Fragmented Fiscal Policy

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dc.contributor.authorPEROTTI, Roberto
dc.contributor.authorKONTOPOULOS, Y.
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:49:11Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:49:11Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores on a panel of 19 OECD countries the role of fragmentation indetermining fiscal outcomes over the 1970-95 period. We first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy-making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision-makers. Empirically, this notion has two key logical components: the number decision-makers and the rules of the game, or the budget process. In turn, the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition, or the number of ministers in the cabinet. We test all these determinants against each other, and against perhaps e oldest explanation of all, ideology. We show that cabinet size and, to a lesser degree, coalition size and ideology, are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes. In particular, transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors.
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economics, 2002, 86, 2, 191-222
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00146-3
dc.identifier.endpage222
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.startpage191
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/16588
dc.identifier.volume86
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.subjectFiscal policy
dc.subjectFragmentation
dc.subjectIdeology
dc.titleFragmented Fiscal Policy
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
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person.identifier.other26668
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationb23e2659-185d-4237-8723-dd20ba3afa74
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb23e2659-185d-4237-8723-dd20ba3afa74
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