

National Attachments and Good Citizenship: A Double-Edged Sword

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Abstract: The recent popularity of nationalist movements bears witness to the continued power of national feeling in politics. This article considers the potential relationship between different kinds of national attachments and what we call active and allegiant citizenship – support for democracy, community participation, and pro-social behavior. We analyze these relationships using data from two waves of the European Values Study. We find that a set of attachments often called civic nationalism – including patriotism, national identity and respect for one’s country’s institutions – are connected with better citizenship on virtually all of our outcomes, whereas ethnic nationalism is frequently connected with worse citizenship. These associations, however, tend to be weaker in the postcommunist states which have a different experience with both nationalism and democracy. The results suggest that national feeling can be both a blessing and a curse for citizenship.

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The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. The authors are not aware of any conflicts of interest relevant to this research.

The authors thank Rainer Bauböck, Jason Seawright, Maarten Vink, and two anonymous reviewers for valuable advice.

You know, they have a word. It sort of became old-fashioned – it's called a nationalist. And I say, really, we're not supposed to use that word. You know what I am? I'm a nationalist, okay? I'm a nationalist. Use that word! Use that word!

Donald Trump

From the election of Donald Trump to Brexit to the success of parties like the National Front and the Alternative für Deutschland, nationalism again appears to have captured political imaginations. Scholars tend to be fearful of these trends and indeed considerable scholarly research shows connections between nationalism and conflict (O'Leary and Sambanis 2018) and between nationalism and intolerance towards outsiders (Kunovich 2009). Others, however, argue that nationalism is just what the doctor ordered for ailing societies and argue that national feeling is associated with freedom and prosperity (Hazony 2018, Lowry 2019). Despite these works, many potential effects of national attachments await systematic exploration.

This paper contributes to these debates by introducing a new set of dependent variables related to citizenship. While most research on nationalism has considered its impact on policy preferences, particularly policies related to trade, migration, and foreigners, we focus instead on less controversial and potentially positive effects on citizenship. We ask whether those who feel closer to their country or greater pride in their country also do more for their country. Do they participate more in politics? Do they help their communities more? Do they follow the rules more? One might expect national attachments to inspire such sacrifices (Viroli 1995). Of course, these attachments could also point in the opposite direction if they lead to invidious comparisons and a perception that outsiders are free-riding on the nation.

Because nationalism might have diverse effects, we disaggregate national attachment, our general term for these feelings, into a variety of different types to determine exactly which forms

of national attachments are associated with better or worse citizenship. In particular, we consider the connections between patriotism (pride in one's country), national identity (closeness to one's country), respect for one's country's institutions, and ethnic nationalism (beliefs that ancestry and birth are the key markers of belonging) on the one hand and good or bad citizenship on the other.

Analyzing data from two waves (2008-2010, 2017-2020) of the European Values Study (EVS), we find that individuals who feel closer to their nation, are more proud of their nation, and have greater respect for their country's institutions are more active and allegiant citizens who participate more in democratic processes and civil society and accept pro-social norms to a greater degree. These associations are large and consistent. They imply that national attachments might have positive effects.

However, that is not the end of the story. Ethnic nationalism, based on conceptions of ancestry and birth, has less positive correlations. This more exclusivist form of national identity also has consistent associations with citizenship, but the associations are consistently negative. Though we cannot say how to navigate between these forms, i.e., what sort of nationalistic or patriotic education might best create good citizens, we can say that distinct forms of national attachment are associated with both good and bad citizenship, providing some support for both the positive and negative perspectives described earlier.

We further find that these associations differ across contexts. In particular, we find that the connections between national attachments and citizenship tend to be weaker in postcommunist Europe and ethnic nationalism sometimes behaves in less negative ways. These context-specific effects may be connected with these countries' different experiences with both nationalism and democratic participation.

We believe these associations have important implications for public affairs. Nationalism is not something that we can wish away. Even more importantly national attachments are not something that we can clearly praise or condemn. Certain forms of national attachment are associated with better citizenship and others with worse. And this is in addition to existing findings that link national attachments to conflict and tolerance. Indeed, the results in this paper suggest that those who have stronger attachments to the nation may be more influential in politics because they participate more. The question going forward is whether the positive or negative associations predominate and whether we can influence them.

The Nature of National Attachment

Nationalism, defined broadly as identification with one's country or ethnic group, is an indelible feature of the modern world.¹ Yet, social scientists are divided about its effects on political behavior. In one view, national attachments are a social glue that holds societies together, leads members of a nation to sacrifice for each other, and undergirds the equality of citizens necessary for democracy (Miller 1995). Conversely, others see nationalism as a cause of exclusion, prejudice, and even violent conflict as those with strong national attachments discriminate against those who they perceive as outside of the nation, such as ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, migrants, or foreigners (Gustavsson and Miller 2020).

These contrasting expectations are typically rooted in social identity theory as well as theories of prejudice. Tajfel's (1981) minimal group paradigm showed that individuals are easily induced to identify with a group and feel a sense of closeness that leads them to be proud of and work for their group. This paradigm would potentially explain the positive effects of national

¹ Our focus is on nationalism as an identity or feeling rather than nationalism as the ideology that the nation and state should be congruent.

attachment. The question remains whether this positive attachment is inevitably counterbalanced with negative feelings or even hatred towards outsiders (Brewer 1999). Indeed, prominent theories of prejudice are rooted in a similar psychological process (Allport 1954). While some see these positive and negative feelings as two sides of the same coin, there is also evidence that love for a group is separate from hatred towards other groups (see de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003 for a review). Even this psychology is an incomplete account of national attachments which as Anderson (1991) famously put it attach to imagined rather than real groups. It does, however, provide a start.

These views are connected with debates about the proper way to conceive of national attachment. A standard finding in the literature on nationalism is that there are at least two distinct types of national attachment (Jones and Smith 2001, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). One vision is typically referred to as patriotism or civic nationalism and its main characteristics are closeness to and pride in one's country and respect for the laws and institutions of one's country.² A second type is referred to variously as nationalism tout court, ethnic nationalism, or credentialism. Its main features are the connection of the nation to birth and ancestry and feelings of superiority over other nations.³ The difference is sometimes characterized as a voluntarist identification in the case of civic nationalism and an ascriptive or objectivist identification in the case of ethnic nationalism. More recent work, however, distinguishes additional types, for example, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016)'s four-fold scheme of liberal, ardent, disengaged, and restrictive nationalism.⁴

The Quantitative Study of National Attachment

² Some scholars do not accept the concept of civic nationalism as a distinct type of nationalism. See Yack (2012) or Tamir (2019).

³ The feeling of superiority is not exclusive to ethnic nationalism and could be associated with civic nationalism.

⁴ Operationalizing his schema is not possible with the data we have here.

Though nationalism has long been a subject of social science theorizing, its quantitative study is still relatively undeveloped (Kunovich 2009). Nevertheless, several studies have tested the consequences of national attachment. The main results indicate that stronger nationalism and particularly ethnic nationalism often leads to negative feelings towards outsiders, whether foreigners, migrants, or minorities. At the same time, these effects are weaker or non-existent for those with higher levels of civic nationalism.

In one of the more systematic works, Kunovich (2009) found that ethnic nationalists favored more restrictive rules on naturalization, migration, and assimilation and preferred a foreign policy that emphasized national interests over collective security (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003 had earlier shown that nationalists are more hostile to immigrants). Civic or multiple nationalists (those for whom both civic and ethnic identities were salient), by contrast, shared the preferences of other citizens. Huddy and Del Ponte (2020) meanwhile demonstrated that a similar form of ethnic nationalism was strongly and consistently related to opposition to globalization whether through protectionism or limits on migration. In the context of the EU, Muller-Peters (1998) and Carey (2002) showed that more nationalist Europeans were more opposed to the EU and the Euro. Lubbers and Coenders (2017) further found evidence that these attitudes had practical consequences as more nationalist attitudes were linked to voting for the anti-immigrant radical right in Europe.

A smaller number of studies have found more solidaristic effects of national attachment, typically civic nationalism. Thus, Huddy and Khatib (2007) showed that a stronger national identity in the US was connected to higher voter turnout. Levendusky (2018) demonstrated with surveys and experiments that priming American identity through texts describing national achievements (a form of national pride) reduced affective polarization. Several studies have

probed whether national attachment supports the welfare state based on the theory that nationalists would be more willing to support fellow citizens. In the most comprehensive study, Wright and Reeskens (2013) surprisingly found that only ethnic nationalism was associated with greater support for the welfare state and all forms of national attachment led to chauvinism against immigrants. There is some debate about whether these results apply to all societies as Johnston et al. (2010) show that civic nationalism is related to stronger support for the welfare state in Canada, but they connect this result with distinct historical circumstances.

Meanwhile, a substantial number of scholarly works has probed the effect of national attachment on tax compliance (for reviews see Geys and Konrad 2016 and Feldman and Slemrod 2006). Given that self-interested individuals would prefer not to pay taxes, other motivations might help to promote compliance. Several studies have thus demonstrated that countries with higher levels of patriotism collect more tax revenues and have a smaller shadow economy. This applies to a greater extent in wartime, though it also appears in peacetime, and finds support in qualitative studies of the use of nationalist propaganda to promote tax compliance.

The main gap that we identified in the literature is in the effect of national attachment on citizenship. Most studies have focused on policy preferences and particularly preferences on policies related to outsiders or foreigners. These preferences are, of course, contested. Citizens may legitimately hold different opinions on the proper amount of globalization or the proper number of migrants.

We take a step back by trying to link national attachment with less controversial measures of good citizenship that are arguably essential to a functioning democracy. Those who have studied these connections before have either focused on a single country, typically the US, or a limited set of outcomes, usually voting or tax compliance, rather than general measures of

good citizenship in multiple countries. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by looking at the association between various types of national attachments and multiple characteristics of good citizenship across a large group of countries.

Good Citizenship

This paper analyzes whether national attachments and different subtypes of these attachments are associated with better citizenship, in particular active and allegiant citizenship. We conceptualize active and allegiant citizenship as consisting of three parts that roughly correspond to the theories of Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam et al. (1994). This is not a complete characterization of good citizens, nor even of the theories of these authors, and is partially driven by data availability, but it does encompass some major parts of what is commonly perceived to be good citizenship (for example, Van Deth et al. 2017).

In the first place, we are interested in the participatory aspect of citizenship as theorized by Almond and Verba (1963). Good citizens should be active participants in democratic politics and supporters of democracy. Support for democracy and the political system fuels participation and engagement. Informed participation in turn ensures that the interests of all citizens are represented in politics. In practical terms, this means voting, following politics, recognizing the importance of democracy, and being satisfied with the political system.

Second, good citizens work to make their communities better. This means being a part of civil society by joining voluntary organizations, doing volunteer work, and trusting others. These actions are well-known as key elements of Putnam et al.'s (1994) conception of the civic community. He argues that civic community both has positive internal effects on citizens and makes democracies more responsive and efficient.

Third, good citizens should behave in prosocial ways by following the rules and not taking advantage of others. They should pay their taxes and fares on public transport and not accept bribes or benefits to which they are not entitled. These elements come close to Almond and Verba's (1963) conception of allegiant citizenship, where citizens follow and obey the law.⁵

Potential Connections between National Attachment and Good Citizenship

Why should national attachments affect these aspects of citizenship? The basic idea in J.S. Mill's (2010) rendering is that national feeling means that people are "united amongst themselves by common sympathies... which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively." Common national attachment should lead individuals to see co-nationals as equal citizens and thus democracy as the proper form of government for them. It should further lead them to be willing to make sacrifices that would enable this democracy to work better such as voting, volunteer work, and paying their taxes. These connections build on Terry and Hogg's (1996) finding that those who identify more strongly with a group are more likely to conform to group norms. Liberal nationalists like Miller (1995) make exactly this case for nationalism – it is the glue that allows trust and solidarity among diverse groups.

A similar picture emerges from a more historical literature on the origins of nationalism and its effects. Most famously, Weber (1976) describes how peasants were made into Frenchmen and citizens at the same time. Rustow (1970) argues that this sort of family feeling is a prerequisite for democracy as such. Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) meanwhile show

⁵ Almond and Verba's (1963) overall conception of a civic culture combines participatory and allegiant orientations.

evidence that early development of such national attachment made citizens in communist countries better able to resist rule by the Soviet Union.

These sort of positive effects should be most pronounced for inclusive forms of national attachments. These are sometimes referred to as civic nationalism, but we prefer to consider them separately. In particular, we distinguish three forms of national attachments that we hypothesize to have positive effects.⁶ The first is pride in one's country which we refer to as patriotism. The second is a feeling of closeness to one's country which we call national identity. And the third is respect for one's country's laws and institutions. Each might make individuals better citizens. We would note that of these three feelings, patriotism is the one which could most easily shade into negativity as it leads to feelings of superiority or dislike of others.

H1: Stronger feelings of patriotism (pride), national identity (closeness to one's country), and respect for one's country's laws and institutions are positively associated with active and allegiant citizenship.

However, national attachments may not always work in this way. Insofar as individuals see the nation in exclusivist or ethnic terms and believe that others living within the country are not fully its members, they may act in less community-oriented ways. One mechanism relies on reactions to those perceived as outsiders. If others are benefitting from the nation while not properly being part of it, then one should not continue providing these benefits. In this situation, being a good citizen – that is, sacrificing to benefit one's community – means being duped or taken advantage of by those who are not sacrificing. One might then “free ride” by not

⁶ Our terminology here follows work by Huddy and collaborators (Huddy and Del Ponte 2019, Huddy and Khatib 2007).

participating and by not following the rules. Only a more encompassing form of nationalism should have the positive effects posited by Mill.

Another potential mechanism for these effects is more cultural and psychological. It is described in recent work by Henrich (2020) as based on kinship groups that are necessarily less inclusive than modern nations. In this way of thinking, participation and obedience are reserved for those identified as kin rather than all denizens in or citizens of the democratic state. Outsiders to the group are regarded with suspicion. Henrich argues that a more individualistic and universalistic psychology is necessary for democracy to emerge. Both of these mechanisms align with existing research connecting ethnic nationalism to intolerance.

An objection is that ethnic nationalists might react to this situation by engaging in forms of active and allegiant citizenship based around their in-group. Putnam (2007), however, found an overall decline in civicism in heterogeneous communities. He argues that citizens “hunker down” rather than contribute to public goods. Though Putnam’s work may not apply directly to national attachments, a meta-analysis by Dinesen et al. (2020) finds a robust negative association between ethnic diversity and social trust. These considerations lead to our second hypothesis.

H2: Stronger feelings of ethnic nationalism are negatively associated with active and allegiant citizenship.

Country-level factors may further affect the relationship between nationalism and citizenship. For a number of reasons, we expected a different relationship in Western and

postcommunist Europe⁷, each of which comprises about half of the European Values Study, our main source of data. In the first place, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) have demonstrated that there are large attitudinal differences between individuals who grew up in a communist regime and those who did not. One of the most relevant effects is greater skepticism about democracy among citizens who experienced communism first-hand. Similarly, differences have been found for civil society and electoral turnout, other key dependent variables, where for a variety of reasons postcommunist countries lag behind the industrialized democracies (Howard 2003, Kostelka 2017). Adding to the differences is the mediocre democratic performance in many postcommunist countries.

Possibly more important are different experiences with nationalism. In contrast to postwar Western European countries, communist regimes tended not to come to terms with the nationalist feelings that had been at the root of fascism or dictatorship in the interwar and war years (Subotic 2019). Indeed, there has long been a presumption that Eastern Europe is a region of ethnic nationalism compared to civic nationalism in Western Europe (originally Kohn 1944, see Janmaat 2006 for confirmation and Shulman 2002 for doubts). Moreover, the fall of communism was motivated by and associated with national liberation (Beissinger 2002, Bunce 1999). As Milanovic (2017) points out, many of these countries became both ethnically homogeneous and independent states for the first time in their history and this was a matter of more importance to citizens than democratization. For these reasons, we might expect national attachments to be related to citizenship in different ways in postcommunist Europe. In particular,

⁷ We also considered other country-level factors that might affect this relationship. In particular, we hypothesized that countries with larger migration flows and a greater percentage of foreign-born population had a different relationship. We did not find any significant relationships when running multilevel models with these variables.

ethnic nationalism might not have the same negative association with citizenship in the postcommunist region as it does in Western Europe.

H3: The relationship between national attachments and active and allegiant citizenship is weaker or reversed in postcommunist Europe.

Data and Methods

To test our hypotheses, we used data from the fourth and fifth waves of the European Values Study (EVS) conducted in 2008-2010 and 2017-2020 (EVS 2011, EVS 2020). We chose the EVS because it includes a range of measures of national attachment along with a range of measures of good citizenship for a large group of countries. While some studies include more nuanced measures of nationalism (particularly, the International Social Survey Project modules on nationalism), they do not include the outcomes we are interested in. Conversely, other studies with a wider range of outcome measures (for example, the World Values Survey) do not include good measures of alternative forms of national attachments. The EVS covered 30 countries in the fifth wave and 44 countries in the fourth wave. Each wave is about evenly divided between Western Europe and the postcommunist region. A list of countries is included in the online appendix (Tables OA5 and OA6).

To define our main independent variables empirically in line with the theoretical assumptions described above, we calculated Cronbach's alphas and conducted factor analyses for all of the items measuring different types of national attachment included in the EVS. These tests yielded four separate measures of national attachment that serve as the main independent variables in our analyses. Two items tended to hold together as an ethnic nationalist construct.

These were “in order to be fully [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] you need to have [COUNTRY’S] ancestry” and “in order to be fully [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] you need to be born in [COUNTRY].”⁸ The Cronbach’s alphas for the two items are $\alpha = \sim 0.73$ (2008-2010 wave) and 0.78 (2017-2020) wave. We combined these measures in an additive index to produce our measure of ethnic nationalism.⁹

By contrast, the other measures, which correspond more closely to the “civic” conceptions of nationalism, were not closely related to each other according to Cronbach’s alphas.¹⁰ We thus included three separate measures in our analyses. These are patriotism, measured as “how proud are you of [COUNTRY]”; national identity, measured as “how close do you feel to [COUNTRY]”; and respect for institutions, measured as “it is important to respect [COUNTRY’S] political institutions and laws”.¹¹ Similar questions have been used to capture these concepts in previous works and the distinctive associations have been confirmed in numerous factor analyses (Johnson and Smith 2001, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Kunovich

⁸ Similar variables also included questions that asked whether it is important to speak [COUNTRY’S] language, live in [COUNTRY] for long time (2008-2010 wave) and/or share [COUNTRY’S] culture (2017-2020 wave). While Cronbach’s alphas were relatively high with all four questions in both waves ($\alpha = \sim 0.75$ in 2008-2010; $\alpha = \sim 0.78$ in 2017-2020 wave), when conducting factor analyses for all four items in each wave we observed that the items load on two distinct factors. Apart from the empirical distinction, the division is also theoretically plausible. While being born in country and having country’s ancestry are things that cannot be chosen by an individual, speaking the language, sharing culture, and living in the country for a long time are all voluntary choices and thus refer to a more inclusive notion of nationalism.

⁹ We also tested other variations of this variable with similar results. In particular, we isolated just ancestry and we combined all four items – birth, ancestry, language, and living in the country for a long time. In both cases, the results were broadly similar.

¹⁰ The Cronbach’s alpha for the items comprising patriotism and respect for institutions in the 2008-2010 wave is $\alpha = \sim 0.33$ and for the items comprising all three measures (patriotism, national identity and respect for institutions) in 2017-2020 it is $\alpha = \sim 0.49$.

¹¹ Unfortunately the national identity question was not asked in the 2008-2010 wave.

2009).¹² Each of these variables is measured on a four-point Likert scale.¹³ Country averages for all four (in the fifth wave) and three (in the fourth wave) variables are in the online appendix.

Our main dependent variables can be divided into three groups. The first group captures the participatory element of democratic citizenship. Good democratic citizens should vote in elections¹⁴ and follow politics.¹⁵ We add to these basic requirements a belief in the importance of democracy and satisfaction with the current political system (for the fifth wave, both were measured by a 10-point scale; for the fourth wave, both were measured on a 4-point scale and the democracy question referred to democracy being better than other forms of government and the satisfaction question explicitly mentioned satisfaction with democracy).

The second aspect of democratic citizenship is variously called civil society or civic community. We measured this as membership in voluntary organizations (a sum of the number of memberships in nine different organizations for the fifth wave and 15 organizations for the fourth wave), voluntary work (a dichotomous variable on whether the respondent had done volunteer work in the last six months), and trust in others (a dichotomous variable indicating whether most people can be trusted or not).¹⁶

¹² Pride and national identity are commonly used to measure civic national feeling (for example, Huddy and Khatib 2007, Huddy and del Ponte 2020). While ancestry is similarly frequently used as part of a conception of ethnic national feeling, most studies use ISSP data which includes additional measures of this construct (Kunovich 2009, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Huddy and del Ponte 2020). Lubbers and Coenders (2017) use nearly identical measures to our own.

¹³ Despite their similarities, the correlations between the four variables were relatively low. For the fifth wave, the correlation coefficient for ethnic nationalism and national identity was $r = 0.06$, for ethnic nationalism and patriotism $r = 0.24$, for ethnic nationalism and respect for institutions $r = 0.12$, for national identity and patriotism $r = 0.34$, national identity and respect for institutions $r = 0.22$ and patriotism and respect for institutions $r = 0.17$. For the fourth wave, ethnic nationalism and respect for institutions were correlated at $r = 0.18$, ethnic nationalism and patriotism $r = 0.23$ and respect for institutions and patriotism at $r = 0.19$.

¹⁴ For the fifth wave we summed two questions on voting in past national and local elections to produce a 6-point scale, while for the fourth wave we used a dichotomous question about intention to vote in the next national election.

¹⁵ For the fifth wave a 20-point scale based on a sum of 5-point scales for following politics on TV, radio, newspapers, and social media and for the fourth wave a single 5-point scale for following politics on TV, radio or newspapers.

¹⁶ The voluntary work variable was not available for the fourth (2008-2010) wave.

The third set of outcomes encompasses the willingness of citizens to follow the rules of the social order and not take advantage of others. We operationalize these as beliefs in the justifiability of cheating on taxes, accepting a bribe, avoiding a fare on public transport, and receiving benefits that one is not entitled to. Each is measured on a ten-point scale though the means tend to be quite high.

We considered producing summary measures for each of these three aspects of good citizenship. However, calculations of Cronbach's alpha indicated that the measures of active citizenship and civic community were only weakly related ($\alpha = \sim 0.4$). Only the measures of rule following had a strong relationship ($\alpha = \sim 0.7$). For this reason, we primarily present results for the individual elements separately.

We would add that these three aspects do not capture the entirety of good citizenship. We chose them because they constitute beliefs and actions that are relatively uncontroversially regarded as behaviors of good citizens. They thus differ from the sort of contested policy preferences like immigration or trade restrictions that are commonly investigated in studies of national attachment. Our choices were further guided by the availability of measures for these aspects in recent waves of the EVS.

For each of these outcome variables, we ran regressions that included all four (2017-2020) and/or three (2008-2010) measures of national attachments. These were OLS, logit or ordinal logistic regressions depending on the nature of the dependent variable. We also included country fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneities across countries.

We further included controls for many of the social and demographic factors that might influence both national attachment and good citizenship.¹⁷ These include age, a quadratic term

¹⁷ The wording of the survey questions and descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix (Tables OA1-OA4).

for age, university education, gender, income, unemployment, church attendance, and left-right self-placement.¹⁸

The analyses presented below exclude respondents who might not fit ancestry definitions of the nation because we expected national attachment, particularly ethnic nationalism, to work differently for them. This included those who fulfilled at least one of the following criteria: (i) they were not born in the country; (ii) they had at least one parent not born in the country; (iii) they did not consider themselves to be nationals of the country. In the 2008-2010 sample information on parents was missing. Thus, only respondents who were born in country and had the country's nationality were included.¹⁹ The inclusion of respondents who did not meet the birth or ancestry criteria did not change the results for the main independent variables. When they were included along with a dummy variable indicating their "outsider" status, the coefficients on the outsider variable tended to be strongly negative – that is, they were less likely to vote and participate and they were more likely to think that not following the rules was justifiable.

Results

For each of our sets of dependent variables, we present figures showing the estimated coefficient and confidence intervals for our four main independent variables – one measure of ethnic nationalism (the sum of the ancestry and birth variable) and three measures of more civic attachments (patriotism, national identity, and institutional respect). The dependent variables have all been recoded so that positive coefficients mean that greater national attachment is

¹⁸ Urban/rural variables were missing for some countries and therefore were not included. Their inclusion for the countries where they were available did not change the results.

¹⁹ In the 2008-2010 sample information on parents was missing. Thus, only respondents who were born in country and had the country's nationality were included.

associated with better citizenship as we have defined it above. All of these estimates include the controls mentioned above along with country fixed effects. The coefficients and standard errors for the full models are included in the online appendix.

We begin by analyzing responses from the fifth wave of the European Values Survey conducted between 2017 and 2020 (EVS 2020). Figure 1 presents results for four measures related to support for democracy and participation in democratic politics. They are the importance of democracy, satisfaction with the political system, following politics, and voting in elections. For the full sample, we found the predicted result for each question. Stronger national identity, patriotism, and institutional respect are positively and statistically significantly associated with more support for and participation in democracy, while greater ethnic nationalism is negatively and statistically significantly associated with the same outcomes.

Turning to the Western Europe sample, we see that it mirrors the sample as a whole. Here the association is stronger for national identity than patriotism (though both have statistically significant associations) and institutional respect has a weaker effect on following politics. The postcommunist sample diverges more. Ethnic nationalism in the region has a less negative and in one case (satisfaction with the political system) even a slightly positive though insignificant association. And unlike Western Europe, it is patriotism rather than national identity which has stronger associations. These results support scholars who see a stronger ethnic component to national attachments in postcommunist Europe. Indeed, patriotism could also be considered more similar to the ethnic conception than national identity.

Figure 2 presents results for three dependent variables connected to what Putnam et al. (1994) call civic community. They are membership in civil society organizations, voluntary work, and generalized trust in others. For the full sample, national identity is significantly related

to all three forms of community and ethnic nationalism is negatively related to all three. Both patriotism and institutional respect, however, have small and sometimes negative associations with the three measures of civic community. We do not have a theoretically well-grounded explanation for this result. Perhaps the outcomes studied here are local enough that they are not linked to national attachments but this would not explain the significant results for ethnic nationalism and national identity.

Figure 1: Participation, Democracy, and Nationalism, 2017-2020






Figure 2: Civic Community and Nationalism, 2017-2020



The differences between Western Europe and the postcommunist countries are even more apparent with regard to civic community. While Western Europe looks similar to the full sample, the postcommunist results differ. Though the variables maintain the same ordering, the coefficients tend to be smaller and less significant, especially for the voluntary organizations and volunteerism variables. This corresponds with work by Howard (2003) who argues that the weakness of civil society is a defining characteristic of the postcommunist region. He attributes this to the legacies of mandatory participation and vibrant private networks under communism as well as disappointments with transition. National attachments thus do not translate into more joining or volunteering in the region as they do in Western Europe.

Figure 3 turns to the pro-social preferences of following the rules by not cheating on taxes, not accepting bribes, paying one's fare on public transportation, and only claiming state benefits that one is entitled to. The full sample results again confirm our main hypotheses with one exception. National identity, patriotism, and respect for institutions are positively and statistically significantly associated with following the rules in all of these ways, while ethnic nationalism has a negative association for three of them. The exception is avoiding a fare on public transportation where ethnic nationalism has a precisely estimated zero. A possible explanation is that paying or not paying one's fare is less associated with outsiders (foreigners, minorities) than the other actions here. It could be seen as more a spur-of-the-moment and low-stakes decision. The other actions, by contrast, are easier to see as a systematic defrauding of the government.


Figure 3: Prosocial Attitudes, 2017-2020



The differences between Western Europe and postcommunist countries are less apparent for rule-following than they were for our first two sets of results. Mirroring the results on democracy, national identity is slightly more associated with good citizenship in Western Europe than in postcommunist countries, where patriotism instead tends to have a slightly stronger association. Similarly, ethnic nationalism appears to have slightly less of a negative association (particularly for accepting a bribe) in the postcommunist region. Respect for institutions has among the strongest associations for both groups, which makes sense given that the questions imply respect for laws. But overall, the results for the two regions are mostly similar.

We also considered one final dependent variable that we had difficulty characterizing. It is willingness to fight for one's country. While in some ways this desire is paradigmatic of national attachments (Kateb 2006), it is also difficult to say that pacifists or those who oppose fighting for other reasons are not good citizens. We did expect this variable to behave differently than the others and perhaps be positively connected to ethnic nationalism. In fact, as Figure 4 shows, we found that patriotism, national identity, and institutional respect are positively and statistically significantly associated with willingness to fight for one's country, but ethnic nationalism had a near zero relationship. These results appeared in all three samples. Willingness to fight thus behaves much like our other dependent variables.

Figure 4: Willingness to fight for own country, 2017-2020



To check how robust these results are, we conducted similar analyses for the fourth wave of the European Values Study conducted from 2008 to 2010 (EVS 2011). This study, however, lacked a measure for national identity and so we were only able to include the measures of ethnic nationalism, patriotism, and respect for institutions. Several of the dependent variables were also slightly different in their wording or coding (see online appendix).

Figure 5 presents the results for our four measures of democratic participation. All of these variables took slightly different forms than the 2017-2020 survey wave, which provides another robustness test. The support for democracy variable mentioned that democracy may have problems but is better and the satisfaction variable explicitly mentions democracy rather than the political system. Following the news is measured only by one question, “how often do you follow politics in the news”. Voting is measured as voting intention if there was a general election tomorrow and is a dichotomous variable in the 2008-2010 sample instead of a continuous variable as in the 2017 sample.

For the full sample and for Western Europe, we see our standard result of positive associations with patriotism and respect for institutions and negative associations with ethnic nationalism. The postcommunist sample differed in that ethnic nationalism did not have the expected negative associations for satisfaction with democracy and following politics where the estimated coefficient was quite close to zero.

Figure 6 presents results for civic community. While the results for the full sample show the expected positive association for patriotism and the negative association for ethnic nationalism, respect for institutions had much smaller associations, sometimes slightly positive and sometimes slightly negative. The regional subsamples also behaved somewhat differently. In

Western Europe, patriotism was not very associated with working for a voluntary organization or trusting others. Patriotism does not seem to capture the positive sort of national attachment that national identity did in the 2017 data. Patriotism does have more of this role in the postcommunist region, while ethnic nationalism does not have quite such a negative association.

Figure 5: Participation, Democracy and Nationalism, 2008-2010





Figure 6: Civic Community and Nationalism, 2008-2010




Finally, Figure 7 shows results for prosocial preferences. The strongest result is the consistently positive association between patriotism and respect for institutions on the one hand and beliefs that anti-social behavior is unjustified on the other. Respect for institutions has particularly large coefficients. These results are statistically significant for all three samples and are even larger for the postcommunist region than for Western Europe. Ethnic nationalism, however, has relatively low associations with these attitudes. In the full sample, it is a precisely estimated zero for cheating on taxes and accepting a bribe, slightly negative for claiming unearned state benefits, and significantly positive for avoiding fares. This last case corresponds with the mixed results from the 2017 survey. Ethnic nationalism also behaves differently between Western and postcommunist Europe. In Western Europe, the associations are mainly negative (except for avoiding fares) and in postcommunist Europe they are mostly positive, though not substantively large.

Overall, the 2008-2010 sample confirms most of our findings from the 2017-2020 survey. Again, patriotism and respect for institutions tended to have positive associations with good citizenship, while ethnic nationalism tended to have negative associations. As in the previous analysis, patriotism seemed to be a stronger predictor in postcommunist Europe than in Western Europe. The more positive form of national attachment for Western Europe – national identity or closeness – was missing from this survey. Further, ethnic nationalism had less negative associations in these surveys, especially for postcommunist Europe. Though we are hesitant to make generalizations about changes over time due to differences in question wording, postcommunist countries were more distinct in the survey conducted a decade earlier which could mean that attitudes in the region are shifting towards those common in Western Europe or alternatively that Western Europe is shifting towards postcommunist norms.

We conducted a number of other robustness tests on both samples. We ran models with additive and factor-analytical combinations of our three classes of dependent variables (despite low Cronbach's alphas as noted above). We also constructed multilevel models while controlling for the type of region (Western versus Postcommunist) at the macro-level. In each case, the results are substantively equivalent to those presented here.

Figure 7: Prosocial Attitudes and Nationalism, 2008-2010



Conclusion

Our analysis of European survey data has shown that there is a strong, positive, and consistent association between patriotism (pride in one's country), national identity (closeness to one's country), and respect for institutions and a range of measures of active and allegiant citizenship. Citizens who are proud of their country, feel close to it, and respect its institutions are more likely to believe in democracy, participate in and follow politics, engage in volunteerism or voluntary organizations, trust others, and dislike cheating the government in a variety of ways.

Conversely, those who embrace an ethnic national identity – a belief that only those with the country's ancestry and birth are members of the national community – are less likely to act in most of these ways. In short, what is commonly characterized as civic or inclusive nationalism appears to be related to good citizenship and ethnic or exclusive nationalism to bad citizenship. Interestingly, this applied even to willingness to fight for one's country, which is often associated with more exclusivist forms of national attachments.

There are, of course, nuances in these findings. Many of the associations were stronger in Western Europe than in postcommunist Europe. In Western Europe, it was national identity (closeness) that seemed to have a stronger effect, while in postcommunist Europe it was patriotism (pride). Further, ethnic national attachment was sometimes a neutral or less negative force in postcommunist Europe, though it rarely had large and positive effects. This may help to explain the success of ethnic nationalist parties in the region as ethnic nationalists participate more in civic life. And throughout Europe the associations between national attachments and civic community tended to be smaller than for other outcomes.

We would emphasize that these results should not be given a causal interpretation. Although we controlled for a variety of correlates of good citizenship as well as country fixed effects and we found that the associations held up over time, national attachments are far from exogenous and without experimental or natural experimental manipulations, we cannot say that increasing or decreasing particular forms of national attachments would affect different aspects of citizenship. While we have theorized reasons why the two forms of nationalism might have these effects, we have neither tested these mechanisms nor accounted for the origins of national attachment.

Our main results correspond with a recent wave of normative theorizing on the benefits of national attachments. Cowen (2019), for example, suggests that we recognize a doctrine of practical nationalism. Practical nationalism means a recognition that a system of nation-states has worked relatively well and that most citizens feel an attachment to them. However, some nationalists are racists or bigots and it would be good to weaken those forms.

An open question is how exactly to increase the proper kind of nationalism and reduce the wrong kind. The creation of national attachment was typically accompanied by coercive means and the forced assimilation of minorities (Weber 1976). Such means are no longer acceptable. The use of schools and civic rituals to promote pride and closeness would be the solutions that most readily leap to mind, but these are also policies that already exist in just about every country. Indeed, at least in Europe, levels of national attachment appear to be quite stable in recent years (Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheeper 2020). They may not be so amenable to manipulation.

Our results are also consistent with a more negative conclusion. Lepore (2019) encourages scholars and public figures not to demonize national attachments. Krastev (2018)

similarly argues that the lesson of recent populist movements for liberals is to not be seen as “anti-national”. This creates a particular dilemma in the EU where parties who embrace the EU may be seen as traitors to the national cause. It requires special care for parties to show that they are both proud of their nation and supporters of the EU, while attracting voters whose national pride possibly makes them better citizens in the sense that we find here (Carey 2002). Mazower (2016) suggests the need to recover the possibility of a pro-European nationalism or a patriotic internationalism.

This embrace of nationalism naturally has its dangers. As previous work has shown, encouraging nationalism, or the “wrong kind” of nationalism, can have negative effects on tolerance of minorities, migrants, and foreigners and support of an open economy or the EU. Most disturbingly, it has been linked with international conflict (O’Leary and Sambanis 2018).

Future work on this subject should thus take care to confirm our findings in more rigorous ways. In the first place, scholars could conduct experimental work in the manner of Levendusky (2018) where he primes different aspects of national feeling to investigate their consequences for citizenship. Levendusky’s work shows that priming national pride lowers affective polarization. One could investigate what sort of primes affect different aspects of citizenship. Similarly, scholars might study natural experiments where national attachment increases for exogenous reasons, for example, sports victories a la Bertoli (2017).

Further, scholars should investigate heterogeneities in the effect of national attachment. Does it work in different ways in different contexts as we found here for the differences between Western Europe and the postcommunist region? For example, does migration or diversity produce more of the hunkering down that Putnam (2007) finds? We performed a test with multi-

level models to see whether the size of migration flows or the percentage of foreign-born made a difference, but we did not find significant results.

There may be additional heterogeneities in types of national attachment. Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), for example, suggests that there are more nuanced types than the ones we have identified here and they might be associated with different forms of citizenship. Along this line, one could consider whether these results extend to the developing world where nationalism has often served different and anti-imperialist functions (Anderson 1987). Finally, scholars could further investigate why different forms and degrees of national attachment emerge in different places and times. This would help to determine what sort of policies could help to encourage better citizenship.

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