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Title:Competition for status creates superstars : an experiment on public good provision and network formation Author(s):VAN LEEUWEN, Boris; OFFERMAN, Theo; SCHRAM, Arthur
Date:2020Citation:
- Journal of the European Economic Association, 2020, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 666–707
Type:ArticleAbstract:We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a ...


Title:Design the electricity market(s) of the future : proceedings from the Eurelectric-Florence School of Regulation conference 7 June 2017 Editor(s):ROSSETTO, Nicolò
Date:2017Citation:
- Florence : European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2017
Type:BookSeries/Number:Florence School of Regulation; Energy; ElectricityAbstract:The profound transformation of the European electricity system is putting the design of the electricity markets that emerged during the restructuring of the 1990s and early 2000s into question. The need for decarbonisation ...

Title:Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining Author(s):KOHLER, StefanDate:2013Citation:
- Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 2013, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 31-41
Type:ArticleAbstract:, the potential sensation of envy also boosts the share of the eventually envy-free party who leaves the bargaining with the larger share under the agreed partition. This gain in bargaining strength through envy can result ...
Title:Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining Author(s):KOHLER, StefanDate:2012Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECOAbstract:Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend ...
Title:Pseudomarkets with Priorities in Large Random Assignment Economies Author(s):MIRALLES, AntonioDate:2010-01-01Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI MWP; 2010/39Abstract:I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the ...
Title:Three essays on game theory and social choice Author(s):GALBIATI, MarcoDate:2007Citation:
- Florence : European University Institute, 2007
Type:ThesisSeries/Number:EUI PhD theses; Department of Economics
Title:Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games Author(s):GALBIATI, MarcoDate:2006Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 2006/24Abstract:We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous
goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free
and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic
Behavior), a ...
Title:Intergenerational altruism and sustainable development Author(s):BORGHESI, Simone
Date:1999Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 1999/40

Title:A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes Author(s):CALSAMIGLIA, Xavier; KIRMAN, AlanDate:1991Type:Working PaperSeries/Number:EUI ECO; 1991/37