, before the leader left the country, Tunisia created an example not only for Egypt but also for the whole Arab world. While Egyptians were following the Tunisian example in 2011, copying their patterns, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda became much more cooperative after seeing their Egyptian counterparts massacred in August of 2013.

Table 4.2. Structural conditions relevant for the character of regime change and subsequent democratization in Tunisia and Egypt

Condition	Tunisia	Egypt
Economic development (in 2011)[26]		
GDP per capita PPP, US$ (WB 2018)	4,179	2,747
Life expectancy (years)	74	70
CO_2 emissions (tons per capita)	2.5	2.5
HDI	.70	.68
Gini index (in 2010)	36	31.5
Attitudes (WVS 2010-2014)[27]		
index of emancipative values 0-1; standard error in brackets	.28(s.e. .15)	.30(s.e..15)
index of secular values 0-1; standard error in brackets	.28(s.e..15)	.33(s.e..15)
Political regime type before the revolution (GWF 2014)	party	party-personal-military
Opposition organizations		
Bottom-up activism	heavily repressed	repressed
Opposition parties	completely banned or silenced; only present in the capital	completely banned or silenced; only present in the capital
A large rival Islamist party	organizational structures completely demolished, members are in exile	de jure banned, de facto often tolerated under different names, but repressions are regular

[26] Source: World Bank (2018).

[27] Source: Ingelhart et al. (2014).

Nationwide umbrella trade union: organizational presence	exists for ninety years, developed network of local branches	exists for sixty years, developed network of local branches
Nationwide umbrella trade union: cooptation	mostly co-opted on a national level but preserves autonomy in local branches	completely co-opted
Nationwide umbrella trade union: participation in Arab Spring	local branches present their organizational capacities to protesters in the early stage, from January 9, 2011 national body gets involved	no
Nationwide umbrella trade union: participation in negotiations after the revolution	yes	no

4.3.2. The incumbent regimes

Tunisia and Egypt share very similar histories after the Second World War. The quality of governance in autocratic political regimes ranges from economic miracles to humanitarian catastrophes, and "for every President Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, there are many like President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire" (Rodrik, cited in Gelman, 2020, p.). In this regard, Tunisia was closer to the latter. Shortly after decolonization, Tunisia became dominated by the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party headed by Habib Bourguiba. His reign lasted from 1954 to 1987, and he established a stable and highly institutionalized party dictatorship with a strong socialist inclination and warm relationships with the West at the same time. His socialist policies emphasized the introduction of mass education, including the university level, strong state participation in the economy, and a remarkably high level of unionism. His rule

was even associated with a failed experiment with radical socialist policies in 1964–69, headed by the former UGTT Secretary-General Ben Salah (Perkins, 2004, p. 146).

The size of the Tunisian army was minuscule, especially in comparison with Egypt: Tunisia never needed any army in the first place. To begin with, before the independence, neither France attempted to develop an army in Tunisia, nor was its own resistance militant enough. During Bourguiba`s rule, Tunisia had cordial relationships both with the West and with the Arab League. Furthermore, due to its small size, it could never pretend to be a significant power in the region. Neither was the army needed or used for domestic political goals because the regime had a more sophisticated coercive apparatus (Abadi, 2013, p. 434).

At the same time, the regime was restrictive toward political parties. As a result, the electoral component that we expect in modern dictatorships was missing throughout the times of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The opposition parties were repressed to the extent that the ruling RCD and Bourguiba would end up earning more than 99% of the votes, and, apart from the initial two or three years, the situation did not change much with Ben Ali (see, for instance, Perkins, 2004, p. 174).

From the very beginning, the Tunisian regime was not only secular but also openly hostile to religion. At different points of time, it fought even against the tradition of Ramadan fasting. Moreover, Islamist movements inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979 always were a red line for the regime. For instance, when Ben Ali came to power in 1987, he allowed some Ennahda members (see detailed discussion below) to participate in the 1989 elections as "partyless" nominees, but then, seeing their electoral success arrested some 25,000 members (Abadi, 2013, p. 508).

Like in Tunisia, the Egyptian incumbent regime was party-led and socialist, but it also had a strong army and a more militant Islamic movement. The history of that regime started with the military organization, the Free Officers, seizing power via a coup d`etat. After its first years (when it was also ruled by the Revolutionary Command Council or RCC), the regime relied on the more quasi-civic party Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussain was extremely popular because it was the first completely independent government in modern Egyptian history. It provided popular socialist reforms and a strong independent foreign policy. The socialist reforms were somewhat similar to the Tunisian ones apart from that they took larger scale: they redistributed the farmlands from the large landowners to the

peasants and the state in the 1950s and 1960s, but then also nationalized many other businesses (Daly, 1998, p. 345).

A different historical course was taken after Abdel Nasser, with Sadat having followed a different, nonsocialist policy, with greater political freedoms and a liberalized "open door" economic policy in the hope of Western and Arab capital and investment resulting in a revitalized economy.

The Egyptian army remained very strong. To begin with, the regime was involved in three wars with Israel in the years 1948, 1967, and 1973. Since Israel enjoyed foreign support, Egypt had poor relationships with the West, which, together with its socialist nature, at a certain point pushed it toward the alliance with the Soviet Union (Daly, 1998, p. 353). This was especially relevant in the times of Nasser. Most importantly, the very nature of the incumbent military regime and the massive distributions within its first two decades made the military not only the most serious physical or political power in society but also allowed them to dominate the economic realm. Most of the property in Egypt belongs to the military cadres, and military state officials control most businesses. As Yezid Sayigh points out, "the military claims to employ 5 million people, but virtually all are in fact employed by private subcontractors working for the military" (2020). This disparity hardly favored democratization from the point of view of those theories that explain the political regime with the distribution of means of production (Vanhanen, 1997, 2003).

The relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was always extremely violent, with waves of escalation and de-escalation. Before coming to power, Abdel Nasser briefly joined the MB, which emerged in the 1920s. Although they had a common goal of getting rid of British imperial control, they differed ideologically. Being a socialist, he accused the MB of exploiting popular religious sentiment for their political goals. As a result, MB leaders were executed, while their less important members were subject to mass arrests. Repression started with the MB`s attempt to murder Nassir in 1954, followed by multiple executions of its leaders, with six people hanged and hundreds arrested. In the same fashion, the MB`s most important ideolog, Said Qutb, was hanged in 1966 (Daly, 1998, pp. 341–342). Brothers would also respond with assassinations and rely on violent methods. At the same time, many members of the ruling Free Officers were also members of the MB. For instance, Qutb even had his own office in the RCC`s headquarters building (ibid., p. 349).

Later, in the times of Sadat, coexistence took a slightly more peaceful character, him having tried a reconciliation policy with the Islamists. After Sadat's assassination by the Islamists, Mubarak was more stringent toward them. Nevertheless, it remained de facto the only existing opposition party. The MB was once allowed to participate in the 2005 elections in a very limited fashion, and it immediately managed to earn as much as 20% of seats. They achieved this despite being oblige to pretend that run partyless. After those elections, their numerous arrests followed.

Thus, before the revolution, the Tunisian political Islam was much more moderate than its Egyptian counterpart, although, somewhat paradoxically, the Egyptian MB was much more present (El-Sherif, 2014; Wolf, 2017).

4.3.3. The organizational structure of the opposition

The two societies share striking similarities in their macro-level characteristics and close historical trajectories and a lower level of aggregation in the composition and characteristics of their opposition organizations. The organizational structure of the opposition in both regimes is similar (see Table 4.2). The sets of these organizations in the two societies are the exact copy of each other and consist of: repressed bottom-up activist networks, completely banned classic opposition parties, banned major Islamist parties, and a co-opted umbrella trade union (see, for instance, Warkotsch, 2014).

Despite being repressed, bottom-up activism was vivid in both societies, although it was only present in capitals. Nonetheless, activism was much more heavily prosecuted in Tunisia—as a result, Egyptian informal activist networks played a much more important role during the 2011 mobilization (Pilati et al., 2019). Opposition parties in both countries were either banned or co-opted. Those of them that enjoyed a small share in parliament had never expressed any serious critique toward the regime, although they were allowed to have their own opinion on minor issues. Their less servile counterparts were excluded from the competition. Both regimes made sure that the levels of fragmentation of their party systems remained high.

Apart from secular political parties, both regimes had banned Islamist platforms. The Egyptian MB was headed by Mohammed Morsi, and in Tunisia, the Ennahda (or Renaissance) movement, formerly known as the Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI), was led by Rached Ghannouchi. Despite the ban, the MB retained an organizational presence in Egypt. Its

members were tolerated so long as their participation in elections was "partyless," although everyone understood their affiliation. In contrast, the Ennahda had been almost annihilated by state repression by the time of the revolution. Most of its members were imprisoned, while those who managed to flee attempted to act from abroad.

To sum up, by 2011, every traditional form of opposition in Egypt and Tunisia was either co-opted or repressed. Still, the remnants of opposition organizations were more present in Egypt. First, the activist networks were slightly less repressed by the regime. Second, whereas the Islamist party Ennahda was completely demolished and expelled in Tunisia, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was partially tolerated and therefore institutionally present. At the same time, as the next section will show, unlike in Tunisia, the main Egyptian trade union, the Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions, was completely co-opted and was actually displacing a bottom-up labor movement.

4.3.4. Trade unions in Tunisia and Egypt

Both countries had large umbrella trade unions with deep historical legacies. The Tunisian UGTT originated in pre-independence times and was created in the 1920s, whereas the Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions (EFTU) was created in 1957. However, the UGTT has bottom-up origins, while its Egyptian counterpart, the EFTU, originated as a top-down structure. At the same time, both organizations were somehow incorporated into the authoritarian regimes. The difference that played a role later was that the local branches of the UGTT started to gain independence during the decade before the revolution. The following section will elaborate on these historical developments.

4.3.4.1.   The embedded EFTU

The EFTU was created in a top-down character by Nasser`s authoritarian regime in 1957. This labor organization attempted to incorporate the working class into the regime, and therefore from the very beginning, the union`s capacity to speak against it was very much limited (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 169). Furthermore, from a certain point, the EFTU's monopoly started to thwart the emergence of an independent labor movement after the "law 35 of 1976 that established [the EFTU] as the sole legal trade union" (Beinin, 2012, p. 6) was implemented. Although the EFTU did organize strikes on occasion, it had never participated in any civil or

labor unrest during the whole decade before the Arab Spring. When labor protests began spontaneously, the EFTU never joined or attempted to mediate them. It is not a surprise that during the last decade of Mubbarak`s rule, the EFTU was inevitably losing its grounds to new independent trade unions.

Unionis was existent in Egypt but would only be tolerated if it goes in the framework of already existing organizations and keeps its claims within certain limits. Namely, the red line were the demands going beyond what the regime perceived as a merely economical realm. For instance, a leftist political party called Togammu` joined the strike of railway workers in 1987, and because of this, both the labor activists and the party were repressed harshly (Daly, 1998, p. 382). Therefore, workers would never make explicit political demands, and the protests of the intelligentsia were always separated from those of the labor movement during Mubarak`s time (Beinin, 2012, p. 6). As a result, by the beginning of the Arab Spring, trade unions had "no nationally recognized leadership, few organizational or financial resources, limited international support, no political program, and only a minimal eco- nomic program" (ibid., p. 1).

The EFTU became even more reluctant to represent the workers in the last decade of Mubarak`s rule. For instance, the neoliberal reform of the year 2004 (Beinin, 2012, p. 4) triggered labor protests. The EFTU, however, never challenged these policies (Blackburn, 2018). Both workers` demands and the government's responses were not addressed to the EFTU, which refrained even from mediating between the workers and the government (Warkotsch, 2014). Throughout the final years of Mubarak's rule, workers were constantly campaigning for a minimum wage and organized large-scale strikes in 2008 and again in 2010 (Beinin, 2012, p. 6).

In other words, the EFTU became so much incorporated into the state that it failed to serve its original function—to channel workers` demands. The new, more independent trade unions were sometimes registered as NGOs ("Center for Trade Union and Workers" Services, see (Beinin, 2012, p. 7)) or even, exceptionally, against the rules of the incumbent regime, as trade unions: namely, the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers, and two unions of teachers and health-care technicians in 2008 and 2010 (ibid.). But, again, none of those had any explicit political agenda.

It is not a surprise that the EFTU never supported the opposition during the Arab Spring. The alternative alliance, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), was organized, which was, again, impossible and illegal within the rules of Mubarak`s regime (Blackburn, 2018, p. 11). By 2012, this movement claimed to have as many as three million members, compared to 3.8 million for the pro-regime EFTU (Beinin, 2012, p. 6). It would campaign not only for democratization but also for the dismissal of the EFTU. However, it would quickly face hostility from both the ruling military body called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the MB, and —as I will show later—it would never get represented enough in the new governments.

4.3.4.2.   The Tunisian UGTT's trade-off before the Arab Spring.

As I have argued in the previous section, in 2011, all "conventional" organizational forms of opposition in Tunisia were either co-opted or repressed. However, Tunisia had one organization—the UGTT, its principal trade union—which had historically had partial independence from the regime and a very articulated position on political participation.

The UGTT originates from the times Tunisia was a French protectorate, based on a grievance that the workers who were Tunisian nationals would be paid half as much as their French counterparts. Therefore, when the UGTT emerged, it had two different goals: a classic labor rights agenda and national liberation. Becoming a socialist-inclined party dictatorship, the Tunisian regime favored trade union activity and cooperated with the UGTT. Now, if the UGTT only persuaded the labor rights, and never challenged the regime per se, then, in a short run, it had very high chances of fulfilling workers` demands. Also, it would guarantee its own survival. Nevertheless, in this case, it faced risks of becoming a mere part of the regime and losing workers` trust. On the other extreme, if the UGTT became too rebellious, it would not only fail to deliver better conditions for workers but would also risk being repressed. Since the extent to which the UGTT could afford itself to be militant would always change, the discussions on this trade-off became a part of the union's routine (see, especially, Yousfi, 2018, pp. 116–122). This allowed it to quickly adjust to the changes brought by the Arab Spring.

The UGTT`s militancy always differed spatially: its regional branches were always autonomous enough to be more opposition or even militant than its headquarters (Netterstrøm, 2017; Warkotsch, 2014; Yousfi, 2018). Its headquarters are also heterogeneous. Its two wings are defined by their regions of origin: the Achourists, who are more pro-regime, and their more

militant Gafsa counterparts. It always took the organization much effort to find a balance between the two groups, and the price of any miscalculation was always high. The highest price was paid in 1978 when the UGTT appeared to be too rebellious and was harshly repressed by Bourguiba (Yousfi, 2018).

However, the UGTT started to regain more independence ten years before the Arab Spring events: it achieved a less co-opted central leadership in 2000 and more militant regional leadership in 2000, 2003, and 2008. In 2011, during the revolution, it once again changed its leadership, with Houcine Abassi—who was markedly anti-regime—taking over. The wave of changes began in September 2000, with UGTT`s Secretary-General: despite the regime`s pressure, loyal Ismail Sahbani was removed with a slightly more militant Abdessalemm Jrad. Then, Ben Arous was the first regional branch that had a changed its leader: froma completely pro-regime RCD member Habib Attig to an openly rebellious Belgacem Ayari. This leadership change had been so much unwanted by the regime that the episode resembles a spy movie. At a certain point, the six UGTT leaders who had to vote for Attig were hiding in a secret house for fifteen days before the elections to avoid being persuaded, intimidated, or arrested. In the end, this operation turned out to be successful for the UGTT (Netterstrøm, 2017, p. 58).

The same power turnover occurred in the Kairouan region in 2003 when the more rebellious Houcine Abassi challenged the RCD-controlled Sghair Saïdane. Like in 2000, the police were unsuccessfully attempting to stop Abassi on his way toward the UGTT`s headquarters where he would be elected. Apart from that, the UGTT `s militant local branches had posed a significant challenge to the regime twice during this decade: partially during the 2003 Tunisair crisis and especially during the 2008 severe Gafsa mining basin crisis. Some claim the latter completely changed the interaction dynamics between the UGTT and the state (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 168). Paradoxically, in the two aforementioned cases, the different branches of the same organization were openly allying themselves with opposite political camps. The UGTT`s headquarters aligned with the government and acted openly against its own regional branches. At the same time, these branches were in open confrontation against the regime and organized strikes and protests. In other words, the diversity within the organization was enormous.

During the revolution, the UGTT was constantly balancing between belonging to the government versus being beyond the struggle. It always took the organization much effort to find a balance between the competing forces. For instance, on 18th of February 2011, when the UGTT switched from the completely opposition CNPR to the ISROR that enjoyed some formal

power, the very fact that the UGTT acquired political office caused much dissent in its ranks (Yousfi, 2018, pp. 88–94). During the intra-UGTT Tabarka Congress on 28th of December 2011, a massive campaign called "Jrad out" managed to remove Abdessalem Jrad (the UGTT`s Secretary-General from 2000 to 2011), who by 2011 was deemed too much co-opted into the Ben Ali`s regime, even though ten years prior he had been perceived as a rebel. Amore independent Houcine Abbassi succeeded him (Yousfi, 2018, p. 162). In the same fashion, the UGTT does not have any single affiliated party—for instance, in certain periods, there were four labor parties in Tunisia, each of which had its roots in the UGTT. During the 2012 and 2013 negotiations, many members of the Troika government were at the same time the members of the UGTT. Therefore, it was not competing with the parties but rather penetrating them, and this partyless position has allowed it to acquire more rather than less power.

To sum up, the Tunisia's UGTT managed to find a balance that allowed it to avoid complete cooptation into the authoritarian regime and repression simultaneously. In addition, it gained some independence during the last decade of Ben Ali's regime, especially in its regional branches. The UGTT had a habit of adjusting between cooptation and militancy. Therefore it did not take much time to join a revolution and provide its great organizational capacity to the opposition. The Egyptian EFTU, in contrast, became that much co-opted into the regime that eventually its influence faded. The new trade union movement was emerging despite the prohibitions even before the revolution approached. After Mubarak was ousted, the new trade unions were especially mushrooming. These newborn unions tried to participate in political life, but they certainly lacked organizational capacity.

4.3.5. Summary: independent variables

The two regimes had similar socioeconomic backgrounds, the same level of economic development, and they had strikingly close combinations of opposition organizations that existed on the ground. The main socioeconomic difference is that Egypt historically had a strong military and a highly state-led economy. The main difference in the level of organizations was that Egypt did not have strong independent trade unions because they were prohibited. On the contrary, Tunisia had an extremely strong trade union the UGTT that was only partially co-opted into the regime.

4.4. The processes leading to successful and failed negotiations

The following part will demonstrate how the participation of the strong and organized trade union the UGTT in Tunisia was beneficial to the successful pacting and the democratization through it. In addition, it will indicate moments when this UGTT intervention was crucial in Tunisia and where it was missing in Egypt.

4.5. Period I: Before the revolution

4.5.1. The outbreak of the Tunisian revolution

The Tunisian revolution (and the Arab Spring) was triggered by the self-employed street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi of the Sidi Bouzid region setting himself on fire on 17th of December 2010. That morning, he had been accused of trading without a license, and his goods were confiscated violently. After the police had refused to return his goods or even to speak to him, he committed suicide. Although this story was not an exception, either for Tunisia or for the entire region, it fell on fertile ground. The protests started the same day, quickly spreading throughout the country.

The only parts of the UGTT that would participate in the initial stages of the protest were its militant local branches but not its headquarters. They helped with mobilization, resources, and spreading the information (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 176). First, the local branches would call for strikes. Second, the physical offices and means of the UGTT`s local branches were massively used by activists. Third, the UGTT helped spread the information on the protests. Since the Tunisian media did not cover the protests of the regions, foreign media such as Al-Jazeera were the primary source of information who would take interviews. The officials of the UGTT local branches would cover the events of protests in their region, and their interviews were known to be the most reliable source of information at the time (ibid.)

Already by 28th of December 2010, Ben Ali started to react to protests, appearing in public and reshuffling the government. As the protests were spreading across the country, the regime`s response had become more and more violent, with hundreds of victims. After massive massacres in Kasserine and Thala 9th-10th of January 2011, the UGTT`s headquarters had joined the protests calling for a general strike. By this time, the violent, large-scale protests were tearing the country apart, and almost 300 people were already killed (Fox News, 2015) by the riot forces. Unlike in Egypt, the Tunisian army refused to shoot the protesters (Maclean,

2011). The dynamics of the revolution and the low odds of Ben Ali`s regime would be that obvious at the moment that the UGTT had no choice but to join the protesters (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 168). The defection of the UGTT`s leadership from the ruling coalition increased the speed of the regime's collapse, but it hardly determined it.

On the 10th of January massacre, Ben Ali started to make concessions and major promises not to run for the 2014 elections. Four days later, on January 14, 2011, Ben Ali tried to dissolve the government, called for the new elections without attempting any negotiations with the opposition. Finally, the Tunisian dictator that ruled the country for twenty-three years had to flee to Saudi Arabia.

4.5.2. The outbreak of the Egyptian revolution

Although Tunisian events inspired some instances of self-immolations in Egypt, none of those provoked a protest wave comparable to the Tunisian. The Egyptian unrest began on 25th of January 2011 when a bunch of small newborn (none of which was older than three years) secular democratic opposition NGOs—such as the April 6 Youth Movement, We are all Khaled Saeed, and the National Association for Change—organized demonstrations connected to the National Police Day. In other words, nothing out of the ordinary was expected. What made the difference, in this case, was the overwhelming number of protesters—exactly like in the Ukrainian revolutions described in Chapter 5. The regime, as always, responded with violent repression. Nevertheless, this time repression did not manage to calm down the protesters. The unrest had spread across the country, being especially viral after Friday prayers on 28th of January (Sowers & Toensing, 2012). The next day, unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian army had been called to repress protesters.

Although numerous religious and party leaders called for protests, empirical evidence suggests that the mobilization mainly occurred through several small informal activist networks (Pilati et al., 2019). In addition, these networks existed only in Cairo (Warkotsch, 2014), while the protests took place everywhere.

Unlike in Tunisia, there was no unified organization that could potentially organize protests in the beginning, and it had never emerged later. In Tunisia, the trade union UGTT played this role, but, as I have described above, there was no chance that its Egyptian counterpart, the EFTU, would take part in the revolution. Thus, neither at this moment nor later did it participate in any protest activities. At the same time, the newborn associations of trade unions, including

the EFITU (see above), joined the protesters with strikes, with "tens of thousands of workers … engaging in some 60 strikes" (Beinin, 2012, p. 7), but those were never nationwide. As a result, Egyptian labor was relatively active despite the lack of organizational capacity. For instance, the ACLED database (Raleigh et al., 2010) also mentions dozens of cases of local labor strikes (mainly with an economic motive) that counted hundreds of workers participating. The first outbreak of violence happened on 2nd of February 2011, with the infamous "Camel Battle," when unidentified men riding camels attacked the protesters. Nevertheless, after a day-long battle, the defenders managed to remain in the square, having, however, two people killed (Sowers & Toensing, 2012, p. 79). From that point, the number of protesters started to increase even further.

As the protests skyrocketed, the first failed attempt at negotiations took place on 6th of February (Davis, 2016, p. 120). By this moment, the number of protesters in Tahir square approached one million. The talks were held between Vice President Omar Suleiman, representing the incumbent, and most of the opposition leaders, including Mohammed Morsi (MB) and "50 prominent Egyptians and opposition figures, including officials of the small, recognized opposition parties" (Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011). The Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak himself was not present (ibid.). The US government strongly supported the idea of negotiations (ibid.) However, in a way those were organized, these negotiations could potentially increase elites` chances at a prolonged dictatorship with minor concessions. The EFTU officials were not present during these negotiations, nor were the representatives of the newborn EFITU.

The resulting agreement was published on the same day and proposed very general terms for a peaceful transfer of power. However, it seems like this document was imposed by Suleiman and was not really discussed since many of the meeting participants (including the most important player, the MB`s leader Mohammad Morsi) did not agree with it. Neither did the protesters in the streets seem satisfied. Their main objection was that the concessions offered by Suleiman were insufficient. First, the resignation of Mubarak nor the dismissal of government was an option; second, the cancelation of the constitution was not considered. Suleiman, in response, was trying to appeal to the reasons of "peacefulness" and the opinions of certain representatives of the crowd.

The opposition movement did not have any unified organization to negotiate with, and Suleiman tried to exploit this weakness. Even if a further compromise was found, there was no guarantee that the opposition would be able to pose a credible threat in case even these minor

concessions were aborted. Had Suleiman`s maneuver succeeded, Egypt would have probably experienced a pact without democratization. Nevertheless, Suleiman and Mubarak had a second problem—the same fragmented opposition could not deliver any credible commitment. Because the opposition consisted of several completely non-coordinated camps that were even hostile to each other, no one could guarantee Mubarak his personal safety should he sign a pact with one side and leave office. Moreover, many powerful opposition players, including MB, were hostile to the agreements. As a result, street contention continued to skyrocket, and the attempt at negotiation did not seem to decrease the scale of the struggle. Labor joined the protest massively after the 6th of February. The newborn EFTU organized multiple strikes (Davis, 2016, p. 122; Raleigh et al., 2010) that are even argued to be decisive Mubarak`s displacement (Beinin, 2012).

In his speech on 10th of February, Mubarak offered many concessions during the negotiations except for the main one—his resignation. This fostered a public outburst with several senior army officers joining the protesters, which raised doubts in the large groups of military officers.[28] The next day, February 11, the military body called SCAF ousted Hosni Mubarak with a coup d`etat. This move was met very warmly by the protesters during the first day. Some authors even claim this coup to be a somewhat necessary but "tough decision" (Davis, 2016, p. 122).

4.5.3. Summary

Both revolutions had a violent character, with at least 100 victims in Tunisia (BBC, 2011) and 300 in Egypt. Tunisia never attempted to negotiate a transition during that stage, but this tells us almost nothing about the country`s capacity to negotiate (see Table 4.3 below). One does not know whether Tunisia would be able to remove Ben Ali in a negotiated way shall they attempt to do so. Egypt, in contrast, attempted a pact, but the actors quickly showed themselves incapable of negotiating. The incumbent was not ready to make concessions and did not seem entirely credible. For its part, the opposition was not united enough to make joint demands and stick with the agreements already made. In other words, the opposition was not able to show

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[28] In addition, many of military officers were unhappy with Mubarak`s son Gamal Mubarak who was responsible for economic policy during last five years of the regime, and seemed to redistribute resources away from the military. Gamal assuming power from his father seemed like a feasible scenario at the time, which could be an additional reason for the coup (Allam, 2011).

neither a credible commitment nor a credible threat. As I will show further, the Tunisian actors could solve crises cooperatively, but at this stage, actors did not attempt to choose this strategy. Egyptian negotiations would always be a twofold attempt at a zero-sum game in the later stages precisely because of the lack of capacity.

The second difference between the two cases lies in the character of mobilization—whereas, in Egypt, it happened solely through the informal networks, the Tunisian activists employed the organizational capacity of the UGTT`s local branches in addition to the informal networks. However, the Tunisian trade union headquarters only joined the protest when the regime had almost collapsed. In Egypt, the EFTU never participated in nor called for strikes. The third difference is that the military forces were deployed to repress the street protests in Egypt, and they openly refused to do so in Tunisia.

By the beginning of the Arab Spring, both Egyptian and Tunisian trade unions were largely co-opted into their respective regimes (see discussion on trade unions above). However, the UGTT`s local branches enjoyed significant autonomy. As a result, the UGTT made its organizational structures available to the protesters during the protests: for instance, the local branches called for strikes or offered their office spaces and shared the information on the events with the independent media. On top of that, after the 8th, 9th, and 10th of January massacres of 2011, even the national body of the UGTT started to call for strikes. However, in Egypt, the top-down-created EFTU never offered its organizational capacities to the protesters. The only labor mobilization occurred through the personal connections of workers or newborn independent trade unions (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 176), such as the EFITU (Beinin, 2012).

One cannot claim, however, that the presence of a strong trade union such as UGTT was essential to start a revolution in Tunisia because every other country of Arab Spring has proven its ability to overthrow their dictator even without having this high organizational capacity of the opposition. Neither do we have evidence that the UGTT had mobilized a statistically significant number of people (Pilati et al., 2019). On top of that, during the beginning of the revolution, the headquarters of the UGTT stayed reluctant (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 167). Thus, although the UGTT`s headquarters participated in mobilization during the last week of the incumbent regime, their defection has only catalyzed the process that was not reversible. As a result, UGTT`s role was never crucial before Ben Ali fled the country. In addition, Egyptian labor also managed to create a new independent trade union called the EFITU quickly and organize a strike in the last week of Mubarak's rule.

There is no statistically significant evidence based on mass surveys to confirm that any meaningful part of the mobilization of the Tunisian revolution happened through the UGTT or any other organization. Instead, the evidence suggests that both in Tunisia and Egypt, the bulk of the mobilization happened because of the informal face-to-face small group ties rather than any organization as those are the most likely to survive in repressive contexts. (Pilati et al., 2019).

Table 4.3. Sequences of steps in Egypt and Tunisia before the breakdown of the incumbent regime

	Mobilization	**Incumbent`s reaction**	**Attempts at negotiations?**	**Outcome**
Egypt	Informal networks	Offers authoritarianism with concessions	First failed attempt at negotiations	Dictator lost power (dismissed by elites)
Tunisia	Informal networks	Offers authoritarianism with concessions	No	Dictator lost power (fled the country)

One should bear in mind that although these differences seem numerous, they are carefully searched for. In almost everything apart from the aforementioned, the two authoritarian collapses are highly similar. It is hard to find any pair of contentious action events resembling each other in every category: by the organizations involved in it, dynamics, extent of violence, and the outcome. In both cases, the violence of repression escalated until the moment of the dictators` departure, and the situations after the leaders left their posts were very similar. However, the two countries' paths later separated.

4.6.   Period II. Constitution writing

After the incumbent dictator was ousted (fled the country in Tunisia and was arrested in Egypt), the power remained in the hands of the strongest force of the incumbent regime: Mohamed Ghannouchi, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali`s prime minister in the Tunisian case, and Mubarak`s former small ruling military body called the SCAF in the Egyptian case. They ended up representing the incumbent in the negotiations over a new constitution. Still, there is one difference between the two cases. As the next section will show, it lies in the extent the opposition was represented in negotiations: whereas in Tunisia, after the pressure organized by the UGTT and the creation of the ISROR, the different forces of the opposition were united

and in control of the situation, in Egypt, the SCAF managed to divide the multiple warring factions of the opposition and to negotiate with its parts separately.

4.6.1. Tunisia. Constitution writing after Ben Ali's flight

After the fall of the regime in Tunisia, "the two most influential institutions were the army and the UGTT" (former Deputy Secretary-General of the UGTT Mohammed Trabelsi, cited in Yiousfi, 2018, p. 78). Some even exclude the army and call the UGTT "the most influential structured and structuring force of resistance and social contention in independent Tunisia" (Omri, 2015, p. 18).

Despite this, in the very beginning, the UGTT was not included either in planning the constitution or into the government, and the first two months, it had to fight for its guiding role in a transition. After the events of 15th of January 2011, former Ben Ali`s prime minister Mohammed Ghannouchi formed an interim government that mostly included the incumbent regime`s elites and co-opted opposition. The influential UGTT was underrepresented, with less than 5% of seats in Ghannouchi`s two cabinets. That is why it refused to participate and preferred instead to fight for power, organizing the so-called Kasbah I and Kasbah II protests. In addition, the UGTT organized collective decision-making platforms for the opposition.

On the same day of Ben Ali`s flight on January 15, 2011, the UGTT established a body called the Council for the Protection of the Revolution (CNPR)[29] and hosted it (Stepan, 2012). The CNPR united virtually every force that is not included in the Mohamed Ghannouchi government under the leadership of a powerful unionist, Ben Anchor. However,the CNPR still cannot be called an attempt at pact according to my definition because the Incumbent was not present there, it only united opposition.

The CNPR did not have any official power at this stage but still enjoyed some de facto influence as the UGTT could call for strikes and protests using its organizational capacities. In two weeks, this led to a deadlock between the government and the CNRP. On 27th of January 2011, the first Kasbah square sit-in succeeded in forcing Ghannouchi to dismiss his first government that had an obvious bias in representing the incumbent regime elites. The sit-in was organized mostly by the UGTT (Omri, 2015, p. 22; Yousfi, 2018).

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[29] Sometimes called the Higher Political Reform Commission.

The first sit-in changed the dynamics. On 18th of February 2011, what Stepan (2012) calls "one of the most effective consensus-building bodies in the history of 'crafted' democratic transitions" was officially created. This UGTT-dominated body was called the ISROR (High Authority for Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition). It was headed by unionist Ben Anchour, who used to lead the CNPR before. The ISROR had a diverse set of members that included both the CNPR and government figures. Most importantly, this body enjoyed legal power to organize elections and electoral laws (Stepan, 2012; Yousfi, 2018) and a substantial de facto authority in many other questions. Despite this compromise, the street pressure continued with the Kasbah II in front of the government building. The main objection of the protesters was the same: now the ISROR was formed, but still, the government mainly consisted of incumbent elites. This led to the interim prime minister Ghanouchi having to resign on 27th of February 2011. The next interim, "technical" government, did not have any former RCD members.

The first phase of Tunisian pacting finished in two months. By 11th of April 2011, this UGTT-hosted Commission agreed to call elections for the Constituent Assembly that would draft a constitution, later approved by referendum and made everything to ensure free and fair elections. Its main product, apart from an electoral design, was a roadmap for a transition that had several elegant solutions: first, it decided not to hold presidential elections before a constitution is enacted because then the president could manipulate the process of constitution-making; second, it delegated the Constitutional Assembly parliamentary powers and a power to appoint or dismiss a government. The results of the Commission`s work are summarized in detail by Stepan (2012, pp. 92–94).

One aspect of this transition, as anywhere else in the cases described in this thesis—was different from the classic understanding of a pacted transition (O'Donnell et al., 1986). If the Incumbent, in this case, Ghannouchi and his first two governments, had not been exposed to constant street pressure by the opposition, there is a chance that they would try to stay in office with minor concessions. One should keep in mind that Mohammed Ghannouchi had initially almost failed to include the opposition and the UGTT in the first government—before they were forced to do so. It was the constant street pressure of the two Kasbah sit-ins accompanied by the UGTT`s capacity to tease out additional powers to influence and guide the transition that allowed Tunisia to approach the first elections with an RCD-free government together with the UGTT-led ISROR. At the same time, one cannot call this transition entirely peaceful or

nonviolent as is generally expected of pacted transitions because Mohammed Ghannouchi resigned after and because of the five victims of street violence. The transition had a cooperative character, it also involved successful pacting, and it is adequate to O'Donnell and Schmitter`s understanding of pacted transition. However, it was not, by any means, elite-led. This varies from Schmitter`s classic understanding, which assumed every pacted transition like this to be initiated and guided by ruling elites while the role of street pressure and the opposition was considered of somewhat secondary importance.

4.6.2. Egypt: Constitution writing after Hosni Mubarak's arrest

Met with public enthusiasm and having dismissed the government and the constitution of the incumbent regime, exactly as the Tahrir square protesters demanded, the military started to prepare a process of writing up a new constitution. In addition to that, the SCAF dissolved Mubbarak`s secret service called the SSIS and made several other popular steps. During the first month of transition (i.e., from 11th of February 2011 to the moment of the referendum), the SCAF led a series of consultations with legal experts (Farouk, 2013, p. 4). The Incumbent had a perfect grip on writing this constitution, and there was no counterbalancing actor. On top of that, the consultations were rather taken with experts rather than with the opposition. That is why I would not consider this instance a case of negotiations—the opposition was not present. A referendum on the principles of the organization of the Constitutional Assembly was held on 13th of March 2011. It had adopted rules designed by and favorable to the SCAF, thus institutionalizing its de facto power using mass support. From this moment until the end of April, it had a de facto control over who participated in the Constitutional Assembly.

During this stage, taking advantage of liberalization, the new trade unions were mushrooming and were very active. For instance, only in one month, February 2011, "15,0000 [workers] participated in 489 strikes" (Beinin, 2012, p. 8). Apart from the democratization agenda, they were demanding basic labor rights such as the "right to form independent trade unions, [and] the right to strike" (ibid.). Also, they advocated dissolving the pro-government EFTU. The latter remained loyal to the SCAF and would help them thwart any bottom-up unionism. Morsi made EFTU even more subordinated after he issued a decree that allowed a Manpower Minister to appoint each of the sixty members of the EFTU board (Blackburn, 2018, p. 11). In fact, the EFITU had found itself opposed by virtually any power of a new regime: "the ETUF[30]

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[30] Some sources abbreviate the EFTU as the ETUF, and the EFITU as the EFIUT.

leadership, the SCAF, and the Muslim Brothers" (Beinin, 2012, p. 17). Even the Egyptian Block, the liberal-left alliance in the parliament, was anti-unionist (ibid., p. 18). The parliamentary Labor Committee was chaired by an anti-unionist "manager in a petroleum sector enterprise" (ibid.). Therefore, the old EFTU became even more embedded into the regime while virtually every actor thwarted the newborn EFITU in the country.

However, the SCAF`s popularity started to fade with the trial of Hosni Mubarak seeming to be too merciful and the SCAF itself having more power than what is needed to just ensure the democratic transition. The more protests they faced, the more brutal the repression was. The two massive Tahrir square protests on 1st of August 2011 and 9th of September 2011 were violently dispersed by the riot forces (Kirkpatrick, 2011; Shenker, 2011). One month later, the third protest was already repressed with extreme brutality and twenty-five protesters being killed, becoming known as a Maspero Massacre (Heo, 2013). By the moment of parliamentary elections, almost every secular opposition party had become openly hostile to the SCAF and demanded it leave office.

Negotiations about the members of the Constitutional Assembly were repeatedly taking place from the moment of the referendum until the end of April *2012* between the SCAF and representatives of numerous fragmented opposition parties that were present in the parliament (a good description can be found in Farouk, 2013, p. 5). They were again performed as a series of informal talks. But, again, the ruling SCAF had perfect control over selecting with whom it would negotiate. Therefore, the SCAF was never fully counterbalanced by the opposition.

The duality of powers that brought the Egyptian transition to its collapse started with the first free and fair parliamentary elections on 11th of January 2012. The new parliament had been dominated by the Islamist, which is, again, de facto the Muslim Brotherhood.[31] After these elections, the SCAF assumed control over the Constitutional Assembly, MB—over the parliament. But, as I will show later, both counterparts had obvious authoritarian aspirations and would always renege from their guarantees whenever convenient.

The first time all the informal negotiations at this stage had failed was on 11th of June 2012. Six days before the presidential elections, the SCAF dissolved the parliament by court order, thus failing to fulfill its promises of 13th of March 2011—beginning of April 2012 negotiations.

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[31] Officially, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted the name of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) to work around the government prohibitions, but I prefer to use its de facto name for the sake of simplicity.

It became evident that the SCAF-affiliated candidate would have almost the same chances of winning the elections as that of the MB. Therefore, the rationale of the SCAF had been that if the MB won the presidential elections, it would have achieved unlimited power. Dissolving the parliament, the SCAF seized even more power. Before that, it had only control over the Constitutional Assembly. Now, one week before the presidential elections, the SCAF controlled everything as the Assembly now had parliamentary powers (Farouk, 2013, p. 5). Again, the lack of counterbalance allowed the SCAF to act unilaterally. If we do a thought experiment and imagine an action of this kind happening in Tunisia, series of the UGTT-led strikes and calls for negotiations would have followed.

The balance of power was restored three days after this point, on 17th of June 2012, when the results of relatively free and fair presidential elections had been declared. The two presidential candidates competed—Mohammed Morsi representing the MB and Ahmed Shafik representing the SCAF. Morsi won a narrow victory with 51.8 percent against 48.27 (Weaver, 2012). On the same day, the SCAF issued a decree that handed almost absolute power over a Constitutional Assembly (Farouk, 2013, p. 5). On August 12, 2012, Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi was appointed the head of the SCAF, the main military body. Again, the fragile Egyptian chances at democratization were threatened by the two sides, and both were the only organized players.

4.6.3. Summary

In both cases, the strongest actors from the incumbent regimes assumed power after the old authoritarian leaders left their offices to mass protests. In both cases, this was obviously not enough for the protesters, and these new governments would face constant and severe street pressure to leave and ensure a democratic reform. In both cases, the transition had a negotiated character during this stage, although the street protests sometimes were dispersed with violence (See Table 3.4 below).

However, the dynamics and directions were different: the incumbent regime`s heir lost all its power in a month in Tunisia and seized the dictatorial power in Egypt. In Tunisia, the two Kabah sit-in protests organized by the UGTT first resulted in the platform for negotiations that the government did not completely control, and second, drove this government away—in one month. In Egypt, the military body SCAF, taking advantage of its initial popularity, was increasing its power and omitting checks on itself, first, with a referendum in March and,

second, by dissolving a government in June. Thus, what used to be a special body that emerged as a result of public pressure together with the UGTT`s organizational capacity to reach a consensus in Tunisia—ISROR—was substituted with a "limited non-transparent consultations with "trustworthy" legal experts" (Farouk, 2013, p. 4) in Egypt.

The reason is that although they did not have any formal power initially, SCAF members enjoyed serious popular support alongside many resources available, including control over the police and the army. At the same time, during that period, the SCAF was never checked by any organization that would be in any way comparable in its organizational capacity during that period. As a result, the new unionist movement did not manage to achieve any political power, while the old ETUF remained completely controlled. The MB already participated at this stage of a transition, but it would only become a serious threat later, and at this stage, it did not gain its full power yet. Although the protests were acute, no single person was speaking in the name of these protesters. Therefore, the SCAF successfully used these initial advantages to seize more de jure and de facto powers.

At the same time, in Tunisia, the civilian government of Mohammed Ghannouchi, even though he had infinite formal powers in the very beginning, was always constantly checked by the government and the opposition players. As a result, he had to give up power quickly. The protests were not only strong, but they were also always backed by the established organization with high organizational capacity—the UGTT. The union also worked hard to unite the opposition and advance its demands. The Ennahda party was not particularly strong during this period, nor did it play a major role in the protests.

Table 4.4. Constitution writing in Egypt and Tunisia after the breakdown of the incumbent regime

	Who is now in power	How the Constitutional Assembly is planned	Reaction to a demand to dismiss a government dominated by incumbent elites	Roadmap for a transition?
Egypt	Remnants of incumbent elites stay in power	SCAF consults 'trustworthy' experts	Government dismissed	No
Tunisia	Remnants of incumbent elites stay in power	Competitive ISROR imposed by opposition	Government dismissed	Yes

4.7. Period III. The rise of radical Islamism: The political crises of 2013-2014

4.7.1. The Tunisian National Assembly

The overall problem Tunisia was facing with the Ennahda in power was the rise of the Salafism, a form of religious fundamentalism. The outbreak of this crisis was triggered by the killings of two leftist activists who are also members of the UGTT—Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, and Mohamed Brahmi on 25th of July 2013. This led to a stalemate, where the UGTT helped oust the Ennahda government.

The elections to the Constitutional Assembly (later— the ANC) were held on 22nd of November 2011 with the plan that it will write a constitution approximately in one year to be later changed with a proper parliament. However, the process of constitution writing took longer than it was expected. The Assembly was heavily influenced by the Islamist Ennahda party that not only won eighty-six out of 215 seats but also had four times more seats than the second-biggest party. Right after the day of the elections, the relationship between the UGTT and the Ennahda swung wildly, from peaceful coexistence in some regions and situations to open hostility in

others. Since the organizations came from different realms, they would sometimes overlap: many members of the Ennahda were also the UGTT unionists.

At the same time, the two could be extremely contentious. The Ennahda would constantly accuse the UGTT of doing political action that goes far beyond the trade union`s economic interests (Yousfi, 2012). For instance, the UGTT and the Ennahda had a violent conflict on 25th of February 2012 in the Sidi Bouzid region when the Ennahda activists dumped garbage in front of the UGTT offices. Another instance of street clashes was the UGTT`s demonstration on the 1st of May 2012 that was aggressively counter demonstrated by the Ennahda (ibid.).

The first calls for a new advisory body that would help foster constitution writing started the following summer. On 18th of June 2012, the UGTT called for a council to resolve disagreements between the parties without having any official power. The initiative, however, did not work because the Ennahda defected from its reasoning that such body would simply duplicate the functions of the Constitutional Assembly (Yousfi, 2018, p. 197). This initiative was also paired with a later canceled national strike on the 5th of December that would demand a roadmap for the transition (Yousfi, 2018, p. 198).

On 6th of February 2013, an anti-Ennahda leftist activist Chokri Belaid was killed by a group of radical Salafists. The subsequent wave of protests did not change the pace of events. On 25th of July 2013, another leftist activist Mohamed Brahmi was killed. The reaction of most of the leftist opposition was to run protests asking to dissolve both the government and the National Constitutional Assembly. However, the UGTT agreed on an intermediate solution—to dissolve the government while keeping the Constitutional Assembly.

The same day, the UGTT entered a strategical alliance with the three other professional unions—the Tunisian Union for Industry, the Order of Lawyers, and the Tunisian Human Rights League. This alliance was called the Quartet and was established to increase the UGTT`s weight during the forthcoming negotiations. This alliance with the high-skilled professional organizations also signaled to investors and the IMF that at this stage, the UGTT was not seeking to pursue a leftist economic agenda. Already on the next day, 26th of July 2013, the UGTT`s Quartet organized a first general strike. Then the Quartet`s pressure continued.

Two days after the UGTT started to step in, on 28th of September 2013, the Ennahda-led Troika government agreed to resign and run the UGTT-led negotiations. The first reason is that, again, contrary to the protesters, the UGTT was offering a compromise: the Ennahda would save its

right to participate in politics, and the UGTT-dominated Assembly stayed intact. In three months, the UGTT-led Quartet drafted a roadmap for the (1) appointment of a new technocratic government, (2) four weeks of constitution-making, and (3) an electoral commission. Second, the military takeover that finished with many thousand people bloodshed in Egypt for more or less the same reason had happened in a neighboring country just one month ago. Therefore, this made the Ennahda's leadership more cautious. At the same time, there was widespread concern that, unlike in Egypt, Tunisia lacked the coercive apparatus that would be able to stop large-scale violence shall the attempts at pact fail—that made both parts more willing to negotiate (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 5). Third, the power of the Quartet, together with the protesters, was overwhelming, and the street demonstrations persisted during the work process of this dialogue (ibid.).

The third series of Tunisian pacting (called a National Dialogue) began on 26th of October 2013. The opposition Quartet of the UGTT was negotiating against the ruling Troika government. The process of constitution writing illustrates the organizational capacities of the UGTT. "[Houcine Abbassi, the president of the UGTT] facilitated discussion. Sometimes he imposed his decisions. He would even require representatives from political parties to stay in the room after the meeting if no decision had been made" (Yousfi 2018, p. 202, reciting International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 4). Therefore, the UGTT used its capacities to farce actors to reach agreements rather than to assume power. The only question is why did not the UGTT just assume a full dictatorial power as the SCAF did in Egypt.

One month and a half later, on 14th of December 2013, this UGTT-led National Dialogue appointed a new prime minister, Mehdi Jomaa, together with a technocratic government (International Crisis Group, 2014). On 26th of January 2014, the National Dialogue succeeded in adopting the constitution (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 7). The first parliamentary elections were held on 26th of November 2014, and they were free and fair. As of now, 2021, this UGTT-promoted democratization proves itself to be durable. All the democracy indexes rate Tunisia as a democracy.

4.7.2. The Egyptian coup d'état

After winning the presidential elections on June 17, 2012, by a narrow victory, Morsi gradually took control over the Constitutional Assembly by 2013. The authoritarian manner in which the

MB dominated over a Constitutional Assembly raised many concerns. The extent to which the civil society organizations and the 6th of April movement were represented in this period was minuscule (Farouk, 2013). By this time, both the MB and the SCAF seemed to play a zero-sum game ignoring any promises and rules whenever convenient. The MB was criticized for a complete ignorance toward the secular opposition.

At a certain point, the MB's policies caused numerous protests that started on 30th of June 2013, led by secular activists of the April 6 Youth Movement. (Housden, 2013). These forces were factionalized. They lacked any capacity to deliver credible threats and credible commitments to force the MB to negotiate with them. However, this gave another power—the SCAF—a legitimation for the more drastic actions. It made a tactical alliance with secular liberals to get rid of the MB. Finally, the negotiated coexistence of the SCAF and the MB ended with the coup d'état of 3rd of July 2013. The MB (including its FJP) was banned, and Morsi was arrested and sentenced to death.

United in their criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi, all the trade unions, including the controlled EFTU and the independent EFITU, have initially supported military coup d`état. In exchange, the EFITU leader Abu Eita held office as minister for human resources in 2014, but he did not spend much time in office. In 2016, the independent trade unions were once again banned, and the old law about the EFTU monopoly was once again implemented (according to Blackburn, 2018, p. 12).

In response to the coup, ousted MB-affiliated MPs, members, and their families started protests and occupied two squares in Cairo and virtually every important city (Ketchley, 2017, p. 130). First, the ruling SCAF guaranteed safety to the protesters. However, these promises were not worth much: in ten days, 14th of August 2013, the military dispersed the sit-ins using lethal firearms and heavy vehicles. (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The bloodiest of the dispersals is widely known as the Rabaa massacre. Attacking the epicenter of anti-coup protests, the military forces killed or injured most of the protesters in the square. This is known to be "one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators" (Human Rights Watch, 2014), with up to 1,000 people killed, 4,000 injured, and 40,000 arrested (Ketchley, 2017, p. 131) in one day. The most famous MB leaders were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment, but some were allegedly killed in the years afterward. After the dispersal, Brothers still protested with other methods than sit-ins (ibid., p. 139), trying to reverse the coup—but unsuccessfully. To suppress dissent, the new government imposed a state of emergency for two months.

In Egypt, two forces—the SCAF and the MB—were trying to achieve unlimited power, and no consensus or (quasi)democratic power-sharing was possible with these aspirations. As a result, all the negotiations, pacts, national dialogues, and constitutional bodies, starting from the most informalized talks and finishing with the most institutionalized assemblies, performed within the two years between 2011 and 2013 appeared to be meaningless. Now, in 2021, the SCAF remains the dominating political force in Egypt.

4.7.3. Summary

The third period shows the most crucial difference between the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions. The Egyptian events and the grievances of the secular opposition are very close to those that informed the events on 8th of September 2013 in Tunisia. There, the UGTT forced the Ennahda to resign to the intermediate government and negotiate. The lack of mediation and capacity to deliver credible threat and credible commitment of the Egyptian fragmentized secular opposition, in the end, had just opened a window of opportunity for the SCAF. The latter also achieved great power by the time and found itself able to commit a coup d'état unopposed. As a result, Tunisia ended up having a pact while Egypt had a coup. See Table 4.5.

Table 4.5. Solutions to Islamist crises in Egypt and Tunisia.

	Challenge	Solution	Outcome
Egypt	Protests to drive out the Islamist-dominated government and parliament	Coup d'état against Morsi	Dictatorship
Tunisia	Protests to drive out the Islamist-dominated government and parliament	Negotiations of the Quartet against the Troika	Democracy

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter shows that one of the most important determinants of the success of the Tunisian pacted transition, and Egypt`s failed attempt at negotiations and the lack of democratic

transition lies in the organizational capacity of the opposition—in this case, the presence and the participation of an independent trade union, the UGTT, in Tunisia and the absence of such in Egypt. Speaking of a broader perspective, the dominant role of the military in Egypt that determined the structure of its political economy together with its more militant Islam also played an important role. The absence of Egyptian unionism is thus embedded within this political context.

The UGTT could help facilitate a compromise, and it could force the dictator to agree when he did not want to. The UGTT was large, influential, and rebellious enough to speak for protesters yet co-opted enough to speak with political elites. Also, it had enough capacity to organize sit-ins and round tables, or, as they are typically called in Africa, National Dialogues, and keep its promises. In Egypt, independent unionism was prohibited, and such actors simply did not exist—although the labor`s potential to organize remained strong.

At the first stage of the transition, before a dictator left the country, the participation of a trade union did not make much difference. It only slightly affected the character of mobilization, but the outcome was the same—in both countries, dictators lost their power. In both countries, the labor strikes accompanied the protests in the last days of the incumbent regimes, and both were thought to merely speed up their demise. Of course, in Tunisia, they were organized by the established UGTT, in Egypt, the newborn EFITU organized them, but in both cases, the strikes took place and were successful.

The UGTT`s capacities for credible commitment (to negotiate with the state and mediate conflicts) and credible threat (to organize strikes and sit-ins) have played a crucial role after the Tunisian dictator left the country. As a result, the UGTT formed at least three successful platforms for dialogue— the CNPR, the ISROR, and the 2013 National Dialogue.[32] Each time, the UGTT changed the pace of reform, forcing the incumbent to the negotiating table by calling a nationwide strike. Therefore, this mediation was possible thanks to the UGTT`s capacity for credible commitment and credible threat. In other words, I claim that there were two focal points when the UGTT changed the pace of revolution using its organizational capacity for credible threat: forcing Ghannouchi to dismiss his government on 28th of September 2011 and forcing the Ennahda-led Troika to resign on 28th of September 2013. Subsequently, in both

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[32] Not including the UGTT`s aborted attempt at organizing a strike demanding for another platform on 5th of December 2012

episodes, the UGTT`s organizational capacity for credible commitment—to organize dialogues, keep promises, and deliver guarantees—turned out to be even more important. Namely, the UGTT organized ISROR on February 18, 2011, and the National Dialogue on 26th of November 2013.

Egypt faced the same challenges—the sudden failure of an old dictator, the interim government consisting of incumbent elites that strived to preserve the status quo, the debate on constitution writing, and later the rise of Salafism, and the uncooperative behavior of the incoming Islamist governing party. However, in those situations where the strong UGTT was able to mediate, to force players to negotiate and to abandon a zero-sum game while not striving for power itself, the Egyptian SCAF military body used the blunt repression to seize unlimited power. In Tunisia, this strong and, at the same time, anti-democratic actor did not exist. Throughout its history, it has always had a very limited army. In addition, the democratic movement in Egypt had limited organizational capacity and could not bargain much. It consisted of a bunch of newborn, weak, and fragmented organizations. The main Islamist party was not capable of credible commitment. For instance, it failed to reach an extrication agreement with Mubarak during the first phase of the revolution. Neither the ruling SCAF was—for instance, while preparing one of the bloodiest crackdowns on street protests in a modern human history, it promised safety to the anti-coup protesters. Egyptian trade unions were created after the revolution began; they could potentially become a strong power if not thwarted. Although Egypt's democratic opposition managed to initiate a revolution, they, paradoxically, had limited electoral success and minimal influence later. So much so that later they were constantly ignored both by the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the two dominant actors left were almost openly anti-democratic, leaving almost no chance for Egyptian democratization.

Most modernization theories do not help explain the difference because they do not consider the organizations and institutions. The only structure-oriented theories that could explain the pair of Tunisian and Egyptian cases well are those that account for inequality and the interests of class groups—see, for instance, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009; Rosendorff, 2001; Vanhanen, 2003. Nor does a purely voluntaristic approach (i.e., that only analyses the interactions of actors) explain much because, until the very end, the sequences of steps were very much similar in Tunisia and Egypt. In this case, it is the difference on this lower, institutional level of aggregation that has played a role: namely, the restrictions and regulations on certain types of

political activities and opposition organizations that are present in the end. Egypt had the potential of both developing strong opposition organizations and of forming a strong unionist movement. However, the repressive nature of its incumbent regime limited the development of both, and trade unions were de facto forbidden in 1976. Thus, the union movement that should have emerged according to the modernization perspective was thwarted. The difference with Tunisia here is that the bottom-up trade unionism was always tolerated there; parties, however, were also banned. It is not a surprise that in both countries, the secular political parties did not play any role. Egyptian political Islam was much more militant than a Tunisian one that also played a major role. Tunisian unionism eventually played a major role—in the political realm. In addition, the modernization scope does not consider the military forces that were especially powerful in Egypt because of its geography and history—and their position was dominant also in political and, most importantly, economic realms.

The story of the UGTT also explains what is particular in trade unions that means they are the drivers of pacted democratizations and demonstrates the two characteristics that were not theoretically expected. First of all, the UGTT preserved the balance between being independent enough from the regime to still represent the interests of labor while at the same time being loyal enough not to be banned. Had the UGTT become too incorporated into the regime, it would have lost workers' trust and been eventually replaced. Another part of the trade-off was no less dangerous: whenever the UGTT became too rebellious, it was harshly repressed by the regime. This balance was not the result of wise and careful decision-making. Quite the opposite—it was the fruit of endless re-negotiations, discussions, compromises, various forms of contentious action, and state repression. Maintaining this balance was possible because the UGTT`s goals lay primarily in the economic realm, and its existence per se did not contradict the authoritarian regime. This was impossible for a political party, at least in the Tunisian autocratic context. Only after the regime fell, and only temporarily, did it enter the political realm. This resulted in its second characteristic—the UGTT did not strive for political power as political parties do. At a certain point, it enjoyed the position of being the strongest political entity in the country. Any political party that comes to office would be tempted to preserve power as long as possible, even at the cost of undermining the fragile young democracy. A trade union, since it came from another realm, was beyond the struggle. This, it could not have this temptation.

The Tunisian case illustrates very well the mechanisms at play in the first pathway to pacted transition. The Tunisian secular opposition parties did not have enough organizational capacity and resources, which the UGTT was able to provide. Also, the two cases show very well the concepts of credible commitment and credible threat. The credible commitment in these cases was demonstrated by the UGTT when it organized various platforms for negotiations. Moreover, it managed to pose credible threats with sit-ins and strikes—and those seemed to have always worked.

The Egyptian case study unpacks very well why it is an outlier in a truth table row with a party/military regime and an established opposition party. The Egyptian case is very different from other countries in the same row—namely, Greece in 1974, Nicaragua (1990), South Africa (1994), and Spain (1975). Egypt is the only one to have a very long-lasting military dictatorship and a radical opposition organization at the same time. Among those countries, only Greece is a military dictatorship. However, in Greece, it was relatively short-lived. There existed an entire group of responsible civilian political parties and leaders who used to rule the country before and were ready to take power. All other countries were long-lasting party dictatorships that tolerated the organized opposition to a great extent.

Chapter 5.
The successful Ukrainian pact in 2004 and failed attempt at negotiations in 2014

5.1. Preface

At 5:30 a.m. on February 20, 2014, a phone went off in the bedroom of Andrey Shevchenko, one of the leaders of the Euromaidan protests. It was a riot police commander calling, with whom he had just recently exchanged phone numbers in case the conflict between protesters and the police should escalate. The commander told him that someone had started to shoot at the riot police officers from the second floor of the conservatory building controlled by the protesters and that eleven officers were already wounded. Shevchenko was told that his time to sort the situation out was short; otherwise, the police would eventually shoot back. He called the commandant of the Euromaidan, Andrey Parubii, who allegedly sent his people to search the conservatory building, but they did not find anyone. By the time Shevchenko reached the Maidan, already more than a dozen protesters had been shot dead.[33] The police started to retreat, returning fire. The protesters began to take chase, albeit chaotically, following the police down Institutskaya Street as the snipers shot at them. By the end of the day, the number of protesters killed counted in the hundreds, with scores of riot police also killed.

Even now, in 2021, it is uncertain who started shooting that day. Allegedly, it was neither the main body of the protesters nor the police officers in the square who started to shoot. It is likely that the first shots were fired by an unknown third force because both the police officers and the protesters had been shot. Each side blames its rivals. Nevertheless, the most recent and reliable analysis of bullets shows that the riot police were responsible for most of the shootings and killings that day (Stanko, 2020).

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[33] The recounting of this episode was derived from an interview with Andrey Shevchenko in the "Maidan Massacre" documentary (at the timestamp 12:25). In addition, it can be found in an article by Gatehouse (2015).

This shooting resulted in (but was also preceded by) an earnest attempt at making a pact the same day that lasted overnight until February 21 and would also fail. After the agreement was reached between the political elites and the representatives of the Maidan, opposition leader Vitalii Klitchko made a speech to the protester about their deal with the president. The two main conditions were that Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovitch resigned in nine months, in December 2014, in exchange, the protesters had to unblock the streets[34] (Wilson, 2014, p. 92). To say that Klitchko was booed (once again) is to say nothing. On the night when the crowd did not accept this pact, Yanukovitch had to flee the country.

How did it happen that Ukraine, which already had a successful pacted transition with the same leader who willingly gave away power in 2004, failed to achieve the same thing in 2014? What was the characteristic of the Maidan 2004 that enabled pacting then but was absent ten years later?

5.2. Introduction

This chapter compares two attempts at pacted transitions in Ukraine in the years 2004 and 2014. The two transitions started in the same country with more or less the same generation of political leaders. The level of economic development in Ukraine was more or less the same (see Table 4.1), with a slight increase ten years later. Even more, in both cases, the same political leader, Victor Yanukovitch, a presidential candidate in 2004 and a president in 2014, had to step back due to mass protests, which on both occasions occurred in the Maidan Nezaleznosti.[35] Each of these crises was to be solved by negotiations, which in both cases was an explicit and publicly explicated event with the participation of the representatives of the European Union and those of Russia. In both cases, the political leaders had finally reached agreements.

However, the negotiations in the same society between almost the same group of people ended in strikingly different ways. The results of the 2004 negotiations were successfully implemented and served as a roadmap for the further transition. On the contrary, the results of the 2014 negotiations, after being accepted by political leaders signing it, were angrily declined by the rank-n-rifle protesters and numerous organizations which led to the failure of the negotiations.

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[34] These were two concessions that I find the most important, while I list the others further in the text.

[35] Literally – Square, or just The Maidan, The Square.

In this chapter, I claim that this difference lies in how the two revolutions were triggered and organized. The protests in 2004 were triggered by the contested elections that were known to take place long in advance, while those of 2014 took place spontaneously because Yanukovitch decided to abandon the association agreement with the EU at the last moment. Therefore, in 2004, the protests were organized in a top-down way inherent to the electoral revolutions (see, among many others, Levitsky & Way, 2010). The core organizational structure of the 2004 Maidan was the party of Yuschenko, the leader of the opposition. Therefore, the protest movement had a hierarchical structure and could be controlled by its leader. The Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014 emerged as a series of sporadic bottom-up protests resembling those in Egypt in 2011 (see Chapter 4). There were, of course, numerous opposition organizations and party leaders, but none of them could control or represent the protesters. The organizational network was evolving together with the protest. Of course, the Euromaidan developed its own decision-making body at later stages, but still, people on the streets and even some Euromaidan commanders, *sotniks*, could challenge and defy its decisions. In other words, the Maidan 2004 was organized and orchestrated by a cheated rival. Its leader could represent and command the protesters, while the 2014 Maidan had a network structure where political leaders representing it during negotiations could hardly control the situation.

I find the two cases analytically important for this dissertation because it is a rare pair of regime changes when the conditions—including even the person to be ousted by the protest—were not *merely similar* but, in fact, *the same*. Therefore, structural conditions such as historical legacy, level of economic development, inequality, education (see Table 4.1), and the like can hardly explain the difference. However, the outcomes were entirely different, and the organizational capacity of the two opposition movements seems to be the explanatory variable in the two cases. This chapter shows the sequence of events and the mechanisms involved in a failure to implement the pact signed in 2014 and compares it with the relatively disciplined solution in 2004.

The cases of Ukraine 2004 and 2014 have different outcomes that are *not explained*, unlike in the pair of Tunisia and Egypt, through the presence of a trade union. The case of 2004 is not a part of any solution formula from the QCA model presented in Chapter 3. It has both successful negotiations and successful democratization while neither the trade unions nor a party/military regime exists. However, the protest movement of 2004 can be characterized by the combination of other favorable factors that are not a part of my QCA model. For instance, it is bundled in a

single umbrella alliance, and it has organizations older than three years. Also, both the candidate and the coalition had more than 40% of the votes, and more than 2% of the country`s population was present on the streets of Kyiv. The case of 2014 is yet another typical case for my QCA model regarding the success of negotiations: neither the trade union nor the Catholic Church was present, which substitutes the necessary condition for the failure of negotiations.

Thus, the organizational capacity of the opposition was the major difference between the two Ukrainian revolutions, whereas almost every other societal characteristic that is normally used to predict democratization was the same (see Table 4.2). During both revolutions, Ukraine was developed to the extent that it could be easily found both among democracies and autocracies. Therefore, this case study aims to demonstrate how Yuschenko`s capacity to control the nonviolent protest in 2004 was crucial for the successful pacting, while the decentralized, often non-hierarchic structure of the 2014 protests undermined its capacity to negotiate with the dictator. The only problem in this pair is the element of time. The events of 2014 were built on the experience of 2004 and its consequences. In other words, the two cases are not entirely independent from each other.

The 2014 case, however, deviates from the other cases in my database in the second dependent variable—democratization. As I show later, unlike the other cases, the democratization after the 2014 revolution happens notwithstanding the failed pact. Its uncooperative character, however, comes at the price of an outburst of violence.

Table 5.1. Structural conditions relevant to the character of regime change and subsequent democratization in Ukraine 2004 and 2014.

Condition	2004	2014
Economic development[36]		
GDP per capita PPP US$(WB)	5,255	8,647
Life expectancy	68	71
CO_2 emissions (tons per capita)	7.2	5.9
HDI	.69	.75
Gini index	28.7	24
Attitudes (WVS)[37]		
index of emancipative values 0-1; standard error in brackets	.38	.40
index of secular values 0-1; standard error in brackets	.47	.47
Opposition organizations		
Bottom-up activism	Not strong but exists on an individual level; activists sometimes are harassed or killed	Not strong but exists on an individual level; activists sometimes are harassed or killed
Opposition parties	Those that participate in parliament represent economic elites—oligarchs—rather than the citizenry	Those that participate in parliament are co-opted to a certain extent and represent economic elites—oligarchs—rather than the citizenry. A leader of a major competing party—Julia Timoshenko—is in jail.
Nationwide umbrella trade unions	do not exist	do not exist

Finally, the cases are among the most typical for my database. As discussed in a previous chapter, attempts at pacted transitions in my database vary by the extent to which the incumbent and the opposition control the situation, by the extent to which the incumbent and the opposition are represented in negotiations, by what is discussed, by whether and how the

[36] Source: World Bank (2018).

[37] Source: Ingelhart et al. (2014).

foreign powers intervened, and by the scale of violence and contention (see on variation between transitions in the database in Chapter 1). The cases of Ukraine stay within the middle of this variation. Concerning the stage of negotiations, these two cases almost do not vary in the extent to which the incumbent and the opposition control the situation, nor in the extent of what is discussed. The violence is absolutely absent in the first case and is overwhelming in the second.[38] They do, however, deviate from the average in the extent the foreign powers intervene. In 2004, Russia enjoyed as much control over the situation as it wanted while its intervention was present yet reluctant; the EU countries were supportive of the opposition, and the US subsidized the democracy-promoting agents. In 2014, both Russia and the EU did not control the situation, and both were acting desperately. Russian reaction was growing more and more violent as the revolution spread and ended up with the notoriously known annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea and openly supporting the armed rebels in the East of Ukraine with its regular army.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the dependent variable—the success of negotiations—while explaining why issues of democratization are not included in this chapter. I show that the negotiations failed in 2014 while they succeeded in 2004; then, I show why there was significant democratization in both cases. Second, I discuss the initial regimes in both cases and show that Ukrainian regimes in 2004 and 2014 are what Levitsky and Way(2010b) call "competitive authoritarianism." Third, I show my independent variable—the organizational capacity of the opposition. I describe how the two Maidans were organized, arguing that the opposition's organizational capacity was relatively higher in 2004 than 2014.

The second part of the chapter tells the stories of the two Maidans, is organized in chronological order, and has three essential parts. First, I trace how the well-known 2004 Orange Revolution emerged, how it led to negotiations, and how the negotiations ended. Then, I briefly describe Ukrainian history between the two transitions and argue why what Yanukovitch had done in 2010 is a typical democratic backslide. Then, I show how the 2014 revolution emerged and evolved. Last but not least, I deconstruct as many steps of the negotiations in 2014 as possible without taking interviews with participants. Then, showing how negotiations collapsed, I argue why it is a non-hierarchical network structure of the Euromaidan protest that did not allow for the successful negotiations and a subsequent pacted transition. In the conclusion, I summarize

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[38] Here I, of course, refer to the situation as it stood before the negotiations began.

various reasons that explain the outcome and relate them to the theories on modes of regime change.

5.3.   Dependent variable—the success of negotiations

Whereas in the previous pair, Tunisia, and Egypt, the success of both negotiations and democratization in the first country and the collapse of both in the second is obvious and does not require additional explanation; this is hardly the case for Ukrainian transitions. Different scholars, reports, and indexes show contradicting results when it comes to the Ukrainian Maidan campaigns. Of course, the attempt at negotiations succeeded in 2004 while collapsing in 2014. Therefore, according to my definition presented in Chapter 1, Ukraine 2004 is an occurrence of successful pacted transition (i.e., negotiations were successful and led to democratization)[39] while Ukraine 2014 is a failed attempt at negotiations. This section elaborates on my stance.

In 2004, the negotiations and the following pact were successful, and a very fragile democracy followed. The pact, however, did not have any grassroots character and was signed by political leaders—Yanukovitch, Yuschenko, and Kuchma alone (i.e., it was not supported by any organization on the ground). After that, Yuschenko, one of the two antagonists, lost elections and office in 2010 to the second one, namely Yanukovitch. This event left no strong organization that would be able to enforce this treaty, which eventually allowed Yanukovitch to dismiss it unilaterally.

In 2014, the attempt at negotiations failed even though Yanukovitch and the leaders of main opposition parties managed to reach an agreement. First, the concessions made by the ruling Yanukovitch as a result of negotiations were too minor and implied that he would resign in nine months while the protest should have finished right after the pact was signed. Second, the opposition leaders who signed the agreement did not manage to implement it (i.e., convince the protesters to return home). Finally, it would have been impossible to deliver a credible threat if the Maidan had left the square: since it did not have any identifiable organizational base, it would have been impossible to summon it again if Yanukovitch had not followed through on his part of the agreement.

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[39] Democratization is calibrated as a.15 increase in the V-Dem liberal democracy scale in the three years after the transition. See Chapters 2 and 3 for the justification.

5.4. Independent variables: the organizational capacity of the opposition—Ukraine 2004 and 2014

The organizational capacity of civil society and opposition parties on the country level always remained low during the three post-Soviet decades of Ukrainian history. For instance, in the non-revolutionary times, the level of participation according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index was 7.75 in 2006, 6.0 in 2013-4, compared, for instance, with a level of 10 for Poland. Quite typically for this kind of regime, the citizenry only participated during times of mobilization while being absent in normal times (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). This, of course, undermined the development of political institutions: it allowed Yuschenko to be corrupted and reluctant after coming to power in 2004, it did not interrupt the democratic backslide in 2010, and the like. Whereas the opposition organizations always had low organizational capacity, the two protest movements, however, differed drastically in the way they were organized.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 was more centralized than the Euromaidan in 2014 because the former was headed from above by the rival presidential candidate, whereas the latter had a spontaneous origin. First, the organizational basis of the 2004 Orange Revolution was an umbrella alliance of three large parliamentary parties that not only enjoyed more than one-third of voters` support but also had about half of the seats in a parliament. Therefore, the protest enjoyed the organizational means of parties: parliamentary coalition, professional administration cadres, resources, offices. Second, the Coalition was prepared long in advance for both electoral competition and post-electoral protests. It was ready and able to lead a protest that was mobilized in a top-down way. As a result, the Orange Revolution had a very straightforward hierarchical structure. The protest was always subordinated to one leader, Victor Yuschenko, who was capable both of credible threat having one and a half million people on the streets and of credible commitment proven to have a veto power against radical aspirations to capture government buildings.

In contrast, the Euromaidan 2014 was very decentralized and had shallow organizational capacity because it emerged spontaneously. First, the opposition parties were weaker than ten years ago. The Maidan only had three small parties, two of them having less than 10% of the votes and seats in the parliament. The largest opposition party, Fatherland, was beheaded. Second, no one expected neither that Yanukovitch would abort the association agreement with

the EU at the very last moment nor that it would bring a million to the streets. The opposition parties joined the Euromaidan late after its protesters started to organize the logistical support—that is, security, food, housing, medicine—on their own, and bottom-up organizations were mushrooming. The parties became merely a part of this network. The Euromaidan was not subordinated to any single leader: it was a network that had a dozen completely independent bottom-up organizations, at least three influential parliamentary politicians pretending to control it, a committee responsible for the logistical support claiming to have leadership, one influential field commander subordinated to the committee (Way, 2014, p. 38), and several entirely independent combat units outside of its main perimeter. Needless to say, no actor had veto power over the entire network of the Euromaidan. The two following sections elaborate on this argument.

5.4.1. The organizational structure of the opposition in 2004

The Ukrainian 2004 protest was organized by the powerful Orange Coalition, an umbrella alliance that consisted of pro-democratic political parties. The sum of the votes of these parties would comprise 37.7%, according to the electoral results of 2002. Therefore, the Orange movement had about half of the MPs behind its back.[40] Its leader Victor Yuschenko (who used to be a prime minister of Ukraine in 1999-2001 under the rule of Kuchma) won slightly more than half of the votes in presidential re-elections of 2005. The umbrella alliance consisted of two political factions: the Our Ukraine [Наша Украина] political alliance of Yuschenko together with The Block of Yulia Timoshenko [Блок Юлии Тимошенко] allied with the Socialist Party. The Our Ukraine was yet another pollical alliance of Yuschenko formed in 2001 together with twelve smaller parties.[41] The Our Ukraine achieved 23.6% of the votes during the 2002 elections and a plurality of 112 seats[42] out of 450 (Szajkowski, 2005, p. 603). The Yuliya Tymoshenko Block was formed in 2001 and based on the All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" (created in 1999) allied with smaller parties: "the Ukrainian Social Democratic

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[40] It does not make sense to calculate precisely because MPs of both sides could constantly defect or be bribed from day to day.

[41] These were the "Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists; Forward Ukraine!; [the] Liberal Party of Ukraine; [the] Party of Christian-Popular Union; [the] Popular Movement of Ukraine; [the] Reforms and Order Party; [the] Republican Christian Party; Solidarity; [and the] Youth Party of Ukraine" (Sagar, 2009, p. 597)

[42] Though, later this majority was corrupted by Kuchma who managed to bribe enough MPs to have a coalition of 172 members (ibid).

Party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly," and achieved 7.3% of the votes and twenty-three seats (Sagar, 2009, p. 597). Finally, the Socialist Party that allied with the movement achieved 6.9% of the votes and twenty seats during the 2002 elections (ibid., p. 603).

Apart from political parties, the rival Orange Coalition included a popular youth movement, Pora! [ПОРА!].[43] It was headed by Oleg Yatsenko and was often instructed by Yuschenko himself.[44] It is a close sibling of Georgian "Khmara!" and Serbian "Otpor" (see especially Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; McFaul, 2007). Pora activists are known to have studied from their Serbian counterparts some six months before the protests. The Pora had been arguably receiving its funding from the US (McFaul, 2007, p. 70). Since the movement had never been registered officially, it is impossible to receive its reports. However, it is known that, according to the US official figures, the US spending on Ukrainian democracy promotion within the two years before the revolution was scoring as high as fifty-eight million dollars (Brinkley, 2004). Apart from Pora, the Freedom of Choice Coalition and the Committee of Ukrainian Voters mobilized citizens to vote (McFaul, 2007, pp. 58–59). Together with a Democratic Initiatives Foundation NGO, the latter organized careful monitoring of the fairness of the electoral process and rang a bell about the electoral fraud of the first two rounds, thus mobilizing the protest (ibid., p. 59).

Although the media were largely controlled by the state and President Kuchma, democratic enclaves existed. Namely, Chanel 5 was controlled by Yuschenko and belonged to his ally Petro Poroshenko. The further the revolution went, the larger the audience of the independent media grew. Together with this trend, the mainstream media would become more and more independent. (see, especially, ibid., pp. 61-62;)

In 2004, the alliance of Yuschenko and Timoshenko was prepared to organize a post-electoral protest in advance because they knew that the usage of electoral fraud was likely. Six months before, the Orange Coalition had started to buy tents, sleeping bags, and mobile canteens (Homenko, 2014). The opposition leaders booked Maidan Nezalezhnosti square in advance for a "music festival" and installed[45] a stage, a screen, and speakers so that everything was ready

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[43] Literally – "It`s time!"

[44] For instance, it was Yuschenko`s direct command to the Pora activists to start constructing tents.

[45] Opposition MPs had to install the stage literally, by hand, taking advantage of their immunity (See McFaul, 2007, p. 64)

for election day. The number of people in the crowd was hundreds of times larger than expected, with 200,000 turning up on the morning of November 22 (ibid., p. 125) and reaching as many as 1.5 million by the end (McFaul, 2007, p. 65; Rennebohm, 2011). Because the Maidan was carefully organized in a top-down way with serious financial investments, it nevertheless managed to deliver food and supplies even to a million of people. The opposition camp also had its own security apparatus—Self-Defense—which consisted, as opposed to the 2014 Maidan, of a limited number of staff with a police or military background hired by the Orange Coalition and directly subordinated to it. It was only playing internal security functions.

As a result, the whole sit-in resembled a music festival with a cheery atmosphere: apart from ruble-making speeches and collective prayers, many of the famous post-Soviet rock- and pop-bands played there. The public was granted places in tents and free food (McFaul, 2007; Wilson, 2005, p. 126). Thus, there was no need to create an independent network of bottom-up NGOs that would collect and deliver essential goods to the protesters, and the hierarchy was not alternated.

Most importantly, Yuschenko had proven himself to be able to control the protesters. Every step and every event were carefully pre-planned and were constantly under control (Homenko, 2014). During most of the time, protesters were surrounding the government buildings. However, at a certain point, Timoshenko, together with the radical wings of the Pora movement, carried out a plan of seizing the building by force, hoping that the security would not use fore. Yuschenko had enough authority to prevent them from doing so (McFaul, 2007, p. 65).

To sum up, the organization of the Maidan 2004 had a perfectly vertical hierarchy where everything was subordinated to a single leader throughout the organizational capacities—that is, cadres, money, offices, resources—of political parties. No alternative centers of power existed, and the protest remained completely controlled and nonviolent.

5.4.2. The organizational structure of the opposition in 2014

As Way (2014, p. 38) has pointed out, "much of the organization behind the Euromaidan emerged spontaneously *during* the crisis … the process involved a good deal of chaos." Although it had three established opposition parties in its basis, none of their leaders were authoritative during the protests. Many of them were perceived somewhat alien to the spontaneous movements; there were countless occasions when MPs were booed by the crowd.

The leaders of the three main opposition political parties were somehow associated with the protesters and therefore despised (Homenko, 2014). They, however, enjoyed a certain degree of control over what were the executive bodies of the Maidan.

The organizational core of the protest and most of its financing (see below) consisted of the alliance of three opposition parties that sought to unite against Yanukovitch during the 2015 elections. The largest party in this alliance was the beheaded Yulia Timishenko`s Fatherland (Ukr. Батькивщина) (see below on democratic backslide in 2010). It was led by Arsenii Yatsenuk substituting the arrested leader and had almost 25% of the votes and the (later destroyed) plurality of seats in the parliament after the 2012 elections. However, at the time of the Euromaidan, its popularity was fading, and later, during the 2014 elections, it only achieved 5.4% of the votes. On the other hand, the UDAR[46] (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms), led by an ex-boxer Vitalii Klitchko, which was created in 2005, had about 10,000 members and later achieved 13% of the votes within a big alliance. Finally, it was accompanied by Tiagnibok`s Freedom (Ukr. Свобода) that had twenty thousand members and later achieved as few as 1.7% of the votes that I describe below in the text.

The Euromaidan had its own centralized decision-making body (see Figure 1). It was called the Maidan Council[47] (Rus. Рада Всеукраинского Объединения «Майдан»). The Council was building on the alliance of political parties accompanied by the influential leaders of the Maidan and had about fifty members. As Arsen Avakov said in his interview, "you need to represent at least 100 people to be in the Council" (Gordon, 2014a). This Council was somewhat a board. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the Council appointed the members of the headquarters of the National Resistance (Rus. Штаб Национального Сопротивления), commandants, and gave orders to the headquarters. The headquarters was somehow an executive body responsible both for street fights and for logistical support. Therefore, its commandants were divided between the Chief Commandant (Ukr. Комендант Наметового Містечка) who was also a commander of the Self-Defense of Maidan (Ukr. Самооборона Майдану), and those commandants responsible for the logistics. See ibid.) A certain number

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[46] Удар can be translated from Russian as "stroke."

[47] There were, however, numerous attempts at creating alternative bodies, each of them can be translated into English as Maidan Council: Рада Майдану, Громадяньска Рада Майдану, Громадяньский Сектор Майдану, Суспильна Рада Майдану. None of them, however, enjoyed any significant power. When I refer to *The* Maidan Council further in the text, I mean Рада Всеукраинского Объединения «Майдан».

of commandants represented opposition parties, and the others were elected directly. At the same time, the degree to which the Maidan Council actually controlled the situation was limited, to say the least (Homenko, 2014; Wilson, 2014).

The Self-Defense was organized in a fashion inspired by the Cossack armies. It consisted of forty-two Sotnias,[48] each having about 300 members rotating by shifts, among which about 100 were constantly present. Most of the *sotnias* were independent units organized in a bottom-up, somewhat feudal way. According to Arsen Avakov, the Maidan`s Commander did not have a right not appoint or change a *Sotnik*, the leader of *Sotnia*, because they were elected directly from below(Gordon, 2014a). This, however, contradicts my interview with one of the field commanders of the Maidan, who assured me that *Sotniks* of the inner perimeter were dependent on and even paid by political parties. Each *Sotnia* represented a particular political orientation or city and was subordinated to the commander through its leader, *Sotnik*. *Sotnias* consisted of *Roi*, or Desiatok—i.e., ten members that also enjoyed relative autonomy.

On top of that, most of the sotnias of the Maidan on the frontiers, outside of the main perimeters, were not subordinated to the commander and independent from the entire system of Self-Defense. The four levels of barricades of the Gruschevskogo street were completely independent of the Maidan Council. This would play a significant role in attempts at negotiations (Gordon, 2014a; Author's interview with Maidan participant, 2020). At a certain point, the opposition leaders were allegedly even ready for direct sabotage to eliminate the Grushevskogo street people. Yet, they were sometimes coordinating their activity with the main Maidan`s commandment. Sotnias were not only in charge of street fights but would also serve as the inner militia that would detect Yanukovitch`s agents—titushki—to prevent kidnapping and maintain order. (Most of the information on the internal organization was retrieved from the interview of Arsen Avakov with Hromadanske TV 2014 (Gordon, 2014a) and from my own interview my own interview with the person who fought for sotnia on Grushevskogo street (*My own interview with Maidan participant*, 2020).

The main facilities of the Maidan were organized around its buildings. Everybody present on the Maidan could be fed: citizens donated fresh food that as many as 1,500 activists later cooked in the peak times (Ponomarev et al., 2018). The buildings had Wi-Fi provided by companies the DataTelecom and the NetAssist (*ibid.*). Those who volunteer for any of the

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[48] Сотня can be translated from Russian as "one hundred."

Maidan`s works could be housed: in the routine times, about 500 people in the tents, 2,000 people in the buildings, and the rest in the flats of citizens of Kyiv (Gordon, 2014a). The street fighters, members of Sotnia could also receive ammunition collected through donations. Since the government started to arrest and kidnap from hospitals those injured on the Maidan, it had to develop its own network of field hospitals called People`s Hospital (рус. Народный Госпиталь). To volunteer in the People`s Hospital, one had to have a medical education diploma (Ponomarev et al., 2018). The Maidan was surrounded by the perimeter of barricades, and the militia from Self-Defense would check any person entering the Maidan to avoid drunk and homeless people (ibid.) The daily costs of the Maidan were allegedly comprising US$70,000 (most of which was spent on food, ammunition, electricity, and medicine), with about three-quarters of the budget coming from political parties and one-quarter coming from donations collected right in the square (Gordon, 2014a).

As Diuk points out, "As the Maidan drew more residents and visitors, its daily routine took on a self-organizing character" (2014). A dense network of grassroots organizations accompanied the main organizational hierarchy of the Maidan. Those were coordinated with the Maidan`s main bodes but not subordinated to the Council. The AvtoMaidan, the voluntary organization of car owners who brought supplies to the Maidan and made car marches (one of which was to Mezhyrie, the main palace of Yanukovitch, that made him extremely angry), was the most influential. The EuromaidanSOS provided emergency support to the kidnapped and arrested activists. The logistical headquarters (Ukr. Логистичний Штаб) comprised of a hotline, the Dopomizhni Euromaidanu that was helping with the supply of goods, the Transfer Euromaidanu, and many more (see Ponomarev et al., 2018; Wilson, 2014).

The role of far-right organizations in the Euromaidan has been largely overestimated. Their neo-Nazi slogans and banners had been initially propelled by Russian TV Channels to discredit the protest and then widely discussed even within the academic debate (see, for instance, Byšok & Kochetkov, 2014; Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2014). These organizations were, however, tiny. For instance, the most notoriously known Right Sector (рус. Правый Сектор) had been created after the Maidan started. It consisted, in fact, of only 450 members (Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2014, p. 59), many of which had dubious connections with the Ukrainian president`s administrations (see, for instance, Wilson, 2014, p. 69).

On top of that, it was insignificant even during the street fights: it had only had one sotnia[49] out of 42, routinely under the command of Self-Defense, but also in many moments completely independent from the commandment (Author's interview with Maidan participant, 2020). The organization itself, of course, was always acting independently and was always radical. After the revolution, Right Sector earned only 1.7% of the votes together with the Svoboda during the 2014 elections (Szajkowski, 2005). The right-wing Svoboda headed by Oleg Tyahnibok, way less radical and more influential, instead resembled the so-called challenger parties of the West. It was created in the 1990s and had recently experienced its first and last sudden electoral success in 2012, enjoying thirty-six seats out of 450 in the parliament (ibid.). It is hard to measure its influence during the Maidan because it did not have its distinct sotnia but had many commandants and even council members. This influence, again, faded away with the electoral fiasco of 2014.

The Euromaidan emerged in a bottom-up way and was organized as a network that was not subordinated to anyone. Although the Maidan Council had its own hierarchical structure (see Figure 5.1), it emerged later, its functions were always paralleled, and it was surrounded by numerous completely independent organizations. The logistical functions were supplemented with the newborn bottom-up organizations such as the AvtoMaidan and the MaidanSOS that were completely autonomous from the Council. The security functions were supplemented by many independent sotnias outside the main perimeter and organizations such as Right Sector. That is why no one had veto power over the Euromaidan.

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[49] That later divided into two parts.

Figure 5.1. The organizational structure of the the Euromaidan 2014 protest movement.

Organizations in figures with dotted fill are not subordinated to the commandment

The Council of All-Ukrainian Alliance "Maidan
(Рада Всеукраинского Объединения «Майдан»)

A collective decision-making body that comprises of party members and figures that are influential on the Maidan; works as a board/ parliament. Has 50 members.

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The headquarters National Resistance

(rus. Штаб Национального Сопротивления)
A small executive body selected by- and subordinated to The Council. Chaired by Alexander Turchinov. Consists of Commandants, apart from them, Averchenko, Avakov, Pashinski and about 5 more people.

⇩   ⇩

The City Commandant, or The Chief Commandant

(ukr. Комендант Наметового Містечка, or Главный Комендант)

Most of the time – Andrey Parubii.
Is a commander of Self-Defense (rus. Самооборона Майдана), in charge of any street fight action, and also for the solution of "political" questions, conflicts, etc. Not responsible for the logistics.

Commandants from Parties
Commandants of Buildings

Responsible for the logistical issues: food supplies, medical treatment, housing, etc.

Facilities
(mostly in the buildings)

Offices of commandants and MPs
Centre for donations (ingredients for food, new clothes, phones, etc.)
Kitchen
Sleeping space for volunteers (mostly in the buildings)
People`s hospital (rus. Народный Госпиталь)
IT facilities – Wi-Fi, phone chargers, etc.

Sotnia – about 300 people

Desiatok, or Roi – about 10 people

Independent sotnias outside of the main perimeter

Avtomaidan; MaidanSoS; Right Sector

5.5.   The processes leading to successful and failed negotiations Ukraine 2004

The story of the Ukrainian decade of instability started with the authoritarian aspirations of Leonid Kuchma, who used to be the president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2005. He could not participate in the 2004 presidential elections because he had already finished his second term.

Kuchma's power was undermined by a constant economic decay of the 1990s, several economic crises, and the protest campaign "Ukraine without Kuchma" of 2001. Therefore, changing the constitution became a too risky option for him. Kuchma`s initial plan was to transform Ukraine into a parliamentary republic with a president appointed by the parliament, giving him two more years in the presidency (Kuzio, 2005, p. 90). After failing to do so, Kuchma decided to find an heir who could represent his winning coalition. He chose Victor Yanukovitch, the prime minister during the last two years of Kuchma`s rule, and had ruled the Donetsk region from 1996. However, this choice was questionable, and the reasons invoked for this choice vary.[50]

Victor Yanukovich was a weak public figure. First, he had a criminal past: he had to publicly admit having served two terms in prison in the past, one in 1968, at the age of 17.[51] Second, Yanukovitch was educated as a car mechanic, even though he formally had his distance

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[50] Some say he could rule behind Yanukovitch`s back while others even claim that Yanukovitch won a corruption "auction" for the position of Kuchma`s heir (Zygar, 2015, p. 186). In addition, when the possible heirs were allegedly going to Moscow to be chosen or declined by Putin, Yanukovitch was the least bad candidate for Putin compared to the governor of the eastern city of Kharkiv and the head of presidential administration Vladimir Litvin (ibid.).

[51] There is a widespread anecdote that he was stealing expensive fur hats fashionable at the time taking advantage of a combination of his tall height and low doors of the toilets at a railway station (Danilov, 2015, p. 238). Anyways, he was accused of robbing Mr. Soloviev together with members of a "Pivnovka" mafia clan and was jailed for two years, after that he was granted parole. Having spent less than one year free, he was jailed for the second time for two years for beating a person (Gorina, 2005). There were, however, many more accusations (for instance, rape in 1970 and corruption with four years in prison in 1977). However, these were unproven and contradictory because the evidence and the papers were removed later (Leschenko, 2010).

learning higher education at the age of 30[52] [53]. This was impossible to hide in his public appearance.

5.5.1. The events of 2004

Presidential elections were held in two rounds, on the 31st of October 2004 and the 21st of November 2004. However, the incumbent`s heir Yanukovitch was blamed for using massive electoral fraud and for an attempt to poison his opponent Yuschenko that happened before the elections on the 5th of September 2004 ("RBC," 2005b), which eventually provoked a popular mobilization.

In the first round, Yanukovitch had to compete with several opposition candidates that were not consolidated. As a result, he obtained only 39.3% of the votes while his competitor Yushchenko took 40%, resulting in a second round.

Opposition forces knew that Kuchma and Yanukovitch, having low public support but enjoying control over the state apparatus, would use electoral fraud, and they were preparing long in advance. The period before the electoral commission announced the results was already contentious: both sides declared exit polls to be predicting their victory. The difference lies in methodologies—the pro-Yuschenko KMIS and the Razumkov Centre used more anonymous survey techniques than the pro-government SOCIS and thus predicted more votes for rival Yuschenko (McFaul, 2007, p. 60). The next day after the second round of elections, on the 22nd of November, the electoral commission announced the preliminary victory of Yanukovitch. According to the official results, Yanukovitch achieved 49,4% of the votes, while his opponent—46.7%.

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[52] This implies, given the overall crisis of higher education in the post-Soviet space at the time, that he hardly visited his school more than twice.

[53] Following a widespread tradition of post-Soviet elites, he had a fake doctoral degree in economics and a fake professor position. While being rather a norm for most of the state officials, this degree peculiarly contrasted with his personality as he was always making grammar and spelling mistakes during his speeches. Moreover, he became especially enfamous for writing a word "proffesor[проффесор]" in his statement for the 2004 presidential elections and then claiming it was proper Ukrainian spelling (Neftegaz, 2020). Since then, "proffesor" became his popular nickname and even became widely used as a label for any low-educated politician throughout post-Soviet space.

Numerous electoral observers, NGOs, Ukrainian MPs, and Western officials declared the victory of Yanukovitch to be a mere result of electoral fraud. Nevertheless, Russia and some other CIS countries congratulated Yanukovitch on his victory even before the official results were announced. The stalemate led to a widespread protest mobilization in the capital of Ukraine with 200,000 people on the streets in the beginning, on 22nd of November 2004, and reached up to as many as one million and a half on 27th of November, which constitutes more than 2.5% of the Ukrainian population and almost 40% of the population of Kyiv (Kuzio, 2005, p. 93; McFaul, 2007, p. 65). This number of protesters was shocking and unexpected to everyone. Although this text mostly concentrates on organizations and leaders, the number of people in the streets was the deal-breaker. This was the factor that enacted the potential organizational capacity of opposition parties, and this was the main factor causing elite negotiations that I describe later in the text.

However, the coercive apparatus available to Yanukovitch and Kuchma was far from those of grim dictatorships of the first part of the past century. The Ukrainian regime was what Levitsky and Way (2010a, pp. 214–215) would later call competitive authoritarianism. Although the physical means of repressions were available, they were never openly used. The elections were competitive, i.e., it was impossible to simply ban the opponent from participating; fraud was used in a limited way. Thanks to the presence of some free media in the country, both killings and fraud would often become known immediately, thus causing street protests and pressure from the West when used. For instance, the single secret killing of Georgi Gongadze in 2001 resulted in a massive protest campaign.[54]

The members of the winning coalition of Yanukovitch started to hesitate half a year before the elections and to dissolve openly as he was making wrong steps and as the numbers of people on the streets were skyrocketing. Yanukovitch was a choice that was quite convenient for Kuchma himself but awkward and unsafe for Kuchma`s winning coalition. As Kuzio mentions,

> The pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority began to fall apart during the April
> 2004 … moderates in the pro-Kuchma camp openly flirted with Yushchenko.
> The People`s Democratic Party was openly in favor of Yushchenko, especially
> its Democratic Platform. Kuchma`s allies from his first term in office refused
> to back Yanukovitch. Kinakh`s Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs,

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[54] See "Ukraine without Kuchma."

which Kuchma had headed in 1993– 94 and which had helped him come to power, backed Yushchenko in round two" (Kuzio, 2005, p. 35).

The state institutions also started to show support to Yuschenko by the outbreak of the crisis on the 25th of November: SBU (former KGB) promised to protect pro-Yuschenko protesters using force ("PRAVDA," 2005) while the Supreme Court prohibited the electoral commission from declaring the results of elections ("RBC," 2005a). The staff of TV channels that used to be controlled by the government also started to defect and join the protests (McFaul, 2007, p. 63). Last but not least, the mayor of Kyiv, Oleksander Omelchenko, joined the protests after the 22nd of November, offering them "food, water, and sanitation." (ibid., p. 65)

These shifts made Yushchenko and Yanukovitch interdependent by the 25th of November, and none of them could unilaterally impose their decision on each other. In other words, the contention ended up in what is understood as a classic situation of pacting (O'Donnell et al., 1986; Rustow, 1970).

5.5.2. Time break of negotiations in Ukraine 2004

Before going into the details of the negotiations, it is worth noting that the Ukrainian political elites were used to the process of constant bargaining with opposition for at least two years preceding the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the pacting of the 2004-5 was a mere continuation of this trend. The elections in 2004 happened to be only an upshot of a political crisis caused by Kuchma`s authoritarian aspirations paired with his low levels of popularity. Being almost overthrown by the protest campaign "Ukraine without Kuchma" three years ago, having won the 2002 election only by a very narrow victory, he was constantly forced to compromise and negotiate with his parliamentary opposition. In 2003 Kuchma tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a change to the constitution that would allow him to stay in power beyond his limit of two terms[55]—at least for several years (see especially Kudelia, 2007, pp. 87–92).

The talks over the electoral crisis started almost immediately after the protests erupted, on the 26th of November in the Mariinski Palace. The negotiations between Kuchma, Yanukovitch, and Yuschenko were accompanied by many EU leaders and a representative of Russia (see

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[55] The offer is known as draft law 4105.

Table 5.2), who, however, was always reluctant and late for meetings (Wilson, 2005, p. 139). However, the first round of the Ukrainian "Round Table"[56] failed to lead to any compromise. Although the violence never erupted, its threat always remained acute during the following week—from both sides. When the negotiations began, the Orange protesters had already laid siege to several government buildings and successfully prevented state officials from entering. The protest, however, remained completely nonviolent. After the failure of the first round of negotiations, the main challenge for Yuschenko was to tame his radical ally Yulia Timoshenko and people on the streets who openly advocated for the escalation of the conflict (McFaul, 2007, p. 65). It was the organizational capacity of the Orange Coalition that helped tame these aspirations.

The government never used repression because the president of Ukraine, Kuchma, was to leave office anyway. Not only the radical parts of Kuchma`s administration were also the proponents for the forcible dismissal of protesters paired with the state of emergency. According to Kuzio (Kuzio, 2015, p. 74), the principal idea of lifting the state of emergency was supported by the emergency session of RNBO. The problem, however, was that Kuchma did not want to take responsibility for repressions—for a good reason. He would suffer the costs of repression and would increase the price of his exit while anyway giving away power to Yanukovitch. In the end, it was not a big difference for Kuchma whether Yanukovitch or Yuschenko would succeed him. In the parade of elite defections, his was the most crucial. At the same time, as prime minister, Yanukovitch did not want to (or prove unable to) take responsibility for the forceful dismissal on his own (ibid.). Even when Yanukovitch did try to order the police to disperse from the Maidan unilaterally, the police were tamed by the SBU and army, which openly supported the opposition (ibid.; Wilson, 2005, p. 136). What is most interesting, the SBU was allegedly acting with a direct Kuchma`s consent (Wilson, 2005, p. 137). On top of that, Putin, in his talks with Kuchma, was always advocating for the coercive solution.

The main successful round of negotiations took place on the 1st of December (see Table 5.2 for participants). As Kudelia argues, "[Kuchma] saw the solution in adopting the political reform, while Yushchenko insisted on changing the election law to prevent further fraud during the third round of elections" (2007, p. 96). The political reform meant transforming into a parliamentary republic, guaranteeing the pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority some remnants of his political power for two more years. The label "electoral reform" hid a simple bundle of

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[56] rus. Круглый Стол.

measures that would ensure the free and fair electoral procedure during the third round of elections.

Some demands have never worked and even put negotiations at risk. There was one more demand for Yanukovitch to be fired (officially, he was on vacation) from his prime minister position paired with the dismissal of the government that almost collapsed the whole round of talks (Kudelia, 2007, p. 96). Yuschenko also risked making a mistake, almost promising to disperse the crowds immediately, which he would hardly manage to do (Wilson, 2005, p. 140).

The last round of 7th of December was instead the re-negotiation of the earlier terms after the Supreme Court took Yuschenko`s side. It mostly fixed guarantees on vital interests of Kuchma and Yanukovitch. The secret part of the final agreement allegedly guaranteed Kuchma and Yanukovitch not to be prosecuted, which echoes with Kuchma`s appointee Sviatoslav Piskun taking the office of the chief prosecutor (Kudelia, 2007, p. 100). As a result, the regime was pressed to produce the third round of elections well-controlled by the electoral observers. As a result, Yuschenko won with 52% against 44% of the votes for his opponent.

To sum up, the peaceful resolution of the conflict was not very likely in 2004 because radicals were strong on both sides, and Russia opted for the escalation. The negotiated solution was at risk in many moments. Putin`s directives to Kuchma seemed to be ignored for the first time in post-Soviet history. Timoshenko has almost ordered to capture government buildings and was stopped by Yuschenko; Yuschenko himself was prevented from the violent solution by his party on the 8th of December. The riot police of Yanukovitch coming to disperse the Maidan were stopped by the army and secret service at the very last moment.

It was always organizations and institutions that prevented single actors from escalating the conflict. In the opposition camp, it was the Orange Coalition that first tamed Timoschenko`s aspirations for the violent action, and then it was the Our Ukraine that tamed Yuschenko. Then, it was the Ukrainian institutions that forced Kuchma to depart, which made repression useless for him. Thus, paradoxically, it was the Ukrainian secret service that stopped Yanukovitch from forceful dispersal of protests.

Despite being at risk many times, the final agreement was a *locus classicus* of a pacted transition. It excluded radicals, ensured a peaceful solution for a crisis, and exchanged power (which here takes a form of the "electoral reform") to the vital interests of Kuchma while agreeing on the new rules of the game—namely, a new 2004 parliamentary constitution.

Table 5.2. The participants of the negotiations in Ukraine on 26th of November, 1st, and 7th of December 2004.[57]

Incmumbent	Opposition	Russia	EU
Leonid Kuchma, the president of Ukraine	Victor Yushchenko, the rival presidential candidate, the leader of the Our Ukraine party and the Orange Coalition, ex-prime minister (1999-2001)	Boris Gryzlov, the speaker of the Russian Duma.	Alexander Kwasniewski, the president of Poland;
Victor Yanukovitch, the presidential candidate, the prime minister of Ukraine		Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, who was not physically present but allegedly rang several times[58]	Valdas Adamkus, the president of Lithuania,
Vladimir Litvin, the Speaker of the Parliament			
			Javier Solana, the European Union high representative for the common foreign and security policy
			Jan Kubish, the secretary-general of the OSCE

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[57] Source: Kudelia, 2007, p. 95.

[58] Source: Wislon, 2005, p. 140.

5.6.   The backslide of 2010

The rule of the Orange Coalition of Yuschenko and Timoshenko did not go as smoothly as it started. The alliance had fallen apart in less than one year (112ua, 2005), and Timoshenko was removed from her position of prime minister. Yuschenko`s health was undermined with dioxide, and he was spending much time in hospitals. The levels of corruption (including Yuschenko`s personal one) were continuing to skyrocket throughout the whole term of his rule.

Nor did the Orange government become more "pro-Western" or "anti-Russian" than any other post-Soviet government. In the USSR and later in the CIS, any newly elected leader of a republic had to pay a visit to Moscow. As any other leader in this position, unwilling to break this tradition, Yuschenko first went to Moscow (*Kremlin.ru,* 2005). Also, the new government of Yuschenko became immediately involved into corruption scandals with Moscow (see, for instance, Wilson, 2014, p. 46).

The political crisis started to pop up immediately after the split of the Orange Coalition allowed once overthrown Yanukovitch to challenge it. The parliamentary elections took place in 2006, and the parties of the Orange Coalition won. Although Yuschenko`s and Timoshchenko`s parties together would potentially have had a majority, they refused to ally with each other. Therefore, Timoshenko surprisingly allied with the party of Yanukovitch, who became a prime minister as a result. Since he had the resources to bribe state officials, at a certain point, his power increased that much that in 2007 Ukraine found itself again facing a stalemate between Yanukovitch as a prime minister and Yuschenko as a president. The crisis was solved by the parliamentary re-elections that eventually brought Timoshenko to the chair of prime minister. The economic crisis of 2008 made the ruling Orange Coalition thoroughly unpopular, and finally, they lost elections to Yanukovitch in 2010 (according to Wilson, 2014).

Yanukovitch`s coming to power in 2010 resulted in a classic democratic backsliding. Immediately after assuming office, Yanukovitch did a thing that Bermeo calls executive aggrandizement, "when elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one." First, he managed to bribe just enough parliament members to have a narrow majority. Later he captured the judiciary, the constitutional court, which is the key turning point according to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Then he got rid of his political opponents starting with putting Timoshenko in jail and proceeding with arresting dozens of her state officials (Wilson, 2014, p. 51). He did every necessary step of a democratic backslide.

Since the Ukrainian regime underwent a democratic backslide in 2010, by 2013, it was a non-democracy. Wintrobe`s (1998) understanding of a tinpot regime—i.e., a dictatorship that seeks to maximize the incumbent`s personal consumption rather than his political power—is the most precise description of what Ukraine was in 2014. Deriving from the other theoretical perspective, the regime once again returned to what Levitsky and Way (2010a) call "competitive authoritarianism."

5.7. Ukraine 2014

5.7.1. The events of 2014

Yanukovitch wanted to get re-elected for his second term in 2015, and since economic development was not a card to be played, he needed something else. Since 2010, Ukraine and the EU had been preparing the Association Agreement that was later hampered by the obvious democratic backslide and froze in 2011 when the opposition leader Yulia Timoshenko was jailed (see above). However, by the end of 2013, the EU had relaxed its stance, and the agreement seemed close to being signed, while Yanukovitch turned this issue into his presidential campaign. During the whole year, his TV channels[59] showed the Association with the EU to be virtually the best thing that could happen to Ukraine—and, of course, the main accomplishment of his presidential term. This would have allowed him to easily surpass what was left from the elections, especially since his opposition was beheaded.

Yanukovitch miscalculated the Russian pressure. Trying to prevent Ukraine from signing the agreement, Russia practically banned trade with Ukraine which constituted a major part of its income (Ulianova, 2013; Welle, 2013), while Yanukovitch was forced to negotiate with Putin. A week before the agreement was to be signed at the Vilnius Summit, on November 23, Yanukovitch canceled the deal (Stepovik, 2013).

Spontaneous protests started immediately (Wilson, 2014, p. 65), but their scale was relatively insignificant. Interestingly, the initial protests were not even supported by any remnants of the opposition organizations, not speaking of them organizing the protests. As Wilson argues, "Parliamentary leaders like Arseniy Yatsenyuk joined in with belated tweets but were far from setting the pace" (ibid., 68). Yanukovitch attempted for the first time to repress the small-scale and unknown student protest on the 30th of November 2013—and thus created an avalanche

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[59] Yanukovitch captured most of the media after coming to power in 2010 – see above.

he could hardly stop. More and more people would come to the protest, and the police would use more and violent methods. Reacting to the violent government actions, protesters radicalized. They built barricades and occupied government buildings: the Kyiv Administration building and Dom Profsoiuzov[60] on the 1st of December, and the October Palace on the 2nd of December (Ponomarev et al., 2018). In a week, most of the Ukrainian opposition forces started to join the initially spontaneous bottom-up protest. By the 8th of December 2013, the protest rally called the "Last chance" tried to gather as many as one million participants (Wilson 2014, p. 73). However, another massive attempt to disperse the protest with the police forces on December 11 failed.

Since then, the stalemate of the Euromaidan lasted for two months, with the number of people occupying the streets fading. The parliamentary opposition that initially tried to dissolve the government proved weak enough to be simply ignored. The regime used to kidnap the most active participants of the Maidan, and this tactic succeeded in increasing the costs of participation. At the moment the movement was radicalizing and marginalizing, Yanukovitch managed to trigger the protesters for the third time. On January 16, Yanukovitch tried to pass the so-called "dictatorial laws," a series of laws banning and criminalizing most protest activity in Ukraine (Sakwa, 2015, p. 262). Being passed by a blatant mock procedure that violated almost every Ukrainian rule, they provoked a massive public outburst, ending with huge street fights on Hruschevsky Street near the Maidan. By the 23rd of January 2014, [61]the protesters occupied more of the government buildingsand took control of some of the regions to the West of Ukraine.

By mid-February, the severity of violence was colossal. On the 18th of February, the opposition organized a march from Maidan Square toward the government building that demanded the government's resignation and the return of the 2004 constitution. The Maidan forces, armed with shields and firebombs, went beyond the barricades and assaulted the government buildings. The march managed to capture several buildings on Institutskaya Street, but the protesters had to retreat (Wilson, 2014, p. 87). The clashes between the police and the protesters left three dozen people dead (Sakwa, 2015, p. 279). That day and the two following, the

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[60] In English this means Trade Unions building, but in fact the building had nothing to do with actual trade unions at the moment.

[61] Namely – "Kiev" TV Chanel building on 21st of January 2014, Parliamentary library on 22nd of January 2014, on 24th of January – Agrarian Ministry building; on 26th of January – Ukrainian House; and some more the19th of February 19 (Ponomarev et al., 2018)

contention of street fights escalated, with many protesters being killed. The government responded with its most serious attempt to clear the streets called "Operation Boomerang" together with "Operation Surge" the same evening. It failed, leaving more than two dozen people dead (ibid.) and Dom Profsouzov, the logistical heart of the Maidan (see above), being burned down.

Throughout the entire February, and during the last day before the notorious shooting, 18th of February, there were numerous attempts at negotiations between the Ukrainian leader Yanukovitch and the parliamentary opposition leaders Yatsenuk, Tyahnibok, and Klitchko. Every attempt at these negotiations failed: "Yanukovitch was duplicitous, the parliamentary opposition did not speak for the Maidan" (Wilson, 2014, p. 86). Furthermore, as Wilson notes, "Every time an agreement was signed between the parliamentary parties and the president, the protesters ignored it or put on a show of force to demonstrate that they were not consulted" (Wilson, 2014, p. 86).

In addition, the situation was worsened with a political conflict between the independent sotnias that were occupying Grushevskogo street and the opposition leaders. First of all, having independent fighting units was a big problem not only for the regime but also for the political leaders of the Maidan. Every preliminary peace agreement between the opposition and Yanukovitch made before the 18th of February would include giving up Grushevskogo street in exchange for the release of political prisoners. Allegedly, the opposition leaders even tried to bribe the commanders of Grushevskogo to give up the barricades after failing to convince them to do so (*My interview with Maidan participant*, 2020).

The massacre described in the preface of this chapter happened the next day, February 19. A group of unidentified snipers started to shoot both at the riot police and the protesters, thus provoking a massive gunfight. Because Euromaidan supporters had already captured control over several regions to the West, it was armed, and so was Berkut, the riot police. Both sides started to use the firearms, as they thought, in response. Finally, the riot police started to retreat, and the protesters took control of some of the government buildings. The same night, the parliament forbade riot police to use force against protesters, and the conflict froze, leaving several hundred dead.

5.7.2. Time break of negotiations in Ukraine 2014

Right after the massacre, Ukrainian politicians started to prepare the most serious round of negotiations. The representatives of the EU arrived in Kyiv on the same night. Those were foreign ministers of Germany, Poland, and France: Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Radoslaw Sikorski, Laurent Fabius[62], accompanied by Eric Fournier, Director at the Continental Europe Department of the French Foreign Ministry (see names and affiliations of the participants in Table 5.3). They started preliminary talks with Yanukovitch right in the morning of the twentieth (Wilson, 2014).

The official negotiations started when the representatives of Russia Vladimir Lukin, the ex-ombudsman, and Mikhail Zurabov, the Russian ambassador in Ukraine, arrived on the 21st of February, 01:20 (ibid.). Fabius left negotiations the same night before the agreement was reached. The original version of the pact was prepared by the main pool of participants at 07:20 (Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014; Wilson, 2014).

The opposition was represented by the leaders of three parliamentary opposition parties—the AUUF, the AUUS, the UDAR. At the same time, the leaders of numerous smaller organizations played important roles. However, they were not embedded into the Maidan Council hierarchy, such as AvtoMaidan, Pravii Sector, or independent Sotnias outside of the main perimeter were not represented. The three leaders alone could, of course, hardly represent the massive Euromaidan movement. However, the negotiators did everything possible to use all the main organizational capacities of the Euromaidan. Later, after the first document was reached at 7 a.m., Yatsenuk, Klitchko, and Tyahnibok, accompanied by Western foreign ministers, went to the Council of Euromaidan, its main organizational body (see above). Therefore, the key decision was taken not entirely by the three leaders but also, or even mostly, by the Maidan Council with thirty-four votes for the agreement and two votes against it (Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014). It took Sikorski a great deal to convince members of the Maidan Council that an alternative solution did not exist and that violent repression was likely. After that, the pact was signed officially, according to different sources, on the 21st of February at 16:00 (Sakwa, 2015, p. 277), at 18:00 (*Grani*, 2014), or 18:45 (Wilson, 2014, p. 91). Police forces withdrew from the streets on the "evening" of the 21st of February (Wilson, 2014, p. 91).

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[62] Fabius is only mentioned by Wilson.

Table 5.3. The participants in negotiations in Ukraine from the evening of 20 February until 18:45 on February 21.[63]

Incumbent	Opposition	Russia	EU
Victor Yanukovitch, the president of Ukraine	Arsenii Yatsenuk (the AUUF or Batkivshchyna) later achieved 5.4% of the votes	Vladimir Lukin, ex-ombudsman (did not sign the pact claiming that he does not know whether Yanukovitch is still actually in power)	Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrey Kluev, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine	Vitalii Klitchko, the UDAR, 10,000 members and later achieved 13% of the votes within a big alliance	Mikhail Zurabov, Russian Ambassador to Ukraine. Left negotiations earlier "at night" (Wilson).	Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrey Portnov, president`s adviser	Tiagnibok (the AUUS, or the Svoboda) had 20,000 members and later achieved 1.7% of the votes.[64]		Laurent Fabius, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, "left later" (Wilson). Eric Fournier, Director at the Continental Europe Department of the French Foreign Ministry. Left negotiations earlier at night, probably simultaneously with Zurabov (Sakwa, UNIAN).

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[63] In this table, I only cited sources for the names that are not present everywhere in the literature, therefore, there is a potential contradiction. The other names are mentioned everywhere in the literature and press. With time estimation, I took the longest estimate offered by (2014, p. 91).

[64] The data for the party votes are taken from svoboda.org.ua 2016 and cvk.ov.ua 2014.

The substance of this pact was favorable to Yanukovitch, to say the least, because he did not have to resign immediately and could even participate in the presidential elections nine months later. Protesters had to empty the streets and give up firearms immediately, which also applied to the riot police. In exchange, the old 2004 constitution was to be implemented within two days (the one that emerged through negotiations and was not diminished by the changes made during the 2010 democratic backslide), and the new "national unity" government had to be formed within twelve days. A new constitution that would "balance presidential and parliamentary powers" was to be drafted before September 2014, and presidential elections were to be held immediately after that but no later than December 2014 with the new independent electoral commission[65] (Sakwa, 2015; *Полный Текст Соглашения Оппозиции и Януковича*, 2014).

To begin with, the deal was disproportionate to the extent that the opposition controlled the situation: at least three regions—Volyn, Lviv, and Ternopil—were captured by its protesters at the moment (Sakwa, 2015, p. 263). Moreover, the deal was also extremely risky for Euromaidan, which did not have any stable organization behind it. Accordingly, it could be possible that the protest would not manage to mobilize again if Yanukovitch started to defect from his part of the agreement. Furthermore, Yanukovitch had to participate in elections three months later anyway. The compromise, however, was risky for Yanukovitch as well because, at least according to Sikorski, his hardliner elites were carrying out detailed plans for a violent crackdown of protests (Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014), and such a pact was ruining these plans and upsetting hardliners thus increasing their probability to defect even further.

What undermined the pact was the horizontal network structure of the Euromaidan. Even though Yanukovitch cut a deal with the largest and the most influential organization of Euromaidan—that is, the Maidan Council—he could never cut a deal with the entire network of Euromaidan. The compromise that has satisfied the Council was unacceptable for people in the streets and most bottom-up organizations.

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[65] The problem is that the text of the pact was deleted from all Ukrainian official websites in March 2014 after it became detremental for the new government (Borisov, 2018, p. 494). Therefore, I need to rely on sources in the media.

The same evening, at 21:36 the 21st of February, one of the three leaders of the parliamentary opposition Vitalii Klitchko made a speech to Euromaidan[66] (*Ukraine 112*, 2014). He chose the wrong moment to pop up during the funeral procession of those who died two days before, during the 19th of February, right at the moment when the crowd was carrying the coffins. As a result, the mere fact of him negotiating "with the murderers" appeared wrong in front of the dead bodies. As a result, instantly, Klitchko was angrily booed by the crowd. After that, the footages show a Sotnia leader Vladimir Parasuk breaking his way to the stage and snatching the microphone from Klitchko`s hands (Espreso.TV, 2014; hromadske, 2014). First, he said that it is immoral to negotiate "with the criminals" and that the only thing they delegated to politicians was to make Yanukovitch resign, and they failed this task. Second, and most importantly, he gave an ultimatum that if politicians do not demand Yanukovitch to resign immediately, "they" (probably him and his *sontia*) were going to capture government buildings with arms[67]. His speech was cheered enthusiastically by the crowd. After that, Klitchko and others started to excuse unconvincingly for shaking hands and said that at the moment it was impossible to drive Yanukovitch out. This made the three leaders seem even worse. After that, several leaders were making speeches, and those calling for forbearance were always booed while those calling for the escalation were cheered.

On top of that, many organizations of the Maidan did not support the agreement even before the public uproar. Most importantly, Dmitrii Yarosh, the head of the Right Sector (Pravii Sector), one of the forty-two *sotnia*s of the Maidan (see above), made a speech at 20:55 that drastically declined any agreements and openly called for an armed fight. Likewise, AvtoMaidan (see above) refused to accept any conditions except for the resignation of Yanukovitch at 19:00 (Hadzhynov, 2014a, 2014b). Given only this evidence, it seems likely that neither the Maidan Council nor the opposition Troika would be able to tame the protests, especially without promising the resignation of Yanukovitch.

The widespread discourse in the literature suggests that Yanukovitch fled after Parasuk`s "rabble-rousing speech got a big cheer" (Sakwa, 2015, p. 280; Wilson, 2014, p. 280). No matter how smooth and movie-like this version of events appears, the evidence suggests a different

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[66] Richard Sakwa on page 279 claims that the three leaders made a speech together but in fact Yatsenuk and Tyahnibok were standing somewhere in the background of the stage.

[67] Later during his speech, he says that if Yanukovitch does not resign before 10:00 22nd of February "they" are going to capture government buildings.

sequence. The time code on the leaked footings from Yanukovitch`s CCTV cameras shows him physically leaving the building of his residence in Kyiv at 21:24, ten minutes *before* Klitchko was booed and Parasuk made his famous speech (Frolyak, 2017). Moreover, the same video shows his staff carrying a painting toward a truck around 15:24, even before the pact was officially signed (but after the agreement had been de facto made and approved by the Maidan Council).

Yanukovitch first fled to Kharkiv, the main city of eastern Ukraine, and tried to build a coalition of eastern political elites. However dangerous to Ukrainian territorial integrity this move could be, it failed. The next day, on the 22nd of February 2014, he was impeached by an illegal yet legitimate parliamentary procedure with 338 votes out of 450 (Wilson, 2014, p. 93). Then he went to Crimea and finally to Rostov, Russia, continuing to claim that he was the "lawfully elected president." The attempt at making a pacted transition failed.

Each side claims that the counterpart started to cheat first, and each position has its weak sides. The pro-Russian pro-Yanukovitch position is that the deal was cut but the opposition cheated from the very beginning. Yanukovitch himself says that he was surprised that after having an agreement with the high-level EU and Russian mediators, "they played [him] for a sucker"[68] (Frolyak, 2017). After the police started to leave squares following the government`s part of the agreement, the numerous opposition leaders made militant speeches and, failing Troika`s promise to leave the square, started, on the contrary, to conquer government buildings. Therefore, Yanukovitch had no choice but to flee. Russia used this position to claim that a "coup d`etat" had led to a new state, the territorial integrity of which would not be respected by Russia. It has numerous contradictions. The first one is timing: as I have shown above, Yanukovitch started to pack long before the crowd had booed the Troika, and the government buildings were occupied only after he departed from Kyiv. Second, neither the Maidan Council nor the opposition Troika is responsible for the crowd's reactions and those of certain branches of the Maidan, and one cannot know whether they would have managed to implement their part of the agreement had Yanukovitch stayed in Kyiv.

The pro-Maidan position (see Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014; Wilson, 2014) argues that the deal was cut even though it was definitely not the best for the opposition. Most of the organizational capacities of the Maidan, including the three parliamentary parties and the

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[68] My translation from the Russian: "Меня кинули как лоха!"

Maidan Council (34:2 votes), supported the deal and sent Klitchko to announce it to the Maidan. The mere fact that he was booed by the crowd and not supported by many radical organizations and *sotnia*s does not mean that the main body of the Maidan and most of its *sotnia*s would not follow it. Furthermore, there are claims that when he left his workplace, he had, therefore, automatically resigned from it. In other words, this position says that Yanukovitch ran because he overestimated the danger or had some other reasons. In Wilson`s (2014) words, he either fled because he "was a coward" or because he "finished packing." This explanation, however, overlooks the rational reasons for this escape: considering the level of violence, the independence of many Maidan`s fighting units, the number of elite defections, and the absence of his (and anyone else`s) control over the situation, it was actually dangerous for him to stay in the capital. Not to mention, leaving the capital does not mean that the agreement becomes invalid or that he resigns as president—he did not even flee the country.

Both positions are wrong because they seek the answer in *agency* when the problem lies in *the structure*. The two sides did make every step possible to achieve a negotiated solution for this crisis. Although one can speculate that Yanukovitch was slightly greedy and the Troika was slightly overconfident, they still did every action possible to implement the agreement they made: the Troika tried to calm the protesters down, while the government withdrew the police forces from the streets. The problem here was in the structure: the organizational capacity of the opposition here was so low that it is impossible to imagine any sequence of actions that *would* have led to a successful pacted transition.

Because of its immanent bottom-up network structure, Euromaidan did not have an organizational capacity to provide compliance with the results of any negotiations. It emerged spontaneously three months before as a constellation of various independent organizations and sotnias that later joined the protest and had numerous wings independent of each other. Although it managed to develop its own organizational body called the Maidan Council, it was instead responsible for logistics than an entity that could command the protesters like an army. Not only could not it tame radical wings such as the Right Sector, but also the moderate parts, such as AvtoMaidan, could openly deny its decisions. Even within its ranks, the Maidan`s Self-Defense had a Sotnik[69], who could break his way to the stage, speak independently and even give an ultimatum to the government—obviously without his commander Andrei Parubi (subordinated to the Maidan Council) allowing it. There was no person or organization with

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[69] A squad commander.

whom Yanukovitch could make a pact; the Maidan could not deliver a promise of any living person because no one controlled it. Here lies the answer to why Yanukovitch fled the country and why the negotiated exit while staying in the country—the solution that would satisfy most rank and file Maidan activists—was not an option for him. Nobody on Earth could guarantee Yanukovitch his safety if he gave up power and stayed in Kyiv because the city was full of armed *Sotnias* independent from the commandment. He started packing earlier while negotiating, and he fled when it became evident that he would lose power not because (or at least not only) he "was a coward" (Wilson, 2014, p. 93) but because "it was already clear that his life was in danger" (Sakwa, 2015, p. 211) and that there were at least four assassination attempts (ibid.)

Apart from the network structure, the Euromaidan did not have enough organizational capacity because most of its organizations were even younger than the Maidan itself. The Maidan Council was summoned one month after the Maidan started, on the 22nd of December (BBC, 2013); Pravii Sector was launched in December 2013 (Tarasenko, 2014); AvtoMaidan was created on 30th of November 2013 (Hodkovskii & Kozlovskaya, 2014). The only three organizations older than three years were the parliamentary political parties represented by Yatsenyk, Klitchko, and Tyahnibok, who joined the protests during the later stages, defecting from the Ukrainian parliamentary elite. The three proved themselves unable to control the Maidan`s actions and were mostly despised by the general protesters. On top of that, their parties did not have much public support. Two of them had earned only 5% of the votes during the 2014 elections, and the other had just 10% of the votes in a large coalition. The Maidan did not include any single large and influential organization that would be anything close to Poland's Solidarity or the Tunisian UGTT.

It is hard to say whether the intra-regime forces could protect Yanukovitch shall he stay in the capital. By the moment of the pact, different riot police units were surrendering one after another. Police completely withdrew from the streets during the day of negotiations, after they were in principle over—about 15:00. However, it remains uncertain whether this happened because Yanukovitch was sticking to his part of the pact or because of elite defections (according to Wilson 2014, p. 92). The army commandment was never ready to participate in the struggle (see, for instance, Braterskii, 2014).

At the same time, the elite Alpha group, 200 bodyguards, and *titushki*, the radical youth movement that was used to harass the protesters, remained loyal to Yanukovitch. Moreover,

serious reinforcements of riot police were allegedly approaching Kyiv (Wilson, 2014, p. 93) On top of that, an authoritative journalist Dmitry Gordon later argued that the leaked documents revealing that the ruling elites, together with the SBU (the Ukrainian secret service) were carrying out a plan to forcefully disperse the protesters by military force using firearms (Bic, 2014; Gordon, 2014b).

The reason for this situation can be attributed to a "political regime." However, this regime was created by a human being, and if there is any person to blame for the situation when nobody could guarantee Yanukovitch his physical safety, it was Yanukovitch himself. He was the one who commited the executive aggrandizement after being elected in 2010 (see above), and he was the one who beheaded his main rival party—Fatherland—putting its leader Timoshenko in jail in 2011. Therefore, instead of a coherent opposition movement united around one leader, in February 2014, he faced a group of three petty leaders who could hardly influence the protest. Speaking in theoretical terms, he solved his Dictators` Dilemma by choosing repression as a method of staying in power, thus increasing his price of exit and making the negotiated exit option impossible.

5.8. Conclusion.

The processes of negotiations over the two political crises in Ukraine share many commonalities. To begin with, the same actors and the same organizations played against each other. It was the alliance of the Our Ukraine of Yuschenko and with the Fatherland of Timoschenko paired with the Pora! movement that campaigned against Yanukovitch then— and it was the alliance of three parties the Fatherland of Timoschenko, the UDAR, the descendant of the Pora, and the radical newborn Freedom campaigning against Yanukovitch again. In both cases, the parties were in the heart of the Maidan`s organizational basis; in both cases, the Maidan was financed mainly by these political parties. Moreover, the direction of Russian influence and that of the EU was the same in these two cases. In both cases, the number of people on the streets was shocking, reaching almost half of the population of Kyiv. What is more, the negotiation rooms were packed with high-level EU representatives, whereas the Russian presence in the negotiations was rather a formality. Finally, in both cases, Russia preferred to directly command Ukrainian leaders to forcefully disperse protests, and in both cases, this never happened.

The key difference eventually led to the successful pact in 2004 and the collapse of negotiations in 2014. The Euromaidan 2014 movement was far more decentralized (if not to say chaotic) and had no control over the protesters. In contrast, the Maidan 2004 was organized in a strictly hierarchical way, and its organizers enjoyed complete control over the situation. First, the Maidan 2004 was prepared long in advance because the opposition Orange Coalition knew that Yanukovitch would rely on fraud. Hence, the protest movement had a hierarchical structure, was well-organized and centralized.

In contrast, the Euromaidan 2014 was caused by a series of mistakes by Yanukovitch and suddenly triggered by an unexpected violent crackdown of a small student protest—in other words, it came as a surprise for the political parties that joined late. Additionally, the Orange Coalition umbrella alliance of 2004 itself was extremely strong and supported by the bulk of political and economic elites. The party alliance of 2014, in contrast, was weakened and beheaded after the democratic backslide of 2010. Therefore, in 2014, many logistical functions were taken by independent bottom-up organizations because parties were not fast and strong enough to take the initiative. As a result, these bottom-up organizations were instead cooperating with- than subordinated to- the main party-based body of the movement. Thus, in 2014, the parties became nothing but a very important node in a network.

On top of that, the leaders of the Euromaidan did not have a monopoly on violence inside of its perimeter, to say nothing of the street fights on its frontiers and bottom-up Euromaidans in other cities of Ukraine. Furthermore, the structure of the Maidan Self-Defense force was decentralized: many of its fighting units, *sotnias*, were summoned in their regions of origins and were subordinated rather to their commander than to the commander of the Euromaidan. Likewise, the three *sotnia*s outside the main perimeter that participated in the most heated struggles openly did not subordinate to Self-Defense of Maidan. On top of that, the Maidan 2004 was only organized in the capital and was, therefore, easier to control. The Euromaidan in 2014 was sparkling in a bottom-up way in almost any significant city of Ukraine and were rarely directly subordinated to their counterparts from Kyiv.

In addition to the character of the movement, this pair of cases has two case-specific differences that go beyond my theoretical expectations: the scale of violence and the presence of a mediator. The conflict of 2014 was way more complicated to resolve by negotiations because it was way more escalated, and a strong mediator was missing in the negotiations. To begin

with, the contention of 2004 was perfectly nonviolent whereas, in 2014, the level of violence was unprecedented for the post-Soviet state, with the number of people killed approaching two thousand according to the GWF data set (Geddes et al., 2018b). However, most importantly, the 2004 Round Table included almost a perfect mediator—Leonid Kuchma, the president of Ukraine at the time. He was going to leave office anyway. His safety, after all, was more important for him than his heir, Yanukovitch, coming to power. At a certain point, his interests started to diverge from the ones of Yanukovitch, and he prevented him from escalating the conflict twice. The Round Table of 2014 did not include such a figure.

The Ukrainian story enriches the argument presented in Chapter 3. It shows that to have a capacity for credible commitment and a credible threat, merely being strong is not enough for a protest movement. The capacity for credible commitment and credible threat requires the opposition movement to have a somewhat old-fashioned hierarchical structure with uncontested leadership and a monopoly on violence. The old-fashioned organizations such as trade unions and, especially, the Catholic Church, are characterized by these vertical hierarchies. The Euromaidan movement of 2014, even though it was incredibly strong, lacked this hierarchy. The QCA model presented in Chapter 3 fails to explain this difference between the two Ukrainian cases because it takes into account only the presence of certain types of organizations. It does so mostly because it was impossible to include the hierarchical/horizontal structure of a movement into a large-n analysis. Knowing whether a particular movement has a vertical hierarchy requires qualitative methods and deep knowledge of a case. At the same time, the logic of the argument of this research remains the same in the Ukrainian pair: to make a pacted transition possible, the opposition should have a strong organizational capacity—that is, to be able for credible commitment credible threat. These capacities can be achieved in numerous ways,—and the way they were achieved in Ukraine in 2004 and not achieved in 2014 goes beyond my QCA model while following its logic.

The pair of Ukrainian cases illustrates very well the theories of Geddes et al. (2018b) and Linz and Stepan (1996a). It is hard to put the Ukrainian regimes into one of the regime types offered by them. However, if one observes their requirements for pacted transition separately, they prove to have worked precisely in a predicted direction. To begin with, it is the "organizational presence" (Linz & Stepan, 1996a) of "moderate opposition parties" that allowed both attempts at pacts to happen. It is the presence of strong opposition parties that enabled the first pact in 2004. The huge umbrella alliance tamed the aspirations for violent actions both from

Timoshenko on the 27th of November 2004 when she wanted to capture the government buildings and from Yuschenko on the 8th of December 2004 when he wanted to cancel the pact because Yanukovitch was not fired as prime minister. At the same time, it is "some degree of intra-elite pluralism" (Linz & Stepan, 1996a) that allowed for the elite defections in 2004 that enabled the protests and forced the incumbent to pact in the first place and then prevented Yanukovitch from repressing the protest. The weakness and fragmentation of the party system —and the existence of many newborn challenger parties—were key reasons for the failure of the pact in 2014. The three leaders of small and beheaded parties could not convince the decentralized network of a protest movement to follow the pact and could not ensure the safety of Yanukovitch once he steps down. Geddes's (2018b) argument that less personalistic and more party-led dictatorships are more likely to pact also supports this stance—these were always party structures that de-escalated conflict on both sides.

The theories do not stand, however, when the broad "regime type" categories such as "authoritarian" or "sultanistic" are applied. It was always rather a matter of a degree than of a kind that, combined with other factors, explains the success of negotiations in one case and failure in the other.

Conclusion

This dissertation has investigated the preconditions for pacts to succeed and has shown that a society needs to have a very strong opposition movement if a transition from authoritarian rule is to be successfully negotiated. The opposition can realize high organizational capacity in two different ways. The most intuitive way is, of course, to have established opposition parties. Such parties are frequently united with the Church. However, an opposition movement has a second, less obvious yet more frequently met and more effective way to realize significant organizational capacity—namely, drawing it from the economic realm. Transitions with a strong independent trade union that organizes the opposition forces and participates in negotiations always lead to democratic results, and these attempts at negotiations never fail. The participation of trade unions leads to this result because they are good at organizing negotiations with the authorities. When the authorities try to avoid or renege on their guarantees, trade unions can force them to comply by organizing strikes. Indeed, strikes as opposed to protests seem to be the most effective lever at unions' disposal in this regard. I have referred to this throughout the dissertation as the *capacity to make credible commitments and credible threats*. In line with the existing literature, it is expected that both pathways will be more likely in party dictatorships because those are normally more tolerant of the opposition (Geddes et al., 2018b; Linz & Stepan, 1996a; Wintrobe, 1998).

Trade unions frequently participate in pacted transitions because they are generally the most organized opposition force in industrial societies. When authoritarian regimes in industrial societies are consolidated, trade unions are co-opted into them. At the same time, they are very likely to preserve some autonomy. When an authoritarian regime collapses, the trade unions can turn against the dictator and lead the opposition movement.

The results of this dissertation strengthen the "working-class" democratization thesis. For Rueschemeyer and colleagues (1992), the participation of the working class has a democratizing effect, but only indirectly. Contrary to this view, Collier and Mahoney (1997) have claimed that there is little connection between the participation of the working class and the success of democratization. Against this backdrop, my own QCA analysis shows that the participation of a trade union (or "organized labor" in class terms) in a pacted transition has *a direct and substantial effect*. Moreover, my case study of the Tunisian Arab Spring events

supports this argument by showing that the participation of the UGTT was the most crucial reason for successful negotiations. The regression analysis finds a robust linear connection between the share of the population belonging to a trade union that participates in negotiations and the subsequent increase in the democracy score. This democratizing effect caused by a trade union might itself derive from structural social conditions. For example, countries with large trade unions might have a higher level of what Putnam (1994) calls social capital. However, even the proxy indicators of this variable are not available for the sample of my countries. Therefore, it was impossible to test this hypothesis. In one way, the results of this analysis support another argument of Collier (19 99), who claims that trade unions never act alone as agents of democratization. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.1), their presence always goes hand in hand with other opposition organizations.

This analysis offers two significant contributions, first lending support to the argument of Geddes and colleagues (2018a), and second, revealing an alternative pathway toward pacted transitions. Geddes and colleagues claim that party regimes are most likely to make pacts; my empirical analysis confirms this result but also shows that there is another way. Several countries underwent successful attempts at negotiations (e.g., Sudan in 1985) and democratized through pacts (e.g., Peru in 1980, Madagascar in 1992, Mali in 1991, and Benin in 1991) despite not being party regimes. Those cases made successful pacted transitions thanks to trade unions. Thus, there is no contradiction between the two explanations on a theoretical level: the regime's inherent institutionalization and a certain degree of internal pluralism can be indicated both by falling into a "party dictatorship" category and the presence of a trade union. Besides, the sets of countries with trade unions and party regimes overlap in eleven cases (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1).

On the empirical level, the presence of a strong organizational capacity of the opposition provides a more precise explanation than merely being a party regime. The two regimes that were more likely to undergo pacted transitions according to Geddes and colleagues' (2018a) theory—the military dictatorships in Egypt in 2011 and Myanmar in 1988—have, in fact, even experienced failed negotiation attempts, while successful negotiations in Taiwan in 1990 brought about very limited democratization (.06 points within three years). The organizational capacity of the opposition was low in all of these cases: in none of those, the trade unions, the Catholic Church, or established political parties were represented in negotiations.[70] On the

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[70] Even if they existed in a society in one or another form.

contrary, those attempts at negotiations where trade unions were present never collapsed and always led to democratization.

This thesis speaks against the original "elitist" understanding of pacted transitions (O'Donnell et al., 1986; Rosendorff, 2001) that treated negotiations as an exclusive elite exercise that can hardly be affected from the streets. It instead shows that, paradoxically, these exclusive elite pacts are the most successful and democratizing when the working-class representatives participate. Such pacts were only successful when accompanied by constant street pressure. Finally, this analysis has shown that a successful democratizing pacted transition demands many more prerequisites than the goodwill of political elites. Specifically, either the incumbent regime must be a party dictatorship, or the opposition's organizational capacity must be strong, which frequently derives from the efforts of a trade union or the Catholic Church.

The level of aggregation of my explanatory variables always seems to lie exclusively in the organizational realm. Indicators at a macro-structural level of aggregation[71]—such as culture or economic development—hardly explain much of the success of negotiations and further democratization. Nor do the variables that belong to the lower level of leadership (the "voluntaristic" level) explain much. The agents ' actions were the same in the four transitions studied closely in Chapters 3 and 4, yet the outcomes that followed these interactions differed.

The institutional level of aggregation (i.e., the political regime) also provides a plausible explanation. Nevertheless, that explanation is less focused than the one that deals with the slightly lower level of aggregation —namely, the social group. According to the results of the QCA analysis and the case study analysis, the best explanation lies at the *organizational level of aggregation*. To be even more nuanced, it belongs to the level of aggregation that is slightly lower than what can be called the "organizational capacity of the country's opposition" and is somewhat closer to the "organizational capacity of an opposition movement." These two are, of course, very close, but in some of the cases, the difference can explain the outcome. In many cases, the organizations present in a country do not necessarily participate in negotiations. For instance, influential Spanish trade unions were not included in the main Moncloa pact.

The comparison of the pair of two Ukrainian transitions described in Chapter 5 illustrates this difference. Although the totality of organizations and overall organizational capacity of the

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[71] I draw here on the terms used by Mahoney and Snyder (1999). For further discussion, see Chapter 1.

opposition in the country did not change much from the year 2004 to the year 2014, the organizational capacity of the two opposition movements varied drastically. The 2004 Maidan protests had a hierarchical structure that was controlled by a single leader, while the 2014 Euromaidan had a network structure that by definition could not be subordinated to anyone. As a result, the former was capable of negotiations while the latter was not.

Despite my acknowledged selection bias, which has led me to collect more known and successful cases while overlooking tacit and failed negotiation attempts, I believe that I have managed to show a clear difference between the two groups. I have partially solved this problem of selection bias by using QCA. I have collected all known attempts at pacted transitions from the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization and then compared the twenty-nine successful cases using the analysis of sufficiency. Because negative outcomes are less important for the analysis of sufficiency in QCA, it provided a clear venue for success stories.

On the other hand, having said this, I did not come up with a succinct recipe of a failed attempt at negotiating a pact. Some countries do not have sufficient conditions for a pact but nevertheless negotiate one (as Ukraine did in 2004). At the same time, these countries can also have failed negotiations. In these cases, the outcome is explained with tiny case-specific nuances. Speaking in QCA terms, the analysis did not reveal any set of conditions that are sufficient for a failed attempt at negotiations.

However, I have developed an intuition on what was common in failed negotiation attempts— *a zero-sum game*. This intuition comes from the case studies and what I learned about failed negotiation attempts while collecting the data. Obviously, none of these cases had an opposition movement with strong organizational capacity as a whole: simply speaking, no single leader (or at least a single collective body) could call the mass public and radical organizations to a ceasefire (or vise-versa). However, most importantly, in each of the failed cases, the two sides were playing a zero-sum game. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood showed no intention to share political power with its opponents, the SCAF, which was equally intransigent in this regard. The Ukrainian and Egyptian authoritarian leaders, Yanukovitch and Mubarak, were not prepared to accept an agreement that would force them to resign immediately. At the same time, in both countries, neither the opposition organizations nor the mass public would allow them to stay.

This dissertation has contributed to the existing literature in several ways. To begin with, it has systematized all the attempts at pacted transitions since 1974 and collected all the possible data on opposition organizations participating in those transitions. The created database can be used in further research. Most importantly, the dissertation has bridged the gap in the existing literature on pacted transitions concerning the requisite characteristics of the opposition. First, it has unpacked those features that lead to successful negotiations and democratization. Second, it has shown the mechanisms underlying this—namely, how the organizations participating in negotiations contributed to their successful completion. Third, it has introduced an actor that the existing literature on pacted transitions has tended to downplay — organized labor. Specifically, the thesis has shown that in many cases, it was the participation of trade unions that helped negotiate the most plausible pacted transitions. In addition, combining a unique data set with innovative methods based on Boolean algebra, my dissertation has confirmed the old finding of existing literature that pacted transitions are more likely to happen in party regimes. Finally, it has demonstrated that "elite-driven" pacted transitions are, in fact, most of the time fueled by constant street pressure.

There are fewer attempts at pacted transitions now than in the past, and they are becoming increasingly less likely to succeed when they are attempted. Besides, the typical composition of opposition actors is changing: the organizations that used to be the main drivers of pacted transitions are now disappearing. Before the end of the Cold War, rival trade unions were central to the successful completion of negotiations with autocratic elites. Nowadays, this phenomenon is fading: Tunisia in the years 2011-2013 is the only case of union-driven negotiations in the last two decades. The same holds for transitions that involved the Catholic Church. Since the year 2000, the Church has not participated in a single pacted transition. Modern autocrats are thwarting unionism and religious organizations, including the Catholic Church, preferring to tolerate authoritarian parliaments that co-opt puppet opposition parties. By reducing their risks of losing power to independent trade unions or the Church in this way, autocrats also diminish their chances of safe exit via peaceful pacted transitions. In addition, nowadays, the share of pacts that resolve contested elections is larger than it was two decades ago. Negotiations of this kind are less extraordinary and rule-setting by their nature. As a result, they tend to include a narrower circle of participants and bring about less change.

Moreover, the development of IT technologies now allows protests to be organized with less organizational structure than before (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), and political protests tend to

be more decentralized and spontaneous. In fact, the political crisis in Belarus in autumn 2020 has demonstrated that mass-scale protests can be organized and coordinated through messengers without any organizational resources whatsoever. At the same time, it is almost impossible to negotiate a pacted transition with a network of this kind. For authoritarian leaders like Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, this means that their chances of having a peaceful pacted transition and a prosperous post-tenure fate are decreasing. Having said this, I can anticipate that there will be fewer attempts at pacted transition in the future, and more of them will fail.

Against this backdrop, an important question — one this study has deliberately avoided, but that must be addressed — remains: *is it a pacted transition per se or its prerequisites that lead to democratic results*? In 1999, Geddes wrote that only one-third of transitions that occurred in the world since 1974 was successful. Out of my thirty-six instances of successful negotiations, only seven did not end up with democracy. Moreover, even among those seven, many cases can be argued to be somewhat deviant in their process of pacting (see the section on variation between pacted transitions in Chapter 2) and would be considered irrelevant if thresholds are raised. On the other hand, it might be the case that literally almost every pacted transition leads to democracy—more than that, pacted transitions "facilitate" or are "more likely" to lead to democratic results, which is a consensus view now. Of course, democratic gains can be surrendered in the following period, but the initial impulse they give is colossal. At the same time, preconditions for pacted transitions are very demanding. I have now narrowed down the scope of the pacted transitions of the Third Wave and understood their prerequisites. Also, it is now evident that these prerequisites can be approximated with a party regime for this next design since we do not know which organizations would participate in the pacts were they to happen. Now, we know enough to address the second part of the question.

One final question is of interest: *What is more important for democratization—starting in a party dictatorship being negotiated cooperatively?* Knowing the answer would enrich theoretical knowledge about authoritarian breakdowns and have significant implications for policymakers. For example, should the international community concentrate on moments of authoritarian breakdown or periods of peaceful authoritarian existence? Or should the opposition and the international community pursue a cooperated pacted transition in a highly personalistic dictatorship? Or, instead, would a pacted transition improve the situation even further in a party dictatorship context?

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Appendix

Tables

Table A2.1. The full database of forty-five attempts at pacts

Country	Year	Negotiations failed	Democratization (raw data)	Democratization (fuzzy value)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization. (raw)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization. (fuzzy value)	Trade union	The Catholic Church	Party/military dictatorship	Established Opposition Party (crisp)	The age of the oldest party	Share of population in the trade union
Albania	1992	0	0	0	.75	.53	0	1	0	0	2	2.46
Albania	1997	0	.05	.07	.75	.53	0	0	0	1	6	2.54
Argentina	1983	0	.57	1	1	.97	1	0	1	1	53	8.48
Bangladesh	1990	1	.10	.51	0	.01	0	0	0	1	41	1.10
Benin	1991	0	.16	.98	1	.97	1	1	0	1	17	5.82
Bolivia	1982	0	.36	1	1	.97	1	1	1	1	46	8.56
Brazil	1985	0	.29	1	1	.97	1	1	1	1	20	2.57
Bulgaria	1990	0	.31	1	1	.97	1	0	1	1	101	3.32
Chechoslovakia	1990	0	.49	1	1	.97	0	1	1	0	1	0
Comoros	2001	0	.15	.94	.75	.53	0	0	0	0	4	0
Congo DRC	1992	1	0	0	0	.01	0	1	0	0	2	0
Dominican Rep.	1978	0	.16	.98	1	.97	0	1	0	1	39	0
Ecuador	1979	0	.35	1	1	.97	1	0	1	1	110	3.34
Egypt	2013	1	.05	.06	0	.01	0	0	1	1	85	0

Country	Year	Negotiations failed	Democratization (raw data)	Democratization (fuzzy value)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization. (raw)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization. (fuzzy value)	Trade union	The Catholic Church	Party/military dictatorship	Established Opposition Party (crisp)	The age of the oldest party	Share of population in the trade union
Georgia	2003	0	.19	1	1	.97	0	0	0	0	2	0
Greece	1974	0	.64	1	1	.97	0	0	1	1	18	0
Hungary	1989	0	.52	1	1	.97	1	1	1	1	59	.47
Iran	1979	0	.02	.01	.75	.53	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	2000	1	.16	.97	.25	.05	0	1	0	1	18	0
Ivory Coast	2011	1	.03	.01	0	.01	0	0	0	1	24	0
Kenya	2008	0	.06	.07	.75	.53	0	0	0	0	3	0
Madagascar	1992	0	.22	1	1	.97	1	1	0	0	2	0
Malawi	1994	0	.28	1	1	.97	0	1	0	1	35	0
Mali	1991	0	.32	1	1	.97	1	0	0	1	28	5.50
Mongolia	1993	0	.42	1	1	.97	0	0	1	0	3	0
Myanmar	1988	1	0	0	0	.01	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nepal	2006	0	.21	1	.75	.53	0	0	0	1	12	0
Nepal	1990	0	.09	.38	.75	.53	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua	1990	0	.17	.98	1	.97	0	0	1	1	8	0
Peru	1980	0	.39	1	1	.97	1	0	0	1	56	4.03
Poland	1989	0	.57	1	1	.97	1	1	1	1	9	13.17
Slovenia	1990	0	.47	1	1	.97	1	1	1	0	1	0
South Africa	1994	0	.27	1	1	.97	0	0	1	1	82	2.04
South Korea	1987	0	.32	1	1	.97	1	1	1	1	41	3.55
Spain	1977	0	.65	1	1	.97	0	0	1	1	54	0
Sudan	1985	0	.09	.42	.75	.53	1	0	0	1	40	9.71

Country	Year	Negotiations failed	Democratization (raw data)	Democratization (fuzzy value)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization. (raw)	Combined success of negotiations and democratization. (fuzzy value)	Trade union	The Catholic Church	Party/military dictatorship	Established Opposition Party (crisp)	The age of the oldest party	Share of population in the trade union
Taiwan	1990	0	.06	.12	.75	.53	0	0	1	0	4	0
Togo	1991	1	.04	.03	0	.01	0	0	0	0	0	0
Togo	2006	1	.04	.02	0	.01	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tunisia	2011	0	.43	1	1	.97	1	0	1	1	68	4.80
Ukraine	2004	0	.17	.98	1	.97	0	0	0	0	3	0
Ukraine	2014	1	-.04	0	0	.01	0	0	0	1	23	0
Uruguay	1984	0	.70	1	1	.97	1	0	1	0	0	7.22
Yemen	2011	0	-.08	0	.75	.53	0	0	0	1	42	0
Zambia	1991	0	.15	.95	1	.97	1	1	1	1	27	4.85

Codebook

Data file 1. Attempts at pacts database.

country_name—the name of the country that experiences an attempt at negotiations. Text variable.

year—year of the negotiations, or the last round of negotiations. This may vary from the other databases that conventionally use the date of the first elections. *FAILED*—dummy variable, indicating whether the negotiations collapsed in the initial stages. If the negotiations collapse because of either the incumbent or the opposition not holding their promises, the case is coded as 1, *failed pact.* If the negotiations do not collapse, regardless of whether they ended up with democratization or not, the case is coded as 0.

DEM—dummy variable, showing whether the negotiations ended up with democratization. Democratization is operationalized in a very undemanding way as an increase in the level of democracy by at least 10% in the three years following the negotiations. The level of democracy is operationalized as a Liberal Democracy index by V-Dem. It has a scale of 0 to 1, and therefore the increase by.1 means that the the level of democracy has increased by 10%. Dummy. (Numerical version of this variable is called *v2x_libdem_change*)

TU—Dummy, which indicates whether a trade union participates in negotiations.

The Catholic Church—A dummy variable that indicates whether *The Catholic Church* participates in negotiations.

PARTY—The initial regime is a party or a military dictatorship (deriving from the GWF database (see GWF variable)

org_votes_sum—the sum of the votes earned by all opposition parties present in negotiations. This data is mostly taken from the 'Parties of the World' encyclopedia(Sagar, 2009; Szajkowski, 2005; Day, 2002; Day et al., 1996; Day & Degenhardt, 1984; Day & Degenhardts, 1980)), otherwise, the source is mentioned in the *membership_source* variable. Numeric.

oldest_org_age—the age of the oldest organization that participates in the pact and represents opposition at the moment of negotiations. Data were taken from the two above-mentioned encyclopedias. Numerical.

umbrella_alliance– A dummy variable that indicates whether most of the organizations in the movement belong to the same alliance. If there are many competing alliances, the case is coded as 0, because this variable gets a value of 1 for the unity of the opposition.

org_membershipthousandsTUofth—the membership of a trade union that participated in the negotiations. This data is mostly taken from the 'Trade Unions of the World' encyclopedia

(Harper, 1987), otherwise, the source is mentioned in the *membership_source* variable. Numeric.

TUshare100—the percentage of the country's population involved in a trade union that participates in negotiations (*org_membershipthousandsTUofth* divided by population). Numerical, from 0 to 100.

v2x_libdem_change—numerical version of *change* variable, indicates the difference between the country's liberal democracy score at the moment of negotiations and three years after it.

camp_size_num—a (very) loose approximation of the number of protesters on the streets. An encoded, 'enumerated' version of the *camp_size* variable from the NAVCO 2.0 database. *Camp_size* was coded into 5 categories, where 1 means less than 1,000 people on the streets and 5 means over 1,000,000 people on the streets during the political campaign. Numbered to calculate the *protest_share* variable. Numerical 1000 to 1,000,000.

protest_share—the approximate share of the population that participated in the protest. Constitutes of the *camp_size_num* variable divided by the country's population. Numerical.

GDP_WB—GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), the source is Word Bank.

population—population of the country, the source is Word Bank.

v2x_cspart—Civil society participation index (from V-Dem v7.1 database).

v2csantimv_osp (V-Dem v7.1)—CSO anti-system movement; from V-Dem v7.1 database. Numeric, 0 to 4 scale.

org_names—names of the organizations that participate in negotiations. Kept for data replicability. It does not include organizations that were important in a revolution but were not participating in negotiations. Text variable.

membership_source—the source from which the membership of a trade union for the 'org_membershipthousandsTUofth' variable is collected. By default, it is the Trade Unions of the World encyclopedia, and if the source varies, it is here.

source_numparticipants—a numeric variable that indicates the number of participants of strikes or protests that are evoked directly by the organization represented in the pact. This variable has too many missing observations to be included in the analysis.

source_numparticipants– the text variable indicating the source that has been used for the org_events variable.

Data file 2. Text descriptions.

A supplementary collection of fifty brief drafts of anecdotal descriptions of the processes of negotiations. Includes sources. Normally, the files briefly sum up the process of political crisis and dig into the negotiations; they sometimes include massive citations of what has happened. Please note that these files serve rather the replication purpose and also helped me to return to cases to double-check or add variables. They do not intend to have encyclopaedical significance.

Robustness Tests and Assumptions.

Initially, in the statement on the necessity of the absence of a trade union for the failure of an attempt at pact, the result was slightly hampered by one outlier—namely, Bangladesh 1990, which might have had a trade union involved in negotiations. Yet, this country has been coded the database as a failed attempt at pact because several academic sources cite the *rumors* that the *secret* negotiations took place. Moreover, any reliable information on the presence or absence of a trade union was not available, none of the academic sources mentions trade unions specifically.

The robustness tests that separate the cases between those before and after the Cold War did not show a major difference. The results of the model are more or less the same. The only difference is that there are no cases with Trade Unions after 1993 except for Tunisia 2011even though its presence affects the outcome in the same direction. There are more failed attempts at pacts and fewer democratizations after 1993 (due to the rise of competitive authoritarianism with its inherent electoral revolutions and probably—due to selection bias). The way other conditions affect the outcome also did not change.

More variables—a share of party`s votes, the presence of an umbrella alliance, a share of the country`s population involved in the street protests—were initially collected and tested, but they have shown virtually no connection with the outcomes and therefore were excluded from the final version of this chapter.

The reasonable changes in calibration of the democratization variable and especially in the age of the organization variable do not change the model because both variables that require calibration have two peaks. With the extent of democratization, one country was close to the borderline of partial inclusion—that is, Sudan 1985. Within three years after the transition, it had an increase of democracy of.09, whereas my cutoff line was deliberately set at.10 to exclude it. The reason is that four years after the transition, the military faction made a coup d`etat and has thus undermined a fragile democratization and brought Sudan back to autocracy. In the analysis of sufficiency for the combined outcome of successful negotiations and further democratization, I used a somewhat unusually low consistency score inclusion cutoff of.75, whereas Schneider and Wagemann suggest that "In general, consistency levels (well) above .75 are advisable" (2012, p. 279). If this number is raised to.76, this will exclude the truth table row with the cases of Benin 1999 and Sudan 1985. Those countries had trade unions, a Catholic Church, and established opposition parties in negotiations but nevertheless derived from personalistic regimes. I would not like to exclude this TT row because it illustrates my Pathway

II very well. The case of Benin 1999 is very typical: the very strong and well-organized opposition movement manages to peacefully negotiate the exit with an aging personalistic dictator. The decrease in consistency is caused by the unstable character of democratization in Sudan in 1985 that has problems with conditions, outcomes, and even inclusion. First, in terms of outcome, the young democracy was overthrown in 4 years (see the discussion one paragraph above). That case is also problematic in terms of conditions: professional and student unions dominated above the labor unions, and the latter were present and active only formally. On top of that, much is known about the negotiations within the opposition, and less is known about the negotiations between the alliance of the opposition and the ruling elites, which is on the borderline of my inclusion rules (see in Chapter 2). Therefore, the case is deliberately coded as successful negotiations without democratization and, thus, when analyzed in a combined variable, has a fuzzy value of.53, which is if not the most ambivalent value that could be assigned.

Nevertheless, raising the consistency score inclusion cutoff to.76 does not change the substance of the resulting solution formula much even though it makes it slightly more cumbersome (see Table A3.2) and sightly decreases the coverage (from.63 to.68). Without changing the interpretation substantively, it now pays less attention to the role of trade unions ascribing the cases with trade unions to "Party regime and Established Opposition Party" category instead. One should also note that the established opposition party was also present whenever the trade union was present. Finally, one must keep in mind that these changes are caused by the exclusion of the prototypical case of Benin 1999 and the potentially problematic case of Sudan 1985, where the military *coup d`etat* in 1989 might have not too much connection with the negotiations.

Raising the consistency score inclusion cutoff above.79 also does not put the entire argument at risk: substantively, it excludes the fourth solution formula from the model and decreases the coverage score by .174 (see Table A3.3). It would exclude the TT row with Greece 1974, Nicaragua 1990, South Africa 1994, Spain 1975, and Egypt 2013 because of the latter. All those cases underwent a transition from a party or a military dictatorship and had at least one established opposition party, and all of those are the well-known instances of pacted transitions. The case of a failed attempt at pact is Egypt in 2013 is investigated in a dedicated Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The case is different from the others in the same TT row because of a very radical, religious fundamentalist character of its established opposition party Muslim Brotherhood, to say nothing of an excessive amount of economic and political power in hands to the elites of its military regime.

Solutions	Pathway	Consistency	covS	covU	Covered cases
Trade union and no Catholic Church	I	.975	.221	.063	Mali 1991, Peru 1980, Uruguay 1984, Argentina 1983, Bulgaria 1990, Ecuador 1979, Tunisia 2011
Trade union and no Established Opposition party	I	.975	.095	.032	Uruguay 1984, Madagascar 1992, Slovenia 1990
The Catholic Church and Party regime	II	.975	.253	.032	Czechoslovakia 1990, Slovenia 1990, Bolivia 1982, Brazil 1985, Hungary 1989, Poland 1989, South Korea 1987, Zambia 1991
Party regime and Established opposition party	II	.910	.443	.127	Egypt 2013, Greece 1974, Nicaragua 1990, South Africa 1994, Spain 1975, *Argentina 1983, Bulgaria 1990, Ecuador 1979,* Tunisia 2011*, Bolivia 1982, Brazil 1985, Hungary 1989, Poland 1989, South Korea 1987, Zambia 1991*
Whole model		.929	.632		

Table A3.2: The parsimonious solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both success of negotiations and a democratic outcome with the inclusion cutoff.76. covS—coverage, covU—unique coverage, overlapping cases with trade unions and party regimes are marked with *italics*.

Solutions	Pathway	Consistency	covS	covU	Covered cases
Trade union and no Catholic Church	I	.975	.221	.190	Mali 1991, Peru 1980, Uruguay 1984, Argentina 1983, Bulgaria 1990, Ecuador 1979, Tunisia 2011
Trade union and no Established Opposition party	I	.975	.095	.032	Uruguay 1984, Madagascar 1992, Slovenia 1990
The Catholic Church and Party regime	II	.975	.253	.221	Chechoslovakia 1990, Slovenia 1990, Bolivia 1982, Brazil 1985, Hungary 1989, Poland 1989,South Korea 1987, Zambia 1991
Whole model		.975	.506		

Table A3.3: The parsimonious solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both success of negotiations and a democratic outcome with the inclusion cutoff. covS—coverage, covU—unique coverage, overlapping cases with trade unions and party regimes are marked with *italics*. `