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Economics of majoritarian identity politics
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RSC WP 2023 52_V1.pdf (527.44 KB)
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1028-3625
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EUI; RSC; Working Paper; 2023/52; Global Governance Programme
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TICKU, Rohit, VENKATESH, Raghul S., Economics of majoritarian identity politics, EUI, RSC, Working Paper, 2023/52, Global Governance Programme - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75965
Abstract
Majoritarian identity politics has become salient in representative democracies. Why do parties engage in identity politics and what are its consequences? We present a model of electoral competition in which parties capture voter groups based on their identity, and compete over an economic policy platform for the support of nonpartisan voters. In addition, the party that caters to majoritarian interests makes a costly investment in polarizing identity. The investment provides subsequent payoffs to voters who have a preference for identity. When voter preferences over policy platforms are idiosyncratic in nature, greater investment in polarizing identity (i) increases both parties’ rents from office; and (ii) marginalizes minority voter interests. Further, the majoritarian party substitutes away from economic policy platforms. This enhances its overall payoffs in equilibrium and decreases that of the non-majoritarian party. We discuss the implications in context of episodes of majoritarianism in India, Turkey, Brazil, and the United States.
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We thank the second author’s former affiliation AMSE (Aix-Marseille University), and IRES (Chapman University) for financial support. The paper is part of the project titled “Public Decision and Social Welfare: Efficiency and Distributive Justice”, PY18-2933. All errors are our own.