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Public-private partnerships caught in a trust-trap and the potential role of information : the burden of divergent rationales

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2254-7088
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European journal of government and economics, 2024, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 5-28
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KAPPLER, Moritz, SCHOMAKER, Rahel M., BAUER, Michael W., Public-private partnerships caught in a trust-trap and the potential role of information : the burden of divergent rationales, European journal of government and economics, 2024, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 5-28 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77182
Abstract
Trust is known to be beneficial for cooperation, though remains underdeveloped in public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are caught in a trust trap due to the cooperative regime’s internal heterogeneity. Accordingly, PPP’s inherent trust relationship is disentangled, and the burden of divergent actor rationales is introduced. We hypothesize that potential PPPs find themselves ex ante in a situation that requires certain repair mechanisms before the ‘usual’ venues of trust development can become effective. As such, exogenous information is theorized as quasi-substitute for relational experience that may support the development of a ‘leap of faith’. Theoretical considerations are tested by a vignette experiment with representatives of both the public and the private sector. Within and between-group analyses find strong support for the burden of divergent rationales and stable levels of (role-based) trust. However, the effect of the information treatment on trust levels is limited.
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Published online: 06 June 2024
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