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Four essays on dynamic evolutionary models in economics and game theory

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Florence : European University Institute, 1993
EUI; ECO; PhD Thesis
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SACCO, Pier Luigi, Four essays on dynamic evolutionary models in economics and game theory, Florence : European University Institute, 1993, EUI, ECO, PhD Thesis - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/5052
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-- Noise traders permanence in stock markets : an evolutionary approach -- Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games -- Coevolution of social norms with noisy enforcement -- Bertrand vs. Cournot : an evolutionary approach
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Defence date: 15 March 1993
Examining board: Peter Hammond, Stanford University ; Prof. Christopher Harris, Nuffield College, Oxford ; Prof. Alan Kirman, E.U.I., supervisor ; Prof. Robert Waldmann, E.U.I. ; Prof. Stefano Zamagni, University of Bologna
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Chapter 3 ' Evolutionary selection of correlation mechanisms for coordination games' generalizes previous work by ourselves [Sacco, P.L. 1992. “On the Dynamics of Social Norms.” Preprint, presented at the Second Workshop on Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Castiglioncello]
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