The Eurozone crisis and Italian corporate governance : the end of blockholding?
License
Access Rights
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
1353-2944; 1469-9877
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
Modern Italy, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 365-378
Cite
BULFONE, Fabio, The Eurozone crisis and Italian corporate governance : the end of blockholding?, Modern Italy, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 365-378 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/38767
Abstract
This article explains the process of change in domestic corporate governance. An actor-centred coalitional approach is applied to the Italian case to show how the main features of domestic corporate governance are a product of behavioural patterns (i.e. informal institutions), rather than formal legislation. Leveraging their superior financial means, business elites act as institutional incumbents shaping these informal institutions according to their preferences. It is argued that a change in corporate practices is more likely to be triggered by a socio-economic crisis, which weakens the domestic elite’s influence, rather than a legal reform. These findings call into question the excessively formalistic approach of many corporate governance scholars, and are confirmed by the Italian trajectory. After having resisted 20 years of liberalising legal reforms aimed at eroding their power, Italian blockholders are now being forced, as a consequence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, to dismantle their cross-shareholding networks.
Table of Contents
Additional Information
Published online: 5 October 2015