WORKING PAPER

Trade and Sustainable Development: Non-Economic Objectives in the Theory of Economic Policy

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Abstract

While the theory of economic policy offers a potential framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs), over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, rather than as goals that may themselves be endogenous alongside EOs. We examine the analytical treatment of NEOs as co-determined with EOs, revisiting some of the ground broken by Alan Winters in his analysis of NEOs. We review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss current practice in the representation of such objectives as exogenous constraints, and develop an argument for representation of NEOs as objectives in themselves.

Keywords

Non-economic objectives, endogenous economic policy, trade policy, issue linkage, values

JEL codes

I38, F13, O24
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Introduction

States pursue national prosperity and security through external policies spanning a range of instruments. These include trade policy (tariffs; nontariff measures; trade agreements for goods and services), development cooperation (financial grants and loans), regulation of inward and outward direct investment and movement of people (temporary and longer-term migration), access to public procurement markets, and control of trade in dual use technologies and military products. States also use external policies to protect or project their values. This can take the form of production requirements that apply to imports (labour standards; environmental sustainability regulations) and efforts to promote specific values and norms – e.g., political and civil rights, human rights more broadly – through bilateral engagement, or international cooperation to protect the global commons (e.g., reduce greenhouse gas emissions, control overfishing). Values also drive regulation in new areas such as digital trade and digital technology, e.g., ethics guidelines for trustworthy artificial intelligence, or addressing the potential for online harms and discrimination across age, gender, or ethnicity.

In the case of the European Union (EU), as well as other OECD member countries, trade (market access) is used as a tool to pursue both commercial (trade) interests and values (non-trade objectives). The Treaty of Lisbon explicitly calls for EU trade and investment policy to support and promote EU values and standards relating to human rights, labour rights, the environment, and sustainable development. As a result, trade is not an end in itself. Instead, it is “a means to deliver prosperity at home and to export [EU] values across the world’ [including] ‘the highest standards of climate, environmental and labour protection, with a zero-tolerance policy on child labour’. The operationalization of this principle takes the form of explicit issue linkages: conditioning access to the EU market on the pursuit and realization of non-trade objectives. This occurs both in the context of nonreciprocal preferential access for developing countries and in reciprocal trade agreements (Borchert et al., 2021). An implication of the strategy is that the EU Members, like other high-income countries, pursue a mix of economic and non-economic objectives through their common external trade and investment policy. Commercial policy is not the only instrument set available to the EU, but because the EU is a customs union with expanded investment competence following the Treaty of Lisbon (Van der Loo and Hahn 2020), it is the main fulcrum for the collective pursuit of non-economic objectives (NEOs) in partner (foreign) countries.

In principle, the theory of economic policy offers a framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of EOs and NEOs. As we discuss below, the need to consider both in thinking about policy was recognized over a century ago (Pigou, 1920). Unfortunately, over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, not as goals in and of themselves that should be included explicitly into the objective function and be part of the analysis of policy. The need to do so was identified by Alan Winters in two important articles on NEOs (Winters, 1989; 1990). In this paper, we retrace some of the ground tilled by Winters, whose insights unfortunately does not appear to have had much impact outside of the agricultural trade policy literature, review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss the main positions in the representation of such objectives, and present (yet another) alternative representation.
I. NEOs in the Theory of Economic Policy

As we have argued in recent work (Hoekman and Nelson, 2020, p. 11), the theory of economic policy is a robust, practical, common sensical framework for thinking about economic policy. As argued there, as a practical matter, the theory of economic policy can be reduced to three basic questions:

• What is the problem?
• What instruments are available to deal with the problem?
• Of those instruments, which politically feasible one(s) achieves the goal at lowest cost?

Although “what is the problem?” seems a simple question, this is both the most important and, in some sense, the least clearly analysed of the three questions. Because the policy choice problem proceeds as an optimization problem, an essential part of the analysis involves getting clarity on the objective function of the relevant decision-maker. That is, “the problem” must be defined relative to some clearly understood preferences over outcomes of the policy process. In a sense, an EO is relatively easy to understand in this context. By defining the objective as improving economic efficiency, we automatically have a straightforward metric for evaluating both the costs and benefits of the (absence of) the policy in question. This is not the case for NEOs. For example, while income distribution is obviously an economic metric, goals with respect to income distribution do not strictly follow from distortions in the economy per se, but from broader political struggles or widely held values in civil society. Thus, income distribution goals are non-economic. Similarly for national security, human rights, or any of the other objectives justified in this way.

Loosely speaking, an EO seeks to restore efficient conditions in an otherwise perfectly competitive economy when faced with some form of distortion, while a NEO is not related to efficiency as a goal. The meaning of “EO” as the response to the failure of satisfying the marginal conditions for efficiency, and the evaluation of optimal instruments to use to respond to such situations are clear in the case of EOs, but less so for the case of NEOs. The attempt to define something in terms of “not something else” is never going to be particularly satisfactory.

A first problem with defining an objective function for the analysis of NEOs has to do with establishing the legitimacy of a given NEO. Because the goal of an EO is to increase efficiency, such goals will have a prima facie plausibility. The legitimacy of a policy that seeks to improve efficiency might require little justification, while the legitimacy of any given claim to a NEO is unclear and might be considered “essentially contested” (Gallie, 1955; Collier et al., 2006). Gallie notes:

Any particular usage of any concept of common sense or of the natural sciences is liable to be contested for reasons better or worse; but whatever the strength of the reasons they usually carry with them an assumption of agreement, as to the kind of use that is appropriate to the concept in question, between its user and anyone who contests his particular use of it. When this assumption cannot be made, we have a widely recognized ground for philosophical enquiry. Thus, “This picture is painted in oils” may be contested on the ground that it is painted in tempera, with the natural assumption that the disputants agree as to the proper use of the terms involved. But “This picture is a work of art” is liable to be contested because of an evident disagreement as to-and the consequent need for philosophical elucidation of-the proper general use of the term “work of art”. (Gallie, 1955, p. 167)

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4 Hoekman and Nelson (2022) argue that, while there are ways to derive national security as an economic objective (primarily as a public good supplied by the state), most public arguments for national security-based trade policy derive from NEOs.

5 It is this plausibility that underlies the Kaldor-Hicks type of argument in favour of any policy that increases efficiency (Hicks, 1939, Kaldor, 1939). While it has been well-understood, at least since Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947), that such arguments don’t really extend the Pareto ordering, they do argue to the point of efficiency as a goal of economic policy. However, as Pigou (1920, Chapter 1, Section 8) argues, while such efficiency objectives might well conflict with NEOs, undermining any clear conclusions of the overall effect of a policy based on economic objectives alone, it is legitimate to consider the economic effects.
As with “work of art”, so with “non-economic objective”. There are a potentially very wide range of values in terms of which such an objective might be justified and at least as wide a range of political actors that might legitimately deploy such values and bodies of technical knowledge that might be legitimately used to support such claims. Without clarity about the nature and form of the objective function, it is not clear what it means to claim that something is a NEO.

A second problem, also embodied in the objective function, is the way claims about a given NEO are to be traded-off against other objectives. Considering only the most pressing long-run issues, a decision-maker needs to consider how to allocate scarce economic, political, and social resources across a variety of income distribution, defence, environmental, public health, education, and other goals. While these are often treated independently in both the relevant political institutions and in policy studies, they are obviously linked in the grand general equilibrium and a fully adequate objective function should consider the trade-offs implied by that general equilibrium. This is only possible in the context of a well-specified objective function that embodies those trade-offs. As mentioned in the Introduction, such trade-offs are often ignored, reflected in a focus on a broad range of NEOs that implicitly are treated as being equally important, with all to be pursued through the instrument of trade policy.

Perhaps not surprisingly, while applications of the theory of economic policy to EOs are many and sophisticated, the modern literature on NEOs is quite small. The next section provides a brief review of this literature.

6 Gallie offers a five-part formal definition of essential contestedness, all of which characterize “NEOs”: “(I) it must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement. (II) This achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole. (III) Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the respective contributions of its various parts or features; yet prior to experimentation there is nothing absurd or contradictory in any one of a number of possible rival descriptions of its total worth, one such description setting its component parts or features in one order of importance, a second setting them in a second order, and so on. In fine, the accredited achievement is initially variously describable. (IV) The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance. For convenience I shall call the concept of any such achievement ‘open’ in character. … not only that different persons or parties adhere to different views of the correct use of some concept but (V) that each party recognizes the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties, and that each party must have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of which the other parties claim to be applying the concept in question” (Gallie, 1955, pp. 171-172).

7 Several readers have suggested that standard methods of policy comparison, in particular the marginal value of public funds (MVPF, see e.g., Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020), can be applied to compare among NEOs. While both Eos and NEOs can be evaluated under a money metric, this is orthogonal to the point of this paper. Without prejudice to the value of research using MVPFs to evaluate well-specified policy choices, our distinction between EOs and NEOs concerns the objective of policy, not whether it is measurable in monetary terms. If sufficient information is available to use MVPFs to make welfare statements one can work directly with welfare. For our purposes the latter is cleaner (requiring fewer assumptions—in particular about the marginal utility of money to the decision-maker) and clearer, in that the marginal conditions that reflect the comparisons are explicit about the comparisons being made. The difficulty of analyzing NEOs relative to EOs is not due to measurement, but the way such issues are embedded in political systems, their essentially contested nature and the fact they do not rest on straightforward efficiency issues. To illustrate, consider environmental sustainability as an EO and as a NEO. As an EO, environmental degradation flows from an externality the measurement of which is a technical engineering problem. Policies that offset the externality can easily be ranked in terms of their relative costs. The evaluation of those costs takes place under a social welfare function with a fixed commitment to environmental sustainability (the environmental NEO). A change in the environmental NEO is a change in the structure of the objective function and will change any policy with linkages to environmental policy. While these effects will be revealed in changes in marginal conditions, identifying and justifying the change is a matter of policy discourse, not engineering.
II. Major Contributions to the Literature on NEOs

The fundamentally practical orientation of classical and early neoclassical economics meant that most of the policies analysed would be considered non-economic as defined in modern theory of economic policy (e.g. poverty, employment, growth, national security, etc.). As a result, there has been some attempt to claim this early work had an explicit notion of NEO (Elmslie, 2004b, a, Maneschi, 2004). Of course, mercantilist (Viner, 1948) and statist (List, 1885) analysts also presented analyses that would be considered non-economic under any reasonable definition of “non-economic” (in particular, a focus on national security).8 A systematic differentiation between EOs and NEOs in welfare analysis seems to go back no further than Pigou’s (1920) classic The Economics of Welfare. For Pigou, the distinction was whether or not a policy could be evaluated in terms of the “measuring rod of money” (Pigou, 1920, p. 11). Specifically,

… though no precise boundary between economic and non-economic welfare exists, yet the test of accessibility to a money measure serves well enough to set up a rough distinction. Economic welfare, as loosely defined by this test, is the subject-matter of economic science. (p. 11)

While this appears to rule NEOs out of “economic science”, Pigou is at some pains to suggest that there is bidirectional causation between economic and non-economic phenomena, so that the focus on economic welfare will always be incomplete. Nonetheless, Pigou goes on to argue (p. 12) that:

… a change in one part never measures the change in the whole, yet the change in the part may always affect the change in the whole by its full amount. If this condition is satisfied, the practical importance of economic study is fully established. … The real objection is not that economic welfare is a bad index of total welfare, but that an economic cause may affect non-economic welfare in ways that cancel its effect on economic welfare. (italics in original)9

While the theory of economic policy as applied to trade has roots in Meade’s (1955) Trade and Welfare and the general theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), the foundational work is in a series of exceptional papers by Max Corden (1957), Harry Johnson (1960), and Jagdish Bhagwati and colleagues (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963, Bhagwati 1967, Bhagwati et al., 1969).10 These papers define EOs in terms of distortions and policies in terms of responses to those distortions.11 More importantly, at least for the case of EOs, they develop a clear analytical framework that permits explicit answers to the instrument identification, ranking and choice problems in an optimizing, welfare theoretic framework.12 Because the goal is economic efficiency, evaluation in terms of marginal conditions, and degrees of deviation from those conditions, permit a sensible and sophisticated analysis of policy choice and evaluation. For the case of NEOs, however, these...
economists implicitly follow Pigou in assuming that such objectives cannot be analysed with the measuring rod of money and therefore do not fit comfortably in the framework applied to EOs.

The preferred approach of the modern theory of economic policy to NEOs is to treat a policy target that deviates from the undistorted equilibrium as a constraint in the analysis and identify the optimal intervention to achieve that target. Corden (1957) is the first systematic analysis of NEOs in the context of a recognizably theory of economic policy framework. Corden considers an industrial policy, adopted “say for strategic or other political reasons” (p. 240), that involves greater production of the import-competing good than would occur in the undistorted equilibrium and shows that, for a large economy, the optimal policy involves the application of both a tariff (given by the optimal tariff) and a production subsidy. Johnson (1960) then develops this sort of analysis in much greater detail under the label of a “scientific tariff”. That is, a tariff that balances the standard costs of protection against NEOs that might be affected by the tariff. Referring explicitly to the then new theory of the second-best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), Johnson suggests that a tariff might apply to both a distortion (as in the case of a large, free-trading country) and to a situation where “the most appropriate remedy is somehow ruled out and where the tariff would produce some improvement” (p. 341). But, argues Johnson, this remains well-within standard welfare economics. That is, it is just policy ranking/assignment again. Instead, Johnson is interested in policies that seek to promote non-economic objectives of various kinds, identified in one way or another with the effects of the tariff on domestic production and consumption of certain products. The notion of a scientific tariff seems to comprise an inchoate notion of a balancing of result achieved against costs incurred. So conceived, the construction of a scientific tariff presupposed definition in quantitative terms of the beneficial results, values that can be weighed against the cost of protection… It entails the dual process … of minimizing the cost of achieving each amount of benefit by adjusting the structure of tariff rates in order to equalize the ratio of marginal benefit to marginal cost in each industry protected and of maximizing the benefits of protection by selecting the general level of protection at which marginal value of benefit from protection equals marginal cost of protection. (p. 341)

Johnson considers tariffs as an instrument to achieve five specific NEOs:

• A tariff to promote national self-sufficiency and independence.
• A tariff to promote diversification, industrialization, or agriculturalization.
• A tariff to promote a “way of life”.
• A tariff to promote military preparedness.
• A bargaining tariff.

Unlike Corden, Johnson does not consider instruments other than the tariff. In a later paper (Johnson, 1965), Johnson does sketch an analysis of NEOs consistent with Bhagwati and Ramaswami’s (1963) formalization, extension and systematization of the theory of economic policy. However, it is Bhagwati (1967) and especially Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) who build on Bhagwati and Ramaswami to develop an analysis of NEOs that is fully consistent with the theory of economic policy.

13 In fact, Corden (1957), explicitly building on Meade (1955), appears to be the first application of the instrument ranking/assignment rule analysis that became central to the theory of economic policy.
As with Corden, for Bhagwati and Srinivasan NEOs are simply constraints that are given from outside the analysis. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998, p. 351) list the “four classic types of noneconomic objective” as:

- Production of a good should not fall below a certain level;
- Consumption of a good should not exceed a certain level;
- Import (or export) of a good should not exceed a certain level;
- Level of factor use in a good should exceed a certain level.

Note, however, that unlike the case of EOs, where the objective is literally to increase efficiency by “fixing” a distortion, these are not actually objectives, but instruments for achieving objectives given from outside the model. There is no real way to compare, in welfare terms, the level of achievement of a NEO with EOs (as suggested in Johnson, 1960, 1965). On the other hand, this presentation does allow the development of a direct parallel between this list of NEOs and the EOs given in footnote 11. That is, for each of the NEOs listed above, there is a parallel EO which is characterized by the same ranking of policies. This is proposition 3.ii in Bhagwati (1971):

a. When distortions have to be introduced into the economy because the values of certain variables have to be constrained, the policy interventions that do this can be … welfare ranked. b. The ranking of these policies is further completely symmetrical with that under the “corresponding” class of [economic objectives]. (p. 18)

As with EOs, the ranking is based on using the least distorting method of pursuing the NEO.

In addition to countless applications of this logic, a number of papers formally extend the basic 2-good × 2-factor × 2-country analysis. For example, Vandendorpe (1974), explicitly linking his work to that on the general theory of second best, shows that extension to the m-factor × n-good is straightforward. This allows Vandendorpe to show that the optimal NEO structure involves a differentiated (as opposed to uniform) tax structure of a fairly complex sort, involving a standard optimal tariff structure if the country is economically large. Given the current interest in global value chains (GVCs), Tan’s (1971) analysis of the case with “imported materials, inter-industry flows and non-trade goods” is worthy of particular note. For the case of interindustry flows, the optimal NEO policies considered by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969), the main difference is that: “Maintenance of a minimum level of gross production of any good requires a tax-cum-subsidy on gross domestic production; a goal of achieving a minimum level of net production of any good requires a subsidy on gross production combined with a tax on inter-industry linkage” (p. 105). With imported intermediates: “self-sufficiency is no longer identifiable with curbing of final imports (since imports of intermediates still need to be paid for); and a goal of increasing domestic value-added is optimally met by uniformly subsidizing domestic inputs” (p. 105). Finally, Rodrik (1986, 1987) makes the important point that, in a full political economic equilibrium, the ranking of interventions in terms of cost may differ from the ranking that does not consider response by politically engaged agents.

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14 Bhagwati and Srinivasan do consider an analysis in which the NEO is included in the objective function, but it still remains a constrained value of one of the arguments in the social welfare function. While Johnson’s analysis is informal, as with the text quoted above, Johnson seems to see NEOs as continuously variable and relatively directly comparable to economic objectives.

15 Bhagwati (1971, p. 77) refers to this parallelism as “dual”, with the scare quotes reflecting that Bhagwati is aware that this is not mathematical duality. Many later papers drop the quotes.

16 Ohyama (1972, section VII esp. p. 58) and Lloyd (1973) develop closely related m-factor × n-good analyses with policy fixed prices and/or quantities.

17 Yu (1975) also considers intermediate goods and Yu (1977) examines optimal effective protection with NEOs.

18 Ohyama (1972, section VII esp. p. 58) and Lloyd (1973) develop closely related m-factor × n-good analyses with policy fixed prices and/or quantities.
In a pair of extraordinary articles, but little noticed outside of agricultural economics literature, Alan Winters appears to reject the Corden-Johnson-Bhagwati approach to the modelling of NEOs and returned to the core approach of Pigou. The central argument is as follows:

The existence of legitimate objectives other than maximising aggregate income is indisputable, but it is wrong to characterise them as "non-economic", hence our use of the term "so-called non-economic objectives" (SNOs). It is true that most of these objectives pose analytical difficulties for economists. For example, some concern social costs and benefits rather than individual ones, e.g. the environment, while others concern the distribution of economic welfare rather than its total level, e.g. the level and variability of farm incomes. Moreover, there are usually no markets in which the demands for such objectives may be satisfied directly. Nevertheless, for so long as the objectives are amenable to measurement and analysis in money terms, even if only crudely, they are economic in the sense defined by Pigou. They are also economic in the sense that their achievement requires the absorption of real resources which could otherwise have been used for other objectives. Thus, while SNOs may raise issues that require analysis in other dimensions, e.g. sociology or aesthetics, they necessarily entail a critical economic dimension because the scarcity of resources means that choices have to be made between conflicting desires.

Winters does not reject the distinction between policies aimed at improving efficiency of the economy and policies that derive from preferences over issues normally considered outside the economy. Rather, following Pigou, he argues that we can evaluate the latter type of objectives in straightforwardly economic terms rendering them, also, economic.19 As we will discuss momentarily, Winters clearly has a notion of NEOs in the objective function but, because he has no way of evaluating the satisfaction of such objectives, he follows the Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) approach of treating them as in some way fixed so that he can ask whether the instruments actually applied are those warranted by the theory of economic policy. This has the effect of essentially treating the NEOs as constraints that can be satisfied at greater or lesser cost. However, this practical concession is embedded in a discussion of the general problem of economic policy which is deeper and subtler than the standard approach to the theory of economic policy. The key to that sophistication is an explicit recognition of the importance of the objective function to the theory of economic policy generally, whether for EOs or NEOs. It is to this that we now turn.

III. NEOs in the Objective Function

As a branch of welfare economics dealing with optimal policy (and deviations therefrom), the objective function (i.e. that which is optimized) must play an essential role. The most obvious objective function is the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (SWF) (Bergson, 1938, Samuelson, 1947, 1956, 1981):

A function of all economic magnitudes of a system which is supposed to characterize some ethical belief—that of a benevolent despot, or a complete egotist, or “all men of good will,” a misanthrope, the state, race, or group mind, God, etc. (Samuelson, 1947, p 221)

Specifically,

…we may write this function of the form

\[ W = W(z_1, z_2, \ldots), \]

Where the \( z \)'s represent all possible variables, *many of them non-economic in character.* (p. 221, emphasis added)

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19 Given that he accepts the distinction between policies that respond to distortions and those that respond to some other source of policy demand, which is the core of the economic/non-economic distinction, it is not clear that the “so-called non-economic objectives” label is particularly useful. Thus, we will substitute “NEO” for “SNO” in direct quotations from Winters.
Samuelson goes on to note that:

Between these z’s there will be a number of “technological” relations limiting our freedom to vary the z’s independently. Just what the content of these technological relations will be depends upon the level of abstraction at which the specifier of value judgments wishes to work. … In other words, the auxiliary constraints on the variables are not themselves the proper subject matter of welfare economics, but must be taken as given. (pp. 221-222).

When Johnson (1960), in the quotation above, refers to the “inchoate notion of balancing of results achieved against costs incurred” across EOs and NEOs he clearly has in mind some such SWF. Winters extends his analysis beyond the scientific tariff. In describing optimal policy choice, Winters (1989, pp. 242-243) says:

Such intervention should ideally be thought of as society as a whole choosing between outcomes, a choice that depends on the relative weighting of various [NEOs] and private goods in social welfare.

While stated informally, Winters’ analysis reflects the same marginal conditions developed explicitly for the SWF analysis of Bergson and Samuelson:

…different policies will tend to deliver [NEOs] and other objectives in different proportions. If, at the margin, two policies trade-off a particular [NEO] against other goods at different rates, the government is essentially buying its [NEO] at two different prices; it should shift its custom toward the cheaper supplier, i.e. pursue the more efficient policy and reduce its reliance on the other. [p. 243]

This subtlety disappears when we turn to the more formal analysis building on Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) where the objective function is a SWF defined over consumption of final goods. This permits the analysis to proceed as if there was a representative private agent with well-behaved, standard neoclassical preferences. This is a sensible strategy for the analysis of EOs, since the point of EO policy is to “fix” distortions and increase efficiency of the final, relative to the distorted, equilibrium.20 When we turn to NEOs, this is pretty obviously not consistent with the general programme of the theory of economic policy.

The great virtue of the theory of economic policy is not that its formal representation is particularly operational, but that it provides a powerful and flexible framework for organizing thinking about policy in practical application.21 This is precisely the same virtue that characterizes the Bergson-Samuelson SWF. The fact that the NEOs themselves may not be measurable in the same way as preferences over final goods are should not be a barrier to development of the relevant theory. To carry out the sort of analysis implied by Winters’ work, the NEOs must be part of the SWF. Recall the separation between objective of policy and the policy-ranking/assignment problem in the characterization of the theory of economic policy as three basic questions. This permits the sort of analysis in which Winters evaluates various policy interventions as instrumental to achieving a NEO, but not themselves as NEOs.22 As the quotation from Pigou above suggests, while ignoring the sort of spillovers across NEOs and EOs, this is a first-order plausible approach to policy evaluation. That said, as both

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20 There remain some tricky issues about income distribution that, in a full welfare analysis, should be considered. The Bergson-Samuelson SWF rests on a redistributive policy in the background of the analysis which produces both a positive and normative representative agent on the demand side of the model. An alternative is to assume Gorman form preferences, e.g. identical homothetic preferences, and a utilitarian policy-maker.


22 This is not so clear in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) and their followers. The explicit analysis of objective function in Bhagwati and Srinivasan is peculiar in two ways. First, the authors suggest that introducing NEOs in the SWF “raises the question of whether it is meaningful at all to distinguish between economic and non-economic objectives when both sets of objectives enter the utility function as arguments” (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1969, p. 37). As we have noted above, the key distinction between EOs and NEOs has nothing to do with the content of the objective function but has to do with the goal of policy. Second, instead to introducing an actual NEO in the objective function, Bhagwati and Srinivasan simply introduce the relevant constraint into the objective function, missing precisely the separation of objective from the policy-ranking/assignment problem that is the core of the theory of economic policy.
Johnson (1960) and Winters (1989, 1990) suggest, a more complete analysis of the welfare effects of policy should at least recognize such spillovers.

So, what would a simple framework for analysis of NEOs look like? Not surprisingly, we start with an objective function that incorporates NEOs. As in the above quotation from Samuelson, we consider a SWF that has two sorts of variables: final consumption goods; and NEOs: $W = W(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{n})$. Here $\mathbf{x}$ is a vector of final consumption goods and $\mathbf{n}$ is a vector of NEOs (e.g., national security, environmental quality, food self-sufficiency, cultural indicators, etc.). Many NEOs are public goods, whereas the vector of $\mathbf{x}$ would ordinarily be private goods. Some NEOs can be treated as EOs by focusing on them as public goods, but this is not satisfactory. The fundamental problem is not underproduction due to free rider problems, but that the conception of them as an object of policy has to do their place in the objective of the decision-maker. Relative to the classic work on theory of policy, the issue is not the failure of a standard marginal condition (which is the case with public goods), but something about the state of the particular NEO. As a place to start, we consider $\mathbf{n}$ relatively fixed over most policy-making situations. However, changes in the non-economic environment will have effects on the full general equilibrium. Suppose that $n1$ is geopolitical security. As long as it is fixed, it is essentially embedded in the SWF, affecting the equilibrium, but not changing it. However, suppose that $n1$ is a function of the geopolitical situation. Hoekman and Nelson (2022) draw on a classic paper by Wolfers (1951) to characterize the state of the geopolitical system in terms of proximity to the “pole of power”, where national survival is at stake and all policy is subordinated to defence of the nation. Thus, if we measure the geopolitical situation ($G$) as lying on a continuum between the pole of power and the pole of indifference, we can represent $n1 = f^{n1}(G)$. While stable under normal situations, an event (such as the launch by Russia of a war against Ukraine) that causes a shift toward the pole of power will cause a shift in the SWF (in particular, a shift in the relative weights on the various NEOs) which, in turn, affects the overall equilibrium. For example, this will cause shifts in policy affecting both allocation of domestic resources and patterns of trade (embargoes, friend-shoring, etc.).

We can carry out a similar exercise for any other NEO. For example, we might consider an environmental quality objective whose state is a function of current environmental conditions. The variable reflecting perception of those conditions might be changed in the direction of life-threatening environmental catastrophe (the equivalent of a state of war for the geopolitical security NEO) by a major environmental event (e.g., the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 or a series of unusually hot summers). Changes in one or more NEO variables should then be evaluated (i.e. traded off) in the objective function with effects on the final equilibrium as a function of perceived relative seriousness of the changes and the costs of responding to the changed situation in the new equilibrium.

Beyond discrete changes in the non-economic policy environment, a more nuanced connection between EOs and NEOs is their embedded relationship in terms of claims on resources, changes in non-economic outcomes due to economic policy (a key point of Winters 1989), the political constraints that NEOs may place on economic policy targeting EOs. What this points to is an implicit connection between the economic outcomes driving and affected by economic policies, and the extent to which those policies also drive non-economic outcomes. As Finger (1981) has stressed, there is also an important role played by the information made available to interested political agents in terms of costs and benefits (winners and losers) when formulating policy. Without a proper understanding of substantive economic policy linkages to non-economic outcomes, even technocratic or “numbers based” assessments may lead to sub-optimal policy outcomes. There is also the critical question of
administrative constraints, by which we mean whether policy mechanisms actually have the degrees of freedom necessary to balance elements of \( x \) against elements of \( n \).\(^{27}\)

### IV. Towards Operationalization: Trade and Sustainable Development

As noted previously, NEOs figure centrally in the rhetoric surrounding EU’s trade policy, and in the public consultation process linked to trade agreement negotiations and ratification (Rojas-Romagosa 2020). Technically, trade and trade preferences are conditioned on the implementation of labour and environmental policies and outcomes in partner countries. The linkage strategy raises many practical questions, including whether it is effective,\(^ {28}\) whether distinctions can (should) be made across different NEOs (are some more important than others?), the relationship between trade and other instruments (substitutes? complements?), and the consequences of conditioning trade on NEOs for trade (realization of the EU’s commercial interests).

Answering these questions requires a conceptual framework that recognizes the inherent interdependencies between the various economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs) that are at stake. Such a structural framework is necessary to inform decisions on trade-offs between NEOs, given inevitable resource and other constraints that differentially affect the (opportunity) cost of attaining any given NEO. This in turn requires information on the relative priorities accorded to different NEOs by decisionmakers and those they represent. No distinction is made in the Treaty of Lisbon between different NEOs—implicitly all are equally important. In practice, of course, implementation of EU external policy reflects such prioritization, but it is usually situational, giving rise to legitimate criticism that EU pursuit of its values through its trade policy is rather arbitrary (Pelkmans, 2021). While this is inevitable to some extent, and governments must (be able to) respond to changed circumstances, greater ex ante clarity on the rank ordering of EOs and NEOs would help.

This was recognized in the recent review of the approach taken by the EU on trade and sustainable development. The European Commission (2022a) notes that looking forward, implementation of trade and sustainable development chapters and provisions in trade agreements will focus on a smaller set of NEOs that are agreed to be priorities. This is an important step forward, but such prioritization is not evident in other EU policies that centre on NEOs, such as the draft directive requiring firms to exercise due diligence over their international supply chains to ensure these conform with a long list of international treaties and conventions signed by the EU (European Commission, 2022b). Implicitly, all NEOs included in the Annex to the draft directive are considered equal. This also applies in the EU’s ex ante trade Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) and associated consultation processes that are used to inform decisionmakers (and negotiators) on the potential impacts of prospective trade agreements or other trade initiatives on NEOs. The methodology for SIAs and consultations simply lists NEOs. SIAs are limited to an effort to assess if trade liberalization will impact on a given NEO (see Rojas-Romagosa 2020). Consultations include surveys that ask respondents whether they believe a trade agreement will affect a long list of NEOs, with each NEO considered independently on a stand-alone basis (Hoekman and Rojas-Romagosa, 2022).

Better integrating NEOs into the objective function in policy assessments would both recognize the need and provide a basis for consideration of trade-offs across and within EOs and NEOs. If accompanied by mechanisms that are designed to generate information on relative priorities of stakeholders accorded to NEOs and prevailing constraints this would assist analysts to determine appropriate weights (reflecting preferences over NEOs) in SIAs and policy assessment more generally. Such mechanisms should include a focus on generating information on the costs associated with...

Essentially, the policy assessment was incomplete in important ways. On a broader scale, the EU has increasingly relied on quantification of the socio-economic and environmental dimensions of policy impact when evaluating trade and investment treaties, although it is not clear to what extent this is more than a process that generates the appearance of valuing NEOs (Rojas-Romagosa 2020).\(^ {27}\) See Gerbrandy (2017) for discussion of the scope for NOEs under Dutch competition law and administration, and Zleptnig (2009) on scope for policies targeting NEOs under GATT/WTO law.\(^ {27}\) See e.g., Ferrari et al. (2021) for a recent empirical assessment focusing on trade agreements.
improving the prospects for achieving NEOs in different contexts (low vs. middle income country partners; authoritarian vs. democracies; small vs. large traders). Instruments that can be used to generate information on priorities accorded to different NEOs, potential instruments to pursue them and their relative costs include deliberative polling (Hoekman and Rojas-Romagosa, 2022), value chain platforms in partner countries (Findlay and Hoekman, 2020), and targeted surveys (Fiorini et al. 2019; Yildirim et al. 2021). Doing so would allow the standard CGE models used in SIAs to better inform policymakers and civil society on how trade policy may impact on NEOs and assist in the prioritization of which NEOs to target in a specific context and period. It would also help address the related challenge of messaging surrounding the assessment of potential policy impact, a point stressed by Finger (1981). In the case of climate policy, Köberle et al. (2021) argue for changes in the framing of policy experiments and in the communication of the costs of policy inaction. This will be important in the upcoming challenges posed to trade policy by the move to carbon border taxes (specifically CO2) on traded goods, and the analysis and framing of such analysis in the policy debate and likely trade litigation.

29 See e.g., Wang et al. (2020) for experimental evidence, and Copland (2020) on the framing of public messaging on environmental policy to attack economic policy targeting NEOs (specifically carbon pricing policies).
References


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