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Abstract

Attitudes toward immigration are usually investigated from the non-migrant residents' perspective. Much less is known about how perceptions of immigration policy and immigrants vary across immigration background lines, especially in the wider European context, and whether migrants' attitudes toward immigration are affected by the same factors and in the same way as those of the non-migrant population. With still-growing populations of migrants and their descendants in Europe, it is, however, crucial to study interethnic relations not only between migrant and non-migrant populations but also among different immigrant groups. Firstly, we investigate whether immigration attitudes among European migrants are based on intergroup solidarity or, rather, an intergroup threat toward new immigrants and whether minority-specific characteristics have differential effects across the (non-)migrant populations. Employing nine rounds of the European Social Survey from 20 European countries and by estimating multilevel regression models of individual factors affecting (non-)migrants' attitudes we uncover that first- and second-generation immigrants' attitudes toward immigration are mostly guided by intergroup solidarity with other immigrants. We further show that minority-specific characteristics work differently across our three sub-samples and that first-generation immigrants' attitudes become more negative the longer they stay in the host country. The findings contribute to our broader understanding of social cohesion, social inclusion, and intergroup conflict.

Keywords

attitudes toward immigration; interethnic relations; group membership; diversity; immigrants' integration

Introduction

Many European societies have become more ethnically and nationally diverse in recent decades. The number of people residing in an EU Member State with citizenship of a non-member country in 2021 was 23.7 million, in addition to 13.7 million persons with citizenship of another EU Member State (Eurostat 2022). Attitudes toward immigration have, therefore, become a salient electoral issue in the last decade in many European countries. However, they are usually investigated from the perspective of the majority population (Dražanová 2022; Schneider 2008; Seymonov et al. 2006). The naturalization of an important share of immigrants and their descendants and the expansion of voting rights to non-nationals (Schmid et al. 2019) has led to a considerable size of a new electorate in European societies. Therefore, it is crucial to study interethnic relations not only between migrant and non-migrant populations but also among different migrant groups countries, such as migrants already settled in as well as newcomers.

Compared to the plentiful studies regarding the majority's attitudes toward immigration, there is still much less research on migrants' immigration attitudes. Notwithstanding, those studies that, in fact, study immigrants' attitudes toward immigration (for example Hindriks, Verkuyten and Coenders 2014; Meeusen, Abts and Meuleman 2019) usually do so on exclusively migrant samples, without comparing them to those of natives. Existing studies explicitly looking at differences between non-migrants and immigrants' attitudes (Huber and Oberdabernig 2016; Becker 2019; Sarrasin et al. 2018) have found that they might be shaped by distinct factors. It is, therefore, essential to investigate whether the determinants of attitudes toward immigration may work differently for diverse segments of increasingly multicultural societies. This is important for our deeper understanding of social cohesion, social inclusion and intergroup conflict, since former immigrants typically have an equal vote in designing the immigration policy of tomorrow. Moreover, previous research set in Europe has mostly been conducted as single-country studies (see for instance Hindriks, Verkuyten and Coenders (2014) for the case of Netherlands, Meeusen, Abts and Meuleman (2019) for Belgium and Sarrasin et al. (2018) for Switzerland). It is however crucial to test the validity of these findings in a cross-country design as well as broaden our findings beyond the Western European focus.

Theoretically, immigrants' attitudes toward immigration can be attributed to intergroup solidarity or intergroup competition (Meeusen, Abts and Meuleman 2019). For instance, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities may be more favorable to immigration than non-migrant individuals because they can identify more strongly with other immigrants due to their own migration history or similar outgroup status (Becker 2019). Moreover, Hindriks, Verkuyten and Coenders (2014) show that immigrants' attitudes toward other minorities vary and that those sharing the same religion and having more contact manifested more positive attitudes toward each other. On the other hand, when immigrants perceive scarcity (of resources such as jobs or welfare) or competition from other immigrant groups, they may, similarly to the majority, start to police national boundaries (Just and Anderson 2015; Kolbe and Crepaz 2016).

This article investigates attitudes toward immigration among first- and second-generation immigrants as well as non-migrants in 20 countries, including Eastern and Southern European ones. Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. Firstly, we investigate whether first- and second-generation immigrants tend to be pro- or anti-immigration, and how these attitudes compare to the non-migrant population across Europe. Thus, we also test which of the two theoretical frameworks generating two opposing predictions regarding immigrants' attitudes toward immigration find support empirically in the European context. This includes examining whether positive or negative attitudes vary with regard to different types of immigration attitudes and different types of immigrant outgroups. Secondly, we examine whether apart from factors usually theorized to affect the non-migrant population's attitudes (e.g., education, socio-economic class) minority-specific factors (e.g., perceptions of belonging to a discriminated group and language spoken at home) affect first- and second- generations' attitudes toward immigration differently than those of non-migrants who also

share these attributes. While there have already been studies regarding how stigma and perceived discrimination (Craig and Richeson 2012; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000) affect interminority attitudes, explicit comparisons of how these factors might work differently for the non-migrant versus migrant population are missing. Thirdly, we also examine whether first-generation immigrants' attitudes toward immigration change depending on the length of their tenure.

In the following sections, we first elaborate on how (and if) we expect non-migrants' and immigrants' attitudes toward immigration to differ from each other and what might theoretically explain it. We then test these theoretical propositions based on cross-national survey data spanning 16 years (2002-2018) contained in the European Social Survey (ESS) across twenty European countries (European Social Survey 2021). We show that those with a migratory background are significantly more positive toward immigration than non-migrants. Nevertheless, the longer migrants stay in the country, the more their attitudes converge to those of the majority and become more negative. This applies to both generations of immigrants. Minority-related factors affect individuals differently based on their migratory background. Finally, we also demonstrate the need to examine different attitudes toward immigration separately rather than in an index combining and averaging answers of multiple measures. We discuss the implications of our findings, especially regarding social cohesion and intergroup relations.

Theoretical Background

The theoretical framework predominantly used by researchers in explaining immigration opposition is the "competitive threat" theoretical model based on Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif 1966) or Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979). According to these theories, anti-immigrant sentiment should be understood as a reaction to the threat of competition (whether real or perceived) with immigrants either in the economic sphere (labor, welfare), or in the cultural sphere (cultural homogeneity, social values). Within this framework, a distinction between the ingroup and the (migrant) outgroup is often made. The ingroup is mostly defined as those born in the country and/or with its citizenship, often even further restricted to individuals with parents and grandparents born in the same country. The migrant outgroup can be broadly defined, as for example those who do not hold the country of residence's citizenship or as those born outside of the country and/or with at least one of their parents born outside of that country.¹ However, as Sarrasin et al. (2018) rightly point out, it is necessary to go beyond the "us" (non-migrant) versus "them" (migrants) dichotomy when analyzing attitudes toward immigration due to the complexities of modern societies and differences between immigrants themselves according to their history or ties with receiving countries.

Although opposition to immigration is mostly studied from the ingroup perspective, existing empirical research has shown that anti-immigration attitudes can also be prevalent among minorities, and well-established immigrants may not be exempt from being prejudiced (Hindriks, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2014; Mustafa and Richards 2018; Sarrasin et al. 2018). This is usually due to the perceived scarcity of resources such as jobs or welfare provisions. Similarly to non-migrants, immigrants already in the country may perceive incomers as threatening their jobs if new immigrants can be hired at lower wages. Unemployed individuals may perceive that the presence of such immigrants makes their job search more difficult (Gerber et al. 2017; Margalit 2019; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Moreover, immigration can be regarded as additional pressure on the welfare system in terms of social benefits (Valentino et al. 2019; Huber and Oberdabernig 2016), education (Ohinata and van Ours 2013; Schneeweis 2013), and public safety (Bell, Fasani and Machin 2013). Thus, the users of these services (non-migrant and immigrants alike) might oppose new immigration. These perceived threats may be even more prevalent among immigrants compared to non-migrants due to their higher integration and accompanying higher opportunities due to their insider status. Moreover, even among some of the most marginalized groups, there are no high levels of homophily (Vacca, Cañarte, and Vitale 2021), and thus immigrants might not be interested in supporting the arrival of new immigrants.

¹ See Data and Method section for the definition of migrants in this study.

On the other hand, the intergroup solidarity theoretical framework suggests that immigrants may feel solidarity and empathy (Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2016; Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2017; Eklund, Andersson-Stråberg and Hansen 2009) toward newcomers due to shared experiences such as moving to another country. These shared experiences and kinship ties with other immigrants shall lead to more positive attitudes toward other immigrants (Just and Anderson 2015). Moreover, as immigrants tend to cluster in ethnically diverse neighborhoods (Semyonov and Glikman 2009), there might be less social distance between different immigrant groups as well as more interethnic contact and friendships (Lancee and Hartung 2012; Lubbers, Molina, and McCarty 2007). Potential immigration may also be viewed as enabling immigrants to form links with people who share the same culture and heritage or simply to bring their families to the country in the future (Braakmann, Waqas and Wildman 2017).

Similarly to Meeusen, Abts and Meuleman (2019) in the case of Belgians of Turkish and Moroccan descent, we first ask which of the two theoretical expectations is prevalent and whether attitudes toward immigration of individuals with an immigration background are shaped by intergroup threat or solidarity. Therefore, our first research question asks within the European context:

RQ1: Are (first- and second-generation) immigrants' attitudes toward immigration the same or significantly different from those of the non-migrant population?

Based on the two theories emphasizing either intergroup solidarity or competition, we put forward two competing hypotheses. Based on intergroup solidarity we would expect:

H1a: First- and second-generation immigrants will hold significantly more positive attitudes toward immigration overall than the non-migrant population in the same country of residence in the same time period.

On the other hand, based on the competitive threat theory, we formulate an alternative hypothesis:

H1b: First- and second-generation immigrants will hold significantly more negative attitudes toward immigration overall than the non-migrant population in the same country of residence in the same time period.

According to the common ingroup identity model, ingroup bias can be reduced when members of different groups consider themselves to belong to a shared, inclusive superordinate category (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Thus, first-generation immigrants might identify themselves as belonging to the superordinate category of "immigrant", while the second-generation is likely to identify more with the population of their birth country. Previous research regarding first- and second-generation migrants' political attitudes also shows that first-generation migrants have distinct attitudes while those of non-migrant and second-generation migrant origin are similar (Maxwell 2010). This is possibly due to the second generation's lower language barriers in communicating with the majority population as well as more intergroup contact and friendships (Martinovic 2013). At the same time, we would expect the second-generation to still hold more positive attitudes toward immigration compared to the country's non-migrant population due to their personal heritage, albeit not as positive as the first-generation's. Based on intergroup solidarity we would expect:

H2a: First-generation immigrants will hold more favorable attitudes toward immigration than second-generation immigrants.

Contrarily, based on competitive threat theory, we would expect:

H2b: First-generation immigrants will hold more negative attitudes toward immigration than second-generation immigrants.

Immigrants' attitudes toward immigration might be explained by standard theories usually hypothesized for the majority population as well as more minority-specific theories. There is no reason to believe that factors known to affect the non-migrant's attitudes toward immigration shall not work similarly for both migrant generations. Thus, we might expect factors such as gender, age, education, employment, income, and socialization (Dražanová 2022) to affect immigrants' attitudes toward immigration correspondingly as they affect those of non-migrants'. Similarly, we expect non-migrants as well as both migrant generations who are citizens of the residing country to have more negative attitudes toward immigration than those without citizenship. Research has shown that, across countries, immigrants that acquire citizenship become more opposed to immigration compared to those who do not (Just and Anderson 2015; Kolbe and Crepaz 2016; Sarrasin et al. 2018). This is thought to be due to the naturalized citizens' increased bonds with the country's population (Kolbe and Crepaz 2016) or the willingness to distance themselves from "stigmatized" immigrants, since immigrants often report experiences of prejudice (Zschirnt and Fibbi 2019; Jones et al. 2019; Vang and Chang 2019).

However, there might be specific minority-related factors playing a role in developing attitudes toward immigration differently for non-migrants compared to immigrant generations. Therefore, we also ask:

RQ2: Do factors associated with more or less stigmatization of one's social identity (e.g., perceived unfair treatment, being an ethnic minority and/or speaking a non-national language at home) translate into intergroup solidarity and empathy or, rather, an intergroup threat toward new immigrants? Do these factors affect (non-)immigrants' attitudes toward immigration differently?

Theoretically, there might be differential effects of perceived discrimination for different groups based on their immigration background. If public opposition to immigration is driven mostly by concerns about economic or existential threats as group conflict argues (Sherif 1966), we would expect the most vulnerable groups (e.g., those discriminated against) to be most opposed to immigration. Contrarily, historically disadvantaged groups might find it easier to imagine themselves in the position of people being unfairly treated solely due to their group membership, even when those people are from a group with which they have little in common (Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2021). Therefore, we would expect those who feel discriminated against to be more positive toward immigrants regardless of their immigration background.

We argue that, in line with Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos (2017), there might be divergent reactions of majority versus minority groups to immigration threats. The authors showed, based on a national survey experiment conducted in the U.S., that African Americans and Latinos are significantly more likely to side with minority detainees and support pro-civil rights policies and actions compared to the *Anglos* majority. Moreover, group empathy was found to be substantially stronger and have a significant mediating effect on the distinct reactions among African Americans and Latinos. Assuming that Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos (2017)'s Group Empathy Theory should be valid outside of the US context, we would expect empathy for immigrants to be stronger among groups with an immigration background who have experienced discrimination directly, and whose group histories resonate with the burden of living as the "other". Accordingly, we predict that first- and second-generations are more likely than non-migrants to exhibit empathy for immigrants regardless of their own backgrounds. On the other hand, we would expect that feelings of discrimination would lead to existential and material threats and thus to more opposition toward immigration (Bai and Federico 2020).

These relationships capture the differential immigrants' position compared to non-migrants regarding objective and subjective group positions. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H3a: Due to intergroup solidarity, perceptions of discrimination will lead to more positive immigration attitudes among first- and second-generation immigrants.

H3b: Due to competitive threat, perceptions of discrimination will lead to more negative immigration attitudes among non-migrants.

Especially relevant for the European context is also ethnic minority membership. This group membership can again lead to two different theoretical expectations based on migratory background. For those respondents without a migratory background and settled in European countries (sometimes even for centuries), being an ethnic minority should lead to more negative attitudes toward immigration due to seeing newcomers as a potential competitive threat. On the contrary, ethnic minorities with migratory backgrounds should hold more positive attitudes toward immigration based on solidarity.

H4a: Due to intergroup solidarity, being part of an ethnic minority will lead to positive attitudes toward immigration among both migrant generations.

H4b: Due to competitive threat, being part of an ethnic minority will lead to negative attitudes toward immigration among non-migrants.

Many European countries have linguistic diversity and the language spoken at home is not necessarily the national language. While most people in Europe speak their national language, including nearly everyone in Poland, Greece, Hungary, and France (Pew Research 2019), the share varies substantially by country. The share of adults who speak the national language at home is smaller in countries like Germany, Slovakia, Spain, and Bulgaria (Pew Research 2019). These more diverse linguistic environments reflect immigration patterns, but also unique local conditions. For instance, in Germany, 2 % of adults speak Turkish at home, a situation largely due to an influx of migrant workers from Turkey in the 1960s and Turkish is spoken by 14 % of adults in Bulgaria. Similarly, Romani, a language spoken by Europe's Roma people, appears as a language primarily used at home in Bulgaria (6%), the Czech Republic (2%), Hungary (2%) and Slovakia (1%) (Pew Research 2019). Therefore, speaking non-national languages at home is not strictly connected to immigration.

For this reason, we expect differential effects, again, for the non-migrant and immigrant populations. While we hypothesize that speaking a foreign language at home would lead to more negative attitudes toward immigration among the non-migrant population, we expect the opposite to happen with immigrants.² Hence:

H5a: Speaking a foreign language at home will lead to positive attitudes toward immigration among first- and second-generation immigrants compared to migrants speaking the national language.

H5b: Speaking a foreign language at home will lead to negative attitudes toward immigration among non-migrants.

Finally, there might be differences not only between the migrant generations but also within the first-generation. Earlier and recent immigrants may hold different views on further immigration. Similarly to the theoretical arguments regarding the second-generation, longer-staying first-generation immigrants may have already integrated into the host society to a larger extent (Manning and Roy 2010) in the form of language acquisition and intergroup friendships, and their attitudes toward immigration might start converging to (more or less favorable) attitudes held by the population in their new country of residence. Thus, we ask:

² Arguably, we do not know from our data whether these individuals are third generation immigrants or people with a foreign partner. Nevertheless, within Europe, we assume that these are autochthonous minorities living in regions that were possibly moved across borders throughout history, such as the Hungarian minority within Slovakia or the German speaking minority in the North of Italy. These includes for instance also the Romani speakers throughout Europe. The methodology section provides more detailed description how these foreign speakers have been selected.

RQ3: Do first-generation immigrants' attitudes toward immigration converge with those of the non-migrant population of their country of residence after they live long enough in their host country?

To answer this question we restricted our sample to the first generation immigrants only. We compared those with a longer tenure in the destination to those arriving recently and expect the first-generation immigrants' attitudes toward immigration to be more comparable to those of non-migrants' the longer they stay in the country:

H6: The more years the first-generation immigrants stay in a destination, the more their attitudes toward immigration differ (whether they are more or less favorable) from those of the first-generation immigrants arriving recently.

Overall immigration attitudes entail several attitudes toward immigrants measures considering different groups and attitudes toward various effects of immigration on the country. Although these generally correlate with each other, some individuals may, in fact, hold diverse, positive or negative, opinions depending on the specific immigration attitude in question. For instance, an individual might be against allowing more immigrants into the country, while simultaneously advocating for (welfare or any other type of) rights of the immigrants already in the country. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis of factors affecting attitudes toward immigration (Dražanová et al. 2022) shows that factors influencing these attitudes differ based on the type of immigration attitudes in question. Moreover, we might expect that particular attitudes toward immigration might converge at different speeds depending on various factors that affect them. Thus, we hypothesize that there is a variation in how particular attitudes toward immigration develop across first-generation immigrants and that different attitudinal responses among them may occur.

H7: The effect of lengths of stay for first-generation immigrants will differ based on the measures of attitudes toward immigration/immigrants.

Data and Methods

Data

This research uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS) collected between 2002 and 2018 in 20 European countries. The ESS is a cross-sectional survey conducted biennially since 2002 and includes most European countries. We employ all currently fully available rounds of data collection. Our data includes Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The country sample is restricted by the minimal number of observations per country and round for each generation ($N > 29$, see Tables A1-A5 in the Online Appendix).

While studying the attitudes of the migrant population is not the primary purpose of the ESS, it is widely used for investigating them in the European context (Safi 2010; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; Gonnot and Lo Polito 2021). The dataset allows us to compare the attitudes toward immigrants among non-migrant and migrant populations while recognizing different migrant generations and groups. The sample we use ($N = 265,698$) comprises three subpopulations. First, it is the non-migrant population ($N = 222,336$), which we define as individuals born in their country of residency (and of the interview) with both of their parents born there. Second, it is first-generation immigrants, consisting of all individuals born outside of the country of the interview with both parents also born outside ($N = 22,273$). Lastly, it is the second-generation, including individuals born in the country of the interview but to at least one parent who was not born there ($N = 21,089$).³ We are aware these measures and definitions of non-migrants and migrant generations are not without flaws.

³ All survey respondents with missing data on the place they or their parents were born are excluded from the sample because it is impossible to categorise them according to their migration background.

There certainly can be individuals who are born outside of the country but could be considered non-migrants. However, apart from these nuances, we follow the standard methodological distinction made by most researchers studying non-migrant and migrant populations (Safi 2010; Johnston et al. 2015; Hooghe and Quintelier 2013).

Key response variables

Our response variables are 6 indicators of attitudes toward immigration, which are included in the ESS questionnaire in each data collection wave. Three measures cover attitudes toward immigration policy and open borders and distinguish between different types of immigrant groups. The other three questions ask about respondents' opinions regarding immigration's effect on the country, culture, and economy. Table A6 in the Online Appendix reports the question wordings and their scales. Three of the indicators are measured on a 4-point Likert scale, while three of the indicators are measured on an 11-point scale. To ease the comparison between the two sets of indicators we rescale the 11-point scales to range from 1 to 4. We ran a series of multilevel hierarchical models for each of them separately. This allows us to compare how different (non-)migrant generations vary in their attitudes toward different aspects of immigration as well as to see what determines this variation.

Explanatory and control variables

Our main explanatory variables are indicators of the migratory background of an individual (two binary variables – one for first-generation immigrants and one for second-generation immigrants, while respondents with a non-immigration background are the reference category). However, immigrants are not a homogeneous group, for example in terms of their time since arrival, educational attainment, employment, etc. To capture this heterogeneity and to be able to disentangle significant differences in the determinants of different immigration attitudes, we include several other independent variables.

As established in the theory section, we employ determinants previously associated with non-migrants' attitudes toward immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Dražanová 2022; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) and immigrants' attitudes (Gonnot and Lo Polito 2021; Rustenbach 2010; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Becker 2019). We control for gender, age, employment status, educational attainment, self-assessed income, frequency of socialization, religious denomination, level of religiosity and citizenship status. We also include measures indicating potential subjective experienced discrimination⁴, belonging to an ethnic minority, and the first and second language spoken at home⁵ as we are interested in the potentially different associations with the immigrant and non-migrant groups.⁶ In models assessing the effect of lengths of stay on first-generation immigrants we also include the first generation's time spent in the country (5 categories) and their region of origin.⁷ Tables A7 and A8 in the Online Appendix report all descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Since we employ a multilevel hierarchical regression model, which controls for both time and country effects, we forego the inclusion of specific national-level controls for specific years. There are 9,7% of cases with missing data overall, which have been deleted listwise.

4 Our measure of a perceived discrimination is based on a dichotomous measure combining whether the respondent replied they feel like they belong to the discriminated group in at least one of the following categories: nationality, religion, race, ethnicity, and language.

5 ESS asks about the first and second language spoken at home. Out of these two variables we coded those speaking at least one official national language at home as those speaking the majority language. We consider an official language would be a language recognized on the whole territory as a second language. Therefore, in our dataset non-migrants speaking a minority language could be 3rd generation migrants, but also minorities whose languages are not (fully) recognized by their country of residence. To sum up, we consider everybody linguistically recognized by the national government as speaking an official language and the rest are minority-languages speakers.

6 5832 individuals (2.62 %) of non-migrants speak a non-official national language, which represents 40% of all non-official national speakers in the whole sample. On the other hand, 1.45 % (3226 individuals) of non-migrants see themselves as a minority members, which is 24,66 % of all minority members in the whole sample.

7 Categories are divided into bigger geographical units such as *the Middle East* in lieu of the country of origin due to the low numbers of observations per country of origin.

Method

Our main objectives in this research are (1) to empirically analyze the differences in attitudes toward immigration among non-migrants and immigrant generations, (2) to analyze and compare the individual-level determinants influencing these attitudes, especially factors associated with more or less stigmatization of one's social identity, (3) to investigate whether immigrants' attitudes toward immigration converge toward those of the non-migrant population as they stay longer in the host country. Thus, our first goal is to summarize patterns in attitudes toward immigration among the three samples. We are particularly interested in the variation depending on the migrant generation and the differences between migrant generations and non-migrants. Our second focus is on the variation in the association between specific explanatory variables and the measures of attitudes toward immigration for the three samples. Thirdly, we analyze, within the first-generation sample, how lengths of stay in the host country may affect immigrants' attitudes toward immigration. Considering the hierarchical structure of our data indicated by its multinational character and several data-collection time points, when countries are nested in country-years, we employ a three-level multilevel hierarchical regression model. This model groups individuals into country-years, which are nested within countries. The model recognizes that respondents from the same country are more similar than respondents from different countries while also recognizing that respondents observed in the same country in the same year have more in common than respondents observed in the same country but in a different year (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016). As we are not interested in the effects of any year-level variables, a three-level hierarchical model is the most parsimonious option (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016). In models with the full sample, we also include a random slope for each generation (first- and second-generation immigrants) to allow the intercepts to vary across generations, as we do not expect the same effects of migrant generations on attitudes toward immigration across countries.⁸

Results

We begin our empirical analysis using multilevel modeling by estimating the null model for each of the dependent variable of interest. The null model provides an assessment of whether significant between-group variation exists and thus whether a multilevel analysis is necessary. Moreover, it also serves as a useful baseline model for evaluating explained variance in subsequent model specifications. This model is referred to as 'null' because it has no predictors at any level of analysis and includes only an intercept, country-year effects and country effects. It, therefore, provides a predicted value for the mean, which is not conditional on any covariates.

⁸ We adjusted the sample using `svyset` and the ESS analytical weights for the integrated dataset of 9 ESS rounds `anweights`, which are designed to account for stratification, clustering, and non-response and are suitable for any analysis.

Table 1. Results for a three-level multilevel hierarchical model for attitudes regarding open borders in the full sample

	Allow different race						Allow same race						Allow poor countries					
	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Model 0		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Intercept	2.531***	(0.059)	2.643***	(0.060)	2.625***	(0.061)	2.827***	(0.050)	2.727***	(0.051)	2.714***	(0.052)	2.440***	(0.062)	2.711***	(0.064)	2.695***	(0.066)
Individual-level																		
First generation			0.127***	(0.008)	0.162***	(0.034)			0.123***	(0.007)	0.151***	(0.029)			0.095***	(0.007)	0.126***	(0.031)
Second generation			0.098***	(0.006)	0.108***	(0.013)			0.094***	(0.005)	0.098***	(0.011)			0.093***	(0.006)	0.099***	(0.012)
Age			-0.008***	(0.001)	-0.007***	(0.0005)			-0.006***	(0.001)	-0.005***	(0.004)			-0.009***	(0.005)	-0.009***	(0.001)
Male			-0.018***	(0.003)	-0.018***	(0.003)			0.002	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)			-0.036***	(0.003)	-0.036***	(0.003)
Upper Secondary			0.099***	(0.004)	0.098***	(0.004)			0.106***	(0.004)	0.104***	(0.004)			0.066***	(0.004)	0.064***	(0.004)
Non-university tertiary			0.179***	(0.008)	0.180***	(0.008)			0.175***	(0.007)	0.175***	(0.007)			0.133***	(0.008)	0.132***	(0.008)
University degree			0.377***	(0.004)	0.377***	(0.004)			0.347***	(0.004)	0.346***	(0.004)			0.320***	(0.004)	0.319***	(0.004)
Employed			-0.015***	(0.003)	-0.016***	(0.004)			-0.026***	(0.003)	-0.027***	(0.003)			-0.014***	(0.004)	-0.015***	(0.004)
Coping on income			-0.092***	(0.004)	-0.090***	(0.003)			-0.098***	(0.003)	-0.096***	(0.003)			-0.080***	(0.003)	-0.079***	(0.003)
Difficult on income			-0.186***	(0.005)	-0.184***	(0.005)			-0.189***	(0.005)	-0.187***	(0.005)			-0.163***	(0.005)	-0.161***	(0.005)
Very difficult on income			-0.278***	(0.008)	-0.278***	(0.008)			-0.294***	(0.007)	-0.294***	(0.007)			-0.244***	(0.008)	-0.244***	(0.008)
Socializing Monthly			0.125***	(0.013)	0.125***	(0.013)			0.175***	(0.013)	0.175***	(0.013)			0.128***	(0.014)	0.127***	(0.014)
Socializing Weekly			0.185***	(0.013)	0.185***	(0.013)			0.245***	(0.013)	0.244***	(0.013)			0.179***	(0.014)	0.179***	(0.014)
Socializing Daily			0.238***	(0.013)	0.238***	(0.013)			0.290***	(0.013)	0.289***	(0.013)			0.230***	(0.014)	0.229***	(0.014)
Discriminated group			0.033***	(0.009)	0.027**	(0.009)			0.037***	(0.009)	0.030**	(0.009)			0.045***	(0.010)	0.039***	(0.010)
Ethnic minority			0.066***	(0.008)	0.077***	(0.008)			0.033***	(0.008)	0.041***	(0.008)			0.058***	(0.008)	0.062***	(0.008)
Citizenship			-0.008***	(0.001)	-0.007***	(0.001)			-0.007***	(0.001)	-0.006***	(0.001)			-0.008***	(0.001)	-0.007***	(0.001)
Minority language			-0.023*	(0.009)	-0.014	(0.009)			-0.004	(0.008)	0.002	(0.009)			-0.034***	(0.009)	-0.034***	(0.009)
religiosity			0.006***	(0.001)	0.006***	(0.001)			0.006***	(0.001)	0.007***	(0.001)			0.010***	(0.001)	0.010***	(0.001)
Roman Catholic			-0.101***	(0.004)	-0.095***	(0.004)			-0.064***	(0.004)	-0.057***	(0.004)			-0.094***	(0.005)	-0.090***	(0.005)
Protestant			-0.058***	(0.005)	-0.062***	(0.005)			-0.012*	(0.005)	-0.017***	(0.005)			-0.064***	(0.005)	-0.068***	(0.005)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.131***	(0.012)	-0.107***	(0.012)			-0.074***	(0.012)	-0.053***	(0.012)			-0.149***	(0.012)	-0.128***	(0.013)
Other Christian denomination			0.091***	(0.014)	0.085***	(0.014)			0.093***	(0.014)	0.0867***	(0.014)			0.096***	(0.015)	0.0916***	(0.015)

Other non-Christian denominations	0.062*	(0.024)	0.064**	(0.024)			0.040	(0.024)	0.040	(0.024)			0.087***	(0.025)	0.090***	(0.025)		
Islam	0.101***	(0.013)	0.114***	(0.014)			-0.0178	(0.013)	-0.003	(0.013)			0.113***	(0.014)	0.128***	(0.014)		
Eastern religions	0.123***	(0.025)	0.122***	(0.025)			0.0225	(0.025)	0.026	(0.025)			0.121***	(0.026)	0.117***	(0.026)		
Random effect estimates																		
Country	0.067	(0.022)	0.0436	(0.014)	0.047	(0.016)	0.047	(0.016)	0.027	(0.009)	0.029	(0.009)	0.074	(0.024)	0.054	(0.017)	0.058	(0.019)
Period (in country)	0.020	(0.002)	0.0146	(0.001)	0.014	(0.002)	0.020	(0.002)	0.012	(0.001)	0.013	(0.002)	0.020	(0.002)	0.014	(0.001)	0.014	(0.001)
Individual	0.667	(0.002)	0.6106	(0.001)	0.609	(0.002)	0.625	(0.002)	0.586	(0.001)	0.585	(0.002)	0.698	(0.001)	0.647	(0.001)	0.646	(0.001)
First generation					0.022	(0.007)					0.016	(0.005)					0.017	(0.005)
Second generation					0.002	(0.001)					0.002	(0.001)					0.002	(0.001)

Table 2. Results for a three-level multilevel hierarchical model for attitudes regarding the effects of immigration in the full sample

	Immigration's effect on country						Immigration's effect on economy						Immigration's effect on culture					
	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Model 0		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Intercept	2.467***	(0.044)	2.465***	(0.042)	2.452***	(0.043)	2.487***	(0.037)	2.411***	(0.038)	2.390***	(0.040)	2.647***	(0.055)	2.631***	(0.052)	2.615***	(0.055)
Individual-level																		
First generation			0.183***	(0.006)	0.192***	(0.027)			0.169***	(0.006)	0.182***	(0.034)			0.158***	(0.006)	0.176***	(0.034)
Second generation			0.076***	(0.004)	0.073***	(0.010)			0.072***	(0.005)	0.075***	(0.013)			0.099***	(0.005)	0.099***	(0.012)
Age			-0.004***	(0.001)	-0.004***	(0.001)			-0.003***	(0.001)	-0.003***	(0.001)			-0.0007	(0.001)	-0.0006	(0.001)
Male			-0.004	(0.002)	-0.004	(0.002)			0.066***	(0.002)	0.066***	(0.002)			-0.039***	(0.002)	-0.039***	(0.002)
Upper Secondary			0.071***	(0.003)	0.069***	(0.003)			0.091***	(0.003)	0.089***	(0.003)			0.099***	(0.003)	0.098***	(0.003)
Non-university tertiary			0.138***	(0.006)	0.139***	(0.006)			0.156***	(0.006)	0.157***	(0.006)			0.175***	(0.006)	0.176***	(0.006)
University degree			0.280***	(0.004)	0.279***	(0.004)			0.350***	(0.004)	0.348***	(0.004)			0.361***	(0.004)	0.360***	(0.003)
Employed			-0.003	(0.003)	-0.003	(0.003)			-0.009**	(0.003)	-0.010**	(0.003)			-0.003	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)
Coping on income			-0.089***	(0.003)	-0.088***	(0.003)			-0.106***	(0.003)	-0.104***	(0.003)			-0.089***	(0.003)	-0.088***	(0.003)
Difficult on income			-0.180***	(0.004)	-0.178***	(0.004)			-0.204***	(0.004)	-0.202***	(0.004)			-0.162***	(0.004)	-0.161***	(0.004)
Very difficult on income			-0.274***	(0.006)	-0.273***	(0.006)			-0.297***	(0.006)	-0.296***	(0.006)			-0.231***	(0.006)	-0.231***	(0.006)
Socializing Monthly			0.103***	(0.011)	0.102***	(0.011)			0.123***	(0.012)	0.122***	(0.012)			0.120***	(0.012)	0.119***	(0.012)
Socializing Weekly			0.158***	(0.010)	0.157***	(0.011)			0.193***	(0.011)	0.192***	(0.012)			0.180***	(0.012)	0.178***	(0.012)
Socializing Daily			0.181***	(0.011)	0.180***	(0.011)			0.208***	(0.011)	0.208***	(0.012)			0.215***	(0.012)	0.214***	(0.012)
Discriminated group			-0.044***	(0.007)	-0.049***	(0.007)			-0.006	(0.008)	-0.016	(0.008)			-0.024**	(0.008)	-0.033***	(0.008)
Ethnic minority			0.075***	(0.006)	0.082***	(0.006)			0.063***	(0.007)	0.075***	(0.007)			0.083***	(0.007)	0.089***	(0.007)
Citizenship			-0.011***	(0.001)	-0.010***	(0.001)			-0.012***	(0.001)	-0.011***	(0.001)			-0.009***	(0.001)	-0.008***	(0.001)
Minority language			0.003	(0.007)	0.014	(0.007)			-0.007	(0.007)	0.010	(0.008)			-0.068***	(0.007)	-0.059***	(0.008)
religiosity			0.012***	(0.001)	0.012***	(0.001)			0.009***	(0.001)	0.009***	(0.001)			0.008***	(0.001)	0.008***	(0.001)
Roman Catholic			-0.075***	(0.003)	-0.072***	(0.004)			-0.056***	(0.004)	-0.051***	(0.004)			-0.101***	(0.004)	-0.096***	(0.004)
Protestant			-0.048***	(0.004)	-0.051***	(0.004)			-0.024***	(0.004)	-0.028***	(0.004)			-0.063***	(0.004)	-0.068***	(0.004)
Eastern Orthodox			-0.094***	(0.010)	-0.058***	(0.010)			-0.127***	(0.011)	-0.074***	(0.011)			-0.109***	(0.011)	-0.077***	(0.011)
Other Christian denomination			0.006	(0.011)	0.002	(0.012)			0.020	(0.012)	0.013	(0.012)			0.008	(0.012)	0.005	(0.012)
Other non-Christian denominations			0.045*	(0.019)	0.045*	(0.019)			0.058**	(0.021)	0.055**	(0.021)			0.033	(0.021)	0.035	(0.021)

Islam	0.201***	(0.011)	0.203***	(0.011)					0.145***	(0.012)	0.142***	(0.012)			0.205***	(0.012)	0.208***	(0.012)
Eastern religions	0.118***	(0.020)	0.102***	(0.020)					0.101***	(0.021)	0.083***	(0.021)			0.139***	(0.022)	0.132***	(0.022)
Random effect estimates																		
Country	0.037	(0.012)	0.022	(0.007)	0.025	(0.008)	0.026	(0.009)	0.014	(0.005)	0.016	(0.005)	0.061	(0.019)	0.042	(0.013)	0.047	(0.015)
Period (in country)	0.008	(0.001)	0.005	(0.001)	0.005	(0.001)	0.012	(0.002)	0.006	(0.001)	0.007	(0.001)	0.006	(0.001)	0.005	(0.001)	0.005	(0.001)
Individual	0.418	(0.001)	0.385	(0.001)	0.384	(0.001)	0.478	(0.001)	0.439	(0.001)	0.438	(0.001)	0.498	(0.001)	0.456	(0.013)	0.455	(0.001)
First generation					0.013	(0.004)					0.023	(0.007)					0.022	(0.007)
Second generation					0.001	(0.001)					0.003	(0.001)					0.002	(0.001)
Observations	257,906		257,801		257,801		257,277		257,174		257,174		258,330		258,229		258,229	

Table 3. Variance Partition Coefficients

Model	Allow different race			Allow same race			Allow from poorer countries			Immigration effect on country			Immigration effect on economy			Immigration effect on culture		
	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	2
Country (%)	8.9	6.5	7	6.8	4.3	4.6	9.3	7.5	8	8	5.3	6	5	3	3.5	10.8	8.3	9.3
Period (%)	2.7	2.2	2	2.9	2	2	2.6	2	2	1.7	1.3	1.2	2.3	1.3	1.5	1.1	1	1
Individual (%)	88.4	91.3	91	90.3	93.7	93.4	88.1	90.5	90	90.3	93.4	92.8	92.7	95.7	95	88.1	90.7	89.7

Table 1 and Table 2 report the null models (Model 0) for each dependent variable.⁹ The random effects reported for each model show the variance components in multilevel models, which can be interpreted with the variance partition coefficients (VPCs). VPCs report the proportion of the observed response variation that lies at each level of the model hierarchy. They, therefore, allow us to establish the relative importance of countries, country-periods and individual respondents as sources of variation in respondents' mean attitudes toward immigration. The respective percentages of variation at each level are shown in Table 3. Most of the variation in attitudes toward immigration lies within countries at the individual level (about 90 % of the overall variation for each of the dependent variables), around 3 – 11 % of the variation lies between countries, and around 1 – 3 % lies within country-periods. Thus, there is only a modest variation in respondents' mean attitudes toward immigration across countries and across country-periods, meaning that there are relatively small differences in individual attitudes toward immigration between countries and between time periods. In summary, the VPCs show that there is a relatively low degree of clustering in the data.¹⁰

In the next stage, we estimate models with individual-level predictors and the multilevel specification. Models 1 in Table 1 and 2 show the results for each dependent variable. We are mainly interested in the independent variables referring to the respondents' migration status (first- and second-generation migrants). In the case of all dependent variables measuring attitudes, first and second-generation respondents are significantly more pro-immigration compared to non-migrant respondents. Those belonging to the first generation hold more pro-immigration attitudes compared to the second generation, as documented by the higher estimated effects of the respective variables. This confirms our first hypotheses H1a and H2a. Therefore, first- and second-generation immigrants' attitudes toward immigration seem to be driven by intergroup solidarity rather than competitive threat (our alternative hypotheses H1b and H2b have been refuted). Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that the differences between immigrant generations are more pronounced for attitudes regarding immigration's effect on the country. Differences between generations regarding allowing immigrants into the country are visibly smaller, and the differences between the two generations in allowing people from poorer countries to come are negligible.

Models 1 in Table 1 and 2 enable attitudes toward immigration to depend on individuals' characteristics, their country of residence as well as the period (within the country) when respondents were surveyed. However, this type of model assumes that the effects of individuals' characteristics such as their migratory background on attitudes toward immigration are the same in each country. That is to say, the coefficients of all explanatory variables are fixed across countries. In the next set of models (Models 2 in Tables 1 and 2), we allow both the intercept and the coefficients for first- and second-generation to vary randomly across countries, thus employing a random coefficient model. Our choice to let the coefficients for the two independent variables vary at the country level rather than country-period level is driven by both, theoretical and empirical reasons. Firstly, while it is theoretically reasonable to expect that the effect of migratory background might affect attitudes toward immigration differently in each country, it is less so to expect that these effects would significantly vary from year to year within one country. Secondly, this is empirically confirmed by the minimal unexplained variance in individual attitudes toward immigration at the country-period level (between 1 – 3 %). Thus, since our dependent variable does not vary a lot at this level, it is reasonable to expect that also the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one would vary more across countries rather than country-periods. Likelihood ratio tests confirmed that the first and second generations' effects differ across countries.

⁹ All three-level models offer a significantly better fit to the data compared to a single-level model. The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic which compare the current three-level model to a single-level model with no country and no country-period effects (i.e., linear regression) were all significant. Respectively, they were general threat ($\chi^2 = 26038.81$, $p < 0.0001$); economic threat ($\chi^2 = 18793.89$, $p < 0.0001$); cultural threat ($\chi^2 = 31682.60$, $p < 0.0001$); allow people of same ethnicity ($\chi^2 = 28163.94$, $p < 0.0001$); allow people from poorer countries outside Europe ($\chi^2 = 31334.46$, $p < 0.0001$); allow people of different ethnicity ($\chi^2 = 31072.26$, $p < 0.0001$).

¹⁰ It is also interesting to note that even with this low degree of clustering the three-level model was significantly preferred to the single-level model and each of its two-level counterparts.

As previously mentioned, the model assumes that the effects of all variables in the model, except first- and second-generation, are fixed across countries and their estimated effects are very similar for both, the random intercept and random coefficient model. The first-generation and second-generation coefficients have a fixed component, representing contrasts with the reference category (non-migrants) on average, and a country-specific component. For example, after accounting for the effects of the control variables, first-generation immigrants in country *c* are expected to have their willingness to allow immigrants of a different race 0.184 points higher than non-migrants in the same country, while second-generation migrants are expected to have their willingness 0.11 points higher compared to non-migrants.

Figures 1 and 2 show the plot of the generation slope residuals versus the country intercept residuals for all the dependent variables from Models 2 in Tables 1 and 2. From these plots, it is possible to identify, for example, countries with lower-than-average positive attitudes toward immigration (all those on the left side from the 0 on the x-axis) or higher-than-average positive attitudes toward immigration (all those on the right of the x-axis). These are for example Sweden in all types of attitudes and Germany and Switzerland (especially for immigrants' contribution to the economy). At the same time, the plots show countries with the strongest relationship between having an immigration background and positive attitudes toward immigration (all those in the two top quadrants). Therefore, countries in the top-right quadrant are countries with the highest proportion of positive attitudes toward immigration and at the same time the strongest relationship between a migratory background and attitudes toward immigration. On the other hand, countries in the top-left quadrant have a below-average positive attitude to immigration, but the effect of an immigrant background is stronger than average.

These figures highlight the importance of distinguishing between different types of attitudes toward immigration. While Sweden, in line with previous research, appears to be above average in all types of positive attitudes toward immigration compared to other countries, the effect of immigration background is weak regarding attitudes toward immigration policy but much stronger in the evaluation of immigration's effect on the country. Notwithstanding, the above-average effect compared to other countries with regard to immigration's contribution is pronounced only with respect to the second-generation. In contrast, the largest negative intercept and slope for the first-generation immigrants belong to Greece. These figures emphasize that countries may differ not only in the effect of immigration background on attitudes toward immigration but also in the strengths of the effects of different generations within one country. For example, while the 2004 enlargement countries are below the European average on most of immigration attitudes, the positive effects of first-generation is especially pronounced in some of these countries (in Czechia, Slovenia, Latvia) with regard to immigration policy. In contrast, the effect of first-generation on attitudes toward immigrant contribution is below the European average. Similarly, the effect of second-generation is below average for most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 1. Plot of random slopes and random intercepts for immigrant first- and second-generation across countries on attitudes towards immigration policy





Figure 2. Plot of random slopes and random intercepts for immigrant first- and second-generation across countries on attitudes towards the effect of immigration



Models 1 and 2 in Tables 1 and 2 show that younger, more educated, more religious, respondents who do not have income difficulties, hold citizenship in the residing country and socialize more hold significantly more pro-immigration attitudes. Those who are in paid work are significantly less likely to be in favor of allowing immigrants to come into the country and also view immigration's effect on the economy significantly more negatively. However, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 and Tables A9-A14 in the Online Appendix, these effects are driven by non-migrants and the second-generation entirely. In short, those in paid work among non-migrants and second-generation immigrants are significantly more negative toward immigration compared to those non-working within their respective groups. On the contrary, working first-generation migrants are significantly more positive toward immigration compared to non-working first-generation immigrants. Women are significantly more willing to allow immigrants of different races and from poorer countries outside Europe to come to the country compared to males. On the other hand, while women also evaluate immigration's effect on the country's culture more positively, male respondents view immigration's effect on the economy significantly more positively. There are also significant differences between the association of respondents' religious denominations and individuals' attitudes toward immigration. While Roman Catholics, Protestants and Eastern Orthodox church members are significantly more negative in their immigration attitudes compared to non-religious respondents, Muslims¹¹ and the followers of Eastern religions are significantly more positive.

We now turn to more specific minority-related characteristics. In order to disentangle the effects of these variables to the fullest, we split the sample into three groups based on the immigrant generation and re-run the models within the split samples as shown in Figures 3 and 4. This allows us to disentangle the effect of specific characteristics we hypothesized would work differently for different samples. For all types of dependent variables, respondents who have an immigration background and subjectively feel part of a discriminated group (in terms of nationality, religion, race, ethnicity, and language) are significantly more positive toward immigration. On the contrary, non-migrant respondents who feel discriminated against are significantly more negative toward immigration. This is fully consistent with our hypotheses H3a and H3b.

Although we hypothesized that being part of an ethnic minority would have a differential effect on non-migrants compared to immigrants, the data has not supported this expectation. First- and second-generation immigrants who are part of an ethnic minority are significantly more positive toward immigration compared to those who are not a minority (confirming our hypothesis H4a based on the intergroup solidarity theoretical framework). However, contrary to our expectations, the analysis shows that even among non-migrants those who are part of an ethnic minority are significantly more positive toward immigration compared to ethnic majorities, therefore refuting our hypothesis H4b.

The story appears slightly more complicated for those who speak a minority language at home. For the three dependent variables that measure attitudes to open borders, those non-migrants who speak a foreign language at home are significantly more negative toward allowing immigrants of different races and from poorer countries outside of Europe into the country¹², while there is no significant language effect among first- and second-generation immigrants. These findings confirm our hypothesis H5b. Nevertheless, for attitudes regarding the effect of immigration, those who speak a foreign language at home among non-migrants and second-generation migrants are significantly more negative regarding their opinion of immigration's contribution to the country's culture. There is no effect of speaking a foreign language at home on attitudes toward immigration's effect on the economy for none of the samples. Finally, those first-generation immigrants who speak a foreign language at home are significantly more likely to view immigration's overall effect on the country positively compared to those who do not, while there is no significant effect of language for non-migrants and second-generation immigrants. Therefore, our hypotheses H5a and H5b are only confirmed for some measures of immigration attitudes.

11 The only indicators where there are, in fact, negative but statistically non-significant differences in attitudes toward immigration between Muslims and atheists is the question asking whether the respondent would allow immigrants from the same race to come and live into the country. The result is most likely due to the fact that the question refers to the country's majority race, thus Muslims are likely answering a question about a different race than themselves.

12 They are also significantly opposed to allowing immigrants of the same race, albeit only at the 0.1 level of significance.

Figure 3. Determinants of attitudes towards immigration policy among non-migrants, first-generation immigrants and second-generation immigrants





Figure 4. Determinants of attitudes towards the effect of immigration among non-migrants, first-generation immigrants and second-generation immigrants



Our final research question asked whether first-generation immigrants' attitudes converge to those of the majority in the host country the longer they stay in the country. We hypothesized that as more years pass, the first-generation's attitudes toward immigration would become more different to those recently arriving, which would be, considering our findings, more negative. Table 4 shows the results of a multilevel regression for the sample of first-generation migrants. After controlling for all the relevant variables mentioned earlier, first-generation immigrants become significantly more negative compared to those that came to the country last year (the reference category) only after 11 or more years in the country (this is valid for allowing immigrants of the same and different race and for attitudes regarding immigration's effect on the economy). The same effect can be found for immigrants staying 21 years or more in the country (this group is also significantly more negative regarding immigration's effect in general). Interestingly, there is no significant difference in attitudes toward those from poorer countries outside of Europe nor toward immigration's effect on culture. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, most immigrants from other parts of the world are significantly more negative toward immigration compared to those from old EU countries. Nevertheless, these effects differ based on the attitude in question. Although we consider, overall, hypothesis H6 confirmed, these results once again highlight the necessity to distinguish between different attitudes toward immigration when investigating immigrants' attitudes toward immigration, confirming our hypothesis H7.

Finally, as robustness checks, we also use 2 indices of attitudes toward immigration, both consisting of 3 items, one measuring attitudes toward immigration policy and one attitude toward the effects of immigration. Finally, we include an analysis of a singular index in which we combined all six items. We created the indices by combining answers for all individuals who answered at least two or four questions, respective to the index, and computing an average value of their non-missing answers.¹³ The results for these indices can be found in Figure A1 and Tables A15-A17 in the Online Appendix. The analysis revealed that broad results are generally consistent across different types of operationalizations of attitudes toward immigration. However, nuances in the strength (and occasionally in the orientation) of the estimated effects of the explanatory factors for separate dimensions of attitudes toward immigration and the indices are present. Some effects of the explanatory factors disappear in the indexed measures. This points to the importance of distinguishing between different types of immigration attitudes when analyzing factors affecting them (Dražanová et al. 2022), especially for non-migrant samples.

¹³ See Appendix for the correlation and factor analyses and Cronbach's alphas.

Table 4. Multilevel hierarchical regression coefficients for the six dependent variables for the first generation immigrants, including years since arrival and region of origin as independent variables in the model

	Allow poor	Allow different	Allow same	Effect on culture	Effect on economy	General effect
Age	-0.013 (0.002)**	-0.008 (0.002)**	-0.005 (0.002)**	0.003 (0.002)+	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)**	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)**
Male	-0.011 (0.012)	0.018 (0.011)+	0.020 (0.010)+	0.008 (0.010)	0.092 (0.010)**	0.030 (0.009)**
In paid work	0.045 (0.013)**	0.037 (0.013)**	0.007 (0.012)	0.051 (0.011)**	0.053 (0.011)**	0.047 (0.011)**
Secondary education <i>(Ref Elementary)</i>	-0.022 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.035 (0.014)*	0.015 (0.012)	0.030 (0.013)*	-0.002 (0.012)
Vocational education	-0.016 (0.027)	0.038 (0.026)	0.075 (0.024)**	0.061 (0.022)**	0.051 (0.023)*	0.059 (0.021)**
Tertiary education	0.163 (0.016)**	0.202 (0.015)**	0.191 (0.014)**	0.194 (0.013)**	0.201 (0.013)**	0.132 (0.012)**
Coping on income <i>(Ref Satisfied)</i>	-0.066 (0.014)**	-0.067 (0.014)**	-0.074 (0.013)**	-0.052 (0.012)**	-0.070 (0.012)**	-0.068 (0.011)**
Difficult on income	-0.074 (0.018)**	-0.108 (0.017)**	-0.117 (0.016)**	-0.084 (0.015)**	-0.115 (0.015)**	-0.091 (0.014)**
Very difficult on income	-0.106 (0.025)**	-0.113 (0.023)**	-0.148 (0.022)**	-0.110 (0.021)**	-0.141 (0.021)**	-0.136 (0.019)**
Monthly socialising <i>(Ref Never)</i>	0.149 (0.046)**	0.046 (0.043)	0.103 (0.041)*	0.006 (0.038)	0.044 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.036)
Weekly socialising	0.163 (0.045)**	0.075 (0.043)+	0.122 (0.040)**	0.044 (0.037)	0.106 (0.038)**	0.046 (0.035)
Daily socialising	0.217 (0.045)**	0.139 (0.043)**	0.180 (0.041)**	0.101 (0.037)**	0.142 (0.038)**	0.091 (0.035)**
Discriminated <i>(Ref Non-discrim)</i>	0.097 (0.017)**	0.093 (0.016)**	0.069 (0.015)**	0.071 (0.014)**	0.068 (0.014)**	0.024 (0.013)+
Minority <i>(Ref Non-minor)</i>	0.042 (0.014)**	0.068 (0.013)**	0.046 (0.013)**	0.094 (0.012)**	0.090 (0.012)**	0.082 (0.011)**
Citizenship	-0.006 (0.001)**	-0.005 (0.001)**	-0.005 (0.001)**	-0.007 (0.001)**	-0.008 (0.001)**	-0.008 (0.001)**
Roman Catholic <i>(Ref No-religion)</i>	-0.100 (0.017)**	-0.087 (0.016)**	-0.025 (0.015)	-0.106 (0.014)**	-0.043 (0.014)**	-0.081 (0.013)**
Protestant	-0.065 (0.022)**	-0.061 (0.021)**	0.023 (0.020)	-0.094 (0.019)**	-0.047 (0.019)*	-0.068 (0.018)**
Eastern Orthodox	-0.106	-0.086	-0.052	-0.098	-0.065	-0.075

	(0.023)**	(0.022)**	(0.020)*	(0.019)**	(0.019)**	(0.018)**
Other Christian religions	-0.012	-0.042	0.021	-0.083	-0.057	-0.098
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.031)**	(0.031)+	(0.029)**
Other Non-Christian religions	0.007	-0.004	-0.030	-0.118	-0.004	-0.079
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.045)**	(0.045)	(0.043)+
Islam	0.077	0.067	0.028	0.091	0.065	0.085
	(0.023)**	(0.022)**	(0.021)	(0.019)**	(0.019)**	(0.018)**
Eastern Religions	-0.053	-0.038	-0.057	-0.025	-0.004	-0.049
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Religiosity	0.007	0.003	-0.002	0.012	0.006	0.014
	(0.002)**	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**
Language spoken at home	-0.005	0.003	0.014	-0.006	0.005	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)+
1-5 years in destination	0.015	-0.103	-0.079	-0.024	-0.061	0.017
<i>(Ref Came last year)</i>	(0.056)	(0.054)+	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.045)
6-10 years in destination	0.004	-0.122	-0.099	-0.016	-0.069	-0.009
	(0.056)	(0.054)*	(0.051)+	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.045)
11-20 years in destination	-0.010	-0.142	-0.138	-0.038	-0.135	-0.040
	(0.056)	(0.053)**	(0.051)**	(0.046)	(0.047)**	(0.045)
21+ years in destination	-0.033	-0.177	-0.179	-0.072	-0.221	-0.107
	(0.057)	(0.054)**	(0.052)**	(0.047)	(0.048)**	(0.045)*
New EU	-0.129	-0.125	-0.095	-0.048	0.006	-0.003
<i>(Ref Old EU)</i>	(0.019)**	(0.018)**	(0.017)**	(0.016)**	(0.016)	(0.015)
Global North and Australia	-0.146	-0.127	-0.097	-0.087	-0.062	-0.043
	(0.026)**	(0.025)**	(0.023)**	(0.022)**	(0.022)**	(0.021)*
Indian Subcontinent	-0.038	-0.036	-0.086	-0.028	-0.028	0.071
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.036)*	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)*
Asia + Oceania	-0.071	-0.029	-0.153	0.001	-0.017	0.084
	(0.034)*	(0.032)	(0.031)**	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)**
Africa	0.043	0.011	-0.075	0.047	0.074	0.050
	(0.024)+	(0.023)	(0.022)**	(0.020)*	(0.020)**	(0.019)**
Middle East	-0.078	-0.106	-0.194	-0.035	-0.080	0.033
	(0.028)**	(0.027)**	(0.025)**	(0.023)	(0.024)**	(0.022)
South America	0.027	-0.035	-0.121	0.099	0.034	0.100
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)**	(0.024)**	(0.025)	(0.023)**
Balkan	-0.091	-0.086	-0.140	-0.049	-0.031	-0.004
	(0.027)**	(0.026)**	(0.024)**	(0.022)*	(0.023)	(0.021)
Central Asia	-0.181	-0.179	-0.104	-0.114	-0.057	-0.019
	(0.041)**	(0.039)**	(0.037)**	(0.034)**	(0.035)+	(0.032)
Year 2004	-0.018	0.059	0.046	-0.045	-0.051	-0.029
<i>(Ref year 2002)</i>	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.037)

	year 2006	-0.093 (0.043)*	-0.025 (0.042)	0.045 (0.036)	-0.069 (0.033)*	0.006 (0.036)	0.006 (0.038)
	year 2008	-0.051 (0.041)	0.043 (0.040)	0.067 (0.034)*	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.034)	0.031 (0.036)
	year 2010	-0.070 (0.041)+	0.043 (0.040)	0.057 (0.034)+	-0.083 (0.031)**	-0.045 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.035)
	year 2012	-0.036 (0.042)	0.049 (0.041)	0.045 (0.034)	-0.021 (0.032)	0.012 (0.035)	0.049 (0.036)
	year 2014	-0.127 (0.041)**	0.069 (0.040)+	0.088 (0.034)**	-0.123 (0.032)**	-0.072 (0.035)*	0.000 (0.036)
	year 2016	-0.046 (0.042)	0.014 (0.041)	0.079 (0.035)*	-0.148 (0.033)**	-0.039 (0.036)	-0.009 (0.037)
	year 2018	-0.007 (0.040)	0.072 (0.039)+	0.135 (0.033)**	-0.115 (0.031)**	0.046 (0.034)	0.032 (0.035)
	Intercept	3.029 (0.098)**	3.120 (0.094)**	3.215 (0.085)**	2.872 (0.079)**	2.720 (0.079)**	2.669 (0.077)**
Random effects	Country	-1.662 (0.172)**	-1.688 (0.170)**	-2.010 (0.174)**	-2.020 (0.174)**	-2.118 (0.175)**	-2.014 (0.172)**
	Period	-2.500 (0.116)**	-2.508 (0.113)**	-2.779 (0.133)**	-2.822 (0.131)**	-2.678 (0.114)**	-2.577 (0.101)**
	Individual	-0.209 (0.005)**	-0.260 (0.005)**	-0.305 (0.005)**	-0.391 (0.005)**	-0.381 (0.005)**	-0.449 (0.005)**
N		21,457	21,454	21,500	21,602	21,439	21,322

Discussion

Attitudes toward immigration are typically investigated through the majority (non-migrant) perspective. The literature examining immigrants' support for or opposition to immigration is still scarce. Nevertheless, given the growing diversity of European societies and the broadening rights of minorities in their host countries, research on attitudes toward immigration should not be restricted to the majority's views as it is insufficient to systematically describe the countries' populations (Ramos et al. 2019). We argue that among individuals with different migratory backgrounds can also be made a distinction between those who are part of an ethnic minority-majority, those who speak a non-national language at home, or those who perceive themselves as belonging to a discriminated group. Moreover, among those with immigration backgrounds also exist subcategories, such as between first- and second-generation immigrants, and between those who hold the citizenship of the residence country or not. Accordingly, we argue it is necessary to go beyond the non-migrant ingroup vs. immigrant outgroup distinction when studying attitudes toward immigration.

Firstly, we investigate the effect of migratory background on attitudes toward immigration compared to the non-migrant population. Secondly, we analyze the association between attitudes toward immigration and individual characteristics, particularly those associated with more or less stigmatization (such as perceived unfair treatment, being part of an ethnic minority, or speaking non-national languages at home). Thirdly, we present variations in these associations across migratory backgrounds and across different types of attitudes toward immigration. Lastly, we establish whether immigration attitudes of the first migrant generation change longer they stay in the country and whether this effect is distinct across diverse immigration attitudes.

When studying minority attitudes toward immigration, previous studies predominantly employ data from Western Europe and the US (Just and Anderson 2015, Gonnot and Lo Polito 2021, Becker 2019). In our research, we aimed to show the importance of broadening these perspectives. Thus, we analyzed data from countries across Europe including Southern and Eastern European countries. Especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, "non-traditional" destination countries such as Poland and Czechia have been facing unprecedented numbers of refugee arrivals. It is therefore crucial to broaden our understanding of minority attitudes toward immigration beyond a few Western European countries. Nevertheless, due to the comparative nature of our research design, we are not able to provide detailed results for each of the countries separately. We also included a broad range of individual minority-related characteristics, therefore allowing a comparison of how these factors affect non-migrant and migrant minorities' attitudes toward immigration. Finally, we document the importance of analyzing dimensions of attitudes toward immigration separately.

We show immigrants' attitudes toward immigration are on average more favorable compared to non-migrants' attitudes, although they tend to become more negative with time spent in the country. Specifically, for the first-generation, considering six measures of attitudes toward immigration separately, we show the negative effect is differently paced with some attitudes (such as to open borders) converging faster than opinions on immigration's effect on culture. Although still significantly more positive compared to non-migrants, second-generation migrants are less favorable to immigration than the first-generation. The determinants of attitudes toward immigration differ for the three groups and across different dimensions of attitudes. Minority-related characteristics such as the language spoken at home and experience of discrimination differ according to one's migratory background. While speaking a minority language and perceptions of discrimination are associated with more favorable attitudes toward immigration among immigrants, it leads to less favorable attitudes toward immigration for non-migrants and in one dimension of attitudes toward immigration also for the second generation.

Our results support existing findings regarding the differences among immigrant generations (Becker 2019) and the convergence of attitudes with the time spent in the country (Gonnot and Lo Polito 2021). Similarly, our analysis confirms the estimated relationship between acquiring citizenship and less favorable attitudes toward immigration (Just and Anderson 2015). Thus, we confirm previous studies' validity in new contexts. We uncovered a variation in the direction of estimated associations between membership in ethnic and linguistic minority groups and perceived discrimination and attitudes toward immigration for the migrant and non-migrant subsamples. This confirms the importance of diversifying the research on immigration attitudes to include minority and migrant samples to achieve a complex understanding of European populations' opinions. Our further contribution is the comparison of different attitudes toward immigration dimensions, which shows that the use of indices when studying immigration attitudes can yield inconsistent results for different subpopulations. These findings contribute to our understanding of social cohesion, social inclusion, and intergroup conflict.

Arguably, due to the design of the used data, our study is observational and therefore our findings can only show associations. Despite these limitations, our research explains variations in the migrants' and non-migrants' attitudes and delivers valuable information for the future research design for the analysis of anti-immigrant attitudes dimensions. Future research using longitudinal data on attitudes can further causally test the associations presented here. Moreover, to increase the internal validity of the analysis data including boosted samples of individuals from specific countries or regions would be needed.

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