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Muhammad Caricatures Controversy: A Challenge to
the Principles of the Secular Public Sphere?

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Claims-making of Danish Muslims during the Muhammad Caricatures Controversy:
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Abstract

During the Danish public debate following the publication of the twelve Muhammad caricatures in September 2005, many commentators stated that the (re)actions/claims of Danish Muslims showed lack of familiarity with the basic principles of democracy and Danish traditions of political debate. The article offers an empirical test to several such public accusations through a systematic analysis of the *content* and *justification* of Muslim claims throughout the controversy. Thus, the paper raises the basic question: To what extent did claims-making by Danish Muslims challenge the principles of the secular public sphere? The article argues that rather than challenging the principles of the secular public sphere, Danish Muslims, in general, seem to actively affirm such principles. Many Muslims demanded an apology, not for the insulting of the prophet per se, but for what they saw as a deliberate attack on Muslim religious feelings. Muslims demanded that the person responsible be prosecuted, not according to *Sharia*, but according to existing secular laws limiting free speech. Danish Muslims demanded equal treatment - not special rights. Danish Muslims, were thus, to a large degree, able to "translate" their religiously based anger and despair into a secular discourse of rights and duties when operating in the secular public sphere.

Keywords

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1. Introduction: Studying Muslim Claims-making

During the Danish public debate that followed the publication of twelve Muhammad caricatures in September 2005, the reactions of Danish Muslims were a central issue. Many Danish commentators, and some politicians, stated that the actions/claims of Danish Muslims showed their lack of familiarity with basic principles of democracy and Danish traditions of political debate. This paper sets out in an explorative manner to investigate the content and framing of *concrete* claims made by Danish Muslim actors throughout the controversy. The paper raises three specific questions – one explorative and two more analytical: 1) What was the content of Danish Muslims' claims, and how were these claims justified during the controversy?; 2) how did Muslim claims-making develop throughout the controversy, and what can account for observed transformations?; and 3) to what degree did the claims-making of Danish Muslims in response to the Muhammad caricatures challenge central principles of the Danish secular public sphere? A "claim" is here defined as the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action in the public sphere (Koopmans and Statham 1999a). The content of claims refers to a) the main issue-field in which the claim is raised (e.g. freedom of speech, discrimination, integration, etc.) indicating perceptions of what is at stake, and b) the proposed solution to the identified problem (the prognostic frame, see Snow et al. 1986). This content can then be justified in different ways. The justification of a claim answers the question: Why should the claim be met?

The three empirical questions raised above pose a range of both methodological and theoretical challenges. First, the second question entails studying the dynamic aspects of Muslims claims-making, i.e. investigating how Muslim claims-making develop as circumstances change. In existing literature on Muslim minorities in Europe this is barely touched upon. In fact, the vast literature dealing with the Muslim presence in Europe, inspired by sociology of religion, tends to focus on the experience of "being Muslim" in different European settings, thus covering such aspects as Muslim organisational life, identity-formation, transformation of rituals and institutionalization (for a state of the art review of this literature see Allievi et al. 2003). Little attention is paid to Muslims as political actors engaging in public claims-making (some exceptions are Statham etal. 2005; Amiraux 2005; Amir Moazami 2006), and how such engagement develops across time. In order to tackle this task I draw inspiration primarily from social movement theory, and here especially the "contentious politics" paradigm and its mechanisms-and-processes approach (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow and Tilly 2006). My starting point is to view the Muhammad caricatures controversy as an episode of contentious politics – i.e. "*a stream of contention including collective claims-making that bears on other parties' interests*" (McAdam et al. 2001: 34). Like other episodes of contentious politics the Muhammad caricatures controversy is constituted by contingent processes of mobilization/de-mobilization, transgressive collective action, polarization, internationalization and framing. In analyzing the content and justification of Muslim claims-making during the controversy this article will explain observed patterns of claims-making by tracing the causal mechanisms and processes that produce these patterns. The paper's main focus is on conjunctural causation – the interaction of structural and conjunctural conditions and contingent actions by Danish Muslims. Special attention will be paid to the role of "transformative events" in shaping the developments of Muslim claims-making along the trajectory of the episode (Hess and Martin 2006). Instead of treating the Muhammad caricatures controversy as a local variant of a larger social process such as the "revitalisation of religion" (see e.g. Sløk 2007) or as an unavoidable "clash of civilizations" (see e.g. Jespersen and Pittelkow 2006), the idea is to pay attention to the timing and sequencing of events, the contingency of actions and the way in which transformative events, such as the violent attacks on Danish representations in the Middle East in the first week of February 2006, transformed the conditions for Muslim claims-making in Denmark.

Thus, this paper operates with an "eventful" rather than "teleological" conception of temporality (Sewell 1996).

Secondly, the questions raised by this paper call for a theoretical deconstruction of the notion of "Muslim claims-making"[1] when studying the diversified reactions to the publication of the Muhammad caricatures by Danish Muslims. In the literature on "Islamic activism" (for a good overview see Wiktorowicz 2004) the internal differences between different Islamic movements and groups active in Western Europe is often downplayed on behalf of the general "exceptionalism" of Islamic activism as compared to non-Islamic activism. This paper takes issue with the Islamic exceptionalism by focusing on the "robust" mechanisms and processes of contention as proposed by the contentious politics paradigm (Tarrow and Tilly 2006) – mechanisms/processes which are found across different types of contention, in different contexts and at different times - while at the same time taking serious the diversified nature of Muslim activism in Europe stressed by many studies in the realm of sociology of Islam (see e.g. Bousetta 2001; Sander 2004). Today, the Muslim population of Europe is extremely heterogeneous, cutting across different ethnic, national and cultural boundaries as well as different interpretations of Islam. Many variants of Islam are organised and are active side by side in local contexts. In my analysis of the reaction of Danish Muslims to the Muhammad caricatures, I draw on these findings as I try to assess the importance of different versions of "normative Islam", understood as the dominating interpretations of Islamic texts and traditions carried out by Muslim individuals or groups (Waardenburg 2000), on patterns of claims-making. Following this the paper assumes that Muslim claims-making is internally heterogeneous, questioning essentialised conceptions of "Muslim" and "Islam", and that whether or not Muslim claims-making is compatible with dominant ways of public reasoning is an empirical question to be assessed for each type of Muslim actor.

Thirdly, the paper's ambition to assess the challenge posed by Muslim claims-making during the Muhammad caricatures controversy vis-à-vis the principles of the secular public sphere obviously calls for theoretical reflections on what constitutes such principles. Deducing from the large and contested academic literature on what such guiding principles of public debate should be (see e.g. Habermas 1989; Crossley 2004), we can say that the minimum constituting principles of the (liberal and secular) public sphere are: 1) Equal access and treatment of all individuals, who are the sole carriers of rights and duties. Socio-economic status and ethno-cultural characteristics are irrelevant to the discourse of the secular public sphere; 2) Neither the state nor religions can dictate the content of the public debate – everybody can be objects of critique; 3) The limits of what can be said and how something can be said in the secular public sphere are determined by the rule of law (e.g. freedom of speech, blasphemy and hate speech laws); and 4) Debate in the secular public sphere should be based on rational-critical argumentation so that the best argument prevails. Dialogical deliberation should be the way of conflict solving, and a basic assumption is that the exchange of arguments leads to better mutual understanding and in the end acceptable compromises. Political claims raised in the secular public sphere that follows these basic principles are said to resonate, while claims that do not are more or less dissonant.

As mentioned, several accusations were made in the Danish debate following the publication of the Muhammad caricatures indicating that Danish Muslims were, in one way or the other, in conflict with these basic principles when raising claims. In fact, the debate was fundamentally about how to understand these principles. When the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* motivated the publication of the caricatures they did so by invoking the second outlined principle, arguing that Muslims, through intimidation, were installing illegitimate self-censorship in the public sphere. Many, including the majority of Danish Muslims, however, responded that because everything in principle

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[1] In this paper a claim is counted as "Muslim" when the claimant identifies himself as such either directly or through the name of the organisation or community to which he says to belong.

can be the object of criticism it dos not mean that it *should* be. In this way the fundamental principles of the secular public sphere were interpreted and re-interpreted through the exchange of claims. Another accusation of Danish Muslims was that they were demanding special treatment when "*insisting on special consideration of own religious feelings*" (Rose 2005), which would be in conflict with the first principle. However, is this in fact the case when we look at actual claims-making by Danish Muslims in the debate that followed? Likewise, did Muslims indeed justify reactions by "*pointing to the fact that the illustrators and the newspaper JP did something, which is forbidden according to Sharia – that is depicting Muhammad*"? (Jespersen and Pittelkow 2006: 22), which clearly would be in conflict with the third principle of the secular public sphere. Or did Muslims instead use other types of justifications of claims? Is it in fact so, as claimed by some actors in the debate, that Danish Muslims in general were not interested in ending the controversy, or reaching any kind of compromise through dialogue, thus conflicting with principle four above? Finally, if Danish Muslims were raising claims essentially within the principles of the secular public sphere, some actors in the debate argued, was this not just a strategic play for the gallery? Did Danish Muslims not say something fundamentally different in the mosques and community centres? Did they not, in fact, speak with "two tongues"? The following empirical analysis of the content and justification of Muslim claims addresses these questions, thus providing an empirical "test" of a range of (critical) claims about the compatibility of Muslim claims-making and principles of debate in a secular public sphere throughout the controversy.

As a way of meeting the challenges outlined above, the article builds methodologically on an approach of political claims analysis (see Koopmans and Statham 1999b) which aims at integrating elements of protest event analysis, discourse analysis and frame analysis. The article draws on a unique empirical database on claims-making during the controversy. The database contains detailed codings (inspired by Koopmans 2002) of all newspaper articles touching on the crisis which appeared in the Danish daily *Berlingske Tidende* from the publication of the caricatures on the 30th of September 2005 until the beginning demobilization of the issue in late March 2006. The choice of *Berlingske Tidende* is based on an assumption that the paper in their coverage of the controversy can be said to be more balanced, and more representative of the interest of the public than any of the other large Danish dailies.[2] I believe that the claims-making approach can help meet the challenge of studying the dynamic aspects of Muslim claims-making as it provides an opportunity for systematic cross-temporal analysis. Likewise, the approach allows systematic cross-actor comparison, which can help deconstruct the notion of "Muslim claims-making" and make more nuanced assessments of the compatibility of Muslim claims-making and the principles of the secular public sphere. The claims-making approach is, however, a contested method. The major criticism raised is that the focus on newspaper data is bound to reproduce the selection bias inflicted in newspaper coverage by certain criteria of newsworthiness. Some actors and some sorts of claims-making (more silent and less visual forms of for example interest politics) will be underrepresented in the data. I try to compensate for this by including in my empirical database codings of other types of material containing claims by identified Muslim actors (internal newsletters, pamphlets, organisational documents, Friday sermons and recordings of internal debates and meetings). By looking also at this kind of material, which contains more internal Muslim claims-making, I can also compare claims-making in the public sphere at large and within the Muslim community. It goes for all coded claims that focus is only on self-reported claims (direct quotes from claimants or

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[2] In the newspaper landscape *Berlingske Tidende* placed it self somewhere in between the two poles of *Jyllands-Posten*, who insisted on the subordination of other values/rights to freedom of speech, and *Politiken*, who was the main critical voice of the caricatures and of the Danish governments handling of the crisis. *Berlingske Tidende* chose not to bring the caricatures out of respect for Muslim feelings, but supported JP's right to publish them, and the governments "non-intervention" strategy of dealing with the crisis.

journalists' "objective" description of claims), and not on journalists' evaluations and conclusions. Besides, one can argue that if the intention is to analyse the publication of the Muhammad caricatures as a publicly contested issue, which is the case here, it makes good sense to look at newspaper data, as this was the main arena of claims-making in the controversy and as the newspaper-media played an active role in the debate. Another critique of the claims-making approach is that the complexity of arguments and the dynamics of interaction involved in public claims-making is oversimplified by the focus on quantifying who said what, when, where and why. As a partial remedy to this objection my analysis is further supported by interviews conducted with representatives of the Muslim organisations active in the debate.

The paper is organised into four main analytical sections. The first compares the claims-making of Danish Muslims to the claims raised by non-Muslim actors; the second compares Muslim claims-making across time; the third compares claims-making among different Muslim organisations; while the fourth section compares Muslim claims-making across different arenas of claims-making (claims raised in the public sphere at large (newspaper material) vs. internal claims aimed more at a Muslim audience (most of the organisational material)). However, as a background map to this analysis of Danish Muslims' claims-making, I will first propose a typology outlining the central discursive dimension of the Danish Muhammad caricatures controversy at large.

2. Central Discursive Dimensions of the Danish Debate on the Muhammad Caricatures

As a way of summarizing observed claims-making in the Danish debate on the Muhammad caricatures (by Muslims as well as non-Muslim actors), I propose an empirically driven typology of the discursive space within which claims-making took place. The typology rests on the empirical observation that certain contents of claims (certain issues and envisioned solutions to conflict) were often linked to certain justifications (the way a claim is framed or legitimized). Issues, envisioned solutions and justificational frames tended to mix in standardised ways forming main "interpretive packages" (Gamson and Modigliani 1995), which competed in lending meaning to the Muhammad caricatures. Two central dimensions can be identified through cross-tabulations – one refers to the content of claims, here especially the prognostic frames, and the other refers to the justification of claims. The justificational frames are divided into "liberalist" or "culturalist" reasonings. The liberal position includes, in my coding scheme, in particular "rights-based" and "moral/ethical" justifications. Though internally different, and providing ammunition for both protagonists and antagonists of the Muhammad caricatures, these frames share the idea that freedom of speech is a universal common good. The frames vary in how they balance rights and duties, but they share the view that all individuals should be equal in terms of rights, and that only individuals can be carriers of rights. At the other pole, the culturalist position covers "cultural", "historical/traditional" and "religious" justificational frames. These frames share the basic idea that freedom of speech is somehow relative to cultures, history and religions. Note that these justifications are by no means automatically in conflict with the principles of debate in the secular public sphere. Harder to place on this continuum are "injustice" justifications and "consequential" justifications. Some injustice frames ascribe to the liberal position as when they stress the gratuitous harm inflicted on Muslims, and the either un-lawful or un-moral aspect of this. Other injustice frames come closer to the culturalist position when they describe the position of Muslims in Denmark as a weak and already marginalised minority. Likewise, "consequential" justifications like "slippery slope" and "dead dogma" arguments clearly adhere to the liberal position (ideographically through the works of especially John Stuart Mill), while frames which justify *Jyllands-Posten*'s actions by reference to Muslim reactions are in a sense culturalistic, as they lend support to the idea that Islamic culture is

essentially un-democratic and pre-modern. The distinction should be seen as a continuum, rather than as separated categories, indicating that frames that adhere to the same end of the continuum have similar characteristics and are more easily "bridged" (Snow and al. 1986).

However, "liberalists" and "culturalists" often seemed to disagree internally on how to solve the crisis – and called for a variety of solutions. The second dimension, thus, introduces a basic distinction within the prognostic frames between those that called for dialogue and deliberation in a "monological" or restricted sense, and those that called for "real" deliberation or "multi-log", where various claimants on equal terms tried to come to a better understanding of each others' differences, and to foster respect. "Monological" frames are less accommodating and inclusive to difference than "multilogical ones", and value less the idea of deliberation across cultures. Monological frames are "un-compromising", while multi-logical frames are "compromising" in their nature:[3]

Figure 1: The Discursive Space of Claims-making in the Danish Muhammad Caricatures Controversy – Four Main Positions

The four positions should be seen as ideal-typical, and not as existing empirically in pure forms. Actors might favour or sponsor certain positions, but are likely, depending on the context, to include claims in their rhetoric that adhere to some of the other positions. Therefore the different positions are depicted as a two-dimensional space with open borders. In an ideal-typical way the four main positions can be described as follows:

> "*Liberal Absolutism*": We have in Denmark, as in other democratic societies, the right to comment critically on everything of public interest. This is a fundamental right and value in our society and includes the right to question religious authorities and beliefs. Without criticism of religious dogma our society will stagnate economically, materially, culturally and scientifically. We have in Denmark a long tradition of using political caricatures as part of public debate, and occasionally hurt feelings is just something people have to accept. When freedom of speech is attacked by threats of violence we must stand firm. There are no 'buts' when dealing with freedom of speech. If we start

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[3] The model is inspired by Kunelius et al.'s reading of the Muhammad controversy on a global scale (Kunelius 2007). However, I use a different conceptualization, which is modified to the analysis of claims-making. Besides, where their model seems to be somewhat theoretically driven, mine is empirically induced.

> bending the principle of freedom of speech we enter onto a slippery slope, and we will slowly erode the basis of democracy. Muslims must learn to accept this.

> "*Liberal Tolerance*": Freedom of speech is a fundamental value, but so is protection of minorities, tolerance and respect of difference. Freedom of speech has limits and needs to be balanced against other values and rights, including freedom of religion and the right to absence of discrimination and prosecution. A right to speak is not the same as an obligation to speak – there are things we do not have to say out of common decency and respect of others' feelings. Denmark is a part of a globalized world, where different cultures and religions have to live side by side. This is not achieved by mocking others, but through dialogue, openness and public virtue. The caricatures should not have been published simply because they were pointless attempts to provoke and hurt.

> "*Mono-Culturalism*": We are in the midst of a "value battle" or "clash of civilizations" with Islamism – a clash that is comparable to the fight against other totalitarian belief systems like Nazism, fascism and communism. Confrontations between the West and Islam are unavoidable and people who believe anything else are naïve (just look at the veil debate, the Rushdie affair, Van Gogh, 9/11 etc.). The caricatures crisis is just one of many value clashes, and the reactions of fundamentalist Muslims and Imams show exactly why we must stand firm and use all available means in the fight against Islamism and backward thinking, including no tolerance/dialogue with fundamentalists. If we don't stand firm, radical Islam will prevail. In a similar vein, some Muslims argue, we must not compromise the sacredness and status of the prophet. To defend his honour is a religious obligation. Islam is superior to Western values and norms.

> "*Multi-Culturalism*": Muslims in Europe, and Denmark in particular, are victims of growing discrimination and islamophobic tendencies. Decades of failed integration policies and an increasingly harsh tone towards minorities have placed Muslims at the margins of society, thus rendering them easy victims of discrimination and scape-goating. The radical right is exploiting public fear of "difference" and "parallel societies", and is constantly pushing the limits of what can be said publicly about Islam and Muslims. The caricatures and the reactions of Muslims can only be understood in this context. Thus, the caricatures were yet another deliberative provocation of an already marginalised and vulnerable minority - the straw that broke the camels back for Danish Muslims. There is an urgent need to chang the tone of debate about Islam, and to improve conditions for Muslim integration and equality. Danes must come to realize that they live in a multicultural society, and that only through direct contact with the (Muslim) "other" in everyday life can we learn more about their practices, learn to appreciate the differences and develop appropriate multicultural competences.

Liberal tolerance and *multi-culturalism* were at the basis of most of the criticism aimed at the publication of the caricatures and the Danish government's handling of the controversy. Critics often switched between or bridged these two perspectives. Exponents of the *liberal tolerance* discourse in the debate were former leader of the Danish liberal party and former foreign minister, Uffe Elleman Jensen, the 22 Danish ex-ambassadors that intervened in the debate in December 2005, large parts of the political opposition, including parts of the *Social Democratic Party*, the daily newspaper *Berlingske Tidende*, some Muslim actors and several representatives of Danish

business interests. Sponsors of the *multi-cultural* position were the daily newspaper *Politiken*, the social-liberal party, *Radikale Venstre*, several famous artists and public intellectuals, and some Muslim actors. Claims that supported Muslim demands for an apology or a sort of recognition of hurt religious feelings were in a similar way predominantly launched from within these two positions. Supporters of *Jyllands-Posten* and the Danish government's actions, and many critics of Muslim demands, raised mainly claims anchored within the discourses of *liberal absolutism* and *mono-culturalism*. Thus, *Jyllands-Posten*'s project was launched from a *liberal absolutistic* position, and backed indirectly by a similar discourse by the Danish government, and here especially Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as well as a large group of journalists, public intellectuals and the majority of Danish PEN.[4] Many claims by *Democratic Muslims* [Demokratiske Muslimer], as we shall see below, can also be ascribed to this position. The *mono-cultural* position's most exemplary exponent in the debate was the *Danish People's Party*. However, other actors raised claims building on similar logic such as the later social minister, Karen Jespersen, and the public commentator and historian Lars Hedegaard, as well as more dogmatic Muslim actors, who used religious rhetoric in a polemic way to criticise the caricatures, and to call for the restoring of the honour of the prophet by not compromising Islam.

3. Muslim vs. Non-Muslim Discourses: Speaking the Same Language?

What is immediately striking when we compare content and framing of Muslim and non-Muslim claims are some rather significant differences (see tables 1, 2 and 3). Considering the nature of the controversy, which from the beginning looked like, and certainly was presented in the media as, a dispute between a Muslim minority and the non-Muslim (and irreligious) majority, this is maybe not very surprising. However, to draw the conclusion that the discursive differences in claims-making represents a fundamental clash of values or world views would be a hasty one. I will in the following section elaborate on how the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims at an aggregated level mask large internal differences, and thus similarities between the two groups. Besides, the discursive differences between Muslims and non-Muslims claims seem, at large, to be ones of degree, focus and accentuation rather than ones of substance.

Looking at tables 1, 2 and 3 we notice that non-Muslim actors were about five times as likely to raise claims within the issue-field of freedom of speech than Muslim actors (17.6% vs. 3.8%), they were twice as likely to propose solutions to the crisis within the area of free speech (18.3% vs. 9.5%), and a little less then twice as likely to justify claims with reference to the right of freedom of speech (19.9% vs. 13.6%).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

How should these differences be interpreted? One way is to say that Danish Muslims during the controversy paid less attention to, and valued less, arguments of freedom of speech than non-Muslim actors. In this perspective there seems to be some truth to the often heard viewpoint in the debate that Muslim claims-making around the caricatures proved exactly what was claimed initially

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[4] If we look more closely at the claims-making by the Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, there are some indications that he moved closer to the *liberal tolerance* position as the conflict escalated abroad in late January and early February 2006. However, it also seems that Fogh Rasmussen returned to the more absolutistic liberal position with his "sheep and goats" interview in March in which he in a confrontational manner launched critique of the "sheep" who had not sufficiently defended the value of free speech during the controversy.

by *Jyllands-Posten*, namely, that Muslims have a problem with "secular democracy and freedom of speech". However, another possibility, supported by the fuller picture of tables 1, 2, and 3 as well as many of the interviews conducted, is that Danish Muslims simply did not accept the terms of debate – those of freedom of speech - proposed by *Jyllands-Posten* initially, and later also by the Danish government. To the majority of Danish Muslims the controversy was not about freedom of speech. Therefore solutions and justifications could not be derived from this principle. To them the controversy was about intentional harm, discrimination, integration and the need of dialogue, apologies and respect: "*This is not about self-censorship or freedom of speech, but about respect*" (in Kastrup 2006). Therefore, the justificational reasonings came dominantly via "injustice" frames (35,6% of Muslim justifications), which positioned Danish Muslims as victims of a gratuitous offence committed by *Jyllands-Posten*, who with the caricatures had delivered the ultimate stroke against the already marginalized Muslim minority. In a sense, Muslim focus on "injustice/victimage" frames can be seen as a product of Muslim perceptions (right or wrong) of the relevant "political opportunity structure" in Denmark as closed or hostile following two decades of harsh public debate over Muslim integration, and a range of tightened rules of asylum, citizenship and immigration policies. This way of framing the conflict by Muslims was only intensified by new "injustices" when Muslim protests were not listened to, not taken seriously and even criticised as showing unfamiliarity with Danish political culture. These injustices were often underlined by Danish Muslims by referring to how double standards seem to exist when it comes to valuing Muslims' religious feelings and those of others such as Christians' and Jews'. Muslims referred to the fact that *Jyllands-Posten* on a different occasion (in 2003) had refused to publish caricatures mocking Jesus Christ, because "*they would create an outcry among the readership of the paper*" (*Jyllands-Posten*'s prior culture editor cited in Engelbrecht Larsen and Seidenfaden 2006: 39). Following such injustice-frames, Muslims in general called for some kind of concrete (e.g. conviction of *Jyllands-Posten* according to existing laws limiting free speech) or symbolic action (e.g. apologies or government meetings with Muslim representatives) which could partly un-do the "injustices" or, at least, show some recognition and appreciation. Accordingly, Muslims were twice as likely as non-Muslims to propose dialogue and respect as the solution to the conflict (15.8% vs. 8.1% of prognostic frames). For the majority of Danish Muslims the controversy was, thus, not about respect of religious dogmas either (very few actually believed that non-Muslims should be bound by the ban of depicting the prophets of Islam), but, simply, about respect and unnecessary provocation in general.

However, the controversy also fostered a large internal debate among Danish Muslims about how to react: "Muslim handling of the controversy". In fact, issues of Muslim handling were the most common in Muslim claims-making (29.7% of all Muslim claims were raised within this issue-field), and solutions which called for some kind of action from Muslims themselves were the most common type of prognostic frames among Danish Muslims (Muslims were almost five times as likely as non-Muslims to call upon Muslims for some kind of action: 6.3% vs. 29.5%). Debated was the legitimacy of different action repertoires (peaceful demonstrations, boycott and transnational actitivism), and especially issues of (legitimate) representation of Muslims in Denmark (the single most raised issue of Danish Muslims). This focus on Muslim reactions by Danish Muslims themselves represented a certain self-critical reflection and internal positioning. However, the Muslim tendency to call upon fellow Muslims to, for example, embrace non-violence or distance themselves from "radical Islam" can also be read as a form of internalization of external pressures.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

With the escalation of the conflict Danish Muslims were faced with growing pressure from non-Muslim actors to affirm specific values and distance themselves from others. Anticipating the cross-temporal analysis of Muslim claims-making (see next section) we can say that explicit affirmation of central values of "Danish" democracy and political culture became markers of "moderateness" of Muslim actors, and a condition for "legitimate" Muslim claims-making in the debate. It was not until after the violent attacks on Danish representatives abroad that Danish Muslims suddenly felt a need to actively affirm principles of non-violent conflict resolution. Often this happened through a specific form of religious justification (see table 3 below). I argue that when Danish Muslims say that freedom of speech, democracy, tolerance and non-violence are fundamentally Islamic values (without judging whether or not this is true), which was increasingly the case after the violent escalations, it can be seen as a way of turning external pressures for affirmation of certain values into an internal Islamic obligation of being a good and righteaus Muslim - a way of religiously justifying "sameness" and affirmation. This is seen, for example, in the following quote: "*Some Muslims have forgotten the words of the prophet: Islam is exemplary behaviour. The example given by the prophet demands forgiveness, indulgence and tolerance. Besides, it demands us to meet our opponents with the best and most beautiful arguments*" (Material 1). Rational dialogue and non-violence here become religious imperatives. The significant use of religious justifications in the secular public sphere seems less "dissonant" when broken down into constituting components. Even though religious argumentation is in principle non-compliant with the principles of the secular public sphere it takes on a form here of defensive adaptation, which can be tolerated. Religious beliefs and arguments are accepted as long as they signal the right values and the right kind of religiousness – not too dogmatic and secular. "Bad religion", here represented by "bad Muslims", is when religious justifications are used to depart from values such as dialogue, compromising, (unrestricted) free speech or even democracy and non-violence. In the empirical data-base examples of this type of religious justifications are very few, and only found with *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (see section 5).

It is interesting to notice that where the religious justifications were a phenomenon of Muslim actors (apart from a few Danish priests), the historical/traditional justifications were a purely non-Muslim phenomenon:

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

This has to do with the fact that in order to use this type of frame (in a convincing manner) an actor has to be considered, and consider himself, a part of the particular tradition invoked. Thus, the immigrant background of most Danish Muslims excluded them from the use of this type of framing. The ascribed, and often actively upheld, identity of being different from the Danish non-Muslim majority makes Danish traditions "their" traditions in the eyes of many Danish Muslims. "Historical/traditional" justifications were, accordingly, a rather exclusive way of arguing, which placed most such frames (and derived solutions of "forced" compliance with traditions) close to the mono-logical deliberation pole in figure 1. "Historical/traditional" justifications were often presented as "ultimate" arguments: These are our traditions and they cannot be questioned. In this way these frames were similar to religious justifications: They both invoke some kind of ultimate authority. When Danish Muslims did invoke such "Danish" traditions they do so from the "outside" – for example "*The democratic tradition in Denmark, as taught to us, says that freedom of speech is not bound in time and space, which means that we have the right to use it in the EU, UN or other institutions and fora*" (Material 2). The tradition is seen as something that has been "taught", not something that you have been brought up with.

At an aggregated level the majority of Danish Muslim actors in the debate seem to argue from either a position of "liberal tolerance" or of "multiculturalism". Establishing victimage through injustice frames Danish Muslims called for tolerance, inclusion, for being listened to, while at the same time explicitly affirming values of moderateness, democracy and free speech. The dominance of issues of discrimination and "injustice frames" were of course partly due to real feelings of despair and unjust treatment among Danish Muslims. However, at a strategic level, this focus also made sense as it is more easily aligned with discourses of liberal democracy, rights and duties, than is religious argumentation. In other words, this focus resonated better with the public at large, and, thus, with potential non-Muslim allies. Often Muslim affirmation of central principles of "Danish" political culture was presented through a critique of other Muslim actors, who were seen as too "radical" and as illegitimate representatives of Danish Muslims. In addition, this affirmation was often religiously justified. Used in this manner, religious argumentation became compatible, or even a variant of, liberal discourses of rights and duties.

Though important differences exist between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of the discursive aspects of claims-making these differences should not be overstated. To frame the Muhammad caricatures as primarily an issue of injustice (fair and equal treatment) rather than an issue of free speech seems to be a matter of focus rather than a matter of Muslims denying free speech and right-based argumentation. Likewise, Muslim use of religious justifications and non-Muslim use of historical/traditional justifications can be seen as a difference of degree rather than of fundamental principles. In fact, Muslims tended to use religious justifications to affirm the same values stressed by the non-Muslim traditional justifications. In other words, Muslims tended to use religious justifications to bridge their own religious worldviews and secular principles – to highlight the similarities of traditions. This was the general picture when looking across the different Muslim actors, although, the trend was more outspoken with certain actors and at certain times (see also sections 4 and 5). Rather than speaking different languages Muslims and non-Muslims were speaking different dialects of the same language. Consequently, it seems that the data presented here does not lend much support to Flemming Rose's assertion that Muslims "*claim exceptional treatment, when insisting on special consideration of own religious feelings*" (Rose 2005). Muslims called for equal treatment, anti-discrimination, respect of difference, furthering of tolerance through dialogue, and if they called for an apology, it was not grounded in hurt religious feelings, but on the grounds that the publication was a "gratuitous offence". In other words, if Danish Muslims did put forward "group demands", which is to some extent non-compatible with the first principle of the secular public sphere outlined above, these were almost entirely "parity" group demands – demands of treating Muslims and non-Muslims alike - and not "exceptional" group demands of the kind Flemming Rose had in mind (see Statham et al. 2005 for a similar distinction). In fact, only about 7% of all Muslim prognostic frames in my data-base can be said to include some kind of Muslim group demand, of which only three instances or 0.8% are "exceptional" group demands calling for *special* consideration of Muslims. The three instances were a call for legal revisions of existing laws on free speech including a special consideration of blasphemy against the prophets of Islam, a call upon the Danish government to intervene with the Danish press and their (critical) coverage of Muslims, and a call upon the government to establish special communication channels with Muslim representatives. These instances are hardly enough to say that Danish Muslims in general are calling for "exceptional treatment" or "special consideration".

4. Muslim Discourse across Time

Above my treatment of the content and framing of Muslim claims in the controversy has been somewhat static. However, the picture presented of Muslim discourses masks interesting developments across time.[5] Looking first at the "issues" of Muslim claims (see table 4) we notice a development where issues of discrimination, such as the intentionality of the offence by *Jyllands-Posten*, general media coverage of Muslims in Denmark, and the general tone of debate regarding (Muslim) integration, dominated in the first phase, while issues of Muslim handling of the conflict came strongly into focus from the second phase onwards.[6] It was especially the issues of raising awareness of the caricatures abroad and of representation of Muslims in Denmark, which gained importance and drove this issue-shift.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Issues of conflict resolution – dialogue and non-violence – also attracted more attention from Muslim claimants from this time onwards. Besides, issues of integration were taken up more significantly in the third and fourth phase of the controversy. The identified issue-shifts in Muslim claims-making mirror developments found in the overall contours of the debate (all claims by Muslim and non-Muslim actors), however, in a more profound manner. As Muslim claims made up a larger part of all claims-making at the beginning of the controversy than they did later, there are some indications that Danish Muslims were, at least partly, setting the agenda of the debate in the first months of the controversy. They sat the agenda with issues of discrimination. The initial protests, manifested, for example, in a large Muslim demonstration in Copenhagen on October 14, 2005, were led by an ad hoc protest coalition of Muslim organisations in Denmark, including *The Community of Islamic Faith* [Det Islamiske Trossamfund] – the largest and most influential Muslim organisation prior to the caricatures. Muslim religious authorities were at the centre of these first protests demanding an apology for the gratuitous offence.[7] The issue-shift towards especially Muslim handling of the conflict and conflict resolution from around December 2005 seems, on the contrary, to have been imposed on Danish Muslims from the outside. The Danish imam-delegations and the international escalation of the conflict with the boycott and later the violent attacks on Danish representations introduced new issues and set a new agenda in the debate. These issues put Danish Muslims more in a defensive position of explaining and defending reactions as well as affirming values of dialogue and non-violence. This is especially true in phase three.

Regarding the envisioned solutions to the conflict by Danish Muslims, it seems that with issue-shifts followed shifts in preferred solutions. Thus, table five shows how Muslim calls for action in the first phase of the controversy were largely about either raising awareness of the caricatures (calls for protest/defence of the prophet and calls for spreading the word abroad) or about receiving some kind of symbolic reparation (an apology from *Jyllands-Posten* or a diplomatic meeting with the government).

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[5] The cross time analysis of Muslim claims-making uses a four phase periodization of the controversy as its "unit of time". The periodization builds on the application of two criteria of demarcation: 1) the scope of contention, and 2) the intensity of contention. Put very simplistically we can say that phase one is characterised by being local/national in scope and by relatively low intensity of contention; phase two by an international scope and medium level of intensity; phase three by an international/global scope and high level of intensity, and; phase four by a national scope and low to medium level of intensity.

[6] As the situation was beginning to normalize in late February and especially in March 2006 issues of discrimination – the "real" focus of the debate from phase one according to most Danish Muslims – were re-introduced.

[7] For a detailed analysis of the process of Muslim mobilization in response to the publication of the Muhammad caricatures see Lindekilde 2008.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

As the focus of the debate shifted so did preferred solutions by Danish Muslims. From phase two onwards calls for dialogue (in the multi-logical sense) became central to Muslim prognostic framing. Likewise, following the embassy attacks in the Middle East Muslim calls for non-violence boomed in phase three (19.3% of prognostic frames in this phase). Another event at this time, which seems to have triggered both the intense internal debate about Muslim representation in Denmark as well as new calls upon Danish Muslims to unite, was the creation and entering on the stage of the *Democratic Muslims*. The *Democratic Muslims*, to a large degree, introduced the issue of Muslim representation with their criticism of the imam-led protest drive at the beginning of the controversy. However, many Danish Muslims believed that the new network was overly keen on positioning themselves in opposition to other Muslims and by doing so creating fragmentation at a time when Danish Muslims needed to stand united. As the situation was slowly normalizing in phase four, Danish Muslims, like other actors in the debate, put stronger emphasis on the importance of trying to turn the crisis into something positive, and of drawing lessons (most importantly about how diverse Muslims in Denmark really are) from the controversy. Taken at an aggregated level there does not seem to be much evidence to the idea, often indirectly endorsed in much literature on Muslim minorities in the West, that Muslims derive preferred actions directly from the ultimate and unchangeable sources of Islam. It seems rather that the religious obligation to defend the prophet takes on context dependent forms and goes through context dependent transformations.

At the level of justifications of Muslim claims we retrieve the picture of a shift away from "blaming" especially *Jyllands-Posten*, through "injustice/victimage" frames, and towards more "neutral" justifications (rights-based, moral/ethical and consequential justifications), which sets in from phase two, but really materializes in phase three of the controversy.[8]

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Parallel to this development we see that religious justifications, although prominent throughout the controversy, were increasingly used by Muslims in phase three. One way of interpreting this result would be to say that Danish Muslims, under increased pressure, were retrieving to familiar and internally resonant, but externally dissonant, justifications of claims. However, if we look at the details of Muslim justifications, we realize that the increase in religious frames is due to the increased use of a certain kind: Religious affirmations of values stressed by many non-Muslim actors in the debate such as tolerance, non-violence, freedom of speech and democracy. The authoritative sources of Islam (Koran and the *Sunna* of the prophet Muhammad) are used to highlight certain aspects, norms and values of Islam. That exactly these values are accentuated at this point in the debate make good sense in light of the escalation of the conflict abroad and the increased criticism of Danish Muslims for being partly responsible for these escalations. Thus, the timing of the increase in this specific form of religious justifications lends support to the mechanism described above of "internalization of external pressures". Even though religious argumentation and references were central to it Muslim claims-making, for the most part, took on a context sensitive character, where, for example, certain "fitting" verses of Koran or aspects of Muhammad's *sunna* were highlighted.

My point regarding these discursive developments in Muslim claims-making is that they are best understood as changes driven by "transformative events" in the debate, both abroad and inside

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[8] In phase two the bulk of injustice frames referred to how Muslim protests have not been listened to in Denmark. Often these frames were linked to a defence of the imam-delegations going abroad.

Denmark. Thus, transformative events introduced new issues and called for new solutions, which were better justified using new, or new combinations of, justificational frames. The most significant discursive changes in Muslim claims-making were brought about by the discussion of the imam-delegations and the boycott in January, and especially by the violent escalations in the Middle East at the beginning of February 2006. These events changed "discursive opportunities" for Danish Muslims in the debate, making it harder to convincingly stress the gratuitous offence and unjust treatment of Muslims. At least three causal mechanisms converged in producing the observed change in the discursive elements of Muslim claims-making. First, massive de-certification of the violence abroad by authorities in Denmark, including Muslim religious authorities, e.g. Danish imams, and by the international community, including international Muslim authorities such as the *European Research and Fatwa Council*, put pressure on Muslim claimants in Denmark to officially distancing themselves from the use of violence. In fact, all Muslim organisations and religious authorities in Denmark who were active in the debate, including *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, did this in one way or the other. Silence would most certainly have been interpreted as acceptance of the violence by most bystanders. The de-certification of violence, secondly, interacted with the mechanism of internalization of external pressures described above, leading many Muslim actors in Denmark to affirm values of non-violence and dialogue through the citing of specific verses of Koran and elements of *Sunna*. These two mechanisms were, finally, advanced and amplified by the medialization of the very emotionally charged imagery of burning Danish flags and embassies. To many Muslims and non-Muslims this imagery simply did not compare to that of the twelve Muhammad caricatures that was proposed as the legitimazion of the violence by Muslims in the Middle East. Thus, just as the publication of the caricature seemed un-justified to many, so did the use of violence as a response. Danish Muslims adapted to these changed circumstances of the debate. However, the changed circumstances affected different Muslim actors in different ways as some were decertified as being "affiliated" or responsible in some way for the violence, and others certified by authorities in light of the events. The illegitimacy of the violence abroad seems to have affected the legitimacy of claims-making by different Muslim actors in Denmark in different ways. It is to the internal differences produced partly by these developments, partly by actor characteristics, that I now turn.

5. Multiple Muslim Discourses: Speaking of the same Religion?

The Muhammad caricatures debate in Denmark gave voice to a variety of Muslim actors, both regarding normative interpretations of Islam and regarding functionality within the Muslim community. In the following I will discuss the differences and similarities in content and justification of claims among various Muslim organisations (representing different normative versions of Islam and different organisational purposes). Figure 2 shows the relative distribution of claims-making by central Muslim organisations and the *Muslim Protest Coalition*, which was constituted by pre-existing Muslim organisations during the controversy.[9] The figure is produced

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[9] Most Muslims in Denmark are organised in local communities, often along ethno-cultural lines, which run small mosques. The organisations that were active in the public debate of the Muhammad caricatures were, however, the larger cross-ethnical organisations, which have a national focus, and who represent different Muslim voices in public debates of Muslim integration and the institutionalization of Islam in Denmark. In a servey done by *Catinét Research* on March 3, 2006, Muslim respondents were asked to express thier level of support for different Muslim organisations: *Muslims in Dialogue* (27.7%), *Democratic Muslims* (23.6%), *The Community of Islamic Faith* (15.5%), *The Network* (12.0%), *Critical Muslims* (8.0%) and *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (1.6%). Of these organisations only *The Community of Islamic Faith* was a part of the *Protest Coalition*, which, however, counted many of the more unobtrusive Turkish, Arabic and Somali "cultural" organisations with large numbers of members.

with a ten claims threshold, meaning that if an organisation represented less than ten claims in total I have coded it in the "others" category (18 organisations).

Figure 2. Shares of Total Muslim Claims-making of Central Muslim Organisations

N=226

Figure 2 shows that out of the Muslim claims-making done by Muslim organisations, 7 actors together represent more than 90% of the claims raised.

Cross-organisational Variance in Issues of Claims
Table 7 below shows the issues stressed by the main Muslim organisations in the controversy. We see that the different Muslim organisations to some extent agreed upon the salient issues of the controversy, but ranked them differently, and stressed different sub-issues within an issue-field. Thus, there is little proof for the claim found in some literature (e.g. Aminzade and Perry 2001) that shared religious identity leads to a common understanding of the situation, at least not in any strict sense.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Where *The Community of Islamic Faith* and the *Protest Coalition* (who in general were very similar in content and justification of claims) focused on the (legitimacy of) boycott and the imam-delegations, organisations like *Muslims in Dialogue* [Muslimer i Dialog] and *Democratic Muslims* stressed more issues of Muslim representation in Denmark. Central was thus criticism, especially from the *Democratic Muslims*, of the way *The Community of Islamic Faith* and the *Muslim Protest Coalition* claimed to represent Danish Muslims, and of their actions in doing so. *Hizb-ut Tahrir*

basically criticised the reactions to the caricatures by all other Muslims, be they religious authorities, who claimed that they were protecting the honour of the prophet, "fallen" Muslims who were not doing anything or Muslim governments in the Islamic world, who were doing too little and for the wrong reasons (preservation of their personal powerbase by accommodating public demands for a stronger "Islamic" profile). When looking at the issue-field of conflict resolution we see that *The Network* [they use the English term also in the Danish context] and *Muslims in Dialogue* were the strongest sponsors of dialogue/non-violence issues, while *The Community of Islamic Faith* and the *Protest Coalition* stressed issues of apologizing. *Democratic Muslims* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir* were the least focused on conflict resolution for, however, different reasons. *Democratic Muslims* seemed to focus instead on larger issues of integration, and saw the resolution of the caricatures crisis as linked to questions of Muslim integration (see next paragraph). *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, on the other hand, seemed simply less interested in ending the conflict, and certainly in issues of integration. Issues of discrimination were important for all Muslim organisations, each one stressing the gratuitous character of the caricatures and their publication, apart from the *Democratic Muslims*. This can be explained by the *Democratic Muslims*' understanding of the crisis, which largely recognised the gratuitous offence and the general harsh tone against Danish Muslims, but insisted that Muslims themselves encouraged this when they failed to make a clear distance from "radical Islam". The *Critical Muslims* [Forum for Kritiske Muslimer] is the only organisation, which spent considerable time on issues of "Islam as a religion": They examined religiously informed explanations of Muslim reactions and feelings towards the caricatures. In fact, Danish Muslims in general, here represented by a range of Muslim organisations, spent much time and energy in the debate focusing on discrimination and establishing "victimage", and little on explaining why these caricatures made all Muslims victims, and why they could be the "last straw that broke the camel's back".

Cross-organisational Variance in Prognostic Frames of Claims

When looking at the prognostic frames of the different Muslim organisations active in the controversy (Table 8 below) we find some proof for the claim found in the literature (see e.g. Snow et al. 1986) that frame disputes are particularly vivid around prognostic frames (table 8 shows a larger statistic correlation than both tables 7 and 9) . Differences are quite large in terms of both the overall direction of envisioned solutions and in specific proposals. However, most of the disagreement lay with two organisations – *Democratic Muslims* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. All organisations, beside *Democratic Muslims* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, stressed dialogue as a way of furthering dialogue and mutual understanding (the first or second preference of solution). The shared idea seems to have been that "*No matter what faith you belong to, the way forward is to talk to each other in a constructive way and to look at each other as equal partners in discussion*" (Material 4). Among the protagonists of dialogue, *The Network* was the most clear-cut exponent (44.4% of all their prognostic frames). Beside dialogue different organisations pointed to different supplement actions: *Muslims in Dialogue* stressed the importance of Muslims using only non-violent means, the *Protest Coalition* sponsored the call for a conviction of *Jyllands-posten*, while *The Community of Islamic Faith* called for a general defence of the holy prophet Muhammad. Here in the (bombastic) words of imam Ahmed Abu Laban: "*In this country and all over the world Muhammad must be respected and we shall insure that what ever the price, insahllah*" (Material 5).

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

Instead of dialogue, *Democratic Muslims* stressed the need for Muslims to distance themselves from "radical Islam" (32% of all prognostic frames), as well as the need for better socio-

economic integration of Muslims. In fact, *Democratic Muslims* perceived the problem and solution as two-fold: Marginalization of Muslims in Denmark fertilize radical Islam and radicalization processes. Only by improving Muslim attachment to mainstream society (socially, culturally, and politically), and by Muslim leaders saying clearly no to radical Islam, can such radicalization of especially the second generation of Muslim immigrants be avoided. Here in the words of Naser Khader, founder and front figure of *Democratic Muslims*:

> *What is needed is an organisation which protests the religious enveloping of the youth by fundamentalist imams, and which ensures that moderate Muslims are heard in the debate about Islam. Muslims who are against capital punishment and sharia, and who endorse religion as a private matte.* (in Arpi 2006)

The quote also shows that *Democratic Muslims* to some extent saw the creation of the organisation as an important landmark, an important part of the solution to the related problem of representation: The monopoly of representing Danish Muslims by "radical" religious authorities. It is interesting to see that it was only *Democratic Muslims* who saw the active de-affirmation of certain elements of Islam as necessary and fundamental to the pursuit of these goals. However, intra-organisational disagreement existed within *Democratic Muslims* on this, and other, issues. The founding father, and initial leader, of *Democratic Muslims*, MP Naser Khader, insisted on an explicit declaration of content to "the ten commandments of democracy", which was a mix of affirmation of basic principles of liberal democracy (freedom of speech, secularism, tolerance etc.) and de-affirmation of aspects of "Islamic" believes (*sharia* as a societal law, capital punishment etc.). Many rank-and-file members, and some board members, especially Hadi Khan, found the declaration un-nuanced, and called for recognition of the fact that one can believe in *sharia* and be a good democrat at the same time.[10]

   Hizb ut-Tahrir proposed their own unique solution to the controversy – a fix-it-all solution that would also ensure that a similar crisis would not occur in the future: The re-establishment of the *khalifat* - the resurrection of a strong Islamic state/empire, which built directly on the revelations of God. The idea is that such an Islamic world power would act as a shield for Muslims living anywhere, also as minorities in non-Muslim societies. Only a strong *khalifat* with a *khalif* who is willing to act forcefully, can ensure that Muslims and Islam are no longer mocked by *kufr* (the non-believers):

> *Determination and true will to end these tragedies can only be found in the establishment of the Khilafah-state for Muslims, which rule them with everything that Allah has revealed, and leads them in Jihad for Allah.* (Material 6).

To the members of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* this is not utopia, but a concrete goal that Muslims should work actively to achieve (see also Husain 2007). *Hizb ut-Tahrir* see themselves as a sort of "revolutionary avant-garde" in this endeavour, an elite who have reached a higher understanding of the courses of Muslim suffering, and who are obliged to spread this knowledge and actively work to install the right mentality in *ummah* (the global Muslim nation): "*Our task is important now. We must install the right mentality in ummah through discussions, enlightenment and different events in the mosques. There is no other way. This was the method of Muhammad (SAW). We must continue his battle*" (Material 7). To *Hizb ut-Tahrir* the caricatures were a piece of a larger strategy of "*psychological terror*" against Muslims in Denmark (and elsewhere), certified by the Danish government, and which ultimately was a strategy to force Muslims to give up Islam (see Material 8). In this light, protesting the caricatures in any way (through demonstrations, law suites,

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[10] Hadi Khan left the organisation over these disagreements in March 2007.

diplomacy, sending delegations, boycotts etc.) was seen as commendable, but insufficient. Concretely, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* criticised the "hypocrisy" of Danish "moderate" Muslims, who reached out to oppressing regimes in the Middle East – "the real enemies of Islam" – for support. Likewise, they criticized attempts at conflict resolution through forgiving dialogue or acceptance of apologies, as such "*forgiveness is ultimately the same as abandoning Islam*" (Material 7). The protests carried out by most Muslim actors were seen as shortterm outbursts of anger, which do not change anything in the long run. However, the many and large demonstrations against the caricatures around the world was seen as an indication of growing consciousness and will in *ummah*. The following quote is exemplary:

> *The anger which has risen in ummah must not ebb out like the one that occurred with the massacres of the intifada or with kufr's attack on Iraq in 2003. This anger must serve the Islamic nation in the long run. Anger without the right mentality always ends with the same result. It only produces temporary reactions, which will not ensure that the problems do not reoccur. How could the situation not be, if the love of the prophet that we see now was lived out in our own true Islamic state?* (Material 9).

The caricatures controversy was in reality a great opportunity for Muslims to realize the nature of their problems and the right way forward, the argument goes, because, *ummah* is more "amenable" when the facts are as clear as in the case of the caricatures.

Cross-organisational Variance in Justifications of Claims

The large content-wise focus on issues of discrimination and calls for dialogue in much claims-making by Muslim organisations (and Muslim actors at large) is reflected in the extensive use of "injustice" frames as justifications. This trend is clear, as seen from table 9 below, with especially *The Community of Islamic Faith*, the Protest Coalition and *Muslims in Dialogue*.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

Among the first two actors mentioned the framing of injustice often stressed the "weakness" of Danish Muslims – the way they constitute a marginalized minority without any profound resources and who are, consequently, easily overheard: "*We are helpless. We are weak. We tried to enter into dialogue, but in the name of secularism, nobody cared about what we might feel about this mocking of the most sacred in our religion*" (Material 10). This weakness discourse was juxtaposed to the "power" discourse used by *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (see below). *The Community of Islamic Faith* often bridged the weakness frames (and in general injustice frames) with rights-based justifications: Freedom of religion should be a right also for the weak minority, and protection of minorities should be a responsibility taken seriously by majorities – they should live up to international (human right) treaties in this respect. Both *Critical Muslims* and *Democratic Muslims* chose not to use injustice/victimage frames to any significant extent. However, they chose different alternatives. *Democratic Muslims* relied heavily upon rights-based justifications (57.1% of all their justifications). They stressed that freedom of speech is a fundamental or absolute right, and, thus, that giving special consideration to any kind of religious feelings is incompatible with the foundation of democracy: "*We should separate religion and politics and never put religion before the democratic rules of the game. Here in Denmark the Danish constitution is the highest authority*" (Material 3). *Critical Muslims*, on the other hand, relied largely on religious justifications of claims (no less than 70% of all their justificational frames). In fact, this result is a bit surprising given the common understanding of *Critical Muslims* as a group of "Euro-Muslims", who recognise

secularism (and the rules of the secular public sphere), and religion as a primarily private matter. The extensive use of religious argumentation despite these facts, should, I believe, be seen as a result of *Critical Muslims*' attempts in the debate at explaining, in religious terms, the feelings and grievances of Muslims. Other Muslim organisations, like *The Community of Islamic Faith* and the *Muslim Protest Coalition*, used religious rhetoric in a less explanatory and more offensive manner – as a way of condemning the caricatures and justifying protest:

> *Because Muhammad and his brothers, like the prophet Moses and the prophet Jesus, are the messengers of God, they cannot be mocked. It lies with any believer regardless of faith, not least anybody sober-minded, to prevent any mocking of such a great Prince with such tremendous effect on believers – even among the sober-minded rivals.* (Material 11).

The status of Muhammad as the prophet of God suffices to dismiss all criticism. Ahmed Abu Laban expressed a similar conviction when he in his Friday sermon religiously endorsed protest of the caricatures: *In Islam we are obliged to defend our prophet. We are obliged to talk. We are not requested to shut up and keep quit*" (Material 5). Still other organisations, like *Muslims in Dialogue*, *The Network* and *Democratic Muslims*, while they seldom retrieved to religious rhetoric, still used religious justifications in a more defensive and affirmative manner. The use of religious references to establish similarity between Muslim and non-Muslim traditions is seen in the following quote by an activist from *Muslims in Dialogue*:

> *I have at no point felt divided between the Muslim and the Danish part of me. In Denmark the mantra of the construction of the welfare state has been solidarity and cohesion – that you look after the weakest in society. One of the five pillars of Islam is exactly charity – the giving to the needy. So, where is the difference in fundamental values?* (Shanin 2006).

Finally, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* was the only organisation in Denmark to use religious frames to counter and reject values held central to the liberal democratic tradition, such as freedom of speech and dialogue: *"The idea of freedom of speech is un-Islamic, it pertains to the Western culture, why it is prohibited to embrace as Allah says: And everything which the messenger gives to you, you should embrace, and everything which he does not say you should reject"* (Material 12). Following this argument, Muslims who embrace freedom of speech are "fallen" Muslims (*takfir*), or Muslims who lack the right mentality due to the offensive assimilation strategy of the Danish government towards the Muslim minority. Another part of this assimilation strategy that many moderate Muslims have fallen for, according to *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, is the use of dialogue. *Hizb ut-Tahrir* was here explicitly criticising an understanding of dialogue, where dialogue is used to tell Muslims about "our" (superior) values. Besides, dialogue was never "the Islamic way" (Material 13). In general, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* exemplifies the most direct (and dogmatic) use of Koran verses as justifications of different viewpoints and actions. The words of Allah are definitive, and not dependent upon context. A last layer of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*'s way of justifying claims is the use of cultural and historical/traditional justifications. Members of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* used the metaphors of "culture battle" and "clash of civilizations" on a regular basis. The debate of the caricatures exemplified such fundamental tension, why Muslims must stand firm on their beliefs and not lose focus:

> *The attacks on Danish embassies have shifted focus so that the Danes now look like the innocent and persecuted to the world. Now it is all of a sudden about how Muslims should distance themselves to these attacks. The debate is no longer about Muhammad and the ongoing cultural battle between the Western and the Islamic world. There will always be a battle between kufr and Islam…(…)…We can only win this battle if we get ummah to support us, and they, inshallah, become receptive of our thoughts. In this way, inshallah, will we overcome the Western culture.* (Material 9).

The quote expresses a very reified perception of cultures as given and fundamentally opposed entities. The Islamic culture is praised, and the western culture dismissed as "rotten" (see also Material 14). The superiority of Islamic culture and the greatness of the *khalifat* was, in a similar way, underlined by frequent references to the history of the *khalifat*. As a justification of why the *khalifat* must be re-constructed, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* refered to the power and determination of the historical *khalif*:

> *What was common to all the khalifs no matter their military strength, was that when such things happened* [disrespect of Islam, ed.], *then they did not say come let us light some torches for peace and understanding, say you are sorry or, no, we want another type of apology. The first word spoken was on almost every occasion; war. That is how resolute the khalifat was.* (Material 9).

The future power of the resurrected *khalifat* was envisioned and brought to life through remembrance of Muslim greatness of old times. This power discourse stands in sharp contrast to the "weakness" discourse of other Muslim organisations described above.

When summing up the analysis of the different Muslim organisations' claims-making at least one thing seems clear: A common definition of the situation and of solutions do not spring from being Muslim. Two organisations, in particular, *Democratic Muslims* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, stood out from the rest, but in different ways. They represented the opposite poles on a continuum between religious minimalism and religious maximalism (Rothstein and Rothstein 2006: 96). *Democratic Muslims* stressed that religious beliefs should be kept a strictly private matter, and in doing so they represented a form of secular or cultural Islam. *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, on the other hand, fed on a dogmatic and all-embracing interpretation of Islam. To the members of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, Islam is a total way of life. The rest of the Muslim organisations placed themselves through their claims-making somewhere in between these two poles. *The Community of Islamic Faith* and the imams of the Protest Coalition were, at times, leaning towards religious maximalism, while *The Network*, *Muslims in Dialogue* and *Critical Muslims* were more solidly anchored around religious minimalism. Returning to the map of the debate as drawn up in figure one, we could say that *Democratic Muslims* come close to the discourse of *liberal absolutism*, while *Hizb ut-Tahrir* in their claims-making draw on the *mono-cultural* discourse. The discourses of the rest of the organisations adhere more to the multi-logical deliberation side of the model. However, *The Community of Islamic Faith* and the *Muslim protest coalition* did at times, when using religious reasoning in the most exclusive and offensive manner, slide towards the mono-culturalist corner of the model. It is difficult, based on the results of the above analysis, to place the remaining organisations unambiguously on the Y-axis (between *liberal tolerance* and *multiculturalism*). Very often organisations like *Muslims in Dialogue*, *The Community of Islamic Faith*, *The Network* and *Critical Muslims* drew on both sets of discursive repertoires, bridging frames or mixing contents and justifications in new ways. This picture shows a much more nuanced and differentiated picture of, for example, the discourse(s) of *The Community of Islamic Faith* (and the imams of the *Muslim Protest Coalition*) than the hostile "Islamic" one often presented in the media and by several political commentators. In fact, the full picture disconfirms swift generalisations like: "*Muslim reactions were justified by pointing to the fact that the illustrators and the newspaper Jyllands-Posten did something, which is forbidden according to Sharia – that is depicting Muhammad*" (Jespersen and Pittelkow 2006: 22). Danish Muslim actors protested the caricatures (or other Muslims' reactions) drawing on several and opposing interpretive packages, depending on time and embraced versions of normative Islam.

6. Muslim Discourses in Different Arenas: Speaking with two Tongues?

After discussing differences in the content and justification of claims among different Muslim organisations I now turn to a discussion of Muslim discourses as presented in two different contexts or arenas: a) Within the public sphere at large (claims in the newspaper material); and b) within the semi-public sphere internal to Muslim organisations (claims in the organisational material which was not meant for further publication appearing for example in internal newsletters, Friday sermons, internal meetings, intranet web-sites etc). The main idea is to test if there is any truth to the claims often heard in the Danish debate of the caricatures that Muslims speak with "two tongues" – they say one thing in public and another thing within the mosques (or within foreign Muslim public spheres). Such claims grew out of concrete incidents like Ahmed Abu Laban's seemingly contradictionary statements about the Muslim boycott of Danish products to Danish and Arabic journalists (bewailing it to Danish journalist, while praising it to the Arabic press), Ahmed Akkari's (the spokesman of the *Protest Coalition*) "death threats" of Naser Khader (founder of *Democratic Muslims*) caught with a hidden camera,[11] and the "mis-information" about Denmark, which seemed to arise in Middle Eastern newspapers following the visits of the imam-delegations. Besides such concrete incidents the "two tongues hypothesis" was nourished by general rumours about how some Muslims found in the Koran justification for such a strategy *(taqiyyah)* – of saying one thing to non-Muslims (even a lie), and another to fellow Muslims, if it would favour the course of Islam. In the context of the Muhammad caricatures the claim was that Danish Muslims in public pretended to be more moderate, liberal and oriented towards dialogue than they really were. However, if we look beyond these few incidents towards the general pattern of Muslim claims-making in these two different arenas is there then any proof of the "two tongues hypothesis"?

Table 10 suggests a no to the above question. In general Danish Muslims stressed the same issues whether they were in the public sphere, or airing claims internally (no statistically significant correlation).

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

Nevertheless, a few noticeable differences can be detected. Somewhat contrary to the "two tongues hypothesis" we find that Muslims on average were more inclined to take up issues of freedom of speech internally. Thus, the results do not suggest that Muslims when speaking among themselves were dismissing that the controversy had anything to do with freedom of speech. Likewise, even though Muslim handling of the conflict, and especially the issue of legitimate Muslim representation, was slightly more in focus in Muslim claims in the newspaper, it was not as if Muslim reactions were not discussed and criticised within. The only result which at first looks like it is in support of the "two tongues hypothesis" is the fact that Muslims stressed issues of conflict resolution more when raising claims in the public sphere at large. This could be interpreted in the way that some Muslim actors believed that the crisis was to their advantage, and were thus less interested in discussing solutions. However, if we look at the details we see that the difference is largely due to Muslims stressing general issues of conflict resolution more in the newspaper material, while they are in fact more preoccupied with the issue of dialogue and non-violence within the boundaries of Muslim organisations. This suggests that Muslim leaders saw it as their responsibility to commit constituents on peaceful protests and dialogue. In fact, several Muslim leaders, like Ahmed Abu Laban, suggested that they saw themselves as guarantors of peaceful protests and as security valves for young frustrations: *"We could have left the issue of the caricatures then* (after the dismiss of the Muslim ambassadors, ed.), *but we feared that it could*

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[11] A French TV-documentary about the controversy shows Ahmed Akkari in the backseat of a car, where he jokingly says about Naser Khader: "If he becomes minister should one not sent to guys to blow the ministry up?"

come to a situation like the one in Holland with the killing of Theo van Gogh" (Material 10). Finally, we find, not very surprisingly, that Muslims spend more time on issues of "Islam as a religion" in claims in the newspaper material; Muslims use the media attention to try to explain to non-Muslims basic facts about Islam, and especially that Muslims in Denmark represent many different interpretations of Islam.

At first glimpse table 11 might suggest more support for the "two tongues hypothesis." The differences between Muslim claims-making in the two arenas are somewhat larger when it comes to prognostic frames (V=0.18 for table 10 and V=0.33 for table 11).

TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

However, not many of the differences point in the direction of the "two tongues hypothesis" suggesting that Muslims were preaching anti-free speech and calling for violent protest or *jihad* in the mosques, while calling for peace and understanding in the public sphere. In fact, and in accordance with the point above, Muslim leaders were more inclined to call for non-violence in the organisational data than in the newspaper data (13.3% vs. 6.3%). Non-violence and dialogue were by far the most called for solutions internally in the Muslim community. These proposed solutions seem to be more then just strategic affirmations and adaptations to the context and the developments of the controversy. Table 11 also shows that Muslims were more inclined in the mediated claims to call upon the government (to put distance between themselves and the caricatures and to undertake a diplomatic meeting with Muslim ambassadors) and upon *Jyllands-Posten* (to apologize for the printing of the caricatures) for certain actions, which could help resolve the conflict. This result reflects, I believe, the fact that Danish Muslim actors used the media to communicate claims and propose solutions to opponents and other stakeholders. The only support of the "two tongues hypothesis" in table 11 is the strong internal call for protest in the name of the prophet, calls to stand up and defend his honour. Thus, Danish Muslims seem on average to insist on continued (peaceful) protest of the caricatures, especially when raising claims internally. However, rather than seeing this result as a proof of Muslims speaking with two tongues, it should be seen in the light of the motivational character of internal claims-making as opposed to the more communicative character of external claims-making. For example, when some imams during the Friday sermons infused in congregated participants the moral and religious obligation of protesting the caricatures, this should not, as it often was by journalists, necessarily be seen as a claim of implacability and aggression vis-à-vis the public at large, but rather as a call for internal support. The simple point here is to see that the meaning of claims cannot be translated on a one-to-one basis between the two different arenas of claims-making. The extensive talk about two-tongued Muslim claims-making in the Danish debate seems to stem partly from the inability or unwillingness of many commentators to realize this. Accusations of two-tongued talk is likely to develop when we insist upon absolute congruence between internal and external claims-making, which was often the case with Muslim claims-making during the Muhammad caricatures controversy.

Looking at justificational frames across the two arenas of Muslim claims-making we see some quite large differences (statistically significant correlation). For example, injustice frames are by far the most used justifications of claims mediated in the newspaper, *Berlingske Tidende* (35.6% vs. 25.7%), while religious justifications heavily dominate internal Muslim claims-making (36.3% vs. 28.8%).

TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE

Muslims on average used "secular arguments" more when raising claims in the public sphere at large than when airing claims within the organisational material. However, rather then saying this as proof of the "two tongues hypothesis", I see this as a quite natural result of adapting one's message to the audience – of trying to ensure resonance. Danish Muslims seem able to translate their religious despair to a discourse of injustice/victimage when entering the public sphere. This translation is partly strategic, aimed at maximizing chances of invoking sympathy with potential non-Muslim allies. The strategic adaptation can also be detected in the way the use of religious justifications in the public sphere, when occurring, is of the affirming and defensive kind, while religious justifications in, for example, the mosque can stress the holiness of the prophets and citing the holy texts in a more aggressive way. However, it would be wrong to read this adaptation as a sign of Danish Muslims lying about their real intentions or manipulating the Danish non-Muslim population. The references to central (liberal) values, rights and duties inherent in the injustice frames, rights-based frames and affirmative religious justifications in public Muslim claims-making was more than a play for the gallery, more than strategic rhetoric. In fact, Danish Muslims used rights-based justifications more in internal claims-making than in external claims-making (22.1% vs. 13.6%).

Summing up: While the results presented above show some proof that Muslims adjusted the content and, especially, the justification of claims according to the arena of claims-making and potential listeners, there is not much that suggests that they were speaking with "two tongues" – saying fundamentally different things in different contexts. To situate a message in different ways depending on who you address is not the same as speaking with two or more tongues. It is something everybody who wants to get a message across must do to some extent. Danish Muslims were not doing anything different from, say, a unionist giving a fulmination at a union congress, and then speaking in a more mellow tone to journalists afterwards. Or, from the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who used metaphors of family and kinship ties when addressing an Arabic audience in an interview with *Al-Arabiy*a on 2 February, 2006. Resonance-building is a precondition for successful communication (see Williams 2004), not necessarily a sign of hidden agendas and manipulation. That Danish Muslims were, to some extent, strategically adapting their claims-making to their audience is not a sign of "foul play". If anything it is a sign of knowledge and ability of playing by the rules of the secular public sphere.

7. Conclusions

The Danish debate of the Muhammad caricatures began as a debate of the limits of free speech vis-à-vis Islam in the public sphere. However, its thematic scope widened as time passed, creating several interrelated sub-debates. Actions and re-actions regarding the caricatures, by both Muslim and non-Muslim actors, became controversial issues of debate in their own right involving more and more segments of society. In this way the publication of the Muhammad caricatures grew from being a statement of free speech and criticism of Islam to become a matter of a much wider set of issues including legal justice, economical prosperity, social cohesion, inter-cultural tolerance, political conflict management, religious diversity and even global peace. Speaking in discourse analytical terms, we can say that the publication of the Muhammad caricatures activated many different discourses, which blended in several interpretative packages, at times challenging the discursive hegemony of the secular and liberal political order in Denmark. The intensity of the Danish debate had to do with exactly this perceived challenge.

From the beginning of the debate Danish Muslims were central claimants. However, as the above analysis has shown, the content and justification of Muslim claims varied in many ways. First, Muslim claims varied from non-Muslim claims by giving different priority to certain issues, prognosis and justifications. The differences between Muslim and non-Muslim claims in the debate were on average ones of priority, focus and degree rather than of substance and principle. Danish Muslims refused to accept the proposed terms of debate focusing on free speech, insisting instead that the caricatures where a matter of gratuitous offence, without, however, denying the importance of free speech and freedom of the press. In a similar way we saw how one of the most distinctive features of Muslim claims-making – the use of religious justifications – was often used, not to dismiss secular value-judgements, but to bridge religious worldviews and secular principles. Rather than speaking different languages, I conclude that Muslims and non-Muslims in the debate spoke different dialects of the same language. They stressed different interpretations and implications of the principles of the secular public sphere. But it should be noted here that very few Muslim actors questioned the basic principles. Considering the degree of alienation experienced by Danish Muslims under and after the Muhammad caricatures controversy this point must be underlined.

Secondly, Muslim claims, and their constitutive discursive elements, varied across time. My point regarding these developments in Muslim claims-making is that they are best understood as changes driven by the "transformative events" of the controversy, both abroad and within Denmark. "Transformative events" introduced new issues and called for new solutions, which were better justified using new, or new combinations of, justificational frames. In other words, the conditions of the debate changed. This was especially true for Muslim actors after the imam-delegations, the boycott and the violent attacks on Danish embassies. These events abroad changed the discursive opportunities for Muslims in Denmark. This was manifested in a slide away from focusing on the gratuitous nature of the publication and related prognostic frames of compensation framed in terms of injustice and victimage, to issues of Muslim handling of the conflict and calls for dialogue and non-violence justified in terms of rights and duties. Even though this trend can be found also within non-Muslim claims-making, the transformative events abroad had more intense effects on the content and justification of Muslim claims. Following this, one conclusion to be drawn is that these transformative events through mechanisms of medialization and actor certification/de-certification had diverse effects on actors' opportunities for formulating further claims in the debate. My cross-temporal analysis does not support the idea that the exchange of arguments in the public sphere leads actors to modify their positions in response to persuasion and mutual adaptation – the ideal of public debate. Most actors entered the discussion with certain perceptions, and in most cases these perceptions were sustained throughout the cause of the debate. Danish Muslims did not come to accept the primary framing of the caricatures in free speech terms. Instead, the timing of the observed changes in Muslim claims-making suggests that specific transformative events made (some) Danish Muslims tone down certain arguments and solutions in a strategic rather than deliberative manner.

Thirdly, the content and justification of Muslim claims varied among different Muslim organisations. My main conclusion here is that Danish Muslim actors protested the caricatures (or other Muslims' reactions) drawing on several and opposing interpretive packages, depending on time and dominating versions of normative Islam. The variance between different Muslim organisations seems to stem from different normative interpretations of Islam, and, thus, in goals for organising and participating in the debate. Put simply, the content and justification of claims by different Muslim organisations depend on whether you are striving for a society in which Islam is the organising set of ideas, also in the political sphere, or a society where religion is a strictly private matter, and secularism the rule of the political game, or, as in most cases something, in between these two poles. Thus, *Hizb ut-Tahrir*'s dissonant counter-framing of "Western" ideas of

free speech, democracy and dialogue in the Muhammad controversy is closely linked to their goal of resurrecting the *caliphate* and the rule of "true" Islam. One simple, but often overlooked, conclusion here is that the *same* religious doctrines can be used to interpret the same events and situations in multiple ways. Muslim claims-making is not simply derived from Islamic ideology in a straightforward manner. Which religious references and traditions should be highlighted is a contingent choice, making it possible to deploy Muslim religious rhetoric within opposing interpretive packages. Danish Muslims were in the controversy deploying multicultural, monocultural, liberal absolutist as well as liberal tolerant depictions of Islam.

Finally, Muslim claims varied in their discursively components according to the arena of claims-making, in the public sphere at large (newspaper material) and the semi-public sphere internal to Muslim organisations (most organisational material). In contrast to the "two tongues" hypothesis I argue that this variance, especially seen in justificational framing of claims, should be seen as strategic adaptation by Muslim actors to the different audiences, rather as proof of Muslims saying fundamentally different things in the different contexts. Danish Muslims translated their religiously based despair and grievances to a language of rights, duties and public virtue when entering the larger public sphere. Rather than as a sign of "foul play" I see this as an important indicator of the ability of Danish Muslims to formulate claims in accordance with the principles of the secular public sphere.

Taken as a whole the analysis of Danish Muslim claims-making during the Muhammad caricatures controversy leaves room for future optimism vis-à-vis the political cultural integration of the Muslim minority in Denmark. In contrast to the popular view of Islam, and as a consequence of Muslim claims-making, as "resilient" and "stagnated", and, thus, dissonant within a secular democratic setting, the analysis here finds that Danish Muslim claims-making, at large, is adapted and flexible vis-à-vis changing conditions. The analysis suggests that there is little *sui generis* to "Muslim claims-making", which should make it inherently difficult to reconcile with the dominant discourses of secular democracy. What we saw instead in the Muhammad caricatures controversy was a few Muslim actors who were deliberately negating the principles of the liberal and secular public sphere, while the vast majority of Muslim actors in the controversy managed to bridge religious sentiments with liberal notions of freedom of speech, discrimination, injustice, dialogue, deliberation and conflict resolution. While Danish Muslims to a large extent insisted on certain interpretations and implications of the principles of the secular public sphere they were at the same time affirming these very principles.

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Appendix 1: Tables

Table 1. Issues of All Claims. Non-Muslim vs. Muslim Actors[a]

		Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total
Muslim Handling of Conflict	Frequency	70	55	125
	Percentage	11.4	29.7	15.7
Freedom of Speech	Frequency	108	7	115
	Percentage	17.6	3.8	14.4
Government Handling of Conflict	Frequency	90	7	97
	Percentage	14.7	3.8	12.2
Conflict Resolution/Prevention	Frequency	64	33	97
	Percentage	10.4	17.8	12.2
Discrimination	Frequency	42	21	63
	Percentage	6.9	11.4	7.9
Integration	Frequency	41	17	58
	Percentage	6.7	9.2	7.3
Violence	Frequency	39	15	54
	Percentage	6.4	8.1	6.8
Tolerance/Respect	Frequency	44	4	48
	Percentage	7.2	2.2	6.0
Islam as a Religion	Frequency	21	16	37
	Percentage	3.4	8.6	4.6
Media	Frequency	31	2	33
	Percentage	5.1	1.1	4.1
Equality/Parity	Frequency	22	4	26
	Percentage	3.6	2.2	3.3
Globalization	Frequency	18	1	19
	Percentage	2.9	0.5	2.4
Other Issues	Frequency	23	3	26
	Percentage	3.8	1.6	3.3
Total	Frequency	613	185	798
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. All tables show only the aggregated coding categories. Sub-categories are left out in order to enhance clarity.
b. $x^2 = 229.99$, P= 0.00, V= 0.54

Table 2. Prognostic Frames of All Claims. Muslim vs. Non-Muslim Actors[a]

		Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total
Tolerance/respect	Frequency	58	21	79
	Percentage	20.4	22.1	20.8
Freedom of speech	Frequency	52	9	61
	Percentage	18.3	9.5	16.1
Government actions	Frequency	49	12	61
	Percentage	17.3	12.6	16.1
Muslim actions	Frequency	18	28	46
	Percentage	6.3	29.5	12.1
Media actions	Frequency	27	11	38
	Percentage	9.5	11.6	10.0
Benchmarking	Frequency	28	3	31
	Percentage	9.9	3.2	8.2
Equality/parity	Frequency	14	5	19
	Percentage	4.9	5.3	5.0
Discrimination	Frequency	11	2	13
	Percentage	3.9	2.1	3.4
Puclic investigation	Frequency	13	0	13
	Percentage	4.6	0.0	3.4
Integration	Frequency	6	2	8
	Percentage	2.1	2.1	2.1
Secularism	Frequency	4	1	5
	Percentage	1.4	1.1	1.3
Other	Frequency	4	1	5
	Percentage	1.4	1.1	1.3
Total	Frequency	284	95	379
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 125.81$, P= 0.00, V= 0.58

Table 3. Justifications of All Claims. Muslim vs. Non-Muslim Actors[a]

		Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total
Injustice/victimage	Frequency	38	21	59
	Percentage	13.0	35.6	16.8
Rights-based justification	Frequency	58	8	66
	Percentage	19.9	13.6	18.8
Religious justification	Frequency	1	17	18
	Percentage	0.3	28.8	5.1
Cultural justification	Frequency	47	4	51
	Percentage	16.1	6.8	14.5
Economical justification	Frequency	13	0	13
	Percentage	4.5	0.0	3.7
Historical/traditional justification	Frequency	56	0	56
	Percentage	19.2	0.0	16.0
Consequentialist justification	Frequency	45	7	52
	Percentage	15.4	11.9	14.8
Moral/ethical justification	Frequency	33	2	35
	Percentage	11.3	3.4	10.0
Other	Frequency	1	0	1
	Percentage	0.3	0.0	0.3
Total	Frequency	292	59	351
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 147.12$, P= 0.00, V= 0.65

Table 4. Issues of Muslim Claims across Phases of the Controversy[a]

		Phase 1[b]	**Phase 2**	**Phase 3**	**Phase 4**	**Total**
Muslim Handling of Conflict	Frequency	11	36	27	15	89
	Percentage	20.0	38.3	25.5	25.4	28.3
Conflict Resolution/Prevention	Frequency	6	20	20	4	50
	Percentage	10.9	21.3	18.9	6.8	15.9
Discrimination	Frequency	14	7	9	13	43
	Percentage	25.5	7.4	8.5	22.0	13.7
Integration	Frequency	3	3	15	9	30
	Percentage	5.5	3.2	14.2	15.3	9.6
Violence	Frequency	8	2	13	2	25
	Percentage	14.5	2.1	12.3	3.4	8.0
Islam as a Religion	Frequency	3	5	6	8	22
	Percentage	5.5	5.3	5.7	13.6	7.0
Freedom of Speech	Frequency	3	6	5	3	17
	Percentage	5.5	6.4	4.7	5.1	5.4
Government Handling of Conflict	Frequency	2	7	2	2	13
	Percentage	3.6	7.4	1.9	3.4	4.1
Equality/Parity	Frequency	2	4	3	0	9
	Percentage	3.6	4.3	2.8	0.0	2.9
Tolerance/Respect	Frequency	1	0	3	2	6
	Percentage	1.8	0.0	2.8	3.4	1.9
Media	Frequency	1	2	2	0	5
	Percentage	1.8	2.1	1.9	0.0	1.6
Other Issues	Frequency	1	2	1	1	5
	Percentage	1.8	2.2	0.9	1.7%	1.6
Total	Frequency	55	94	106	59	314
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. x^2 = 60.68, P= 0.00, V= 0.25

b. Phase 1: 30-09-05 to 25-12-05, Phase 2: 26-12-05 to 03-02-06, Phase 3: 04-02-06 to 25-02-06, Phase 4: 26-02-06 to 20-03-06

Table 5. Prognostic Frames of Muslim Claims across Phases of the Controversy[a]

		Phase 1[b]	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Total
Muslim actions	Frequency	15	21	23	6	65
	Percentage	44.1	31.3	36.5	20.7	33.7
Tolerance/respect	Frequency	5	14	15	6	40
	Percentage	14.7	20.9	23.8	20.7	20.7
Media actions	Frequency	9	8	1	0	18
	Percentage	26.5	11.9	1.6	0.0	9.3
Government actions	Frequency	2	8	3	2	15
	Percentage	5.9	11.9	4.8	6.9	7.8
Freedom of speech	Frequency	2	7	2	3	14
	Percentage	5.9	10.4	3.2	10.3	7.3
Equality/parity	Frequency	1	4	3	3	11
	Percentage	2.9	6.0	4.8	10.3	5.7
Benchmarking	Frequency	0	1	4	4	9
	Percentage	0.0	1.5	6.3	13.8	4.7
Reconstructing the Khalifat	Frequency	0	2	5	2	9
	Percentage	0.0	3.0	7.9	6.9	4.7
Integration	Frequency	0	1	2	3	6
	Percentage	0.0	1.5	3.2	10.3	3.1
Discrimination	Frequency	0	1	3	0	4
	Percentage	0.0	1.5	4.8	0.0	2.1
Other	Frequency	0	0	2	0	2
	Percentage	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.5
Total	Frequency	34	67	63	29	193
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 55.18$, P = 0.00, V = 0.31

b. Phase 1: 30-09-05 to 25-12-05, Phase 2: 26-12-05 to 03-02-06, Phase 3: 04-02-06 to 25-02-06, Phase 4: 26-02-06 to 20-03-06

Table 6. Justifications of Muslim Claims across Phases of the Controversy[a]

		Phase 1[b]	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Total
Religious justification	Frequency	10	13	25	10	58
	Percentage	32.3	25.0	50.0	25.6	33.7
Injustice/victimage	Frequency	13	14	7	16	50
	Percentage	41.9	26.9	14.0	41.0	29.1
Rights-based justification	Frequency	5	12	10	6	33
	Percentage	16.1	23.1	20.0	15.4	19.2
Consequentialist justification	Frequency	1	5	3	2	11
	Percentage	3.2	9.6	6.0	5.1	6.4
Historical justification	Frequency	2	2	1	3	8
	Percentage	6.5	3.8	2.0	7.7	4.7
Cultural justification	Frequency	0	4	3	0	7
	Percentage	0.0	7.7	6.0	0.0	4.1
Moral/ethical justification	Frequency	0	2	1	2	5
	Percentage	0.0	3.8	2.0	5.1	2.9
Total	Frequency	31	52	50	39	172
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 24.53$, P = 0.14, V = 0.22
b. Phase 1: 30-09-05 to 25-12-05, Phase 2: 26-12-05 to 03-02-06, Phase 3: 04-02-06 to 25-02-06, Phase 4: 26-02-06 to 20-03-06

Table 7. Issues of Muslim Claims by different Muslim Organisations[a]

	Muslims in Dialogue		Critical Muslims		Protest coalition		Community of Islamic Faith		Democratic Muslims		Hizb ut-Tahrir		The Network		Others		Total	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Muslim handling of conflict	8	14.5	3	20.0	9	22.0	23	35.4	16	38.1	9	34.6	3	27.2	7	22.6	78	27.3
Conflict resolution/prevention	10	18.2	2	13.3	9	22.0	9	13.8	3	7.1	3	11.5	5	45.5%	7	22.6	48	16.8
Discrimination	8	14.5	3	20.0	7	17.1	7	10.8	2	4.8	8	30.8	0	0.0	4	12.9	39	13.6
Integration	5	9.1	1	6.7	3	7.3	4	6.2	10	23.8	1	3.8	2	18.2	1	3.2	27	9.4
Violence	9	16.4	2	13.3	2	4.9	4	6.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	16.1	22	7.7
Islam as a religion	1	1.8	3	20.0	1	2.4	6	9.2	5	11.9	2	7.7	0	0.0	3	9.7	21	7.3
Freedom of speech	2	3.6	0	0.0	5	12.2	6	9.2	0	0.0	3	11.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	5.6
Gov. handling of conflict	6	10.9	1	6.7	2	4.9	1	1.5	3	7.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	13	4.5
Equality/parity	2	3.6	0	0.0	2	4.9	3	4.6	1	2.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.2	9	3.1
Tolerance/respect	2	3.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	9.1	2	6.5	5	1.7
Media	2	3.6	0	0.0	1	2.4	1	1.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.2	5	1.7
Other issues	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.5	2	4.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	1.0
Total	55	100	15	100	41	100	65	100	42	100	26	100	11	100	31	100	286	100

a. x^2= 114.50, P= 0.00, V= 0.24

Table 8. Prognosis of Muslim Claims by different Muslim Organisations[a]

	Muslims in Dialogue		Critical Muslims		Protest coalition		Community of Islamic Faith		Democratic Muslims		Hizb ut-Tahrir		The Network		Others		Total	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Muslim actions	12	31.6	3	60.0	8	22.9	14	32.6	12	48.0	5	26.3	2	22.2	6	54.5	62	33.5
Tolerance/respect	10	26.3	1	20.0	7	20.0	10	23.3	2	8.0	0	0.0	5	55.6	3	27.3	38	20.5
Media actions	1	2.6	0	0.0	10	28.6	5	11.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	8.6
Government actions	3	7.9	1	20.0	3	8.6	3	7.0	3	12.0	1	5.3	0	0.0	1	9.1	15	8.1
Freedom of speech	1	7.1	0	0.0	5	14.3	7	16.3	0	0.0	1	5.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	7.6
Equality/parity	3	7.9	0	0.0	2	5.7	2	4.7	3	12.0	1	5.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	11	5.9
Reconstructing the Caliphate	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	9	47.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	9	4.9
Benchmarking	3	7.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	4.7	1	4.0	0	0.0	2	22.2	0	0.0	8	4.3
Integration	3	7.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	12.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	3.2
Discrimination	2	5.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	5.3	0	0.0	1	9.1	4	2.2
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	4.0	1	5.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	1.1
Total	38	100.0	5	100.0	35	100.0	43	100.0	25	100.0	19	100.0	9	100.0	11	100.0	185	100.0

a. $x^2 = 175.45$, P = 0.00, V = 0.37

Table 9. Justifications of Muslim Claims by different Muslim Organisations[a]

	Muslims in Dialogue		Critical Muslims		Protest coalition		Community of Islamic Faith		Democratic Muslims		Hizb ut-Tahrir		The Network		Others		Total	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Religious justification	4	20.0	7	70.0	8	25.8	16	37.2	3	14.3	15	21.7	1	50.0	4	40.0	58	34.9
Injustice/victimage	7	35.0	0	0.0	17	54.8	15	34.9	1	4.8	6	20.7	0	0.0	3	30.0	49	29.5
Rights-based justification	3	15.0	2	20.0	3	9.7	9	20.9	12	57.1	0	0.0	1	50.0	0	0.0	30	18.1
Consequentialist justification	3	15.0	1	10.0	1	3.2	1	2.3	2	9.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	30.0	11	6.6
Historical justification	1	5.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.3	1	4.8	5	17.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	4.8
Cultural justification	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.2	0	0.0	1	4.8	3	10.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	3.0
Moral/ethical justification	2	10.0	0	0.0	1	3.2	1	2.3	1	4.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	3.0
Total	20	100.0	10	100.0	31	100.0	43	100.0	21	100.0	29	100.0	2	100.0	10	100.0	166	100.0

a. $x^2 = 94.18$, P = 0.00, V = 0.31

Table 10. Issues of Muslim Claims by different Arenas of Claims-making[a]

		Berlingske Tidende	**Organisational Material**	**Total**
Muslim Handling of Conflict	Frequency	55	34	89
	Percentage	29.7	26.4	28.3
Conflict Resolution/Prevention	Frequency	33	17	50
	Percentage	17.8	13.2	15.9
Discrimination	Frequency	21	22	43
	Percentage	11.4	17.1	13.7
Integration	Frequency	17	13	30
	Percentage	9.2	10.1	9.6
Violence	Frequency	15	10	25
	Percentage	8.1	7.8	8.0
Islam as a Religion	Frequency	16	6	22
	Percentage	8.6	4.7	7.0
Freedom of Speech	Frequency	7	10	17
	Percentage	3.8	7.8	5.4
Government Handling of Conflict	Frequency	7	6	13
	Percentage	3.8	4.7	4.1
Equality/Parity	Frequency	4	5	9
	Percentage	2.2	3.9	2.9
Tolerance/Respect	Frequency	4	2	6
	Percentage	2.2	1.6	1.9
Media	Frequency	2	3	5
	Percentage	1.1	2.3	1.6
Other Issues	Frequency	4	1	5
	Percentage	2.1	0.8	1.6
Total	Frequency	185	129	314
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 9.89$, P = 0.54, V = 0.18

Table 11. Prognostic Frames of Muslim Claims within different Arenas of Claims-making[a]

		Berlingske Tidende	Organisational Material	Total
Muslim actions	Frequency	28	37	65
	Percentage	29.5	37.8	33.7
Tolerance/respect	Frequency	21	19	40
	Percentage	22.1	19.4	20.7
Media actions	Frequency	11	7	18
	Percentage	11.6	7.1	9.3
Government actions	Frequency	12	3	15
	Percentage	12.6	3.1	7.8
Freedom of speech	Frequency	9	5	14
	Percentage	9.5	5.1	7.3
Equality/parity	Frequency	5	6	11
	Percentage	5.3	6.1	5.7
Benchmarking	Frequency	3	6	9
	Percentage	3.2	6.1	4.7
Reconstructing the Khalifat	Frequency	0	9	9
	Percentage	0.0	9.2	4.7
Integration	Frequency	2	4	6
	Percentage	2.1	4.1	3.1
Discrimination	Frequency	2	2	4
	Percentage	2.1	2.0	2.1
Other	Frequency	2	0	2
	Percentage	2.1	0.0	1.0
Total	Frequency	95	98	193
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 21.49$, P = 0.01, V = 0.33

Table 12. Justifications of Muslim Claims within different Arenas of Claims-making[a]

		Berlingske Tidende	**Organisational Material**	**Total**
Religious justification	Frequency	17	41	58
	Percentage	28.8	36.3	33.7
Injustice/ victimage	Frequency	21	29	50
	Percentage	35.6	25.7	29.1
Rights-based justification	Frequency	8	25	33
	Percentage	13.6	22.1	19.2
Consequentialist justification	Frequency	7	4	11
	Percentage	11.9	3.5	6.4
Historical justification	Frequency	0	8	8
	Percentage	0.0	7.1	4.7
Cultural justification	Frequency	4	3	7
	Percentage	6.8	2.7	4.1
Moral/ethical justification	Frequency	2	3	5
	Percentage	3.4	2.7	2.9
Total	Frequency	59	113	172
	Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. $x^2 = 13.51$, P = 0.03, V = 0.28