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Response to Reviewers:
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Abstract (max 150 words)

Despite the Lisbon Treaty’s modifications in the foreign and security policy domain, the EU has frequently relied on third parties to address external conflicts and crises. Using the Ukrainian conflict as a case study, this article adopts the orchestration model to explain why and how the EU enlists intermediary actors over which it has no formal control to pursue its objectives. It finds that in this conflict the EU outsourced part of its crisis management activities to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe because it lacked the civilian and military capabilities, as well as the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia. Indeed, the Ukrainian case shows that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management, raising...
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Introduction

This article sheds light on a distinctive practice the European Union (EU) has been adopting in its management of external conflicts and crises. After years of progressive enhancement of EU civilian and military crisis management capacities (Blockmans, 2008), the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 turned the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy into a Vice President of the European Commission and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, while envisioning the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). These modifications were considered strategic for ensuring effective policy coordination among member states, as well as between them and EU institutions (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017; Amadio Viceré, 2018), including EU crisis management structures (Koops & Tercovich, 2020; Tercovich, 2014). As a result, the EU should have devised a “comprehensive approach” to external conflicts and crises (Amadio Viceré, 2014), and hence become a more efficient global crisis manager (Boin et al., 2013). Still, on several occasions the EU has relied on third parties to achieve its foreign policy objectives, de facto externalizing its crisis management activities (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018; Gowan & Witney, 2014).

The past decade offers both well-known and lesser-known examples of such externalization across a spectrum of EU crisis management areas. Among other cases, the EU has recruited and supported civil society organizations to promote human rights and democracy in the Middle East and in Northern Africa after the Arab Uprisings (Huber, 2013); it enlisted the Libyan coastguard and Turkey to manage migratory flows across the Mediterranean (Nielsen, 2020; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016); and it relied on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to improve public governance and support socio-economic development in the Western Balkans’ process of democratic transition (Bonomi, 2015). Nonetheless, this pattern of interaction between the EU and non-EU actors in crisis management remains largely uncharted territory. Against this background, the article aims to answer the following question: Why and how does the EU rely on third parties to achieve its crisis management objectives?
Adopting a broad conceptualization of EU crisis management (Koenig, 2016), the article addresses this question drawing on the orchestration model (Abbott et al., 2015a). It employs “theory-testing process-tracing” (Beach & Pedersen, 2019) to conduct an in-depth study of the EU’s relationship with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during the Ukrainian crisis. This case study offers relevant empirical evidence for tracing the occurrence and development of the pattern of interaction considered. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the ensuing destabilisation of Ukraine were perceived as the most dangerous predicaments in European security after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty (MacFarlane & Menon, 2014; Rynning, 2015). For sure, as this crisis unfolded, the EU devised a series of measures aimed at supporting Ukraine politically and economically. At the same time, while the EU sought to compel Russia to solve its conflict with Ukraine through sanctions, it attempted to soft balance its position in Ukraine by boosting the resilience of the Ukrainian security sector through the civilian CSDP mission “EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine” (Nováky, 2015). Still, to challenge Russia directly and confront Ukrainian separatists and Russian troops, the EU enlisted a third party over which it had no formal control: the OSCE.

This article’s contribution is twofold. On a theoretical level, it contributes to the understanding of EU foreign policy post-Lisbon (Amadio Viceré, et al., 2020), by systematically applying for the first time the orchestration model to EU crisis management activities. While doing so, the article also contributes to the empirical validation of this model. On an empirical level, the article offers valuable insights into a largely neglected practice in EU crisis management. To do so, it relies on primary and secondary sources. In particular, the article’s empirical analysis is based on a triangulation of data drawn from: sixteen semi-structured elite interviews conducted during face-to-face meetings in Brussels in December 2015 with EU and member states’ officials involved in the Ukrainian policy dossier as well as with experts in the field (see List of Interviews, below); and on an extensive analysis of EU official documents. To contextualize these interviews and official documents, the article uses secondary sources, such as policy reports and newspapers.
The article’s main argument is that the orchestration model is particularly suitable for explaining EU security efforts. Resorting to arrangements of indirect governance to relay on the competencies of intermediary actors is a common practice for “governors” in international politics (Abbott et al., 2020). Still, it is reasonable to argue that the EU is inclined to choose orchestration over other modes of indirect governance in its crisis management activities. Certainly, in contrast to most other international organizations (IOs), the EU combines intergovernmental traits with supranational features. Given the pre-eminence of intergovernmental practices in EU foreign and security policy, however, the EU is likely to behave like other IGOs in its security efforts, and hence to be keen to engage in orchestration (Genschel & Jachtenfuschs, 2018). In particular, the EU might choose orchestration when it has ambitious goals but extensive capability deficits to achieve them, which is often the case in its crisis management activities. As a matter of fact, despite the Lisbon Treaty’s modifications, the EU ability to mobilize its considerable economic and security power is still constrained by member states’ unwillingness to coordinate their decentralized resources in specific cases. Indeed, the case of Ukraine shows that the pre-eminence of intergovernmental practices in EU foreign policy governance and of the role played by the European Council in decision-making processes, led the EU to behave like a “purely” intergovernmental organization. At the same time, the article’s empirical analysis demonstrates that in the Ukrainian conflict the EU orchestrated the OSCE not only because it lacked the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia directly, but also because of EU member states’ unwillingness to get directly involved in the conflict.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of the existing literature on EU crisis management and international organizations, introduces the orchestration model, and elaborates a causal mechanism based on it. The second section tests the proposed mechanism by tracing the process resulting in the EU orchestration of the OSCE to target the behavior of Russia from the annexation of Crimea (March 2014) until the immediate aftermath of
the Minsk II Agreement (February 2015). Finally, the concluding section discusses the results and implications of my analysis, including avenues for further research.

**EU crisis management and other international organizations**

Crisis management can be defined as the set of activities an actor devises to achieve the settlement and containment of violent conflicts (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). The EU, especially, conceives crisis management as the ensemble of its immediate, medium, and long-term responses to external crises, through the mobilization of all its security-related external policies and instruments (EEAS, 2019b; European Commissioner for External Relations, 2007). Scholarly literature on EU crisis management has grown not only in parallel with its increasing institutionalization and the expansion of its policy instruments (Dijkstra, 2013; Gross & Jucos, 2011; Mace, 2007), but also with the proliferation of actors in global security governance. Various scholars have devoted their efforts to examining the effects of overlapping IGOs on international crisis response (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2019). Some of them have drawn on institutional choice accounts (Jupille et al., 2013) to assess how European states choose among multiple institutional alternatives for addressing demands for cooperation problems in security policy (Hoffman, 2019; Reykers, 2019). Others have adopted the concept of regime complexity (Aggarwal, 1998; Alter & Meunier, 2009) to investigate EU cooperation and rivalry with multiple governance actors in international crisis management (Brosig, 2015; Hofmann, 2009, 2011, 2019).

However, these analytical perspectives are neither sufficient for explaining why the EU relays on other IGOs as intermediaries, nor for assessing the causal mechanism accounting for specific cases of interaction between the EU and other IGOs (Brosig, 2017). As a matter of fact, while they downplay status differences between IGOs (Abbott et al., 2015a), they generally focus on the systems of governance emerging from the interactions among them (Biermann et al., 2009; Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020).
Indeed, scholarly literature has frequently addressed EU interactions with other IGOs, among which the OSCE (van Ham, 2008; van Willigen, 2014; van Willigen & Koops, 2015). Research on these matters has explored especially how such interactions can foster “policy coordination” between the EU and other IGOs, and thus increase their efficiency in addressing specific issues (Gawrich, 2017; McEvoy, 2017; Koops & Tardy, 2015), including in the context of the EU comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises (Major & Mölling, 2009) and of the implementation of the 2016 EU Global Strategy (Dijkstra et al., 2018). In this context, resource dependency approaches to inter-organizational relations (Biermann & Harsch, 2017; Biermann, 2014) have provided relevant insights into the reasons why the EU seeks partnerships with other IGOs in its security efforts and how these interactions are structured (Brosig, 2014; Petrov et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the analytical frameworks employed in these studies do not envisage the occurrence of indirect governance arrangements, namely the possibility that an IGO might enlist another IGO to achieve its preferred objective.

The scholarly literature on indirect governance may be particularly useful for filling these research gaps. The proponents of the competence-control theory, in particular, argue that governors can employ various forms of indirect governance to relay on the competencies of intermediary actors, namely: co-optation; delegation; orchestration; and trusteeship (Abbott et al., 2020). These modes of governance differ in terms of control of the governors over the intermediaries, and hence in terms of constraints over the exercise of their competencies. Orchestration, in particular, is the only mode of indirect governance in which the governor relays only on ideational and/or material inducements to influence the intermediary’s behavior. Certainly, the competence-control theory can offer a thorough understanding of why the EU enlists third parties in its crisis management activities. Like resource dependency approaches, it acknowledges that IGOs may relay not only on their member states’ capabilities (Patz & Goetz, 2019), but also on those of other IGOs (cf. Jacobs, 1974). At the same time, this theory can provide relevant insights into how EU reliance on third parties works in practice.
Contrary to the literature on overlapping IGOs and on EU inter-organizational relations, in fact, this theory focuses on the interaction itself (Abbott et al., 2015a).

Bearing all this in mind, the orchestration model provides the most useful framework for examining EU security efforts. On the one hand, the EU is likely to behave like other IGOs, which have less capacity than states to pursue hard and direct modes of governance, and hence to be keen to engage in orchestration rather than in other arrangements of indirect governance (Genschel & Jachtenfuschs, 2018). On the other hand, similarly to other governors, the EU is likely to choose this distinctive arrangement of indirect governance and abandon high controls over the intermediary when it has ambitious goals but extensive capability deficits (Abbott & Snidal, 2021). Indeed, despite its aspirations to become an international crisis manager (Boin et al., 2013), the EU ability to mobilize its considerable economic and security power is often constrained by member states’ unwillingness to coordinate their decentralized resources in specific cases (Rieker & Blockmans, 2021).

All this notwithstanding, existing scholarly work on the EU orchestration of intermediaries is scarce (Blauberger & Rittberger, 2015; Mattli & Seddon, 2015; Tallberg, 2015). Studies focusing on the EU’s externalization of crisis management suggest a tension between the EU’s formal authority in foreign policy and its capabilities for exercising it at the EU level (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016, 2018). Nonetheless, since these studies are mostly speculative, empirical work is needed to advance our understanding of this governance arrangement. Conversely, with few exceptions (Elsig, 2015; van der Lugt & Dingwerth, 2015), examinations conducted through the lens of the orchestration model have not unpacked how this governance arrangement works in detail. These gaps in research on EU crisis management and on orchestration are the reason why this article argues in favor of adopting the orchestration model in the study of EU foreign policy.

The orchestration model
The orchestration model posits that when IGOs lack certain competences to achieve their desired goals, they may engage in orchestration by enlisting an actor (i.e. an intermediary) on a voluntary basis (Abbott et al., 2015a, 2015b). Crucially, states themselves may foster the IGO’s adoption of orchestration rather than more hierarchical forms of indirect governance when they lack the competencies needed to pursue specific objectives (Abbott et al., 2012). This is even more so if they face risks and diffuse vulnerabilities rather than security threats coming from organized actors (Weiss & Jankaukas, 2019). Since the IGO can neither control nor command the intermediary, it generally provides it with material and ideational incentives (Abbott et al., 2015a, 2015b). The value attached by the intermediary to these incentives leads it to voluntarily take part in the IGO’s orchestration and to follow its guidance over time.

Competences may include all the capabilities needed to achieve such goals, among which expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and operational capacity (Abbott et al., 2020). While resorting to orchestration may offer a substitute when certain capabilities are lacking, this governance arrangement may also serve as a complement when capabilities exist but are insufficient to attain certain objectives (Tallberg, 2015). Notably, orchestrators do not completely lack capabilities. For orchestration to be successful, in fact, they need to have something to offer to the intermediary. Hence, it is the combination between the level of different capabilities over time and across policy issues that determines the development of specific orchestration patterns (Abbott et al., 2015a).

By resorting to orchestration, the EU may address its capability deficiencies. Based on the orchestration model and on existing scholarly work on the EU’s role as global crisis manager (Boin et al., 2013; Smith, 2021), this article argues that such deficiencies can be related to five equally important and interdependent types of capabilities: military capabilities; civilian crisis management capabilities; external economic action capacity; regulatory competence; and the reputation for an acceptable intervention. While the first three types of capabilities refer to the EU level, the last two refer to the
external context in which the EU operates. For each of these capabilities, it is possible to identify a specific assumption.

First, by orchestrating third parties the EU may escape the constraints imposed by its member states on its military capabilities. In fact, owing to member states’ reluctance to integrate core resources of sovereign government (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018), at the EU level there is a general insufficiency of centralized capabilities for deploying military forces in response to crises (Menon, 2013). Second, the EU may orchestrate a third party to address a lack of civilian capabilities for managing external crises. Although the EU considerably expanded the civilian component of its crisis management’s capabilities throughout its emergence as a player on the international scene (Ioannides, 2010), such capabilities are often insufficient to meet its crisis management needs (Juncos & Blockmans, 2018; Major & Mölling, 2010). Added to this, due to the numerous veto points and member states’ extensive involvement in the management of this sector, the EU has often been unable to deploy its civilian capabilities as easily as other IGOs (Dijkstra at al., 2019). Third, the EU may choose to orchestrate a third party when it lacks external economic action capacity. In the crisis management sector, such capacity may include not only EU humanitarian assistance, but also EU sanctions in response to external crises. EU capacity to act as an agent of humanitarian relief has traditionally been extensive, because of the huge amount of resources at its disposal for humanitarian assistance and of member states’ limited role in EU aid decisions (Boin et al., 2013). EU sanctioning capacity, in turn, has often been hindered by member states’ frequent resistance to this foreign policy tool. In fact, since the Council of the EU adopts sanctions by unanimity, member states can exert a veto over their approval (Portela, 2015).

Fourth, by enlisting third parties the EU may overcome its lack of regulatory competence (Abbott & Bernstein, 2015), which generally includes rights of norm setting, implementation, and enforcement (van Zeben, 2014). In principle, the EU has been increasingly qualified as a “regional organization” able to foster peace and security under the authority of the United Nations Security Council (Gibney
& Biscop, 2012). Still, the EU may lack problem-solving capacity in external crises where other international and/or regional actors enjoy such rights, due to: geographical and functional reasons (Dijkstra et al., 2018); and/or to the distinctive features of its approach to external conflicts and crises (Faleg, 2018).

Lastly, the EU may rely on the assistance of a third party when it does not possess a reputation for an acceptable intervention outside its domain of sovereignty, based on the recognition of its utility and/or its perceived legitimacy (Beach, 2005; Boin et al. 2013). Through orchestration, in fact, the EU may support interventions that are neither recognized as useful nor perceived as legitimate in affected countries, while attributing public responsibility for them to its intermediary actor (Rittberger et al., 2017).

Tracing orchestration in EU crisis management: Causal mechanism and empirical fingerprints

To conduct a systematic examination of the causal mechanism linking the EU’s alleged lack of capabilities to its orchestration of third parties in international politics, this article adopts theory-testing process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). Based on insights from the orchestration model, it submits that in situations where multiple governance actors co-exist, if the EU lacks military capabilities, civilian crisis management capabilities, the capacity for external economic action, regulatory competence, and/or the reputation needed for pursuing its governance goals, it may enlist an intermediary actor and provide it with material and ideational support to address target actors in pursuit of such goals. Through this theoretical conjecture, it is possible to elaborate a causal mechanism accounting for the EU’s orchestration of an intermediary in pursuit of its objectives (i.e., the outcome, O). The causal mechanism, which is initiated by the EU’s lack of capabilities needed to attain its goals (i.e., the cause, C), is conceptualized as composed of three parts (see Table 1). The mechanism-constituting parts, which should be considered as individually insufficient but necessary elements of it, are the following.
First, given the capabilities needed to pursue its governance goals, the EU enlists an intermediary actor on a voluntary basis. Second, after having enlisted an intermediary actor, to gear its activities towards pre-determined objectives, the EU provides it with cognitive and normative guidance. Third, since the EU cannot exert direct control over the intermediary, to keep this system of governance oriented towards its preferred goals, the EU supports it with direct material and ideational means. Fourth, in exchange for such support and in order to maintain it, the intermediary addresses the targets in pursuit of the EU’s governance goals.

After having delineated a theoretical conjecture about a plausible mechanism linking the cause (i.e. the EU’s capability gaps) to the outcome (i.e. EU orchestration of a third party), in order to engage in theory-testing process-tracing, it is necessary to select a “typical case,” that is a case where there is relatively strong prior confidence in the presence of such a causal relationship (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). The EU-OSCE relationship during the Ukrainian crisis is a typical case for two main reasons. First, the required contextual condition of the proposed causal mechanism (i.e. the existence of multiple governance actors) is present. As a matter of fact, the European security architecture sees the co-existence of three main organizations: the EU, NATO, and the OSCE (Forsberg & Haukkala, 2015). Second, it has been argued that since the EU lacked the necessary capabilities to act as a crisis manager against Russia’s behavior in Ukraine, it relied on the OSCE’s assistance to do so (Averre, 2016; Lehne, 2015; Staack, 2018). Nonetheless, on the one hand, studies on the EU response to the Ukrainian crisis generally adopted a narrow focus on EU crisis management capabilities, mostly concentrating on the Common Security and Defence Policy (Howorth, 2017; Maass, 2019; Schilde, 2016). On the other, a systematic analysis of the causal mechanism linking the EU’s alleged lack of capabilities to its recruitment and support of the OSCE has not yet been conducted.

Should the causal mechanism formulated above be present in this case study, we could see it through a series of specific “empirical fingerprints” left by each of its parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). First, the EU’s enlistment of the OSCE could assume different forms. The EU could draw on the convening
power of its member states, which represent twenty-eight of the fifty-seven OSCE participating states, fund more than two thirds of the OSCE budget, and—together with the EU—contribute the most to the OSCE’s extra-budgetary projects (EEAS, 2016). Alternatively, the EU could empower the OSCE by putting it in contact with influential actors in world politics, including those directly involved in the crisis (Abbott et al., 2015a). Evidence of EU initiatives in this direction, of the OSCE’s participation in them, and of its ensuing adoption of EU-backed principles would prove the enlistment’s existence.

Second, the EU’s cognitive and normative guidance of the OSCE’s activities may be visible in EU institutions’ official documents and/or in EU decision-makers’ public statements, in which they set the OSCE’s agenda on certain issues and/or put forward specific institutional and policy arrangements to address them (Abbott et al., 2015a). In principle, it is the High Representative and the Commission that are tasked with managing cooperation with the OSCE (TEU, Art. 32; TFEU, Art. 220). Nevertheless, the European Council is entitled to define the EU’s strategic interests and objectives in foreign affairs (TEU, Art. 22). Therefore, it is quite plausible that this intergovernmental forum would exert a coordinating role and that the High Representative, alongside the Foreign Affairs Council and with the Commission’s support, would subsequently ensure the consistency of the EU’s approach by bilateral diplomacy in relation to the OSCE. Finding proof of an adaptation of the OSCE’s priorities and strategies to EU’s guidelines could demonstrate that the EU influenced this international organization.

Third, to keep this system of governance oriented towards its preferred goals, the EU may provide the OSCE with material and ideational incentives (Abbott et al., 2015a). Material incentives may consist of military and/or civilian personnel and equipment; and, more in general, funds. Ideational incentives may include the provision of technical expertise, information, and/or overt endorsement of the intermediary’s mission and activities. These incentives could be observed through official statements in which EU institutions and/or decision-makers offer to provide material support to strengthen the OSCE’s capabilities to pursue shared objectives; and/or ideational support to increase
the OSCE’s credibility, legitimacy, and reputation vis-à-vis Russia (Abbott & Bernstein, 2015; Abbott et al., 2015a). Evidence for the OSCE’s acceptance—and/or absence of express refusal—of such incentives, and requests for assistance would reflect the value attached by this international organization to the EU’s assistance, and hence its propensity to voluntarily take part in the EU’s orchestration over time.

The next section investigates whether the causal mechanism was operative and functioned as hypothesized in the Ukrainian crisis from Crimea’s annexation (March 2014) until the extension of the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (March 2015), that is following the conclusion of the so-called Minsk II Agreement (February 2015).

**EU orchestration of the OSCE in the Ukrainian crisis**

EU approach on Ukraine has historically been marred by member states’ divergent economic and security preferences over Russia’s stance in eastern Europe (Raik, 2007). Still, over time the EU has been pursuing the economic association and political association of Ukraine into the EU, particularly in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership. In parallel, Ukraine has been adopting a multi-vectored approach to its foreign and economic policy, aimed at reconciling Russia with free trade with the EU (Dragneva-Lewers & Wolczuk, 2015). Faced with these dynamics, Russia has been increasingly worrying about its status as a regional power (MacFarlane & Menon, 2014). In the years preceding the Ukrainian crisis’ outbreak, especially, Moscow put forth a series of political and economic measures to discourage the then Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from signing the Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DCFTA) with the EU. Eventually, Yanukovych’s refusal to sign such agreement at the November 2013 Vilnius Summit and the ensuing outbreak of the protests in Kiev’s Maidan Square sanctioned the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis.
EU initial reaction to these events resembled its responses to the 2008 Georgian crisis, the Ukrainian 2004-2005 Orange Revolution and recurrent gas crises (Juncos & Pomorska, 2011). Between November 2013 and March 2014, EU member states and institutions recurrently condemned the violent repression of protesters; reiterated EU commitment to deepen cooperation with Ukraine; and sought to act as mediators of peace deals between Ukrainian authorities and opposition forces. While doing so, however, they often devised uncoordinated—if not conflicting—positions (Howorth, 2017).

For sure, the Russian annexation of Crimea represented a game-changer in EU approach to Ukraine, triggering the emergence of a consensus among EU member states over the need to induce Russia to decrease tensions in Ukraine (Ikani, 2019). This notwithstanding, as discussed in the next sections, EU member states continued to prefer an approach that would avoid direct confrontation with Russia, particularly in eastern Ukraine where Russian troops and military equipment had been deployed.

The Cause

Evidence shows that the EU relied on the OSCE during the Ukrainian crisis because of the inadequacy of the capabilities at its disposal. Since the mobilization of EU military crisis management capabilities largely depends on member states’ unanimous consent and on their willingness’ to coordinate their resources on specific issues, the EU essentially lacked the military capabilities to confront Russia directly in the period considered. As an EU official emphasized: “The EU diverted its action through the OSCE” as “member states had understood that if they had undertaken a military action in Ukraine, the Russians would have totally gone nuts” (Interview C). According to another EU official, “Member states were afraid that this could cause reaction from Russia” (Interview F). The possibility of employing EU civilian crisis management operations with military or defense implications was out of the question as well. As a matter of fact, at the time, Russia’s priority was to prevent that any possible CSDP activity would “strengthen the military potential of the Ukrainian armed forces to suppress Russian speakers in Ukraine” (Interview reported in Nováky, 2015, p. 251).
At first sight, the OSCE would have not been the most suitable candidate for the externalization of EU crisis management. OSCE crisis management tools were limited to the provision of good-offices and mediation (Freire, 2018). Therefore, NATO would have been better equipped than both the EU and the OSCE to deploy a military force in response to Russia’s destabilization of eastern Ukraine. As for the civilian crisis management capabilities, the OSCE suffered from significant operational limitations (Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019). In fact, despite its deficiencies in the civilian crisis management sector, the EU had essentially replaced the OSCE as the most prominent provider of civilian missions (Dijkstra et al., 2018). During the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, for instance, the EU had conducted a civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) to oversee the implementation of a ceasefire between the two conflicting parties. The UN mission in Abkhazia and the OSCE mission to South Ossetia, in contrast, had been forced by Russia to leave (Whitman & Wolff, 2010). All this notwithstanding, the OSCE was the most suitable IGO to challenge Russia’s position in Ukraine by getting directly involved in the conflict because of its regulatory competence and its reputation.

In terms of regulatory competence, the EU lacked the authority to set norms, implement them and enforce them in the Ukrainian crisis. Addressing Ukraine’s destabilization through NATO was not an option either. On the one hand, since Ukraine was not a NATO member, it could not benefit from the Atlantic Alliance’s collective defense measures as per Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. On the other, since Russia is a permanent member with veto power on the UN Security Council, the latter could not authorize the use of regional organizations—such as NATO—against Russia’s aggressive policy in Ukraine, as per Art. 53.1 of the UN Charter (Douhan, 2015).iii Indeed, the OSCE did not enjoy the formal right of determining norms specifically for Russia. Nonetheless, OSCE participating states are committed to respecting a series of principles in their reciprocal relations. These include but are not limited to: sovereign equality; refraining from the threat or use of force; the inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity; the peaceful settlement of disputes; and cooperation among states (OSCE, 1975).

Given that both Russia and Ukraine are participating states in this organization, the OSCE had rights
of implementation and enforcement over Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. Certainly, the OSCE could have neither put an end to violence nor stopped the Russian activities in eastern Ukraine. Nonetheless, it could have exposed Russia’s false claims about organized violence against Russian speakers where such violence was not occurring, and hence increase the public costs of Russia’s invasion (Farrell, 2014).

Lastly, considering that it was perceived as being directly part of the conflict (Interview A, E, F, H, I, J, K; Nitou, 2016), the EU lacked the reputation for an acceptable intervention vis-à-vis the target of regulation (i.e. Russia). NATO too did not enjoy such a reputation. Due to its historic mission to combat the risk of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and given its intrinsic nature as a military and defense organization, there was the risk that its intervention would lead to an escalation of the conflict with Moscow. Added to this, NATO’s expansion was considered among the causes of the crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014). An EEAS official described the role of NATO with respect to these circumstances as follows: “The Russians were convinced that Ukraine was part of a plot to enlarge NATO. As a result, they have been very aggressive […] because of that there was more NATO presence in Ukraine, which again has reinforced the Russian fears” (Interview E). On the contrary, the OSCE was born as a “multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West” (OSCE, 2019, p. 3) underpinned by a cooperative approach to security, particularly in the post-Cold War era (OSCE, 1990). By enlisting the OSCE, the EU could exploit its reputation as the ultimate forum for negotiations with Moscow, while avoiding having to intervene directly in Ukraine and generating tensions with Russia (Interview A, F).

The combination between such capability deficiencies across policy issues pertaining to EU crisis management activities and the OSCE’s capabilities determined the EU enlistment of the OSCE. Of course, that doesn't mean that the EU outsourced completely its foreign policy towards Ukraine to the OSCE. The EU recurrently showed political support to Ukraine and its people. Three days after Russia had officially declared its annexation of Crimea (21 March 2014), EU member states signed the
political provisions of the AA with Ukraine to further signal their commitment to cooperate with the recently appointed pro-EU government. After the May 2014 Ukrainian Presidential elections, in turn, the EU signed the AA’s economic parts with Ukraine’s newly elected president. Meanwhile, it provided extensive humanitarian assistance to address the consequences of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (European Commission, 2020). In addition to this, by imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions over Russia, the EU attempted to compel Russia to solve its conflict with Ukraine diplomatically. Through the deployment of EUAM Ukraine in December 2014, it even sought to undermine Russia’s position on the ground by strengthening the resilience of the Ukrainian civilian security sector. Still, these activities did not challenge Russia directly (Nováky, 2015). Rather paradoxically, it is through orchestration, an arrangement of indirect governance, that the EU carried out its direct confrontation with Russia.

The Process

As a first step in the causal mechanism, the EU had to recruit the OSCE on a voluntary basis. Empirical evidence shows that the European Council served as a relevant consultation and coordination forum for EU member states, headed by Germany (Farrell, 2014), to set EU approach in this regard. Once member states had defined EU strategic interests and objectives, as an EU official explained: “the European Council had an agenda-setting power and the other institutions decided within the rules that were already set by the member states” (Interview F). Within the European Council’s strategic guidelines, the High Representative, alongside the FAC and with the European Commission’s support, promoted specific policy means; coordinated the use of supranational and decentralized national resources; and represented member states’ consensus in EU bilateral diplomacy and international settings (Amadio Vicerè, 2020; Szép, 2019).

The OSCE’s enlistment consisted of two phases. In the first phase, EU member states sought to draw on their convening power to encourage an agreement on an OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine
within the consensus-based OSCE’s Permanent Council. However, even though it had been officially supporting the deployment of an OSCE mission, Russia had been clearly obstructing its approval during the intergovernmental negotiations within the OSCE framework (Agence France-Presse, 2014). While reaching such an agreement seemed increasingly unlikely, Crimean and Russian officials signed the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea (18 March 2014). It is against this backdrop that, on the initiative of the Nordic, Baltic and Visegrad member states, the EU decided to threaten the deployment of a CSDP monitoring mission (Nováky, 2015). On 20-21 March 2014 the European Council stated that unless an “agreement” would have been “promptly reached on an OSCE mission to be deployed in Ukraine as soon as possible,” the EU would have sent its own mission (European Council, 2014a, p. 14). Upon conclusion of the European Council, the British Prime Minister David Cameron clarified that the EU member states had proposed a CSDP mission with the aim of pushing Russia to accept OSCE’s monitoring activities in Ukraine (Council of the EU, Newsroom, 2014). Contrary to the OSCE activities, an EU monitoring mission would have completely excluded Russia. Hence, on the same day the European Council released its conclusions (21 March 2014), the Russian delegates approved the OSCE decision to send a monitoring mission of 100 civilian observers to Ukraine. Interestingly, while the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier defined such decision as “a step that helps support our efforts toward de-escalation” (France 24, 2014), the Finnish Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade Alexander Stubb pointed out that it was the proposal for an EU mission that had sped it up (Stubb, 2014).

In the enlistment’s second phase, the EU organized a meeting among the relevant parties involved in the Ukrainian conflict through the Geneva talks. In this context, the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton backed, alongside US representatives, an agreement between Ukraine and Russia (17 April 2014). On that occasion the participants agreed on “concrete steps to de-escalate tensions and restore security,” while deciding that, through their support, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission would play a “leading role” in the implementation of such measures. The OSCE’s swift declaration
that it was ready to “assist Ukraine in implementing the de-escalation measures” contained in the Geneva Statement, reflects the fact that the enlistment was successful (OSCE, 2014f).

It is relevant to note that that the OSCE’s regulatory competence over Moscow’s behavior in Ukraine and its reputation vis-à-vis Russia were crucial in the EU’s decision to enlist this IGO (Averre, 2016). As for the regulatory competence, in the words of an EU official, “they [Member States] thought: ‘Ok, through the OSCE involving the Russian Federation, we can do something at least about controlling this’” (Interview C). Concerning the reputation, the EU aimed at relaying not only on the OSCE’s perceived legitimacy as forum of peaceful cooperation between the West and the East, but also on the recognition of its utility as a mediator in similar conflicts (e.g. Estonia in the early 1990s). Thus, OSCE observers could support the reconciliation between Kiev and Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine (Farrell, 2014). According to the same interviewee, “Because the Russian position had always been that there was no Russian military in Ukraine but only volunteers, they [Russia] could not openly reject it [the OSCE]. They had to cooperate somehow” (Interview C). Notably, as envisaged by the proposed causal mechanism, such enlistment occurred on a voluntary basis. Empirical observations show that the EU’s goals were clearly correlated with those of the OSCE before the Special Monitoring Mission was deployed. In fact, OSCE representatives had urged its participating states to draw up plans for a mission in Ukraine several times during Crimea’s annexation, including at a meeting on the Ukrainian crisis held in Paris on 5 March 2014 (OSCE, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d).

The causal mechanism’s second step is the provision of cognitive and normative guidance to the intermediary. Empirical evidence shows that the EU geared the OSCE’s activities towards its objectives by influencing the overarching strategies of this organization in Ukraine. Through the Geneva Statement the EU acted as an agenda-setter for the OSCE, although alongside the other signatories. The Statement envisaged a series of precise de-escalation measures to address security challenges in Ukraine, namely: the launch of a national dialogue; the disarmament of illegal armed groups; as well as the return of illegally seized buildings and occupied public places. Furthermore, it
encouraged the promotion of specific normative principles in their implementation, such as the rejection of extremism, racism, and religious intolerance, and the inclusivity, transparency, and accountability of the constitutional process (EEAS, 2014, p. 1). It is important to note that the OSCE’s subsequent roadmap enshrined all the actions spelled out in the Geneva Statement. Hence, after the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Didier Burkhalter, presented this roadmap to EU foreign ministers, the FAC assured its full support for the OSCE’s plans (OSCE, 2014h).

In line with the empirical propositions about the fingerprints left by the second part of the causal mechanism, the EU put forward institutional and policy arrangements to be adopted by the OSCE. Certainly, neither EU member states nor EU institutions were directly part of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. The latter consisted of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE. Still, it is reasonable to assume that the OSCE pursued EU objectives within the Trilateral Contact Group’s negotiations. For instance, on 27 June 2014, EU member states reunited within the European Council listed in detail a number of “steps” that they expected to be taken in Ukraine, namely: the agreement on a verification mechanism for the ceasefire and the border control to be monitored by the OSCE; the “return to the Ukrainian authorities of three border checkpoints”; “the release of hostages”; and the “launch of substantial negotiations” (European Council, 2014c, p. 13). Remarkably, the same exact arrangements were mentioned among the principles to be observed in order to reach a sustainable ceasefire by the Trilateral Contact Group during its subsequent meeting in July 2014 (OSCE, 2014l).

The third step of the causal mechanism is the EU’s provision of direct incentives to the OSCE. As for ideational incentives, member states’ representatives reunited within EU intergovernmental forums publicly and frequently expressed support for the OSCE’s efforts (European Council, 2014b, 2014d, 2014e). On several occasions, they reiterated the EU’s commitment to the agreements the OSCE was monitoring (European Council, 2014b; Council of the EU, FAC, 2014), while the High Representative (2014) overtly called for their implementation. In this context, the EU generally praised the OSCE’s field operations (European Council, 2014f; High Representative, Spokesperson, 2014). Concerning
material support, EU member states and institutions also expressively offered funds and military capabilities to the OSCE (European Council, 2014a, 2014d, 2014f, 2015; High Representative, 2014).

In practice, the EU was the biggest contributor to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, accounting for two-thirds of its budget and observers (EEAS, 2019a). According to an EU official, “the EU member states pushed a lot, especially Germany, to provide funds for this OSCE mission on the ground” (Interview C). The timing of EU contributions to the OSCE is particularly relevant. Through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (Bergmann, 2018), under the label “Exceptional Assistance Measures on Ukraine,” the European Commission allocated 5 million euros to the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in April 2014 to sustain the implementation of the de-escalation measures enshrined in the Geneva Statement. Following the conclusion of the Minsk Agreement in September 2014, the Commission provided 2 million euros in November 2014 to sustain the OSCE’s new monitoring tasks (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, the EU transmitted satellite imagery via the EU Satellite Centre to the OSCE Mission, donated several armored and unarmored vehicles to boost its operational capacities, and trained its observers on the ground (EU, 2014). Meanwhile, the European Commission also considerably increased its aid flows to Ukraine through the OSCE. Notably, while in 2013 the OSCE did not serve as a channel for EU aid, in 2015 the European Commission allocated 4.9 million euros to Ukraine through the OSCE (European Commission, 2021). The OSCE’s public displays of appreciation and requests by its representatives for EU support, in turn, reflect the relevance attached by the international organization to such incentives (European Commission, 2015; OSCE, 2014e, 2014g).

The Outcome

Two main observable outcomes provide evidence that, in the period considered, the OSCE targeted Russia’s behavior to ensure its compliance with the EU’s objectives, namely a de-escalation of tensions in Ukraine. The first observable outcome consists of the OSCE’s activities addressing Russia’s destabilization of Ukraine through the implementation of the main de-escalating measures and the
adoption of the principles enshrined in the EU-backed Geneva Statement. To launch a national
dialogue, in May 2014 the OSCE supported “national unity” roundtables, which were led by the
Ukrainian government but chaired by a representative of the OSCE Chairmanship in Kiev (OSCE,
2015b). As part of the same process, some teams in the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission brought
together the Ukrainian governments and stakeholders from the civil society to discuss a range of issues
related to the implementation of the ceasefire (Swiss Government, 2014). As for the disarmament of
illegal armed groups and the vacation of illegally occupied places, the OSCE provided substantial
assistance to Ukraine’s Disarmament Program and expanded the number of its observers to boost the
operations of its Special Monitoring Mission in Eastern Ukraine’s occupied territories (OSCE, 2014n).

While conducting its activities, the OSCE also followed the principles enshrined in the Geneva
Statement. Over time, in fact, the OSCE sought to address extremism, racism, and religious intolerance
in the country through a series of initiatives. Between March and May 2014, an OSCE joint Human
Rights Assessment Mission was deployed to assess the human rights situation in Ukraine. Moreover,
not only did the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors, undertake official
visits to monitor the conditions of national minorities in the country (OSCE, 2014i), but an assessment

The second observable outcome is the OSCE’s elaboration and enforcement of common rules within
the Minsk Process. There is ample evidence that the OSCE’s activities within this process were in line
with the EU’s goals. While the OSCE constantly coordinated its approach with EU member states and
institutions, the EU often commended the Minsk process and synchronized its official positions and
efforts with its implementation (European Council, 2014f; High Representative, 2015a, 2015b). In this
context, a division of governance to manage Russia’s behavior in Ukraine emerged between the EU
and the OSCE. Since the September 2014 Minsk I Agreement elaborated by the Trilateral Contact
Group on Ukraine was ineffective, France and Germany, in close and constant coordination with EU
institutions, negotiated a new truce within the Normandy FormatIV. An EEAS official explained these
developments as follows: “The EU is not directly involved in the Normandy format but the two member states that are in the lead there keep the EU constantly informed. They sort of represent Europe” (Interview E). The OSCE, in turn, was tasked with monitoring the ensuing Minsk II Agreement (12 February 2015). In the words of the same official: “The OSCE has been instrumental in the context of Normandy format. Germany and France have made efforts to give importance to the OSCE role which the Russians were not very keen on having” (Interview E). Not long afterwards, the European Council decided that “the duration of the restrictive measures” against Russia would be “clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements” (19 March 2015; European Council, 2015). In fact, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and throughout its destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the EU had been able to introduce several rounds of political and economic sanctions against it (Portela, et al., 2020).

As the crisis unfolded, a similar division occurred also on the ground. On the one hand, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was mandated to reduce tensions and to facilitate peace, stability, and security, by engaging with authorities at all levels and facilitating dialogue on the ground between the actors involved in the conflict, including in eastern Ukraine (OSCE, 2015a). On the other, EUAM Ukraine carried out its activities with a relatively narrow mandate referring exclusively to the reform of the Ukrainian civilian security sector, without being involved in the military aspects of such a reform and with no substantial efforts of regional outreach (EEAS, 2021; Nováky, 2015). The logic behind such a difference in the two missions’ mandates is clearly reflected in an EU official’s explanation of the December 2014 deployment of EUAM in Ukraine: “We picked one angle, police, which is civilian. There is already a civil war there, so we can’t send European troops. Even observers, we left that to the OSCE. We don’t do that because of Russia. We don’t want to irritate them even further” (Interview A).

Conclusion
During the Ukrainian conflict, as expected by the literature on indirect governance, the EU acted like other IGOs and preferred orchestration over other forms of indirect governance to draw on the competencies of an intermediary actor. EU–OSCE interaction in the Ukrainian conflict constituted an indirect form of governance because the EU targeted Russia through the OSCE. However, contrary to other forms of indirect governance, the governance arrangement that emerged in the Ukrainian case functioned only through soft inducements. Although EU member states represent almost half of the OSCE members, in fact, the EU had no formal legal control over this IGO.

Of course, contrary to most other IGOs, the EU contains traits of supranationalism alongside intergovernmental features. Still, it is reasonable to argue that the pre-eminence of intergovernmental practices, epitomized by the European Council’s role in EU foreign policy-making processes, led the EU to behave like an intergovernmental IGO in the period considered. Interestingly, these results are also in line with the arguments of the proponents of the new intergovernmentalism and of the intergovernmental union (Fabbrini & Puettter, 2016). As the scholarly literature on orchestration posits, in fact, it was EU member states that favored the EU orchestration of the OSCE, while the European Council served as a catalyst of integration among them.

In this regard, the article’s analysis also confirms that governors are more likely to choose orchestration when they have ambitious goals but lack the necessary capabilities to achieve them. Indeed, the EU did not completely lack crisis management capabilities in the case of Ukraine. Still, it did not have the “right blend” of capabilities necessary to pursue the ambitious goal of confronting Russia directly. Contrary to the scholarly literature on EU foreign policy, which generally adopts a narrow understanding of the EU capabilities to manage external crises, this article has demonstrated that it is the combination between the type and level of deficiencies in EU crisis management capabilities that determined the EU decision to enlist the OSCE as an intermediary. At the EU level, EU military capability was insufficient and its civilian capabilities for crisis management were scarce. Instead, EU external economic capacity, both in terms of humanitarian assistance and sanctions, was
extensive. On the external level, in turn, EU regulatory competence and reputation vis-à-vis Russia were absent. Considering all this, despite its operational limitations, the OSCE was the only organization within the European security architecture that could confront Russia’s behavior in Ukraine directly. Overall, these empirical results also point to the need to take into consideration capabilities not only across different policy sectors, but also both at the EU level and in the external context, when carrying out evaluations of the synergies and complementarities among the EU and other international actors in crisis response.

At first sight, the EU decision to choose orchestration to confront Russia seems to contradict existing studies on governance arrangements in the security domain. Previous scholarly work demonstrated that governors are keen to maintain hierarchical control over their intermediary actors when they face actor-centered security threats (Weiss & Jankaukas, 2019). Therefore, one would have expected member states to target Russia’s activities in Ukraine through an arrangement that would have allowed them to exert a hierarchical control over their intermediary actor. Still, it is reasonable to argue that EU member states chose to adopt orchestration because of functional imperatives. In fact, although they could not exert any hierarchical control over the OSCE, this IGO was the only third party potentially capable of pushing Russia to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine.

These findings have relevant implications for EU role as a conflict manager in international politics. Certainly, IGOs experience the absence of regulatory competence and/or reputation on a regular basis. Even if the EU had the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia directly in the Ukrainian crisis, however, it would have not had the opportunity to mobilize the military and civilian capabilities needed to do this because of member states’ unwillingness to get directly involved in the conflict. One could argue in this regard that decision-making stalemates and lack of political will to coordinate decentralized resources are typical of consensus based IGOs. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of a large part of the EU’s crisis management capabilities to member states’ contingent
strategic preferences inevitably casts a shadow on the Lisbon Treaty’s attempts to boost the pooling of member states’ decentralized resources in the security domain.

Thus, the Ukrainian case demonstrates that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty. This governance arrangement can promote solutions to deal with contingent capability deficiencies which may mar different EU crisis management areas. In the case of Ukraine, outsourcing part of EU crisis management activities to the OSCE was not only necessary, but also appropriate since the EU was perceived as being directly part of the conflict. Nonetheless, the EU’s adoption of orchestration to externalize its foreign policy activities raises serious questions about the EU’s overall capacity to act as a security provider through its crisis management activities. For sure, as the article’s empirical analysis shows, the EU has enough ideational and material resources to guide and support third actors in addressing major security threats in its neighborhood. In the long term, however, the adoption of this mode of governance cannot replace centralized operational capabilities at the EU level to respond to external conflicts and crises. Given the EU’s lack of control over its intermediaries, in fact, orchestration cannot be considered as a panacea for EU structural deficiencies. This is especially so in policy sectors where the EU has so far mostly relied on regulatory means of integration rather than on capacity-building (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016), namely the CSDP’s military and civilian management; and the common foreign and security policy’s sanctioning power. Indeed, at a time when the West’s liberal values are being increasingly contested and hard security concerns have come back into the spotlight, the EU cannot afford to renounce to such crisis management tools (Gowan & Witney, 2014)

Finally, two caveats apply. First, the causal mechanism elaborated and adopted in this article should be conceived as a necessary, but not sufficient, explanation of the EU-OSCE’s governance arrangements in relation to Russia’s behavior in Ukraine in the period considered. Providing a comprehensive assessment of such arrangements was beyond the purpose of this article, as it would
require taking other factors into consideration. Further research may investigate, for instance, whether
the presence of goal convergence—or lack thereof—between EU member states and EU institutions
favored the EU’s decision to enlist a third actor to manage Russian behavior in Ukraine. Second,
within-case mechanistic evidence is by its very nature case sensitive. To further probe the empirical
validity of the orchestration model, future research may investigate the unfolding of this mode of
governance in cases that differ significantly from the one taken into consideration, but where there is
good reason to believe that the presumed cause and outcome are present.

List of Interviews

Interview A – Brussels, 8 December 2015. Policy Officer, EEAS.

Interview B – Brussels, 9 December 2015. Former Policy Officer, EEAS.

Interview C – Brussels, 9 December 2015. Policy Officer, EEAS.


Interview E – Brussels, 9 December 2015. Policy Officer, EEAS.

Interview F – Brussels, 10 December 2015. Ambassador, Political and Security Committee.

Interview G – Brussels, 10 December 2015. High Ranking Policy Officer, EEAS.

Interview H – Brussels, 10 December 2015. Foreign Policy Expert.

Interview I – Brussels, 11 December 2015. High Ranking Policy Officer, EEAS.
Interview J – Brussels, 11 December 2015. High Ranking Policy Officer, EEAS.

Interview K – Brussels, 11 December 2015. Policy Officer, EEAS.


Interview P – Brussels, 16 December 2015. Former Policy Officer, EEAS.

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Menon. A. (2013). Defence Policy and the Logic of “High Politics”. In P. Genschel, & M. Jachtenfuchs (Eds.), Beyond the Regulatory Polity?: The European Integration of Core State Powers (pp. 67-82). Oxford University Press.


The Foreign Affairs Council is the Council of the EU’s formation composed of member states’ ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, and development.

For a detailed overview of the Lisbon Treaty’s modification in the field of crisis management see Blockmans & Wessel (2009).


The Normandy Format included France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.
Causal Mechanism (Orchestration in EU Crisis Management)

**Theoretical Conjecture**

Theorized the combination of capabilities needed for pursuing its objectives including:
1. Military capabilities
2. Civilian crisis management capabilities
3. Capacity for external economic action
4. Regulatory competence and/or
5. Reputation

**Empirical Fingerprints**

- EU lacking the combination of capabilities needed for pursuing its objectives
- Civilian crisis management capabilities
- Capacity for external economic action
- Regulatory competence and/or
- Reputation

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**Cause (Capability Gaps)**

- Governor lacks capabilities needed for pursuing its objectives

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**Part 1 (Enlistment)**

- Governor enlists the intermediary on a voluntary basis

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**Part 2 (Guidance)**

- Governor provides cognitive and normative guidance to the intermediary

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**Part 3 (Support)**

- Governor offers direct material and ideational support to the intermediary

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**Outcomes (Orchestration of a third party)**

- Intermediary addresses the target in pursuit of the governor's objectives

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**Contextual Condition:**

Co-existence of Multiple Governance Actors

- Co-existence of EU; NATO; and OSCE

**Source:**

Personal illustration. Inspired by Abbott et al. 2015a and Beach & Pedersen 2019.
Externalizing EU Crisis Management: Insights from the EU-OSCE relation in the Ukrainian Crisis

After years of progressive enhancement of EU crisis management capacities, the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional modifications in the foreign and security policy domain should have turned the EU into a more efficient global crisis manager. Still, on several occasions in the post-Lisbon era the EU has relied on third parties to achieve its crisis management objectives, essentially externalizing its activities to actors over which it had no control.

The past decade offers both well-known and lesser-known examples of such externalization across different crisis management areas. Among other cases, the EU’s recruited and supported civil society organizations to promote human rights and democracy in the Middle East and in Northern Africa after the Arab Uprisings; it enlisted the Libyan coastguard and Turkey to manage migratory flows across the Mediterranean; and it relied on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to improve public governance and support socio-economic development in the Western Balkans’ process of democratic transition. Hence, the question arises: Why and how does the EU outsource its security?

Through the lenses of the orchestration model, my recent article addresses this question by examining the EU relationship with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe during the Ukrainian crisis. Not only the EU had deployed several CSDP missions in the eastern neighbourhood already before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, but the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the ensuing destabilisation of Ukraine were perceived as the most dangerous predicaments in post-Lisbon European security. For sure, as this crisis unfolded, the EU devised a series of measures aimed at supporting Ukraine politically and economically. At the same time, while the EU sought to compel Russia to solve its conflict with Ukraine through...
sanctions, it attempted to soft balance its position in Ukraine by boosting the resilience of the Ukrainian security sector through the civilian CSDP mission ‘EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine’. Still, to challenge Russia directly and confront Ukrainian separatists and Russian troops, the EU enlisted a third party over which it had no formal control: the OSCE.

The article argues that the combination between the capability deficiencies across policy issues pertaining to EU crisis management activities and the OSCE’s capabilities determined the EU enlistment of the OSCE. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, EU member states favoured an approach that would avoid direct confrontation with Russia, particularly in eastern Ukraine where Russian troops and military equipment had been deployed. Since the mobilization of EU military and civilian crisis management capabilities largely depends on member states’ unanimous consent and on their willingness to coordinate their resources on specific issues, the EU essentially lacked the operational capabilities to confront Russia directly. On the external level, in turn, EU lacked both the competence and the reputation for an acceptable intervention in the conflict. Addressing Ukraine’s destabilisation through NATO was not an option either. Not only Ukraine was not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, but NATO’s expansion was considered by many among the causes of the crisis.

Against this backdrop, OSCE’s regulatory competence over Moscow’s behaviour in Ukraine and its reputation vis-à-vis Russia were crucial in the EU’s decision to enlist this international organization. In fact, the OSCE was the only organisation within the European security architecture that could confront Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine directly. Since both Russia and Ukraine are participating states in this organisation, the OSCE had rights of implementation and enforcement over Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine. Furthermore, the OSCE had a reputation for being an actor committed to ensuring cooperation between East and West.
The article’s findings have relevant implications for EU role as a conflict manager in international politics. Certainly, international organizations experience the absence of competence and/or reputation on a regular basis. Even if the EU had the competence and reputation to challenge Russia directly in the Ukrainian crisis, however, it would have not had the opportunity to mobilize the military and civilian capabilities needed to do this because of member states’ unwillingness to get directly involved in the conflict. One could argue in this regard that decision-making stalemates and lack of political will to coordinate decentralized resources are typical of consensus based international organizations. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of a large part of the EU’s crisis management capabilities to member states’ contingent strategic preferences inevitably casts a shadow on the Lisbon Treaty’s attempts to boost the pooling of member states’ decentralized resources in the security domain.

The Ukrainian case demonstrates that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management post-Lisbon. This governance arrangement can promote solutions to deal with contingent capability deficiencies which may mar different EU crisis management areas. In the case of Ukraine, outsourcing part of EU crisis management activities to the OSCE was not only necessary, but also appropriate given that the EU was perceived as being directly part of the conflict. Nonetheless, the EU’s adoption of orchestration to externalise its foreign policy activities raises serious questions about the EU’s overall capacity to act as a security provider through its crisis management activities.

For sure, the EU has enough ideational and material resources to guide and support third actors in addressing major security threats in its neighbourhood. In the long term, however, enrolling third parties cannot replace the lack of centralised operational capabilities at the EU level to respond to external conflicts and crises. Given the EU’s lack of control over its intermediaries, in fact, orchestration cannot be considered as a panacea for its structural deficiencies. This is especially so in policy sectors where the EU has so far mostly relied on member states’
voluntary coordination of their resources rather than on capacity-building, namely the CSDP’s military and civilian management; and the common foreign and security policy’s sanctioning power. Indeed, at a time when the West’s liberal values are being increasingly contested and hard security concerns have come back into the spotlight, the EU cannot afford to renounce to such crisis management tools.

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