
7. Regional security cooperation

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7.1 INTRODUCTION

Whether individuals or any socio-political group feel (in)secure depends on a host of factors and circumstances. A focus on states and/or national security, for example, reveals that there are factors and relationships both within state boundaries as well as outside them – such as the transnational and regional level – that influence a state’s integrity and the security of its citizens. Some scholars, for example, have focused on regional security complexes and underscored the interlinkages between neighbouring states because ‘their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan, 1983, p. 190). As part of efforts to address evolving security threats and risks at the regional level, states have engaged in regional security cooperation projects such as the Concert of Europe in the 19th century (Schroeder, 1989). What we have come to know as World Wars I and II, started out as regional rivalries and expansion projects.

These regional security cooperation projects have become more institutionalised since the end of World War II, and, in many but not all cases, formalised. Every region, regardless of how we define region,¹ has at least one regional organisation that also engages in security cooperation. Many have several, all of which are nested within the United Nations (UN) (Hofmann, Bravo and Campbell, 2016; Hofmann and Mérand, 2012). On the African continent, for example, we distinguish between a regional (or continental) organisation, the African Union (AU), and other regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Arab League (AL), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Brosig, 2013; Cilliers and Gnanguênon, 2016). Asia, once deemed severely under-institutionalised, has become an alphabet soup of regional security organisations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the East Asia Summit, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Trilateral Cooperation Summit (TCS) (Yeo, 2019). We can also find the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) there. Europe looks almost meagre in comparison. It is home to the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and wider, inter-regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Hofmann, 2013). In Latin America, we can find the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Pacific Alliance, the now defunct Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (PROSUR). These were created in addition to the continental Organization of American States (OAS) (Flemes and Radseck, 2009).

In this chapter, we attempt to answer the following questions: What are the different kinds of regional security organisations that exist? What theoretical tools do we have to explain the

emergence of regional frameworks across the world? And how do they vary from an institutional and operational point of view? Regional security cooperation projects vary in many ways. Regional organisations are not only different in the number of their members (Panke and Starkmann, 2021) but also in the ways they have been institutionalised (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). Some of these cooperation agreements are institutionalised in formal organisations with significant bureaucracy, while others might exist as informal institutions or international treaties (Vabulas and Snidal, 2021). Another dimension where regional security cooperation can vary is whether organisations have been explicitly conceived to focus on security (what scholars refer to as task-specific), as in the case of NATO, or whether security cooperation is part of a multi-purpose organisation, such as with the EU, the AU, or ASEAN (Marks *et al.*, 2015; Haftel and Hofmann, 2017; 2019). We address these forms of security cooperation and thereby demonstrate that security cooperation can be thought of and enacted in a multitude of ways. We furthermore address the kinds of problems and normative concerns they respond to.

To do so, we first define regional security cooperation, following which we revisit the reasons why states and other actors invest in regional security cooperation in the first place; then, we turn to theoretical explanations that can be divided into three broad streams – those that emphasise dynamics internal to the region; those that accentuate dynamics external to the region; and those that focus on political dynamics not linked to security concerns – to explain the existence of regional security cooperation. We then map existing regional security cooperation projects, discussing their functions, effects, and effectiveness, following which, we conclude.

7.2 THE NORMATIVE AND THEORETICAL CASE FOR REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

In this section, we first discuss some of the factors which propel actors towards regional security cooperation and the normative case for such cooperation. Then, we turn to the different theoretical perspectives that highlight the different impetuses for regional security cooperation.

7.2.1 Defining Regional Security Cooperation

What distinguishes regional security cooperation projects from one another is that, some are *task-specific* regional security organisations, while others' security activities are part of a broader, *general-purpose* regional organisation (Haftel, 2012; Lenz *et al.*, 2015). Additionally, not all regional security cooperation occurs in *formalised* intergovernmental organisations with established bureaucracies, treaties and institutionalised routines. The Shangri-La Dialogue, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Club de Berne, the Human Security Network, or the Montreux Document Forum are all informal groupings of regional or regionalised actors, some of which are not states, sharing common concerns (Vabulas and Snidal, 2021). Regional security cooperation also happens on the less formal diplomatic track, in 1.5 or 2-track formations, and can include a host of private actors. In West Africa, for example, *non-state actors* have become important participants in regional frameworks, such as the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), or the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) (Ebo, 2007).

Next to variation along task-specificity, the degree of formality, and actor inclusivity, regional security organisations also vary with regard to their *authority* (Marks *et al.*, 2015) and *geographical reach*. The AL is a good example of the latter, as the organisation reaches both into North Africa and the Middle East. Similarly, the OSCE has member states that stretch from North America to Russia (Barnett and Solingen, 2007). In Africa, the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD) has 25 member states covering Western, Northern, Central, and Eastern Africa. These regional organisations overlap with other regional organisations. This raises the question of how a region should be (re)defined and what a region is (Katzenstein, 2005).

Not only is the definition of a region contested, but so is the concept of security (Baldwin, 1997). The term ‘alliance’ is associated with a traditional understanding of security; these can be found in many parts of the world (Leeds and Anac, 2005). However, via securitisation processes and the creation of policy nexuses, for example the security-environment nexus (Maertens, 2015), the definition of security has broadened not just in academia but also within security cooperation projects (Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver, 1998). Bodies such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) work respectively on the climate-security and security-development nexuses. Even traditional alliances such as NATO have included what they call collective security and crisis management in their mandate and are discussing climate change, energy, and pandemics (Hofmann, 2013). Many regional economic organisations have spilled over into security activities (Haftel and Hofmann, 2017; Gnanguênon, 2020).

Based on these observations we define regional security cooperation as any attempt to reduce armed violence, either within or at the borders of what multiple actors agree to be a region. There are at least four types of regional security cooperation that we can envisage (see Table 7.1): (i) task-specific regional security cooperation within a formalised regional security organisation; (ii) formalised security cooperation within a general purpose regional organisation; (iii) informal security cooperation; and (iv) informal security cooperation within general purpose regional informal cooperation.

Table 7.1 Types of regional security cooperation

	Formal	Informal
Task-specific	Regional security organisation	Security dialogues
General purpose	Regional organisation	Comprehensive informal approach

Source: compiled by the authors.

7.2.2 The Case for Regional Security

Wanting to feel secure is an innate reflex. Even the most risk-prone actors seek a sense of security. This sense of security is often influenced by the environment in which actors find themselves in, which in most cases is their immediate environment (Mitzen, 2006). To feel secure, actors try to create surroundings in which their neighbours will not or cannot aggress them. When these actors are social and political, aggregate constructs that speak in the name of many people, such as states, regional relations, and dynamics are a prime indicator of one’s own security. In most instances, it is regional neighbours who can most easily challenge or confirm another state’s borders, sovereignty, and vitality (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). If

there is no regional security among actors, costly approaches such as arms races are likely to dominate national policies (Jervis, 1976). In the extreme case, an invasion can occur. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine that started in February 2022 is one of the latest examples of these regional dynamics.

To mediate and reduce vulnerabilities and interdependencies, which often influence the threat and risk perception among actors, states engage in small and large, formal and informal, and deep and shallow cooperative initiatives. All regional security cooperation is founded on the attempt to create stability among members, as well as coordination and communication about the use of force. States cooperate regionally to create an environment in which stable and predictable relations can be nurtured. Some states even push for more than cooperation and start integrating certain aspects of their security apparatus, including command structures such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in NATO. However, integration in the security realm remains rare, as states guard their sovereignty and desist from giving up too much in the way of their national power and symbols.

In addition, most if not all regional organisations refer to the norms within the UN Charter, a legitimacy granting device. 'The UN embodies many of the most important constitutive norms of the international community, norms that, in effect, prescribe how modern, sovereign states are expected to behave' (Barnett, 1996, p. 542). Chapters VI and VII address how to act in a conflict and Article 51 justifies the use of force only in an act of self-defence. Chapter VIII addresses how regional arrangements should relate to the UN. The UN and regional organisations have recently re-emphasised Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements of its Charter. 'The principle of establishing stronger partnerships with regional organisations is embedded in the very DNA of the United Nations. With great vision and foresight, Chapter VIII of the Charter lays out the critical role of regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security' (Ban, 2014; see also Abass, 2004). Such subsidiarity can be a cost-efficient measure as well as a necessity in operationalising more direct political and humanitarian interventions in faraway conflicts. However, it also highlights the fact that the UN lacks the resources and, arguably, the knowledge about each potential conflict area.

However, it is not only states that need protection and security; the people living within states do too. But they have not always been protected by their own national governments. Moving beyond the level of the state, arguments have been made to protect individuals and prosecuted groups within states. The human security agenda was first raised in 1994 by the UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994), which recognised the importance of placing people, and no longer states, at the forefront of security agendas. This new, broad approach to security incorporates political, economic, social, agricultural, health, and environmental components. Additionally, what was termed 'humanitarian intervention' in the 1990s has since been renamed several times, and includes the idea of complex humanitarian emergencies (Knecht, 2009; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005). Currently, the UN and others have settled around the concept of responsibility (e.g., the responsibility to prevent, to protect, to rebuild, and responsibility while protecting) and resilience as normative standards based on which people feel secure.

7.2.3 Theoretical Explanations: External and Internal Impetus and Political Motivations

Different theories shed light on these cooperative developments. We divide the existing theoretical scholarship into three categories: regional security cooperation driven by factors external to the so-called region, regional security cooperation driven by factors internal to the region and regional security cooperation that emerges rather as an accident to other regional projects and cooperation. Some of these explanations focus on governance gaps while others observe political dynamics.

External impetus. Some theories emphasise an external impetus for security cooperation at the regional level. The most common factor discussed in this literature is a shared threat perception. Based on this shared threat perception, scholars argue, states have formed and maintained regional security cooperation (Walt, 1987). Given the emphasis on military and physical threats, these scholars observe primarily military responses. Consequently, the design of these regional security cooperation projects is mainly military alliances. The degree of cooperation and integration in these alliances varies with the magnitude of the threat.

The durability of alliances also depends on a shared threat perception. According to this line of argument, mutual security threats bring states together and enable cooperation – if the threat persists (Walt, 1987). What exactly constitutes this threat, i.e., changes in growth of national capabilities and hence in relative power distribution (Waltz, 1979) or perceptions of threats based on ideological commonalities such as ideology (Haas, 2005), is thereby debated in this set of literature.

Internal impetus. Other scholars put the emphasis rather on different internal dynamics. Some scholars have observed that a shared regional identity – which can exist independently of a shared external threat – has evolved into the creation of common security projects. Inspired by Karl Deutsch's (1957) work on pluralistic security communities, scholars have argued that states can form a sense of community and start perceiving their interests as intertwined (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Scholars have referred to a common identity (Barnett, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1996), shared norms (Hofmann and Yeo, 2015), shared ideological positions (Hofmann, 2013), or a shared habitus (Mérand, 2008) to explain why states engage in regional security cooperation. Here, scholars often observe formalised and deeper cooperation projects among regional partners, a few of which even integrate some of their security functions.

However, this literature does not only focus on ideational factors. Instead, some have focused on the state's domestic constitution or regime type (Gaubatz, 1996; Pevehouse and Russett, 2006; Mattes, 2012) as well as domestic politics that are not only based on ideational factors but also institutional factors (Barnett and Solingen, 2007; Hofmann, 2013; Söderbaum and Spandler, 2019; Söderbaum, 2004).

Other scholars such as Patricia Weitsman (2004) have demonstrated that rivalries can lead to the creation of alliances *among* rivals. In other words, to manage their animosity and threats towards each other, states engage in bilateral or multilateral institutions. A famous quote by the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, for example, said that the organisation was created 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down'. Weitsman and others emphasise the 'Germans down' part when looking at regional security cooperation. In such cases, the expectation is that these cooperative formations are not coherent and deep.

Yet another explanation that falls under the internal impetus rubric is efficiency-centred explanations. For example, Celeste Wallander (2000) or Katja Weber (2000) explain that the

existence and persistence of NATO after the end of the Cold War is not because of continued threats from Russia or fear of Germans but because the institution is a vehicle through which transaction costs between members can be reduced and trust can be reinforced. Either way, scholars who primarily observe factors internal to the regional security cooperation projects link their explanatory factors not only to alliances but also to collective security and crisis management organisations.

Political dynamics at large. A third group of scholarship understands regional security cooperation in the light of other political dynamics that can have, but don't need to have, implications for a collective regional security or defence policy. In this line of work, some regional security cooperation can, for example, emanate from other regional policies and institutions which makes cooperation in the security realm easier. Regional economic organisations, for example, have established international bureaucracies, and their frequent exchanges with national governments have created a level of trust that can expand the scope of regional organisations into security cooperation (Haftel and Hofmann, 2017). Others have shown that collective memories of war or a colonial past are enablers of security cooperation, where security is secondary and regional cooperation is the main focus (Hofmann and Mérand, 2020). Here, there is no real impetus but an institutional path-dependent logic that drives regional security cooperation. The resulting institutional design features can be diverse.

As briefly illustrated, these different theoretical underpinnings have implications for the design, cohesion, and durability of regional security cooperation. They help explain why some regional actors form alliances while others emphasise cooperative security or crisis management institutions. They also help us understand why some regional security cooperation initiatives are informal while others are formal. And while some falter soon after their creation, others persist even after their original purpose has vanished.

7.3 MAPPING REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION FUNCTIONS

As security can mean many things, this section proposes a five-way framework for understanding contemporary regional security cooperation functions. It comprises: the promotion of regional security dialogue; the development of a human security agenda; the consolidation of democracy and human rights; the deployment of peace operations; and focus on a state-centric security military agenda. The evolution of regional security cooperation is often conditioned by actual and perceived common threats to security by states in regions.

7.3.1 Promoting Regional Security Dialogue

One of the primary functions of regional security cooperation is to create channels of communication and enhance dialogue between states and potentially other actors. Through regular meetings, heads of state, ministers, diplomats, and military officers build trust through dialogue, thus limiting the risk of miscommunication, inviting opportunities for the resolution of disputes (Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander, 1999; Bailes and Cottey, 2006), and managing the risk of intra- and inter-state war.

Since the early 1990s, different iterations of regional military cooperation have emerged throughout the world. Examples include NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), or the AU's

Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). These are rather inclusive regional cooperation projects as they seek to involve most or all states in a so-called region (Bailes and Cottey, 2006, p. 205). Western Europe, notably France and Germany, has been particularly engaged in developing a sense of common interest and identity, as a means of mitigating conflict risk. In 1991, the Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur – MERCOSUR) was founded in Latin America to strengthen relations between Argentina and Brazil.

One common feature in Europe, Africa, and Asia since the 1990s has been the effort to extend the peace dividends of long-standing regional security cooperation. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP are examples of a regional framework using collective modes of action, not only for internal peace but also externally. Many have observed that peace and stability among its member states is the most important achievement of European integration, and was recognised in 2012 by the Nobel Prize for Peace being awarded to the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2016, p. 192). The Cairo Declaration of 1993 established, within the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which has objectives like preventing the emergence of violent conflicts, keeping existing conflicts from escalating into full-scale armed conflicts, and limiting the spillover of conflicts. In Asia, ASEAN includes elements of common policies with regard to the broader environment. For example, in 1994 ASEAN played a leadership role through the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an instrument for dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region.

7.3.2 Developing a Human Security Agenda

Beyond traditional political-military security policies and politics, regional cooperation promotes the idea of a wider security agenda, with multiple organisations moving towards the concept of human security (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Based on a comprehensive (holistic, integrated) approach, regional security cooperation aims to focus on issues, as they affect the people more than the states and assess the root causes of conflict.

In Europe in the 1990s, the OSCE developed a comprehensive concept of security going beyond political-military security, democracy, and human rights, to include socio-economic and environmental dimensions. In Africa, the overall objective of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is to promote peace, security, and stability, and to anticipate and prevent African conflicts. Human security is one of the principles and values that forms the basis of the CADSP (Vlaponou, 2019, p. 93).

Other regional organisations have followed a similar path in response to transboundary problems (e.g., environmental degradation and pollution, or transnational organised crime) (Bailes and Cottey, 2006, p. 212). Regional security cooperation has been carried into novel fields. ASEAN has expanded into policy domains such as trade, investment, environment, and public health, all of which touch upon a non-traditional security dimension and have security implications (Caballero-Anthony and Cook, 2013). The AL covers a wide range of issue-areas as part of its mandate to facilitate political, economic, cultural, scientific, and social programmes that promote the interests of the Arab world (Jetschke and Katada, 2016, p. 235).

7.3.3 Consolidating Democracy and Human Rights

With the development of the human security agenda, much more attention was paid to the link between governance and security. Democracy and human rights became a key part of the regional security cooperation agenda. Since the 1970s, while democracy was extended in previous authoritarian states, the idea that regional cooperation helps promote good governance and human rights among countries sharing the same cultures, gained momentum. Regional security cooperation aims to reduce risks emanating from breaches in the rule of law, including military coups or unconstitutional changes of government, and violations of democratic principles.

Europe has seen the longest regional cooperation supporting democracy and human rights. Since the 1950s, the EU was built around the promotion of democracy among non-member states, by making democratic consolidation a prerequisite for membership (Schimmelfennig, 2016, p. 193). The EU and NATO have played a central role in enhancing democratic consolidation and peace from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea territories (Bailes and Cottey, 2006). Among other European institutions, the main mission of the Council of Europe is to support democracy and human rights.

In Africa, the 2000 AU Constitutive Act (OAU, 2000) includes the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance, in contrast to its predecessor, the OAU. The African Governance Architecture (AGA) was established in 2011 as a non-binding framework to promote democratic governance and human rights. It is based on the logic that these are important drivers of conflict prevention (Okeke, 2017). The AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as ECOWAS, have been most active in sanctioning unconstitutional changes of government. Military or civilian coups d'état have regularly led to the suspension of the concerned member states from these organisations, the application of economic and military sanctions, or, in other cases, the deployment of good offices aiming to restore the constitutional process (Vandeginste, 2013; Souaré, 2014). As an example, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso were suspended from ECOWAS at various times between 2020 and 2022. The regional bloc also imposed sanctions after the military coup in Niger in 2023.

7.3.4 Deploying Peace Operations

The creation, expansion of activities, and performance of regional security organisations are striking features of the post-cold war environment (Haftel and Hofmann, 2017). Depending on the nature, size, capacity, and location of the organisation, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have been a key functional focus of many iterations of regional military cooperation since the 1990s. The objective was to help countries affected by conflict to make the difficult transition to peace or to prevent relapse.

Although Latin America and Europe have not experienced interstate war, with a few exceptions, intrastate wars and conflicts with spill-over effects exist in hotspots mainly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Africa. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 63 multilateral peace operations have been deployed in 2021, especially in these regions. Operations are distributed as follows: 20 are led by the UN, 37 by regional organisations and alliances and six by ad-hoc coalitions of states.² After the closing in September 2021 of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, led by NATO after an almost two-decades-long presence, the three largest multilateral peace operations are in

Africa: the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

Since the Cold War, both NATO and the EU have evolved into security providers for a variety of crisis interventions beyond their membership (Hofmann, 2013). African regional security organisations undertook peacekeeping operations. Since the military interventions in Liberia (1990) and Lesotho (1998), both ECOWAS and SADC have become active in conflict management and peace enforcement, including the ECOWAS military intervention in Gambia (2017) and the SADC mission in Mozambique (2021). In the West and Central Africa cases, the UN took over from the ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) peace operations. The AU undertook its first peace operations in Burundi in 2003–2004 (this AU operation preceded the deployment of a UN force) and in Darfur in Sudan in 2004. However, these experiences revealed capacity problems for the AU, including in non-military domains, belying a strong dependence on external support.

7.3.5 Focusing on a Military State-Centric Agenda

Historically, regional security cooperation is driven by actual or perceived threats and efforts to contain the risks of conflicts. To achieve this, regional arms control agreements, confidence and security-building measures have been implemented. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States (US), there has been a common trend in various regions to develop initiatives against non-state groups and transnational threats, such as terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction and associated materials and technologies, criminality, and trafficking (human and drug). To limit the risk of spill-over effects and regional instability, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, the AU, MERCOSUR, and the OAS, among others, have adopted new policy frameworks.

Regional security cooperation implies an increasing attention for building ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Olawale and Kifle, 2018; Karlsrud and Reykers, 2020). Both NATO and the EU allow non-members to join their coalitions, specifically in contributions to the start-up of military operations, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan (Henke, 2019; McInnis, 2020). Outside Europe, this phenomenon is not new. In 1984, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) decided to create a collective rapid deployment force of 10,000 soldiers divided into two brigades called the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), based in Saudi Arabia near the Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders (Legrenzi, 2011). When the Arab uprisings reached Bahrain in 2011, the PSF was deployed to enforce the violent crackdown on peaceful protests. In 2001, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) also established a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to address the security problems arising from illicit drugs, arms, and money laundering in the Caribbean (Bianculli, 2016, p. 167).

In Africa, ad-hoc coalitions launched over the last two decades have been endorsed by the AU (Desgrais, 2018; Döring, 2019). These include: the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), launched in 2011 by decision-makers from the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and South Sudan; the G5 Sahel, launched in 2014 by the presidents of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, which deployed a Joint Force across the Sahel in 2017; and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), set up in 2015 to fight Boko Haram, and including Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, which belong to the Lake Chad Basin Commission

(LCBC), with further support from Benin. Other coalitions in Africa are shaped by context more than by formalism. Ghana, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Niger, facing increasing pressure for inter-state cooperation to confront a rapidly expanding security crisis from the Sahel, launched the Accra Initiative in 2017.

'Coalitions of the willing' are increasingly relied upon as more flexible alternative regional security cooperation solutions to deal with national and transregional security challenges, such as in the fight against armed groups, criminality, and jihadism. The emergence of these coalitions, on the margins of the long-standing institutionalised associations, reflects states' political will to keep control over the situation, particularly in the event of a conflict that could call into question their legitimacy and prerogatives (Gnanguênon, 2021b). In most cases, they take advantage of the benefits of the long-term process of institutionalisation (Karlsrud and Reykers, 2020). In essence, regional security cooperation ranges from forums where states can discuss security matters and exchange information, to operational interventions with shared capacities for joint military exercises and the coordination of peace operations. This versatility allows regional security organisations to address transboundary problems and exercise traditional security functions of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Absent, for the most part, are regional nuclear arrangements such as the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

7.4 THE EFFECTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

One recurrent question has been whether regional security organisations sufficiently address the problem and reduce the risk of interstate disputes, intrastate conflicts, and transregional threats, whether they sometimes have no impact at all or aggravate regional rivalries.³ Considering the five functions outlined above (promotion of regional security dialogue, development of a human security agenda, consolidation of democracy and human rights, deployment of peace operations and a state-centric security military agenda), the impact of regional cooperation varies greatly from one framework to another. The effectiveness of regional security organisations can vary, for example, due to the lack of institutionalisation, or they might only be partially effective (i.e., have an impact on some functions but not others or at certain periods of time). For these reasons, assessing the effects and effectiveness of regional cooperation frameworks is a complex and difficult exercise, especially considering that they are shaped by social, political, economic, historical, and geographic contexts. A general observation is that at various stages, different factors influence regional cooperation capacities, objectives, and their internal and external dynamics.

7.4.1 Institutional Aspects that Influence Effectiveness

While not all regional security organisations are effective in bringing about stable and peaceful relations, most, if not all of them, allow their member states to dialogue and signal agreement or disagreement. Even if they are only talking shops, these forums can provide a better understanding of political tensions that can impact the security of member states or states surrounding the organisation. This can potentially increase the state's recognition, cooperation, and support – not only among themselves but also between them and external partners. This

again can enhance the regional institution's credibility. The development of the EU's political dialogues with organisations in Asia, Latin America, or Africa provides opportunities to share experiences.

The success of regional security cooperation depends on many factors, not least the degree of institutionalisation, meaning that treaties, protocols, and mechanisms are in place, and are being used regularly (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan, 2016, p. 306). The larger lesson from Asia and the Middle East is that establishing regional security organisations is not enough to ensure stable inter-state relations. For example, the Arab League (LA) or ASEAN arguably play a limited role due to the lack of political will of its member states to employ these organisations to handle territorial disputes or domestic conflicts or enforce human rights. Geopolitical rivalries also affect the mandates, restructuring, and closing of missions. The OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk ended in 2021 due to increasing tensions between Russia and Western countries.

Even if there is a degree of institutionalisation, not all treaties or protocols necessarily lead to more stability or regional security. While some organisations' efforts are underpinned by regionally accepted governance norms, in other cases their effectiveness can be limited by states' agendas. An example is ECOWAS, with the 1993 revised treaty together with the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, both valuable achievements for ECOWAS. Following the constitutional reforms by Presidents Alassane Ouattara (Côte d'Ivoire) and Alpha Condé (Guinea) to overcome their two-term limits and stand for election in 2020, ECOWAS's capacities to defend regional norms and values in such cases can be questioned (Zounmenou, 2020). Since 2021, the ECOWAS Commission has initiated a review of critical aspects of the 2001 Protocol to respond effectively to the declining democratic governance in the region, including the issue of presidential term limits and tenure elongation.

Another possibility is to evaluate the effectiveness of policy implementation through its ability to achieve its stated objectives. This is especially the case when regional security organisations deploy peace operations or military coalitions. Some goals may remain only stated. For example, while African regional organisations endorse human security, democracy, and human rights, there is an increasing trend to militarise security, such as in peacekeeping operations (Karlsrud and Reykers, 2020), and pursue a more state-centric agenda. In most regional security frameworks, states' commitment to the notion of national sovereignty hampers efforts to refocus security cooperation on (non-military) threats to people, including the dimensions of development, social justice, and human rights. Consequently, some goals of regional security cooperation may only exist on paper, and compliance hardly exists. Compounding this misalignment of objectives is the impossibility of knowing what the outcome would have been had the policy not existed. Evidentially, evaluating the impact of 'soft' measures, such as mediation, conciliation, and good offices, to prevent conflict remains a difficult and ambiguous task. Many states invoke sovereignty to avoid international scrutiny of the potential causes of crises, to avoid discussing their structural vulnerabilities openly (Gnanguénon, 2021a).

With peace operations specifically, it remains difficult to evaluate the contribution of regional security cooperation to managing complex and multidimensional conflicts (Fortna, 2004). For example, Laurie Nathan observes that multiple factors affect regional organisations in peace operations such as the process of state formation, the strength of states, their domestic politics and foreign policies, the level of development, the regional distribution of power and

resources, the role of external powers, and the nature of domestic and external conflicts and security threats (Nathan, 2010, pp. 2–3).

7.4.2 Political Aspects that Influence Effectiveness

The nature of regional cooperation depends not only on the institutional context, but also on whether and how state actors mediate the relationship between national sovereignty and transboundary cooperation (Söderbaum and Spandler 2019, p. 3). In most of the regions discussed in this chapter, one common feature is the predominance of states in regional security cooperation, driven mostly by the defence of national interests and state sovereignty. Some states are willing to engage in regional security cooperation primarily to reaffirm their sovereignty – sometimes over other member states (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan, 2016, p. 303; Söderbaum, 2004). Likewise, regime survival is an important aspect of regional cooperation. Membership in regional organisations can help increase the longevity of autocratic regimes (Debre, 2021). Hence, while regional security organisations might be ineffective in the execution of their mandate, they might be effective in keeping political elites in power or reinforcing political asymmetries between neighbours. And, at least in the short run, the nationally driven purposes of regional security organisations can also maintain stability in a region.

It is ultimately the prerogative of states to determine the scope of the regional security organisation's agenda, mandate, and objectives, all key factors in the overall success of regional cooperation. This may explain why countries in the Middle East and North African endow their regional institutions with limited autonomy, as they are unwilling to transfer any significant authority to the regional level. Consequently, regional organisations may be dismissed as ceremonial, symbolic, or nothing but feeble talking shops (Murden, 2009; Tripp, 1995). Moreover, while proactively leading security initiatives before formally acquiring a regional mandate to do so, organisations like ECOWAS directly contribute to regional stability in West Africa. Its intervention in the 1990s illustrates that, even in the absence of a formal mandate in peace and security, its member states, especially Nigeria, drove the decision to engage with the Mano River Union conflicts. In December 2016, ECOWAS 'restored democracy' in Gambia by using the threat of force with the support of regional leaders such as Nigeria and Senegal (Hartmann, 2017). In 2023, some ECOWAS member states under the leadership of Nigeria used the threat of military intervention in Niger to put pressure on the military junta that had seized power – deployment that has yet to take place. National interests and sovereignty also dominate the conflict prevention agenda.

On the one hand, the effectiveness of regional organisations eventually depends on the level of political trust and cohesion among member states. Some progress has also been made with the support of non-state actors. Platforms on which states and non-state actors can meet exist and are sponsored by, for example, regional organisations or think tanks. Some of them now serve as regular forums to create and enhance a sense of community among relevant security actors, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. This forum, run by a private body, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), provides a space for policymakers to meet and exchange views on security issues (Capie and Taylor, 2010). In the areas of democracy, human rights, governance, and conflict prevention regional non-state actors have also fostered regional security cooperation. In Africa, WANEP is now the most advanced and effective support for ECOWAS to prevent and manage local conflicts. Since 2002, this organisation and network shares information and analysis. WANEP also helps with

the implementation of ECOWAS's early warning system at the local level. In 2018, this kind of partnership was replicated within the AU (Gnanguènon, 2021a). Regional non-state actors are now part of the AU's peace and security agenda and provide it with research and training capacities which ultimately can influence the AU's institutional design and policymaking processes. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) also play a monitoring role to remind states of their commitments, thereby trying to make sure that agreed upon policies are implemented, besides also advocating for reforms (Armstrong *et al.*, 2015).

On the other hand, while security cooperation aims to promote security dialogue, rivalries among member states can persist. A realist perspective, as advanced by scholars like Robert Jervis (1976) through the security dilemma, is instructive in that regard. The premise of a 'security dilemma' within regional organisations is based on an understanding of the international system as anarchic, where cooperation between states is based on zero-sum calculations. The increase in one state's security is perceived as a decrease in another's security. Jervis makes the point that the anarchical nature of international politics fosters an environment of competition between states. Here, cooperation is underlined by fear, where rival states can threaten another state's sovereignty, creating potential spill-over effects such as arms races. Strategic rivalry may, for example, explain why Algeria and Morocco did not opt to militarise the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), in which both are leading members. In some cases, rivalry dynamics can undermine regional efforts by provoking or exacerbating conflict. IGAD's intervention in Darfur was one example of this (Nathan, 2010). And it might explain why in some cases security and defence cooperation remains bilateral. Bilateral defence and military arrangements between the US and Asian states show limited inclination to transform into multilateral configurations (Cha, 2014; Yeo, 2019), for example, while broader security arrangements in Asia grapple with the question of whether to include the US and other countries on the other side of the Pacific (Higgott and Stubbs, 1995; Goh, 2009).

7.5 CONCLUSION

Regional security cooperation is a common feature in global security politics. However, not all existing regional security cooperation projects share common motivations or designs, nor have their numbers remained steady over time, but they have waxed and waned with time. We can observe a variegated plethora of projects that range from ad-hoc coalitions (Reykers *et al.*, 2023) to integrated regional organisations. As the introduction to this chapter has suggested, in many parts of the world, there even exists more than one regional security organisation with overlapping mandates and memberships. This is arguably a reflection of both complementary and competing political, economic, and social agendas at the regional level. In Africa, for instance, while there are cases of 'empty shell' structures which exist in practical terms in name only, member states retain an interest in maintaining African regional organisations rather than winding them down to protect their national prerogatives.

While the 1990s were a booming period for regional cooperation projects at large, multilateralism is less taken for granted today. As states and other actors charter new waters, it remains to be seen whether regional security cooperation projects will multiply or not. If yes, where and in what form remains an open question. As President Trump's four years in office and his 'America First' policy have shown, domestic changes in a core country of a security organisation can create many uncertainties about its continued existence. While Trump was not the

first US president to threaten his European allies with the reduction of the US's commitment to the Alliance, he brought home forcefully that even NATO, a regional security cooperation project that has united a relatively homogenous group of states for over 70 years and which can rely on developed economies and militaries, cannot be taken for granted (Hofmann, 2021). The election of Joe Biden as US president in 2020 has reconfirmed the US's transatlantic commitment, but it has not pushed the burden-sharing debate. We can hence only witness a partial strengthening of the alliance again – further, at least temporarily, strengthened by external threats such as Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. While Russia's war has not (yet) led to Ukraine becoming member of NATO, formerly neutral and nonaligned countries such as Finland and Sweden asked for NATO membership more or less immediately and in the case of Finland were promptly admitted. This all signals a reinforcement of NATO's core 'narrow' security business, namely is collective defence posture.

Overall, the global governance system at large is going through changes in which rising and re-emerging powers such as China or Russia continue to reposition themselves in relation to what used to be understood as the centre of the global governance system – namely, the US-sponsored liberal international order. They do this both within the UN system – particularly China – but also outside of it. Both are members of the SCO and both lead other regional projects such as the BRI and the CSTO. In 2014 and 2022, Russia also acted aggressively and unilaterally to test its sphere of influence by attacking Ukraine, a nonaligned country. States that are considered 'Western' fear for their organisations' relative decline and relevance. It is likely that either group of states will use regional security cooperation projects as springboards to present and even impose their own governance visions. However, whether these regional security cooperation projects will be coordinated on the global level through mechanisms such as the UN is uncertain.

NOTES

1. While scholars have used different definitions of a region, most emphasise the importance of space (Russett, 1967; de Blij and Muller, 1991; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000; Hettne, 2005), politics, and community (Banks, 1969; Deutsch, 1957; Katzenstein, 2005).
2. See <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2022/multilateral-peace-operations-2021-developments-and-trends>
3. For a discussion on the efficiency of regional security organisations, see Hardt (2014).

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