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**Military Class and Perpetual State Control
in Turkey**

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Abstract

Although Turkey has, for more than eighty years, given the impression of a Middle Eastern country eager to apply liberal western institutional structures into its own political life and even join the European Union, it has not stopped falling significantly short of the democratic type. While some attribute its pitfalls to the authoritarian-patriarchal political culture and others on the 'Serves Syndrome' and its discriminatory behaviour towards its citizens on issues such as political Islam and ethnic identity, the majority of observers agree that it is the augmented political, legal, economic and cultural power of its 'ruling' military class. In fact, the ruling military elite in Turkey constitutes a social class. As Orhan Erkanli, a leading officer of the 1960 coup clearly stated, 'In Turkey, there is a military class, just as there is a workers and a peasants' class and the officer corps constitute the backbone of this class'.

Even though both foreign and domestic researchers often refer to the Turkish officer corps as a ruling elite, they avoid treating the military as a socio-economic class. The aim of this paper is to cover this gap in literature by thoroughly examining the political, legal and economic sources of power of Turkey's 'ruling but not governing' military class.

Keywords

Military Class, Turkey, State Supervision, Military-Industrial Complex

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The pre-eminence of the military institution in the evolution of social, political and economic life of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has been a rather indisputable fact among researchers and observers. For instance, ‘it was the military corps’, Lerner and Robinson declared in 1960, ‘that named and military prestige that sustained the leader-once a Sultan-Caliph, now a President’.¹ Fifty years earlier, in the early 1910s, Lybyer emphatically pointed out ‘the Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else...in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose of one institution, composed of one body of men’.² Almost a century later, Aykut Uz argues, ‘In a democracy, the military’s place is in their barracks...not play[ing] the role of an opposition party’.³ And the list of people who believe that the court of last resort in Turkish politics is not the ballot box but the military seems endless.⁴

Officially, the supreme mission of the Turkish Armed Forces (*Turkiye Silahlı Kuvvetler-TSK*) is the protection of the country’s integrity against foreign and domestic threats, a common characteristic among fellow military institutions around the world. In addition to those responsibilities, however, the Turkish Armed Forces feel obliged to safeguard and maintain the country’s constitutional order as well as its political, economic, social and cultural interests on an international level.⁵ The practice of assigning an extended security role and political-military powers to the Turkish Armed Forces is not a new phenomenon as it dates back to the Ottoman-Kemalist times and traditions. What is astonishing, however, is that after more than fifty years of experience in the western camp (NATO,EU), is not the level of political-economic supremacy of the military that has been affected but their level of visibility. As Birand observes, ‘in the past, they [the officers] would follow the developments and intervene when the conditions presented themselves. Now, instead of a coup, they determine the direction of day-to-day policies at the source’.⁶

Through the creation of a variety of political, legal and economic institutions, the Turkish Armed Forces succeeded in legitimising their interventionist role in governmental areas while at the same time preserving their institutional, social class autonomy.⁷ As Johnson had quite accurately pointed out forty years ago, ‘the direct control of government by high ranking officers or military juntas is only a crude indication of the role that the armed forces may be playing at a given moment, for men in uniform have sundry ways of making their will felt.’⁸ Thus, any attempt to comprehend and define the role of TSK in the evolution of Turkey’s social, economic and political life is incomplete without a clear understanding of the historical legacy behind the political and economic supremacy of the Turkish military. In addition, it is important to comprehend the development of political, legal and financial mechanisms that the Turkish Armed Forces have created that contribute to the augmentation and perpetuation of its political-economic hegemony and most important to the military’s transformation from an elite group into a ruling social class.

1 D. Lerner and R. Robinson, ‘Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force’, *World Politics*, Vol.13, (1960), p19

2 A. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of the Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1913) pp90-91

3 ‘Sacrificing democracy to secularism’, *Turkish Daily News*, 9 July 2007

4 J. Salt, ‘Turkey’s Military ‘Democracy’’, *Current History*, Vol.98, No.625, (1999); G. Karabelias, ‘The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.35, No.4, (1999); G. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Adelphi Paper No.337, (2001); S. Kinzer, *Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001)

5 See Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations of the TSK and Article 35 of the Act on TSK stipulate that the military institution ought to use all forces to defend the homeland and the republic.

6 *Turkish Daily News*, 31 August 2001

7 U. Cizre-Sakkalioglu, ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.29, No.2, (1997)

8 J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p7

I. The Historical Factor

I.1 The Ottoman Inheritance

During the Ottoman times, two broadly defined socio-political groups dominated the everyday life and evolution of the Ottoman state: the *askeri* or ruling class, composed of the Sultan-Caliph and the higher ranks of the military, the state bureaucracy and the religious hierarchy (*ulema*) and the ruled or *reaya*, all Muslim and non-Muslim population of the Empire who had no political role or right in the art of government.⁹ The goal of the ruling class was to maintain the *nizam* (social order) as an unchanging structure sanctioned by the word and spirit of the *Sheriat*.¹⁰ This feudalistic division of the population based on their right to participate or not into the country's decision-making processes became through the centuries a socio-cultural characteristic of the Ottoman and Turkish military personnel. In fact, it can be argued that it continues to haunt them till today. At the same time, it is exactly this element that played a fundamental role in assisting the military to maintain a high level of ideological homogeneity and cohesion as a socio-political class.

The heavy reliance of the Ottoman state on its military personnel for both its expansion over neighbouring territorial lands and the preservation of internal order,¹¹ assisted the latter to realize their corporate strength. Thus, whether as members of the famous cavalry corps (*Sipahi*) or the equally famous infantry ones (*Yeniçeri*),¹² the military personnel tried over and over again to play a more direct role in the political affairs of the Empire either by forcing the Sultans to succumb to their demands or by simply replacing them with another, more obedient.¹³ The fact that the *Yeniçeri* were capable of altering certain rules regarding the functioning of their organization (eg. the prohibition of marriage during active service and the engagement in commercial activities) as well as forcing the state to change its taxation system in order to accommodate their financial interests¹⁴ is an indication of their growing political power as an autonomous corporate pressure group. As Karal remarks, in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Armies had 'ceased being the source of state's authority: the principle that the state exists to serve the state had been replaced with the formula that the state exists merely for the corps'.¹⁵

But as those of defeat succeeded the periods of military glory, some Sultans tried to restore the Empire and themselves to their previous glory through the creation of a modern, western educated and trained military and civil bureaucracy.¹⁶ Military schools were established, foreign instructors were invited to introduce the secrets of modern warfare to the Ottoman officers and members of the military personnel were sent to French, Prussian and English military academies to enrich their knowledge in the art of war.¹⁷ At the same time, separate schools were established to educate the new administrators in western European techniques of public administration and Ottoman embassies were used as a training ground for the new breed of diplomats. Acknowledging their influence in the creation of the

9 H. Inalcik, 'The Nature of Traditional Society' in R. Ward and D. Rustow (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) p44

10 K. Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates, to Classes, From Millets to Nations* (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1973) Research Monograph No.39, pp19-22

11 V.J. Parry, 'Elite Elements in the Ottoman Empire', in R. Wilkinson (ed), *Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) p55

12 V. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Pearson, 2007) pp48-55

13 W. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994) pp8-10

14 Sir H. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950) Vol.I, p182

15 E.Z. Karal, *Osmanli Tarihi* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1947-1962) Vol.V p9

16 K. Karpat, 'The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.3, (1972)

17 B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp83-86

Turkish Republic, some scholars have argued that it was *Harbiye* (Military School) and *Mülkiye* (Civil Service School) that created Türkiye.¹⁸

A closer look at the recruitment processes and work assignments at these modern military and civil service schools permits us to argue that despite the superficial character of some of these reforms, certain characteristics emerged that played an important role both in the socio-political evolution of the Ottoman Empire as well as in the strengthening of the corporate identity of the military personnel. First, even though a new Ottoman army and civil bureaucracy were formed, a sense of historical continuity passed successfully from the old to the new institutions.¹⁹ For instance, large segments of the old Ottoman military and bureaucracy were maintained and members of the old elite continued to occupy key positions in both the new army and the state administration. In fact, members of the traditional elite were eager to send their kids and relatives into these schools in order to preserve their socio-political status quo.²⁰ Second, the sense of unity and pride of the Ottoman army were kept alive since even after the reforms neither non-Muslims were allowed to enter into the new corps nor foreign military officers were assigned to important positions, limiting their role to that of advisor or instructor. The gradual entry of Muslim-Turks from wider geographical and social areas of the Empire, mainly from Anatolia, kept ‘the Ottoman military leadership...an indigenous element deeply rooted in the culture of the society which it was to lead’.²¹

In addition, the attempt to transform the character of the Ottoman state from a patrimonial to a bureaucratic one, shifted gradually the loyalty of the civil-military bureaucracy from the Sultan to the state.²² As high-ranking members of the new civil-military groups became exposed to western political ideas and ideals,²³ their degree of corporate identification increased. Institutional changes, such as the creation of the institution of *Serasker*, in 1826, (combining the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Armed Forces, the Minister of War and principal military adviser to the Sultan), its inclusion in the Cabinet (*Meclis-i Vükela*) and the establishment of the Council for Military Affairs (*Meclis-i Dar-ı Şuray-ı Askeri*) contributed to the augmentation of the military’s political autonomy.²⁴ The establishment of a separate military high-school system from junior high level, the *askeri idadis* (upper-secondary military schools), later extended down to middle and to elementary level (*askeri rüşdiyes*), as well as the Staff College (*Erkan-i Harb*) assisted even further to the emergence of the military as a modern socio-political institution and an agent of progress.²⁵ The increasing self-identification of the officer corps as a legitimate political pressure group was bound to bring them into confrontation with forces of the traditional status quo when the Ottoman state failed to end the process of its disintegration.

It is not surprising therefore that when the economic condition of the Ottoman state deteriorated (in 1875 the government announced its inability to pay its external debt) and European intervention seemed inevitable, high ranking bureaucrats and military officers blamed Sultan Abdulaziz for the Empire's misfortunes, staged a coup, deposed the Sultan and moved into introducing the first

18 J. Szyliowicz, ‘Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of Mülkiye’, *World Politics*, Vol.23, No.3, (1971), p376

19 M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000) p54

20 N. Roos and L. Roos, ‘Changing Patterns of Turkish Public Administration’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.4 (1968) pp273-274

21 A. Levy, ‘The Ottoman Corps in Sultan Mahmud II New Ottoman Army’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.1, (1971), p39

22 A. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p71

23 B. Lewis, ‘The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey’, *Journal of World Politics*, (1953)

24 R. Davidson, *Turkey: A Short History*, (Huntington: Eothen, 1988), p77

25 As Turfan points out, ‘These... [Schools aimed] at the production of a particular type of Ottoman soldier’. Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks*, op.cit., p63

constitution and establishing the first Ottoman parliament.²⁶ As foreign military missions and officers such as General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz,²⁷ contributed to the increase of the level of institutional autonomy of the Ottoman military, the conflict between them and the Sultan over the distribution of political power and its handling²⁸ naturally augmented. Abdulhamid II's forced resignation and the transformation of the Sultan into a mere figurehead of the Empire offered a unique opportunity to the military personnel to take his position at the center of the Ottoman political structure.

1.2 The Young Turk Inheritance

What started as a mutiny in the Third Army stationed in Macedonia in July of 1908 with a clear demand for a restoration of the 1876 Constitution,²⁹ ended with the complete and direct involvement of the military in the Empire's political life. Indeed, despite the presence of various reform groups,³⁰ it was the behavior of the officer corps that determined the evolution of events.³¹ The sudden entrance of the ambitious, western-oriented junior officers to partisan politics was bound to leave its seal on the social, economic and political life of the Empire. For instance, when the pro-secularist forces recaptured the power from the counter-revolutionaries with religious sensitivities,³² the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the political party of the Young Turks, passed a number of oppressive laws pertaining to the rights of gathering, association and free press that permitted it to terrorize opposition forces and dismantle political groups and shut down newspapers that were not associated with it.³³ In a grotesque display of brutality, 196 people who had participated in the counter-revolution were hanged en masse publicly while approximately 10.000 soldiers were punished for their involvement.³⁴

At the same time, these officers (*mektepli*) forced the implementation of measures that would increase the military's level of political autonomy. First, they cut any interference of the Sultan into military affairs with the dissolution of his own General Staff (*Maiyet-i Seniyye Erkan-i Harbiyesi*) and the creation of the Council for Military Affairs (*Dar-i Sura-i Askeri*) that under the chairmanship of the Minister of War became solely responsible for all military issues. Furthermore, to avoid any type of non-military interference, the Minister of War who was also a high-ranking officer became the only professional adviser to the elected government and Parliament on issues regarding the military. In addition, they attempted to impose centralized control over the officer schools with the creation of the institution of General-Inspectorate of Education and Instruction (*Terbiye ve Tedrisat Mufettis-i*

26 Mardin argues that even though the deposition of Abdulaziz 'was born from...the discontent of the... men of religion, the men of government and the military, the principal point...is that the matter of the deposition was decided by the soldiers'. S. Mardin, 'Yeni Osmanlılar, Jön Türkler ve Silahlı Kuvvetler', *Forum*, Vol.14, (1961) pp6-7

27 G. Swanson, 'War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913: Mahmud Sevket and the German military mission' in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds) *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp367-385 and I. Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman nüfuzu* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983) pp71-76

28 A. B. Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve 'Jön Türkler'* (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1948) pp239-240.

29 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp6-113; A. Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1997) p74

30 M. S. Hanioglu, 'Genesis of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, No.3, (1982) and his, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp167-199.

31 T. Pasha, *Abdulhamid Yıldız Hatıraları* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931) p259. Ch. R. Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909) p128.

32 S. Aksin, *31 Mart Olayı* (Istanbul: Sinan Yayınları, 1971) pp46-47

33 Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve 'Jön Türkler'*, op.cit., pp281-282.

34 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler: Cilt I: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908-1918* (Istanbul: Hurriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984) p190

Umumiligi), the dissolution of the Manastir and Edirne War Colleges and the transfer of all cadets to those in Constantinople as well as with the making of the Staff College directly attached to the General Staff.³⁵ Hence, the military succeeded in setting up the foundations for creating a homogeneous body capable of transforming itself into ‘the protector of right and justice and the foundation of national existence’.³⁶

Furthermore, their desire to follow the German example of building a national economy, led them to the realization that there was an urgent need for the creation of a new class of entrepreneurs from the Moslem population with national consciousness³⁷ as the traditional one was composed mainly of Greeks, Armenians and Jews. To reach that goal they advocated direct state intervention in economic affairs. The activities of party members ranged from the publication of articles and books in support for the formation of companies among the Muslim population³⁸ and the abolition of capitulations, to laws favoring the establishment of joint ventures between the state and the Muslim population as well as the creation of schools of commerce only for Muslims.³⁹ With the skilful manipulation of the guild organizations,⁴⁰ the CUP initiated a war of attrition towards the non-Muslim commerce while at the same time promoting the national bourgeoisie forces.⁴¹

Finally, the CUP seemed determined to re-arrange the rules of the political game. It passed a number of laws that limited the political power of the Sultan only to the appointment of the Grand Vizier and the *Seyhulislam*, reduced that of religious institutions and strengthened the legislative power of the Chamber of Deputies.⁴² In addition to the passing of laws that would inflict severe penalties to political groups and individuals which could dare express dissatisfaction with its policies, the CUP tried to prevent the creation of political parties and groups that bear ethnic or national names or were formed in order to advance such causes.⁴³ The CPU had set an example for Mustafa Kemal and his followers in the years to come.

1.3 The Kemalist Inheritance

Even though the policy of the Young Turks to enter the First World War along with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire proved to be a lethal mistake for them and the Ottoman Empire,⁴⁴ it was the failing military campaign of the Greeks in Asia Minor during the 1919-1922 period that permitted the remaining forces, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to return to power as true defenders

35 H. N. Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) pp108-121

36 Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks*, op.cit., p166

37 Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987) pp61-62

38 Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de ‘Milli İktisat’ (1908-1918)* (Ankara: Yurt, 1982) pp32-36 and 52-54

39 Toprak, op.cit., pp60-68, 98 and 170-173

40 Although as Quataert states the policies of the Young Turks intended to destroy the guilds and place them under direct state control [D. Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908* (New York: New York University, 1983) p119], as soon as they realized that they could become the only basis for the creation of Turkish bourgeoisie, they strengthened them financially. [Toprak, *Türkiye’de ‘Milli İktisat’*, op.cit., pp348-349]

41 Ahmad argues that ‘one may appropriately describe the CUP as ‘the vanguard party of the Turkish bourgeoisie’ ‘Feroz Ahmad, ‘Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks, 1908-1918’, in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik, *Türkiyenin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi, 1071-1920* (Ankara: Meteksan, 1980) p329

42 Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, op.cit., pp59-60

43 Such laws were the ‘Law on Vagabondage and Suspected Persons’, the ‘Law on Public Meetings’, the ‘Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition’, the ‘Law on the Press and Printing Establishments’, the ‘Law of Associations’, the ‘Law on Strikes’ and the ‘Law concerning the Conscription of non-Muslims’.

44 E. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001) pp179-204

and saviours of the nation. Naturally, the Turkish military-bureaucratic class became the most powerful political group in the new state and as the largest part of the Ottoman officer corps became the nucleus of the Turkish Armed Forces,⁴⁵ the tradition, knowledge and experiences from past domestic and external struggles passed on not only to the army of the Republic but the entire political world..

The desire of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to create a strong state, based on western ideas and ideals, appeared to strengthen the economic and political position of the military. As the extermination of the Armenian and the forced exodus of the Greek populations deprived the new state from the most western-oriented and financially powerful social groups, the only one with strong pro-western feelings was the military. It was the members of this group to whom Atatürk entrusted the realization of his goals. To avoid the pitfalls of the Young Turk period, he took all the necessary measures which could guarantee that the ‘Army...[was going to be] loyal to him and the Republic’.⁴⁶ Hence, Atatürk raised legal barriers to the direct involvement of active officers in the country’s everyday political life.⁴⁷ At the same time, he made no attempts to hide his warm feelings toward the military personnel. It was the latter rather than the civilians (politicians, merchants, etc) who he trusted for the accomplishment of the goals he had set for the Turkish Republic.⁴⁸ Thus, not only he made certain that most political and state institutions were infiltrated with personnel who had a military background,⁴⁹ but that the military-bureaucratic elite could maintain control over the political activities of other social forces (eg, religious and commercial groups, bankers, landlords) through the establishment of a monoparty regime.⁵⁰

In addition, Atatürk and his followers tried to determine the ideological path to westernisation-modernisation. Under the burden of Ottoman elite’s attitude of social engineering⁵¹ and aware of the limited appeal of their pro-western ideas to uneducated rural and religious-oriented population,⁵² they tried to form and implement certain guidelines under which the political game had to be performed in order to retain control over Turkey’s social, political and economic evolution.⁵³ Called Kemalism after its mentor, this set of guidelines made of the principles of republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), secularism (*laiklik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), populism (*halkçilik*), statism (*devletçilik*) and revolutionism-reformism (*inkilapçilik*),⁵⁴ was presented as the much-needed vehicle for society’s modernization. The

45 D. Rustow, ‘The Military: Turkey’, in R. Ward and D. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) p388

46 G. Harris, ‘The role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.19, (1965), Part.I, p56

47 F. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1965) p61

48 ‘Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to stride towards the heights,’ Atatürk argued, ‘it has always seen its army...as the permanent leader in the forefront of this march...In times to come, also, its heroic sons will march in the vanguard of the sublime ideals of the Turkish nation’. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, op.cit., p87

49 ‘Though [the Kemalist regime was] technically civilian,’ Frey observes, ‘persons conditioned by military experience, accessible to military contacts and trusted by military personnel were at the mainspring of power’. F. Frey, ‘The Army in Turkish Politics’, *Land Reborn*, (1966), pp.7-8

50 As Ozbugun points out, in the early years of the Republic, ‘the separation of military from politics was not complete. The civilian regime depended on the support of the army for maintaining its power and implementing its reforms’. E. Ozbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics* (Harvard, Mass: C.I.A., 1966) p8

51 ‘The Kemalist elite,’ Saribay argues, ‘inherited the Ottoman elite’s attitude of social engineering... Republicanists, like Ottomans, acknowledged state politics as a sphere with which [only] the elite would deal. Undoubtedly, that meant that the state [was] alienated from the social roots and the constitution of the unquestionable dominance of the elite in society and politics’. A. Y. Saribay, ‘Cumhuriyet, Devlet ve Toplum’, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No.20, (1992), p37

52 M. A. Karaomerlioglu, ‘The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.34, No.4, (1998) pp.67-69

53 T. Parla and A. Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004) pp270-287 and İ. Kaplan, *Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999) p390

54 P. Dumont, ‘The Origins of the Kemalist Revolution’, in J. Landau (ed), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), pp.26-40.

incorporation of these guidelines into the program of the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) in 1931 and the country's Constitution in 1937, justified the tutelary behaviour of the military-bureaucratic elite to transform society from above.⁵⁵ According to Aydemir, the Kemalists had felt that 'a different sort of state was needed in Turkey. Perhaps despite the people but for the people. Perhaps a *democratie dirigée*...the state had to be the imam and the nation the congregation'.⁵⁶

1.4 The Inheritance of the Early Multiparty Period

The adoption of a multiparty political system in late-1940s under pressure from the rapidly changing international environment,⁵⁷ the rise of the Democratic Party (DP) to power in 1950 and the new economic and social policies that it introduced, upset the officer corps and especially the middle and low-ranking ones. Although the DP did not try to introduce any legal radical changes in the country's civil-military relations, its political and financial policies of supporting the demands of the rural and religious population in conjunction with the eruption of professional grievances inside the armed forces, upset the officer corps and especially the middle and lower ranks.⁵⁸ As the DP continued to receive the majority of people's votes, its exit from power became possible only through a direct military intervention. The long awaited coup took place in the spring of 1960 and signaled the return of the military institution into the country's steering wheel since the Young Turk era.⁵⁹

The popular appeal of the non-CHP parties throughout the 1960-80 period, as representatives of the voice of the excluded and the have-nots, in conjunction with CHP's attempt to open itself up to mass politics (*ortanin solu*), made the officer corps feel that they were left without a legitimate political representative. As self-appointed 'guardians' of the Kemalist state and ideology,⁶⁰ they felt compelled to create a legal-political system that would prevent the re-appearance of a Menderes-like government and allow them to retain control in the evolution of the country's domestic and external affairs. Thus, starting in 1961, the military introduced a new set of institutions and regulations in Turkey's political life. The creation of a new Constitution, the formation of a second political institution, the Senate, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers on issues of national security, were measures which intended to reduce the political power of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) and party leaders while at the same time legalizing the intervention of the military in the country's political affairs.⁶¹

The disappointment of the officer corps with the inability of the political cadres of the CHP to form a government without military assistance and people's electoral support to political leaders and parties

55 Through these guidelines, the Kemalists succeeded in legally forcing 'the people' out of politics. First, by presenting the idea of progress through the process of modernization-westernization as the fundamental goal of the nation and Kemalism as the only mechanism for realising this ideal, they hermetically closed the political arena to other voices. Second, with the construction of a new, all-national Turkish identity, they extricated plurality and diversity from Turkish politics as all ethnic and cultural Muslim groups were excluded from the country's social, educational, cultural and political life. Third, by telling people that religion was a matter of personal conscience and thus to be kept out of politics and under state control, the Kemalists made clear that they would not allow any type of intrusion of religious institutions into the country's political life. Finally, through state's direct intervention into the economic sphere, the new ruling elite put limitations to the process of autonomization of various societal groups.

56 Ş. S. Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* 4th edition (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971) p.436; Ç. Candar, 'Atatürk's Ambiguous Legacy', *Wilson Quarterly*, (Autumn 2000) p95

57 S. Deringil, 'Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdulhamid II to İsmet İnönü', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, (1987), p40

58 K. Karpat, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: a socio-cultural analysis of a revolution', *American Historical Review*, Vol.75, (1970), p1665 and

59 G. Harris, 'The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.24, (1970)

60 M. A. Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991) p22

61 N. Mazıcı, *Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Sivil Rejimi Etkileri* (İstanbul: Sarmal, 1989) pp114-116

that were far from the mainstream Kemalist inheritance made them feel superior to civilian actors⁶² and pursue with greater zeal their institutional autonomy. For instance, with the creation of the Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK) in 1961 and the formation of three similar foundations, the Naval, Air-Force and Land Forces Foundations with ‘shares in a variety of civilian public sector enterprises’⁶³ for the provision of social security to military personnel in conjunction with the rapid enlargement of the defense industry, the military institution became less dependent financially on civilian government. At the same time, the latter could not neglect the officers’ point of view on economic issues. As Ahmad pointed out, the aggrandizement of the financial power of the armed forces led the military to become ‘so intertwined with capitalism [both local and foreign] they ‘no longer could afford to be neutral or above politics’ ‘.⁶⁴

The growing confidence of officers in their mission as guardians of the republic in conjunction with the inability of political leaders to reach a minimum level of compromise on issues such as socio-political stability and civilian supremacy over the military,⁶⁵ permitted the former to intervene in the country’s political life at will. Of course, this was only one side of the coin as the officers found the political arena as a field in which they could solve their ideological differences without affecting negatively the unity and cohesion of the officer corps.⁶⁶ Thus, as the military hierarchy succeeded in solving its own internal organizational problems and perpetuating its influence upon the elected governments, it passed the impression of being the only institution capable of saving the republic and the people from total collapse. However, unlike the previous times, the co-operation of political leaders was not regarded as an essential element to the country’s remodeling. The military leadership felt in 1980 in complete control of all developments inside Turkey and proceeded all alone with its plan.

1.5 The Post-1980 Coup Inheritance

Invoking the power granted to them by the Internal Service Code and using as example the deteriorating social, political and economic conditions that the country was facing, the leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces staged a coup on the 12 September 1980, dissolved the Parliament and the government, arrested all political and union leaders and installed themselves in power.⁶⁷ Bulent Ulusu, a retired navy commander formed a 21-man cabinet with five of his ministers also retired military officers while the rest were non-party technocrats. Also, hundreds of retired officers were appointed to sensitive bureaucratic posts such as that of under secretary, deputy under secretary, directors general of various ministries and public enterprises,⁶⁸ in order to make certain that the public administration will not constitute an obstacle to military’s work.

Three were the main goals of the military junta: First, to change the rules of political game and strengthen the power of the state. Indeed, a new Constitution was introduced in 1982 that abolished the Senate, reduced the membership to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) to 400 with an increased

62 The influence of the military institution in all subsequent governments led Zürcher to argue that ‘the armed forces were granted almost complete autonomy, their submission to the authority of the Cabinet being no more than a formality’. Eric Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) p.263

63 O. Karasapan, ‘Turkey’s Armaments Industries’, *Middle East Report*, No.144, Jan-Feb 1987

64 F. Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977) p281

65 As Heper and Keyman point out, ‘politics in Turkey has been conducted almost completely with a view...to sheer material interests...the resources at the disposal of governments have been seen...as nothing more than a booty to be distributed’. M. Heper and F. Keyman, ‘Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. , No. , (1998), p270

66 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, op.cit., pp.184-231

67 K. Evren, *Kenan Evren’in Anilari* [Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990] Vol.I, pp.546-547

68 *The New York Times*, March 16, 1981

term of five years and enlarged the political power of the President of the Republic.⁶⁹ In addition, fearing that the old political leaders might try to undermine their work during the post-junta period, the military decided to legally dissolve the existing political parties, and ban the chairmen, general secretaries and other senior office holders from any kind of relations with future political parties during the next ten years. Thus, the Political Parties Law imposed certain bureaucratic restrictions to the formation of new parties.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the new electoral law, which was issued in June 1983, reduced the chances of small parties to send their representatives to the Parliament⁷¹ and made the process of forming and maintaining a stable majority government easier. Finally, through Article 14 the military warned ‘the people’ that they were not allowed to employ the ‘rights and freedoms’ of the new Constitution and put ‘the government under the control of an individual or a group of people...or of establishing [another] system of government’.⁷²

Second, to solve the issue of ideological identification. The military leadership seemed irritated with the tendency of political, religious and labour union leaders, journalists, professors, retired and acting officers as well as students from the extreme left to religious right to invoke Kemalism in order to justify and legitimize their policies and actions.⁷³ The commanders felt that they had to put things in order. Believing that ‘because Atatürk’s principles had not been properly presented to new generations, this [ideological] vacuum had begun to be filled with foreign and dangerous ideologies’.⁷⁴ They saw as their duty the process of creating the ‘Atatürk generations’.⁷⁵ Since Kemalism, as an ideology, ‘was not sufficiently systematised during the lifetime of Kemal Atatürk’,⁷⁶ the commanders felt that they could put an end to it. Thus, under the supervision of the MGK, a three volume book was published on Atatürk’s thoughts, principles and actions⁷⁷ and an organization was founded, the *Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu*, with the task of conducting scientific research, producing publications and disseminating information on the thought, principles and reforms of Atatürk.⁷⁸ With the ‘officially’ undisputed view of Atatürkism at hand, the military seemed ready to use the mechanisms of education to instil it in the hearts of the young Turkish citizens.⁷⁹ For the commanders, the post-1983 regime had been built upon sound foundations.

69 E. Ozbudun, ‘The status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982’, in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988)p.39

70 I. Turan, ‘Political Parties and the Party System in post-1983 Turkey’, in Heper and Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and the Military*, op.cit., p.69 and p.74

71 Turan, *Ibid.*, p.71

72 M. Heper, ‘State and Society in Turkish Political Experience’ in Heper and Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and the Military*, op.cit., p8

73 Ş. S. Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantiği* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1974) p396

74 Evren, *Kenan Evren’in Anlari*, op.cit., Vol.1, p337

75 The idea was first put forward by Professor Giritli [İ. Giritli, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul: n.p., 1970), 72] and found supporters in the military ranks. Thus, a new program of instruction for the *Milli Güvenlik Derşleri* (Classes on National Security) was formed, the general purpose of which was defined as the creation of a ‘Turkish youth loyal and committed to Atatürk’s principles’. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, *Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Teblig Dergisi* 2044, 15 October 1979.

76 S. Kili, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul: Robert College, 1969), p3

77 Evren, (1990), *Kenan Evren’in Anlar*,1 op.cit., Vol.4, p358

78 Law 2876 of 11 August 1983

79 The teaching of Atatürk’s principles became mandatory for the eight grade of elementary school (two hours per week) as well as the National Security Knowledge course to indoctrinate young students, conscripts and NCOs to Atatürkist ideology. A.G. Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004) pp134-135

Finally, to contribute to the employment of religion as a factor which would ensure the unity and integrity of the state and Atatürk's principles.⁸⁰ The military leadership saw the Islamic values as a major contributor to the creation of an apolitical, non-ideological 'consensual' society.⁸¹ Their support to Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi-ANAP*) throughout the 1980s, seemed to assist the military's aims.⁸² As a centre-right political force with a moderate, catch-all ideology of 'conservative nationalism',⁸³ ANAP tried to 'draw back into the mainstream supporters of those pre-1980 parties of the right (MSP, MHP)⁸⁴ who were formerly engaged in anti-system protest,⁸⁵ by employing a socio-economic program that integrated Islam as a cultural-moral value system within a strategy of a competitive, open-market economic model.⁸⁶ Its export-oriented economic policy in conjunction with the appointment of managerial-technocratic cadres in state and government bodies,⁸⁷ had as a goal to shift the public's attention away from the old political-legal language (freedom of expression, equality, justice) to a business-technocratic one (liberalization, privatization, de-bureaucratization).⁸⁸ Thus, Özal's program and policies passed, initially at least, the impression that could alter the ideas and perceptions that a new generation with mainly Islamic background has had about the West.⁸⁹ Özal's goal 'to bridge the gap between the level of contemporary civilization and ours,'⁹⁰ appeared as a re-introduction of Atatürk's goals in a modified way.

However, the pace and the dynamism of Özal's politico-economic program appeared eventually as a threat to military's interests. First of all, a success in the implementation of Özal's economic program would upset vital financial and political interests of the military institution since the former relied heavily on private sector's initiative, the privatization of government-owned businesses, the decentralization of state's political power and the country's integration with global economy. In addition, it would challenge the officers' ideological 'hegemony' over the modernization-

80 'Since the army had been conditioned to see socialism and communism as Turkey's most deadly foes,' Zürcher observes, 'it saw [the] indoctrination [of the people] with a mixture of fierce nationalism and a version of Islam friendly to the state, as an effective antidote'. [Zürcher, (1999), op.cit., p.303.] This seemed as a rather natural step since the Kemalists always looked at the Islamic belief system as a feature of Turkish citizenship. P. Dumont, 'Islam as a Factor of Change and Revival in Modern Turkey', in S. M. Akural (ed), *Turkic Culture: Continuity and Change* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p3

81 U.C. Sakallioğlu, 'Kemalism, Hyper-nationalism and Islam in Turkey', *History of European Ideas*, Vol.18, No.2, (1994), p262

82 Some considered ANAP as an extension of the 1980 coup government. See, M. Tünay, 'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony' in A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yeşilada (eds), *The Political and Socio-economic Transformation of Turkey* (Westport: Praeger, 1993)

83 T. Özal, *Başbakan Turgut Özal'in Konuşma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mülakatları* (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi, 1987), p138

84 MSP (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-National Salvation Party) led by Necmettin Erbakan and MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* - Nationalist Action Party) led by Alparslan Türkeş.

85 Ü. Ergüder and R. Hofferbert, 'Restoration of Democracy in Turkey? Political Reforms and the Elections of 1983' in L. Lane (ed), *Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) p37

86 A policy based on the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-Islam Sentezi*). E. Akın and Ö. Karasapan, 'The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', *Middle East Report*, No.153, (1988) p.18; Also, B. Güvenç, *Türk-Islam Sentezi* (İstanbul: Sarmal, 1994) and A.T. Kışlalı, 'İslam'a Karşı İslam', *Cumhuriyet*, 7 April 1997.

87 S. İlkin, 'Businessmen: Democratic Stability' and N. Göle, 'Engineers: Technocratic Democracy', in M. Heper, A. Oncu and H. Kramer (eds), *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p194 and p199

88 E. Mutlu, 'Özal ve Özalçılık', *Mürekkap*, No.3-4, (1995), p.59

89 As Robins argues, 'Özal spoke of a 'general reconciliation' and 'a new synthesis', by which he intended a bringing together of religious conservative circles and liberal Kemalist tendencies'. K. Robins, 'Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe' in St. Hall and P. Du Gay (eds), *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996), 73

90 From Özal's address to the Third Economic Congress. M. Sever and C. Dizdar (eds), *Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönelimler: İkinci Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları* (Ankara: Basak Yayınları, 1993) p.18

westernization project and prove it that theirs was an outdated model.⁹¹ Thus, the military would have to witness the transformation of the Turkish state and polity not from the driver's seat but from the rearback one. Özal's desire to challenge the officers' political power both on the ground of civil-military relations as well as on the ethnic-Kurdish issue⁹² elevated him into a major source of discomfort for the ruling circles. His 'sudden' departure from the political arena, came as a relief to Kemalist forces and above all to military leadership.

Since Ozal's departure, not a single political figure appeared capable to challenge the military's supremacy. Whereas 'Ozal had closed the doors to the military...in the Kurdish dispute...[using] this policy to restore 'civilian' democracy in Turkey,' argues Turkish Daily News, 'Demirel opened the door for the military in fear of losing his own authority if he limited the authority of the commanders...Ciller allowed the military to walk through the door opened by Demirel and has given 'full authority' to the military'.⁹³ The same applies for the Erbakan, Yılmaz and Ecevit administrations. The only institution capable and willing to criticize the political role of the Turkish Armed Forces is the European Union (Copenhagen Criteria). The recent constitutional reform measures reveal the genuine interest of the AKP government to change the traditional structure and dynamics of Turkish civil-military relations. Rebalancing civil-military relations in favour of the constitutionally elected organs remains one of the major reform ambitions of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, the absence of friction with the military establishment has been accomplished due to the carefully designed and implemented 'compromising approach to military sensitivities' policy of Erdogan's administration. As Metin Heper points out, 'the AKP government [has] pursued a careful and balanced policy towards the military...avoid[ed] taking measures that the military would have strongly opposed...refrained from criticizing the military openly on those issues about which the military is quite sensitive'.⁹⁴

Characteristics of the Perpetual Supremacy of Turkish Military Class

I. The Political Factor

Following the Ottoman tradition of 'keep[ing] under control any sources of power that appeared outside the boundaries of the legitimate power-structure',⁹⁵ the military class in Turkey has established a long-standing practice of institutional supervision over the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government.

91 The old elites, 'conceived themselves as the bearers of Western values,' Göle observes, 'and defined their mission as that of educating the people'. The new professional elites of the 1980s, the engineers, 'were not only more representative of local interests and values, but also defined their relationship with the West in terms of participatory competitiveness. The West appears as a competitive partner and not as a model of self-definition'. Nilufer Göle, 'Engineers: Technocratic Democracy' in Heper, Öncü and Kramer (eds), *Turkey and the West*, op.cit., pp.216-217

92 N. Pope and H. Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After* (London: John Murray, 1997) pp.264-266

93 *Turkish Daily News*, 24 March 1994; *The Observer*, 26 March 1995

94 M. Heper, 'The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, (2005), pp222-223

95 S. Mardin, 'Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.12, (1969), p259 and M. Heper, 'Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire, with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century', *International Political Science Review*, Vol.1, (1980).

1.1 Institutional Supervision of the Executive

The National Security Council

The establishment of the National Security Council (*Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK*) provided the armed forces with the mechanism that has given them the constitutional right to convey its views on issues of national security to the elected civilian government.⁹⁶ Especially after the 1980 coup, the MGK has become for the majority of observers and analysts Turkey's most powerful political body, 'the institution that really runs the country'.⁹⁷ Its so-called 'recommendations', as Ilnur Cevik argued, were actually orders to the civilian government on how it should legislate and conduct policies.⁹⁸

With the amendment of the Constitution on 17 October 2001, the number of civilians in the MGK has increased, so that the military members are supposed to be now the minority. Turkey's National Security Council is composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.⁹⁹ In August 2004, Turkey appointed for the first time a civilian to the post of the Secretary General to the Council. A serving full general or admiral had traditionally held that position. The reform package also reduced the frequency of meetings from monthly to bi-monthly.

The activities of the MGK are defined in the third paragraph of article 118 of the amended Constitution as follows:

The National security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that are taken and on ensuring the necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the state. The council of Ministers shall evaluate the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.

Turkish law defines national security as the defence and protection of the state against any type of external and internal threat to the constitutional order, national existence, unity as well as to all interests and contractual rights in the international arena, the competence of the National Security Council encompasses the majority of policy areas that are of immediate concern to the elected government.¹⁰⁰

The National Security Policy Document (MGSB), better known as the red book, identifies the main interests and goals of Turkey, and gives an overview of the national threat perceptions, as well as the policies for coping with them. Until recently, its preparation and formulation had been a matter for the office of the Chief of the General Staff. Under the co-ordination of the General Secretariat and with the association of some high-ranking bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the armed forces set the framework for Turkey's security policy. Neither the elected government nor parliament had a role to play in policy formulation. Only the civilian members of the MGK could see the document, but were not allowed to propose any type of revision. Proposing revisions remained the exclusive right to the Chief of the General Staff and his advisors.¹⁰¹ With the changes that have taken place, the document is still being prepared by the

96 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, op.cit., Chapters 6 & 7

97 C. Candar, 'Redefining Turkey's Political Center', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.10, No.4, (1999), p131.

98 'MGK should not be above Parliament', *Turkish Daily News*, 19 July 2003

99 Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution as amended, 17 October 2001.

100 Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, op.cit., p46

101 Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, op.cit., p47

National Security Council in consultation with the Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff, the Interior Ministry and the National Intelligence Organization. Once completed, it is submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers.

The latest process of updating the National Security Policy Document was initiated at the National Security Council meeting in June 2004 as a result of changes in the threat perceptions. In January 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed a critical letter to the Secretariat General in which he reminded the Council that national security was the responsibility of the elected government. According to Article 117 of the Constitution, ‘the Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security’. Erdogan also requested the Council that the updated document to be ‘short and to the point’.¹⁰² This assertive behaviour reflects both more self-confidence and determination to strengthen the involvement of civilian authorities into national security policy formulation.

All background data collection and units either set up within the armed forces or under their direct supervision carry out analysis that the National Security Council may need. Although there was a reduction in size of personnel, the August 2004 reforms did not affect that particular area of the MGK. There is little information available about the size and activities of these units. Some of the better-known national security information has been:

- the Strategic Research and Study Group-SAREM specialized in international politics as well as in regional and global military balance of power,
- the Caucuses Research Group, which pays attention to changes in the Caucuses and the so-called Turkic Republics of ex-Soviet Union
- the Prime-Ministerial Crisis Management Centre (*Basbakanlik Kriz Yonetim Merkezi*), which observes and reports on crises by Islamic reactionism
- the Directory for Relations with Society-TIB (*Toplumla Iliskiler Baskanligi*), which is concerned with the evolution of events in higher education, media and religion.

The General Secretariat is responsible for the collection of information and the preparation of briefing papers for all meetings of the National Security Council. While in the past the General Secretariat was responsible for setting the agenda, under the EU reform measures it is now the duty of the President of the Republic. In addition, the number of departments under the authority of Secretary General was reduced from 11 to 7, his access to classified and non-classified information and documents from both public and private institutions was reduced and the same occurred to its budget. The appointment of Ambassador Yigit Alpdogan, the first ever civilian to the office of Secretary General in August 2004, was seen as a sign to the right direction of civil-military relations.¹⁰³ However, as Kanli argues, ‘whether wearing a civilian suit or military uniform, what the MGK secretary-general says is important’.¹⁰⁴

The implementation of recent reforms on the function and power of the MGK and the office of Secretary General, have brought an unprecedented sense of euphoria to certain domestic and international circles about Turkey’s democratic future. What they tend to overlook, however, is that since the late-1990s and after an initiative by the military hierarchy, the decisions at the MGK meetings are not taken by a majority vote but unanimously. Hence, even if the civilian members of the MGK increase to 33 and the military ones are reduced to a single representative, that of the Chief of the General Staff, the military would continue to have the last word on MGK’s decisions. Also, even though at the National Security Council’s meetings a variety of issues are discussed, political,

102 ‘Government Responsible for National Security’, *Milliyet*, 11 January 2005

103 B. Salmoni, ‘Turkey’s Summer 2003 Legislative Reform: EU Aavance, Civil-Military Revolution or Islamist Assertion?’, (<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sept03/europe.pdf>)

104 ‘Why now?’, *Turkish Daily News*, 22 April 2005

economical, social, educational, technological, cultural and others, defence matters have no place on the agenda as they remain a prerogative of the armed forces. The right for greater parliamentary scrutiny over the military budget appears to have been the only exception to that rule. Hence, even after the EU reforms, the military continues to wield maximum political power in the National Security Council with little accountability while the civilians wield limited power but carry all the responsibility.¹⁰⁵

1.2. Legislative Oversight

The 1982 Constitution of Turkey, like the 1961 one, was not a product of negotiations, bargaining and compromise by a broadly representative Constituent Assembly as in most democratic countries, but of a processes in which ‘the influence of state elites was predominant and the role of civil society institutions was correspondingly negligible’.¹⁰⁶ Whereas the 1961 Constitution terminated the government’s monopoly over decision-making mechanisms¹⁰⁷ and legalized the participation of non-elected institutions (eg. MGK), the 1982 one strengthened the political power of the President and the MGK and made certain that decision-making mechanisms would be protected from the influence of both political parties and the people.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the 1982 Constitution reinforced the interventionist attitude of the officer corps by stipulating that the Turkish Armed Forces has the duty to protect the country from all external and internal threats to its national unity and territorial integrity. Thus, it offered the legitimacy mantle to Article 85 of the TSK’s Internal Services Directive, which obliges the military to defend the country against ‘internal and external threats, if necessary by [the use of] force’. Hence, the 1982 Constitution not only strengthened the political hegemony of the military hierarchy¹⁰⁹ but also weakened considerably that of the elected government. Even though Erdogan’s administration has passed an enormous amount of bills that satisfy some of EU’s criteria and have undoubtedly improved the country’s democratic image, it has not dared to challenge directly the entire 1982 Constitution and form a purely civilian one.¹¹⁰

In addition to the Constitution, the Turkish Parliament (*Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi -TBMM*), the institution with the longest history in the Middle East, has followed a similar route. Subject to the performance of political parties and party leaders, the TBMM has been affected by their major weaknesses. Since parties failed to develop a stable internal structure, political life in Turkey became prey to charismatic and demagogic leaders. Parties and party leaders could not accustom themselves to the alternating roles of government and opposition while the habit of looking at the outcome of the elections as a ‘zero-sum game’ became an obstacle to the establishment of western democratic political characteristics into Turkey’s political life. Furthermore, the suspicion of the military and bureaucratic elites towards intermediary groups and institutions not only allowed the political exploitation of the masses through extensive use of patron-client relations¹¹¹ but also prevented the

105 ‘There are still provisions on the basis of which the military continues to enjoy a degree of autonomy...[as] there are legal and administrative structures which are not accountable to civilian structures’. *Regular Report 2004 on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels: Commission of the European Community, 2004) p23

106 E. Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000) p68

107 R. Aybay, ‘The Constitutional and Judicial Review in Turkey’, in *Armagan: Kanun-u Esasi’nin 100 Yil* (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgileri Fakultesi, 1978) No.423, p.338 and B. Tanor, *iki Anayasa, 1961-1982* (Istanbul: Beta Basim, 1994) p24

108 *Turkish Daily News*, 7 September 1999

109 ‘Ceberrut Bir Rejim Miras Kaldi’, *MAG-NTV MAGAZIN*, No.13, (2000)

110 Speech of Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu. *Abhaber, EU-Turkey News Network*, 1 March 2004. Also, *Regular Report 2004 on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels: Commission of the European Community, 2004) p23

111 Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, op.cit., p14

creation of strong, autonomous, corporate social institutions.¹¹² As a result, political parties and party leaders became a source of weakness for the proper functioning of Turkish Parliament.

The greatest blow to Parliament's political power, however, has come from the 1982 Constitution. The latter has openly rejected the supremacy of the legislative assembly through the strengthening of the office of the President. The President not only has taken over from the TBMM the right to command the Armed Forces in certain cases but has also through the principle of 'non-accountability' has escaped any supervision to his action from the Parliament. As Tanor argues, 'the 1982 Constitution considers the assembly not as a body where various policies are weighted and debated and a consensus reached, but rather a 'law-making factory''.¹¹³ Relegated to such a low political status, the TBMM becomes simply the meeting point of political leaders and party members who try hard to increase their own value. For instance, Cengiz Candar points out that TBM is composed 'of deputies without ideas or principles and whose only goal was to enter the Parliament. Deputies of this type elected from the ranks of various parties become 'individualized' once they find themselves in Parliament... These 'individualized' deputies have lots of room for manoeuvring against their leaders with whom they do not share any ideology or principle...Anything can be expected of such a Parliament'.¹¹⁴

Since November 2002, the AKP government is making a genuine attempt to alter radically that view of parliamentary politics in Turkey. The introduction of a large number of bills into the parliament that challenge directly or indirectly the traditional political power of the military (eg changes in the structure and responsibilities of the MGK, the supervision of military expenses by the Court of Accounts) has been a major step. In addition, the decision of the parliament not to allow the Americans to use Turkish soil and open a second front in their impending military campaign in Iraq, in 2003, enhanced even further its appeal to the people and the political world at large.¹¹⁵ Although the road to the supremacy of the Turkish Parliament over elected and non-elected institutions is a lengthy one, the AKP government seems to have taken it to the right direction. The question that seeks an answer, however, is whether that process will continue if the EU dream fails or the Erdogan administration falls from power. Will political parties and party leaders be capable of preserving and even taken a step further AKP's work or they would easily fall back to their traditional 'zero-sum' game approach.¹¹⁶

1.3 Judicial Oversight

There is no doubt that the main factor of protecting an individual or a group from state abuses is 'judiciary supervision'. Equally, the factor that damages people's confidence in the justice system is the existence of certain mechanisms whose procedures, decisions and actions do not comply with the rule of law. These mechanisms appear to exist and function well in the case of Turkey. In fact, neither the contribution of low-to-middle courts in the process of reinforcing and perpetuating the kemalist-secularist interpretation of just society ought to be overlooked, not that of State Security Courts. The latter, composed of two civilian judges and a military one with the duty to deal with offences against the individual integrity of the State, constituted for almost two decades a clear example that the

112 Commenting on the functioning of non-traditional organizations in Turkey, Bianchi argues that even 'the emergence of class-based associations among workers, employers and professionals is generally inhibited by the organization of primordial solidarities based on religion, ethnicity and localism'. Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)

113 B. Tanor, 'The Place of Parliament in Turkey', in A.Finkel and N.Sirman (eds), *Turkish State, Turkish Society* (London: Routledge, 1990) p157

114 *Sabah*, 1 December 1995

115 Heper, 'The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey', op.cit., p218

116 'Is Parliamentary vote on key EU protocol risk-free?', *Turkish Daily News*, 7 August 2005

military could not even believe that the civil judiciary was competent enough to protect the integrity of the state in certain ‘sensitive’ areas.¹¹⁷ Although the military judge has been taken out from the State Security Courts due mainly to EU pressure, it has not progressed on the issue of separating domestic from national security in their decision-making procedures.

Another institution that continues to enjoy the protection from judicial supervision is the Supreme Military Council (*Yukse Askeri Surasi-YAS*). Although the main duties of YAS is to discuss issues related with the Armed Forces (eg. draft laws and regulations, promotion), it has become the centre of attention as far as its authority of dismissing officers and military judges from their duties is concerned. Although the procedure of dismissal from the Turkish Armed Forces for ‘undisciplined behaviour and moral issues’ appears to be based on the rule of law, as clause 50/c of TSK’s Personnel Law and clauses 91 and 92 of Regulation of Officers’ Records indicate, however, it is emphatically protected by judicial supervision through Article 125 of the 1982 Constitution which states that ‘All procedures and actions can be subject to judicial supervision...Supreme Military Council’s decisions are out of judicial supervision’. Although a number of prominent political and judiciary personalities, among them the ex-Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court and tenth President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the ex-Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Mustafa Bumin, the Head of State Council Nuri Alan and the current Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul,¹¹⁸ have expressed their strong dislike for the above the rule of law status which the Supreme Military Council enjoys, their views have not altered the political and legal status of YAS. Whether the government will, as Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin announced recently, pass a constitutional reform package which, among others, make YAS decisions on retirement and promotion of officers contestable in court, remains to be seen.¹¹⁹

Above all, it is the past and current way of functioning of the Constitutional Court that re-enforces the kemalist-military supremacy at the highest political level. It is no accident that the 1960 military intervention gave birth to the presence of Constitutional Court in the political and judicial affairs of Turkey. Its establishment seemed to add to the military leadership another legitimate non-partisan institution that would set limitations to acts and behaviour of the elected government and function as ‘a watchdog of the regime’.¹²⁰ Although constitutional courts are regarded as the bastions of protection of fundamental rights against possible attacks by the legislative and executive arms of the state,¹²¹ in Turkey the Constitutional Court sacrifices the rights and liberties of the people for the sake of the state’s sacred authority. For instance, by invoking the principles of Kemalism and especially those of secularism and Turkish nationalism as a yardstick for setting the boundaries of constitutional rights, the Constitutional Court has banned from the political arena at least eight parties during the post-Ozal period,¹²² has declared unconstitutional an Act of Parliament which tried to remove the ‘headscarf ban’¹²³ and has banned from politics or temporarily removed the political rights of party leaders and members at will.¹²⁴ The functioning of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitutional

117 M.S. Gemalmaz, *The Institutionalisation Process of the ‘Turkish Type of Democracy’: A Politico-Judicial Analysis of Human Rights* (Istanbul: Amac Yayincilik, 1989) pp.27-28

118 ‘Turkish government objects to sackings by secular military’, *Turkish Daily News*, 4 August 2003

119 ‘The government intends to amend the Constitution to make the president and YAS accountable while altering YOK’s authority to accomplish its objectives’, *Turkish Daily News*, 9 August 2005

120 Y.G. Ozden, *Hukukun Ustunlugune Saygi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990) p.413

121 The Hon. Sir John Laws, ‘Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?’, *Public Law*, (Spring 1993) p.59

122 ‘The voice of reason from the Supreme Court’, *Turkish Daily News*, 28 April 1999.

123 N. Gole, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997)

124 ‘As Husametin Cindoruk, a prominent politician and ex-Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, pointed out, [can you] cite a decision of the Constitutional Court furthering the freedom of citizens?...The Constitution was revoked after the military coup in 1980, but the Constitutional Court continued to work [with leasing cases]. Can the

order which the military elite introduced, contributed to the perpetuation of the latter's political supremacy.¹²⁵

II. The Economic Factor

What started as an attempt to save the military's internal unity and cohesion from the crisis-prone Turkish economy and the unfriendly financial policy of the elected civilian administration has become a major characteristic of its institutional autonomy and political supremacy over the elected civilian government. Since the 1960 coup, the independent financial power of the military institution has increased at such a pace that it cannot afford to retain an above politics and economics stance.¹²⁶ Everything started with the creation of the Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK) in 1961¹²⁷ for the provision of social security to military personnel. Its phenomenal development into one of Turkey's most powerful financial conglomerates,¹²⁸ led to the formation of three similar foundations, the Naval, Air-Force and Land Forces Foundations with 'shares in a variety of civilian public sector enterprises'.¹²⁹ The formation in 1987 (Law 3388) of the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV) from the merging of Land, Naval and Air Forces Foundations as an outright military corporation and in contrast with the OYAK-type mutual trust and pension fund, its exemption from corporation tax, stamp tax (with regards to its transactions) and inheritance and transfer taxes (regarding all donations and assistance it receives) contributed likewise to its phenomenally successful period of aggrandizement up to today.¹³⁰

In addition to the above, Law 3238 of 1985 established the Defence Industry Development and Support Administration Directorate (DIDSAC) with the aim 'to establish a defence industry in Turkey

(Contd.) _____

Constitutional Court remain in duty in a country where the Constitution is revoked?'. 'Cindoruk: Turkey could not emerge from the status of a military republic', *Turkish Daily News*, 24 June 2001.

125 Also, Chief Justice Nuri Alan has argued that the 1982 Constitution limited the scope and powers of the administrative judiciary. 'Alan: Independence of judiciary obligatory', *Turkish Daily News*, 11 May 2001.

126 As Ahmad points out, due to its increasing economic power 'the High Command became more involved with the defence of the system than with any particular party. The primary concern was with stability and there was an inclination to intervene against any party or political leader who appeared to be a threat to a stable order'. F. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993) p131.

127 Law 205. Enactment: 1/3, promulgation : 01/09/1961

128 OYAK derived its income from the obligatory contribution of all active and reserve officers as well as civilian employees of the Ministry of National Defense, deducting ten percent from their monthly salary, from donations from public debt and loans and income returned from its financial investments in various sectors (in the Automotive Industry with OYAK-Renault, Motorlu Aclar Imal ve Satis and Goodyear, in the Cement Industry through Cukorova Cimento, Unye Cimento, Mardin Cimento, Bolu Cimento and YASAS, in the Electronic Industry through ASELSAN, in the Service Industry through OYAK Sigorta, OYAK Menkul Kiy and OYTAS Ic ve Dis Tic., in the Construction Industry through OYAK Insaat A.S., OYAK-Kutlutas konut, OYAK-Kutlutas Paz, OYAK-Kutlutas In. and OYAK-Kutlutas Ist.Prfl., in the Food Industry through Tam Gida, Tukas, Entas Tavuk, Pinar Et and Eti Pazarlama, in the Agricultural Industry through Hektas, in the Petroleum Industry through Turkiye Petrolleri A.O., Petro-Kimya A. O. and Seylak, in the Travel Industry through OYTUR and in the Stock Exchange Industry through AXA). [S. Sen, *Silahli Kuvvetler ve Modernizm* (Istanbul: Sarmal, 1996) pp.148-162]. To the list above one should add OYAK's entrance into banking sector through the establishment of OYAK Bank, the acquisition of Sumerbank ['OYAK to take over Sumerbank', *Turkish Daily News*, 1 August 2001] as well as a large proportion of shares of Toprakbank and Isbankasi. Throughout the 1990s, the OYAK conglomerate ranked among the top five corporations in the country according to annual reports of Istanbul's Chamber of Industry. As Parla points out, 'OYAK's corporate success lies in the unique and unprecedented set of subsidies and legal privileges it enjoys under the stipulations of the Special Law. OYAK is exempt: (1) from corporation tax, (2) from all other kinds of income tax, (3) from the special income tax collected from all organizations who withhold dues and fees from members, (4) from all sales and excise taxes, (5) from the state stamp tax imposed on all legal transactions. Furthermore, OYAK's assets, earnings and accounts receivable enjoy preemptive priority vis-a-vis third parties.' T. Parla, '1960-1998', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol.19, (1998), p32

129 O. Karasapan, 'Turkey's Armaments Industries', *Middle East Report*, No.144, Jan-Feb 1987

130 Parla, 'Merchantile Militarism in Turkey', op.cit., pp44-48.

and encourage local and foreign partners to enter into cooperation in the defence industry field to meet the requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces'.¹³¹ The same law also established the Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF), a state-owned investment company, the role of which was to provide financial support to the modernization process and to function as the Under Secretariat for Defence Industry. The Fund's income was to be drawn from taxes levied on alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, petroleum products, lotteries and corporation taxes. Since the Fund's revenues have never equalled the needs of defence industry, the shortfall had to be covered by additional funds from Turkey's annual budget. In addition to DIDSAC and DISF, Law 3238 of 1985 established the Defence Industry High Coordination Board which gives the general directives and determines the procurement methods of arms and equipment required under the Strategy Target Plan (SHP); the Defence Industry Executive Committee which makes decisions in line with the general strategy and plans of the High Coordination Board and gives instructions to the DISDAC for research, development, production and long-term orders; and the Defence Industry Inspection Board which is responsible for inspection of all the procedures of DISDAC and DISF.¹³²

Instrumental for military supremacy in the evolution of the defence industry was the transformation of DIDSAC into the Undersecretariat for the Defence Industry (SSM) in 1991. SSM is a corporate body with special budget and among its tasks is the reorganization and integration of the existing national industry with defence industry requirements, the performance of feasibility studies and technical and economic evaluations, the undertaking of defence contract negotiations, the signing of contracts, the execution of quality control activities and the coordination of offset trade issues and the export of defence industry products. The goal of the Undersecretariat (SSM) is to develop the capabilities of national defence industry in order to satisfy the modernization/restructuring requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces. Furthermore, to encourage public or mixed investments in the development and production of new weapons and technologies and to assist the military institution in forming strong ties with international defence conglomerates.¹³³ With the establishment of posts for armament attaches at Turkish Embassies aiming to purchase arms of urgent need under TAF's directives, the military's dominance over Turkey's exports of defence industry products and offsets trade became indisputable.¹³⁴ The office of the Chief of the General Staff is the single body with the power to authorize the procurements to the Ministry of Defence and the Undersecretary of the Defence Industries.¹³⁵

As Parla argues, the aggrandizement of the financial power of the armed forces leads to 'an organic integration of military capital with private capital, both local and foreign, blurring [thus] the lines between the private and public economy, and between the economic and the political'.¹³⁶ Control of the production is not the only benefit the armed forces get from their involvement in the economy. To some degree, military involvement in Turkey's economy facilitates cohesion within the armed forces.¹³⁷ It also influences the shaping of the national economy and the country's entrepreneurial

131 L. Sarribrahimoglu, *Turkish Defence Procurement, Joint Ventures & Offset Agreements* (London: Smi Publishing, 1999) p121

132 Ibid. pp122-124

133 Sarribrahimoglu, op.cit., (1999), pp120-122

134 'Turkey announces new industry strategy', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 1 July 1998.

135 Sarribrahimoglu, op.cit., (1999), p132

136 Parla, (1998), op.cit., p49

137 The financial issue that led low and medium ranking officers to instigate the 1960 coup d'état have been erased from the Turkish armed forces. The reason can be traced to substantial benefits and other financial support measures offered to military personnel by the growing economic power of the military-industrial and financial enterprises as well as due to development of strong relations between private corporations and the Turkish Armed Forces. 'Askerden ekonomi dersleri', *Aksiyon*, Vol.16, 24-30 July 1999.

class.¹³⁸ The development of relations with international corporations finally may have direct links with Turkish foreign policy objectives. In short, the Turkish Armed Forces not only play a major role in determining the evolution and nature of Turkish capitalism and the character of its entrepreneurial class but most important assists them to maintain their institutional autonomy and status as a socio-political class.

Conclusion

During the 1960s, a number of political scientists like Manfred Halpern,¹³⁹ Eric Nordlinger¹⁴⁰ and Jose Nunn¹⁴¹ developed the idea that there was a direct link between the social class background and behaviour of the military personnel and attributed the active behaviour of the officer corps to their 'middle class' social background. Following their path, Kislali and Brown were the first to conduct some surveys in the Turkish Armed Forces and found that in Kislali's case the officers coming from a middle class background constituted 72.6 percent of the sample,¹⁴² whereas in that of Brown cadet officers with a middle class background constituted 61.3 percent of those surveyed.¹⁴³ However, the middle class factor failed to offer a clear answer to questions related with the political behaviour and demands of Turkish officer corps.

After a closer look of these surveys, however, we could notice that Kislali finds that 11.7 percent of those who responded were sons of military men and 34.7 percent sons of civil bureaucrats.¹⁴⁴ In Brown's survey, 22.2 percent of the military cadets were sons of officers while 22.4 percent sons of civil servants. 'The recruitment of the officer corps,' Brown argues, 'primarily [from] 'sons of military' and civil servants, suggests a perpetuation of kinship and personal ties to Ataturk and the Revolution he brought'.¹⁴⁵ Even though the sample base of these surveys seems quite limited, the level of continuity in the Turkish military is striking. Hence, one can come to the conclusion that the officer corps constitutes the base of a social class in itself and thus agree with Orhan Erkanli's observation that 'in Turkey there is a military class, just as there is a workers and peasants' class, and the officer corps constitute the backbone of this class'.¹⁴⁶ This can indeed offer an answer to many of the questions regarding the political behaviour and demands of Turkish officer corps.

A vital element for the perpetuation of the military's political supremacy over the civilian forces is the ability of the former to reproduce the elitist values and axioms of their social class. 'Always bear in mind,' says an instructor of the Military Academy to the cadets, 'that you are superior to everyone and everything, and that you are trained here to have superior knowledge and superior qualities...As an

138 S. Ilkin, 'Businessmen: Democratic Stability' in M. Heper, A. Oncu and H. Kramer (eds), *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993) p189; S. Mardin, 'Turkey: The Transformation of an Economic Code' in E. Ozbudun and A. Ulsan (eds), *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980) p37

139 M. Halpern, 'Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class', in J. Johnson (ed), *The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962)

140 E. Nordlinger, 'Soldiers in Mufti: The impact of the military rule upon economic change in non-western states', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.64 (1970)

141 J. Nunn, 'The Middle Class Military Coup', in C. Veliz (ed), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)

142 A. Kislali, 'Turk Ordusunun Toplumsal Kokeni Uzerine bir Arastirma', *Siyasal Bilgiler FakultDergisi*, Vol. 29, (1974), p90

143 J. Brown, 'The Military and Society: the Turkish case', *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol.25, (1989), p399

144 Kislali, op.cit.,

145 Brown, op.cit.

146 O. Erkanli, *Anilar...Sorunlar...Sorumlular* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1973) p376

officer of the Turkish Army...you are different from your friends in civy street'.¹⁴⁷ The careful process of selection of the future corps, the early age of their entrance into military schools (military high-school, lyceum, academy) and their indoctrination into Kemalist principles and ideals¹⁴⁸ aims to breed members of an educated, statist elite capable of defending Turkey's borders and Ataturk's ideas as well as being concerned with the country's domestic problems¹⁴⁹ without any interference from civilian forces.¹⁵⁰ The absence of a strong political representative of the military class, as was the case with the CHP during the Ataturk and Inonu years (1923-1965), has permitted the military hierarchy to assume that role with considerable success.

In short, even though the officer corps might have started as an elite their journey into Turkey's political, economic and socio-cultural life, their attempt to rule the country without governing during the post-war era forced them to develop into a distinct social class. The wild development of the military-industrial complex during the post-Ozal years in conjunction with the creation of important legal-political institutions into its decision-making mechanisms has allowed the Turkish military to assume the role of a political force that represents and defends the interests of a specific social class known for their secular, statist, pro-western ideology and culture. The greatest challenge to this class seems to come from within, as the demands of educated pro-western technocrats (bankers, construction, energy, etc) might feel the need to confront those who continue to favour heroic soldiery.¹⁵¹

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147 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, op.cit., p321

148 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: an anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* (London: Tauris, 1991), p.26

149 *Le Figaro*, 2 July 1997

150 If there is a case of civilian interference in the military schools or in the officer corps, the high- ranking officers quite often expel undesired cadets and officers from the military. The expelled are not able of taking their case to court since the 1982 Constitution stipulates that decisions of the Supreme Military Council cannot be contested judicially.

151 'Turkey should send businessmen to northern Iraq instead of troops', *Turkish Daily News*, 27 August 2006