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ICMPD
International Centre for
Migration Policy Development

Impact of Public Attitudes to migration on the political environment in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

Second chapter: Southern Partner Countries

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Contents

Executive Summary

This is the second of three chapters for the report entitled 'Impact of Public Attitudes to migration on the political environment in the Euro-Mediterranean Region'[1].

The report forms part of the Phase III EUROMED Migration Communications Study. This report follows Phase II EUROMED Migration Communications Study, entitled "Public attitudes on migration: rethinking how people perceive migration"[2], which demonstrated that attitudes to migration in the Euro-Mediterranean region seem to have remained fairly constant over time, while the importance of the issue to individuals has changed.

This chapter overviews public attitudes to migration in Southern Partner Countries (SPCs) and considers their effects on migration politics and policies in the region over the past 20 to 30 years. Overall, the quantitative overview of attitudes in the SPCs offers a number of clear patterns:

- A large majority (at least 63 per cent) of citizens in almost every country considered display positivity or indifference when asked about general xenophobic attitudes to immigrants.

- However, a significant minority offer explicitly xenophobic attitudes to immigrants in all but one country, with between 15 per cent and 38 per cent stating they would not like to have an immigrant as a neighbour.

- Attitudes to refugees tend to differ from those of other immigrants, with either greater positively or negatively depending on country context and between 9 per cent and 26 per cent stating that they would not like to have them as neighbours.

- By contrast, in every country and across time, the vast majority (75 – 99 per cent) of citizens display anti-immigration attitudes regarding the labour market, with in some cases almost unanimous belief that employers should give priority to citizens.

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1   Dennison, 2019 "Impact of public attitudes to migration on the political environment in the Euro-Mediterranean Region – First Chapter", developed for ICMPD under the EU funded programme EUROMED Migration IV

2   Dennison and Drazanova, 2018 "Public attitudes on migration: rethinking how people perceive migration", developed for ICMPD under the EU funded programme EUROMED Migration IV

- However, attitudes to both immigrants as neighbours and as participants in the labour market are in many cases becoming more positive over time.

- When North Africans are asked to choose between free movement of persons between their countries, on the one hand, or government control over intra-North African migration, on the other, they are divided roughly equally in each country, with a slight majority in favour of government controls.

- Despite significant anti-immigration sentiment, immigration remains a low salience issue in every country considered (with the recent exception of the issue of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon).

- It is the low salience of immigration that most differentiates the politics of the SPCs from European Union Member States (as shown in Chapter 1 of this report).

- Low salience means that policy-makers—regardless of regime type—are likely to feel relatively little public pressure when creating migration policy, giving them significant flexibility.

- It also means that NGOs and civil society organisations are likely to have increased influence on policy, rather than the public at large, which we provide some evidence to suggest is indeed the case in Tunisia and Morocco.

- In Jordan and Lebanon, by contrast, increased salience of Syrian refugees as a political issue has led to tightening government restrictions.

- This is not to say that SPC publics do not see migration as an important issue *outright*, but rather that they clearly consider it relatively less important than economic, administrative and security issues, and it is these issues that policy-makers are most likely to feel pressure to act on.

- We also find some evidence that *emigration* is considered an exceptionally large problem in SPCs. However, we also find a lack of data regarding attitudes to emigration, as in other regions.

In this report we also offer a number of recommendations for how communicators on migration in the region can avoid polarisation, based both on this chapter and chapter 1 of this report (Dennison, 2019). These points will be elaborated further in chapter 3 of this report.

1. There is a need for **more detailed data** on attitudes to migration in the region. In particular, this should include data on migration issue salience—not just the salience of 'immigration' but also particular aspects such as irregular immigration—and attitudes to emigration. We recommend the production of regularly collected pan-regional datasets that could align with existing datasets.

2. **Recognise national contexts.** As we show in our qualitative histories, much anti-immigration and anti-refugee sentiment in the region is the result of specific national contexts.

3. **Avoid emotionalising the debate.** Emotionalising a debate both enhances the salience of the subject and leads to greater polarisation and politicisation, as shown in chapter 1 of this report.

4. **Remain evidence-based.** In the SPCs, significant anti-migrant sentiment is driven by labour market concerns, primarily over unemployment. Studies have shown that attitudes to the economic effects of immigration are those most responsive to evidence-based communication.

5. **Be value-balanced.** As shown in previous reports, those who favour migration typically hold universalist values, while those opposing it typically value tradition, conformity and security. As such, communication that only emphasises the former is likely to enhance polarisation. Further research needs to be done to the generalisability of value-based determinants to the SPCs and to explore how to produce effective value-based communication.

6. **Be specific** on types of immigration and immigrants. When overarching terms like 'immigration' are used, individuals are able to evaluate a situation with their own prejudices (either positive or negative), leading to greater polarisation.

7. **Avoid hyperbole** or sweeping statements. Migration is a complex subject involving a vast spectrum of individuals and should be treated as such.

8. Acknowledge trade-offs and alternatives. Communicators of policies should acknowledge if they had other options and explain why there were not chosen.

9. Be both rights-based and law-based. Communication on migration gains significant credibility if it can show that *both* the rights of the migrants and the laws of the countries are being respected, allowing all sides to consider the situation or policy fairer.

10. **Evaluate**. Evaluating the effectiveness of communication afterwards allows lessons to be learned and adds to best-practice knowledge.

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to answer the following question: what are the political effects of public attitudes to migration in the southern and eastern Mediterranean? To answer this question, a series of sub-questions are posed: what are attitudes to immigration in the region? How have migration patterns developed in the SPCs in the past decade? What kind of policies have countries adopted? And what explains these policies? To what extent can they be explained by attitudes to immigration?

The methodology of this chapter is to analyse pan-regional quantitative data and consider qualitative data from four main country cases to represent the two main regions of the Mediterranean: Morocco and Tunisia in the south of the Mediterranean and Jordan and Lebanon in the East-Mediterranean region – in addition to the particular case of Palestine.

We start by offering a broad description of attitudes to immigration in the region, using the most high-quality, comparative data sources available. Next, we review the main features of migration from and to the region since independence and particularly the main developments in the past 20-30 years. We then go on to develop more focused narratives of the main policies undertaken by the governments of Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon in response to both the emigration of their nationals and the immigration of foreigners to their territory. By way of comparison to the first chapter of this report, which studied Europe, a special focus will be given to public opinion and related factors such as civil society activism and their role in shaping these policies.

In this chapter we show that attitudes to migration in the region are notable in a number of ways. Although citizens show relatively little xenophobia in their personal lives, when it comes to the labour market, there is considerable anti-immigration sentiment. However, we argue that, until now, this has had relatively little effect on the politics and policies of the region. Although older studies had assumed that this is because of regime type, we argue, that it is also likely to be because of the low salience of immigration as an issue in the region, for reasons based on theoretical and empirical findings of the political psychology literature explained in Chapter 1 of this report (see also Culpepper, 2011). In our data time-series, we show that people in the south of the Mediterranean care in the first place for economic issues, such as unemployment, inflation, corruption, and security matters. We demonstrate this quantitatively before showing that recent events in the eastern Mediterranean may have ended immigration's depoliticised nature in some countries. Moreover, we argue that attitudes to migration affect policies if and when immigration is intimately linked to high salience issues, like economics and security, particularly since 2011. Despite that, so long as immigration fails to excite southern Mediterranean publics directly, their governments will continue to enjoy greater flexibility in their migration policy than their European equivalents.

What are attitudes to migration in the Southern Partner Countries?

In this section we describe attitudes to migration in the SPCs. In particular, we consider variation by types of attitude (including preferences, perceptions, and salience) by country and over time since 2006. We then tentatively suggest how these patterns are likely to affect the politics and policies of the SPCs, based on our theoretical knowledge before moving on to qualitative analyses in later sections. Overall, our quantitative overview of the SPCs offers a number of clear patterns:

- The majority of citizens in almost every country considered display positivity or indifference when asked about general xenophobic attitudes to immigrants.

- However, a significant minority display xenophobic attitudes to immigrants in every country, with between 15% and 38% stating they would not like to have an immigrant as a neighbour (notwithstanding the exception of Libya).

- Attitudes to refugees tend to differ from those of other immigrants, either more positively or negatively depending on country context, with between 9% and 26% stating that they would not like to have them as neighbours.

- By contrast, in every country at every time point, the vast majority (75 per cent to 99 per cent) of citizens display anti-immigration attitudes regarding the labour market, with almost unanimous belief in all countries considered that employers should give priority to citizens.

- However, attitudes to both immigrants as neighbours and as participants in the labour market are generally becoming more positive over time. More research should be done to explain this phenomenon.

- When North Africans are asked to choose between free movement of persons between their countries or government controls they are divided roughly equally in each country, with a slight majority in favour of government controls.

- Despite significant anti-immigration sentiment, immigration remains a low salience issue in every country considered (with the exception of the issue of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon) because of the relatively higher salience of economic, administrative and security issues. More data is needed to consider the absolute, as well as relative, salience of migration issues.

- It is the low salience of immigration that most differentiates the politics of the South Partner Countries from European Union Member States (as shown in Chapter 1 of this report).

- Low salience means that policy-makers—regardless of regime type—are likely to feel relatively less public pressure when creating migration policy, giving them significant flexibility.

- It also means that NGOs and civil society organisations are likely to have increased influence on policy, rather than the public at large, in those countries that have liberalised since the Arab Spring. We find some evidence to support this notion in the qualitative section of this report.

- In Jordan and Lebanon, by contrast, increased salience of Syrian refugees as a political issue has led to tightening government restrictions.

- This is not to say that SPC publics do not see migration as an important issue *outright*, but rather that they clearly consider it relatively less important than economic, administrative and security issues, and it is these issues that policy-makers are most likely to feel pressure to act on. Given the interrelated nature of migration and these latter issues, public pressure for government to act on migration in the SPCs is most likely to arise indirectly as a result of pressure to act on other issues.

- We also find some evidence that *emigration* is considered an exceptionally large problem in SPCs. Much more data is required to understand the nature and causes of these attitudes.

Preferences towards migrants and migration policy

In Figure 1 we show how citizens in SPCs responded when asked if they would like, dislike or not care about having an immigrant or foreign worker as a neighbour, as taken from 2016 and 2018/2019 fieldwork for the Arab Barometer. In every country and every year except one, a plurality responded neutrally, stating that they would not care or neither liked nor disliked the prospect. The only exception was Libya in 2019 (the country was not surveyed in 2016), when a plurality of 42 per cent said they would dislike having an immigrant or foreign worker as a neighbour. In 2019, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Palestine all reported reasonably similar levels of negativity, between 27 per cent and 38 per cent. Tunisia stands out with only 15 per cent stating that they would dislike having a foreigner or immigrant worker as a neighbour. In terms of change over time, there is a relatively consistency during this short period, as we would expect. However, Algeria, Jordan and Tunisia reported less negativity, whereas Egypt and Morocco reported slightly higher negativity.

Using the same data source, we can also consider the rates of other forms xenophobia—to other religions, races or branches of Islam. As shown in Figure 2, again we see high levels of indifference, particularly regarding other races. In all eight countries, 'neither dislike nor like' was the most popular response to every question, with the exception of Libya in which there was a higher score for 'dislike' regarding having someone of a different religion as a neighbour. In six of eight countries, an outright majority said that they would not care about someone of another religion living as a neighbour. Similarly, in six of eight countries, this was the case for responses to someone of different race living next door. In four out of seven (Lebanese were not included due to lower sample size) this was the case regarding responses to someone of a different branches of Islam—indicating greater wariness towards this outgroup.

Figure 1. 'Would you like having immigrants or foreign workers as neighbours, dislike it, or not care/neither dislike, nor like?' (source: Arab Barometer, Wave 4 and 5; fieldwork in 2016 and 2018/2019, 1200/2400 observations per country)

Previous waves of the Arab Barometer—held in 2006/7 and 2010/11—asked the same question regarding attitudes to immigrants as neighbours. As shown in Figure 3, in these two earlier waves, possible responses were either 'do not want' or 'do not object', more limited than the five-unit scale used in 2016 and 2018/19, making comparisons over time more difficult. We can see in both waves and in every country the majority of respondents stated that they 'do not object'. This majority varies from being very large (91% in Morocco in 2007 and 92% in Tunisia in 2011) to very slight (53% in Jordan in 2006). As such, the country trends that we observed from 2016 and 2018/19 in Figure 1 were similar a decade earlier. Within countries, we see greater


Figure 2. 'Would you like having people of a different [religion/race/branch of Islam] as neighbours, dislike it, or not care?' (source: Arab Barometer, Wave 5; fieldwork in 2018/19, 2400 observations per country)

Figure 3. How would you feel about immigrants or guest workers/expatriate workers as neighbours? (source: Arab Barometer, Wave 1 & 2; fieldwork in 2006/7 & 2010/11, 1200 observations per country)

positivity over time to having immigrants as neighbours in each of the three countries that were surveyed in both 2006 and 2010/11. Future research should consider the causes of these changes.

In 2011, the Arab Barometer also gauged public opinion in the SPCs on attitudes to having refugees, specifically, as neighbours. The responses are shown in Figure 4. In Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, attitudes to refugees were more negative than to immigrants and guest workers, whereas the opposite was true in Jordan and Lebanon—both of which have given refuge to very large numbers of Palestinians, Iraqis and, latterly, Syrians in recent decades (see section II).

Figure 4. How would you feel about refugees as neighbours? (source: Arab Barometer, Wave 2; fieldwork in 2010/11,   1200 observations per country)

In addition to attitudes to immigrants as neighbours, the World Values Survey asked the SPCs about their attitudes to immigrants in the labour markets—specifically, whether employers should give priority to citizens rather than immigrants. At this stage, there is not sufficient data to consider how this might vary by type of job, though future research could consider how the job of the respondent affects attitudes. The results show overwhelming support for priority for nationals (between 75% and 99% in every wave). However, it is notable that in the three countries that were surveyed more than once—Egypt, Jordan and Morocco—support for priority for nationals over immigrants dropped over the latter two waves—by 13%, 5% and 7%, respectively. Future research should consider the causes of this trend.

Figure 5. 'When jobs are scarce, should employers give priority to people from this country rather than immigrants?' (source: World Values Survey, 2001-2014; 1200/3000 observations per country)

Finally, the Afrobarometer survey asked representative samples (for details, see Afrobarometer, 2014-2015) of North Africans (all but Libyans) in 2014 and 2015 which of the following they agree with more: free movement of peoples in North Africa or government controls over cross-border movement. When presented with such a trade-off, a slim majority of respondents agree with border control (52% in Algeria, 56% in Egypt, 52% in Morocco and 58% in Tunisia). This suggests that North Africans are more positive to migration of fellow North Africans—be that for religious, racial or similarities—than of other groups, given the very large minorities in favour of complete North African free movement (43%, 40%, 43% and 42%, respectively).

Figure 6. Which of these statements do you agree with more? 'People living in North Africa should be able to move freely across international borders in order to trade or work in other countries' or 'Because foreign migrants take away jobs, and foreign traders sell their goods at very cheap prices, governments should protect their own citizens and limit the cross-border movement of people and goods.' (source: Afrobarometer, 2014-2015; 1200 observations per country)

Salience of immigration

In this section we move on from considering what citizens in SPCs think of immigration in terms of prefer-ences and instead consider how important they consider immigration to be as an issue. In this sense, we continue the work of the first chapter of this report (Dennison, 2019), which showed how the salience of immigration—the proportion of the population that considers immigration one of the most important issues affecting their country—has radically altered the politics of Europe in recent years, via the emotional acti-vation of pre-existing preferences regarding immigrants and immigration policy. In short, for an individual to change their political behaviour, they have to not only have an opinion on an issue, but also their emotional state needs to be changed by it, and this *only* happens if the individual sees the issue as important. More specifically, that chapter outlined a complex psychological relationship between an increase in 'the relative importance and significance that an actor ascribes to a given issue on the political agenda' and political outcomes via, in order: activation of emotional systems; additional and selective exposure to relevant in-formation on that issue; stronger opinions and greater knowledge on the issue; approval and evaluation of policy-makers according to the issue; voting and other forms of political participation (petitions, meetings, letters, protest, etc.) based on the issue. The SPCs vary considerably in the status of their regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit's 2019 Democracy Index). However, it is by now well-established that public opinion can strongly influence policy-making regardless of regime type (Chen and Xu, 2017).

With this in mind, we consider it plausible that the salience of immigration—relative to other political issues—is likely to dictate the extent to which public attitudes to immigration affect public immigration policy in the SPCs.

With this in mind, we now consider the salience of immigration as a political issue using evidence from the Arab Barometer series of surveys from 2006 to 2017. The Arab Barometer offers respondents a number of potential 'most important challenges', as well as giving them the option of answering 'other' and inserting their own 'most important challenge'. As shown in Figures 7 to 14, immigration was not offered as a potential response by the survey team. However, we can see the proportion responding 'other'—in which respondents could have placed immigration related issues—was typically far lower than the suggested issues—notably the economic situation, corruption, security and, in some countries, foreign interference or occupation.

We also examined the responses given by those who initially responded with 'other'. 'Immigration' was only mentioned by one individual in any country across the time series—in Morocco in 2016. The only migra-tion-related issue mentioned by a large number of people (more than 1%) is that of Syrian refugees, men-tioned by 34% of Jordanians and 43% of Lebanese as an important issue in 2016. We therefore graphically display these results in Figure 9 and 10, respectively, despite them initially appearing under 'other'. At the time of writing, the 2018/2019 Arab Barometer data had just been released, however, information on what individuals responding 'other' gave as their reason has not been released, so we omit that round of data for now. In most cases, 'the economic situation' and 'financial and administrative corruption' remained the most important two challenges. However, it should be noted that 32 per cent of Moroccans listed 'other' in this most recent wave. We will have to wait to see if this 'other' included migration related issues.

However, these quantitative figures only measure *relative* issue salience—i.e. which are the *most* important issues. It could be that citizens in SPCs consider immigration to have had, at times at least, high *absolute* issue salience, but that this absolute salience just happens to be lower than that of other issues—again, the economic situation, corruption, security and, in some countries, foreign interference or, in the case of Palestine, occupation. We therefore also now consider qualitative evidence.

Several interviews were conducted recently by Roman and Pastore (2017) in Tunisia with a number of civil society activists, decision makers, and academics. The vast majority of the 29 interviewees confirmed that unlike in Europe, immigration is not a salient issue at all. For instance, an interviewee stated that, 'contrary to in the EU, in Tunisia no political party has used migration-related issues in political terms; migration is not the object of nationalist or xenophobic political positions; actually, it is not the object of political debate at all' (Roman & Pastore, 2017: 9). This evidence, particularly in the case of Tunisia, supports the above data.

Figure 7. Algeria 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer I, II, III, IV, 1200 observations per wave)

Legend:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation)
- Strengthening democracy
- Arab-Israeli conflict
- Foregin interference
- Others
- Financial and administratice corruption
- US occupation of iraq
- Internal stability and security
- Religious Extremist
- Don't Know / Refused

Figure 8. Egypt 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer II, III, IV, 1200 observations per wave)

Legend:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation)
- Strengthening democracy
- Internal stability and security
- Religious extremist
- Don't Know / Refused
- Financial and adminstrative corruption
- Arab - Israelli conflict
- Foregin interface
- Other

Figure 9. Jordan 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer I, II, III, IV,   1200 observations per wave)

Legend:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation)
- Strengthening democracy
- Arab - Israelli conflict
- Foregin interface
- Syrian Refugees
- Don't Know / Refused
- Financial and adminstrative corruption
- US occupation of Iraq
- Internal stability and security
- Religious extremist
- Other

Figure 10. Lebanon 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer I, II, III, IV,   1200 observations per wave)

Legend:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation)
- Strengthening democracy
- Arab - Israelli conflict
- Foregin interface
- Syrian Refugees
- Don't Know / Refused
- Financial and adminstrative corruption
- US occupation of Iraq
- Internal stability and security
- Religious extremist
- Other

Figure 11. Libya 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer III; April 2014   1200 observations)

Bar chart labels:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation) — 37%
- Financial and adminstrative corruption — 57%
- Strengthening democracy — 6%
- Internal stability and security — 3%
- Foregin interface — 93%
- Don't Know / Refused — 4%

Figure 12. Morocco 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer I, III, IV 1200 observations per wave)

Legend:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation)
- Financial and adminstrative corruption
- Strengthening democracy
- US occupation of Iraq
- Arab - Israelli conflict
- Internal stability and security
- Foregin interface
- Religious extremist
- Syrian Refugees
- Other
- Don't Know / Refused

Figure 13. Palestine 'What are the most two important challenges your country is facing today?' (source: Arab Barometer I, II, III, IV, 1200 observations per wave)

Legend:
- Economic situation (poverty; unemployement; inflation)
- Financial and adminstrative corruption
- Strengthening democracy
- US occupation of Iraq
- Arab - Israelli conflict
- Internal stability and security
- Foregin interface
- Religious extremist
- Syrian Refugees
- Other
- Don't Know / Refused

However, migration is clearly connected to the main concerns of the SPCs' citizens. In particular, *emigration* is closely related to economic issues, mainly unemployment, and immigration has always been considered as a security/economic challenge both by the public and governments of the region. In the following sections we will show how this is the case, first, by considering the migration history of the region, its migration policies and evidence of the role of public opinion, amongst other things, in the formation of migration policy in the region.

Attitudes to emigration

Although there is significant, albeit to varying extents, data measuring propensity to migrate, to where and for what reasons regarding citizens of the SPCs, there is very little data on attitudes to emigration as a political issue. This is hardly unique to the region, in fact even in countries with significantly more systematic, high-quality attitudinal surveys (for example, in Europe), attitudes to emigration are rarely measured.

One recent exception to this trend is a 2018 survey by Pew Research that asks representative samples in 26 countries the extent to which they think people leaving their country for jobs in other countries is problem.[3] Tunisia was the only country in the region to be included in the survey, the results of which are shown in Figure 15. Of every country under consideration, Tunisia had the *most* respondents (73%) stating that emigration was a very big problem for the country.

3   https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/many-worldwide-oppose-more-migration-both-into-and-out-of-their-countries/

Figure 15. Responses to the question 'Do you think people leaving our country for jobs in other countries is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all for (survey country)?', Spring 2018

Migration in the Southern Partner Countries

Having analysed attitudes to migration, in this section we consider the recent history of migration in the SPCs. We start by quantitatively outlining migration stocks in each SPC and how these have changed over time since 1990 using data from the United Nations Population Division. We then move on to discussing the history of migration—both *emigration* and *immigration*—in four case study countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon. We do this in two sections. First, with a brief overview of each country's recent trajectory and, second, by considering contemporary developments in each case.

Changing migrant stocks in SPCs

In Figure 16, we show how the migrant stocks in the eight countries under consideration have changed over four intervals since 1990. The following trends are striking:

- The numbers of migrants vary considerably by country, with Morocco and Tunisia having migrant stocks in the tens of thousands, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Palestine in the hundreds of thousands and Jordan and Lebanon in the millions.

- Every country has seen an increase in migrant stocks since the 1990s except Algeria and Palestine.

- In a number of countries, the largest foreign-born populations are those fleeing conflict. In particular, these include those from the Western Sahara in Algeria and Palestinians and later Iraqis and Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon. Palestinian populations can be found in large numbers in every country except Morocco and Tunisia.

Figure 16. Migrant stocks (numbers of individuals born in a different country) in each of the SPCs from 1990 to 2017. Source: United Nations Population Division, nationalities under 10,000 persons grouped under 'other'

**Figure 16.** Migrant stocks (numbers of individuals born in a different country) in each of the SPCs from 1990 to 2017. Source: United Nations Population Division, nationalities under 10,000 persons grouped under 'other'

Qualitative history of migration in the SPCs: 1950-1990

The southern Mediterranean

Emigration flows from the SPCs have been primarily determined by larger political and economic transformations. Initially, the most important of these were colonial and post-colonial relationships. For example, France encouraged labour migration from Maghreb countries very early to contribute to its rapidly developing economy after the first and second World Wars, whereas Britain did not encourage migration from Egypt. Instead, Britain encouraged internal migration from rural to urban areas that is still persistent in Egypt today (de Haas, 2007). The emigration of Maghreb workers was not only limited to France; in the period between 1962 and 1965, Morocco and Tunisia signed labour recruitment agreements with France, West-Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands to control unemployment at home (de Haas, 2007: 9). This led to a guest-worker boom from Maghreb countries in the 1960s. By contrast, Egypt prohibited labour migration under the Nasserist regime, and out-migration of other countries such as Jordan remained minimal (Fargues, 2005).

Similarly, the next large change in emigration patterns happened as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, when the Arab oil-producing countries cut their exports to Europe and the United States in response to their support for Israel. This crisis led to unprecedented increases in oil prices. For Europe, the increasing oil prices led to economic crisis, stagnation, and unemployment, leading to the adoption of restrictive immigration policies that, to some extent, continue today. Out-migration to Europe increased in the 1970s despite restrictive policies (Brand, 2006: 47). The numbers of Moroccan residents in Europe increased from 400,000 in 1975 to one million in 1992, Tunisians from 225,000 in 1977 to 444,000 in 1992, and Algerians, who were already 335,000 in 1945, increased from 500,000 in 1964 to 800,000 in the 1980s (de Haas, 2007:12-14).

This crisis also created two additional emigration destinations in the Arab world: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in Asia and Libya in North Africa. At the same time, political leadership changes in Egypt led to the end of restrictions on migration and encouragement of labour migration, as well as an *Infitah* (openness) policy adopted under Sadat who came to power in 1970. This created massive labour emigration, both of skilled and unskilled Egyptian workers to the GCC in the 1970s and 1980s. Egyptian migrants abroad increased from 70,000 in 1970 to almost 3.3 million in 1983 (de Haas, 2007: 10-11). Likewise, Jordan's labour market benefited from the oil boom in Gulf countries in the 1970s (Fargues, 2005).

A second key turning point resulted from the 1991 Gulf War. As a consequence of the war, nearly 1.8 million workers fled Kuwait and Iraq in 1991, out of which 700,000 were workers from Egypt alone, with 200,000 Jordanians and 150,000 Palestinians (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 5). This led to lower employment opportunities for unskilled Egyptian workers who started migrating to Italy as a new destination in the 1990s (de Haas, 2007:15).

Finally, the 1992-1999 arms and air embargo on Libya led to another significant change in emigration pattern in the south-Mediterranean countries. Qadhafi adopted an 'open door policy' to immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s (Beredeloup & Pliez, 2011: 8). This led to Libya being unable to control its borders in the face of immigration from Sudan, Chad, and Niger, which also served as transit countries for immigration

from further south in sub-Saharan Africa (de Haas, 2007). By 2000, the number of Sub-Saharan workers in Libya reached 1.5 million workers (Beredeloup & Pliez, 2011: 6).

In the 21st century, Libya has witnessed anti-African riots. 130 Sub-Saharan migrants were killed in the autumn of 2000 alone. Libya started adopting restrictive immigration policies against foreign workers, especially Africans, who started leaving the country to the Maghreb or to cross the Mediterranean.

The eastern Mediterranean

The migration dynamics of *Jordan and Palestine* have followed a different pattern to that of the North African countries, far more determined by the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948. This is partially because, first, Palestine lacks full state authority and, second, the absence of a state border. As a result, Jordan has taken in a large number of Palestinians who have become Jordanian citizens since the 1950s. Simultaneously, Jordan has faced high levels of unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s, arguably as a consequence of these migration waves from Palestine, leading to increasing labour emigration to Gulf Countries, especially Kuwait. In fact, the majority of the Jordanian diaspora is of Palestinian origin. For several political reasons, the relationship between Jordan and its diaspora community has often been complicated. In some cases, Jordan has encouraged emigration to decrease unemployment and alleviate labour market-related tensions. It is also important to distinguish between Palestinians primarily from the West Bank who fled to Jordan and those primarily from Gaza who migrated to Egypt, Europe, North America, and the GCC. Most migrants who fled Palestine since 1945 did so with their families, however, later in 2000s, this trend has relaxed as individual migration has increased.

Lebanon has an altogether distinct trajectory. Although the modern Lebanese state was declared in 1920 and won independence in 1943, the Lebanese formed a large expatriate community in the 19th century even before the modern Lebanese state came into existence. Residents of Mount Lebanon (areas surrounding Beirut) began emigrating between 1840 and 1860, with further waves motivated by religious study, the collapse of the silk industry and the desire to avoid Ottoman conscription. By WWI, one third of the Mount Lebanon population had already left (Tabar, 2010: 2-3).

Between 1945 and 1960, labour emigration was very low due to strong economic growth in the country at the time. This changed with the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 as well as increasing activity within Lebanon by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) following the Black September of 1970. As in Jordan, Palestinians fled in large number to Lebanon after the 1948 and 1967 wars. In 2001, it was estimated that the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon was around 350,000, half of them living in UNRWA camps in Lebanon (Dorai, 2003: 23). However, Palestinians living in Lebanon have been affected by the same emigration patterns as the Lebanese, and around 100,000 refugees emigrated from Lebanon to the GCC and northern Europe between 1980 and 2003 (Dorai, 2003: 23).

The 1975-1989 civil war in Lebanon saw fighting between different religious groups, mainly Maronite Christians and Palestinian fighters of the PLO, who left Jordan in 1970, and later Muslim factions that allied with the Palestinians. As a consequence, around 990,000 Lebanese emigrated during these years (Tabar, 2009: 7), around 40% of the total population (De Bel Air, 2017: 2). During the same period, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, in addition to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that took place, partially in bordering Syria. Emigration of high-skilled Lebanese labour to GCC countries also increased in the 1960s, and even more so in the 1970s

(Pearlman, 2013: 197). Overall, with the exception of Palestinian refugees, Lebanon was a largely emigration country until the early 1990s. As will be shown in the contemporary developments section, emigration of the Lebanese has continued, but the country has also become an immigration country for low-skilled labour and refugees after the Syrian crisis. Today, it is estimated that 25% of the Lebanese population live outside the country. Around 45% of Lebanese households claim at least one member living outside the country's borders (Pearlman, 2013: 197).

Contemporary developments (1990-present): transit migration and refugee shocks

Irregular and transit migration in south Mediterranean countries

The most notable contemporary development, starting from mid 1990s and still accelerating today, is that of transit migration from and via South and East Mediterranean countries to Europe. It is important to note, particularly in this context, that transit migration may occur over a long period of time that may extend to more than a decade, and a transit migrant may not be able to continue all the way to his or her planned final destination. For example, Kimbell (2017) refers to the case of Morocco that houses tens of thousands of transit migrants who could not make the final leg across the Mediterranean for financial reasons (Kimbell, 2017: 122).

Until the 2010s, there were mainly three factors that contributed to this phenomenon: population growth in Africa and increasing numbers in relative, rather than absolute, poverty (Lahlou, 2006: 111); the changing nature of the economy in Southern Europe and the increasing demand for more labour in agriculture and construction; and finally the introduction of visa requirements in Italy and Spain in 1990-1991 in compliance with the rules of the Schengen area (Berriane et al, 2015: 506). As a consequence, the south-Mediterranean area became a source of irregular emigration as well as a main transit station for irregular migration from the mid-1990s and until today. These changes were rapidly accelerated by the political instability following the Arab Spring, which accelerated developments and made them harder to control as a result of civil war in Libya.

Morocco is now one of the most important gates to Europe for irregular and transit migrants because of its strategic location. Numbers of irregular migrants dropped significantly after 2005 when a number of irregular migrants tried to cross the security fences in Ceuta and Melilla and border soldiers opened fire (Lahlou, 2015: 9). However, the closing of the central and eastern Mediterranean routes has heightened pressure again. As Kimbell (2017) mentions, large numbers of transit migrants cannot make the final leg to the Mediterranean, mostly for financial reasons, and therefore prefer to stay in Morocco rather than go back to their country of origin. For this reason and although Morocco has been always an emigration country, very recently Morocco is increasingly considered as an immigration country. Figures on irregular migrants living in Morocco are scarce because of their status, but estimates have varied over the years from 10,000 to 15,000 (Chertia & Collyer, 2015: 594).

In 2018, the West Mediterranean route became the most used route to enter Europe irregularly. As shown in figure 17 the number of irregular crossings into Europe through the West Mediterranean route increased from 23,063 in 2017 to 57,034 just one year later

Figure 17. numbers of irregular crossings to Europe through the West Mediterranean Route (both sea and land), 2008-2018. Source: Frontex 2018

Figure 18. numbers of irregular crossings to Europe through the Central Mediterranean Route (2008-2018). Source: Frontex, 2018

Figure 18 shows the dynamics of the central Mediterranean route, from Tunisia and Libya to Italy. Numbers increased sharply after 2013, but significantly decreased in 2018. Tunisia replaced Libya as the main country of departure in the second half of 2018, with most of the nationalities crossing being Tunisians and Eritreans (Frontex, 2018).

Jordan: Refugee shocks

Contemporary migration patterns in Jordan correspond to refugee crises rather than to transit migration from other regions. Only two years after King Husayn declared disengagement with the West Bank, Jordan received another shock as a consequence of the first Gulf War the massive returns of Jordanian workers from Kuwait as 360,000 returnees caused a 10 per cent increase in the population (Zaghal, 2005: 159). Because of Jordan's pro-Iraq stance, Kuwait never allowed these workers to return. Jordan was also a hub for transit migrants between Kuwait and Iraq, and an estimated two million transit migrants passed Jordanian

lands during the war. The migration patterns for Palestinians started to change during 1990s as a result of the closure of the Gulf labour markets and the signing of Oslo accords that created the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The latter resulted in a new phenomenon, which is the return of many thousands of Palestinians, who were dispersed in different countries around the world. In 1994, 267,355 Palestinians (around 10 per cent of the population) returned to Palestine from Jordan alone (Hanafi, 2005: 253).

Large number of Palestinians, however, yet again attempted to emigrate in the 2000s due to political gridlock and very bad economic conditions. These Palestinians were mostly young and of higher socio-economic profiles, in terms of qualifications and skills. On top of this, the Iraq War in 2003 led to another large wave of refugees—an estimated 350,000 to 450,000 Iraqis—entering Jordan (Zaghal, 2005: 159). At the same time, the second Intifada of 2000 in Palestine and the instability that followed led to around 100,000 Palestinians leaving again, with large numbers of them crossing the Jordanian river to Jordan. Since 2011, the Syrian civil war has also affected Jordan in a similar manner. In 2015, 662,000 Syrian refugees were registered in the UNHCR (Achilli, 2015), constituting around 9 per cent of the Kingdom's population.

Lebanon: Labour emigration and refugee crisis

Contemporary developments in Lebanon starting from the 1990s have transformed it into an immigration country, similar the Moroccan transformation, yet for different reasons. Two main parallel processes contributed to this qualitative change. The first was the end of the civil war in 1989 and the demand in the labour market for particularly manual jobs. The second was the exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Iraq in the 1990s and Syrians more recently after the Arab Spring, both of which went to Lebanon in large numbers.

After the civil war ended officially in 1989 with the Taif Agreement, many of the Lebanese who left the country did not return home. The consequences were that a large number of low-skilled jobs like those in households, construction and sanitation were left vacant. As a consequence, large numbers of workers from Asia and Africa started to migrate to Lebanon. In 2008, the numbers of female domestic workers in Lebanon were estimated at around 200,000, mainly from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia, working in Lebanese households.[4] The overall number of foreign workers in 2006 was around 600,000, of which 400,000 were Syrians, 100,000 were Sri Lankans, 20,000 were Egyptians, in addition to others from the Philippines and Ethiopia (Dorai and Clochard, 2006: 1).

In addition, Lebanon also received increasing numbers of refugees starting in the 1990s. Following the first Gulf War, Iraqis have constituted the second largest group of refugees in Lebanon, after Palestinians. More recently, the Syrian civil war led to a new of wave of refugees seeking asylum in Lebanon. According to Human Rights Watch, there were around 1.5 million Syrian refugees living in Lebanon in 2018, only 26 per cent of whom are registered with the UNHCR. Therefore, 74 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are considered illegal migrants.[5] The official numbers of Syrian refugees make them 25 per cent of the Lebanese population.

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4   https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/29/lebanon-protect-domestic-workers-abuse-exploitation

5   https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/lebanon

What are the politics of and policies towards migration in the Southern Partner Countries? What is the role of public attitudes in these changes?

In this section we overview and attempt to explain the immigration and emigration policies of our four primary case study countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon.

Morocco

Immigration

Since immigration in Morocco was not a notable phenomenon until the late 1990s, there were few clear governmental policies dealing with it except for some piecemeal security measures. For example, King Hassan II declared his support for Spain's attempts to combat irregular immigration. He actively changed police leadership in the coastal city of Tangier in order to remove sub-Saharan Africans (Kimbell, 2017: 122). However, it was not until the May 2003 Casablanca bombings that the government started taking clear policies toward immigration. The first and most important step was Law No. 02/03 that named irregular immigration a criminal offence for the first time, itself a considerably more restrictive change. The law gives the right for irregular migrants to have a translator, a lawyer, and to contact national embassy, In addition, Article 26 gives special treatment to pregnant women such as exemption from expulsion.[6] However, some NGOs have questioned about the extent to which these rights are enforced (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006; Kimbell, 2017: 124).

Furthermore, in November 2003, Morocco created the *direction de la migration et de surveillance des frontiers* [Migration and Borders Surveillance Office], which took charge of fighting migrant-smuggling networks. In addition, in 2004, Morocco and Spain created joint patrols to work in the Gibraltar strait as well as in the Atlantic between Morocco and the Canary Islands (Lahlou, 2006: 121). These measures lead to a decrease in irregular immigration through Morocco from 36,344 persons in 2003 to 16,560 in 2006 (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). State immigration policy in Morocco was at least in part based on security and geopolitical considerations, with cooperation with European countries seen by the Moroccan government as way to enhance economic cooperation.

The year 2013 witnessed a radical change in Moroccan immigration policy. In a public speech, King Moham-

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6   For the full law articles, see: http://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/legislation/ar/penal/immigrationar.htm

med IV admitted human rights violations towards immigrants based on reports from NGOs and the from the National Council of Human Rights (NCHR).[7] A new immigration policy was announced, specifically directed towards irregular immigrants and comprised of three main pillars: (1) performing exceptional regularisation for irregular immigrants; (2) extending the power of UNCHR in giving asylum to larger numbers in Morocco; and (3) better integration for asylum seekers (Lahlou, 2018: 7). Following this, the Moroccan government conducted two exceptional campaigns to legalise the status of irregular immigrants. The first, which took place in the last quarter of 2014, accepted 17,916 requests for regularisation. Between 2016 and 2017, a second exceptional campaign accepted 24,000 additional requests (Lahlou, 2018: 7).

What was the role of public attitudes to migration in these policy changes?

There is some evidence that public opinion was against immigration flows at the time of the more restrictive policy changes. Berriane, de Haas, and Natter (2015) argue that the general public expressed xenophobic and racist behaviour and attitudes. In a number of interviews with irregular migrants in Morocco, Chertia and Collyer (2015) show that the majority of sub-Saharan immigrants had a negative experience when interacting with Moroccans. 'In some cases', a Moroccan stakeholder argued, 'the basic image that the average Moroccan has about sub-Saharans is of dirt, AIDS, prostitution, and theft.' (Chertia & Collyer, 2015: 597). The causes of such xenophobia are complex and hardly unique to Morocco. However, Kimbell (2017) has mentioned competition for jobs and media attacks (including on 'invading black locusts'), as well as the growth of Christian communities from sub-Saharan Africa (Berriane et al, 2015: 515), as potential reasons.

The reasons behind the radical 2013 change left observers bewildered at the time, though were most probably linked to post-Arab Spring political liberalisation, which included the drafting of a new constitution, which was designed to satiate demands for change and greater respect for human rights. In this respect, such changes were likely a response to public attitudes to constitutionalism and the role of the state broadly, if not specifically regarding immigrants. Alternatively, Chertia and Collyer (2015) suggest that geopolitical, rather than domestic, factors were behind this change, with Morocco keen to reorient itself towards Africa and so better ingratiate itself with sub-Saharan governments.

Emigration

Shortly after independence, Morocco created the Bureau of Emigration in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to regulate and encourage labour recruitment as a consequence of the increasing levels of unemployment. Morocco also had its first labour conventions after independence with France and Germany that were concluded in 1963. Later, France created the French National Office d'Immigration (ONI) in Casablanca to recruit Moroccan workers for the French factories. The Moroccan state documents at this time showed that unemployment rates were the primary concern for the state (Brand, 2006: 59-62).

Moroccan migration policy concerning those already emigrated can be divided into two parts: economic—facilitating remittances and investment—and sociocultural. Regarding the latter, a primary policy was the creation of the *amicales (Widdadyat* in Arabic). The cases of Morocco and Tunisia are very similar in

صبري الحو (2016)، "المغرب والهجرة القادمة من إفريقيا جنوب الصحراء"، مركز الجزيرة للدراسات.
http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/161221075959991/12/2016.html

the way the *amicales* operated and their social and political roles. Generally, the *amicales* were created as social associations that hold social activities such as language education, celebrations of religious and national events, delivering information from the national state to its diaspora, and other types of activities that aimed at keeping the diaspora communities connected to the state. King Hassan II also created *La Foundation Hassan II* for Moroccans resident abroad to enhance their connection to their home country (de Haas, 2007).

A final qualitative change in the Moroccan emigration policy happened in 2011. Following mass demonstration in 20 February 2011, a new constitution was drafted. The new constitution gives Moroccans living abroad to vote in elections for the first time. However, a number of "organisational barriers" disabled voting abroad for the Moroccan expatriate community.[8] In addition, the constitution created the National Human Rights Council headed by Driss el-Yazami, who was an activist in human rights and headed the council of expatriates in France.[9] Therefore, Moroccan state policies toward emigration have changed from considering emigrants as a class of poor, unemployed (often Berber) workers to considering their role in national development and, finally, to treating them as full citizens.

One reason for this progressive change, according to Sahraoui (2018), is that the French state only granted the freedom for foreigners to form organisations in 1981. Before that, immigrants needed to get special authorization (Sahraoui, 2018: 533). Lacroix (2013) argues that the changing nature of Moroccan NGOs in France has impacted emigrant policy in Morocco. Whilst until the 2000s, most newly created NGOs focused on civic and sociocultural rights in France, since 2003 the majority of newly founded NGOs have focused on development and hometown associations in Morocco. This trend became increasingly clear throughout the 2000s. By 2010, 65 per cent of the newly created NGOs dealt with development in Morocco compared to only 30 per cent at the end of the 1990s (Sahraoui, 2018). The increasing number and changing nature of the Moroccan diaspora community engagement in civil society and activism abroad has gone hand-in-hand with major changes in the Moroccan state's migration policies toward its own diaspora abroad as well as to development. One piece of evidence of this link is the role played by "Development et Migration", an NGO established by migrants that helped to deliver infrastructure and water supply to a number of villages in the Rif, especially the Souss-Massa-Drâa region, and led to changing state development policy toward these regions (Sahraoui, 2018: 533).

Tunisia

Immigration

Tunisian policy toward irregular immigrants is less clear than in Morocco. The main law that regulated irregular immigration to Tunisia was law no. 6/2004 that was meant to regulate passports and other travel

8   "مغاربة من ألمانيا: حرماننا من الانتخابات انتقاص من مواطنتنا"
https://www.dw.com/ar/%D%85%9D%8BA%D%8A%7D%8B%1D%8A%8D%8A%-9D%85%9D%-86%9D%8A%3D%84%9D9
%85%D%8A%7D%86%9D8%9A%D%8A%-7D%8AD%D%8B%1D%85%9D%8A%7D%86%9D%86%9D%8A-7
%D%85%9D%-86%9D%8A%7D%84%9D%8A%7D%86%9D%8AA%D%8AE%D%8A%7D%8A%8D%8A%7D%8AA-%D%8A%7D
%86%9D%8AA%D%82%9D%8A%7D%8B%-5D%85%9D%-86%9D%85%9D%88%9D%8A%7D%8B%7D%86%9D%8AA%D8%9
%6D%8A7/a35968040-

9   https://www.maghress.com/ksarsouk/4002   "إنشاء المجلس الوطني لحقوق الإنسان في المغرب"

documents. However, the law also included articles regulating and penalising irregular migration, classifying it as a serious crime. The law sentenced traffickers who help migrants to enter Tunisia illegally to three years of prison and a fine of 8,000 Dinars (Article 38) and those who offer accommodation to irregular migrants to four years of prison and a fine of 10,000 Dinars (Article 39). The penalties included in this law for helping irregular migrants could be as high as 15 years imprisonment.[10]

This law was criticised by the Tunisian civil society after the revolution for making Tunisia a "watcher on the southern boarders of the EU" (Sabhani, 2016: 27). Tunisian civil society organisations are, at the time of writing, attempting to get a new law passed that would organise asylum and irregular migration, but it is has been blocked in the parliament since 2016.[11] In addition, Tunisia does not have a formal asylum system but it permits UNCHR to work in this field.

Following the descent of Libya into civil war, the Tunisian state had little choice but to adopt an open-door policy to massive incoming immigration of refugees. They were aided by NGOs and the Tunisian army (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012: 10). These refugees, however, had no legal status in the absence of laws regulating asylum and some of them stayed on tourist visas. Berriane, de Haas, and Natter (2016) indicate an ambivalent attitude among the Tunisian public toward refugees fleeing the Libyan war. Generally, Tunisians welcomed Libyan families and called them 'brothers'. Many Libyans invested in the real-estate market and their money represented an important investment source at a time when the Tunisian economy was suffering after the revolution. This is believed to have contributed to the 'positive' frame through which emigration of Libyan families was perceived. However, the emigration of African workers at the same time was often received negatively by the Tunisian public. Racism and prejudice against sub-Saharan immigrants in Tunisia were raised by several NGOs. Tunisia also faces a problem with irregular immigration from sub-Saharan Africa. As a consequence of free-entry agreements with a number of African countries, many African citizens enter Tunisia for visits or to study at Tunisian universities and overstay their visas, turning them into irregular immigrants.

What was the role of public attitudes to migration in these policy changes?

Again, the domestic, rather than geopolitical, approach might be better able to explain the absence of a clear immigration policy in Tunisia. Tunisians have, arguably, welcomed Libyan families but did not welcome workers from sub-Saharan Africa. The absence of a clear policy can be seen as a consequence of these ambivalent attitudes in the Tunisian public. Whereas Libyan were widely seen as culturally proximal and deserving of refuge and as economic investors, sub-Saharan Africans are more likely to be seen as the contrary (for a discussion of the various factors facing the post-revolutionary state in migration policy see Lexi, 2018; also Natther, 2018).

Emigration

Tunisia's emigration policies have historically been aimed at incentivising labour emigration, typically in a more organised manner than those of Morocco. However, encouraging labour emigration under the Bourgiba regime was considered as a temporary rather than a permanent solution, with priority given to encouraging job creation at home.

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10   For the full law articles, see: https://legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/45000

11   "UNHCR Tunisia Factsheet - March 2018 "https://reliefweb.int/report/tunisia/unhcr-tunisia-factsheet-march-2018

The Tunisian state encouraged labour emigration and started to regulate it earlier and in a more organised manner than the Moroccan state (Brand, 2006: 94-6). Unlike in Morocco, early Tunisian state policy focussed more on employment than remittances. After the 1987 coup, the creation of the *Communite tunisiene en etrenger*" (CTE) expanded this approach to the development of Tunisia, particularly via investment by emigrants. In particular, certain economic policies were undertaken to encourage CTE investments, such as applying preferable interest rates, allowing CTE to open bank accounts with foreign currencies and custom privileges on imported materials and equipment used by CTE in investment and industry, leading to the creation 40,000 jobs by one estimate (Brand, 2006: 106). The Tunisian state also created *amicales* between 1956 and 1960 abroad as a way to connect with the diaspora communities, as in the Moroccan case.

The state's treatment of its diaspora community changed radically after the revolution. Tunisians living abroad became considered as full citizens who should enjoy political rights, including political participation. Political parties and Tunisian public opinion after the revolution defended the rights of Tunisians abroad to vote in elections, and political parties included the Tunisian community abroad in their programs. As a consequence, Tunisians living abroad were granted the right of voting for the first time in the Tunisian history. In addition, 18 seats of the 217 seats in the Assembly were allocated to expatriates in six districts abroad (Boubakri, 2013: 13-14). The new government also created the Secretary of State for Migration and Tunisians Abroad.

The qualitative change after the revolution reached its peak when several Civil Society organisations and party activists organised protests to support Tunisians detained in Italy. Irregular migration from Tunisia to Italy peaked in the three months that followed the revolution as shown above. As a consequence, the Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi visited Tunisia to reach an agreement to stop irregular emigration. At the same time, protests denounced the Italian PM's visit and demanded better treatment of emigrants in the detention centres. The Tunisian government made an agreement with the Italian government on 11 April 2011 during this visit. According to this agreement, all Tunisians in detention centres that arrived before that date will be granted a residence permit in Italy, whereas those who arrived later will be returned to Tunisia (Boubakri, 2013).

Jordan

Immigration

Before 2003, Jordan had adopted an open-door policy to labour immigrants coming from Arab countries, especially Egypt, and to refugees coming from the West Bank after 1948 and 1967, Iraq and Kuwait after 1991, and Syria between 2011 and 2014. Jordan granted nationality to 200,000 Palestinians living in the West Bank in the 1950s after the annexation. Jordan started adopting a stricter policy toward refugees fleeing the Iraq War in 2003, still, however, granting a 30-day allowance to those fleeing the war and showing flexibility in dealing with them. This situation changed in 2005 when three Iraqis were accused of committing three terrorist attacks on hotels in Jordan that killed 60 people. As a consequence, the country adopted a stricter immigration policy against Iraqis. Thousands of Iraqis were denied entry at the Jordanian borders in addition to repatriating thousands of Iraqis who exceeded their 30-day permit and not allowing their return

to Jordan in five years.[12]

The same pattern was repeated with Syrian refugees after 2011. By 2015, 662,000 Syrian refugees were registered in the UNHCR, constituting around 9 per cent of Jordan's population on the eve of the Syrian revolution. The Syrians were a heavy financial burden on Jordan, estimated at $4.2 billion in 2016 (Achilli, 2015: 2). These costs were added to the termination of one of the most vital trade routes to Jordan through Syria and the competition Jordanians found in labour market from the Syrians. In addition, refugees affected the real estate market as rents doubled and tripled in some areas. Some Jordanians who welcomed Syrian refugees initially were reported to have become hostile as a consequence of these perceived negative effects on their already uneasy economic life. Although the Jordanian policy toward Syrian refugees was very permissive, it started changing from 2014 (Achilli, 2015: 5).

What was the role of public attitudes to migration in these policy changes?

As already shown previously, between 2013 and 2016 Syrian refugees became one of the Jordanian public's most salient political issues, as was the case in Lebanon, creating something of a constraining dissensus for the government who responded with more restrictive measures in 2014, as discussed above. Moreover, Jordan's geographical position, compared to the relative isolation of Tunisia and, especially, Morocco has meant that the country has been forced repeatedly to react to major migration crises in its neighbouring countries.

However, Jordan's other migration policies have been far more similar to those of the Maghreb, focussed on remittances and unemployment. Throughout the 1980s to early 2000s the share of remittances to GDP gradually increased beyond 20 per cent (Zaghal, 2005: 156). In addition, high unemployment rates, partially a result of the Palestinian migrations in 1948 and 1967, encouraged workers to emigrate, especially to the Gulf, which hosted 75 per cent of Jordanian workers abroad. Such emigration, in turn, lead to immigration to Jordan, overwhelmingly of Egyptians (Zaghal, 2005: 157).

There is a general feeling among Jordanians that the situation of having hundreds of thousands of foreign workers amid high unemployment level (estimated at 15 per cent in 2018 according to the World Bank) should be solved by more restrictive policies on labour immigration. Professional associations often oppose recruiting foreign labour in those professions that already suffer high levels of unemployment. As a consequence, the Ministry of Labour has issued a list of sixteen professions that are exclusive to Jordanians as a way to respond to these pressures from the professional associations (Zaghal, 2005: 160). In a similar vein and more generally, in 2018, the estimate of daily repatriation of irregular workers reached 80-100 workers per day.[13]

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12 جون إيمرسون (2006)، «معاملة يلفها الصمت: نازحون من العراق ومقيمون في الأردن».
https://www.hrw.org/ar/report/2006/11/27/255382

13 زيد الدبيسة (2018)، «الأردن يحفز العمالة الوافدة على مغادرة أراضيه.» العربي الجديد.
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2018/3/7/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-
%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%A7%D
8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%87

Emigration

Compared to Morocco and Tunisia, Jordan has not had an emigration policy in the strict sense of the term (Brand, 2006). Olwan (2005) indicates that state migration policies in Jordan were dispersed laws and legislative instruments that organised Jordanian citizenship, entry and departure, asylum, and migrant domestic workers.

However, in 1975, Jordan created a Ministry of Labour, a Directorate of Expatriates, and sent attaches to its embassies and consulates abroad in order to organise Jordanian labour emigration. Jordan did not have clear recruitment bureaus as in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, however. The classic informal recruitment based on connections to those family members who had already left was more important than state policies in this regard.

Economic policies related to Jordanians abroad were adopted later as the state began to perceive the economic importance of remittances. In 1972 and 1973, the Encouragement of Investment Law no.53/1972 and the Post Office Fund were initiated to encourage transferring remittances of Jordanians living abroad back home and transforming them into useful investments. However, Jordanian investment policy changed significantly with the establishment of the structural adjustment programme in the 1990s, after which no special advantages were given to Jordanian investment and all investors were treated alike. The state also started a series of conferences in 1998 directed to expatriate businessmen (Brand, 2006: 185-193).

Jordan cultural emigration policies have also been less developed than those of Morocco and Tunisia. Jordan has not organised such associations abroad (Brand, 2006: 195-99). This was primarily because the majority of the Jordanian diaspora community lived in the Gulf countries, which did not allow organisational activities of foreigners on their soil. Perhaps the most serious attempt at connecting the Jordanian diaspora were expatriate conferences held from 1985 onwards. These were meetings held to listen to and solve the problems faced by the Jordanian diaspora.

Lebanon

Immigration

Lebanon does not consider itself as a settlement destination for refugees. Rather, it sees itself as a 'transit' country, albeit in a different manner to the south Mediterranean countries. Lebanon has said that it can host refugees, but only for a short time before they are transferred to another country. This policy has various antecedents. First, Lebanon did not sign the 1951 Refugee Convention in Geneva, and therefore does not recognise refugees (other than Palestinians as will be discussed). Second, the Lebanese constitution does not give the right to asylum (Tabar, 2010: 11). Third, the only refugees recognized in Lebanon are Palestinians, and all other refugees are considered by law as irregular immigrants. Palestinians have a special condition in Lebanon and are given the right of entry and exit as they please. The law regulating other refugees is the 1962 Law of Entry and Exit. Article 32 of the Law of Entry and Exit sentences any irregular migrants to a period of 1-3 months of prison and a fine of 2500-12500 Liras (that was vastly increased in another iteration

of the law in 2000).[14] Therefore, the general categories of asylum seekers, refugees, irregular migrants, and economic migrants do not exist in Lebanon and all are considered irregular migrants (Dorai and Clochard, 2006: 1-2; for more on Iraqi refugees in Lebanon, see Tabar, 2010: 10).

Another aspect of the Lebanese policy toward immigrants is its bilateral agreements with inter-governmental organisations. Lebanon signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UNHCR in September 2003. According to this agreement, the UNHCR can issue temporary residence permit to asylum seekers for three months that can be renewed for a further six-nine months upon recognition by the Lebanese government. However, the MOU mentions explicitly the role of Lebanon as a temporary 'transit' zone before resettlement of refugees in other countries: '[...] *in spite of the ongoing crisis in Iraq, it is hoped that repatriation on a larger scale will become possible during 2004. RO Beirut will also exert efforts to explore repatriation possibilities for refugees originating from the Sudan and 4 COP Lebanon 2004 Somalia. Meanwhile, third country resettlement will remain the only durable solution for those who are unable or unwilling to return home*' (MOU, 2004).

A final aspect of Lebanon's immigration policy is toward foreign workers. There are no laws regulating foreign workers in Lebanon. However, there is a supervision system (*Kafala*) similar to the system applied in the GCC.[15] This system avoids the need for work permits that take time and money. According to this system, a supervisor (*Kafeel*) determines how the work will be done. This system includes low skilled jobs (e.g. construction, sanitisation, etc.) that the Lebanese avoid, and, therefore, arguably does not impose "pressure" on the Lebanese labour market (Tabar, 2010: 12-13). However, there is no special legislation protecting foreign workers, notably domestic women workers in Lebanese households, leading to some reports of abuse.[16]

Despite receiving 1.5 million Syrian Refugees, the Lebanese government has at times adopted restrictive policies to them and generally considers the Syrian refugees' status as temporary. The Lebanese government first denied entry to Palestinians living in Syria, limited admission of Syrian refugees to extreme humanitarian cases, and rejected 60 per cent of the refugees coming to the Lebanese boarders from Syria (de Bel Air, 2017: 4). In addition, Lebanese policymakers took anti-refugee stances after the crisis and insisted that the impact of the crisis on Lebanon must be lessened.[17][18][19] In addition to Syrians, a large number of Palestinians living in Syria fled the war to Lebanon. There are currently 450,000 registered Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon according to the UNRWA, with around 35,000 Palestinians coming from Syria after the war. The newcomers face problems related to basic needs such as official documents, work permits,

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14   Full articles of the Law of Entry and Exit of 1962 can be accessed at: http://ahdath.justice.gov.lb/law-nearby-Foreigners.htm

15   "The Kafala system: from the perspective of employers". Insan. Retrieved from http://www.insanassociation.org/en/images/the%20kafala%20system%20when%20employers%20also%20accepted%20to%20share%20their%20perspective%20ar.pdf

16   https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/29/lebanon-protect-domestic-workers-abuse-exploitation

17   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/lebanon-troops-demolish-syrian-refugee-homes-deadline-expires-190701111106849.html

18   https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-potential-forced-return

19   https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/30/syrian-refugees-forced-destroy-own-homes-lebanon

health care, and education.[20]

What are the factors that contribute to policy changes?

One factor that stands behind restrictive immigration policies in Lebanon, especially against refugee assim-ilation, is political. Population composition in Lebanon is not only a demographic or economic concern, but primarily a political issue that lies at the very core of the nation-building process (Dorai and Clochard, 2006: 13). The whole political system of the country is based on the demographic composition of the Lebanese population and any serious changes would undermine the current system. This is a major factor behind state policy toward migrants and refugees. For example, there are around 400,000 Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon and around 200,000 to 250,000 refugees residing in Lebanon. Laws in Lebanon generally exclude refugees from the labour force as well as from citizenship (Tabar, 2010: 10). The Palestinian refugees are predominantly Sunni Muslims and integrating them within the Lebanese population means changing the demographical balance and, therefore, the constitutional design of the state itself. For these reasons, Lebanese policy-makers have generally opposed settlement for non-Palestinan refugees as well (Dorai and Clochard, 2006: 13). In this vital respect, the case of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has been divergent to that of Jordan: in the latter, they received citizenship and were claimed to be subjects of the Jordanian crown, but in the former they are denied citizenship out of fears of changing the political balance between different political and religious groups in Lebanon.

Another important factor that plays a role in the Lebanese restrictive immigration policy is security. The Lebanese ministry of interior has found it difficult to control its borders and distinguish between legal and irregular migrants due to the large numbers of Syrians in Lebanon having different statuses (economic migrants before the civil war, refugees, Palestinian residents in Syria, Palestinian refugees originally living in Lebanon, etc.). Therefore, the major stakeholder that has the ultimate authority over migrants and refugees issues is the Lebanese General Security (*Al-Amn Al-A`am*).

A third element is public opinion. Although there are few if any credible studies on how public opinion affects migration policies in Lebanon, there are several pieces of evidence suggesting that the Lebanese public opinion is becoming increasingly opposed to the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. First, as Chaaban et al (2018: 10) found in their fieldwork report, 'the Syrian refugees were targeted in the Lebanese election campaign, which employed an increased anti-refugee rhetoric demanding their return.' Second, there is some evidence that a large fraction of the Lebanese hold anti-immigrant attitudes. The Arab Ba-rometer (2016) showed that more than 37 per cent of the Lebanese respondents answered that they either strongly dislike or dislike having an immigrant or a foreign worker as a neighbour, with only 17% answering to the contrary. These anti-immigrant sentiments in Lebanon seem high when compared to other Arab countries, as shown in section I. Similarly, "Syrian refugees" in 2016 was considered one of the most important challenges affecting the country, listed by 43 per cent of Lebanese citizens, making it the joint-second most important issue and significantly higher than the analogous 34 per cent in Jordan.

Third, in a report conducted by BBC Arabia under the title '"Have the Lebanese become fed up with Syrian

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20   https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon

refugees'[21], the majority of interviewees confirmed that public opinion in Lebanon is becoming increasingly antagonistic to the Syrian presence on Lebanese territory. The reasons for this anti-refugee stance are multiple, but the main concerns tend to be related to security, public order, the economy and labour market competition, as well as the prices of real-estate units that are said to have doubled as a consequence of the increasing demand created by Syrians. Other reports have also investigated these relations between Syrians and the Lebanese.[22] Therefore, it seems that public opinion, politicians' and policymakers' attitudes are moving in the same direction of favouring a "quick return" of Syrian refugees to safe zones in Syria. However, the effect of public attitudes on the real policies undertaken by the government and its agencies needs closer investigation.

Emigration

Among the four cases covered in this review, the Lebanese state has the most limited emigration policies. It could be argued that, although Lebanon has been called "a bird with two wings" (referring to the Lebanese living inside and outside the country), there are no explicit state policies toward emigrants. The Lebanese cabinet created a section under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and changed the name of the ministry to be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (MFAE) that still stands today, however, in reality the interaction with the expatriates is limited.[23] This section took care of issuing documentation for the diaspora community abroad, encouraging citizenship acquisition for all expatriates who would return to Lebanon, and to extend consular representation and protect rights abroad (Brand, 2006). Another form of institution that started in 1960 was the creation of the World Lebanese Union (WLU). Although the WLU was established as a non-governmental, apolitical, and non-confessional organisation, it had governmental figures on its top positions and it was headed by the minister of the MFAE (Brand, 2006: 150). The general goal of the WLU was to enhance ties between the Lebanese living abroad and to contribute to the development of Lebanon. However, the WLU was hampered by financial problems and political divisions in the run up to the civil war (Brand, 2006: 150-5). Unlike the other countries, Lebanon did not have policies to encourage development through its emigrants, largely owing to the country's free market tradition, already allowing anyone, including emigrants, to invest as they please. This tradition also leads remittances to be seen as a private matter. See Pearlman (2013) and (Brand, 2006: 145) for some of the functions of migration as perceived by the Lebanese state. Despite its small population compared to other Arab countries, Lebanon is the seventh largest recipient of remittances in the world and the first among the developing world in remittances per capita – making remittances of around $575 per capita in 2003 (Tohme, 2004).

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21   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-GCZ5fFvJk

22   كنان قوجة (2017)ز ''اللبنانيون والسورين: من العنصري''. رصيف22.
https://raseef22.com/article/%-4473D%8A%7D%84%9D%84%9D%8A%8D%86%9D%8A%7D%86%9D8%9A%D88%9
%D%-86%9D%88%9D%8A%7D%84%9D%8B%3D%88%9D%8B%1D8%9A%D%88%9D%-86%9D%85%9D8%9E%D-86%9
%D%87%9D%-88%9D%8A%7D%84%9D%8B%9D%86%9D%8B%5D%8B%1D8%9A%D9%8F

23   A separate ministry of expatriates (Ministry of Expatriates) was created in the beginning of 1990s, but did not continue to exist.

Recommendations

In this report we also offer a number of recommendations for how communicators on migration in the region can avoid polarisation, based both on this chapter and chapter 1 of this report. These points will be elaborated further in chapter 3 of this report.

1. There is a need for **more detailed data** on attitudes to migration in the region. In particular, this should include data on migration issue salience—not just the salience of 'immigration' but also particular aspects such as irregular immigration—and attitudes to emigration. We recommend the production of regularly collected pan-regional datasets that could align with existing datasets.

2. **Recognise national contexts.** As we show in our qualitative histories, much anti-immigration and anti-refugee sentiment in the region is the result of specific national contexts.

3. **Avoid emotionalising the debate.** Emotionalising a debate both enhances the salience of the subject and leads to greater polarisation and politicisation, as shown in chapter 1 of this report.

4. **Remain evidence-based.** In the SPCs, significant anti-migrant sentiment is driven by labour market concerns, primarily over unemployment. Studies have shown that attitudes to the economic effects of immigration are those most responsive to evidence-based communication.

5. **Be value-balanced.** As shown in previous reports, those who favour migration typically hold universalist values, while those opposing it typically value tradition, conformity and security. As such, communication that only emphasises the former is likely to enhance polarisation. Further research needs to be done to the generalisability of value-based determinants to the SPCs and to explore how to produce effective value-based communication.

6. **Be specific** on types of immigration and immigrants. When overarching terms like 'immigration' are used, individuals are able to evaluation a situation with their own prejudices (either positive or negative), leading to greater polarisation.

7. **Avoid hyperbole** or sweeping statements. Migration is a complex subject involving a vast spectrum of individuals and should be treated as such.

8. **Acknowledge trade-offs** and alternatives. Communicators of policies should acknowledge if they had other options and explain why there were not chosen.

9. **Be both rights-based and law-based.** Communication on migration gains significant credibility if it can show that *both* the rights of the migrants and the laws of the countries are being respected, allowing all sides to consider the situation or policy fairer.

10. **Evaluate.** Evaluating the effectiveness of communication afterwards allows lessons to be learned and adds to best-practice knowledge.

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