

## D2.6 Report on the workshop on trends and patterns of EU multi-level governance

WP2 EU modes of governance

Grant Agreement n° 822735, Research and Innovation Action



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement n° 822735. This document reflects only the author's view and the Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

# TRIGGER

## Trends in Global Governance and Europe's Role

<b>Deliverable number:</b> 2.6	
<b>Deliverable name:</b>	D2.6 Report on the workshop on trends and patterns of EU multi-level governance
<b>WP / WP number:</b>	WP2 EU modes of governance
<b>Delivery due date:</b>	30.06.20
<b>Actual date of submission:</b>	30.06.21
<b>Dissemination level:</b>	Public
<b>Lead beneficiary:</b>	CEPS
<b>Contributor(s):</b>	Moritz Laurer, Hieu Nguyen, Gaby Umbach
<b>Reviewers(s):</b>	Chiara Del Giovane

**Changes with respect to the DoA**

Not applicable

**Dissemination and uptake**

Public

**Evidence of accomplishment**

Report

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### 1. Introduction

Global and EU governance is disrupted by shifts in global power constellations, new technologies, the erosion of liberal democracies and the transformation of economic systems. In order to investigate these shifts in global governance, TRIGGER organised a workshop together with ESPAS (European Strategy and Policy Analysis System) at the European University Institute's 2021 State of the Union Conference on 06 May 2021. The workshop on "Trends and Shifts in Global Governance and the Role of the EU" created a rich discussion on the many challenges the EU faces in times of crises, while also pointing out its potential to overcome these challenges.

The workshop was moderated by Prof Dr Gaby Umbach, TRIGGER lead for EUI, director of GlobalStat and part-time professor at Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the EUI. The discussants were:


- Jim Cloos, Secretary-General TEPSA | former Deputy Director-General, General and Institutional Policy, General Secretariat of the EU Council of Ministers, Brussels (remote)
- Dr Florence Gaub, Deputy Director, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris (remote)
- Prof Dr Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and Head of Global Governance, Regulation, Innovation and the Digital Economy, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels | Part-time Professor, EUI-STG (remote)
- Anthony Teasdale, Director General, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels (remote)

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic the workshop was organised via an interactive online platform (Swapcard), which enabled a group of participants to interact with the speakers via a chat, Q&A functionality and a polling system. 107 participants joined the workshop via the online platform. In addition, a Youtube live stream was provided, which an estimated 10.000 viewers followed across the State of the Union event. The full live stream is freely available online.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [youtu.be/\\_cvsnrVZdpA](https://youtu.be/_cvsnrVZdpA) (starting at 4:22:10)

Figure 1: Workshop event advertisement



## 2. Workshop Summary Protocol

The online session was structured along several key questions which were posed to the discussants by the TRIGGER moderator. The text below provides a summary protocol of the key arguments and insights shared by each speaker throughout the online session. Given the COVID-19 pandemic, the workshop could unfortunately not be organized in person, but the organizing team captured the participant’s feedback via several polls and the Q&A and chat functionality.

Figure 2: Screenshot of the workshop's online webinar format



### 2.1. Introduction by Gaby Umbach

The erosion of the global climate change regime, the internationally-agreed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the peaceful use of nuclear power being at risk, burden-sharing conflicts in

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international security politics and new global trade wars – all of these developments testify to the contestation of global governance and the acceleration of the renationalisation of politics. Both go hand in hand with shifts in global power constellations, disruptive technologies, the erosion of liberal democracies and the transformation of economic systems. In short, the world is on its way towards a new geo-political, geo-economic and geo-technological order and it seems unclear, which role the EU will play in it. Based on TRIGGER and ESPAS research, this panel will discuss the impact of trends and shifts in global governance and the EU's potential to act as a global player.

### 2.2. Discussant Jim Cloos

#### 2.2.1. Questions on the EU's Strategic Autonomy

Mr. Cloos broke down his intervention into several key questions on the EU's Strategic Autonomy:

Why is there a debate on Strategic Autonomy now? For the EU to survive in a brutal modern world, the EU, not only individual institutions, has to become a stronger global player, a geopolitical actor. This requires more Strategic Autonomy.

What is Strategic Autonomy about? It is about drawing the right lessons from the recent crises and the weaknesses they reveal, becoming more resilient, and more capable to act powerfully and autonomously. It's about the freedom to act and the freedom from dependence. But it is clearly not about protectionism, or autarchy for the biggest trading power in the world, or about attacking NATO.

What lessons can be drawn from the crisis? The crisis that hit does remind one of Dante's Inferno. Even the smallest sins are viciously punished, and we do have weaknesses. We practice strategic autonomy without being aware of it. The example of subprime and sovereign debt crisis revealed the imbalance between the economic and monetary part. They showed that the "no bailout" clause was too rigid, and the ECB's role needs to be adapted. Thus, the EU strengthened economic coordination, allowed the ECB to innovate and created the ESFS and the ESM to help countries in trouble. Migration threatened the loss of control of the EU's external borders. The answer was a conservative external policy, including a tough deal with Turkey, better control of the internal borders and the attempt at reforming the migration and asylum system. And last but not least, the COVID crisis with all the measures and a financial package of 1.8 trillion.

What does Strategic Autonomy entail? It is time to pass from a reactionary phase to a proactive one. For this, the EU needs a better understanding of the modern world. The EU is rightly proud of promoting multilateralism and values, and it should continue doing that. But the end of history is nowhere near. The EU needs to adopt to a world that is fierce, brutal and often hostile. It needs a reflection of its exact place on the global chessboard. Where is the EU between China and the United States? How is it going to relate to Turkey and Russia? What would the EU do in its

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relationship with the UK and its transatlantic relationship? The EU needs an honest assessment of the balance between interest and values to regain the capacity to look at all the angles of its relationships with third countries.

How can the EU strengthen its Strategic Autonomy across policies? Strategic Autonomy starts at home. What the EU needs is a thorough analysis of its strengths and weaknesses across major policy areas: climate change, digital Europe, single market, etc. The EU has regulatory power but with many flaws: the role of the euro, its trade capacity, and security and defense. The EU needs a better definition of its relation to NATO.

In conclusion, the present debate arose out of the necessity that Strategic Autonomy is a way to respond to crises and a complicated world. It is about freedom to act and freedom from overdependence. It's not about autarky, protectionism or anti-NATO. The EU has been more resilient than people thought, but it has adapted in a haphazard manner. The EU needs to come to a more proactive phase, develop a policy framework with more strategic thinking, a better analysis of our strengths and weaknesses, and potentially a fresh look at its governance. Finally, the discussant thinks all of this can be done within the present institutional framework without any major treaty reforms. He remains convinced that the EU has the capacity to survive and to reinvent itself.

### **2.2.2. Is resilience compatible with multilateralism? How does it link to strategic autonomy?**

Mr. Cloos doubts that the EU is being seen as an inspiring leader for people's values while the actual policies and cooperation seem to contradict these values. He agrees that the EU needs to be a model, but that's not enough. The EU, in his opinion, should also be a global actor with toughness or otherwise it is just "preaching in the desert".

Mr. Cloos continues to advocate for a "stronger" EU when he warns about the dream of multilateralism. If the EU can convince other actors to play the multilateral game, it will be ideal, but if some actors do not want to cooperate, the situation will be harsh. For him, the EU has been doing good under the American sphere to develop its economy, its values, to talk about human rights and about multilateralism. However, when the U.S. crumbles away on this fields, the EU has to emancipate and be more powerful to preserve its values.

## **2.3. Discussant Florence Gaub**

### **2.3.1. How has COVID changed the future of EU in global governance?**

The discussant argues that COVID-19 did not dramatically change the future of the EU in global governance. Even if there were changes, it would take more time to see how they are going to unfold. On the relationship with China, the EU is still in the middle ground. COVID-19 ripped the hopes and positive views of China apart. For example, the EU and China are recently struck when

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it comes to trade issues. China is being perceived as a potential opponent or already an opponent with different values and visions. China's behaviors during the pandemic were key for understanding this. Before, the relationship between China and EU seemed to have been friendly. However, since the pandemic the relationship will contain a certain level of hostility – albeit not to a similar extent as the relationship with Russia.

Ms. Gaub also takes the example of digitalization: before the COVID pandemic, the idea of promoting digital means has already begun. COVID created the boost for the digital reform, however, the reality is that only 30 percent of the working people were able to move online. Most of the working people do not work or do not have the capacity to work online. COVID has shown that the office is going to survive as the place where people meet. COVID clearly gave a push to digitalization, but also showed its limitations.

Ms. Gaub also argues that Europeans were confusing health care with health. The EU has the best health care system in the world and yet it does not deal well with COVID because of obesity, smoking, and lack of exercise. Thanks to the pandemic, people have understood that health is their own responsibility rather than something you can pay for. The discussant called for more responsibility at the EU level because the EU is not dealing with this issue at the moment.

However, the discussant sees changes in the topic of climate change when it is left, front and center to how people deal with the pandemic. Paris, Berlin, Bogota, San Francisco and many other cities became greener as a result of the pandemic because of the absence of restaurants, parks, etc. Awareness also became clear with lower level of meat consumption. Moreover, renewable energy got a push not just in Europe but also in Asia and in the U.S. Climate change is the key beneficiary of COVID, because while we are in crisis mode, we finally managed to engage with other crises.

### 2.3.2. Should the pandemic not make us better people? Can the EU put empathy on the list of its priorities and interests within global governance?

Ms. Gaub responded that the pandemic should perhaps have this effect, but probably will not. Because in a crisis, you will focus first on what's existential to you with a high level of protection. This can be observed clearly from the early days of the pandemic globally, and even in Europe. The instinct that when people asked for “bringing everybody home, bringing all our nationals home”, it is, in fact, harmful when you brought back a lot of people with COVID-19.

Ms. Gaub thinks that the space for empathy will come at the end of the crisis, when optimism comes back because the worst will be behind us. When the pressure is lifted, the Europeans can start thinking about empathy, not just amongst Europeans, but also towards others. However, Ms. Gaub stills argues that the important and natural thing to do now is to protect what is important to yourself first, the story of empathy can wait for later.

### 2.4. Discussant Anthony Teasdale

#### 2.4.1. How has COVID changed the expectations of the European governing system and of parliamentarism?

About eight to nine years ago, it was assumed that the world will experience more globalization and the advancement of the market. Individuals would be empowered, and this type of humanitarian way would lead to a greater prospect for liberal democracy with technology empowering the individuals and limiting the role of the states. Now, the environment is different with less positive and more threatening developments over time.

For Mr. Teasdale, the effect on the EU system by the crisis so far has been broadly positive. Of course, there have been some quite serious threats: the threat to free movement, the threat to the single market, the shutting down of competition policy, etc. But in other areas, we are witnessing good progress. There is a greater focus on the questions of risks, capabilities, and resilience. This focus will last and lead to better thinking about where Europe is going so that it is not just a zone of values but rather a zone of interests that needs defending and advancing.

However, parliamentarism is under pressure. The past year was a year in which executive power has grown. It is still not clear what the future holds for the parliamentary system at the moment, especially in an environment in which the state can unilaterally change things that people take for granted. This comes on top of things which have been fragilized in parliaments. In recent years, there has been a high turnover in parliamentary membership: 63 percent from the EP in last year's election with similarly low numbers in national parliaments. COVID has made parliaments look more like the parliaments of strangers, of people who cannot meet, cannot communicate, and cannot form political communities. This is one important part of liberal democracy which has been eroded.

The discussant argues that there are two different EU political systems at once. One is the policy-cycle EU system, which is more professional. It is based upon the notion that it does ex-post evaluations and then extensive evaluation. By this system, the EU defines what the added value of something is and gets it through the legislation process. This model highlights the power of the interaction between the EU institutions and the Commission with the control over the exclusive right of initiative. But there is also a crisis-driven EU model, which is the product of the so-called "European rescue of the nation state" to get the EU system in action to invoke a European-level response to empower nation states. This system does not rely upon impact assessments or implementation reports, it is a crisis response in which important decisions are made quickly with lasting effects.

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### **2.4.2. What is the relationship between the Brussels effect and democratic governance? Can EU regulatory power be utilized to induce democratization abroad?**

Mr. Teasdale points out the risk that once the Brussels effect is discovered or invented, its actual existence will diminish. Because a lot of people around the world who weren't previously consciously aware that they were de facto or de jure adopting EU technical standards will start seeing it as a political issue and are now sensitized to it. So the era of EU regulatory power in that sense has peaked and the recognition of the Brussels effect as a sort of time-lagged consequence of the assertion of that power has become more wide-spread.

Mr. Teasdale emphasizes the presence of two different EU political systems with different attitudes of the public on how far they want to be actively involved in the management and definition of policies. For the regulatory areas in which the Brussels effect has been observed, they are complex issues that are the preserve of civil servants or regulatory bodies rather than the public. Therefore, it is possible for a global system to evolve under that effect. However, he points out that with the flow of time, the public will be more engaging and the potential for the Brussels effect will be diminished, but it will come together with an opportunity for enhanced democratic participation.

## **2.5. Discussant Andrea Renda**

### **2.5.1. Is resilience something that could become an automatic stabilizer for global governance?**

For Mr. Renda, resilience is not going to be a stabilizer at the moment. The notion of resilience, however we define it, is at odds with the way in which we have conceptualized public policy until now. In the past decades, the world came from a wave of Washington consensus that has been dominating in various forms at the global level and imposing in many circumstances, for example for health systems, for welfare systems, for investments in defense and security, unless there is a compelling strategic reason. This has also been reflected over the past decades in what the private sector does. Now there is globalization of production that has come together with a lack of diversification of global value chains and, especially after the financial crisis, a gradual impoverishment of the periphery of those global value chains that have been constantly reaping a very tiny fraction of the value that was created. The digital economy, the savior of the current times, has been also responsible for the value capture from the periphery to the center.

However, resilience inspires a sense of decentralized governance, requires empowerment of local communities, and requires living in a decentralized way. It means the ability to act, the flexibility, the discretion to react to different situations. This is opposite of what the world in general have been doing until now. The focus on resilience will be inevitable over the coming years and will also require a refinement of the focus on sustainability. At the moment, the definition of

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sustainability typically does not incorporate sufficient attention towards resilience and well-being. Global governance is unable to translate or to manage the transition between forms of capitalism. It is a form of capitalism that is looking inward for corporations with the concept that the private sector and the public sector are allies toward the greater good including developing countries and vulnerable communities.

In his opinion, the EU is forced to be the leader. The expectations in the EU are always high. In the coming years, the EU should do three things. First, the EU should have more courage in proposing a different approach to capitalism that is not even stakeholder capitalism but goes beyond that - a genuine European enterprise model. The second thing is to refocus and reconceptualize its approach to global development. The EU should develop new tools to engage with citizens directly. As a final note, the EU's leadership should have acted more proactively in certain areas. For example, in the first weeks of his presidency, Joe Biden has said two things that the EU could have probably said earlier: the time for shareholder capitalism is over and the patents over vaccines could be temporarily waived. This does not mean that the U.S. can teach the EU anything, but rather that the leadership role of the EU could have been more proactive.

### 2.5.2. What is the impact of the EU's post Covid-19 recovery on the capacity of the EU to have a value-based foreign policy? Is there a need for conditionalities in agreements?

Mr. Renda predicts that the EU will be under pressure in the coming years because of the different ways in spending the Recovery and Resilience funds across Member States. This leads to a divergence inside the EU and thereby internal tensions that may reverberate in the ability of the EU to promote its model towards the outside and to focus on the clear direction towards sustainability and resilience, which is the current double logic that we see in the EU's policies.

Mr. Renda continues to point out that during this pandemic, many developing countries will be in need of help because of financial debt. This is a testbed for the EU in showing the ability not only to express solidarity, not only to work on aid, but also to generate values at the local level and create the preconditions for a polycentric world where even the developing countries and the least developed countries are bringing and building their own abilities to thrive. What might change in the way in which the EU pursues its values on the global stage is not by imposing conditionalities but by establishing cooperation paths. Mr. Renda agrees with Mr. Cloos that the EU needs to be tough but at the same time it needs to solve the problem of being perceived as a colonial power, especially in Africa.

### 3. Supplementary materials

The workshop was accompanied by three questions to the audience, which were asked in the form of online polls. Table 1 reports on the results of the three polls. The data shows that participants were optimistic about resilience becoming a new terrain of global governance. At the same time, they were more sceptical as to whether parliamentarisation of international organisations can increase the legitimacy of global governance.


**Table 1: Questions to the audience and answers**

Question	Answer options	Answer distribution	Number of total answers
Can resilience become a new terrain of global governance?	Yes Potentially No Don't know	44% 33% 11% 11%	9
Can the further parliamentarisation of international organisations increase the legitimacy of global governance?	Yes Very likely Somewhat Only to a minor extent No Don't know	20% 0% 40% 30% 10% 0%	10
Are EU strategic autonomy and the EU's priority on multilateralism mutually exclusive strategies?	Yes Probably No Don't know	0% 50% 50% 0%	2

Moreover, the figure below shows the layout of the 'behind the scenes' setup on Zoom. The event was available to 107 participants via the Swapcard platform, while many other viewers were able to view the event via the live stream and the Youtube recording.

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Figure 3: Behind the scenes view in Zoom



## 4. Organisational details on the workshop

The following table provides an overview of the organisational details of the workshop, the format and speakers.

<b>Event title</b>	Trends and Shifts in Global Governance and the Role of the EU
<b>Duration of the event (1 hour maximum)</b>	55 minutes (Thu 06/05/2021, 17.55 – 18.50)
<b>Format</b>	<p>Livestreamed parallel to the two main SOU2021 Conference streams</p> <p>2 ways of broadcasting: Swapcard_ &amp; Livestream on SOU Youtube channel</p> <p>Speakers and moderator(s) of the event used Zoom.</p>
<b>Speakers – please specify in-person or remote</b>	<p>Jim Cloos, Secretary-General TEPSA   former Deputy Director-General, General and Institutional Policy, General Secretariat of the EU Council of Ministers, Brussels (remote)</p> <p>Dr Florence Gaub, Deputy Director, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris (remote)</p> <p>Prof Dr Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and Head of Global Governance, Regulation, Innovation and the Digital Economy, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels   Part-time Professor, EUI-STG (remote)</p> <p>Anthony Teasdale, Director General, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels (remote)</p>
<b>Moderator(s) – please specify in-person or remote</b>	Prof Dr Gaby Umbach, Director GlobalStat, Part-time Professor, EUI-RSC-GGP (remote)
<b>Co-Moderator in charge of content support</b>	Dr Aaron Rosa (remote)
<b>Back-up Co-Moderator in charge of content support</b>	Dr Igor Tkalec (remote)
<b>Event description</b>	<p>The erosion of the global climate change regime; the internationally-agreed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for peaceful use of nuclear power at risk; burden-sharing conflicts in international security politics; new global trade wars – contestation of global governance and renationalisation of politics have taken up speed. Both go hand in hand with shifts in global power constellations, disruptive technologies; erosion of liberal democracies; and transformation of economic systems. In short, the world is on its way towards a new geo-political, geo-economic and geo-technological order and it seems unclear, which role the EU will play in it. Based on ESPAS and TRIGGER research, the panel will discuss the impact of trends and shifts in global governance on the EU's potential to act as a global player.</p>

Figure 4: Logos of the participating organisations



## 5. Conclusion

Ms. Umbach ended the session by asking each discussant about one thing the EU needs to focus on to become a resilient actor in global governance. Mr. Cloos stressed the importance of developing the EU's industries in order to sustain the Brussels effect. Ms. Gaub emphasizes that the EU should get its priorities right when it is trying to do too many things at the same time. Mr. Teasdale suggests the EU should take advantage of the Biden presidency to defend Western values and interests. For Mr. Renda, the EU should focus on coherence, as many of the values and priorities are pursued in a patchy way. Overall, the session has shown the great potential of the EU to shape global governance despite (or because of) its intricate internal multi-level system. At the same time, the discussants pointed out several challenges, which the EU needs to overcome in order to become an independent actor in times of crisis and global shifts.



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