

Gas Pipeline Politics in Light of the Green Transition:

A Qualitative Study of the Justifications of the Baltic Pipeline Project

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Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Master of Arts in Transnational Governance of the European University Institute

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ABSTRACT

How can fossil fuel infrastructure be justified in Europe today given ambitious climate targets? I study the arguments put forward by Denmark and Poland for the Baltic Pipeline Project (BPP) to study the interaction of energy security, environmental and economic concerns. The BPP is a novel and understudied project at a time when the salience of pipeline politics has reached new heights. After developing theoretical predictions, I use document analysis to examine the Danish and Polish arguments. I find that quests for energy security are the most pronounced justifications, natural gas is framed as a bridging fuel and is thus environmentally compliant, and the implications beyond the two participating states are leveraged by policymakers. It is inevitable that fossil fuel projects will be fraught with controversy and I find that policymakers neuter critiques by framing the BPP as a step towards a green future and a reflexion of geopolitical reality.

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Introduction

Energy is a crucial commodity; it allows for our societies to function and for economies to grow. Natural gas is one of the most consumed energy sources in the world and accounts for a quarter of global electricity generation (IEA, 2020). However, very few states have the capacity to fulfil their natural gas needs from domestic production. Access to natural gas largely depend on states' geographical location, which has resulted in interdependencies between the states that can produce it, and those who cannot. Pipelines are an essential mode of transport that sustain these interdependencies. Without pipelines, it would be extremely difficult for states to efficiently and economically export and import natural gas (Finkel, 2018).

However, pipelines are more than just transport, they are inherently political. The war in Ukraine and Russia's weaponization of gas exports to certain European Union (EU) states underline the woeful reliance on Russian energy. Thus, in light of geopolitical realities it may be apparent why European countries are seeking to diversify away from Russian gas. However, with a pressing global climate crisis, this process of fossil fuel diversification is more nuanced; European states are also at radically different points in the green transition and face differing degrees of risk to their energy security. With the rise of environmentalism, concerns regarding climate change are no longer limited to scientists and it is evident that divestment from fossil fuels is key to the green transition (Paterson, 2021).

In this thesis, I focus on the Baltic Pipeline Project (BPP) which spans from Denmark to Poland as a case to explore how these dynamics of pipeline politics interact. I zero-in on the BPP since it is emblematic of European pipeline construction sans Russia, and connects two states with divergent environmental, economic and energy security realities. Specifically, I seek to understand how states participating in fossil fuel projects today justify their decisions to undertake these projects. How are the conflicting needs for energy security and the green transition reconciled? How do policymakers leverage the domestic concerns vis-à-vis the external benefits of the pipeline? How and by whom are supranational bodies invoked when discussing

pipelines and their contribution to energy security and the green transition? In posing these questions I hope to uncover how the BPP is discussed and argued for by stakeholders in Denmark and Poland. Namely, I seek to underline how intra-European connectivity of this most crucial resource is inherently political.

This paper takes a qualitative approach and begins with a summary of existing literature in order to situate the dissertation within current research. Subsequently, the theoretical framework is presented which outlines the three main dimensions that have been deemed present when states embark on pipeline projects: security, environment and economic considerations. The framework elaborates on these considerations in light of the two states' realities and apply them to the novel case of the Baltic Pipeline. I thus develop a theoretical lens that will serve to analyse the main research question: "In what ways have Denmark and Poland justified the development of the Baltic Pipeline Project?" Following this, I detail the document analysis method, along with the document selection for Denmark and Poland. Here, I touch on the strengths of the method as well as potential weaknesses and limitations. Next, the analysis is carried out and the results are interpreted. Subsequently, the overall findings are reviewed within a broader discussion that seeks to reflect and elaborate on the results. Lastly, a conclusion is reached which summarises the overall results of the thesis and how the BPP fits in to the politics of pipelines and the green transition.

Literature Review

The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, it provides an overview of the existing research that has been conducted on the politics of pipelines. Second, this section will describe the Baltic Pipeline Project and how it is situated within the wider European setting.

The Politics of Pipelines

Finkel (2018) compares the importance of pipelines to the human vascular system, stating that “pipelines are the lifeblood of the energy sector” (p.1). This is rooted in the fact that pipelines are essential for any state that either relies on the import or export of fossil fuels (Demirbas, 2006). Data shows the world consumes 60 million barrels of natural gas every day, and the world’s energy consumption has almost tripled in the last fifty years (Hussein, 2021). It has been estimated that the global pipeline infrastructure today includes over 3.3 million kilometres of oil and gas pipes that span across the globe (Szeman, 2017). Several policy actors participate in natural gas pipeline projects, including representatives of governments, oil and gas companies, interest groups, consulting firms, and occasionally activists (You et al., 2020). In Europe, pipeline politics are often discussed in relation to energy imports (oil and gas) from external countries, primarily Russia, as the state is the EU’s biggest supplier of natural gas (European Commission, 2022). In 2021, 43,5% of the EU’s imports came Russia alone (European Commission, 2022). As such, debates regarding pipelines have often referenced the importance of energy independence and potential actions to diversify away from one major supplier (Bekin et al., 2013).

Despite its relevance to governments and non-state actors, and subsequently, to citizens worldwide, pipelines have historically received little attention in international relations. In part, this is because pipelines have been viewed as technical projects largely separated from the political sphere (Berling, 2021). In addition, pipelines have also been considered, put simply, as just pipelines; an infrastructure that transports sources of energy from origin to destination (Whist, 2008). However, these assumptions changed significantly with the construction of the Nord Stream, a 1,200 km natural gas pipeline that transports Russian gas to Germany via the Baltic Sea

(Cohen, 2006; Belyi, 2012). Scholars became interested in the politics surrounding pipelines and began to analyse the security, economic and political dimensions surrounding the Nord Stream. Whist (2008) investigated countries' different interpretations of the Nord Stream pipeline, finding that states were either proponents or opponents of the project based on their economic interests or security concerns. Lochner and Bothe (2007) argued that the eastern European states politicised the pipeline largely due to the fact that it would bypass all transit countries, meaning that Russia would be in a position to threaten gas supplies to states such as Poland without interrupting supplies to the rest of Europe (Weiner, 2019).

Extensive research on the politics of pipelines have been published following the reveal of the second Russian-German Nord Stream 2 pipeline (Goldthau, 2016; Laskot-Strachota, 2016; Babic, 2021). In this case, scholars have dedicated even more focus to analyse the security and economic implications of the pipeline, and how it contributes to increased EU dependence on Russian gas (Sharples, 2015; Fischer, 2016). Lang and Westphal (2017) expand on Germany's economic rationality behind the project, highlighting that despite controversy Russia has been an 'attractive economic partner' for some EU members in the energy field (p.10). Moreover, in relationship to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the literature also found that Poland and other eastern European governments were strongly against the pipeline due to anxieties over Kremlin's increased military aggression in Ukraine (Stern et al., 2014). Scholars have also sought to map the factors that have formed EU states' attitudes towards the pipeline, thus finding that historical ties with Russia and identity were key factors that shaped negative preferences of the project (Jong et al., 2020; Siddi, 2019). Similarly, Danielsson (2019) investigates the negative perceptions of Russia within member states and argues that internal issues within the EU also shape the debates surrounding the Nord Stream 2. Hence, security and economic conditions are present within the politics of pipelines and it is evident that states express different preferences depending on their energy interests and objectives (Adomeit, 2016).

Moreover, pipelines have also been analysed in light of environmentalism and climate change politics. (Yordy et al., 2019). In the Nord Stream 2, it was put forward that the

project was highly contradictory to the EU's climate and energy targets for 2030 (Lang and Westphal, 2017). Thus, a body of literature has sought to address the EU's dependency on natural gas and states' continued investment in fossil fuel infrastructure (Zhongming et al., 2016). Scholars have argued that by financing new pipelines, European states are moving towards carbon lock-in; a scenario in which countries favour fossil fuel energy over low-carbon energy such as Renewable Energy Sources (RES) (Lehmann et al., 2012). Oil and gas contribute to a significant share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the use of fossil fuel technologies continues to cause environmental degradation (Vogler, 2013). Yet, with the signing of the Paris Agreement, some claimed that the world could be moving towards the "end of the fossil fuel age" as limiting the global heating to 1.5 degrees Celsius requires governments to divest in new fossil fuels (Paterson, 2021). The EU has, through the Green Deal, set the goal of decarbonising the energy system which means that member states will need to transform their energy sectors (Hainsch et al., 2022). Despite this, researchers have noted that states continue to embark on new fossil fuel projects, notably natural gas pipelines (Payne, 2020). Howarth (2014) holds that this is largely due to the fact that natural gas has been categorised as a bridging fuel which allows states to continue to use fossils over the coming years while developing alternative RES. Less CO₂ is emitted when natural gas is burned as opposed to other fossil fuels, which is in essence what has given natural gas the green light (Howarth, 2014).

While limited research has been published on the Baltic Pipeline Project (BPP), scholars have emphasised its relevance in climate and security politics. Geertsen (2020) highlights the environmental problems associated with the pipeline and the controversy it has evoked amongst Danes. The author highlights the concepts of carbon lock-in and fossil capitalism, framing the Baltic Pipe as a force that sustains climate change (Geertsen, 2020). Thus, questions arise as to whether new pipelines are truly necessary in light of the environmental costs (Hein et al., 2019). Voytyuk (2022) explores the importance of the pipe to European security, stressing that natural gas demand will likely increase in Poland which will require expansion of gas infrastructure. The author also notes the threat Russia continue pose to the eastern

bloc' energy supplies, which again underlines the relevancy of pipelines in security politics (Voytyuk, 2022).

Beyond this, the BPP has received little scholarly attention. Several factors can explain this, one of them being that the BPP, as opposed to the Nord Stream pipelines, has received far less criticism from the international community. Hence, the BPP is a project between EU states without a controversial third-party. As such, it is plausible that scholars have considered the BPP as just another pipeline. However, the BPP is a relevant topic as it sheds light on interests that inherently compete with one another; energy security, decarbonisation and economic profit. Denmark and Poland vastly differ in terms of economic growth, environmental credentials and security. It thus provides an interesting case study as to how different states approach the politics of pipelines. Understanding how Denmark and Poland have justified this new pipeline is therefore relevant as it helps us to recognise how states prioritise their energy interests in light of climate change and geopolitical instability. Thus, similar projects may be replicated in the future due to Russia's aggression, which makes the BPP an interesting case to highlight.


The Baltic Pipeline Project

Negotiations surrounding the possibility of constructing a new natural gas pipeline that would transport natural gas from Norway via Denmark to Poland began in the early 2000s (Polityka, 2022). However, it was not until 2016 that the project was considered economically feasible by Danish and Polish policymakers and energy companies. In 2016, Polish energy company Gaz-System and Danish oil and gas company Energinet began to conduct feasibility studies of the BPP. Various studies demonstrated that the BPP could generate significant economic and social benefits for both Poland and Denmark, as well as for the rest of the EU (Baltic Pipe, 2022). Difficulties later arose when the Danish Environmental and Food Appeals Board announced in 2021 that it had revoked the initial land permit that was issued in 2019 for the pipeline (Energinet, 2021). The board reasoned that studies regarding the potential effects the pipeline could have on bats and birch mice in Denmark were not sufficient which resulted in months of delay for the construction (Energinet, 2021).

Eventually, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency issued a new environmental permit for the BPP, which meant that the construction could resume. The BPP's key objectives are to improve energy security, increase competitiveness in the European gas market, facilitate accessibility benefits for consumers, and to help reduce CO2 emissions (Baltic Pipe, 2022).

In essence, the BPP is a 120 km pipeline and consists over-ground and undersea construction; a gas pipeline that connects the Norwegian and the Danish gas transmission systems, and a gas pipeline that connects the Danish and Polish systems (Baltic Pipe, 2022). Hence, similar to the Nord Stream route, a section of the BPP will run underneath the Baltic Sea. The pipe will have the capacity to transport 10 billion cubic meters per year from Norway to Denmark and Poland. The construction of the pipeline was finished in April 2022, and is planned to be operational in October 2022.

Figure 1: Map of the Baltic Pipeline Project



(Baltic-Pipe, 2022).

The Baltic Pipeline in the wider European Context

The EU has been divided in energy policy and it has proven difficult for the organisation to construct a common position within the energy market (Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017). This is largely due to the fact that member states have the right to decide between different energy resources (Danielsson, 2019). Energy security, which indicates “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”, has been a top priority for the member states for the last decades (IEA, 2019). It is understood that energy supply is volatile; it can be disrupted by exporting states (e.g. Russia) or by factors such as cyberattacks and natural disasters (European Commission, 2022). Energy security is reflected in the EU’s Energy Union Strategy. The Energy Union was developed in 2015 and is a strategy that aims to ‘provide all EU consumers – households and businesses – with secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy (European Commission, 2019, p.1). Thus, in recent decades, the energy policy has sought to diminish the dominant role of Gazprom by promoting diversification and liberalisation in the EU market (Mikaulska, 2020).

The BPP has been granted the status as a “Project of Common Interest” (PCI) by the European Commission. This means that the EU recognises the BPP as an infrastructure project that can help strengthen the EU’s internal energy market while being in line with the EU’s energy policy of delivering secure, affordable and sustainable energy to consumers (European Commission). Although the BPP is primarily a project between Denmark and Poland, it is situated within the Energy Union as it helps to contribute to the aims of the strategy. The BPP’s status as a PCI also means that it is part of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan – a wider initiative to connect gas infrastructure between countries in the Baltic Sea region and the rest of the EU (European Commission).

Theoretical Framework

As mentioned, this paper seeks to investigate the following research question: In what ways have Denmark and Poland justified the development of the Baltic Pipeline Project? I am thus interested in analysing the arguments that have been put forward by both states in order to justify the pipeline. It is evident from the reviewed literature three key dimensions are present in the debates surrounding pipelines: security, environmental and economic. I therefore utilise these three factors in my research to identify the justifications behind the BPP.

In essence, I develop bespoke theories based on existing literature of Denmark and Poland in light of natural gas pipelines and the three considerations. I build on the three dimensions in each country case and subsequently determine 'logics' as to how I predict Danish and Polish policymakers to have justified the BPP. I deploy literature relating to the states' history, energy consumption and production, national politics, economic realities, climate progression and environmental ambitions. By doing so, I can apply these logics to the BPP case and make sense of the findings that arise from the analysis. As such, this section also helps to broaden our understanding of the state of play in each country when it comes to energy politics and pipelines.

1. Logic for Security Justifications of the BPP


Denmark

Up until the oil crisis of the 1970s, Denmark relied exclusively on imported gas and oil (Rudiger, 2014). Yet, the disruptions following the crisis prompted the government to invest heavily in RES such as wind and solar (Berling, 2021). This policy response has enabled the country to hold a higher share of RES than other EU countries, and Denmark has been self-sufficient in its energy supplies since the 1990s (Dyrhauge, 2017). Scholars have argued that due to these developments in the energy sector Danish policymakers have traditionally not considered energy as a security issue (Berling, 2021). Instead, energy has been primarily understood as a technical issue relating to the "accessibility, affordability and accountability of energy sources" (Berling, 2021, p.1).

The notion of energy policy as only a technical topic in Denmark changed with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines (Berling, 2021). As a Russian-German pipeline project, the first Nord Stream was presented in 2005 and required the permission from several countries, including Denmark as it would pass Danish seas (Wood and Henke, 2021). At this point in time, the diplomatic relationship between Denmark and Russia was challenging, as Denmark had long promoted the accession of the eastern bloc to the EU and NATO (Berling, 2021). In part, Russia viewed the eastern enlargement as a Western power grab and an anti-Soviet alliance (Sweeney, 2022). Thus, when the Nord Stream was announced, the Danish government considered the project as a step towards developing better relations with Russia (Berling, 2021). Despite events such as the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and strong protests from Poland regarding the pipeline, the Danish government less sceptical of Russia's role in European energy politics (Wood and Henke, 2021). Consequently, Denmark became the first country to grant official permission to the Nord Stream (Berling, 2021).

However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 threatened the principles of territorial integrity and European security (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2019). These events altered Denmark's opinion of Russia and subsequently "divulged change in Denmark's self-perception and role in European politics" (Wood and Henke, 2021, p.5). Thus, when a proposal for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was presented in 2017, Danish policymakers were hesitant as to whether it was a tactical decision to approve the pipeline (Berling, 2021). Politicians therefore began to use technical solutions to prevent the pipeline from moving forward, specifically by postponing the permit processes (Berling, 2021). After years of discussions, Denmark was the last country to approve the pipeline (Prince, 2019). Since these events, Denmark has supported the tenets of EU energy policy which aims to end contracts with unreliable exporters, like Russia (Wood and Henke, 2021). Denmark has thus wished to portray itself as a 'responsible global actor' that contributes to a stable world order adherent to international law (Wood and Henke, 2021, p.5).

Given all this, I theorise that Danish policymakers will have justified the BPP based on external security considerations. It is evident that Denmark’s perception of Russia as a viable gas exporter changed significantly following the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine and that Denmark began to consider energy as a security issue. As such, it is plausible that policymakers will have argued for the ways in which the BPP can strengthen the energy security of Poland and other Eastern European states in its justifications for the pipeline. Framing the BPP as a security mechanism that enables Denmark to help other states coincides with the existing literature that highlights Denmark’s self-perception as a responsible global actor (Wood and Henke, 2021). Since Denmark is highly secure in its energy supply thanks to RES, it is unlikely that Denmark will have relied on internal security arguments to justify the BPP.



(Authors own, 2022. Based on 2020 data from IEA).

Poland


Contrary to Denmark, energy has been considered a security issue in Poland since the 1990s (Misik and Nosko, 2017). Poland has been concerned with the geopolitical aspect of energy security, as the state has throughout history relied heavily on Russia as the main provider of gas (Szabo and Fabok, 2020) However, the domestic debates

regarding energy security in Poland have historically been divided into two main camps: those who have viewed Russia as a prominent threat to Poland's energy security, and those who have held a more restrained, technocratic attitude (Ostrowski, 2021). The former has argued that energy is a way for Russia to destabilise countries (Berling, 2021). The latter technocratic camp has argued that Poland's dependence on Russian gas is overstated, as Poland's electricity system is largely sustained by domestically produced coal (Ostrawski, 2012). Despite the arguments put forward by this group, those who consider Russia as a threat have historically gained more prominence in Polish energy debates (Ostrowski, 2021). This is essentially due to several instances whereby Russia has used its role as the dominant supplier of oil and gas as a means to exert political and economic pressure (Kovacevic, 2009). There have been multiple instances since the 1990s in which Russia has either threatened to or has simply cut off gas supplies to countries like Ukraine due to political disagreements, which has caused disruptions for Poland (Stultberg, 2015). Scholars have thus referred to Poland as a 'new cold warrior'; a state that has established a hostile relationship with Russia due to the Kremlin's lack of cooperation on energy (Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 2010). This approach to Russia is particularly noticeable in the Nord Stream debates; Polish politicians framed the Nord Stream as a "geopolitical disaster" capable of interrupting energy transit routes between Western and Eastern states (Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 2010, p2.).

As such, Poland's energy policies have been centred around the need for diversification (Voytyuk, 2022). Although Poland has been largely self-sufficient in electricity generation due to coal, the Polish economy remains dependent on gas (IEA, 2020). Poland has been active in the European energy debates, thus supported the EU's Energy Union, which attempts to strengthen the EU's common voice towards Russia (Roth, 2011). Hence, with varying degrees of success, Poland has sought to bring its own energy security priorities to the EU level (Sharpley, 2012).

Since energy has long been treated as a security issue in Poland, I theorise that Poland will have justified the BPP based its ability to strengthen energy security in the state and enable Poland to become independent from Russian supply. Poland has for

decades been sceptical regarding Russia's role in its energy mix, which has prompted it to seek alternative routes. As such, this is likely to be a strong security justification for the BPP. Moreover, existing literature also points to the fact that Poland has sought to convince European states of the security issues with Russian gas, which thus leads to the theory that Poland will similarly highlight the security benefits that the BPP will provide to the rest of the EU in its justifications.



(Authors own, 2022. Based on 2020 data from IEA).

2. Logic for Environmental Justifications of the BPP

Denmark

The role of clean energy has been important to Denmark's environmental and climate policymaking (Sovacool and Tambo, 2016). After Denmark turned to the development of RES following the oil crisis, energy policy and environmental policy became inseparable as concerns also cultivated regarding GHG emissions (Rudiger, 2014). Denmark has been a pioneer in wind energy, and the country's national energy plans have continuously encouraged the use of RES and less polluting fuels such as natural gas (McBryan, 2009; Menu, 2021). Indeed, Denmark's extensive production of wind

energy has in many ways enabled the public to consider Denmark as a 'green state' (Sovacool and Tambo, 2016).

Moreover, widespread support for ambitious environmental goals are embedded across the Danish political spectrum as well as in public opinion, signalling that climate is a top priority for Danish voters (Sovacool and Tambo, 2016; Sorensen, 2019). On the European stage, Denmark has been considered a 'forerunner' in climate policy, capable of shaping the EU's environmental policy agenda since the 1990s (Magnusdottir, 2015). Scholars have thus argued that climate policy has grown to become part of Denmark's international brand which is visible in both their national strategy and in its various bilateral climate partnerships (Greaker et al., 2019). Interestingly however, although Denmark has pushed EU member states to implement cleaner energy, the country prefers to maintain its position in Europe as 'cleaner than the rest' (Andersen and Liefferink, 1999, p.7). Thus, this gives reason to assume that Denmark's status as 'green' is important to its national identity.

For this dimension, I theorise that policymakers will emphasise justifications linked to the green transition in Poland. With Denmark's status as a green forerunner in the EU, it is likely that policymakers will highlight how the BPP can reduce CO₂-emissions and replace coal consumption. Cooperating on the BPP for Poland's climate prospects is thus theorised to be a justification for the project as it coincides with Denmark's efforts to push states' climate efforts.

Poland

In contrast to Denmark, Poland has historically been relatively passive in its national climate policies. With a powerful coal industry, there has been broad scepticism towards environmentalism due to the negative economic and social effects such policies can have on the population (Brauers and Oei, 2020). Poland has a large number of mining communities which have formed powerful lobbying groups that have been influential in energy transition debates (Mrozowska et al., 2021). The energy industry has been the largest greenhouse gas emitter in Poland, accounting for over 30% of its emissions (European Parliament, 2020). Policymakers are aware that in order for

Poland to radically transform its energy policies, the country needs to convert its traditions of the coal industry into a more sustainable culture (Mrozowska et al., 2021).

Due to reliance on coal and reluctance to accept certain policy measures, Poland has from time to time been characterised as the 'black sheep' of the EU's climate policy (Tokunaga, 2020, p.329). Since joining the EU, Poland has gradually moved towards developing more RES such as wind and solar, but to date this only accounts for a small share of the energy mix (Iskandarova et al., 2021). Thus, as Poland aims to transition away from coal entirely by 2040, natural gas is understood as a potential bridging fuel for the transition (Galgoczi, 2019).

Based on this, I theorise that Poland will similarly to Denmark justify the BPP in light of the green transition. The trend of phasing out coal is present in Poland, and with pressure from other European states, it is likely that it will frame natural gas as a bridging fuel that allows the state to shift from coal. I thus anticipate that this will be the focal justification for the BPP in environmental terms, and that arguments will be put forward to support these claims.

3. Logic for Economic Justifications of the BPP

Denmark

Denmark has extracted oil and gas from the Danish part of the North Sea since 1972 which has contributed considerably to its state revenue (Danish Energy Agency, 2022). The key to the Danish gas infrastructure is the transmission system which transfers natural gas from the North Sea to the networks on Danish land (Danish Energy Agency, 2022). In 2020, it was found that Denmark exported \$102 million worth of natural gas, making it the 29th largest exporter of natural gas globally (OEC, 2020). However, the economic importance of the Danish gas sector has decreased over the past years as the exports of wind turbine technology have generated growth (State of Green, 2020).

Moreover, the Baltic Pipeline turns Denmark into a transit state, which means that Denmark will impose transit fees which generate revenue. When the pipeline is

operational, increased volumes of gas will be transported via the network which can lower the tariffs for Danish consumers (Energinet, 2022). Scholars have noted that Danish citizens have doubted the economic gains of the project and questioned how much Denmark is expected financially contribute to the BPP (Geertsen, 2020). Thus, there have been discussions in Denmark as to whether the economic gains outweigh the environmental harm that the project poses.

Therefore, I theorise that any economic justifications will be linked to the reduced gas prices that consumers may experience from the development of the BPP. The literature emphasises that due to increased supply and more completeness, natural gas prices may be lower for the Danish consumers. However, since Denmark is decreasing its reliance on fossil fuel revenue, it is difficult to predict how prominent economic considerations will have been for the justification of the BPP.

Poland

Poland has had a problematic relationship with Russian Gazprom when it comes to imports of natural gas (Riley, 2012). Historically, Poland has been one of the countries that has paid the most for Russian gas in the EU, which has caused continuous debates in the state (Weiner, 2019). There have been instances whereby the Polish energy companies have filed lawsuits against Gazprom over high gas prices and anti-competitive practices (Riley, 2012). Russia has long held a monopolistic position in the European gas market which means that it has continuously been capable of dictating its own prices and conditions for natural gas (Umbach, 2010).

Moreover, scholars have argued that the Polish government have been interested in moving beyond its position as only a natural gas importer (Voytyuk, 2022). Indeed, an economic objective for Poland is to become a stronger natural gas exporter to other European countries, allowing its energy companies to grow by exporting extra volumes of natural gas to other states (Voytyuk, 2022). The Baltic Pipe is therefore one way for Poland to possibly achieve this objective, as the country could become key distributor of natural gas to central and eastern Europe. However, there are limits to the economic benefits of the BPP. While it can perhaps help to increase competitiveness

on the market, it is likely that Poland will pay a high price for the Norwegian gas that will flow through the pipeline.

I thus theorise that for economic considerations, policymakers will have relied on justifications linked to increased competitiveness and a potential strengthening of Poland's role on the European gas market. It is evident that the economic gains are limited in this case for Poland, as consumers will still pay a high price for the natural gas and the cost of the project itself is high. As such, it is likely that policymakers will have justified the project less in economic terms.

Methodology

This section details the document analysis method that will be used to examine the research question in this paper. Different variations of document analysis exist and this thesis will follow the version outlined by Bowen (2009).

Document Analysis

Document analysis is a research method that focuses on the contents of written materials in order generate empirical knowledge around topics, questions and theories in social sciences (Wach and Ward, 2013). Document analysis is thus a form of qualitative research that collects and analyses non-numerical data in order to interpret underlying meanings and processes that help facilitate an understanding of social phenomena (Mohajan, 2018). As such, the purpose of this method is to develop a “deep understanding of the particular” through the systematic examination of textual data (Mohajan, 2018, p.24). Textual data can include a range of documents such as reports, policy-briefs, books, newspaper articles, press releases, meeting minutes and agendas (Bell and Waters, 2018). Document analysis therefore involves the systematic selection, depiction and interpretation of such textual data which allows the researcher to conduct an in-depth analysis of the topic under study (Mohajan, 2018). In order to perform the document analysis, the researcher develops a research design that enables the review and examination of the materials in an orderly manner (Mohajan, 2018).

Advantages and Limitations

Document analysis was selected for this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, since the paper seeks to explore the focal justifications put forward by Denmark and Poland in the development of the BPP, a qualitative research approach was suitable. Analysing written documents published by policymakers and stakeholders in both countries was necessary as I seek to understand the different arguments and interests present in the BPP development. Documents provide both background and context, so the method enables me to form a broader understanding of the topic. Hence, by analysing documents, I have the potential to suggest “possible relationships, causes, effects, and

dynamic processes” (Mohajan, 2018, p.39). Furthermore, it was evident that for the research questions to be analysed, it was necessary to apply a method that avoids issues related to reactivity and obtrusiveness as this could disturb any naturally occurring arguments (Bowen, 2009). Document analysis is therefore a viable option as documents are inherently ‘non-reactive’; they are unaltered by the research process and the researcher will not disturb the data that is being studied (Bowen, 2009, p.31).

Moreover, document analysis was also chosen as it holds several practical advantages. The first benefit is linked to the availability of documents. Many relevant documents are today published online and made open to the public, which means that by choosing documents as the standpoint I am able to access relevant data for both country cases. Written documents also contain specific information; names, dates, titles, participants etc. Such details are crucial for analysing the research questions, as without this information, it would be impossible to identify the arguments put forward by the states. Finally, document analysis requires *data selection* as opposed to *data collection*, which in essence results in it being an efficient method (Bowen, 2009, p.31.).

There are some prominent limitations to the document analysis method which warrant a few words. Firstly, some scholars argue that document analysis is inefficient as a single methodology, and should instead be used as part of a wider design that incorporates additional research methods such as interviews and surveys (Bowen, 2009). This is because documents are typically produced for purposes other than research, meaning that they are “created independent of a research agenda” (Bowen, 2009, p.31). Hence, it is always the possible that documents are unable to provide enough context to answer research questions.

Another limitation of using document analysis in this particular case is linked to the document selection. When I began searching for documents, it became apparent that it was difficult to find the same type of data for both countries. Ideally, the document selection would include the same kind of documents as this would allow me to conduct a very similar evaluation of both cases. However, this proved difficult as

different types of documents regarding the BPP were available for both countries. As such, I had to select the materials accessible which means that diverse forms of documents have been utilised in the analysis. This difficulty relates to another common issue with the document analysis method, specifically the potential for biased selectivity (Bowen, 2009). As a rule, qualitative research should be executed objectively (Bowen, 2009). Yet, this is challenging with the data selection as the documents are naturally selected by the researcher (Bowen, 2009). This makes it difficult for the researcher to stay fully detached from the process which in turn can potentially interfere with the transparency of the results (Bowen, 2009). However, this limitation is acknowledged in this thesis and it creates an opportunity for further research to be carried out in combination with additional research methods.

Document Selection

The selected data are written documents that have been produced by stakeholders and policymakers involved in the BPP. The BPP is a transnational project that involves different actors, including government ministries, agencies and energy companies. While these actors naturally come from different standpoints and aspects of the project, they intend to represent the energy interests of Denmark and Poland in the BPP. For example, the Polish energy company Gaz-system is responsible for the natural gas transmission in Poland and all shares of the company are administered under the State Treasury. Similarly, Energinet is Denmark's national transmission system operator for natural gas, and is owned by the Danish state under the Ministry of Climate and Energy. Thus, although these are independent companies, they are established to serve the energy interests of the state and can thus be utilised in the analysis. I decided it was useful to include different actors as it helps add context and additional information to answer the research questions. As such, the data which discuss the BPP in both countries include documents produced by a combination of these actors. For simplicity and practicality, I refer to both 'policymakers' and 'stakeholders' when I discuss the final findings and results.

The selection includes fifteen documents from each country and the timeframe of the documents span from 2007 to 2021. In the case of Denmark, the data includes minutes

from parliamentary debates and open questions, annual reports, press releases and national energy strategy reports – all of which include text regarding the BPP. For Poland, the data includes annual reports, national energy strategy papers, statements, press releases and declarations surrounding the BPP. Most of the documents were available in English, while others required translation. I personally translated the Danish documents and machine translated the subset of Polish documents which were published in Polish.

Table 1. Selection of Documents

Denmark	Poland
1. (13/03-2016). Energinet. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 13/03	(15/11-2007). Gaz-System. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 15/11
2. (10/09-2018). Energinet. <i>Report</i> . Text-citation: 10/09	(25/01-2018). Ministry of Assets. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 25/01
3. (12/11-2018). Climate, Energy and Supply Committee. <i>Minutes from Open Questions</i> . Text-citation: 12/11	(20/02-2018). Republic of Poland. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 20/02
4. (08/02/2018) Climate, Energy and Supply Committee. <i>Assessment of the Baltic Pipe</i> . Text-citation: 08/02	(09/03-2018). Gaz-system. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation 09/03
5. (02/2019) Energinet. <i>Report of the Environmental Consequences of the Baltic Pipe</i> . Text-citation: 02-2019	(09/03-2018). Gaz-System. <i>Minutes from Public Hearing on the Baltic Pipe</i> . Text-citation: 09/03
6. (16/04-2019) Danish Parliament. <i>Minutes from Open Questions</i> . Text-citation: 16/04	(15/03-2018) Ministry of Assets. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 15/03
7. (07-2019). Enhversstyrelsen. <i>National Planning Directive for Baltic Pipe</i> . Text-citation: 07-2019	(18/04/2018) Gaz-system. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 18/04
8. (25/10-2019). Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities. <i>Public Statement</i> . Text-citation: 25/10	(30/11-2018) Ministry of Assets. <i>Announcement</i> . Text-citation: 30/11
9. (12/2019). Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities. <i>Denmark's Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan</i> . Text-citation: 12-19	(19/09-2019). Ministry of State Assets. <i>Announcement</i> . Text-citation: 19/09-2019
10. (2020) Energinet. <i>Annual Report</i> . Text-citation: 2020	(04/01-2019). Ministry of Energy. <i>National Energy and Climate Plan 2021-2030</i> . Text-citation: 04/01
11. (19/05/2020) Climate, Energy and Supply Committee. <i>Minutes from Open Questions</i> . Text-citation: 19/05	(05/08-2020) Ministry of Climate and Environment. <i>Report</i> . Text-citation: 05/08
12. (14/08-2020) Climate, Energy and Supply Committee. <i>Minutes from Open Questions</i> . Text-citation: 14/08	(31/08-2020). Republic of Poland. <i>Announcement</i> . Text-citation: 31/08
13. (08/09-2020) Energinet. <i>Press Release</i> . Text-citation: 08/09	(19/09-2020). Ministry of State Assets. <i>Announcement</i> . Text-citation: 19/09-2020
14. (2021) Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities. <i>Report</i> . Text-citation: 2021	(02/02-2021). Ministry of Climate and Environment. <i>Report: Energy Policy until 2040</i> . Text-citation: 02/02-2021
15. (2021) Energinet. <i>Annual Report</i> Text-citation: 2021	(13/03-2021). Republic of Poland. <i>Announcement</i> . Text-citation: 12/03

Method Description

As mentioned, this thesis utilises the document analysis outlined by Bowen (2009). This specific document analysis revolves around two distinct processes. The first stage is completed through the superficial investigation of the documents, and the later second stage is completed through a more detailed interpretation of the data (Bowen,

2009). Hence, Bowen's (2009) approach relies on features from both content analysis and thematic analysis. The content analysis works to organise the textual information originating from the data into categories pertinent to the research question. The thematic analysis, which is the second stage, is used to conduct a more thorough evaluation and interpretation of the data gathered in the content analysis. By completing these two stages, I am able to examine and unravel specific themes, arguments, objectives and considerations relevant for the research questions.

Content Analysis

Following the completion of the document selection for both Denmark and Poland, it was necessary to organise the data. I therefore performed an initial content analysis; I began to skim through the documents selected for Denmark in order to gain an understanding of the context of the documents. I then started to search more systematically for any information that either mentioned, referenced or discussed the BPP which could indicate any notable findings (or possible contradictions, or unexpected findings). I filtered out relevant text and disregarded unrelated data. I thus was able to synthesise the data relevant for the research question which allowed for an overview of the arguments and debates surrounding the BPP. Hence, this was useful as many of the documents selected also contained information unrelated to the pipeline. After I was finished with the content analysis for Denmark, I applied the exact same technique for Poland.

Thematic Analysis

After all of the relevant materials from the documents were successfully organised through the content analysis, it was possible to pursue the thematic analysis. This stage was crucial as I searched for concrete evidence that could signify arguments relating to the three considerations outlined in the theoretical framework. Starting with Denmark, I read through the data and divided the different texts into three categories (security, environment, economic). I was thus able to re-examine the data more closely after organising the text further. Following this, I began to analyse the arguments that were put forward in regards to the BPP by Danish stakeholders and policymakers, and sought to match and compare these findings to the theoretical framework. As such, this step entailed a "careful, more refocused re-reading of and review of the data"

(Bowen, 2009, p.32). Any unexpected findings were also examined and accounted for. After this was completed for the Danish case, I applied the same process to Poland.

Results

1. Results for Security Justifications

Denmark

Danish policymakers prioritise both Poland's and the broader EU's security in their justifications for the development of the BPP. Firstly, the documents imply that Poland's need for increased security of supply is the main reason for the pipeline's overall existence: *"if there was not a wish for it (BPP) from Poland, and if this situation had not occurred, that they from 2022 will be cut off from natural gas supplies from Russia, this pipeline would not have been put forward"* (16/04). Thus, this signals that the BPP has been understood as a project initiated by the Poles as they facing issues with future gas supply from Russia, which ultimately decreases Poland's energy security. The data thus also shows that policymakers therefore consider the BPP as a means to help Poland in its quest for energy security: *"The pipeline is also about helping the Polish people in a very, very difficult situation, where they are cut off from the opportunity to import Russian gas"* (16/04). As such, it is evident that Danish policymakers utilise arguments based on Poland's need for energy security due to Russia and that the BPP is subsequently a bilateral project which allows Denmark to help Poland in the energy field.

Secondly, the data also show that arguments for the BPP have been framed as a way of boosting the security in the wider European region: *"The pipeline will not just benefit Denmark and Poland, but also neighbouring countries and the European gas market"* (10/09). More specifically, Danish stakeholders reference the Eastern bloc which have historically been sceptical about energy imports from Russia: *"Denmark cooperates with Poland and Norway on the Baltic Pipe project ... direct access to Eastern and Central Europe to gas deposits in Norway will improve the security of supply by opening a permanent corridor for the delivery of gas"* (12/19). Such findings can signal that Danish policymakers see value in pointing out how other EU countries will benefit in security terms from the BPP. Moreover, the documents also illustrate that Danish policymakers have sought to highlight how the BPP strengthens the EU's energy ambitions as well as a way to assist Ukraine in the future: *"The Baltic Pipe contributes to realise the EU's goal of energy security of supply ... and gives an opportunity for exports towards Ukraine"* (08/02). This

was expected, given that Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 changed opinions of Russia's role in the EU's energy landscape.

Finally, there was some evidence that confirmed that the BPP is part of Denmark's foreign policy strategy: *"the foreign minister sent on the 12th of October a statement to the climate, energy and supply minister the ways in which the project (BPP) is in line with Denmark's foreign, security and defence interests"* (25/10). This is in line with existing research which has emphasised how Denmark has perhaps, since the Nord Stream 2, reasserted energy issues as part of foreign policy.

Poland

Polish policymakers rely on the potential of the BPP to help Poland become independent from Russian imports. The documents verified that this has been a primary driver behind Poland's involvement in the BPP: *"Our goal is to ensure energy security in Poland. The Baltic Pipe Project will contribute to the achievement of this goal"* (18/04). The BPP therefore serves as a way for Poland to release itself from Russian gas: *"The Baltic Pipe is an investment that will break the domination of one supplier and help make Poland independent of Russian gas supplies"* (18/04). The documents reinforced the theory that Poland views Russia as an actor capable of using energy as a weapon: *"the main benefit to be provided by the Baltic Pipe project is the security and continuity of transmission in case of supply interruptions"* (09/03). Thus, it is evident that for Poland to strengthen its energy security, it prioritises the need to diminish the role of Russia as the key gas exporter: *"severing dependence on one supplier will significantly improve our security"* (20/02).

Furthermore, the theoretical framework predicted that policymakers and stakeholders would utilise arguments for the BPP relating to the wider energy security of Europe. However, limited evidence was found for this, except for some references to the BPP's significance as a PCI: *"Baltic Pipe is not just a Polish-Danish project, but also an European project – this gas pipeline is recognised by the EU as a project of common interest which means that it receives economic and political support from the European Commission based on its contribution to strengthen the EU's internal energy market and to deliver sustainable and*

reliable energy to the European consumers. Energy is often used as a political weapon in all parts of Europe” (31/08).

Lastly, the analysis found that security arguments have also made in light of Poland’s growing demand for natural gas: *“Along with the progressing energy transformation in Poland, the demand for natural gas is expected to increase dynamically and the importance of this fuel for the stability of the Polish power system is expected to increase” (31/08).*

Summary

In security terms, Denmark highlights the positive effects that the pipeline can have on the energy security of Poland as well as other European states that currently rely on Russian gas. These findings are in line with the theory which predicted that Denmark would seek to justify the development of the BPP based on the threat Russia poses to the energy security of smaller states in Europe. Here, it can be argued that Danish policymakers have constructed a so-called ‘humanitarian agenda’ - framing Poland as a state dependent on cooperation in order to strengthen its security (Geertsen, 2020). Moreover, based on the analysis, it can also be hypothesised that Denmark has sought to reassert its position in light of energy security as the country took a rather pragmatic and hopeful approach towards Russia in the first Nord Stream project. Thus, the BPP could be a way for Denmark to change how other states have considered contribution to European energy security.

Furthermore, as the analysis showcased, Poland’s security arguments for the BPP are primarily based on its own energy security and historical relationship with Russia. Interestingly, few arguments were made in reference to how the BPP can potentially strengthen the security of other small states vulnerable to Russia’s influence. This was surprising, as it was anticipated that Poland would emphasise how the BPP can provide future gas supplies to for example the Baltic states. However, some arguments were put forward regarding the BPP’s significance as a PCI, which perhaps helps Poland legitimise the development of the BPP for security reasons. Finally, it is also clear that a key concern for Poland is the domestic demand for natural gas. Since the

state is not renewing its gas contract with Russia, Poland is reliant on receiving natural gas from other sources to strengthen its security of supply.

2. Results for Environmental Justifications

Denmark

Danish policymakers focus on considerations linked to the green transition as well as the possibility of introducing biogas in the BPP. Firstly, the documents show that from the Danish side, the BPP is a way to help Poland's prospects in propelling the green transition: *"Baltic Pipe is beneficial in terms of Poland's green transition. It is, because this is a stepping stone that allows Poland to find a solution that is far more environmentally just, that has lower CO2 emissions, and that also allows them to invest in renewable energy"* (16/04). This justification thus hints towards the idea that natural gas can work as a bridging fuel that would enable investments in RES, which been of importance to Denmark's green transformation. Other references were also made that support such assumptions: *"To provide this opportunity of pumping natural gas from the North Sea gives Poland the opportunity to further strengthen its green transition, given that natural gas releases almost half as much CO2 than coal, so this pipeline is actually contributing greatly to Poland's energy and climate ambitions towards 2030"* (16/04). Hence, policymakers consider that for coal consuming countries like Poland, natural gas can encourage more climate-positive policies. In addition, the documents also showed that policymakers compare Denmark's fortunate position in the green transition as opposed to Poland's as a reason to develop the BPP: *"Poland stands at a completely different place than Denmark, when it comes to energy politics and renewable energy, and that is why this (BPP) can help"* (16/04). It is plausible that actors have made this distinction in order to showcase Denmark's status as a climate forerunner capable of helping other states, which supports the theory that Denmark cares about its international reputation in environmental policy.

Moreover, while no specific results were found as to how Danish policymakers situate the BPP in light of its own green transition, some references were made to the transport of biogas: *"Baltic Pipe can support increased use of biogas and other green gases in Denmark"* (12-19). It is plausible that since the BPP is arguably somewhat contradictory to

Denmark's climate policies, it is difficult for policymakers to justify the fossil fuel project to the citizens in domestic climate terms.

Poland

Polish environmental considerations for the development of the BPP are framed in light of the green transition and how it is in line with the EU's climate efforts. For the former, particular emphasis is put on the characterisation of natural gas as a transition fuel: *"The Baltic Pipe is a central element in Poland's green transition, and it will directly lead to lower CO2 emissions ... this can seem paradoxical given that natural gas is a fossil fuel, but natural gas actually emits around 60% less CO2-emissions than coal"* (31/08). Additionally, mentions of specific effects that the natural gas in the BPP can have in Poland were present: *"increasing the use of gas in the energy sector will contribute to reducing the emission intensity of the Polish economy and will thus be an effective tool in the fight against smog"* (20/02). These findings are in line with the assumptions that Poland has found it challenging to turn away from the consumption of fossil fuels. Thus, framing natural gas as a step towards realising climate pledges is logical given its current environmental progress.

Furthermore, the documents showed that policymakers justify the BPP based on the fact that the EU has approved the project: *"Baltic Pipe has the support of the European Commission as it fits in with Poland's ambitions for a green transition"* (31/08). This is perhaps a means to convince the public as well as other states that the BPP is a project that has been permitted as compatible with the EU's energy transformations. In this context, references were also made as to how climate policies are related to the economic situation in Poland: *"the EU debate should be dominated by an understanding of the different starting points of the Member States ... the Polish-Danish Baltic Pipe project will enable a decrease in the share of coal in the domestic energy production"* (12/03).

Moreover, the analysis uncovered that policymakers have pointed towards the fact that bilateral cooperation on the BPP would also benefit Denmark in its European climate efforts: *"Poland and Denmark have a lot to win by continuing to cooperate to reduce the EU's climate footprint"* (31/03).

Summary

The analysis shows that Denmark and Poland have reflected on both similar and different environmental considerations in the development of the BPP. In both cases, the BPP is situated within wider efforts to lower CO₂ emissions as natural gas. It is apparent that Denmark views the BPP as a means to help Poland achieve its climate goals and to push the country's green transition. The analysis also sheds light on the fact that Denmark considers its position in the green transition as far more advanced than that of Poland, which functions as another justification for the fossil fuel project. Overall, these findings were in line with the theory that Denmark would justify the BPP based on the green transition in Poland. Furthermore, policymakers also propose the concept of transporting biogas in the pipeline in the future, which also to some extent can explain why Denmark is participating in fossil fuel infrastructure projects at this point in time.

Furthermore, similar to the Danish case, Polish policymakers deploy arguments linked to how the BPP will help propel the green transition. This is not surprising as existing literature have highlighted how the coal-consuming country is hesitant to phase out all fossil fuels. Policymakers therefore rely on natural gas as a bridging fuel that will contribute to reducing the emissions of the Polish economy and help improve certain areas such as air quality. Such findings were in line with the theory that the BPP would be positioned as part of Poland's climate efforts. Moreover, by emphasising the BPP's status as a PCI, it is possible that that stakeholders have sought to counter opposition from fossil fuel sceptics. Hence, by establishing a link between the BPP and a fair transition, Poland is perhaps seeking to defend the negative impacts that the project will have on the climate. Finally, an interesting finding was that policymakers also argued for the 'wins' that Denmark would achieve from pipeline cooperation. This can perhaps indicate that policymakers are aware of the importance of Denmark's climate reputation.

3. Results for Economic Justifications

Denmark

The analysis showed some evidence for economic considerations centred around the economic benefits for consumers and the Danish economy in light of the BPP. Firstly, the theory predicted policymakers would focus on the consumer benefits in terms of natural gas prices. Such economic considerations were found in the documents: *“Baltic Pipe contributes to keeping tariffs low for Danish consumers and enterprises”* (2021). The data also showed that policymakers have sought to highlight that the BPP is not financed through Danish tax payers: *“It is not the Danish consumers, that will pay for this pipeline ... with this deal, it will be Poland and the Polish consumers that will finance the construction of this pipeline”* (16/04). Additionally, results were found for how the policymakers foresee that the BPP will benefit the wider Danish economy: *“Baltic Pipe is a huge gain for Denmark ...the pipeline will give billions of profits to the society, and gas consumers will get lower tariffs”* (08/09).

Finally, results were also found for other economic considerations, mainly linked to the strengthened role of Denmark in the European gas market: *“The Danish gas infrastructure will soon get a more central place in the European gas market”* (2021). Mentions were also made as to how the BPP can increase the overall demand for natural gas, thus making the BPP a more cost-effective project: *“there will be opportunities to attract new actors on the energy market and a potential increase in the demand for gas in exposed regions”* (13/03).

Poland

Limited results were found for economic considerations in the BPP in the case of Poland. The theory predicted that since the BPP is a costly project and the gas that will flow through the pipeline is expensive, Polish policymakers would have few economic justifications. However, some arguments were made as to how the BPP could facilitate more competitive pricing: *“investments in the gas sector, such as the Baltic Pipe ... are intended to ensure competitive prices for the raw material for Poles”* (15/03) as well as: *“becoming independent from the dominant gas supplier is a guarantee of competitive gas prices”* (12/02). Given Gazprom’s monopolistic position on the European gas market

which has resulted in very high prices of Polish consumers, it is likely that the BPP will increase the freedom of Poland to negotiate prices. Other than these findings, no specific references were made in terms of economic arguments for the development of the BPP.

Summary

The theory in both cases predicted that limited economic arguments would be put forward in the two countries. In the documents for Denmark, it is clear that most focus has been given to how the BPP can contribute to lower gas prices for Danish consumers, thus resulting in overall energy savings. It can thus be argued that policymakers view Denmark's future role as a transit state as an economic gain that will provide revenue to the state. The analysis also illustrated that policymakers have sought to clarify who is actually paying for the construction of the pipeline, which they maintain is Poland. This verifies the claim that certain groups in Denmark have been concerned about the financial costs of the project. Moreover, an interesting yet surprising finding was the consideration of how the BPP can strengthen Denmark's role in the gas system. This was unexpected and perhaps signals that the fossil fuel industry in Denmark is still a powerful lobbying group in Danish energy debates. Finally, the documents for Poland showed few results. Besides the possibility of increasing the competitiveness on the market, no specific economic considerations were discussed. This can arguably confirm the theory that the BPP is a costly infrastructure project for Poland and that the government is primarily replacing expensive Russian gas with expensive Norwegian gas.

Discussion

The Baltic Pipe has been primarily rationalised in terms of energy security and the green transition by Polish and Danish stakeholders. Polish policymakers sought to underline the immediate threat of energy security and how the BPP enshrines diversification away from Russian gas while also incorporating European-wide arguments to underline and emphasise the project's environmental credentials. Danish stakeholders focused on the same broad justifications but took an alternate perspective; Denmark was consistently portrayed as a leader assisting Poland and the wider region in augmenting their energy security and green transition. Each side invoked the EU as a device to justify the project in European terms, leveraging arguments that the BPP reduces aggregate carbon emissions in the bloc and deepens inter-bloc networks of energy transfer. Additionally, history appears to play a significant role in the energy security arguments which have been made for the pipeline. Both Poland's distrust of its domineering neighbour and Denmark's policy shifts after the Crimean invasion may contribute to the overall emphasis on energy security. Conversely, economic arguments are less frequently used in discussing the merits of the BPP. Surprisingly, Danish documents illustrate the economic arguments more than the Polish documents and in fact focus on a domestic audience far more than the security and transition arguments which are made by the Danes. This highlights how, from the Danish perspective, domestic economic interests in the pipeline are substantial even though they contradict the image of a green leader which guides justifications in other areas. In contrast, the realities of Russian imports ending in 2022 mean that Poland's justifications of competition in the market are weak and might explain why they appear so infrequently.

This thesis has focused exploring the justifications for the BPP prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, the BPP in light of the war warrants a few words. Since the conflict broke out, Russia has stopped its exports to Poland and Bulgaria and has further threatened to halt gas supplies to other EU countries that support Kyiv (Ray, 2022). As such, the security significance of the BPP has become ever more prominent for Poland. Furthermore, an apparent justification of the BPP is

that it will decrease Poland's use of coal. However, experts have argued that the Ukraine crisis may halt decarbonising efforts (Delbeke et al.,2022). Hence, Poland is likely to revert back to coal if the state struggles to meet its energy needs (Gosling, 2022). By prolonging the use of coal, Poland will experience a spike in carbon emissions which will ultimately delay climate action in the energy field.

Finally, while the analysis generated compelling results that have produced more insight to the justifications behind the BPP, there are limits to this research. Due to the practical limitations of this paper, it was impossible to incorporate all the findings that derived from the document analysis. Several interesting passages have been excluded as it was restrained by the length of the paper. Moreover, while the analysis focused on examining data from different stakeholders, including government ministries, it is evident that these cannot verify the states' official justifications. Hence, this paper gives an insight into the arguments that have been put forward. It is likely that the states will have had more arguments for the pipelines, and that in order to uncover these, further research is required. For future research, it would be particularly interesting to interview government officials from both countries who have participated in the decision-making aspects of the project as this would facilitate more knowledge as to why the BPP was initiated. Additionally, looking more closely as to how the BPP will affect Poland's green transition moving into the future would be a compelling study given that this was a strong justification for the pipeline.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to understand how Danish and Polish stakeholders have justified the BPP which connects the two countries. Overall, explanations referencing energy security trumped rationalisations of the pipeline in light of the economic benefits. The threat to Polish gas supplies from its reliance on Russia was a driving force behind the project from Danish and Polish perspectives. Nevertheless, the environmental benefits of the project were also leveraged by both sides. Across the different themes and justifications, a European and sub-regional narrative was also evident, particularly in the Danish documents. The BPP was described as a benefit for the broader eastern bloc since it enhances Poland's ability to distribute gas on to its neighbours and the EU was invoked to highlight the environmental credentials of the project by both Danish and Polish stakeholders.

Within Poland's support for the project, energy security was particularly pronounced. Issues with the reliability of the Kremlin and the politicized nature of Russian fossil fuel exports were heavily referenced in its support of the BPP. Additionally, even the economic justifications for the project, which were somewhat limited in the Polish case, invoked Russia by underlining that the BPP would give competition to Gazprom who currently have a monopoly on Polish gas supplies and can charge excessive prices. For Poland, the BPP was defined as a bridge away from its reliance on coal which will reduce the overall carbon footprint of the state. Denmark's partnership was discussed in light of reducing the overall emissions from Europe and the EU's approval of the project was also instrumentalized to bolster the BPP's green credentials.

In contrast to Poland, Denmark's justification was more outward-looking whereby the principal arguments in support of the project involved outlining benefits for the Polish side. Denmark portrayed itself as a green leader who by approving the project would assist the transition away from coal in Poland. Additionally, and perhaps due to reticence surrounding the historic mistake of wholeheartedly supporting Nord stream 1, Poland's energy security was also a central plank in Denmark's justification of the

project. Lastly, in comparison to Poland, the economic benefits did play a more significant role. Danish policymakers reference the possibility for lower tariffs and revenue to the state as a transit country.

All in all, the BPP is a relevant transnational project within the global politics of pipelines. It can be concluded the BPP is a mixed blessing given current realities such as the war in Ukraine which threatens Europe's energy supply. Yet, with the pressing climate crisis, it is evident that the natural gas flowing through the pipeline will delay global mitigation efforts. As such, it is plausible to view the BPP as primarily a security endeavour that helps safeguard this crucial commodity. While the green transition is acknowledged in its development, natural gas remains, at the end of the day, a harmful fossil fuel.

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