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Cover photo: The French photojournalist of Iranian origin Reza Deghati led a three-day photography training workshop in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. The training was aimed at migrants returning to their country after experiencing difficult journeys abroad. Six young photographers also participated in the training. After learning the technical aspects of photography, the participants put their new skills into practice by attending reintegration and recreation activities organized by IOM for returnees and community members. © IOM 2019/Mohamed Aly Diabaté

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# 6 PEACE AND SECURITY AS DRIVERS OF STABILITY, DEVELOPMENT AND SAFE MIGRATION<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

In early 2020, as COVID-19 was beginning to spread globally, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appealed for a global ceasefire, calling on all warring parties to “silence guns” and focus on fighting a pandemic that had left no country untouched.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary-General’s words recognized that despite an ongoing global health crisis, insecurity, violence and conflict continued to ravage many countries across the world, with catastrophic implications for millions of people.

In addition to the terrible loss of lives, injuries and destruction of property that result from conflicts, many people who live in these settings are also often compelled to leave their homes, communities and even countries in search of safety and security. In 2020 alone, there were 26.4 million refugees and 4.1 million asylum seekers globally.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, in the same year, an estimated 48 million people were living in internal displacement due to conflict and violence,<sup>4</sup> the highest figure on record. This is by no means a new phenomenon. In the last decade, the number of people displaced due to armed conflict, violence and various forms of persecution has increased by more than 100 per cent,<sup>5</sup> while global peacefulness has deteriorated in the same period.<sup>6</sup> Conflicts are now responsible for most humanitarian needs globally, and by 2030, an estimated two thirds of the world’s poorest people could potentially live in societies that are highly insecure, conflict-ridden or violent.<sup>7</sup> Currently, almost nearly 86 per cent of the world’s refugees are hosted in developing countries.<sup>8</sup>

Conflicts have also undermined the ability of many countries to make progress on development, to the point of eroding previous gains. These realities have placed the need to address the underlying causes and dynamics of conflict and to foster more peaceful societies high on the global agenda. This is most clearly reflected in several global processes and outcomes, notably the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with SDG 16, for example, committing States to promoting “peace, justice and strong institutions”.<sup>9</sup>

While conflicts have undoubtedly proliferated in recent years, some countries remain much less affected by instability, conflict and violence and have greater levels of peace and security. These countries and the people who live in them enjoy overall higher levels of human development, including economic prosperity, and are much less

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2 UN, 2020.

3 UNHCR, 2021.

4 IDMC, 2021.

5 Ibid.

6 IEP, 2020.

7 World Bank, 2020.

8 UNHCR, 2021.

9 See goal 16 of the SDGs, UN DESA, n.d.

likely to experience unsafe forms of migration or displacement caused by conflict. For example, people from stable and wealthier countries are highly mobile and mostly do not have to make the agonizing decision as to whether to embark on irregular migration journeys under life-threatening conditions, as do many people from fragile and less developed countries. This is not an accident. People from developed and peaceful societies have a wider variety of options for safe migration and mobility, unlike those from more fragile contexts, whose options are much more limited. To some degree, access to regular migration channels depends not just on a country's economic standing or status and how it interacts with the broader international community, but also on how safe, prosperous and stable it is.<sup>10</sup> The "lottery of birth" means that people from less peaceful and underdeveloped countries are at a greater disadvantage when it comes to access to safe migration and mobility options (see Chapter 7 of this report for a trend analysis of migration patterns in terms of the Human Development Index).<sup>11</sup>

Recent international agreements, such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, have been developed in response to these realities and challenges. In addition to committing States to reducing negative and structural drivers of migration, such as conflict, violence and climate change, the Global Compact for Migration stresses the need to support legal migration pathways, which are especially needed by people living in countries affected by conflict and underdevelopment, and who are often the ones compelled to undertake irregular and unsafe journeys.<sup>12</sup> The Global Compact on Refugees, meanwhile, also complements other efforts by the United Nations in areas such as migration, peace and security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.<sup>13</sup> Further, in recognition of the ever-growing number of refugees and asylum seekers globally, the Global Compact on Refugees seeks to foster "more cooperation in distributing the responsibility of hosting and supporting the world's refugees".<sup>14</sup>

This is the context within which this chapter discusses the links between peace, security, development and migration. Using existing evidence and research, it explores the interaction between conflict, instability and insecurity; development; and migration, showing that instability or conflict feed negatively on development and hence drive displacement, asylum-seeking and unsafe migration. The chapter seeks also to go beyond these obvious and well-documented links to show how migration can contribute to stability and development and thus mitigate the conditions that lead to irregular migration and displacement.

The next section provides a brief overview of the context and key concepts relevant for this chapter. This is followed by analysis of the links between peace, security, migration and development, using recent data and information from key indices, including the Global Peace Index (GPI), the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Fragile States Index (FSI). The chapter also discusses current initiatives, responses and challenges to fostering peace and security, before providing conclusions.

## The relationship between peace, security and development

Peace, security and development are complex concepts that need to be unpacked before they can be operationalized and the links between them explored. Conventionally, peace has been defined as the absence of war, conflict or violence within or between countries.<sup>15</sup> However, this conceptualization (negative peace) has long been challenged

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10 McAuliffe et al., 2017.

11 Ibid.

12 UN, 2019.

13 UNHCR, 2018.

14 Newland et al., 2019.

15 See Galtung, 1969; Höglund and Kovacs, 2010.

as insufficient to understand fully what peace entails. There is a broad consensus that peace also encompasses a range of factors that entrench it (positive peace), such as justice, human rights and accountability, among other factors.<sup>16</sup> The meaning of “security” has also evolved over time from its traditional focus on the national security of the State. The emergence of concepts such as “human security” was an attempt to bring together and link aspects of development, human rights and national security.<sup>17</sup>

The three concepts – peace, security and development – have not always been seen as interlinked. Prior to the end of the Cold War, they were viewed as distinct in both policy and academic spheres.<sup>18</sup> However, this changed with the end of the Cold War and in light of a new political context in the 1990s.<sup>19</sup> Since then, there has been wide recognition that countries in which conflicts and violence are widespread also tend to underperform on various dimensions of socioeconomic development.<sup>20</sup> The link is also apparent in the opposite direction: low levels of socioeconomic development are associated with high levels of insecurity and conflict. Further, it has become increasingly clear that fostering peace and security enables development, and that development also seems to enhance stability.<sup>21</sup>

Indeed, the links between peace, security and development are broadly accepted in international development, with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, for example, clearly reflecting this wide consensus: “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.” The Sustaining Peace approach,<sup>22</sup> which is informed by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also stresses the significance of inclusive and sustainable development in preventing risks of violent conflict.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, the emergence of the “triple nexus” concept – the humanitarian, development and peace nexus (HDPN) – is also an effort to capture the interlinkages between the three areas and to ensure more coherence in meeting people’s various needs and reducing vulnerabilities, while enhancing peace.<sup>24</sup> The concept also recognizes that sustaining peace is fundamental to meeting all the SDGs.<sup>25</sup>

While peace and security are evidently not the only factors that underpin economic growth and development,<sup>26</sup> there is wide consensus that they are important elements in creating environments that allow countries to prosper. Recent work by the Institute for Economics and Peace, for example, demonstrates that less peaceful countries not only experience more economic volatility, but are also associated with poor macroeconomic performance.<sup>27</sup> In fact, over the last six decades, per capita GDP growth in highly peaceful countries has been almost three times higher

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16 Diehl, 2016.

17 See Igbuzor, 2011; Hussein et al., 2014.

18 Hussein et al., 2014.

19 Ibid.

20 See, for example, Collier et al., 2003.

21 Martínez-Solimán, 2017; Stewart et al., 2011; Geneva Declaration, 2010.

22 The Sustaining Peace approach is based on twin groundbreaking resolutions passed in 2016, whose aim is to help sustain peace “at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions”, while also preventing “the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict” (Ponzio, 2018).

23 UN, 2018.

24 Caparini and Reagan, 2019.

25 ECOSOC, n.d.

26 This chapter uses the term “development” to refer to both economic growth and human development, while cognizant of the fact that even though economic growth does not always go hand in hand (or is positively correlated) with various dimensions of development such as education and increase in per capita incomes, it is still an important element in contributing to economic prosperity, as acknowledged by SDG 8 in that “sustained and inclusive economic growth can drive progress, create decent jobs for all and improve living standards.”

27 IEP, 2020.

than in those that are less peaceful.<sup>28</sup> Other empirical studies on the links between prosperity and peace have found that peace does not just provide a “suitable environment” for economic prosperity, but that it has a “mechanical” impact on countries’ economic prosperity, with a clear positive link between peace and economic prosperity.<sup>29</sup>

More recent research and analysis seeking to establish the relationships between the 17 SDGs finds that there is a strong positive correlation between SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth).<sup>30</sup> These links extend beyond growth and are apparent in other dimensions of development; in terms of poverty reduction, countries that have higher levels of peace and stability have historically outpaced those in conflict. Conflict-affected countries have seen their poverty levels rise over the years.<sup>31</sup> Peace, justice and strong institutions have also been strongly linked to other key dimensions of development, such as “quality education”.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, countries that are able to create resilient societies through inclusive and sustainable development are also less likely to descend into crises, such as conflict, underscoring the mutually reinforcing links between peace, security and development.<sup>33</sup> It is worth mentioning that some analysis has questioned these links, suggesting that the evidence showing the correlations between insecurity and underdevelopment is stronger than those between peace and development,<sup>34</sup> as there are several peaceful countries with low levels of development.

## Conflict, displacement and irregular migration

While significant research exists on how conflict and violence can lead to irregular migration when no protection pathways are available, we know less about how peace and security are linked to migration. We need to understand better the positive equation: how peace and security are related to international migration. There is a relative dearth of literature on how peace and security not only minimize displacement and irregular migration, but also on how they enable migration that is more regular, safe and predictable. It is unsurprising, however, that available research and analysis overwhelmingly focuses on conflict-induced migration and displacement, given the proliferation of conflicts and violence in recent years,<sup>35</sup> which have wrought devastation among millions of people. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that conflict and violence are not the only factors that contribute to displacement and irregular migration, they remain some of the biggest drivers.

Considerable research and other evidence shows how wars, conflict and violence generate threats to people’s lives, forcing many to leave or flee their homes.<sup>36</sup> In 2020 alone, millions of people were living in internal displacement driven by conflict and violence in nearly 60 countries and territories, most of these low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).<sup>37</sup> In recent years, research has shown that a combination of factors, including conflict, political instability and economic insecurity, are behind the significant increase in the number of people attempting to enter Europe via irregular means, including during the so-called “2015 European migration crisis”.<sup>38</sup> It is important to add,

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28 IEP, 2018.

29 Ho and Dinov, 2013.

30 Fonseca et al., 2020.

31 Hong, 2015.

32 Fonseca et al., 2020.

33 World Bank, 2018a.

34 Denney, 2013.

35 See Appendix A on trends and drivers of conflict.

36 See for example Schmeidl, 1997; Castles, 2006; Hayes et al., 2016; Adhikari, 2013.

37 IDMC, 2021.

38 Cummings et al., 2015.

however, that many who entered Europe via irregular channels were subsequently recognized as refugees. Research explains how conflict and persecution were the main reasons given for embarking on irregular migration journeys by the majority of people from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Somalia, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic who entered Europe irregularly in 2015 and 2016.<sup>39</sup> These dynamics are not limited to people resorting to irregular entry to Europe. The recent increase in irregular arrivals in the United States of America from Northern Triangle countries — including El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala — has also largely been attributed to high levels of insecurity and unprecedented levels of violence orchestrated by gangs and other criminal organizations.<sup>40</sup> However, it is important to stress that conflict and violence are only part of the story; irregular migration is a complex process that often involves a range of factors, including socioeconomic and political dimensions.<sup>41</sup> The limited nature of regular migration channels for people in low-income and fragile contexts, for example, is another important determinant of irregular migration.<sup>42</sup>

## Key Definitions

### **Irregular migration**

Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.

### **Regular migration**

Migration that occurs in compliance with the laws of the country of origin, transit and destination.

### **Displacement**

The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.

Source: IOM, 2019a.

## A tale of two different migration experiences

Access to regular migration channels remains highly unequal, with citizens of certain countries enjoying much greater migration and mobility options than those from other countries. This gap — in terms of who can and cannot access regular migration channels — is related to several factors, including socioeconomic, political and security reasons. Unlike nationals from low-income and politically unstable countries, citizens of more privileged countries that are both politically stable and economically prosperous are often able to travel visa-free or, where visas are required, are more likely to be granted visas and entry permits.<sup>43</sup> As some analysis points out, those who do not need visas tend to be considered low risk and “desirable”, while people from more fragile contexts are perceived as posing a greater risk — often linked to overstaying or security — and are regarded as “undesirable”, and thus are mostly required to apply for visas prior to entry.<sup>44</sup>

39 Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019.

40 Carlson and Gallagher, 2018; Clemens, 2017; MSF, 2017.

41 McAuliffe and Koser, 2017; de Haas, 2011; Jayasuriya, 2014.

42 McAuliffe et al., 2017; Triandafyllidou et al., 2019.

43 McAuliffe et al., 2017; Neumayer, 2005.

44 Neumayer, 2005.

Early research on visa restrictions, analysing how these controls perpetuate uneven access to foreign countries, concludes that “for passport holders from OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries the world appears in easy reach with relatively few restrictions imposed. But for passport holders from poor, authoritarian countries with a history of violent political conflict, travel remains severely restricted.”<sup>45</sup> A separate study on visa waiver programmes finds that while these schemes have greatly increased since the late 1960s, they have not benefited everyone.<sup>46</sup> Non-OECD countries, especially fragile and underdeveloped countries in Africa, have not only been excluded from the expansion of waiver programmes, but saw their mobility rights decline in 2010 when compared to 1969.<sup>47</sup> The 2020 Henley Passport Index and *Global Mobility Report* bear this out, showing that while there has been a significant increase over time in the number of countries an individual can visit without needing a visa beforehand, this trend has largely been driven by high-income countries, with low-income countries remaining static.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, States in conflict have seen their scores substantially deteriorate over the last 10 years, with countries such as Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic ranking toward the bottom of the passport index.<sup>49</sup>

Other recent analysis examining who gets a United States B visa further underlines these dynamics, showing that nationals of poorer countries were less likely to be granted short-term travel visas than those of wealthier nations.<sup>50</sup> As the gross domestic product (GDP) of a potential migrant’s country of origin increased, the rate of visa denial decreased. The costs of applying for visas reveal broadly similar patterns, with large disparities in visa prices across the world.<sup>51</sup> Citizens of politically unstable and poorer countries are subjected to much higher visa prices compared with those from wealthier and more stable countries. This, some argue, further deters citizens from certain countries from accessing regular migration channels to wealthier destinations.<sup>52</sup>

The Global Compact for Migration, the most comprehensive framework for cooperation on international migration, is partly a response to the lack of avenues for regular migration and the increased concerns over unsafe and irregular migration. Addressing irregular migration is a key component of achieving the Global Compact’s overall goal of safe, orderly and regular migration; among its shared responsibilities, for example, the Global Compact aims “to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration while reducing the incidence and negative effects of irregular migration through international cooperation...”<sup>53</sup> Several Global Compact commitments have a direct bearing on irregular migration, such as “ensuring that desperation and deteriorating environments do not compel them to seek a livelihood elsewhere through irregular migration” (objective 2). The Global Compact further aims at “ensuring security for States, communities and migrants, and facilitating safe and regular cross-border movements while preventing irregular migration” (objective 11).<sup>54</sup> Most notably, objective 5 of the Global Compact commits States to enhancing the “availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration”.<sup>55</sup>

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45 Ibid.

46 Mau et al., 2015.

47 Ibid.

48 Henley & Partners, 2020.

49 Ibid.

50 Zhou, 2020.

51 Recchi et al., 2020.

52 Ibid.

53 UN, 2019.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.



## Understanding the links between peace, fragility, migration and development

International migration by citizens of peaceful and economically prosperous countries is largely safe, orderly and regular. By contrast, migration by many citizens of low-income and insecure settings is more likely to be unsafe and irregular, often propelled by crises.<sup>56</sup> Almost half of all international migrants from low-income countries were asylum seekers or refugees.<sup>57</sup> Further, mass movement and displacement events in low-income, fragile contexts have characterized some of the most significant inflows to several high-income countries in recent years. For example, the 2015/16 mass migration to Europe or the recent large movements from the Northern Triangle countries of Central America to the United States comprised citizens from politically unstable and developing countries, many of whom embarked on irregular journeys to reach their destinations.

Table 1 illustrates some of these dynamics, showing how peace and fragility are correlated to development and displacement.

Table 1: Global peace, State fragility, human development and displacement (selected countries)

Country (in GPI rank order)	Global Peace Index (GPI), 2021 Rank	Fragile States Index (FSI), 2021 Rank	Human Development Index (HDI), 2019 Rank	Refugees and asylum seekers (country of origin), 2020	Number of IDPs (conflict and violence), 2020
Iceland	1	177	4	10	
New Zealand	2	176	14	67	
Austria	6	166	18	33	
Canada	10	171	16	192	
Singapore	11	165	11	116	
Japan	12	161	19	162	
Norway	14	178	1	21	
Sweden	15	172	7	41	
Australia	16	170	8	40	
Germany	17	167	6	242	
Bhutan	22	96	129	7,219	
United Kingdom	33	150	13	259	
Costa Rica	39	149	62	1,033	
Botswana	41	122	100	344	
Sierra Leone	46	45	182	14,151	5,500
Uruguay	47	158	55	455	
Chile	49	144	43	2,792	
France	55	159	26	222	

56 UN DESA, 2021.

57 Ibid.

Country (in GPI rank order)	Global Peace Index (GPI), 2021 Rank	Fragile States Index (FSI), 2021 Rank	Human Development Index (HDI), 2019 Rank	Refugees and asylum seekers (country of origin), 2020	Number of IDPs (conflict and violence), 2020
Republic of Korea	57	159	23	854	
Dominican Republic	82	107	88	4,806	
Bangladesh	91	39	133	83,583	427,000
China	100	95	85	283,451	
Côte d'Ivoire	103	28	162	71,815	308,000
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	105	73	107	1,923	
Guatemala	111	59	127	170,668	242,000
Thailand	113	87	79	3,918	41,000
Uganda	114	24	159	19,136	1,000
Myanmar	131	23	147	1,096,724	505,000
Ethiopia	139	11	173	276,393	2,060,000
Mexico	140	90	74	127,137	357,000
Colombia	144	61	83	152,008	4,922,000
Nigeria	146	12	161	426,013	2,730,000
Mali	148	19	184	175,730	326,000
Russian Federation	154	74	52	97,133	1,100
Libya	156	17	105	23,034	278,000
Somalia*	158	2		868,351	2,968,000
Iraq	159	20	123	574,121	1,224,000
South Sudan	160	4	185	2,193,685	1,436,000
Syrian Arab Republic	161	3	151	6,782,383	6,568,000
Yemen	162	1	179	54,904	3,635,000
Afghanistan	163	9	169	2,833,569	3,547,000
A number 1 ranking means	Very high peacefulness	Most fragile country	Very high human development		
A low ranking means	Very low peacefulness	Least fragile country	Low human development		

Sources: Global Peace Index 2020 (IEP, 2020); Fragile States Index 2020 (Fund for Peace, 2021); Human Development Index 2019 (UNDP, 2020); Refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2021); IDPs (IDMC, 2021).

Note: Somalia is not ranked on the HDI.

Several key aspects are evident from Table 1. First, countries that rank highly on the Global Peace Index (GPI) tend to perform well on the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure of countries' performance across several dimensions, including health, education and a decent standard of living. While there are some exceptions, with countries such as Sierra Leone, Bhutan and Botswana ranking relatively highly on the GPI, but exhibiting low human development, the general trend seems to suggest that higher human development goes hand-in-hand with high levels of peace.

Second, countries that rank towards the bottom of the Fragile States Index (FSI), thus being more stable, seem to have high levels of human development, with those that are highly fragile – in almost all cases – associated with low HDI. Also clear, however, is that not all countries that are stable or with low fragility have high human development. In other words, stability does sometimes coexist with low HDI, suggesting perhaps that stability is a necessary, but not a sufficient factor for development.

Third, countries that score high on the peace index also produce fewer refugees and asylum seekers, and have a lower number or are completely without conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs). The number of refugees and asylum seekers that originated from countries such as Singapore, Sweden, Chile or the Republic of Korea in 2019 starkly contrasts with the number of those from less peaceful countries such as Myanmar, Ethiopia, Yemen and South Sudan. This reality is especially acute in countries such as the Syrian Arab Republic, whose protracted conflict means that more than half of its population is still forcibly displaced.<sup>58</sup> A closer look at where most refugees and asylum seekers are hosted mirrors this trend; while refugees and asylum seekers comprised only about 3 per cent of all international migrants in high-income countries, this number was as high as 50 per cent in low-income countries,<sup>59</sup> partly a reflection of the fact that several low-income countries are in proximity with countries in conflict and continue to bear most of the burden of hosting the vast majority of refugees. These glaring differences – between high-income, peaceful countries and more fragile and less developed countries – are also visible in the number of conflict-induced IDPs. Less peaceful countries, perhaps unsurprisingly, have a much larger number of conflict-induced IDPs, with countries such as South Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia having millions of IDPs in 2020, while more stable countries, such as Uruguay, Japan and Botswana recorded zero conflict-induced IDPs in the same year.<sup>60</sup> These observations further underpin how peace and security not only help to foster development, but also contribute to less volatile population movements.

While the number of migrant workers is not reflected in Table 1, their distribution across various regions and income groups further illustrates how peaceful and economically prosperous countries foster migration by choice, which is regular and more predictable. For example, while the number of international migrants from both low-income and high-income countries has increased over the last 20 years, in the former, this growth has largely been driven by displacement. In high-income countries, however, migrant workers have significantly contributed to much of this increase in international mobility.<sup>61</sup> This is especially the case in the European Union (EU), where people are highly mobile, often motivated by work-related factors such as employment and higher wages.<sup>62</sup> High-income countries remain the major destinations for migrant workers and in 2019, of the 169 million migrant workers globally, 67.7 per cent were employed in these countries, while only 3.6 per cent were employed in low-income countries.<sup>63</sup> Migrant workers in high-income countries were largely concentrated in Northern, Southern and Western Europe (almost 24%) and Northern America (around 22%).<sup>64</sup>

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58 UNHCR, 2021.

59 UN DESA, 2021.

60 IDMC, 2021.

61 UN DESA, 2021; Strey et al., 2018.

62 Ibid.

63 ILO, 2021.

64 Ibid.

## Community stabilization and the prevention of displacement

As conflicts have increased in recent years,<sup>65</sup> efforts to foster peace and stability have taken on heightened importance. Through various peacebuilding initiatives and approaches, there has been a particular focus by international organizations on addressing the drivers of conflict and violence, and seeking to prevent countries previously in conflict from falling back into crisis. The adoption of ideas such as the HDPN across various organizations reflects these efforts, as the nexus seeks “to better address both the immediate needs of people affected by conflict as well as the underlying causes of protracted crises.”<sup>66</sup> Organizations such as IOM regularly work alongside other United Nations agencies to contribute to various system-wide peacebuilding efforts on the mobility dimensions of crises and sustaining peace.<sup>67</sup> This has encompassed key areas such as displaced persons and host community relations; elections support to governments in expanding migrants’ access to electoral processes in their countries of origin; preventing violent extremism (PVE), covering aspects such as supporting at-risk youth and providing psychosocial prevention and recovery services; and, importantly, community stabilization.<sup>68</sup>

Community stabilization, a non-coercive approach to restoring stability at a community or local level in contexts affected by crises, has particularly emerged as central to peacebuilding efforts. Community stabilization is increasingly seen as key to helping communities to transition away from crisis, while laying the foundations for achieving durable solutions.<sup>69</sup> This approach seems to have emanated from the broader concept of “stabilization”. While stabilization has no universal definition, some conflict analysts have defined it as “efforts to end social, economic and political upheaval, and reconstruction, which includes efforts to develop or redevelop institutions that foster self-governance, social and economic development, and security, are critical to securing political objectives before, during, or after conflict.”<sup>70</sup> Other researchers stress that despite lacking a unifying definition, what is clear is that the application of the concept is increasingly limited to several realistic and pragmatic activities and objectives instead of promoting democracy or building liberal States.<sup>71</sup> Some analysts contend that stabilization is rooted in the nexus between insecurity, underdevelopment and fragility, and explain that it “problematizes instability in terms of weak governance and poverty, and therefore responds to instability accordingly.”<sup>72</sup>

Community stabilization, in the context of migration and displacement, aims to both lessen “the likelihood of (re) emergent crises and further displacement” and build “resilience at community levels towards destabilizing influences in future.”<sup>73</sup> Through community stabilization organizations such as IOM seek “to provide assistance to governments, States and communities undergoing significant socioeconomic and political changes during and following a crisis, in order to (re)establish stability and security, prevent further forced migration, restore trust among community members, vulnerable populations and local authorities and lay the foundations for durable solutions, lasting peace and sustainable development.”<sup>74</sup>

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65 See Appendix A on trends and drivers of conflict.

66 Interpeace, n.d.

67 IOM, 2020.

68 IOM, n.d.a.

69 Grundy and Zingg, 2020; IOM, 2020. A durable solution is achieved “when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement.” See for example IASC, 2010.

70 Bensahel et al., 2009.

71 Pedersen et al., 2019.

72 Carter, 2013.

73 Grundy and Zingg, 2020.

74 IOM, 2016.



The community stabilization approach to peacebuilding cuts across multiple sectors and employs various initiatives in responding to the drivers of insecurity and instability. These include supporting local governance capacity, improving access and provision of essential services such as education, water and health, and resolving grievances, among others. Importantly, to ensure its success and sustainability, community stabilization is community-owned and driven, with communities and vulnerable populations such as refugees and IDPs empowered to play key roles at all stages of project design, implementation and monitoring.<sup>75</sup> Community stabilization has proven especially effective as a peacebuilding approach, not only because it involves affected local communities and populations in efforts to restore peace and stability, but also because it is adaptable, with initiatives designed to respond to the specific and evolving needs and challenges of fragile and crisis contexts.<sup>76</sup> Community stabilization programmes have been implemented in several States undergoing conflict-related crises, most recently in countries such as Chad,<sup>77</sup> Iraq<sup>78</sup> and Somalia.<sup>79</sup> Further, these initiatives can and have also been applied not just in communities, but also in migrants' transit routes and areas of settlement. It is worth pointing out, however, that while community stabilization has become increasingly important in peacebuilding efforts, targeting or implementing this approach can be difficult in some contexts, particularly those highly impacted by or at risk of large-scale irregular outward migration. Moreover, while community stabilization is fit for purpose at a microlevel, given that it is a localized approach, other interventions are required at a macrolevel, since many of today's conflicts and insecurity issues that drive irregular migration and displacement are macro in nature. In other words, both global/regional and local interventions are needed.

### Lebanon: Building relationships between refugees and host communities through community stabilization activities

In various parts of the globe, IOM's work focuses on building relationships between groups, particularly displaced populations and host communities, in order to ease tensions and prevent violent incidents fuelled by, among others, perceived differences and relative deprivation. An example of this work is conducted in Lebanon, where many displaced persons from the Syrian Arab Republic are hosted.

Over the years, basic services have been insufficient to cover local communities and the displaced population. Integrating refugee youth has been particularly difficult in northern Lebanon, where refugee communities have been blamed by host communities for the rise in crime and increased environmental degradation.

IOM implemented a project funded by the Government of Canada from 2017 to 2019 in Lebanon to reduce tensions by promoting a culture of constructive collaboration through activities such as road rehabilitation and clean-up campaigns, among others. The project also reinforced local government's and civil society's capacity to respond to and mitigate tensions. Beneficiaries reported that the activities enabled communities to broaden their networks and create new relationships with members of different communities. It was noted that the relationships that were built led to changes in perceptions about other groups, contributing to a reduction in tensions.

*Source: Abridged excerpt from Lukunka and Grundy, 2020.*

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75 IOM, n.d.b.

76 IOM, 2016.

77 IOM, 2020.

78 IOM, 2019b.

79 Grundy and Zingg, 2020.

## Migrants as active players in peace and security

The discourse on diaspora engagement in peacebuilding has often focused on migrants' negative roles in peace and security, such as fuelling conflict, exacerbating tensions and even representing security threats to their countries of origin.<sup>80</sup> Such discourses, however, fail to adequately acknowledge the wide-ranging nature of diaspora, or are limited by their focus on small elements within these communities.<sup>81</sup> This has been changing over time, and the diasporas are increasingly seen as key to various peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries. In particular, their knowledge of local customs and traditions, as well as their in-depth understanding of ongoing conflicts, are a comparative advantage to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies.<sup>82</sup> The diasporas' vast transnational networks, as well as their ability to pull together significant financial resources, also enable them to make positive impacts on their countries of origin.<sup>83</sup>

There is growing research and analysis on the various ways that migrants have contributed to peace.<sup>84</sup> One avenue has been through activism, with the diasporas, for example, campaigning against ongoing conflict and speaking out, raising awareness and drawing attention to issues in their countries of origin. The Irish diaspora activities in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s have often been cited as an example of successful campaigning and lobbying for political involvement of their countries of destination and residence to help speed up peace processes in their country of origin or heritage.<sup>85</sup> Efforts by various other diaspora groups, such as the political activism of Zimbabwean migrants in the United Kingdom to bring about socioeconomic and political changes in their country of origin, have also been well documented.<sup>86</sup>

### Refugee-led South Sudanese NGOs and peacebuilding in Ugandan refugee settlements

Uganda is home to nearly 900,000 refugees from South Sudan, who fled the civil war that broke out in 2013. Prior to the creation of a unity government in 2020, delays in the implementation of peace agreements signed in 2015 and 2018 had troubled prospects for the return of refugees to South Sudan, but they also fuelled refugee-led grassroots advocacy, education and peace work in refugee settlements. Refusing to rely solely on political leaders and international institutions, civil society actors strategically focused most of their efforts on the grassroots, proactively attempting to build "the South Sudan we want", starting in Ugandan settlements.

Sensitizing refugee populations on political processes surrounding the 2018 peace agreement is a key priority for South Sudanese civil society in Uganda. Through information sessions and workshops in settlements, where access to information and the Internet is often limited, refugee-led organizations shed light on the details of the agreement and provide a space for participants to openly express their views on the implementation process, including their doubts and frustrations. When possible, organizers relay this information to decision

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80 Nordien, 2017; Toivanen and Baser, 2019.

81 Féron and Lefort, 2019.

82 Nordien, 2017.

83 Osman, 2008.

84 Freitas, 2012; Turner, 2008; Leung et al., 2017.

85 Vanore et al., 2015.

86 Kuhlmann, 2010.

makers. Yet the work of South Sudanese groups in Uganda does not stop at high-level negotiations and peace agreements, or at sensitizing refugee populations about their content. With international funding, grassroots peacebuilding initiatives aim to impart non-violent conflict resolution skills and to lessen ethnic stereotypes through cross-cultural dialogues and performances, as well as through projects aimed at mitigating hate speech.

Abridged excerpt of Gatkuoth and Leter, 2020.

In addition to activism and raising awareness, migrants have also facilitated peace processes – either as negotiators or as active participants in talks – in which they act as bridge-builders and foster constructive dialogue. Their contextual knowledge can help mediators locate various parties engaged in conflict, while sometimes also being able to urge these groups to take part in peace negotiations.<sup>87</sup> Their insights, as research has shown, play a big role in inspiring confidence and trust among both those involved in conflict, as well as mediators.<sup>88</sup> The Afghan diaspora, for example, continues to be very active in its home country's peace processes, including by organizing and participating in peace talks.<sup>89</sup> Migrants from several countries, such as Somalia and the Sudan, are also making significant contributions to peace processes and negotiations in their countries of origin.<sup>90</sup> These efforts have also extended to areas such as transitional justice, where they can and have bolstered processes of truth and reconciliation.<sup>91</sup> Migrants' contributions to peacebuilding have also encompassed restoring and creating key institutions, such as diaspora agencies,<sup>92</sup> which may not have existed or may have been undermined during conflict.<sup>93</sup> In addition to engaging in discussions and in drafting key political documents and legislation that may determine a country's political future,<sup>94</sup> migrants have also returned to run community and social cohesion programmes, been appointed to key roles in government or run for political office, as was notably the case in countries such as Latvia and Benin.<sup>95</sup>

Perhaps migrants' most documented peacebuilding contributions are those directed toward post-conflict reconstruction and development. As this chapter has already suggested, just as peace is fundamental to driving development, so is development fundamental to sustaining peace. Migrants' contributions to development, including to countries transitioning from conflict, are longstanding and have been studied over several decades. International remittances, for example, have been widely researched and shown as fundamental not only to supporting families and local communities, but also as important economic assets at a macrolevel, making up large shares of GDP in some countries.<sup>96</sup> As shown in Figure 1 below in low- and middle-income countries, remittances exceed both official development assistance and foreign direct investment<sup>97</sup> – see Chapter 2 of this report for trend analysis of international remittances globally.

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87 Vanore et al., 2015.

88 Ibid.

89 Schlein, 2019.

90 Brinkerhoff, 2011.

91 Haider, 2014; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2016.

92 Schöfberger, 2020.

93 Vanore et al., 2015.


94 Ibid.

95 BBC News, 2019.

96 McAuliffe et al., 2019.

97 World Bank, 2021a.

Figure 1. Remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) flows to low- and middle-income countries, 1990–2020



Source: World Bank, 2021a.

Further, there is evidence showing that for people in some settings, particularly those in economic distress or in crisis and at risk of conflict, an increase in remittances can reduce the risk of conflict.<sup>98</sup> Remittances, it is argued, can diminish incentives for civil war in times of economic distress by helping to address the welfare needs of citizens when States are unable to do so.<sup>99</sup> In line with these findings, some researchers have shown that by reducing poverty and shoring up both average incomes and human capital, remittances discourage and disincentivize violence and thereby lessen violent social and civil strife.<sup>100</sup> In other words, with improving economic prospects, individuals are less likely to engage in violence.<sup>101</sup> Even where countries are already in conflict, remittances seem to play a positive role, contributing to a de-escalation of hostilities. Relatively recent work on whether remittances can “buy peace” demonstrates a negative causal effect on both the incidence and continuation of conflict, as remittances diminish or change the incentives for engaging in civil war.<sup>102</sup> It is important also to acknowledge, however, that remittances are not always associated with activities that foster peace or reduce conflict. Some research has, for example, linked these contributions to supporting armed groups or rebel movements.<sup>103</sup> Some have also noted the negative effect of remittances on the quality of a country’s governance, lowering civic engagement in some contexts and, as a result, diminishing the quality of institutions.<sup>104</sup> Beyond remittances, migrants’ other contributions to development, such as through investment in diaspora bonds, innovation and entrepreneurship, human capital stocks (including returning with new and specialist knowledge, skills and expertise) and helping to fill labour shortages also remain hugely important to peacebuilding.<sup>105</sup> Additionally, migrants’ “social remittances” or the ideas, values and practices that they bring with them<sup>106</sup> can also “contribute to local attitudes that are more receptive to peacebuilding processes”.<sup>107</sup>

98 Regan and Frank, 2014.

99 Ibid.

100 Hassan and Faria, 2015.

101 Ibid.

102 Batu, 2019.

103 Brinkerhoff, 2011.

104 Abdih et al., 2008.

105 McAuliffe et al., 2019.

106 Levitt, 1998.

107 Vanore et al., 2015.



## Conclusion

There have been substantial international efforts in recent years to foster migration that is safe, orderly and regular. The Global Compact for Migration, adopted by most United Nations Member States in 2018, is a culmination of and a significant step forward in such efforts. Migration by choice that is safe and more predictable, as this chapter has demonstrated, is in fact the norm for citizens in many countries that enjoy high levels of peace and stability. This is what we have sought to explore and underscore: to provide a better understanding of the connections between peace, security, development and migration and to engage a perspective that is often missing in discussions on population movements.

This chapter does not overlook or ignore some of the negative determinants of migration, notably conflict and violence. It would be impossible to explore how peace and security enhance more predictable population movements without discussing how the absence of peace and security undercuts and even impedes the kind of migration we all seek to see. Rather, in addition to demonstrating how conflict and underdevelopment result in displacement and irregular migration, our aim and key contribution lies in showing how peace and security underpin and are indeed a prerequisite for migration that is safe, orderly and regular.

Irregular migration and displacement remain key areas of concern for governments across the world. The devastating stories and images of migrants suffering abuses and even death during irregular migration journeys, coupled with the significant increase in displacement due to conflict and violence, continue to dominate international headlines. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, many people have continued to embark on dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, for example, with hundreds dying or going missing along the way. As the world continues to grapple with such humanitarian disasters, and as various actors, including policymakers, consider how to respond and prevent such tragedies from happening in the first place, it is important to reflect on how and why citizens of some countries are less affected by such events and are much more able to remain internationally mobile without undergoing the same harrowing experiences.

This chapter answers these questions by demonstrating that peace and security are key to understanding these dynamics and differences in migration experiences. Peace and security, where they are present, not only enable population movements that are more predictable and less defined by displacement, but also play a major role in driving economic growth and development which, in turn, also reduces irregular migration and lessens the possibility of countries falling into conflict. As the evidence suggests, conflict-induced displacement and irregular migration are simply much less present in highly peaceful and economically prosperous countries. What is also clear is that citizens of these countries, unlike those in unstable and fragile States, enjoy much more access to regular migration channels.


Addressing the underlying factors that drive conflict and violence is vital to building and maintaining peaceful and stable societies, which in turn foster migration that is safe. This chapter has highlighted some of the pragmatic peacebuilding initiatives, such as community stabilization, that have proven key within the context of migration and displacement to building and sustaining peace at a local level. We have also demonstrated how migrants, through a range of activities, contribute to peacebuilding. They do this by advocating for peace, through mediation, building public service institutions, and supporting their families and communities through remittances. Examples included in this chapter illustrate some of these key contributions.

Looking ahead, it will remain important for all relevant actors – including governments and international organizations – to further acknowledge as well as harness the many positive and unique contributions that migrants can and continue to make towards peace, stability and development. Further, it is critical for all key stakeholders to continue working towards the implementation of both the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, as central to both Compacts is a commitment to fostering peace by reducing and preventing negative drivers of migration, such as conflict and violence. The Global Compact for Migration’s call for broader legal and regular migration pathways, moreover, has also never been more urgent, and its implementation will help narrow the gap in terms of who can and who cannot legally and safely access travel abroad or migrate to foreign countries.

## Appendix A. Trends and drivers of conflict

During the last decade, conflicts have proliferated globally, reversing the trend set in the years following the end of the Cold War when the world was becoming more peaceful as the number and intensity of most types of conflicts declined over the subsequent decade (see Figure 1).<sup>108</sup> Today, more than 40 per cent of those who are poor live in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence.<sup>109</sup> Conflicts across the world have become more fragmented, complex and protracted.<sup>110</sup> While the number of inter-State conflicts (conflicts between States) has significantly declined, intra-State conflicts (those within States) have escalated. Increasingly, however, internal conflicts are fueled by external actors in the form of proxy wars.<sup>111</sup> The decline in direct conflict between States has been attributed to a combination of factors, including the emergence of international norms that have increasingly been embraced globally, the rise of more effective international organizations to enforce these norms, and the fact that previous key drivers of conflicts between States, such as the seizure and annexation of land, have become less appealing and less rewarding in a globalized economy.<sup>112</sup>

Figure 1: Armed conflict by region, 1946–2019



Source: UCDP, n.d.

In addition to being largely characterized by civil wars, contemporary conflicts have taken on new forms, comprising not just armies of States, but also non-State armed groups, terrorists and even criminal gangs. They have also become internationalized, often spilling across borders and aided by regional and global links, underscoring how transnational various groups engaged in conflict have become.<sup>113</sup> While it is all too common to try and reduce various conflicts to a single cause or driver, conflict and violence are in fact often influenced by an interplay of factors and processes and are often underpinned by socioeconomic and political dimensions. The causes of conflict have been analysed through a range of drivers, those related to poverty, inequality and exclusion and those based

108 World Bank, 2018b.

109 World Bank, 2021b.

110 UN, n.d.a.

111 Dupuy and Rustad, 2018; Collier et al., 2003.

112 Szayna et al., 2017.

113 Avis, 2019.

on material interests, such as natural resources.<sup>114</sup> Much attention in recent years has focused on inequality and social exclusion, linking many of today's conflicts to these drivers. Inequalities and exclusion do not in themselves directly lead to conflict, but create conditions needed for grievances to fester.<sup>115</sup> These drivers do not exist in a vacuum and are often steeped in a set of underlying conditions, including historical and development patterns, such as colonial era and post-colonial development strategies, the institutional capacity of States, and international policies.<sup>116</sup>

### Advancing peace: The UN and regional bodies

Various actors, including the United Nations, have long worked to advance peace and security globally by both resolving and preventing conflicts. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 in the aftermath of the Second World War was driven by the single objective to maintain international peace and security;<sup>a</sup> and today, the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.<sup>b</sup> The Organization has pursued global peace and security through a range of mechanisms, such as preventive diplomacy and mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, counter-terrorism and disarmament.<sup>c</sup> The United Nations has also promoted the rule of law at both national and international levels, as this is seen as key to lasting peace and to “the effective protection of human rights, and to sustained economic progress and development”.<sup>d</sup> Further, the Organization has facilitated the adoption of resolutions as well as global norms and values that have played a major role in managing conflict-related challenges. Recently, for example, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council adopted twin resolutions on sustaining peace, which set out an ambitious and comprehensive agenda for peacebuilding.<sup>e, f</sup> The Global Compact on Refugees, adopted in 2018, is an effort to foster international cooperation on “more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing”, given the sharp increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers globally, and also commits States to preventing and addressing the root causes of large-scale refugee movements and protracted refugee situations, including bolstering their international efforts to prevent and resolve conflict.<sup>g</sup> The Global Compact also aims to pursue a multi-stakeholder and partnership approach, including leveraging the United Nations system to ensure on-the-ground cooperation that aligns with the United Nations Secretary-General's reform agenda in the areas of peace, security and development.<sup>h</sup> Regional organizations, including regional economic communities, have stepped up their peace efforts and play an increasingly vital role in resolving and preventing conflict within their regions. Organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, are heavily involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts within their regions.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>a</sup> UN, n.d.b.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid.

<sup>d</sup> UN, 2007.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid.

<sup>f</sup> The United Nations' long focus on peace and security is also reflected in the several Secretary-General reports that have been published over the years (see Appendix B).

<sup>g</sup> UNHCR, 2018.

<sup>h</sup> Ibid.

<sup>i</sup> Obi, 2009; Nathan, 2010.

114 Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Kett and Rowson, 2007; World Bank, 2018b.

115 World Bank, 2018b.

116 Goodhand, 2001.



## Appendix B. UN documents for peacebuilding: Secretary-General's reports

30 July 2020, <a href="#">S/2020/773</a>	Report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, submitted in connection with the 2020 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.
30 May 2019, <a href="#">S/2019/448</a>	Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/276 and Security Council resolution 2413.
18 January 2018, <a href="#">S/2018/43</a>	Secretary-General's implementation report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.
23 September 2014, <a href="#">S/2014/694</a>	Report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict.
6 January 2014, <a href="#">S/2014/5</a>	Secretary-General's report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict.
8 October 2012, <a href="#">S/2012/746</a>	Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict.
18 February 2011, <a href="#">S/2011/85</a>	Secretary-General transmitting the report of the independent review on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict.
7 September 2010, <a href="#">S/2010/466</a>	Report on women and peacebuilding.
16 July 2010, <a href="#">S/2010/386</a>	Progress report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
11 June 2009, <a href="#">S/2009/304</a>	Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
4 August 2008, <a href="#">S/2008/522</a>	Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund.
28 November 2006, <a href="#">S/2006/922</a>	Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone.
23 October 2006, <a href="#">S/2006/838</a>	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia.
29 August 2006, <a href="#">S/2006/695</a>	Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone.
14 August 2006, <a href="#">S/2006/429/Add.1</a>	Addendum to the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), providing specifics on the mandate and structure of the integrated office in Burundi.
21 June 2006, <a href="#">S/2006/429</a>	Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), proposing the establishment of a UN integrated office.
21 August 2000, <a href="#">S/2000/809</a>	Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report).
11 February 2000, <a href="#">S/2000/101</a>	Report on the role of the United Nations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) that included small arms and light weaponry among the primary targets of DDR operations, and highlighted the importance of tracing small arms and combating the illicit trade in small arms.
25 January 1995, <a href="#">S/1995/1</a>	Position paper of the Secretary-General, Supplement to <i>An Agenda for Peace</i> , on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.
17 June 1992, <a href="#">S/24111</a>	Report <i>An Agenda for Peace</i> in which Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali noted that peacebuilding after civil or international strife must address the serious problem of landmines.

Source: United Nations Security Council Report, 2021.

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