The Government of Judges
The Impact of the European Court of Justice on the Constitutional Order of the United Kingdom

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INTRODUCTION
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1. THE INTERACTION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS

This work deals with the relationship between legal systems. It looks for and at the evidence that the legal system of the European Communities, as developed by the European Court of Justice, has influenced and shaped the internal order of the English and Scottish legal systems, particularly in the spheres of constitutional and administrative law.

First of all, it might be appropriate to give a note on methodology. The approach which is adopted to clarify the relationship between these bodies of law is primarily one of case-law analysis. Cases from the European Court of Justice and from the national courts of the United Kingdom are examined and their judgments subjected to close scrutiny.

Judicial pronouncements of particular interest because, under Common law systems (among which I would, for these purposes, group Scots Law) it is what judges say when on the Bench that has normative weight. The doctrinal writings of contemporary legal scholars are rarely openly
referred to in or by the courts and even then they have, at most, persuasive force. 1

Thus, questions as to the extent to which Community law has been taken into the legal systems of Scotland and England will be resolved by examining the judgments of the courts of those countries rather than by looking at the writings of legal academics. In common law systems the latter are of interest in predicting or advocating how the law might be developed, but the only authoritative pronouncements as to the present state of the law are made by judges when acting as judges and deciding cases.

Such a concentration on judicial activity might tend to give the impression that legal hierarchies form elements in a closed system whose frame of reference is and should be only to those norms which have validity within that system. 2 However such a strict positivist analysis would give no clear explanation for change and development in a legal system in the absence of formal legislative enactments,

1. See Van Caenegem Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History, 1987 in particular "Jurists are dispensable" at 53-67

specifically in the acceptance by judges and lawyers of standards, tests and values which have their origins outside the formal parameters of their own legal system. When these borrowed standards were formed in the context of another "foreign" legal system this phenomenon may be termed the "reception" of law.

2. LEGAL RECEPTIONS AND TRANSPLANTATIONS

(i) Examples of the reception of law

The general definition of "reception of law" as the penetration of one system of laws into other legal systems is, however, insufficiently precise. It could mean simply the partial reception of law by way of individual legal borrowings or transplants of individual legal concepts from other systems, an example of this would perhaps be the statutory introduction of the law relating to trusts (an English concept) into Scots law. What I am interested, however, is the model of full reception whereby a whole new body of authoritative doctrine is taken up by one legal system from another and that other

3. For an attempt to develop a theory of such legal change see Watson The Evolution of Law, 1985.

4. For further examples see Alan Watson Legal Transplants, 1974.
system is accepted to be a source of "higher law".

The primary exemplar of this phenomenon is clearly the reception of Roman law into the various systems of customary law which applied in mediaeval mainland Europe and in Scotland. With the re-discovery of Justinian's *Corpus Iuris Civilis* in the West and the development of legal studies within the emerging universities of Europe, Roman law, as interpreted over the centuries by the Glossators, the Commentators and Humanists, was accepted as an authoritative source of law. Roman law was seen, throughout Western Continental Europe and Scotland, to be a higher law which supplemented gaps in the prevailing customary laws, and in some cases, came to replace customary law fully.  

In England, however, Roman law was not received as an authoritative source. In England customary law was taught, developed and defended not in the universities but in the Inns of Court, the schools of the barristers who practised before the courts. English legal education was accordingly isolated from the academic

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5. For a general outline of the reception of Roman law in Western Europe see Robinson, Fergus, Gordon An Introduction to European Legal History, 1985
developments taking place in the universities throughout Europe. Thus, English law developed outside the trends of European legal history. 6

However, in its own history English law mirrored Roman law in becoming an authoritative source and model for other legal systems. English law was exported and received into other jurisdictions with the growth of the British colonialism. The United States, Canada, (including Quebec), Australia, India, Ceylon, the West Indies, Hong Kong and Singapore, South Africa, Israel, and Scotland since its political union with England in 1707, were all subject to the influence of English law and their legal systems have been marked as a result. 7

The reception of laws continues in the present day. A more recent example of partial reception is the export of certain aspects of United States law, particularly those laws relating to cartels and to anti-competitive practices to certain American trading partners, notably Japan, in the interests of ensuring fair and free trade between the countries.


7. See generally Hooker Legal Pluralism: an introduction to colonial and neo-colonial laws, 1975
Free trade is also the apparent driving force behind the most recent example of full-scale reception of laws, namely the reception of European Community law within the municipal legal systems of the Member States. Thus, while the English legal system may have succeeded in developing outside the trends of European legal history, with the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community the Scottish and English legal systems have become dependent upon a system of laws being developed by the European Court of Justice.

(ii) Two modes of legal reception

As well as partial and full reception, one might distinguish two modes by which foreign law is received: directly and indirectly. Direct reception would be the formal imposition of another system's standards and approaches on to the receiving legal system; indirect reception is rather a process of legal osmosis, whereby foreign legal concepts spillover into the workings of the other legal system, notwithstanding the absence of any formal legal norm requiring the application of the other legal system's standards.
I will look at the manner and pace of this reception of the new body of Community law into the legal systems of the United Kingdom. The evidence for both direct and indirect reception of Community law concepts into the municipal law of the United Kingdom will be looked at and its significance considered. This empirical study is ultimately aimed at assessing the possibilities for and likelihood of the development of a "European Common Law" formed from a marriage, sealed by the European Court of Justice, between the civilian systems of the Continent and the common law systems found in the British Isles.

3. **SCHEMATIC OUTLINE**

In Chapter 1 we consider the gradual transformation of the foundation Treaties of the European Communities into "constitutional documents" which form the basis for an independent legal order. This is a process which began almost immediately the Court of...
Justice of the European Communities was set up in 1957. It has been continuing to the present day, most recently with the apparent development by the Court of the idea that certain provisions of the foundations Treaties of the European Communities are entrenched and may no longer be amended.

By the time of the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Communities in 1972 it was clear that Community law formed a distinct legal system which was capable of creating directly effective rights for the nationals of Member States which were not only independent of national laws but were to be regarded as superior to them. In Chapter 2 we look at the way in which the doctrine of the superiority of Community law was gradually taken up by the courts of the United Kingdom, a process which culminated in Factortame 2 in which the House of Lords unequivocally accepted their duty under Community law to disapply Acts of Parliament which they considered to be contrary to rights guaranteed under Community law. The acceptance by the courts of the supremacy of Community law is the prerequisite to the full reception of Community law into national law.
In Chapter 3 we examine one of the consequences of the United Kingdom courts' acceptance of the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law, namely the growth of the judicial review of national legislation for its conformity with Community law. Of particular importance in this regard is the principle of proportionality which Community law requires to be applied, in a number of instance, in the assessment of the "validity" of national legislation. The application of the doctrine of proportionality in the context of the judicial review of legislation is seen as an example of the direct reception of a Community law doctrines into the legal systems of the United Kingdom. It is an example of reception, because proportionality is a concept which has been developed in non-U.K. legal systems and, in some ways, runs counter to the native tradition. It is direct because its application in the national review of legislation is a specific requirement of Community law.

In Chapter 4 we look for evidence supporting the "indirect" reception of the doctrine of proportionality by seeing if that doctrine, as developed in Community law, has been applied by United Kingdom courts in areas of national administrative law outside the scope of Community regulation. We conclude that pressure for such
indirect reception exists, but that judicial hostility to the concept has thus far prevented the unequivocal acceptance of proportionality.

In the concluding chapter we suggest that if there is reception of Community law doctrines and general principles only in those areas of national law which directly relate to matters also covered by Community law, this will have the effect of creating two paradigms of law and legal reasoning. It is suggested that such a situation is an inherently unstable one, and that the tendency will be for political and legal pressure to increase to allow for the application of Community law concepts across the full range of national law, in the interests of consistency in the application of the law.

It is suggested that the much discussed common European law can only develop if Community law is fully received beyond the areas of its immediate application into areas of national law which, as yet, fall outside the scope of Community law. With the phenomenon of indirect reception there will be a growing together of the legal systems of the member states and the emergence of truly European Common law, under the aegis of the European Court of Justice.
CHAPTER 1

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE "EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION"
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"Be you never so high yet the law is above you" ¹

1. A EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

A supra-national European Court was first set up under article 7 the 1951 Treaty of Paris which created the European Coal and Steel Community. The duty of this Court of the Coal and Steel Community was to ensure that in the interpretation and application of that Treaty the law was observed. To this end the Court was given jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of the High Authority, the executive of the Coal and Steel Community, as well as, in certain circumstances, the acts of enterprises engaged in the coal and steel industry. ²

In 1957 the European Economic Community was formed by the Treaty of Rome. This Treaty also envisaged a role for a Court to ensure that the law was observed by the various institutions and member states in applying and interpreting the

¹ Lord Denning commenting on Tameside Borough Council v. Secretary of State for Education [1977] AC 1014
² See article 31 of the Treaty of Paris 1951
Treaty. 3 A new Court of Justice was formed to replace the earlier Court of the Coal and Steel Community, while continuing to exercise that Court's jurisdiction conferred under the Treaty of Paris. 4

This notion of a special tribunal entrusted with the task of controlling or checking the acts of administrative authorities, particularly insofar as their decisions affect individual interests, derived from the notion of a complete separation between judicial and executive functions as developed in post-Revolutionary France and spread throughout continental Europe during the Napoleonic adventure. The French developed a system of two distinct legal orders, public or administrative law and private law. The law as regards relations between the state and the individual was seen to be sui generis and so distinct from the law governing relations between fellow private citizens as to require a quite separate hierarchy of courts - the administrative courts headed by the Conseil d'Etat; the

3. See article 164 of the Treaty of Rome
"private" courts headed by the Cour de Cassation.

The European Court of Justice was set up under the foundation treaties of the European Communities to control the administrative acts of the new executive institutions set up under the treaties. The Court of Justice seems to have been intended to be an administrative law court on the model of the Conseil d'Etat with the task of ensuring that the institutions of the Community respected the Community treaties. Its purpose was to ensure the proper administration of the Community order within a legal framework. Reflecting on the reasons for the framers of Treaty of Rome providing for the existence of a Court of Justice, Lord Mackenzie-Stuart has stated:

"[H]aving once created an administrative authority with power to take administrative decisions affecting individual interests, the concept of such an authority not being controlled by an independent tribunal would be


sufficiently outrageous as to be positively offensive"

The setting up of a Court of Justice under the Treaty of Rome ensured that those bodies which acted under and with reference to the Treaties of Paris and Rome did so within a legal order. Acting within a legal order meant, for the Court, that the acts of such bodies were subject to judicial review and, if found wanting, were liable to be struck down as invalid because not in conformity with the Treaties.

It is interesting to note that on the French model of courts on which the European Court was originally based there is no possibility for the judicial review of legislation once formally enacted. The separation of powers as understood in post-revolutionary France (given the experience during the Ancien Régime of judicial review of laws by the Parlements) meant that the duty of judges was seen to be one of applying the law, rather than questioning it. 7

7. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958 there has a limited form of constitutional review of draft legislation, prior to its formal enactment, which may be carried out by the Conseil Constitutionnel. See Beardsley "Constitutional Review in France (1975) Supreme Court Review 189 at 204; Davis "The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court (1986) American Journal of Comparative Law 45
2. TRANSFORMING THE TREATIES

In a judgement of 1986 the European Court asserted its jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of the European Parliament, notwithstanding the failure of the original draftsmen explicitly to grant the Court any such power under the Treaties. The Court stated: 8

"[The Community] is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither the Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty."

The history of the European Court of Justice shows a development of the role of the Court from being a purely administrative court modelled on the French Conseil d'Etat into a Constitutional court, apparently inspired by the activism of the American Supreme Court. 9 This development is


not one which was specifically envisaged in the Treaties, but is the result simply of the Court making ever growing claims about its own role in promoting "an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe" and ensuring that "in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed".  

This transformation in the Court's role has occurred as a result of case by case developments by the Court. One technique used by the Court in introducing innovations and fundamentally new principles into the text of the Treaty has been

Federalism" (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 205

10. See Petersmann "Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration" (1991) 46 Aussenwirtschaft 247 at 256:

"The EEC Treaty was concluded as an international agreement among government and was carefully placed into the then existing framework of world-wide monetary and trade agreements, such as the IMF agreement and Gatt whose provisions served as a model for the customs union rules of the EEC."

11. See the first preamble to the Treaty of Rome: "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"

12. Article 164 of the Treaty of Rome: "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."

to introduce the broad principle by way of obiter remarks in a case, but not immediately applying the new principle to the facts of the case before it. Thereafter, however, the case in which the principle was first enunciated, although not applied, is referred to as authority for the existence of the new principle of law. The Court is obviously assisted in this technique by the fact that it is a Court of Final Instance and there is no appeal against its ruling and its general development of doctrine, even where such development is a result of reading provisions into the Treaty, rendering other provisions of

14. For an example of this technique in the development of the notion of the direct effect of directives compare Van Duyn v. Home Office (41/74) [1974] ECR 1337 to Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Muenster (8/81) [1982] ECR 53. On the development of the claim by the European Court to have jurisdiction to give rulings on the meaning to be attributed to provisions of national law which make reference to Community law compare Dzodzi v. Belgian State (C-297/88, 197/89) [1990] ECR 3763 with Gmurzynska-Bscher v. Oberfinanzdirektion Koeln (C-231/89) 1990 ECR 4003.

the Treaty otiose and ineffective 16 or, indeed, contradicting the plain wording of the Treaty. 17

The Treaty does not, in terms, apply directly or generally to private citizens in their relations to Member States. The Treaty does allow any natural or legal person to institute proceedings against executive decisions of the Council and Commission either directly addressed to that person or of direct and individual concern to them. 18 However, failure by a Member State properly to fulfil an obligation laid on it by

16. See Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide) (C-300/89) [1991] ECR 2867 which effectively renders ineffective article 130S procedure on the adoption of environmental protection measures by subordinating it to article 100A on the completion of the internal market. The rationale for this decision appears to be that the latter procedure allows for greater participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process and permits measures to be passed by way of majority voting rather than by unanimity in the Council of Ministers. For commentary on this judgment see Crosby "The Single Market and the Rule of Law" 1991 European Law Review 451; Barnard "Where politicians fear to tread ?" [1992] European Law Review 127; Somsen (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 140


18. See article 173 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 175 of that Treaty also allows any natural or legal person to complain to the Court of Justice that a Community institution has failed to address to that person any act other than a recommendation or an opinion.
the Treaty laid that State open to legal action brought only by the Commission or by another member state before the Court of Justice. 19

There was and is no provision for private parties to challenge Member State's actions in relation to their (non-) conformity with the Treaty or to pray in aid, before their national courts, provisions of the Treaty against national laws. Further, there was and is no provision in the Treaty to the effect that Community law would prevail over national laws in the courts of Member States. The Treaty specifies only that Community regulations should be binding in their entirety and directly applicable in Member States while Community directives should be binding as to the results to be achieved, but should leave to national authorities the choice of forms and methods to that result. 20 Finally there was and is no provision allowing the Court of Justice to rule on the compatibility of Member States' legislation with Community law.

19. See articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty of Rome
20. See article 189 of the Treaty of Rome
All of these supposed "shortcomings" in the Treaty have since been remedied by the activism of the judges of the European Court. 21

(i) Direct Effect of Treaty Articles

The first of these matters was addressed in a judgment of 5 February 1963, some five years after the setting up of the Court of Justice. In Van Gend en Loos 22 the Court proclaimed that the spirit of the Treaty of Rome which referred in its preamble to a union of peoples and not simply of governments, together with the fact that the peoples of Europe were involved in the functioning of the Community through the European Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee showed that the Treaty was more than an agreement creating mutual obligations between the contracting states, but was a new legal order of international law which imposed obligation and conferred rights on individuals independently of


national legislation. These rights of individuals could be created expressly in the Treaty or could follow as a direct corollaries from the fact that Member States have particular obligations under the Treaty, such as the obligation in the instant case not to introduce new customs duties or to increase existing ones. By this decision the European Court established that the Treaty could be "directly effective" in the sense that it was capable of creating for individuals rights enforceable before their national courts, independently of national legislatures.

(ii) Supremacy

The precise relationship between national law and the law of the Community was not spelled out in the provisions of the Treaty. This matter was addressed in a case decided one year after Van Gend en Loos. In Costa v. ENEL, the European Court held that obligations undertaken by Member States under the Treaty of Rome could not be called into question by subsequent legislative acts of those Member States. If this were the case Community obligations would be contingent, rather than unconditional; the law

23. Costa v. ENEL (6/64) [1964] ECR 585. See Stein op. cit. note 19, 10-16
stemming from the Treaty would accordingly be deprived of its character as Community law; and the legal basis of the Community would therefore be called into question. The Court stated that in entering the Community, Member States had permanently limited their sovereignty to extent that their subsequent unilateral legislative acts could not prevail against Community obligations. Community law is to be regarded as supreme over national law.

(iii) Directives and direct effect

The Court has built upon these principles of direct effect and supremacy. It has extended the notion of direct effect as applying not only to Treaty provision, but at least, as against the State and its institutions, 24 to directives which have not been timeously implemented by Member States. 25

Marshall would appear to be authority for the proposition that private parties, as opposed to "emanations of the State" will not be found to have acted contrary to law if they failed to

24. See Marshall v. Southampton and S.W. Hampshire Area Health Authority (C-152/84) [1986] ECR 723

respect the provisions of a directive which had not (properly) been implemented. This is the distinction between vertical and horizontal direct effect. However, with the drive toward the implementation of the Single European Market, there has been a clear shift in the approach taken in the way in which directives are being used, and consequently drafted, by the Commission. While the earlier directives were addressed unequivocally to the Member States and set out duties which were incumbent upon those States, some of the "post single market" generation of directives set out duties which are said to be incumbent directly upon private parties. A clear example of this new generation of directives is the 1989 second framework directive on Health and Safety 26 which is concerned with the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work and which lists duties incumbent upon employers and employees.

In the light of the changing uses to which directives are put, it is interesting to note the approach of Advocate General Van Gerven in Marshall II, 27 the second Article 177 reference


27. Marshall v. Southampton and S.W. Hampshire Area Health Authority II (C-271/91), not yet reported. See
in this case where he suggests that the distinction between the horizontal and vertical direct effect of directives which was affirmed in *Marshall I* be now abandoned by the European Court of Justice on the grounds that such a distinction militates against the coherence and uniformity in application of Community law.

In any event in the absence of vertical direct effect, the Court of Justice has held that, even in cases involving only private parties, national courts have an obligation to interpret national law in the light and purpose of any relevant directives, 28 whether or not the national law originated before or after adoption of the directive. 29

(iv) The Principle of Effectiveness

The obligation on Member States and their courts under Article 5 of the Treaty to facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaty or resulting from action by Community


28.  
    *Von Colson v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen* [1984] ECR 1891

29.  
    *Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA* (C-106/89) [1990] ECR 4153 also reported in [1992] 1 CMLR 305
institutions and to abstain from any measures which might jeopardize the attainment of the Treaty's objectives has also become a fruitful source for the Court to construct specific legal duties. 30 From this article the Court has deduced the principle that a Member State is liable to individuals for damages resulting from that State's failure to implement Community provisions which provide for individual rights within its national territory. 31

(v) The judicial review of Member States' legislation

Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome allows the Court of Justice only to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, the interpretation of statutes founding Community bodies and the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community.


31. See Francovich and Boniface v. Italian State, (C-69/90) ECJ 19 November 1991, not yet reported at para 36. For an analysis of this case see Duffy, "Damages against the State: a new remedy for failure to implement Community obligations" 1992 European Law Review 133. The possibility of Francovich damages being claimable not simply for non-implementation of a directive but for all and every Member State breach of Community law which resulted in damage to an individual was canvassed by Lord Goff of Chievely in Kirklees Borough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd. [1992] CMLR 765 at 785.
However the Court of Justice has, over the years, used Article 177 as if it permitted it to give rulings directly on the validity of national law. The current Italian appointee to the European Court has stated: "[T]he Court does not confine itself to interpreting the Community rule; instead it enters into the heart of the conflict submitted to its attention, but it takes the precaution of rendering it abstract, that is to say that it presents it as a conflict between Community law and a hypothetical national provision having the nature of the provision in issue before the national court. The technique just described ... results in the Court of Justice acquiring a power of review which is analogous to - though of course narrower than - that routinely exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States and the constitutional courts of some Member States."

32. See Chapter 2, infra, for an history of this development.

33. See Federico Mancini and David Keeling "From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court" (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 1 at 9
As one commentator has stated: 34

"[T]he European Community has already acquired many of the features one would expect to find in a federation. This is largely due to the efforts of the European Court, which has not hesitated to remodel the law even when this has entailed adopting a solution different from that envisaged in the Treaties."

3. THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER AS A TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTION

The original formulation of the status of European Community law by the European Court was that the Treaty of Rome was "more than an agreement which merely created mutual obligations between the contracting states" but instead constituted "a new legal order of international law" 35. The Court soon altered this formulation to emphasise that Community law was sui generis and should not be seen as simply another part of general international law. As the Court stated in Costa v. ENEL: 36


35. See Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 at 12

36. [1964] ECR 585 at 593
"By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply."

(i) Obligations assumed under International Treaties

It is not only in its direct effectiveness within Member States that Community law is to be distinguished from general international law. The European Court has not been slow to emphasize the distinctiveness of the Community legal order from general law of international treaties. Treaty obligations assumed under classic (post-Westphalian) public international law might be seen as analogous to contract law in depending for their existence on the brute fact of continuing agreement of the parties involved. Both contract and international law involve the creation of mutual obligations by the agreement of two or more sovereign individuals. The mutuality principle whereby the default of one party in carrying out his obligations might have the effect of suspending the reciprocal
obligations of the other party would appear to apply both to contract and public international law. 37 Obligations under a contract are assumed by the free act of the parties and the parties retain the radical capacity to repudiate the obligations assumed under the contract, although repudiation of these obligations may give rise to certain consequences under the general legal order under which the contract is created, for example damages for breach of contract. 38

In comparison to the obligations of citizens under municipal law systems, public international law may also be described as relatively normatively weak. Not only are the international norms subject to variation by mutual agreement of the parties and new norms may be created by simple customary practice, but states can choose to refuse to submit to or to renounce the jurisdiction of international courts. It might be said, somewhat cynically, that the normative strength of international law appears to be in inverse proportion to the

37. See Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for the conditions of applicability of this principle in public international law

38. For a general account of the Law of Treaties see Brownlie Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn 1990, Chapter 25.
political strength of the sovereign states in question.

(ii) Community membership analogous to citizenship?

The Community legal order, at least according to the European Court's aspirations, is entirely different from classic public international law in these aspects of the role of continuing consensus, the possibility of contrary customary practice overriding formal written norms, and even in the permissibility of the variation of obligations by explicit agreement of the contracting parties. It is, or should be regarded as, normatively strong.

For the European Court, Community law constitutes an overarching legal order which is greater than the continuing consensus which originally created it. For a state to become part of the European Community is, in the eyes of the European Court, more akin to an individual taking on the citizenship of a country, rather than one individual making a contract with another. Once citizenship has been taken up, the citizen cannot pick and choose among the obligations which apply to her. Citizenship involves a package of rights and obligations, both as regards ones
fellow citizens and as regards the central authority. Further, like citizenship, in the view of the European Court membership of the Community cannot be renounced unilaterally by one member state. The Treaty of Rome was created for "an unlimited period" 39 and contains no provisions for the secession of states from the Community. 40 It would appear to be from these facts that the Court felt able to make the following claim: 41

"The transfer by the State from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail."

39. See article 240 of the Treaty of Rome

40. Although secession from the Community was effected by Greenland by formal amendment of the Treaty in 1985 in accord with the provisions of article 236

41. Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 594
(iv) Community law as a supra-national legal system

Community law is seen by the European court to be a new supra-national legal hierarchy, superior to the legal orders of individual Member States. This new legal order draws its legitimacy from a particular political vision of what constitutes "an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe". Member States are regarded not as having delegated power to the Community but actually to have transferred their sovereignty thereto, at least in certain areas. Thus in Van Gend en Loos the European Court spoke of the institutions of the Community as being "endowed with sovereign rights" and that the Member States "had limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields". The European Court's model appears to be one in which Community law is seen as constituting a new sovereign order of law, which although initially brought into being by the consensus of the governments of Member States, does not depend on but transcends any such consensus for its continued existence and binding force on both the Member States and their citizens.

42. [1963] ECR 1, 12
The ideal appears to something almost Hobbesian: namely the creation of a new (pooled) sovereign power to which individual national member state governments have irrevocably subordinated themselves. Developments in Community law are justified insofar as they make for the fuller realization of this vision. This vision obviously has profound implications for questions such as the possibility of national derogations from the requirements of Community law, the idea of continuing national sovereignty and the possibility of (unilateral) secession from the European Union. As one commentator has put it:

"The Member States, although originally the creators of the Communities, are no longer the independent masters of the Treaties but are bound by them." 43

This high vision of Community law becomes clear when the question as to whether or not there can be said to be limits on the powers of the Member States acting with the Community institutions to make substantive amendments to the foundation Treaty of the European Community is addressed.

43. See Schwarze The role of the European Court of Justice in the Interpretation of Uniform Law among the Member States of the European Communities, 1988 at 11
4. ARE THERE LIMITS ON THE POWER OF MEMBER STATES TO AMEND THE TREATIES?

One of the characteristics of written constitutions is that they are regarded as in some sense a higher law, existing on a different order to the general run of legislation. One common feature of this difference is that special procedures are required to be followed before a constitution can be amended. Thus, in the United States, constitutional amendment normally requires the votes of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, together with ratification by at least three quarters of the states of the Union. Certain constitutions even provide that some features of the constitution cannot be altered. Thus the French and Italian Constitutions both hold a republican form of government to be unchangeable, while the German Grundgesetz provides that its provisions relating to fundamental rights protection, a democratic form of government and the division of the country into Laender cannot be amended.

44. Article 5 of the United States Constitution. See Gunther Constitutional Law (12th edn.) 1991 at 201

45. See article 139 of the Italian Constitution, and article 89 of the French Constitution

46. See Doehring "The Limits of Constitutional Law" in Bernhardt/Beyerlin (eds.) Reports on German Public Law
The Treaty of Rome provides a procedure under article 236 for its amendment whereby the Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit proposals to the Council for amendments of the Treaty. The Council, after consultation with the Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, may then deliver an opinion in favour of calling a conference of the representatives of the Member States Governments. The President of the Council shall then convene such an Inter-Governmental Conference so that the amendments to be made to the Treaty should be determined by common accord. Once such accord has been reached, the amendments shall enter into force only if and when they are ratified by all of the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. It should be noted that there is nothing in the wording of the Treaty of Rome to indicate that any provisions of the Treaty might be entrenched against this procedure of amendment.

and Public International Law, 1986. Article 79(3) of the Grundgesetz provides that:
"Amendments of this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Laender, the participation on principle of the Laender in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 to 20 shall be inadmissible."
The question of the non-alterability of certain provisions or aspects of the Treaty has, however, recently arisen. In August 1991 the European Court was requested by the Commission to give its Opinion on the legality of a draft Treaty concluded between the European Community and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The Court delivered its Opinion on 14 December 1991. The view of the Court was that the tenor of the agreement reached with EFTA was incompatible with the Treaty of Rome.

The grounds on which the Court found the EFTA agreement to be incompatible with the EC Treaty indicate unequivocally how far the European Court considers the European Community system to constitute an entirely new legal order, distinct from both municipal law and the general order of international law. The Opinion also shows the

47. See generally Barbara Brandtner "The 'Drama' of the EEA: comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92" (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 300.

48. Under article 228(1) of the Treaty of Rome.

49. For an account of the negotiations leading to this first draft Treaty see Jacot-Guillaumond "Droit international et droit communautaire dans le futur Traité instituant l'EEE" (1991) 317 Aussenwirtschaft.

50. See Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area (Opinion 1/91) European Court of Justice 14 December 1991 reported in [1992] CMLR 245
extent to which the Court sees that it is its duty is to protect the Community legal order in all its distinctiveness.

The EFTA agreement was seen by the Court to be simply an agreement under general public international law, involving no transfer of legislative sovereignty by the parties to it. 51 The Court looked at the details of the EFTA agreement critically, with a view to determining whether or not conclusion of this agreement by the Community might in any way compromise the characteristics of the Community legal order as this has been developed in the jurisprudence of the Court since the Court was first set up in 1957.

This agreement was intended to create a European Economic Area (EEA) between the Community and EFTA in which rules on free trade and competition identical to those existing within the Community were to be applied. As part of the procedures to ensure that the same rules were applied within

51. Protocol 35 of the EEA Agreement contained the following preamble:

"Whereas the Agreement aims at achieving a homogeneous European Economic Area, based on common rules, without requiring any Contracting Party to transfer legislative powers to any institution of the European Economic Area; and whereas this consequently will have to be achieved through national procedures ... "
the Community and in the new European Economic Area, the draft Treaty provided for the establishment of an EEA court hierarchy to provide a system of judicial supervision within the European Economic Area. The proposed new hierarchy consisted of an independent EEA Court, functionally integrated with the European Court of Justice, and an EEA Court of First Instance. The new courts were to consist of a number of judges from the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance sitting together with judges appointed from the various EFTA Member States.

The European Court found that the system of judicial supervision proposed under the EEA Treaty was incompatible with the EEC Treaty on a number of grounds. In particular the Court asserted that the European Community differed in its essentials from the proposed European Economic Area. The latter was no more than a free trade area with a common competition policy while the objective of European Community Treaties was "to contribute together to making concrete progress towards European unity." 52 and its free trade rules and competition policy were simply means to achieving that objective rather

52. Article 1 of the Single European Act.
than final ends in themselves. The Court asserted that the EEA was established on the basis of an international Treaty, creating rights and obligations among the contracting parties but providing for no transfer of sovereignty to the inter-governmental institutions which the Treaty sets up. By contrast, the Court stated that the European Community Treaty was the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law, which law was supreme over the law of Member States and directly applicable to the nationals of the Member States.

(ii) **Same words, different meanings.**

The "essential differences" perceived by the European Court between the European Community and the proposed European Economic Area rest simply on repeated judicial assertions rather than from any particular differences in the wording of the two treaties. As we have seen, the doctrines of Community law's supremacy and direct applicability together with the claim that entry into the Community involves (an irreversible?) transfer of sovereignty result from the case law

53. See para 18 of the Court's Opinion

of the Court of Justice and are not to be found in any provision of the Treaty of Rome. Notwithstanding that the provisions of the EEA and the Treaty of Rome on free movement and competition are identically worded, the Court appears to consider them essentially different. The Court stated: 55

"[H]omogeneity of rules of law throughout the European Economic Area is not secured by the fact the provisions of Community law and those of the corresponding provisions of the agreement are identical in their content or wording."

The Court once again emphasises the idea that the actual wording of a provision is not its paramount interest; rather, what it considers of primary importance is divining the spirit and then reflecting on the general scheme of the Treaty in which the provision is found. In this way the same words can be made to mean different things. As has been observed: 56

"[F]or the European Court, the teleological method frequently precedes

55. Ibid. para. 22
56. Slynn, "The Court of Justice of the European Communities" (1984) 33 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 409 at 421
and conditions the textual method of interpretation."

In its Opinion, the European Court went on to note that the proposed EEA court would be called upon to decide on the interpretation of rules which will have been adopted wholesale from Community law and which go to the fundamentals of the Community legal order. It would seem that identity of wording is of some relevance there. Further, in determining the *locus standi* of the parties appearing before it, the EEA court might require to come to a decision as to the respective competences of the Commission and the Member States of the Community.

In addition, the draft Treaty provided that the European Court of Justice was to be required to pay due account to the decisions of the EEA court and the national courts of the EFTA states when applying and interpreting the EEA agreement or provisions of the EC Treaties which were identical in substance to the EEA provisions.

All of these matters, in the Opinion of the Court, represented an encroachment on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the Treaty of Rome and undermined the autonomy of the Community legal order in pursuing
its own particular objectives. Consequently the proposed system of judicial supervision in the EEA was found to be contrary to article 164 of the Treaty of Rome. 57

(iii) Are there entrenched provisions in the Treaty of Rome?

The Court concluded its first opinion on the Treaty with the question posed by the Commission as to whether or not Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome dealing with conclusion of association agreements between the Community and certain third parties permitted the establishment of the system of courts provided for in the agreement. In the event of the incompatibility of article 238 with such a system the Commission proposed that that article might be suitably amended so as to allow for a system of courts functionally integrated with the Court of Justice and guaranteeing the specific nature and integrity of Community law. However the Court stated: 58

57. In response to the judicial objections to the first draft EEA Treaty, the Treaty was revised and a reference was made to the European Court for a further Opinion in February 1992. The Court delivered its Opinion in favour of the revised Treaty, which no longer sought to create an EEA court in April 1992. See Opinion 1/92, 8 April 1992.

58. Paras. 70-1
"Article 238 of the EEC Treaty does not provide any basis for setting up a system of courts which conflicts with Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and, more generally, with the very foundations of Community law. For the same reasons, an amendment of Article 238 in the way indicated by the Commission could not cure the incompatibility with Community law of the system of courts to be set up by the agreement."

This is a statement of extraordinary implications. The Court appears to be suggesting that the Member States of the Community, even when acting collectively in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Treaty, cannot amend the Treaty in any way which compromises the provision that "the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation of this Treaty the law is observed" or, indeed, any other provision which might be regarded by the Court as constituting part of the "very foundations of Community law". Such a purported amendment would appear to be, in some sense, "illegal". But what does this mean? The court appears to be suggesting that the Treaty
contains certain entrenched provisions which are unalterable.

5. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TREATIES

The outcome of the European Court’s creative interpretation of the Treaties has been the creation within the territory of the Communities of a federal legal system, in the sense that Community law constitutes a separate legal system, distinct from the municipal legal orders of the Member States (Community law cannot, for instance, be amended by the legislatures of the Member States) but differing from classic international law in that it falls to be applied by the courts of the Member States to any cases brought before them, when the European Court has declared a particular provision of Community law to be directly effective or applicable. 59 This federal development in the law has not, however, been matched by any clear political development of a federal nature. Even after the conclusion (but not yet the ratification) of the Maastricht Treaty on European Political Union, there remains

59. On the characteristics of a federal legal system see Lenaerts "Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism" (1990) 38 American Journal of International Law 205
a clear disjunction between the legal and political regimes which apply within the Communities. 60 This disjunction has come about as a result of judicial activism.

The Treaty of Rome did not convert itself into a federal constitutional document, it was and is consciously and consistently re-interpreted and re-written by the European Court so as to take on federal constitutional characteristics. As one author has stated, by way of apologia for the Court's approach: 61

"If you do not admit that you are writing a constitution, you fail to say certain things which you would otherwise certainly include. This means that the courts have to decide whether the things you have omitted are there or not."

Once the assumption is made that the Treaties were always intended to be a constitution, and that the Court is therefore simply fulfilling its role in drawing out the implications of that unfinished Treaty, the approach of the Court

60. On this disjunction see Weiler "The Community System: the dual character of supranationalism" 1981 1 Yearbook of European Law 267

becomes clear. The European Court appears to see itself as sole guarding of the vision of the original framers of the Treaty and imposes that view over even the views of all the Member States Governments. The Court appears to regard itself the proper guardian of the values of the (yet to be fully realized) European polity.

The legal key to the Court's approach appears to be article 164. In the face of silence in the Treaty regarding "constitutional foundations" the Court has had recourse to article 164 which enjoins it to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty. The Court uses this provision in a substantive way and not simply as a formal injunction relating to the need to apply general procedural norms of consistency and universality in the reaching of decisions. Rather, the provision is seen as allowing the court to refer to some higher, unwritten natural law. The European Court uses article 164 as a carte blanche for it to assume new grounds of jurisdiction, 62 to

62. See the Opinion of the then Advocate-General Mancini in Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 at 1350:
"[T]he obligation to observe the law takes precedence over the strict terms of the written law. Whenever required in the interests of judicial protection, the Court is prepared to correct or complete rules which limit its powers in the name of the principle which defines its mission"
incorporate into Community law references to fundamental rights 63 or to more general principles of law, 64 and it would appear from the first EEA opinion, to declare the fundamentals of the Treaty to be unalterable. Article 164 places an absolute duty on the Court to ensure that the law is observed and contains no reference to any limits on the power or jurisdiction of the European Court. Thus, every innovation is justifiable by reference to article 164.

In the case law of the European Court there appears to be little discussion of these problems. As one former President of the Court has stated: 65

For a general discussion of the court’s case law in this area see Arnulf, "Does the Court of Justice have inherent jurisdiction ?" (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 683.


65. Robert Lecourt in Le juge devant le Marché Commun 1970 at 64 [Author’s translation]
"Once the idea of a court of arbitration was abandoned and a judge was charged with ensuring the respect for the law which the Treaties were instituting, that judge could not ignore the very aims of that law. ... Thus, within the Community, the judge is the repository of the will of the Treaties' authors who disappeared on the day the Treaties were signed, only reappearing on the rare occasions when new agreements are concluded. They have made the judge the guardian of their joint work, which is to say of its objectives, its institutions and of its law."

The Court concentrates on realizing the preambles of the Treaties. The Court assumes that the preambles embody the real hidden spirit of the Treaty. They further assume that it is their duty to uncover the true nature of the Treaty, particularly in the face of a lack of political will in the Member States. Accordingly the Court feels itself justified in departing, wherever necessary to achieve the objectives of the Community, from any strict or literal reading of the provisions of the Treaty. 66 Collins puts it thus: 67

66. Lecourt in L'Europe des juges, 1976 at 237 states:
"[T]he outstanding characteristic of the Court's method of interpretation is that it has regard to the principles and objectives of the Treaties, even when no ambiguity is involved. The Court sees its role as essentially a dynamic one, to contribute to the development of the Communities." 68

The intention of the Treaty as gleaned from its formal preamble is given a normative status higher than the text of the operative provisions of the Treaty itself. Indeed, as part of the process of carrying out of a dynamic role, it would appear that the Court is committed to promoting the intention (of the promoters) of the Treaty over and against the understanding or intention of those who actually ratified or acceded to the Treaty, namely the Member States.

"He [the judge] can add nothing to the Treaties, but he must give them their full meaning and interpret their provisions so as to completely realize the consequences, implicit or explicit, required by the letter and the spirit of the Treaties."

[Author's translation]

67. Collins European Community Law in the United Kingdom, 4th edn. 1990 at 238

68. For a brief survey of the European Court's role in promoting integration see Koopmans "The Role of Law in the next stage of European Integration" (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 975
6. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TREATIES

The assertion is often made that the Treaty of Rome was really a Constitution for a European Federation, which political expediency required to be left inchoate. 69 The assumption is made that it is entirely legitimate, and may indeed be required of those applying and interpreting the "intensely political text" 70 of the Treaty to complete the Treaty and to realize the vision of the civil servants and politicians (elevated to the status of "Founding Fathers) who were responsible for conceiving of the Treaty. 71 This approach raises a number of issues, neatly summarised by Weiler: 72

69. See Temple Lang "The Development of European Community Constitutional Law" (1991) 25 The International Lawyer 455 at 456: "The European Founding Fathers knew that what they wanted had to be done gradually. Jean Monnet wrote that economic integration and setting up a Community institution with binding legal powers over States would be "the first practical foundations of a European federation indispensable for the preservation of peace.'"

70. As described by Lord Mackenzie-Stuart in The European Communities and the Rule of Law 1977 at 79

71. For an brief account of the differing visions of Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer and Alberto Spinelli see Peter Sutherland "Joining the Threads: the influences creating a European Union" in Curtin and O'Keefe (eds) Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law, 1992.

72. Weiler "The Court of Justice on Trial" (1987) 24 Common Market Law Review 555 at 575. For an analysis
"Who are the elusive "Founders"? Are they Jean Monnet and the others, or are they the Member State negotiators? How do we, and how should the Court, elucidate their intentions in the absence of a legislative history of the negotiations of the Treaties? How do we determine their intention in relation to issues which they did not contemplate, or which they deliberately left vague or over which they compromised or disagreed? What do we do in the case of conflict between text and intention? Should we interpret the text with the purpose of elucidating the intention, or should we seek the intention in order to elucidate the text? ... [I]s it so clear in legal theory that the intention of the Founders should continue to govern years and generations after their demise?"

The political implications of the Court's activism are rarely addressed. 73

73. See however Rasmussen On Law on Policy in the European Court of Justice, 1986 for a sustained attack on the policy choosing and making role of the European Court
relies on an unwritten law to find provisions of the fundamentals of the Community to be unalterable even by formal Treaty amendment. The Court limits the powers of the Member States and the central Community institutions, but leaves itself unlimited and unlimitable. The Court is unlimited because only it would appear to have access to the higher law which allows it to expand and alter express Treaty provisions. It can therefore read anything it deems fitting or appropriate into the Treaty, but never is there any explicit indication as to the criteria which guide the Court in completing the inchoate Treaty.

In asserting that certain unspecified foundational provisions of Community law are entrenched, the Court is maintaining that the sovereignty of the Member States of the Community has not simply been pooled when entering the Community, but has been lost. The supra-national body which the Member States constitute together appears to be fundamentally limited, in a way in which most of the individual States were not limited prior to entering the Community. The whole is less than the sum of its parts. The Court does not appear to consider whether or which stands as an almost lone exception to the body of literature favourable to the Court's activities.
not such a result was ever agreed to intended or understood by the Member States when they created and/or acceded to the Communities.

Further, on the basis of this doctrine developed by the Court, the Court is unlimitable because any attempt by the Member States even acting together with the Community institutions to limit the Court may be claimed by the Court to be void as contrary to article 164. The reliance by the Court on article 164 and natural law stands without justification or challenge. The Court's case law, culminating in the first EEA opinion shows a tendency toward creeping infallibility. We might be said to be witnessing the development of "judicial papalism".

This argument rests on the assumption that judicial law making by the European Court is to be regarded as objectionable because it is law making without any direct democratic mandate. One commentator, sympathetic to the Court's expansionist policies, has gone as far as

suggesting that such lack of democratic legitimacy need be of no concern to the Court of Justice. On this vision the judges of the Court of Justice appear to have been elevated to the status of Platonic guardians or philosopher kings - paternalistic, wise, independent, far-sighted, and always benevolent. However the judges of the Court are neither politically nor legally accountable for their decisions. It is the extensive law-making by judicial activism in the European Court of Justice which is the very source of the oft-lamented democracy deficit within the Community.

Further, the suggestion by the Court of the existence of entrenched provisions in Community law which cannot be altered even by Treaty amendment places the Court above the Treaties and

75. Deirdre Curtin "The constitutional structure of the Union: a Europe of bits and pieces" (1993) Common Market Law Review 17 at 65-66: "[T]he guarantee of judicial control by a Court concerned to protect the rights of individuals and their fundamental freedoms may be essential to fulfil the characteristics of the EC treaty as a "constitutional charter based on the rule of law". It is also much too simplistic to believe that the only valid form of legitimacy in the context of the Community is that of the democratic system. The rule of law and the protection of individual rights, which constitute fundamental elements of any political legitimacy do not emanate from democracy as such, but from the independence of the judiciary. It is precisely the function of an independent judiciary to guard the unique legal system it has been so instrumental in constituting."
thus, it might be said, above the law. The insinuation of a category of entrenched provisions into the corpus of Community law fundamentally alters the institutional balance within the Community - as envisaged by the Founding Fathers - in that the Court holds itself to stand supreme even against the collective action of the Member States together with the other central institutions of the Community in seeking to amend the Treaty.

7. ARE NATIONAL COURTS BOUND BY THE EUROPEAN COURT'S VISION FOR EUROPE?

Much has been made, by commentators sympathetic to the project of the Court of Justice, of the fact that the European Court has no sanctions open to it to compel the national courts of Member States to apply Community law as developed by the European Court. 76 It is possible for national courts to refuse to refer a matter to the European Court 77 and to refuse to apply a

76. See Federico Mancini and David Keeling "From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court" (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 1 at 7, note 21 where the case law of the French Conseil d'Etat dissenting from the approach of the European Court of Justice in the matter of the direct effect of directives is described as "objectionable".

77. See in particular the Cohn-Bendit case, Conseil d'Etat, 22 December 1978, Dalloz 1979 p. 155; (1986) 27 CMLR 543. For the impact of this case on the Court of
ruling of the European Court once a reference has been returned to it. Thus the French Conseil d'Etat has refused to accept the doctrine of the direct effectiveness of directives and the German and Italian Constitutional Courts both have expressed certain reservation regarding the compatibility of the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law over national law with those courts' duties to protect the fundamental rights.

Justice see Gerhard Bebr "The Rambling Ghost of 'Cohn-Bendit': Acte Clair and the Court of Justice" 20 Common Market Law Review (1983) 439; also Tatham "Effect of European Community Directives in France: the development of the Cohn-Bendit jurisprudence" (1991) 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 907. The Cohn-Bendit rejection of the direct effective of directives was followed by one German court, the Federal Tax Court. See the Bundesfinanzhof decision of 1981 Re Value Added Tax Directives reported in [1982] 33 CMLR 527.

78. For an example of this see Hartley "Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems" (1986) American Journal of Comparative Law 229 at 237.


guaranteed in their respective national constitutions. 81

When national court's accept and apply the European Court's innovations in the law, this is understood to be an acceptance by the national judiciary of the correctness of the European Court's approach such as to confer retrospective legitimacy on the development and to justify further development on the same principles. The application by national courts of Community law as developed by the European Court is seen as victory of the European Court and the acceptance of their vision of law.

In point of fact, the application by national courts of European Court jurisprudence need imply neither approbation nor legitimation of the European Court's approach. National courts might apply Community law as interpreted by the European Court simply because they have been so instructed by their national Parliaments, and not because they accept the natural law vision which appears to drive the European Court.

81. For an analysis of, inter alia, the Italian and German constitutional case law see Schermers "The Scales in Balance: National Constitutional Court v. Court of Justice" (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 97
Thus, in the United Kingdom, at least, the acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* and the application by the courts of Community law doctrines can be seen as a consequence not of the acceptance of some *idée d'Europe* involving the subordination of national State sovereignty to the central Community institutions but rather as a result of their healthy respect for the notion of national Parliamentary supremacy. It is the United Kingdom Parliament which has instructed the United Kingdom courts to apply Community law. When and if that Parliament instructs those courts to cease to apply Community law, then Community law will no longer be applied within the United Kingdom. 82 This attitude might be characterised as one which sees the European Community resting on the base of a continuing consensus and provisional self-limitation on the part of the Member States of

82. Thus Lord Denning in *Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith* [1979] 3 AllER 325 at 329:

"If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision of it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I should have thought that it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament."

In the same case Lawton LJ stated at 334:

"Parliament's recognition of European Community law ... by one enactment can be withdrawn by another."
their sovereign powers. It is a vision inspired more by Locke rather than Hobbes.

8. CONCLUSION

Effectively what we end up with are radically different lines of legitimacy and of justification. Can these differing lines of justification and legitimacy co-exist? One tendency of the European Court's jurisprudence has been to make it almost impossible to define what limits there might be to Community competences vis a vis Member States. "Sooner or later "Supreme" courts in the Member States would realize that the "socio-legal contract" announced by the [European] Court in its major constitutionalizing decisions, namely that 'the Community constitutes a new legal order ... for the benefit of which states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields' ... has been shattered, that although they (the 'Supreme" courts) have accepted the principles of the new legal order - supremacy and direct effect - the fields do not seem any more to be limited, and that in the absence of Community legislative or legal checks it will fall on them to draw the jurisdictional lines of the Community and its Member States."
development of the Community, often at the expense of Member State powers. 84

In the United Kingdom context a conflict between the two lines of legitimation will necessarily arise when and if the United Kingdom courts are required to apply Community law over and against provisions of national law. Such a course brings into question the cornerstone principle of United Kingdom constitution, namely the sovereignty of Parliament.

The one time legal adviser to the Commission's Legal Service has rather disingenuously attempted to dismiss or disguise the enormity of the constitutional change brought about by the application of Community law by national courts in the United Kingdom. He states: 85

[T]his new approach is particularly necessary in sphere where the Community law is judge-made case law, both because in those sphere there is no Treaty text

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84. For a survey of specifically "European" modes of interpretation of law in comparison to those prevailing in the United Kingdom and Ireland see Millett Rules of Interpretation of EEC Legislation (1989) 11 Statute Law Review 163.

to point to, and because it is the case-

law which is developing the implications of the Community. ... English lawyers should have no difficulty dealing with case law, even when it develops constitutional principles of far reaching importance. After all, your doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament was developed by lawyers, not by Parliament itself."

The European Court asserted in Simmenthal 86

"[I]n accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions on the one hand and national law of the Member States on the other is such that these provisions not only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law but ... also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions."

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Simmenthal echoes the approach arrived at two hundred years earlier in the United States of America in *Marbury v. Madison*, 87, which laid the foundation for the judicial review of legislation in that country:

"The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchallengeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall be pleased to alter it. If the former part of the alternative is true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable."

In the following chapter we shall look at how this doctrine set out in Simmenthal doctrine was received by the Courts of the United Kingdom.

87. 5 US 368, 389, (1803) 1 Cranch 103, at 177
CHAPTER 2

SIMMENTHAL AND FACTOR TAME: A SEA CHANGE IN THE
BRITISH CONSTITUTION
SIMMENTHAL AND FACTORTAME: A SEA CHANGE IN THE
BRITISH CONSTITUTION

Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are now pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange. 1

1. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MEMBER STATES' LEGISLATION

The Treaty of Rome gave no power to the European Court to review the validity of Member State legislation. However, Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty allow the European Court, in direct actions brought against one Member State by the Commission or by another Member State, to declare that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty, by for example enacting or failing to repeal a contentious provision of national law. If the Court makes such a judgment article 171 of the Treaty obliges the Member State to take such measures as are necessary to comply with the Court's judgment. The Maastricht Treaty contains an amendment to article 171 to the effect that the Court also be

1. Shakespeare *The Tempest*, Act 1, Scene 2
given the power to fine any Member State which fails to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty.

Of far greater importance in the development of the judicial review of Member States' legislation has been the preliminary reference procedure provided under Article 177. When questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty or to the validity and/or interpretation of the acts of Community institutions are raised before Member State courts, and the Member State court considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable that court to give judgment in the case, the national court may, (or if it is a court against whose decision there is no remedy under national law, must) request the European Court to give a ruling on the question of Community law. An additional reason for making an Article 177 reference, not expressly mentioned in the Treaty as it is a consequence of the European Court's jurisprudence since Van Gend en Loos, is to determine whether or not a provision of Community law is directly effective within the Member State.

Article 177 procedure would seem to have been aimed at ensuring a uniformity of interpretation
of Community law throughout the Member States. 2 However, given the European Court's declaration of the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law over inconsistent national laws, questions then arise before national courts as to the compatibility of provisions of national law with Treaty provisions and with secondary Community legislation. The resolution of this question may require reference to the European Court in order for the national court to ascertain the correct interpretation to be given to the relevant provisions of Community law.

The European Court's remit under article 177 procedure is simply to set out the correct interpretation of Community law and it has no power to interpret or to rule on the validity of provisions of national law. In point of fact Article 177 procedure has been used by the European Court to highlight inconsistencies between national legal provisions and the rules of Community law, thereby requiring the national courts, in fulfilment of their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty and as a consequence of the doctrine of supremacy of Community law, not to apply the inconsistent national law.

Thus, in the context of an article 177 reference in Simmenthal, the European Court stated:?

"[E]very national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule. ... Any provision of a national legal system and legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of Community law"

In its judgment in Simmenthal the European Court made it clear that the application of Community

law over and against the provisions of national law was not a matter which concerned only the Constitutional courts of the Member States. Rather, the provisions of Community law were held to so completely permeate the legal system of the Member States that Community law fell to be applied by all courts within the national hierarchy. Community law laid on every judge in a national legal order the duty to give precedence to the provisions of Community law over all and any conflicting national laws.

The trinity of Van Gend en Loos, Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal established the three essential characteristics of the Community legal order: its creation of directly effective rights for the citizens of member states; its supremacy over the national legal orders of the member states; and its universal applicability, by and within all courts of the member states. The application of Community law over and against the provisions of national law was laid squarely at the door of national courts.

The problem for the United Kingdom courts is that their absolute duty to accord supremacy to Community law could, potentially, conflict with their equally absolute duty to apply the laws passed by the United Kingdom Parliament.
2. PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The prevailing constitutional orthodoxy in the United Kingdom, as expressed from Dicey 4 on, was that the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, which had been established in the constitutional settlement which followed the expulsion of James II and VII in 1688-89, meant that there were and could be no legal limits (in contrast to political or practical ones) on the power of Parliament to pass whatever laws it wished. 5 As a corollary of this it was seen as the duty of the courts simply to apply the laws passed by Parliament. There was no possibility of any development of the higher constitutional review of legislation because there existed no higher legal standard against which such legislation might be judged.

This approach to Parliamentary supremacy remained the dominant English consensus 6 notwithstanding


5. For a critical account of this orthodoxy see P.P. Craig "Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame" (1991) 11 Year-book of European Law 221

certain academic arguments advanced by Scots 7 to the effect that the Acts of Union of 1707 between England and Scotland created a new basic law (Grundgesetz) of the United Kingdom and set limits on the power of the new Parliamentary body created on the abolition of the separate Parliaments of England and Scotland. Judges in Scotland have, however, never struck down any provisions of a post-Union Act of Parliament on the grounds of their contravention of articles of the Acts of Union. The judges in Scotland have studiously avoided giving an unequivocal answer to the question as to whether or not they indeed have any such power. 8

The constitutional position was recently summarised by Lord Donaldson MR as follows: 9

"Our unwritten constitution rests upon a separation of powers. It also rests upon a mutual recognition of those powers. It is for Parliament to make


new laws and to amend old laws, including the common law. It is for the courts to interpret and enforce the law. It is for the government to govern within the law. Each within its own sphere is supreme. Ultimate supremacy lies with Parliament, but only to the extent that it can control the government by its votes and that it can control the courts by using the full legislative procedure for changing the law, either generally or with a view to reversing a particular decision by the courts."

The accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities in 1972 resulted in the incorporation of the legal systems of the United Kingdom into the Community legal order. By Sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 the courts of the United Kingdom were required to apply law in the United Kingdom as interpreted by that Court. 10

As we have seen, the European Court's interpretation of Community law requires national courts to give superiority to the provisions of Community law over and against those provisions of national law. However, while the Community doctrines of superiority, direct effect and permeability might have been unequivocally established in the jurisprudence of the European Court within six years of the acceptance of the United Kingdom's legal systems into the Community legal order, the actual reception of those doctrines in the practice of the courts in the United Kingdom has required more time.  

There has been a time lag between European constitutional theory and United Kingdom court practice.

3. JUDGES AND PARLIAMENT: THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Writing in 1980, Mauro Cappeletti stated the following:  


"If ... the United Kingdom accepts the doctrine [of the supremacy of European Community law], a novel form of judicial review of legislation will have been adopted by a nation which, even more rigourously than France, has purported to reject all forms of judicial review since, at least, its Glorious Revolution of 1688."

While the superiority of European law and the competence of the European Court definitively to expound the requirements of European law in relation to national laws was generally accepted in obiter remarks by the United Kingdom judges from the time of the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities 13 the courts of the United Kingdom rarely disapplied provisions of Acts of Parliament on their own initiative. 14

13. See eg Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith [1981] 1 All ER 111 at 120:

"It is important now to declare, and it must be made plain that the provisions of article 119 of the EEC Treaty take priority over anything in our English statute. That priority is given in our own law. It is given by the European Communities Act 1972 itself. Community law is now part of our law; and whenever there is any inconsistency, Community law has priority."

There is evidence of a greater readiness among lower level administrative tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies to take it upon themselves to disapply provisions of primary and secondary national legislation as being contrary to Community law. However, Costa v. ENEL, the locus classicus of the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law over national law was cited or referred to in only four cases before the United Kingdom courts prior to the European Court judgment in Factortame 2 of 19 June 1990 and


16. This is the result of a "Lexis search". The cases which referred to Costa v. ENEL were Blackburn v. Attorney General [1971] 2 All ER 1380, decided on 10 May 1971 prior to the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities; R v. Attorney General, ex parte ICI, Queen's Bench Division, 60 Tax Cases 25 January 1985; Sun International v. Sun Oil Trading Company and Another Queen's Bench Division, unreported judgment of 30 July 1986; R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and others (Factortame 1) in both the Court of Appeal (reported in [1989] 2 CMLR 353) and the House of Lords (reported in [1990] 2 AC 85).

17. R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and others (C-213/89) [1990] ECR reported in [1990] 3 WLR 818
in none of these cases was any national law "disapplied" in favour of Community law. And in the period up to 19 June 1990 Simmenthal has been cited or referred to by the United Kingdom courts in twelve separate cases of which only three involved the national court actually disapplying provisions of an Act of Parliament which were seen to be inconsistent with Community law.

Where it was felt that no reference needed to be made to the European Court, on the grounds that


19. W.H Smith Do-it-all v Peterborough City Council (1991) 1 QB 304, 4 June 1990; R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (Queen's Bench Division) [1989] 2 CMLR 353, overruled by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords on the question of "disapplication" (see infra); Merseyside Cablevision Ltd v The Commissioners, Manchester VAT Tribunal, [1987] VAT Rep 134, [1987] 3 CMLR 290, 30 January 1987.
the applicable Community law was unequivocal, rather than directly overrule inconsistent provisions of national law new canons of interpretation for national legislation and regulations intended to implement, or at least conform to, Community law were developed, in particular, by the House of Lords. Rather than exegesis of the plain language of the text, the Lords adopted an eisegetical approach to the national provisions which should be read in conformity with Community obligations, even to the extent of reading into the national regulations such words and phrases as were necessary to ensure their harmony with Community law. 20 The justification for such a novel approach to legislative interpretation appeared to be that if the intention of Parliament was indeed to implement Community law, then it was the duty of the courts in carrying out Parliament's intention to re-cast the relevant regulations to ensure this conformity with Community law as this was developed over time by the European Court. 21


However, the general practice of the United Kingdom courts continued to be to regard Acts of Parliament as the final word on the law. Thus Lord Donaldson M.R. was able to state in earlier stages of the Factortame litigation: 22

"[I]t is fundamental to our Constitution that it is for Parliament to legislate and for the judiciary to interpret and apply the fruits of Parliament's labour. Any attempt to interfere with primary legislation would be wholly unconstitutional."

Indeed a presumption developed that Acts of Parliament were to be regarded as valid and compatible with Community law, unless and until that matter had been finally and unequivocally ruled upon by the European Court of Justice. Thus the first judgment of the House of Lords in Factortame, 23 prior to the ruling of the recent affirmation in Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (C-106/89) [1990] ECR 4135, [1992] 1 CMLR 305 of the duty of national courts to interpret provisions of national law in the light of the wording and purpose of Community directives, whether the latter pre- or post-date the former. See Mead "The obligation to apply European law: is Duke dead" [1991] European Law Review 490.

22. Factortame 1 (Court of Appeal) [1989] 2 CMLR 353 at 397.

23. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and others (H.L.) [1990] 2 AC 85
European Court, was interpreted by the Scottish Inner House as wholly confirming the proposition that
"a statute passed by the United Kingdom Parliament must be presumed to be valid, until such time as the Act has been declared to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction." 24

It is not clear from the judgment of the Scottish court which national courts, if any, they considered to be competent to declare an Act of Parliament invalid.

The institutional balance as between the United Kingdom courts and Parliament reflected in this presumption as to the validity of acts of Parliament was to be challenged in the Factortame litigation which followed legislation by the United Kingdom aiming at putting an end to the practice of "quota-hopping" whereby non-U.K. nationals were able to benefit from the fishing quota allocated to the United Kingdom under the Common Fisheries Policy by registering their vessels in the British Register of Shipping. 25


In 1988 the U.K. Parliament passed the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in order, it was claimed, to implement and enforce the quota system established by the common fisheries policy. The Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulations 1988 were brought in under this Act. These regulations required all vessels previously registered under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 to re-register under new regulations.

The litigation in Factortame is somewhat complicated, involving as it does one judgment in the High Court ([1987] 1 CMLR 277) and in the Court of Appeal ([1989] 2 CMLR 353) two judgments in the House of Lords ([1990] 2 AC 85; [1990] 3 WLR 818 at 856) and two rulings by the European Court on two separate article 177 references made by the English High Court and the House of Lords respectively ([1991] 1 AC 603 and [1991] 3 All ER 769). For convenience I shall refer to all stages of the litigation prior to the first European Court judgment of 19 June 1990 (Case 213/89) as Factortame 1. The European Court judgment of 19 June 1990 together with the House of Lords second judgment applying the European Court’s ruling will be referred to as Factortame 2. The European Court judgment of 25 July 1991 in Case 246/89 (reported in [1991] 3 All ER 769) will be referred to as Factortame 3. In November 1992 an application was made to the High Court in England by the Factortame fishermen for damages to be awarded them under Francovich principles for the losses suffered by them as a consequence of their having been barred from fishing for the period from the implementation new shipping register under the Merchant Shipping Act 1989 until the dis-application of the relevant provisions by the House of Lords in 1990. This application R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd & Others, Queen’s Bench Division (Crown Office List), CO/1735/88, not yet reported, 16 November 1992 was made the subject of an Article 177 reference to the European Court of Justice. This stage in the litigation will henceforth be referred to as Factortame 4.
conditions which were designed to exclude non-British vessels, specifically Spanish, from eligibility for registration. Registration was the pre-requisite to obtaining a licence to fish under the quota permitted the U.K. under the Community's Common Fisheries Policy. The Act came into force on 1 December 1988 and it was provided that the validity of registrations under the previous Act would expire on 31 March 1989.

(i) The High Court

The validity of the new Merchant Shipping Act and of the regulations made thereunder was immediately challenged as contrary to Community law by the owners of fishing vessels which had been refused registration under the new regime. The court at first instance, holding that the matter raised substantive questions of Community law, ordered that a reference be made to the European Court of Justice under article 177 for a preliminary ruling on those matters of Community law which had been raised in the proceedings. Pending the decision of the European Court on these substantive matters, the Divisional Court made an interim order purporting to "disapply" the operation of both the principal Act and the disputed regulations made under it and forbidding the Secretary of State from enforcing those
regulations as against the parties to the case, thereby allowing their previous registrations under the 1894 Act to continue until the final determination of the cause.

(ii) The Court of Appeal

The Secretary of State appealed only against the interim orders and not the article 177 reference which continued to the European Court of Justice. The decision of the Divisional Court to grant interim relief in the above terms was reversed by the Court of Appeal on 22 March 1989. This judgement of the Court of Appeal was itself appealed against by the trawler owners. Thus, by the time the case reached the House of Lords the matter at issue was one concerned with procedural law regarding the availability of interim relief pending the determination of the substantive issues raised by the passing of the 1988 Act.

(iii) The House of Lords

The Court of Appeal decision to reverse the order to disapply the Act and regulations ad interim was upheld by the House of Lords on 18 May 1989 on two grounds of national law: (i) that the courts in England had no power to grant injunctions against the Crown and (ii) that there
was a presumption in English law that Acts of Parliament were valid and compatible with Community law unless and until the matter was finally and authoritatively decided by the European Court of Justice. 27 Thus, standing the traditional theory of the sovereignty of Parliament, the national courts in the United Kingdom could have no power to "disapply" an Act of Parliament pending a decision from the European Court as to the compatibility of the Act with Community law.

(iv) The European Court of Justice

Notwithstanding the apparently unequivocal position in domestic law, the House of Lords was persuaded that it was necessary to make a reference to the European Court in order to determine whether or not there existed some overriding principle derived from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice which compels national courts of Member States, whatever their own law may provide, to assert and, in appropriate circumstances to exercise, a power to provide an effective interlocutory remedy to protect putative rights in law.

27. See Lord Bridge [1990] 2 AC 85 at 112
Relying on the principle of co-operation of national courts to ensure the full and effective protection of rights acquired under Community law in every member state, the European court held in the House of Lords Factortame reference that:

"Community law must be interpreted as meaning that a national court which, in a case before it concerning law, considers that the sole obstacle which prevents it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule."

(v) The House of Lords

On receiving this ruling back from the European Court, the Lords granted an order restraining the Secretary of State "from withholding or withdrawing registration in the register of British fishing vessels maintained by him pursuant to the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulations 1988."  


29. See R. v. Sec. of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1990] 3 W.L.R. 818.
5. **THE IMPLICATIONS OF FACTORTAME**

It is submitted that the decision of the European Court in *Factortame 2* has brought about a fundamental change in the attitude of United Kingdom courts as regards their role within the constitutional order of the United Kingdom. As the practice of the courts change, so too does the unwritten constitution. One consequence of the European Court's decision in *Factortame 2* has been to effect a significant constitutional change in the United Kingdom by fundamentally weakening the presumption of the validity of an Act of Parliament in relation to Community law and by making it clear to the United Kingdom courts that the question of the judicial review of national legislation for its conformity with Community law is primarily a duty laid upon national courts.

The acceptance of a new vision and the consequent rejection of the heretofore traditional understanding of Parliamentary sovereignty is clear from two statements of Lord Bridge of Harwich made at various stages in the *Factortame* litigation. When the matter was first before the House of Lords Lord Bridge stated: 30

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30. *Factortame Ltd. and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport* [1990] 2 AC 85 at 143.
"If the applicants fail to establish the rights they claim before the E.C.J. the effect of the interim relief granted would be to have conferred upon them rights directly contrary to Parliament's sovereign will ... I am clearly of the opinion that as a matter of English law, the court has no power to make an order which has these consequences.

However in his second judgment in the case following the European Court's ruling Lord Bridge expressed the view that the United Kingdom's accession to the European Communities in 1972 meant that the courts of the United Kingdom had fully accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice with all that implied, including acceptance of the Simmenthal decision. He stated: 31

"Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom Court, when delivering final judgement, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of law ... Thus there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to

31. Ibid. 857-8 [Emphasis added].
rules of law in those areas in which they apply and to insist that, in the protection of rights under law, national courts should not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that supremacy."

This is somewhat disingenuous of Lord Bridge. If the matter were so clear in European law, what need then was there for a reference by the House of Lords to the European Court when the doctrine of acte clair could have been be applied interim relief granted immediately? Factortame 2 might well mark the "logical recognition" of the supremacy, but it is the first unequivocal recognition by the highest court in the United Kingdom of the implications of that supremacy for the practice of all courts of the United Kingdom. Lord Bridge attempts to disguise the extent of the change brought about by Factortame 2, by presenting it simply as a case where the national courts were granted rights to suspend Acts of Parliament temporarily, to supplement the power

32. For criticism of the "parochialism" of the Lords in making a reference to the European Court rather than themselves applying clear principles of Community law see Gravells "Disapplying an Act of Parliament pending a preliminary ruling: Constitutional enormity or Community Law Right?" [1989] Public Law 568.
they have had since 1972 to "disapply" them permanently. As we have seen, however, the power to disapply Acts of Parliament was rarely used and barely acknowledged.

In fact, the creation of a power to grant interim relief in these circumstances means that henceforth it is the judgment of the national courts alone which results in the suspension of Acts of Parliament, rather than the judgment of the European Court.

The fact that the judgment of the European Court was seen to be saying something new and altering the traditional constitutional understanding is made clear from certain remarks made by the head of the Court of Appeal two weeks after the European Court's judgment in Factortame 2. Lord Donaldson MR modified his statement as to the proper relationship between courts and legislature in the United Kingdom to the following effect: 33

"The constitutional position is clear. Subject only to a recent pronouncement by the European Court in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte

33. See R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Hammersmith [1990] 3 WLR 925 at 934, judgment of 3 July 1990
Factortame (No. 2) (C-213/89) [1990] 3 WLR 818, the significance of which has yet to be worked out, Parliament has a limitless right to alter or add to the law by means of primary legislation, enacted by the full constitutional process of debate and decision in both Houses on first and second readings of the Bill, committee and report stages and third readings followed by Royal Assent. The result is a statute and in relation to statutes the only duty of the judiciary is to interpret and apply them."

6. FACTORTAME AND THE RECEPTION OF SIMMENTHAL

Simmenthal has been cited in twenty separate cases in the fourteen years from the beginning of 1979 to the end of 1992. 34

The year refers to the year of the decision in which Simmenthal was first cited in that case, rather than necessarily the year in which the case was concluded or reported. If one includes different stages in the same cases in these same years, Simmenthal was cited on a total of twenty

34. This is the result of a Lexis search.
six occasions. The distribution was as follows (the figure in brackets includes the total of multiple citations at different stages in the same case:

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<th>SIMMENTHAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>41</td>
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35. Shields v E Coomes (Holdings) Ltd [1978] ICR 1159, 27 April 1978; R v Henn, R v Darby, Court of Appeal Criminal Division [1978] 3 All ER 1190, 7 July 1978


40. Bourgoin SA and others v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1 QB 716, 29 July 1985, CA; R v Attorney General (ex parte Imperial Chemical Industries Plc) 60 Tax Cas 1, 25 January 1985

41. R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Schering Chemicals Limited [1987] 1 CMLR 277, 10 July 1986
1987 42  1 (1)
1988   0 (0)

post-Factortame 1
1989 43  1 (3)
1990 44  1 (2)

post-Factortame 2
1991 45  4 (5)
1992 46  4 (4)


44. W.H Smith Do-it-all v Peterborough City Council [1991] 1 QB 304, 4 June 1990; Factortame Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2), [1991] 1 All ER 70 11 October 1990, HL


By the end of 1992 Factortame had been cited on a total of twenty two occasions. 47 The case in its various stages has been cited to support two distinct general propositions.

One result of the Factortame 1 judgment was a "firming up" of the idea as to what constituted the proper relationship between the executive and the judiciary in the United Kingdom. Thus Factortame 1 has been cited as authority for the fact that injunctions cannot be granted against the Crown, and that the Crown is, in some ways, not fully subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, in matter which concern English law alone. Such citation was made on sixteen occasions. They are distributed thus:

FACTORTAME 1 YEAR OF DECISION NUMBER OF CITATIONS

1990 48 2 (3)


47. This is the result of a Lexis search.

The second proposition, drawn from the European Court and from the second House of Lords judgments in Factortame 2 is that, in matters touched by Community law, all measures to protect rights under Community law are available to the United Kingdom court - these measures include the disapplication of Acts of Parliament and the


granting of injunctions against the Crown. Only in matters where Community law is relevant might Factortame 2 be applied to allow for the full judicial review of legislative and administrative action. Such citation was made on a total of sixteen occasions. In tabular form the distribution is as follows:

**FACTORTAME 2 YEAR OF DECISION NUMBER OF CITATIONS**

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<td>1992</td>
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53. R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd & Others (No 3), Queen’s Bench Division
All of the five cases in 1991 which cited Simmenthal after the European Court and House of Lords decision in Factortame 2 also made reference to Factortame 2. Of the four cases in 1992 which cited Simmenthal, three of these also cited Factortame 2. 54

It is clear that the decision in Factortame 2 has coincided with a substantial increase in the references made in the United Kingdom courts to Simmenthal. It is submitted that this increasing reference to Simmenthal within the United Kingdom courts is indicative of a growing awareness among lawyers and judges of the implications of the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law for the United Kingdom. It may, indeed, be argued that the decision of the European Court of Justice on 19 June 1990 and its implementation by the House of Lords in Factortame 2 on 9 July 1990 represents the unequivocal reception of the Simmenthal doctrine


54. See the cases cited in note 46. The only case not to cite Factortame being Rankin v. British Coal Corporation [1993] IRLR 69, EAT 7 December 1992.
into the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and in particular, of the acceptance of possibility of the judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom

7. **CONCLUSION**

The idea that the Courts in the United Kingdom are doing nothing more than realizing the will of Parliament is the shibboleth of constitutionalism as traditionally understood in the United Kingdom. It is, however, impossible to maintain this formula when the United Kingdom courts actively review and openly suspend Acts of Parliament as contrary to the higher law embodied in the Treaty of Rome.

The importance of the European Court’s decision in **Factortame 2** is firstly that it emphasises to the United Kingdom courts that it is their duty to apply Community law to national Acts of Parliament. Once this is done the proposition that in applying Community law national courts are doing no more than implementing the will of national Parliaments appears fictional. **Factortame 2** forces the United Kingdom courts openly to acknowledge that, as Community courts, their duty is to further the achievement of the
goals of the Community. Factortame 2 has thus brought about the reception in the United Kingdom of the doctrines of supremacy and permeability as expounded by the European Court in Simmenthal.

Under Community law, it is the duty of every court in the United Kingdom to consider whether or not an Act of Parliament should be applied or disapplied in the case before it, depending upon that court's understanding of the requirements of Community law. As Mustill L.J. has stated: 55

"Since [the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities] the courts have been obliged to read statutes of the United Kingdom in the light of the general principles laid down in the Treaty of Rome, as developed in instruments of the Council and Commission, and as expounded by the European Court of Justice. The interaction between these instruments and the public and private rights of organisations and individuals in Member States is complex, but one thing must be taken as clear for the purposes of the present case; that if there is a collision ... the former must yield."

Further, no court within the national judicial hierarchies can properly seek to impose rules which restrict the right of lower courts within that same hierarchy to "disapply" Acts of Parliament since this is a power which derives from Community law. 56

Legal theory as developed by the European Court has lead inexorably to the complete and substantive review of acts of Parliament by the national courts. This development, which has been a, perhaps unforeseen, result of judicial activism on the part of the European Court, involves a substantive shift in the institutional balance among executive, legislature and judiciary. A silent revolution in the political structure of the United Kingdom, in particular to the traditional understanding of the separation of powers, has been effected by the activities of a foreign court. The implications of such a revolution for the primacy of national parliamentary democracy have yet to be realized.

56. Lord Goff in Factortame 2 [1990] 3 WLR 818 at 871 does appear to attempt to limit the national courts by suggesting that their power to disapply Acts of Parliament should be used only in exceptional circumstances when there is a "strong prima facie case that the law is invalid".
No longer can the national government be confident of enforcing its own enacted laws within its own territory before its own courts, because the duty of the courts in the United Kingdom, while the United Kingdom remains a member of the European Communities, has become to apply the rules of English, Northern Irish or Scots law only insofar as these are compatible with Community law. 57

Factortame 2 marks the unambiguous acceptance of the supremacy of Community law by the United Kingdom courts and with it the general reception of the fact that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice has had the effect of creating a truly federal legal system: the foundation treaties of the European Communities have been ascribed constitutional status; the acts of the central institutions are treated as a higher federal law; and the legislation of the Member States is permitted to stand insofar as it does not contravene or trespass upon Community law. It is the duty of national courts, under Community law, to realize this vision within their own jurisdictions.

The realization of this vision in the United Kingdom requires the introduction of the judicial review of national legislation by national courts. It is to this problem that I will turn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3

FACTORTAME'S WAKE

THE DIRECT RECEPTION OF COMMUNITY LAW
FACTORTAME'S WAKE

THE DIRECT RECEPTION OF COMMUNITY LAW

"The British have no more wish to be governed by judges than they have to be judged by administrators" 1

1. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

(i) Introduction

In Factortame 2 the European Court held that the principle of the full and effective protection of rights under Community law required that courts in the United Kingdom should be able to set aside any potentially conflicting national laws **ad interim**, pending a final decision by the European Court on the relevant Community law. While opinions may differ as to the extent to which this decision represented any new development in Community law since Simmenthal, 2 the effect of the judgment in the United Kingdom has been to

1. Lord Devlin The Times 27/10/76, cited by Mackenzie-Stuart The European Communities and the Rule of Law (1977) at 78

encourage the bringing of cases before the courts seeking the judicial review of United Kingdom legislation for its compatibility with Community law. 3

As we saw in the previous chapter, the idea of the judicial review of legislation is totally alien to the constitutional development of the United Kingdom since its creation as a unitary state in 1707. Coke C.J.'s claims in 1610 4 that the English Common law could in many cases "controul acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is


4. Dr. Bonham's case (1610) 77 Eng Rep 646, 652 (CP 1610).
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such Act to be void"

did not survive the seventeenth century constitutional upheavals which culminated in victory for the partisans of Parliament's absolute supremacy and sovereignty.

Prior to the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Communities, the position regarding the possibility of the judicial review of legislation could be accurately summarised as follows: 5

"What the statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is itself the law, and the highest form of law that is known in this country. It is the law which prevails over every other form of law, and it is not for the court to say that a parliamentary enactment, the highest law of this country, is illegal."

Notwithstanding the fact that it is now generally accepted in the United Kingdom that "the Treaty of Rome is the supreme law of this country,

taking precedence over Acts of Parliament" 6 the centuries' long tradition of the courts' deference Parliament has resulted in some reluctance on the part of the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the democratically elected legislature, as appears at times required of them under Community law.

(ii) National judicial review of legislation as the interpretation and application of Community law

In considering whether or not to disapply an Act of Parliament, either *ad interim* or finally, the national courts are engaged in the act of applying Community law. The European Court has consistently affirmed the need for Community law to be applied throughout the Member States in a uniform manner, declaring that: 7

"[T]he purpose of article 177 of the EEC Treaty is to ensure that all provisions which form part of the legal order are applied uniformly within the Community so as to avoid any variation in their effects resulting from the


interpretation given them in different Member States."

Given the high importance ascribed to the principle of uniformity in application and interpretation of Community law and the development by the European Court of article 5 of the EEC Treaty 8 which requires all national authorities, including national courts 9, "to take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty" and to "abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty", it is clear that the United Kingdom courts have to assess their own national law, in cases of potential conflict with Community law, on the same basis and principles as would the European Court. 10 The European Court has imposed an "interpretative obligation" on national courts to use the same principles and modes of reasoning as used by the European Court when faced with matters of Community law in order to ensure that advancement of the aims and

9. See Van Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (C-14/83) [1984] ECR 1891
10. See generally Grossfeld "The Internal Dynamics of European Community Law" (1992) 26 The International Lawyer 125
objectives of the Communities as outlined in the Treaties. It is therefore the duty of all judges in the United Kingdom to subject all legislation, Acts of Parliament as much as Statutory Instruments, to examination and review if and when they are challenged to determine the conformity of such legislation to the body of supreme law which applies in the United Kingdom, namely Community law.

Community law is not, however, simply a matter of particular regulations and directives, but includes a number of general principles of law as well as fundamental rights. These principles include: proportionality; the protection of legitimate expectations and the preservation of legal certainty; the standard of formal equality that like cases be treated alike;


14. See Decker (C-99/78) [1979] ECR 101

15. See Ruckdeschel (C-117/76, 16/77) [1977] ECR 1753 at 1769
respect for fundamental rights 16; the rights of the defence including confidentiality of communications between client and lawyer 17, due process and considerations of natural justice 18; the non-retroactivity of penal provisions 19.

These principles, too, have to be applied and interpreted by United Kingdom courts in assessing the "constitutionality" of U.K. law against the free market regime provided for by the original treaties. 20 As one former member of the Court has stated: 21

"When judges apply Community law in national courts they must, as I see it, apply Community law as defined by the European Court of Justice. That Court has recognised that certain fundamental principles are part of such law - proportionality, the protection of

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18. Transocean Marine Paint (C-17/74) [1974] ECR 1063 at 1079
legitimate expectations, legal certainty, the avoidance of retroactivity without just cause, to name only four.

(iii) Schema

A complete survey of the way in which these principles have been applied in the United Kingdom is obviously beyond the scope of this work. Accordingly, in this chapter I will restrict myself to looking at the way in which the United Kingdom courts have dealt with the application of the Community doctrine of proportionality in the judicial review of legislation. This doctrine, as we shall see, requires the national courts to assess the legislation from the point of view of its appropriateness, necessity and overall balance.

The application by United Kingdom courts of the principle of proportionality is of particular interest from the point of view of the analysis of the reception of laws because, unlike many of the aforementioned principles, it is a principle which is without precedent or

22. See Usher "The influence of national concepts in decisions of the European Court" (1976) 1 European Law Review 359
counterpart in the domestic law of the United Kingdom. It is also a principle of which applies specifically to the judicial review of legislation.

There have been two areas of law in which the Community doctrine of proportionality has, thus far, been accepted and applied by the United Kingdom courts in the context of the judicial review of national legislation. The first is in the review of the English Sunday trading legislation as set out in the Shops Act 1950. The second is in the application of the tests of indirect discrimination to the provisions relating to part-time workers contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. I will look at both of these areas, but before doing so it is clearly necessary to examine the Community's doctrine of proportionality.

2. **PROPORTIONALITY IN COMMUNITY LAW**

Proportionality has been defined, by a British judge, as the general principle "that a steam hammer should not be used to crack a nut" or, in other words, that excessive means should not

be adopted in order to attain permissible objects.

(i) Proportionality in German law

Proportionality is a principle which was first developed in German administrative law (there termed *Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit*) in the nineteenth century. As a principle of administrative law it requires that administrative authorities should use proportionate or non-excessive means in seeking to achieve some permissible end.

Although originally developed in the context of administrative law, *Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit* has subsequently been found to be a principle of German Constitutional law. It is held to underpin the Constitution and the Rule of Law in Germany and is accordingly applied by the Federal Constitutional Court in assessing the compatibility of legislation with the fundamental rights protected in the *Grundgesetz*.


25. See Kommers *Judicial Politics in West Germany: a study of the Federal Constitutional Court*, 1976 at 210-1

For legislation to satisfy the constitutional principle of *Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit* it has to pass three tests. Firstly, it should be shown to be appropriately and effectively aimed at a legitimate end, in the sense that the relationship between means and ends is neither impossible or unlawful (*Geeignetheit eines Mittels*). Secondly, it should be demonstrated to be necessary, in the sense that there are no less restrictive means which might achieve the same purpose (*Erforderlichkeit eines Mittels*). Lastly it should be seen to be proportionate or balanced, in the sense that any injury or restriction on the individual caused by the act should be offset by the gain to the community as a whole (*Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit im engener Sinne*). 27

(ii) Proportionality appropriated by the European Court

Although finding its original source in German law, the proportionality test has been independently developed by the European Court in

the course of its own case law. 28 In an early case, Fedechar 29, brought under the Coal and Steel Treaty, the European Court held that, to be lawful and valid under Community law, the reaction of the High Authority to an unlawful act must be proportionate to the scale of that act.

In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 30 the European Court applied the principle, which it saw as derived from the proportionality test, that "the individual should not have his freedom of action limited beyond the degree necessary for the public interest" in determining the validity of a system of forfeiture of deposits paid to the Commission when applying for import or export licences.


29. Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel (C-8/55) [1956] ECR 245 at 299.

In a series of cases from *Cassis de Dijon* \textsuperscript{31} onward the European Court has applied the principle of proportionality in relation to article 30 of the EEC Treaty on the free movement of goods restricted by article 36 public policy derogations. The Court has held that such derogation are valid only to the extent that they are proportionate, in the sense of there being no less restrictive alternative which might satisfy the same public policy aims, without being a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade among the member states.

More recently, in *FEDESA* \textsuperscript{32}, the fifth chamber of the European Court stated the following:

\begin{itemize}
\item[31.] See *Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein ('Cassis de Dijon')* (C-120-78) [1979] ECR 649; *Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smidt Pvba* (C-261/81) [1982] ECR 3691; *Commission v. Denmark ('Danish Bottles')* (C-302/86) [1988] ECR 4607 at 4629 para 6: "In the absence of common rules relating to the marketing of the products in question, obstacles to free movement within the resulting from disparities between national laws must be accepted insofar as such rule, applicable to domestic and imported products without distinction, may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy the mandatory requirements recognized by law. Such rules must also be proportionate to the aim in view. If a member state has a choice between various measures for achieving the same aim, it should choose the means which least restricts the free movement of goods."
\item[32.] *R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and another, ex parte Federation Europeene de _a Sante Animale (FEDESA) and others* (C-331/88) [1990] ECR 4023; also reported in [1991] 1 CMLR 507.
\end{itemize}
"The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued."

(iii) Proportionality exported to the Member States

In matters concerning Community law, the principle of proportionality falls to be applied by the national courts in the same manner as it would be applied by the European Court. As Advocate General Mancini has stated:

"The general principles elicited by the Court from the primary and secondary

33. In Jongeneel Kaas v. Netherlands (C-237/82) [1984] ECR 483 at 520, 522 It should be noted that this part of his Opinion did not form the basis of the Court's decision in the actual case."
provisions of Community law, and in particular from those fundamental values which are common to the legal systems of the Member States, form part of the Community legal order and may therefore be relied upon by individuals before the national court which, as is well known is also a Community court ... The general principles of law and, in particular, the principle of proportionality have direct effect. Accordingly they must be applied by national courts if the circumstances in relation to which they are relied upon display a connection with the Community system."

Like the German doctrine, the principle of proportionality when applied under Community law to the "constitutional" judicial review of Member States' legislation is a complex test, involving three separate evaluations: (i) the national legislation should be appropriate or relevant in the sense that the substance of, and the relationship between, the means used and the ends sought in the national legislation is neither factually impossible nor unlawful in general Community law; (ii) the national legislation should be necessary or indispensable, in the
sense that it constitutes a formulation which least restricts the general operation of Community law; (iii) the national legislation should be balanced or proportionate in the sense that it does not excessively adversely affect the four freedoms (of persons, services, goods and capital) protected under the Community treaties.

3. **PROPORTIONALITY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

The application of, particularly, the latter two tests included within the Community doctrine of proportionality involves the national courts in deciding large questions. Such matters as determining whether or not national legislation

34. See the Opinion of Advocate-General Van Gerven in SPUC v. Grogan (C-159/90) ECJ judgment of 4 October 1991, reported in [1991] 3 CMLR 689 at paragraph 27:

"The principle [of proportionality] has two aspects. **First**, in order for a national rule to be justified under law it must be objectively necessary in order to help achieve the aim sought by the rule: that means it must be **useful** (or relevant) and **indispensable**, in other words it must not be capable of being replaced by an alternative rule which is equally useful but less restrictive of the freedom to supply services. **Secondly** if the national rule is useful and indispensable in order to achieve the aim sought, the member state must nevertheless drop the rule, or replace it with a less onerous one if the restrictions caused to intra-Community trade by the rule are **disproportionate**, that is to say of the restrictions caused are out of proportion to the aim sought by or the result brought about by the national rule."
excessively affects Community and might be better and less restrictively formulated are not ones which the United Kingdom courts have traditionally seen themselves as competent to decide. Thus, in Gibson v. The Lord Advocate, 35 a Scottish case in which a challenge was made to the validity of certain EEC fishing regulations on the grounds that they were contrary to Article XVIII of the Treaty of Union between Scotland and England which provided that "no alteration be made in laws which concern private right, except for the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland" Lord Keith of Kinkel stated: 36

"The making of decisions upon what must essentially be a political matter is no part of the function of this court, and it is highly undesirable that it should be. The function of this court is to adjudicate upon the particular rights and obligations of individual persons, natural or corporate, in relation to other persons or, in certain circumstances, to the State. A general inquiry into the utility of certain legislative matters as regards the

36. ibid. at 570
population generally is quite outside its competence."

More recently Hoffman J., in a judgment concerning the compatibility of the English Sunday trading restriction with article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, called upon the European Court to exercise restraint in judicially reviewing legislation and in requiring national courts to do the same. He stated: 37

"In my judgment it is not my function to carry out a balancing exercise or to form my own view as to whether the legislative objects could be achieved by other means. These questions involve compromises between competing interests which in a democratic society must be resolved by the legislature. ... The function of this court is to review the acts of the legislature but not to substitute its own policies or values. This is not an abdication of judicial responsibility. The primacy of the democratic process is far more important than the question of whether our Sunday trading laws could or could not be improved."

37. In Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q plc [1991] 2 WLR 42 at 57
Notwithstanding Hoffman J.'s fears for the democratic process and Lord Keith's concerns as to the proper delimitation between politics and judging, Community law as it currently stands requires national courts to apply these tests in evaluating national legislation. 38

4. **THE APPLICATION OF PROPORTIONALITY TO SUNDAY TRADING**

In a series of cases which have resulted from challenges by large retailing concerns to the restrictions on Sunday trading in England and Wales laid down by Section 47 of the Shops Act 1950 it has become clear that the national courts duty to "disapply" provisions of Acts of Parliament held to violate Community law is not being used consistently across the country because the principle of proportionality is being interpreted in differing ways. The result of this confusion has been a lack of uniformity in the application of both the provisions of

38. See also the remarks of Sheriff J.R. Smith in Walkingshaw v. Marshall 1992 SLT 1167 at 1670 on the necessity for a court to conduct a full inquiry into all relevant facts before being able to pronounce on the question of the proportionality of any legislation challenged before it.
national law and the principles of Community law within one Member State.

(i) **A history of litigation**

Sunday trading cases have been coming before the English courts as a result of what has been termed a "war of attrition" conducted since 1987 by large retailers against the restrictions imposed upon their trading on Sundays by the Shops Act 1950. 39 The tactic of the campaign against the Shops Act 1950 has been to find "European defences" on which resist application of the Act in the particular case. The favoured defence to date has been to claim that the restrictions on trading on a Sunday contravene article 30 of the EEC Treaty by constituting a quantitative restriction on imports from other member states of the Community. Evidence is produced to show that retailers who are required to close on a Sunday lose a proportion of their potential turnover, some of which would be attributable to imports from other EEC countries. Further, Sunday shopping is claimed to have

particular social characteristics which mean that
the loss of sales occasioned by being closed on
the Sunday is not made up by the retail outlet
being open in the other six days.

(ii) Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc

References were made to the European Court of
Justice by a number of courts before whom this
defence was presented. The European Court
considered the merits of this Article 30 defence
in one test case, Torfaen Borough Council v. B &
Q plc. 40 The Court held that a restriction on
trade which applied without distinction of origin
within one member state was a justifiable
derogation from the principle of the free
movement of goods if the trade restriction was
intended to achieve some objective acceptable in
law and that the means chosen were proportionate
to that end.

The European Court considered that it was clearly
"a legitimate part of economic and social policy,
consistent with the objectives of public interest
pursued by the Treaty" for a member state to lay
down national rules regulating the opening hours

40 Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc (C-145/88)
of retail premises so as to accord with "national or regional socio-cultural characteristics". Thus the end at which the laws were aimed was, in principle, acceptable in Community law. However, such national rules would only be compatible with Community law if their adverse effect on the free movement of goods in the Community was outweighed by their beneficial effects in reflecting the particular socio-cultural characteristics of the nation or region in which they applied. The European Court concluded that "the question whether the effect of specific national rules do in fact remain within that limit is a question of fact to be determined by the national court." 41

In effect the European Court of Justice was instructing the national courts in the United Kingdom to apply the doctrine of proportionality 42 to the provisions of the Shops Act 1950 to determine whether or not the Act's provisions should be applied to the circumstances of the case before.

41. Paras 12-16 of the judgement of the Court.

42. As set out in, inter alia, article 3 of the Commission Directive 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1969 on the abolition of measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports.
In one of the first cases following the European Court's judgement in Torfaen, W.H. Smith Do-it-all Ltd and Another v. Peterborough City Council 43, this notion of proportionality was considered in certain obiter dicta of Mustill L.J. He noted that one interpretation of the concept of proportionality might lead the Courts into a type of cost benefit analysis whereby weight would be attributed, for example, to the aim of realizing the free movement of goods as against the weight to be given to the achievement of particular socio-cultural object (assuming that this could be identified) implicit in the challenged national measure. The learned judge thought that such a weighing exercise would, in general, be too difficult a matter for the courts. It was political choice which decided the precedence to be given to different aims in society. Even if values could be given to these different aims, there remained the problem of incommensurability. He asked, rhetorically: 44

"How could (say) a desire to keep the Sabbath holy be measured against the

43. See note 23.

44. *ibid.* at 596.
free-trade economic premises of the Common Market?"

Instead Mustill L.J. favoured an alternative approach to the determination of whether or not the restrictive effect of a national rule on trade exceeded the effects intrinsic to that rule. This approach involved breaking the question down to a series of judgements. The national court was first to determine whether or not the measure in question could be said to be equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports. Having answered 'yes' to that question, the court had then to consider whether or not the objective of the national measure was one which Community law accepted as a justifiable one. If the answer to this question were in the affirmative, then the national court could go on to determine whether or not the national measure went further than was necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose.

It is clear that Mustill J. is only applying the appropriateness and necessity tests, and avoids the last test, proportionality in a strict sense whereby he should consider whether or not the restrictions to intra-Community trade caused by the national law are out of proportion to the aim
sought by or the result brought about by that national rule

(iv) **Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q plc**

Hoffman J. in *Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q plc* 45 was, when granting an injunction against illegal Sunday trading, was even more restrictive in his understanding of proportionality.

He was hostile to the idea that the doctrine of proportionality might involve the courts in some sort of balancing exercise between the value of relatively shopping free Sundays against the value of free movement of goods within the Community. Neither did he think it appropriate for the court to consider whether or not the legislative objective (which he identified as the ensuring, so far as possible, that shopkeepers and shop assistants did not have to work on Sundays) could be achieved by other less-restrictive means. He stated 46

"Is this court to apply its own opinion of the importance of ensuring that shop workers do not have to work on Sundays and weight that against its opinion of


the importance of selling more Dutch bulbs or Italian furniture? If the legislature has declined to adopt any modifications of the existing exceptions, is the court to say that modifications should nevertheless be introduced because in its opinion they would not detract from the legislative object and would mean that the Act was less of a hindrance to trade?"

The answer to these questions is that in Community law that is precisely his duty. On Hoffman J.'s understanding, however, the doctrine of proportionality is to be limited to a consideration of the first test only, that of a rational connection between the aim sought and the means used in the legislation. Thus, per Hoffman J. the court could only hold a measure to be disproportionate if it considered that no reasonable legislature could have held the view that the aim of this legislation justified the reduction in trade consequent upon its application and that that aim could not have been achieved by other, less trade-restrictive, measures. The rationale for this limitation of the court's function was that for the court to substitute its own view as to other less-trade restrictive measures which Parliament might have
adopted in order to achieve the same end would be for the court to subvert the democratic process by usurping the function of the legislature.

The approach which Hoffman J. appears to be applying in considering the proportionality of legislation is that of "Wednesbury unreasonableness", which is a standard developed in English administrative law whereby only decisions which might be described as completely unreasonable, outrageous or absurd decisions might be struck down by the courts. However, as we have seen, the concept of reasonableness implicit within the proportionality test is not "that which is not absurd or outrageous". Rather, the standard applied in the proportionality tests is that of ordinary reasonableness: that is to say, that which constitutes the most efficient and least restrictive thing to do in the circumstances.

Hoffman J.'s approach assimilates the test of proportionality with existing standards applied in English administrative law. Having been instructed by the European Court to apply the tests of proportionality, he attempts to interpret the test in a manner which renders it

47. The concept of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" is discussed in Chapter 4
consistent with the "proper" role of judges, at least as this has been understood since the post-1689 constitutional settlement in the United Kingdom. The equation of proportionality with "Wednesbury unreasonableness" is justified on the basis of broad appeals to constitutional legitimacy and democracy as these have been traditionally understood in the United Kingdom. In particular he seeks to preserve the traditional diffidence shown by United Kingdom judges in relation to political matters.

To back up his understanding of proportionality as containing within it the standards of "Wednesbury unreasonableness", Hoffman J. quoted from a number of cases from Canada and the United States of America. It is noteworthy that reference was made to proportionality as applied to the judicial review of legislation in other common law countries, rather than to the case-law of the European Court of Justice.


49. It is interesting to note that the courts in Canada appear to have adopted the three-fold test of proportionality developed in German and Community law when assessing legislation for its conformity with Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 in considering whether legislation limiting the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter could demonstrably be justified in a free and
self-evident that common law countries, with a tradition of a certain judicial self-restraint, should have developed the notion of proportionality in the same way as those civilian systems with specific constitutional courts whose jurisprudence provided the basis for the adoption by the European Court of Justice of proportionality as a general principle of law.

The fundamental flaw in Hoffman J.'s approach is that proportionality is not a test developed within English law. As we shall see, the House of Lords has shown hostility to the proposed reception of the test of proportionality within the general administrative law of the United Kingdom. Proportionality has been developed by courts which do not necessarily share that particular British vision of the democratic society, the Canadian Supreme Court stated (at 139):

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to meet to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question. ... Third there must be proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter rights or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of sufficient importance."

*R v. Oakes* was not cited by Hoffman J. in his consideration of proportionality.

50. *infra*, Chapter 4
polity and of the requirements of the rule of law as regards the proper balance between judges and legislators. Judges in the United Kingdom are not being asked to apply an English law test of proportionality, but in acting as Community courts, to apply a Community law test. They have to act as Community judges.

(v) B & Q Ltd. v. Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council

A contrasting approach to that of Hoffman J. which does not seek to restrict proportionality to existing standards of national administrative law is illustrated by a Crown Court judgement dated 20 July 1990, only two days after the Hoffman judgement, which appears not to have been cited to that court. In an appeal from magistrates to the Crown Court in B & Q Ltd. v. Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council, 51 Judge Northcote applied the "least restrictive alternative test", the second requirement of the proportionality doctrine, and decided that this required that the offending provisions of the Shops Act be disapplied. He stated:

"The question for the court was therefore in our judgement: 'Could the

objective, namely of employee protection with regard to Sunday employment, be achieved by other means which are less of a hindrance to trade?'
The appellant, through his professional witnesses, suggested the following:
1. A contractual requirement that no employee should be required to work on Sundays against their will.
2. Extension of the fifth Schedule of the Act to include items the appellant desires to sell on Sundays ...
3. Some limitation on the hours of opening for Sunday trading.
4. Licensing by local authorities.
We do not have to say which alternative we favour, but it is clear in our judgement that one or other of these means would achieve the desired object with considerable less of a hindrance to trade in general – to trade in goods having an origin in another Member State in particular."

(vi) Alternative Notions of Proportionality in English Sunday Trading Laws

It is clear that there are conflicting notions of what the proportionality test requires of the
United Kingdom courts in the judicial review of legislation under Community law. Both Hoffman J. and Judge Northcote were agreed as to the purpose of the Shops Act 1950 and both accepted that this end was one which was justified under law, provided that the measure was proportionate to that end. However, the view of Hoffman J. was that, in applying the proportionality test to legislation the courts should assume that Parliament had considered the legislation to be proportionate in passing the measure. Accordingly the court should only substitute its own judgement as to the legislation's disproportionality if the court could hold that the legislation was such that no reasonable legislature could in fact have considered it to be proportionate.

By contrast, the approach taken by Judge Northcote involves the court actively considering the possibility of a "less-restrictive alternative" to the existing legislation once the aim of that legislation has been identified. Hence, despite being agreed as to the aim of the legislation, in applying two different tests the judges came to opposite views as to its proportionality.
In an effort to prevent precisely this piecemeal application of the Shops Act throughout England and Wales, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C expressly approved of the approach of Hoffman J. and stated that it was to be held to be a definitive judgement as far as courts of first instance were concerned on the question of the proportionality of Section 47 of the Shops Act 1950. However Hoffman J.’s judgement in Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q plc was appealed directly to the House of Lords which, having heard argument on the matter, decided on 20 May 1991 to make an Article 177 reference to the European Court of Justice for clarification of the European law applicable to the issue.

(vii) A new approach to proportionality from the European Court

Partly in response to the English courts' confused response to the matter, there appears to have been a re-formulation of the position of the European court on the question of the application of proportionality by national courts. In a conjoined Opinion in two cases, Sidef Conforama and Marchandise, dealing with the validity of French and Belgian Sunday employment restrictions

52. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v. Toys 'R' Us Ltd. 18 October 1990, unreported.
Advocate General Van Gerven suggested a change of approach with regard to proportionality. He challenged the decision of the European court in Torfaen to leave the question of the proportionality of a national measure to the national courts on the grounds that such an approach might lead to non-uniform application of the law throughout the Community. He stated:

"Clearly, it is not a matter for the Court to pronounce on the validity of a national rule, in the course of article 177 procedure; nevertheless, the Court has always insisted on the fact that to achieve the collaboration with national courts envisaged by this provision, it is competent to extract the matters of law whose interpretation is necessary to allow the national court to decide the case before it in accordance with law. Only this method allows the safeguarding of the principle objective of the preliminary ruling procedure which is to ensure the uniform application throughout the of the provisions of law.

53. Opinion of 22 November 1990 in Union departementale des syndicats CGT de l'Aisne v. Sidef Conforama and other (C-312/89) and Criminal Proceedings v. Andre Marchandise and others (C-332/89) reported in [1991] ECR 1007 at para 5 [Author's translation].

54. See note 7, para 7, p 1012 [Author's translation].
so as to avoid that their effect vary according to the interpretation given them in different member states."

Van Gerven almost appeared to be suggesting that national courts were incapable of understanding how to apply the Community's proportionality test, and that the European Court should simply state the result they see as required by Community law.

More radically, however, Van Gerven went on to re-interpret the Community's test of proportionality. He suggested that there were in fact two distinct tests in the one principle of proportionality. The first was that a national measure must be shown to be in fact aimed at some aim accepted in Community law and to be the least restrictive alternative in pursuing that aim. This is the test Van Gerven calls "necessity". However, even where a national measure is shown to be "necessary" in this sense, it may yet be struck down as "disproportionate" if the European Court feels that it adversely affect a Community freedom to too great a degree. He state\(^5\) 55

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55. See note 7, para 14, p 1016 [Author's translation].
"The criterion of proportionality requires that a measure, even if it is appropriate and constitutes the least restrictive alternative, is nevertheless incompatible with article 30 (and must therefore be abandoned or replaced with a less efficient rule) because the restriction on intra-Community trade are disproportionate in relation to the goal sought to be achieved."

According to Van Gerven's re-interpretation, while national courts might be competent to decide upon the "necessity" of a measure, it is for the European Court alone to evaluate the balance between the pursuit of the justified objective and the restrictions caused thereby when called upon to interpret articles 30 and/or 36 in the light of a particular national rule described in an article 177 reference. 56

There would appear to be no reason why this development should be restricted to national legislation which has Article 30 implications; that is to say, which has the effect of creating constitutive restrictions on the import of goods from other parts of the Community. Van Gerven's

56. See note 7, para 14, p 1017 [Author's translation]
approach would seem to apply to any case in which one it could be argued that one of the fundamental principles of the Community order is affected by national legislation. In such a situation, it might be claimed that the question of that national act's "proportionality - the strict sense" in relation to Community law is also a matter solely for the judgment of the European court.

Van Gerven's re-defined test of "proportionality in the strict sense", applied after the tests of appropriateness and necessity have been satisfied appears to be precisely the broad "cost-benefit" interpretation of proportionality which was rejected by both Mustill L.J. and Hoffman J. as being unacceptable encroachment by the judiciary into the political sphere. Clearly Van Gerven does not share this diffidence.

The Van Gerven re-defined hurdle of "proportionality in the strict sense" appears to leave the European Court with unfettered discretion to strike down any measure as being "disproportionate" despite being aimed the least restrictive alternative pursuing an end recognised as legitimate in European law. 57

57. This second hurdle approach is strikingly paralleled also in the way in which the Court has developed its human rights jurisprudence in relation to
Oddly enough, it seems to be the creation of a catch-all "Wednesbury unreasonableness" type of test, whereby national legislation can be dismissed as unacceptable within the Community, although seeming to pass the formal tests for its acceptance.

Somewhat surprisingly Van Gerven's approach to the doctrine of proportionality appears to have the support of the United Kingdom government. In its intervention, as set out in the Reports for the Hearing, in *Reading Borough Council v. Payless DIY Ltd.* 58, the United Kingdom government submitted that:

"The Torfaen judgment left the impression in British judicial circles that there must be a doubt to be resolved concerning the compatibility of the [Sunday trading] legislation at issue with Article 30.

Specifically, the immediate practical difficulties arising from the situation ... can be resolved along the lines suggested by Mr. Advocate-General Van


58 C-304/90, ECJ, decided 16 December 1992, not yet reported
Gerven in the Conforama and Marchandise cases ... where he concluded that the task of assessing the necessity and proportionality of the legislation should not be left to the national courts and that those issues can be resolved 'easily' in favour of the validity of the legislation."

Advocate-General Van Gerven and the United Kingdom government appear to be agreed that proportionality is not a suitable doctrine to be applied by national courts - the former presumably from a fear that national courts would be too respectful of national interests and insufficiently communautaire, the latter because of the fear that national courts will be enthusiastically communautaire and usurp the function of the national legislature.

However, for the European Court to arrogate to itself the task of determining the proportionality of national legislation would be for the Court unequivocally to vest in itself the power to harmonize national legislation, which is quite clearly beyond the scope of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome.
The European Court has stated on numerous occasions 59

"Although it is not open to the Court to pass judgment in the context of Article 177 of the Treaty on the validity or the interpretation of a national law, none the less, for the purpose of assisting national courts, it is within its powers to extract the matters of Community law the interpretation of which is necessary to enable the national court to give judgment on the dispute before it in accordance with Community rules."

The provisions of the Shops Act 1950, with its long and apparently random lists of goods and shops excepted or covered by the Act seems almost designed to prevent the usual approach of the Court of Justice which is to describe a hypothetical national law in general terms which would, or would not, be compatible with Community law. The sheer specificity of the provisions of the Shops Act make it difficult to be described in general terms.

In the House of Lords reference in Stoke on Trent the European Court was faced directly with the

task of either leaving the assessment of proportionality of national legislation with the national courts and thereby face the risk of the non-uniform interpretation and application of a Community law doctrine and consequently of Community law, or, in the interests of uniformity to take upon itself the task of assessing national legislation's proportionality and hence validity. The latter approach is in line with previous cases in which the Court has declared its competence to rule on the meaning to be attributed to provisions of national law when these make reference to Community law. 60 and where it has accepted references from national courts outside the scope of article 177. 61

(viii) The ECJ judgement in Stok-on-Trent

The European Court of Justice replied to this reference on 16 December 1992 62 and found as a matter of fact that the provisions regarding Sunday opening contained in Section 47 of the Shops Act 1950 did not disproportionately affect

60. See Dzodzi v. Belgium (C-197, 297/88) [1990] ECR 3763; Gmurzynska-Bscher v. Oberfinanzdirektion Koeln (C-231/89) [1990] ECR 4003

61. Criminal Proceedings against J. J. Zwartveld and others (C-2/88) [1990] ECR 3365

62. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v. B & Q plc (C-169/91), 16 December 1992, European Court of Justice reported in [1993] 1 All ER 481

intra-Community trade. In the face of the difficulties of the English courts in applying the test of proportionality, the Court of Justice took it upon itself to determine the proportionality of national legislation, in the sense of ruling on the aim of the legislation, assessing the restrictive effects of the legislation in practice, and weighing the national interest in attaining the aim of the legislation against the Community interest in ensuring the free movement of goods. In doing the very same exercises with which the English courts found themselves in such difficulty, the European Court was ruling directly and unequivocally on the validity of national legislation, without even the pretence of advising national courts about questions of Community law. As we have seen this was, somewhat paradoxically, a course urged on the European Court by the United Kingdom government itself. The justification given by the European Court for taking on this role appears to have been that it was necessary for it to do so in order to ensure the uniform application of Community law. As the Commission argued in the associated case of Reading Borough Council v. Payless Ltd. and others: 63

63. Reading Borough Council v. Payless Ltd. and others (C-394/90), 16 December 1992, European Court of Justice,
Examination of the proportionality of the possible barriers to intra-Community trade in relation to the aims pursued ... cannot be left to be determined by national courts, in view of the danger that different national courts will reach different conclusions on cases which are similar.

Proportionality becomes, then, a test of general principle rather than one the result of which might vary with different findings of fact made by individual courts in particular cases.

(vii) Sunday Trading - the Constitutional Implications

It is clear that the matters raised by Torfaen and Stoke on Trent go far beyond the limited question as to whether or not the restrictions on Sunday retailing contained in the Shops Act 1950 might be acceptable in Community law. In Torfaen the European Court instructed national courts to assess national legislation which derogated from the free movement of goods on the basis of the principle of proportionality. In this way the doctrine of proportionality has been not yet reported. See page 29 of the report of the hearing.
introduced into the courts of the United Kingdom. Henceforth, national legislation in derogation from Community fundamental freedoms would seem to fall to be reviewed by every court within the United Kingdom on the basis of standards of "ordinary reasonableness".

Secondly there is the question of the proper relationship between the European Court and national courts - the notion of judicial subsidiarity. The task of the European Court under article 164 of the EEC treaty is simply to see that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. Its concern is with Community law. The Court has no jurisdiction or right to rule on questions of national law.

The European Court emphasised the importance of the principle of the co-operation of national courts to ensure the full and effective protection of rights acquired under Community law in each member state. 64 In emphasising the superiority of Community law over national law, it has insisted that national courts apply Community principles in assessing national

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legislation. However, as has been seen in case of the proportionality, the application of these principles has led to non-uniform interpretations and applications of national law.

In the drive for uniform application of Community leads the European Court now claims that it alone can determine the question as to the proportionality of national law in relation to Community objectives. As Advocate General Van Gerven stated in Stoke on Trent: 65

"With regard to the assessment of proportionality it is in my view for the [European] court and for the [European] court alone, clearly and imperatively to indicate in its case law the criteria to be used in that assessment. It is then the joint task of the [European] court and the national court to apply those criteria drawn from existing case law to the concrete legal and factual context. ... If it appear from the findings of the national court and the arguments submitted to the [European] Court that there is no room for any doubt, the [European] Court itself ... will state

65. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v. B & Q plc (C-169/91), 16 December 1992, European Court of Justice reported in [1993] 1 All ER 481 at 508, para 20 of his Opinion."
the results of the assessment under Community law... If the [European] Court has not itself made an assessment on the basis of the information provided to it ... then the national court, where necessary after further examination of the legislative and factual context, and in the light of the [European] Court's reply to the preliminary question, must arrive at its own decision regarding the application of the proportionality requirement."

Notwithstanding Van Gerven's qualifications and nods to judicial co-operation, in applying the proportionality test to provisions of national legislation the European Court is unequivocally asserting its competence and right to interpret and determine the validity of national rather than Community law. This represents a fundamental shift in the judicial polity within the Community as set out in the original treaties. Others might argue that it is simply the lifting of a veil and is a necessary consequence of the creation by the European Court of Justice of a European federal legal system. To rule openly and directly on the proportionality of a national law might be described by commentators sympathetic to the
extension of the Court's jurisdiction as nothing more than the logical recognition of the principle of the uniformity of Community law which has lain behind the Court's decisions since Costa v. ENEL.

However, a properly federal legal system cannot ultimately be founded on judicial co-operation but must, in the last analysis, involve the assertion of formal legal hierarchy, in which the Federal supreme court which the European Court of Justice aspires to be, may pronounce on the legality of all laws, Member State and Community, applied throughout the territory of the Communities. Once the European Court openly reviews and strikes down, or indeed sustains or upholds, the legislation of Member States as contrary or conform to the spirit of the Treaties, its relationship to the national courts of member states becomes one of hierarchy rather than the co-operation of co-equals. The Court of Justice of the European Communities becomes, in effect, Supreme Court of the European Union.
(i) **Indirect sex discrimination in Community Law**

The European Court has adopted and adapted from the United States race relations legislation the concept of "indirect discrimination" whereby the fact that certain (apparently neutral or gender-blind) criteria required by an employer disproportionately and adversely affects employees of one sex rather than the other is held to establish *prima facie* the existence of sex discrimination, notwithstanding the absence of any evidence of intent to engage in sex discrimination. 66 In the face of such evidence of disparate impact of such measures as between men and women, the onus is placed on the party seeking to uphold the validity of those measures to justify them on objective grounds, unrelated to discrimination on grounds of sex. 67 Failure of the party seeking to uphold measures to adduce evidence justifying the measures to the


satisfaction of the court will lead to the Court to conclude that the measures are a form of unacknowledged sex discrimination and fall to be declared to be unlawful.

In the case of an allegedly discriminatory practice by an individual employer the European court has stated that objective justification of disparate impact practices will be established if the measures can be said to be appropriately and necessarily aimed at meeting some "real need on the part of the undertaking"\(^{68}\), unrelated to any discrimination on the grounds of sex.

(ii) **Indirect sex discrimination in U.K. law**

The concept of indirect sex discrimination already existed in domestic United Kingdom law, having been introduced into United Kingdom law by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Section 1(1)(b) of the Act is in the following terms:

"1(1) A person discriminates against a women in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of this Act if - ...

(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which applies or would apply equally to a man but -

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\(^{68}\) Bilka note 14 para 35 p 1628
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justified irrespective of the sex of the person to whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it.

(iii) Indirect sex discrimination and the review of national legislation

The European Court has extended the notion of indirect sex discrimination beyond that contemplated in the British legislation. European indirect discrimination is held to be applicable not only to the practices of individual employers, but also to the provisions of national legislation of Member States.

In Rinner-Kuehn 69 German legislation provided that six weeks sick pay be paid by employers to employees who worked more than 10 hours a week or 45 hours a month. The requirement of a minimum working period before being covered by the sick pay provisions gave rise to disparate impact of

the provisions as between men and women. The European Court held that in the case of national legislation which is shown to have a disparate impact as between men and women, such legislation will fall foul of the general principle in Community law of equal treatment unless it can be shown to be aimed at achieving some "necessary aim of [a Member State's] social policy". Further such measures will also have to be shown to be "appropriate and necessary" means to achieving the intended objective. This last proviso appears to be a re-statement of the test of proportionality, which, as we have seen, has been developed by the European court as a general principle of law in relation, inter alia, to the lawfulness of Member States' prohibitions of economic activities protected by the European Treaties.

As with the Sunday trading legislation the European Court has consistently stated that the question as to whether or not a measure is objectively justified according to the criteria

70.  Rinner-Kuehn note 16 at para 14 p 2761
71.  loc cit.
72.  See for example Commission v. Denmark ('Danish Bottles') (C-302/86) [1988] ECR 4607 at 4629 para 6 and R v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Federation Europeene de la Sante Animale (FEDESA) and others (C-331/88) [1990] ECR para 13; [1991] 1 CMLR 507
set out by it is a matter of fact for national courts to establish and is not a matter for the European Court. 73

Thus, the task for the national court when national legislation is challenged on the grounds of its causing indirect sex discrimination is to consider firstly whether or not the legislation is aimed at some necessary aim of the State’s social policy and, secondly, whether or not the legislative means chosen to achieve that end pass the test of proportionality as developed by the European Court. The current state of Community law requires national judges to take a view as to whether or not national legislative provisions which can be shown, statistically, to have a disparate impact as between men and women can or cannot be justified on the basis of some national social policy. Further, as we have seen, the judges then have to assess the utility, necessity and appropriateness of such national legislation in achieving that policy.

Thus in R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Schaffter the court stated: 74


74. R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Schaffter [1987] IRLR 53 at paras 21 and 37, pp. 56-7
"The principle of equal treatment enshrined in the [equal treatment] directive is prima facie not being observed if, in a situation where there is an equal number of men and women in the population, one sees a practice working in reality in such a way that many more women are adversely affected by it. ... 

The Secretary of State must show that the advantages of the distinction drawn [by the law] are such that, giving due weight to the principle of proportionality the unequal treatment of women which I have found to occur is in fact justified."

The presumption appears to be that national legislation having disparate impact will be held to be invalid unless shown to be justified by national policy. The onus is on the national authorities to appear before their national courts to defend the legislation. In one way those courts' task is easier when legislation is challenged on the grounds of its allegedly discriminatory impact than simply on its general incompatibility with Community law because the national authorities are required to appear
before the court to specify what policy the legislation is aimed at. In other cases, such as the Sunday trading challenges, the courts have been required to come to their own views as to the policy behind the Shops Act 1950 before determining its compatibility with European law.

6. **THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION CASE**

(i) **EOC - indirect sex discrimination and the justification of national policy**

The implications of the European Court's decision in *Rinner-Kuehn* have only recently come to be realised in the United Kingdom. The first case requiring national authorities to justify legislation which has disparate impact was brought before the national courts in October 1991. In *R. v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte the Equal Opportunities Commission and Another* 76 an action for judicial review was brought.

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76. [1992] 1 All ER 545, QBD; [1993] IRLR 10, CA
review was brought by the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) of a statement made by the Secretary of State for Employment in correspondence with the EOC to the effect that the extant United Kingdom law contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 relating to unfair dismissal and redundancy payments was not contrary to European law.

The EOC argued that the fact that part-time workers were only entitled under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 to bring an unfair dismissal complaint and/or claim for a statutory redundancy payment after five years continuous working, in comparison to the two years required for full time employees constituted indirect discrimination against women workers, contrary to article 119 of the Treaty of Rome as developed in the case law of the European Court of Justice. Statistical evidence was quoted to the effect that by far the greater proportion of part-time employees, some 90%, were women.

The court at first instance was quite clear that proceedings might have been brought by individual employees adversely affected by the part-time/full-time threshold before an industrial tribunal which, if it found the submission on the
existence of indirect discrimination to be justified, would be entitled to disapply the United Kingdom legislation as inconsistent with the direct rights of that individual employee under Community law. However, given the public nature of the duties of the Equal Opportunities Commission it was appropriate that judicial review proceedings be brought.

"If as a matter of primary legislation the employment arrangements for a substantial number of part-time employees in the United Kingdom are operating in a way which creates improper discrimination in the field of employment contrary to the basic principles of United Kingdom and European Community law that men and women should be treated equally while at work, and the Secretary of State responsible for employment arrangements throughout the United Kingdom wrongly decides that he will not take any steps to reduce or extinguish such wrongful discrimination, an issue of public law is raised in which, having regard to its statutory duties, it seems clear to us that the Equal Opportunities Commission has sufficient interest." 77

77. ibid. p 556
The court at first instance accepted that the different qualifying thresholds for full-time and part-time work adversely affected a greater proportion of women than men. Given the fact that the vast majority of part-time workers in the United Kingdom are women and hence disproportionately affected by legislative differences between full-time and part-time workers, the legislation was, on the basis of European Court case law, potentially indirectly discriminatory. Accordingly, the national authorities were required under European law to justify the different thresholds for employment protection between full-time and part-time work contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 to the Court. Before the Court could uphold the legislation as valid, it required to find that it pursued a necessary aim of social policy in the United Kingdom and was proportionate in relation to that aim. In

78. Nolan LJ stated:
"Although it may appear somewhat strange that legislation which is not intended or worded to create discrimination on the grounds of sex should be liable to be treated as discriminatory simply on the basis that a large proportion of those affected by it happen, as a result of particular social considerations, to belong to one sex rather than the other, it has been held [by the European Court] that an arrangement which has a disproportionate effect on employees of one sex rather than the other is indirectly discriminatory."
the absence of proper justification, the offending provisions of the Act would be declared not to be applicable because contrary to the basic principle of Community law that men and women should be treated equally while at work.

The court at first instance also accepted the claim of the Secretary of State that the differential between full and part-time employments was aimed at ensuring that "as many individuals throughout the country should be able to work and to do so for as long as and in the circumstances which they choose." The court accepted that any reduction in employment opportunities would be socially undesirable, perhaps indeed unacceptable. Accordingly the aim of the Employment Protection legislation was accepted to be a legitimate one.

(ii) EOC - indirect discrimination and proportionality

Turning to the question as to whether the legislative means were appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the stated objective, the Secretary of State claimed that abolition of the full-time/part-time distinction would lead to an increased burden on employers and consequently to a reduction in the number of part-time jobs.
available. These claims were criticised by the EOC as "general unspecific and speculative", but the court found the Secretary of State's position to be "inherently logical". As a result, rather than require the Secretary of State to produce positive evidence to show how the differential maintains and/or encourages employment opportunities, the court turned the matter around and sought conclusive evidence from the EOC to show that, contrary to the assertions of the civil servants within the Department of Employment, the abolition of the differential between full- and part-time would not, in fact, lead to any reduction in employment opportunities. Perhaps unsurprisingly the court found such evidence as was produced to it inconclusive of that matter. Nolan LJ stated:

"As the evidence of the experience and arrangements in the other Member States was more closely analysed it became increasingly apparent that it was impossible to make satisfactory comparisons between the Member States or to reach the conclusion that an alteration or removal of qualifying thresholds would have no significant
effect on opportunities for women in the United Kingdom to work part-time." 79

The court at first instance did not go on to consider the other aspects of the proportionality test, namely whether or not there was any less restrictive alternative to the present legislation and whether or not the claimed protection of employment opportunities was sufficiently great as to outweigh the negative impact of the continuing discrimination against part-time, which is to say principally women, workers.

(iii) EOC - the Constitutional Implications

The EOC intially sought a battery of remedies from the court. In addition to a declaration to the effect that the distinction between full and

79. In a conjoined application for judicial review, the EOC also argued that, given that redundancy payments are to be regarded as a form of deferred payment for working (On which see Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Group Ltd. (C-262/89) [1990] ECR 1889 para 13), U.K. statutory redundancy payments which were calculated, in part, on the basis of the employee's pay immediately before dismissal, discriminated against workers who had transferred to part-time work after a period of working full-time. The vast majority of such workers were women, and hence this statutory mode of calculating redundancy payments also constituted indirect sex discrimination. The Court was sceptical as to whether or not this could be called indirect discrimination against women and in any event found the statutory scheme to be objectively justified as a clear, simple and direct scheme for providing protection to employees, regardless of sex, in the event of redundancy.
part-time employees contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 should be disapplied on the basis of Community law, they also sought a declaration that the United Kingdom was in breach of its obligations under article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and EEC directives 75/117 and 76/207 on equal pay and equal treatment respectively as well as a declaration that the Secretary of State's failure to introduce amending legislation before Parliament constituted a breach of the United Kingdom's obligations under Community law. Finally the EOC sought an order of mandamus to require the Secretary of State to introduce appropriate amending legislation before Parliament to ensure the conformity of United Kingdom law with the requirements of Community law.

In the event, the court at first instance held that it had no jurisdiction to ordain the Secretary of State to introduce rectifying legislation had the United Kingdom statute been found by the court not to conform to European law. It would be unconstitutional for a court in the United Kingdom to order either the Secretary of State or Parliament to fulfil obligations under European law, or to make any declaration to that effect. The function of the court was limited to setting out the enforceable
rights and obligations of the parties before it under the law which presently applied within the United Kingdom. As Nolan LJ stated: 80

"It is plain enough that Section 2 of the [European Communities] Act 1972 alters the traditional relationship between the Courts and Parliament in this country in that it obliges the courts to disregard the laws made by Parliament in so far as they conflict with directly enforceable Community law. Further than that it does not go. Domestic legislation remains a matter for Parliament, not for the Courts. ... Rights and duties which have become part of English law by virtue of Section 2 of the 1972 Act, or by virtue of subordinate legislation made under that section are matters for us; the obligations of the United Kingdom under the EEC Treaty are not."

(iv) EOC - the judgment of the Court of Appeal

When the whole matter was appealed to the Court of Appeal 81 a majority of the Court, Dillon L.J.

80. ibid. p 561

81. In an judgment handed down on 6 November 1992, reported in [1993] IRLR 10
dissenting, dismissed the EOC's applications in their entirety on the grounds that (i) there was no actual decision of the Secretary of State which was sought to be reviewed (ii) the EOC had no locus standi to bring judicial review proceedings. The whole Court of Appeal was agreed, however, that in the case of claims brought by an individual the appropriate forum in which the matter might be resolved was by way of private law claims before the industrial tribunals.

In dismissing the appeals on essentially procedural grounds, the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to make any decision on the substantive issues raised by the case Only Dillon L.J. dealt with some of the substantive issues and found that the Secretary of State had failed to discharge the onus laid upon him to justify the different thresholds as between full and part-time workers for the application of employment protection legislation.

The Court of Appeal was very wary about the idea of judicial review of legislation. While conceding the European law might require this to be done, the court appeared unwilling to allow for existing judicial review in administrative matters to be developed into the accepted mode
for fast-track "constitutional" review of U.K. legislation. Hirst L.J. stated: 82

"[W]here an individual ... is seeking to enforce directly effective rights under Article 119 [of the Treaty of Rome], the appropriate forum for their enforcement is unquestionably the Industrial Tribunal. This Tribunal will be obliged under Section 2(1) of the [European Communities] Act of 1972 to disapply domestic legislation if and insofar as it is inconsistent with Community law, thus ensuring that Community law will prevail."

Hirst L.J. was in any event not happy with the general proposition that national courts might submit national legislation to judicial scrutiny as regards its (non)-conformity with Community law, stating: 83

"Proceedings aimed at impleading the Government, or a Minister, for failure to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty to amend legislation inconsistent with the EEC law or Directives should in my judgment be brought not by the EOC or

82. *ibid.* at 23, para 128

83. *ibid.* at 24, para 133
any equivalent body in the English courts, but by the Commission, who are the guardians of the Treaty, in the ECJ under the machinery laid down in the Treaty itself in Article 169. In the light of the past record of the UK Government, ... any adverse ruling by the ECJ will quickly result in the introduction of amending legislation."

(v) EOC summary

All of the judges in EOC, both at first instance on in the Court of Appeal, showed an unwillingness to carry out their duty to review national legislation under Community law. With the EOC case it has become clear that apparently indirectly discriminatory legislation is to be applied only insofar as considered justified by the court. There is therefore presumption that certain legislation is illegal, unless it can be shown to be justified. However, the judges in EOC appeared to operate under an equally strong presumption that legislation is to be considered justified if the Secretary of State says that it is justified, or unless and until the Commission has commenced a 169 action against the United Kingdom.
In concluding that legislation is justified if supported by the executive, the judges failed to carry out the whole new series of duties imposed upon them under the proportionality test. Where national legislation is challenged under Community law, the courts now have to check its aim, verify its proportionality, weigh the overall good achieved by it and think of less restrictive alternatives to the present arrangement. The judges at first instance in EOC appeared only to consider whether the aims of the legislation were legitimate and failed to carry out the other tests required by the proportionality doctrine. The judges of the Court of Appeal appeared to feel that such complex legal tests are best applied at the lowest possible level to the judicial hierarchy, by the "industrial juries" of the Industrial Tribunal system, consisting of one legally qualified chairman sitting together with one representative of each of the "social partners", employers and employees.

7. CONCLUSION

In both the Sunday trading cases and the EOC judgments, it is clear that the validity or "Euro-constitutionality" of legislation is now to be established by the judges or tribunals alone
assessing whether or not the policy choices of the Secretary of State and/or of Parliament are objectively justified and proportionate in their implementation. As a result the courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom are forced to adopt a teleological approach to the interpretation of certain national legislation. Such broad purposive readings of Acts of Parliament contradicts the traditional techniques of close analysis of the final texts of Acts of Parliament (specifically excluding any reference to such Parliamentary debates as preceded and led up to the law's formal enactment) which has characterised the approach, to date, of the United Kingdom courts to national statutes. 84

It is clear that the United Kingdom courts have experienced difficulty in adopting the new approaches required by Community law. In particular, the principle of proportionality does not yet appear to have been properly appreciated or applied by the courts in the United Kingdom. The reception of the doctrine is not yet complete, but it is clear, given the way in which Community law has developed of itself and as regards proportionality that the doctrine will

have to be accepted and applied by the national courts in matters covered by Community law, if the European Court of Justice finds itself with insufficient information to assess the question itself.

The interesting question then become whether or not the doctrine will be accepted and applied by the United Kingdom courts in areas in which Community law does not yet apply. It is to that question that we turn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4

BRIND AND THE INDIRECT RECEPTION OF COMMUNITY LAW
1. THE IDEA OF THE INDIRECT RECEPTION OF LAW

In the previous chapter we have looked at the way in which Community law has required courts in the United Kingdom to apply concepts derived from Community law, in particular the principle of proportionality, to provisions of national law. This phenomenon might be termed the direct reception of Community law doctrines, in that it has occurred as a direct result of the acceptance by the United Kingdom courts of the supremacy of European law over conflicting national law provisions.

In this chapter I intend to examine whether or not there is any evidence in the case law of the United Kingdom courts for what might be termed the "indirect" influence and reception of Community law doctrines. The matter to be examined is whether or not the influence of Community law over the national system has become so strong as to have a "spillover effect" into areas of national law which are not, as yet, specifically covered by any Community legislation.
In *M v. Home Office* 1 the Court of Appeal considered the question as to whether or not a Minister of the Crown, in this instance the Home Secretary, could be found guilty of contempt of court. The High Court had ordered the Home Secretary to procure the return of an applicant for political asylum to the High Court's jurisdiction so that his application for judicial review of the refusal of political asylum could be given due consideration. The question of possible contempt of court arose from the fact that the Home Secretary had, on legal advice, decided not to comply with this order of the High Court but instead to challenge it as irregular on the grounds that it purported to grant a mandatory interim injunction against an officer of the Crown, contrary to Section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the decision of the House of Lords in the *Factortame* 1. 2

The Court of Appeal held that orders of the High Court fell to be complied with unless and until they had been set aside and that deliberate and wilful failure by ministers of the Crown and civil servants to comply with such order might


2. *R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 1)* [1990] 2 AC 85. See *infra* Chapter 2 for a discussion of this case.
constitute contempt of court. Lord Donaldson MR went on, however as follows: 3

"It is anomalous, and in my judgment wrong in principle, that whereas the law gives the courts comprehensive power to preserve rights and to "hold the ring" pending a final decision in a dispute between citizens (including companies) or between citizens and local authorities, its powers where central government is involved are more circumscribed. It is even more anomalous that as a result of R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) (Case C-213/89) 1 AC 603 and the operation of European Community law, they now have comprehensive powers even where central government is involved, but only in relation to rights under Community law."

Lord Donaldson’s remarks ("anomalous and wrong in principle") appear to show the inherent instability of the existence of two separate paradigms of legal reasoning and two distinct sets of rights and remedies within the same legal structure. However, his remarks do not show

3. Ibid. pp 99-100
that any spillover has yet taken place, but merely point to the existence of tendencies which might promote such indirect influence of Community law principles and approaches.

Again the possibility of "spillover" from European Community law is alluded to in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 4, where the House of Lords was required to decide on the question as to whether or not interest was repayable on monies which had been paid to the Inland Revenue on the basis of regulations which were subsequently declared to be unlawful. The pre-existing common law had allowed for recovery of monies paid to a public authority only where there had been a mistake of fact or where the monies had been extracted under compulsion, but not where there had been a voluntary payment made because of a mistake in law. However, a majority of their Lordships decided to extend the categories under which recovery of interest was permitted to include the situation where money was paid pursuant to an ultra vires demand from a public authority. Both of the Scottish judges on the Bench dissented from this majority decision. One of the factors which apparently persuaded the

English judges to alter the common law was the position in European Community law. Lord Goff of Chieveley stated: 5

"[T]he decision of the European Court of Justice in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.p.A San Giorgio (C-199/82) [1983] ECR 3595 ... establishes that a person who pays charges levied by a Member State contrary to the rules of Community law is entitled to repayment of the charge, such right being regarded as a consequence of and an adjunct to, the rights conferred on individuals by the Community provisions prohibiting the relevant charges. ... I only comment that, at a time when Community law is becoming increasingly important, it would be strange if the right of the citizen to recover overpaid charges were to be more restricted under domestic law than it is under European law."

Further, in response to a "flood gates" argument that to allow the principle to be established in this case would open up an infinite number of claims for interest in past cases, Lord Slynn of Hadley suggested 6 that the United Kingdom courts

5. Ibid. at page 177
6. Ibid. at 200
should be given the power to limit the effects of any order for recovery which they might make in the same way that the European Court of Justice can, under article 174 of the Treaty of Rome, state which of the effects of a regulation which it has declared void shall be considered definitive.

2. **ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

If there is indeed spillover or indirect reception of European Community law in the United Kingdom it would appear most likely to be in the area of administrative law. Administrative law covers the area of the relationship between public bodies and persons, whether real or corporate. In that it deals primarily with matters relating to the internal organisation of the State and apart from agricultural matters does not have, in general, any intra-Community implications, it is an area which, at the

7. Certain administrative decisions, for example the granting of export licences as in R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Roberts and others [1991] 1 CMLR 555 or the designation of licensed ports for particular imports in R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bell Lines Ltd. and another [1984] 2 CMLR 502 might have implications for Community trade and could therefore come within the field where Community administrative law doctrines fall to be applied.
present phase of Community law, remains in the province of the national legislature and is relatively autonomous of Community law which has its own developed system. 8

The European Court of Justice has developed a system of administrative law, inspired by both French and German law, and characterized by the application of the general principles of law noted in Chapter 3 as part of its duty 9 under article 164 to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. The European Court is charged with the task of seeing that both the Member States and the institutions of the Community respect the Community treaties and therefore seeks to ensure the proper administration of the Community order within a legal framework. Thus, one of the Court’s fundamental concerns has always been to

8. For an brief survey of factors which tend to pull either toward or away from a common approach as between different systems of administrative law see John Bell “Convergences and Divergences in European Administrative Law” [1992] 2 Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario 3.

guarantee the proper exercise of the powers of
the various central Community institutions and to
protect the rights and interests of persons,
whether natural or corporate, affected by them. 10

By contrast with the Community systems,
administrative law in the United Kingdom is at an
early stage of development. The legal systems
of Scotland, Ireland and England all developed
without reference to the trend toward
systematization and codification which was common
to the legal systems of west continental Europe
during and after Napoleon. 11 In particular in
none of those legal systems, which for
convenience we might call Anglo-Celtic, did there
grow up a separate judicial hierarchy for the
review of administrative acts. Without the
separate systems of courts a body of
administrative, law distinct from the remedies
provided for in private law, was slow in
developing. As the Scottish judge. Lord Reid
stated in 1964 in a House of Lords case relating

10. See Schwarze "Tendencies towards a common
3 at 5-14 for a full survey of the European Court’s
development of Community administrative law.

11. For a general historical overview of the two
systems see Sabino Cassese "Il problema della convergenza
dei diritti amministrativi: verso un modello
amministrativo europeo ?" (1992) 2 Rivista italiano di
diritto pubblico comunitario 23
to the dismissal of a Chief Constable without the benefit of a hearing: 12

"[W]e do not have a developed system of administrative law - perhaps because until fairly recently we did not need it. So it is not surprising that in dealing with new types of cases the courts have had to grope for solutions and have found that old powers, rules and procedures are largely inapplicable to cases which they were never designed to deal with."

It is a commonplace that in the last thirty years in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the lack of any specialised administrative law tribunals, there has been an exponential growth in the development of a separate body of administrative law with its own remedies principles and doctrines, distinct from those which apply to the sphere of private law. 13

In the absence of a separate judicial hierarchy for administrative law, what has been developed in both England and Scotland have been new legal procedures, distinct from the procedures which


apply to ordinary private law actions. The new English procedure for judicial review, known as Order 53, was introduced by the courts in England in 1977 14 and was given statutory backing by Sections 29 and 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 15

In Scotland the simplified judicial review procedure was created by a 1985 Act of Sederunt and is now contained in Rule of Court 260B. Under these new procedures the High Court in England and the Court of Session in Scotland can more readily and expeditiously exercise their existing supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of lower courts, (quasi)-judicial tribunals and of any other bodies charged, in England, with the performance of public acts and duties or, in Scotland, to which jurisdiction, power or authority had been delegated or entrusted by statute, agreement or any other instrument. 16

In Scotland, in contrast to the position in England, the competency of an application for judicial review has been held not to rest on any


16. See also Himsworth "Public Employment and the Supervisory Jurisdiction" (1992) Scots Law Times (News) 123; Woolfe "The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Court of Session" (1992) Public Law 435
distinction between public and private law, but rather on the existence of a tripartite relationship among the decision maker, his jurisdiction to make a decision and the interests of the person affected by the decision. 17

These new procedures have encouraged an rapid growth in the applications to the courts for judicial review. 18 As a result of this explosive growth in applications for judicial review, the law itself has developed markedly. 19 The development of this new body of law has been judge led, rather than by any act of the national legislature in the United Kingdom. 20 One of

17. The relevancy tests for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session have been set out by the Lord President in West v. Secretary of State for Scotland [1992] IRLR 399 at 409; 1992 SLT 636 at 640

"to ensure that the decision maker does not exceed or abuse his powers or fail to perform the duty which has been delegated or entrusted to him."


19. For surveys of developments to date and proposals for future development see Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law" [1987] Public Law 368; Oliver "Is the ultra vires rule the basis of judicial review?" 1987 Public Law 543


"[A]dministrative law has to be a developing legal science which it is the duty of judges aided by practitioners and scholars to keep
the areas of administrative which the judiciary in the United Kingdom have developed most creatively has been that of the requirements of "natural justice".

In **Lloyd v. McMahon** 21 Lord Bridge of Harwich stated:

"[T]he so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision making body, the kinds of decisions it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is well established that when a statute has conferred on any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not only require the procedures prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be abreast with the pace of change in public administration."

21. **Lloyd v. McMahon** [1987] 1 AC 625 at 702-3
introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness."

One of the matters currently being considered by the United Kingdom has been the question as to whether or not the requirements of natural justice or general fairness can be extended to create a general duty on the part of administrators and decision makers to give reasons for their particular decisions, even where this is no statutory requirement or customary practice to do so. 22

The European Court of Justice has already developed the notions of procedural fairness and the concept of the rights of the defence in European Community law to the extent that these form the basis, inter alia for a duty on both national 23 and Community 24 administrative authorities to give reasons for their decisions. The European Court has held that a right to a fair hearing implies the ability to test the


23. UNECTEF v. Heylens (C-222/86) [1987] ECR 4097

legality of a decision which in turn requires that reasons be given for that decision. 25

Although the relevant European case law appears not to have been cited to the court, this European line of argumentation is strikingly paralleled in the approach of the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham 26 where Leggat LJ stated:

"[F]or the same reason of fairness that an applicant is entitled to know the case he has to meet, so should he be entitled to know the reasons for an award of compensation, so that in the event of error he may be equipped to apply to the court for judicial review. For it is only by judicial review that the Board's award can be challenged."

It is clear that the developing body of administrative law in the United Kingdom is extraordinarily open to outside influences, particularly from other jurisdictions which have had a longer period in which to develop and


refine their notions of administrative law. 27 Given the predominant influence that Community law has already exercised in areas of national law which fall within the scope of Community law, it is to be expected that the system of administrative law of the European Community would be particularly influential also in this area. 28

3. PROPORTIONALITY AS A GROUND FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(i) Proportionality: a door left open

In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 29 Lord Diplock reclassified the principles of administrative law which were then accepted by the courts in the United Kingdom as grounds for challenging executive acts. Lord Diplock stated that an

27. See generally the essays in Jowell & Oliver (eds.) New Directions in Judicial Review, London 1988

28. See Slynn "But in England there is no ..." Festschrift fuer Wolfgang Zeidler, 1987 Vol 1, 397; Lord Mackenzie-Stuart "Recent Developments in English Administrative Law - the impact of Europe ?" in F. Capotorti et al. (eds.) Du droit international au droit de l'integration: Liber Amicorum P. Pescatore 1987, 411

29. [1985] A.C. 374
executive act might be susceptible to judicial review on the following grounds: its "illegality", that is to say that the decision maker did not correctly understand the law that regulated his decision making power and/or did not give effect thereto; its "procedural impropriety" where there was failure by the executive or administrative tribunal to observe the appropriate procedural norms; and its "irrationality", if the decision which was so outrageous as to be outwith the bounds of the rational.

Lord Diplock accepted that future cases might lead to further development of the grounds upon which an administrative action might be subject to judicial review.

"I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community." 30

In leaving the door open to further development in this way, Lord Diplock would appear to have been responding to calls made in academic literature for the notion of proportionality to

be accepted by the courts and taken up as an independent ground for judicial review. 31

(ii) Proportionality: already implicit in U.K. law?

In a useful short survey of European law on proportionality, 32 Jowell and Lester suggest that the principle of proportionality has already been implicitly accepted in English law, and cite a number of authorities from 1911 onward in which the notion that a punishment or benefit awarded by a body should be in proportion to the wrong or good done in order to be upheld by the Court. They argue that the time is ripe for the explicit recognition of proportionality as a general principle of English administrative law in the interests of greater legal certainty.

The explicit acceptance of the doctrine of proportionality is seen as an important symbol, being understood as part of a general "Europeanisation" of the national laws of the United Kingdom. The idea is that there will in

31. For an example of such academic advocacy, see Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law" (1987) Public Law 368

time develop a common law of Europe by osmosis. The model is one of the mutual influence and a natural tendency toward integration of the legal systems of the member states of the European Community. Given the already noted openness of administrative law in the United Kingdom to judicial development, it would appear to be in this area that any signs of the beginnings of such organic integration would be most likely to be detected. Proportionality has thus become a touchstone of the extent to which the legal systems of the United Kingdom are becoming more "European".

(iii) Proportionality: the case for explicit adoption

The case in favour of the adoption of proportionality as a separate ground of judicial review of administrative action proceeds by way of a series of arguments. The first step is to present proportionality as something commonsensical, and as no more than a specific application of existing standards applied in

administrative law. Thus Jowell and Lester have stated 34:

"It seems so characteristically English to require that the means employed by the decision maker must be no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve his legitimate ends ... that there should be no difficulty in absorbing the concept of proportionality into the English judicial process."

On this argument, proportionality would seem to be nothing more than a particular application of standards contained in the broad notion of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" 35, whereby the courts will strike down a decision which they consider to be so utterly unreasonable that it could not have been taken by any reasonable authority acting in good faith.

The second stage of the argument in favour of proportionality's adoption is to point out that

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34. Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law" (1987) Public Law 368 at 375-6

35. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230. In R v. Birmingham City Council, ex parte Wesson, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/546/91, unreported 16 December 1991 proportionality was argued to be synonymous with "Wednesbury unreasonableness". This argument was rejected by the Court.
the existing category of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" already allows the courts to look at the substance of a decision, and not simply at the decision making process. However the test of "Wednesbury unreasonableness", it is claimed, is not really suitable for the task of reviewing the merits of a decision. It is unrealistically high, imprecise and self-referential. It is not so much an objective test of the decision itself as a test which looks to the subjective reactions of the judges to the decision. If the judges describe a decision as "so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority" 36 or "so wrong that no reasonable person could sensibly take that view" 37 or "so outrageous in defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person ... could have arrived at it" 38 they are doing no more than stating their strong disapproval of the decisions in question, without giving reasons for this. Words like "absurd", "outrageous" are seen as simply emotive words of disapproval as

36.  **Wednesbury** [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229 per Lord Greene MR
37.  **Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council** [1977] AC 1014, 1026 per Lord Denning MR
38.  **CCSU** [1985] AC 374 at 410 per Lord Diplock
contrasted with the approbation expressed in the use of the words "reasonable" and "sensible".

The third step in the argument is to contrast the emotivism of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" with the apparently cool and dispassionate objectivity of determining the suitability of means to ends, implicit in the proportionality test. Further, the standards by which decisions are to be measured are made explicit in the proportionality test. They are public standards of a scientific rationality which can be understood and adhered to by administrators. Indeed, in comparison to "Wednesbury unreasonableness", proportionality actually renders the judiciary more accountable, given that it involves them in an explicit process of comparison of means and ends, of weighing and balancing of different objectives. No longer will decisions be struck down on the basis of non-articulated judicial prejudices, hidden in such catch-all phrases "absurd" or "outrageous".

Given these arguments, the conclusion in favour of the adoption of proportionality as a substantive and independent principle of judicial review appears to follow irresistibly. Surprisingly, however, despite Lord Diplock's openness to the idea, there has been some
judicial resistance to the principle of proportionality.

(iv) Proportionality: the case for explicit rejection

The, principally, judicial arguments against proportionality would appear to be the following. Firstly, the idea that proportionality is already implicit within the doctrine of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" is accepted and while lack of proportionality would not of itself render a decision unlawful, extreme disproportionality might be one factor pointing to the decision being so perverse as could not have been taken by any reasonable authority. 39

As regards the attack of "Wednesbury unreasonableness", the test is presented as checking only "abuse or misuse of power" and "excesses in the exercise of discretion". It is not a general mode for reviewing the merits of a decision but comes into play only in exceptional circumstances when a decision can only be described as utterly unreasonable, despite seeming to have been taken in accordance with the applicable procedures and without violating the

39. R. v. General Medical Council, ex parte Colman [1990] 1 All ER 489, 509 per Lord Donaldson MR
relevant regulations. The Wednesbury test is set at a high level to preserve the idea that the courts are doing no more than supervising the administration's exercise of power and are not seeking to replace it. In applying the Wednesbury tests the courts are not referring to any general standard of what the reasonable man might have done. It is decidedly not a carte blanche for the judiciary to substitute their own opinion for that of the decision maker if they should happen to disagree with him or her. 40

Finally, the idea the proportionality test itself is rejected outright precisely because it does involve a lowering in the standard of the Wednesbury test "extraordinary unreasonableness" to considerations of "ordinary reasonableness". This is because proportionality requires judges to decide whether or not there existed any reasonable relation between a decision, its objectives and the circumstances in which the decision was applied in the particular case. It also requires judges to consider whether or not there were any significant alternative courses of action which might achieve the same end less oppressively. Accordingly, application of the proportionality test would mean that the judges

40. Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720, 737-8 per Lord Lowry.
applied their own standards of what they regarded as the reasonable thing to do in the circumstances and strike down any decision which did not accord with that.

4. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SUBSTANTIVE APPEALS

The application of the proportionality tests would involve judges looking at the merits of every decision challenged on those grounds. However, it has been repeatedly emphasised that judicial review should not be seen as an appeal to the judges to consider the substantive merits of a decision anew. For the courts to go beyond their general supervisory jurisdiction of ensuring that the law was respected by decision makers would be to usurp the functions of public authorities. In any event, such involvement in administrative decision making would be highly inappropriate given the judges' lack of time, of experience and expertise, and of democratic accountability.

Once again, Community law may require such "undemocratic" behaviour on the part of the judiciary. Thus, in R. v. Minister of

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bell Lines Ltd. and another 42 a Ministerial decision to restrict the import of milk into the United Kingdom to certain specified ports was challenged in an action for judicial review. Prior to the Milk Ports Order, the only milk imported into the United Kingdom had been shipped from Ireland via two ports on the Irish Sea. The ministerial decision did not include these or any other ports on the Irish sea among the newly designated "milk ports". This decision was challenged on the grounds that it introduced an unreasonable restriction on intra-Community trade (contrary to Article 30 and unjustifiable under Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome) and a declaration was sought from the Court that the two Irish Sea ports also be designated ports of entry for milk. Article 36 falls to be interpreted in the light of the doctrine of proportionality. The declaration was granted by the Court. The Court held that in considering the justifiability of the decision under Article 36 it was not limited to the criteria set out in Wednesbury, namely: whether the Minister had taken into account matter he should not have done; or failed to take into account matters he should have done; or whether the decision could be described as "utterly

42. [1984] 2 CMLR 502
unreasonable". Rather, if it were plain to the court that the decision constituted, under Community law criteria, an impermissible (which is to say, disproportionate) restriction on Community trade it therefore contravened one party's rights arising from Community law, and it was open to the court to substitute its decision for that of the Minister.

5. BRIND - THE REJECTION OF PROPORTIONALITY

In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind and others[^43] the House of Lords examined the validity of the British Government's ban on the broadcasting of the voices of members of certain political organisations, in particular Sinn Fein. Arguments were presented to the effect that the use of executive power in this regard was disproportionate to its proclaimed objective of "starving the terrorist of the oxygen of publicity". These arguments were given short shrift. Lord Ackner stated:

"Unless and until Parliament incorporates the [European] convention [on Human Rights and Fundamental

[^43]: [1991] 2 WLR 588, 609
Freedoms] into domestic law ... there appears to me to be at present no basis on which the proportionality doctrine applied by the European Court [of Human Rights] can be followed by the courts of this country."

Lord Lowry declared:
"In my opinion proportionality and the other phrases are simply intended to move the focus of discussion away from the hitherto accepted criteria for deciding whether the decision maker has abused his power and into an area in which the courts will feel more at liberty to interfere ... [T]here is no authority for saying that proportionality in the sense in which the appellants have used it is part of English common law and a great deal of authority the other way. This, so far as I am concerned, is not a cause for regret..."

The idea of an organic reception of the doctrine of proportionality into the administrative law of the United Kingdom seems to have been decisively rejected by the Lords in Brind. The rejection of proportionality appears to be based on
constitutional grounds, in particular on a view of the separation of powers which requires judges to show restraint before the decisions of the executive.

Ironically however, as we have seen, Community law does already require the United Kingdom courts to apply the doctrine of proportionality in an even more sensitive constitutional area - namely the judicial review of legislation in the wake of Factortame 2. 44 As a result of the Lords decision in Brind in the absence of any Community law element the reasonableness of decisions of the executive and of administrative authorities can still only be challenged on the basis of "Wednesbury unreasonableness". Acts of Parliament against which a plausible "European defence" can however be challenged on the grounds that, inter alia, they could have been drafted less restrictively, which is to say in a more reasonable way. This latter is a test of "ordinary reasonableness".

6. PROPORTIONALITY AFTER BRIND

The anomaly of creating two paradigms of "reasonableness" in judicial review and, in particular, the fact that Community law requires

44. Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport (C-213/89) [1990] ECR 2433; [1990] 3 WLR 818
that the relatively low standard of "ordinary reasonableness" be applied in the judicial review of Acts of Parliament does not seem to have been addressed (or perhaps realized ?) by their Lordships in Brind. In the light of this apparent constitutional anomaly, it seems likely that pressure for the unequivocal acceptance of proportionality in the administrative law of the United Kingdom will continue.

Thus, in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Another, ex parte National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) regulations which sought to restrict the political activities of officers and staff of local authorities were challenged as unlawful on the grounds, inter alia, of their lack of proportionality. It was argued that it was open to the judge to consider the proportionality test, notwithstanding the lack of any apparent Community element in the case and despite the rejection of proportionality in Brind.

The basis for this argument was that (it was claimed) a majority of the judges in Brind, while rejecting the applicability of proportionality in that case, still accepted Lord Diplock's

45. High Court, Queen's Bench Division, unreported judgment of 20 December 1991
expressed view in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service to the effect that proportionality might some day be accepted in English administrative law. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the judge refused to accept this line of argument or to apply the proportionality doctrine stating:

"Ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, [1991] 1 All ER 720 was decided only a few months ago. There is nothing in Lord Roskill's speech to suggest that he was encouraging judges to accept that there was now a sort of open season for them to introduce the doctrine of proportionality. Rather ... he was contemplating that, with the gradual encroachment of European law, a time might come when the courts of this country would feel that it was appropriate to adopt the principle. However fast or slowly that tide runs, it has not in my view risen perceptibly in the short interval since the decision in Ex parte Brind."

One development which had occurred in Community law between the decision of the House of Lords in Brind and that of High Court in NALGO has been the assertion by the European Court that national
legislation may be assessed by that Court for its conformity with the fundamental rights recognized and protected under Community law. In Elleniki Radiophonia Tielorasi v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis the European Court stated:

"[A]s soon as any such legislation enters the field of application of Community law, the European Court, as sole arbiter in this matter, must provide the national court with all the elements of interpretation which are necessary in order to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights - as laid down in particular in the European Convention on Human Rights - the observance of which the Court ensures."

From this it would appear arguable that Community law concepts, which would include the doctrine of proportionality as well as concern with fundamental rights, are to be applied in the assessment of national legislation not only in areas of the Community's exclusive competence or when there exist rules of Community which are directly relevant to the matter at hand, but also when national laws can be said to apply or to

46. (C-260/89) [1991] ECR 2925 [Author's translation]
have effects in any field or area in which the Community has also (exercised) jurisdiction.

Thus in W Emmett & Son Ltd v The Commissioners of Customs and Excise 47 the argument was put forward that the fixed penalties provided for in Section 14 of the Finance Act 1985 were contrary to Community law in offending against, _inter alia_, the principle of proportionality. Notwithstanding the absence of any principle of proportionality in United Kingdom law, it was argued that the fact that the Community had issued various directives in relation to the harmonisation of tax laws, specifically VAT throughout the Community meant that the general principles of Community law, including proportionality, should be employed in relation to the interpretation and application of the national laws implementing these directives.

The VAT tribunal held, however, that with the complete implementation of the relevant directives by and in national law and the fact that the article 22(8) of the Sixth VAT directive allowed the Member States to impose other obligations in relation to the correct levying and collection of the tax, the only relevant

47. London VAT Tribunal, LON/90/1316Z, unreported, 7 October 1991
general principles in the interpretation and application of that law would be those which are already found in the domestic system. The Tribunal concluded that Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome allowed Member State to choose measures which they considered appropriate, including criminal sanctions to ensure the fulfilment of obligations arising from Community action. In any event, the Tribunal considered that for the Tribunal or courts to assess whether the penalty laid down by Parliament was either appropriate or strictly necessary would involve such detailed inquiry of administrative matters as to be unsuitable for courts and that, in any event to interfere with Parliament's discretion in the matter would be wholly unconstitutional.

7. CONCLUSION

It is clear that there exists strong pressure for the introduction of the principle of proportionality in areas of United Kingdom law which are not directly effected or covered by Community law. This pressure results, in part, from academic writers seeking the general harmonisation of laws throughout the member states of the Community. Pressure also exists from the fact that judges in the United Kingdom are increasingly being required to apply the
principle of proportionality to national legislation which, potentially conflict with Community law norms. The dynamic of the law tends to the introduction of the concept.

The debate over the introduction of proportionality is particularly interesting from the point of view of the indirect reception of law precisely because of the strong judicial resistance to the concept. It shows that indirect reception is not necessarily judge led, but may have a dynamic of its own. Indeed the judges in Brind appear to be fighting a rearguard action against proportionality. Their principal concern appears to be proportionality appears to require national courts to substitute their own judgment of what is needed to achieve a particular objective for the judgment of the executive, or indeed the legislature. The spectre raised is that of the establishment of a "gouvernement des juges" which is seen not only as alien to the traditions of the United Kingdom Constitution, but also as politically and morally undesirable because undemocratic.

48. Though it can be judge led, as is the case for the reception of the concept of legitimate expectation in the administrative law of the United Kingdom. This was introduced by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374

CONCLUSION
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1. TWO VISIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW

The European Court has stated that the Community is based on and governed by the Rule of Law. However, it is clear that judges of the European Community have a different view of the rule of law from the traditional United Kingdom approach. They would appear to operate within a broad system of judicial review which looks into the merits of decisions and of legislation. They clearly do not regard the acts of national executives and legislatures with the same deference as that traditionally accorded by the judges of the United Kingdom. National legislative measures are subordinated to Community measures. National laws have to be interpreted in the light of Community law and, if necessary, disapplied. The primary concern of the European Court for the uniform application of Community law throughout the Community. The European Court has consistently held that it has a duty to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of Community law throughout the Community.

Thus, when acting in matters touched by Community law, the traditional deference shown by United Kingdom courts to Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament should be transferred to the Acts of the central Community institutions. The European Court has declared that national courts of Member States have no competence to declare the acts of Community institutions invalid except in cases of absolute necessity when a national court may suspend a Community measure ad interim pending a final decision on its validity by the European Court. In considering the validity of Community measures as opposed to national measures, the European Court would seem to show these a certain deference. In FEDESA the European Court stated:

2. Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Luebeck-Ost 314/85 [1987] E.C.R. 4199, [1988] C.M.L.R. 57, paras 15, 19. This is a ruling which stands contrary to the plain wording of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, although perhaps more faithful to earlier drafts of this provision which specifically stated that the Court of Justice alone was competent to decide questions of interpretation or validity. See Neri and Perl, eds., Travaux Préparatoires, Traite Institutant la CEE 376-77 Cour de Justice, Luxembourg, 1960.


4. R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and another, ex parte Federation Europeene de la Sante Animale (FEDESA) and others (C-331/88) [1990] ECR 4023; also reported in [1991] 1 CMLR 507 at para 13.
"[W]ith regard to the judicial review of compliance with those conditions [of proportionality] it must be stated that in matters concerning the Common Agricultural Policy the Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions pursues. (see in particular case Schraeder (C-265/87) [1989] ECR 2237 paras 21-2)"

This reference to the test of proportionality applying only to what is "manifestly inappropriate" when considering is remarkably like Hoffman J.'s understanding in Stoke on Trent v. B & Q plc 5 of the application of the proportionality test when considering legislation in an area in which the national Parliament still retains discretionary power and political responsibility. However, in areas touched by Community law, national courts have to treat

5. [1990] 3 CMLR 31. See Chapter 4 infra
their own legislatures and executives as subordinate tribunals, whose acts should affecting matters concerning Community law should be treated with no more deference than the European court would show them.

The judicial review of national legislative action in the United Kingdom as imposed by Community law requires a fundamental revision of the understanding of the proper relationship between judges and the legislature within the country. It seems clear that Hoffman J.'s understanding of the proportionality test is wrong, because it refuses to address the ordinary reasonableness test implicit in the concept of proportionality. However, as we have seen, standing the decision in Ex parte Brind 6 one is left with the paradoxical situation within the United Kingdom that whereas the high standard of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" continues to be applied to executive and administrative decisions, when considering the validity of legislation challenged under Community law the national courts are required by Community law to apply standards of ordinary reasonableness and to substitute their judgment for that of the

6. [1991] 1 AC 696
democratic legislature when they think Community law requires it.

2. **TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN LAW**

In acceding to the European Communities, the United Kingdom transferred its national courts to a distinct supra-national judicial hierarchy, under the authority of a Supreme court, European Court of Justice. National courts thereby became Community courts charged with implementing Community law in the national sphere. While the United Kingdom remains a member of the European Communities, and its courts consequently part of the European court system, the power (and sovereignty) of the national Parliament has been fettered in that it is unable to enforce or to enact legislation which is contrary to Community law, since such legislation will not be recognized by its own national courts. Since no man can serve two masters, as the judges of the European Court of Justice were keen to emphasize in the first Opinion on the draft Treaty on the European Economic Area, it would appear that the more accurate statement of the primary duty of national courts in the United Kingdom is not to ensure the realization of Parliament's will, but rather to uphold the goals of the European
Communities, as discovered in the Treaties and as interpreted by the European Court of Justice.

It is evident that in matters concerning Community law, the United Kingdom Courts are required to adopt the interpretative techniques and approaches to legislation which have been developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court. A number of these techniques, for example teleological reasoning and proportionality, involve the courts taking a quite new and for the United Kingdom legal systems totally alien approach to legislative enactments.

It would seem that there are then two paradigms for the United Kingdom courts' approach to legislation of the United Kingdom Parliament. In non-Community matters the courts should continue to take a classic legal positivist approach of strict interpretation and application of the authoritative texts enacted by Parliament. In matters where questions of Community law arise, however, a more "natural law" approach would appear to have to be taken by the courts in that they are required to ascertain the purpose of national legislation and assess its compatibility in intention and effect with the
ends of a higher law set out in the Treaties and the judgments of the European Court.

This would result in two models of law: one in which courts are supreme in matters of Community law, one in which the national legislature is supreme in matters untouched by European law. But as one former judge of the European Court of Justice has noted: 7

"[T]he progress of Community law will necessarily have an important impact on the national laws of the Member States. How can one deny, for example, that the decision [of the European Court of Justice] in Johnston v. RUC [1986] ECR 1663 will clearly weaken the British system of ministerial certificates being seen as constituting conclusive statements of lawfulness. This system has now been demolished in all areas where Community law confers justiciable rights on individuals. Is it realistic to suppose that it can continue to exist in other [non-Community] areas, with the result that a variable speed system of

7. Yves Galmot "Reflexions sur le recours au droit compare par le Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes" (1990) 6 Revue francaise de droit administrative 255 at 260 [Author's translation]
guarantees of the rights of individual litigants would be established?" 

Factors which would militate against the idea that two paradigms of law might be maintained include the ever-expanding remit of the Commission and the Court of Justice to apply Community law in new areas, and the bare fact that there is no separate national court structure to apply Community law (such as formerly existed in England with the Common Law and Equity Courts and still exists in France with the distinction between Ordinary Courts and Administrative Court) which might allow two separate bodies of law to grow up within the same national jurisdiction.

Whereas the judicial review of administrative action is the preserve of specialist judges in the High Court of England and the Court of Session in Scotland, the judicial review of legislation is a matter for every court in the Kingdom, from Magistrate's and District Courts upward to apply its standards of reasonableness to the actings of Parliament. Community law clearly requires the courts in the United Kingdom to take on the role of a gouvernement des juges and to articulate and apply policy in reviewing legislation.
It is equally clear that the judges in the United Kingdom are hostile to the idea that they should be required to make policy judgments and substitute their own assessments for that of administrators as well as of the executive and legislature. If and when the Community doctrine of proportionality is "indirectly" received into the administrative law of the United Kingdom, notwithstanding this judicial hostility, this will mark the clear acceptance of the idea of the permeation of Community law throughout the national legal system.

Such acceptance of the indirect influence of Community law must eventually mean that the European Court's vision of the rule of law, implicit within its specific judgments and the general approach, will come to dominate, and eventually to supplant the native traditions. In this way the law of the United Kingdom will be transformed and a common European law begun.
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