The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the Autonomy of Competition Authorities
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1861-1176
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Bremen TranState Working Papers; 2009/102
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BLAUBERGER, Michael, The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the Autonomy of Competition Authorities, Bremen TranState Working Papers, 2009/102 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/15500
Abstract
As a result of international legalization, the potential for conflicts of overlapping jurisdictions has multiplied – vertically between national and international law, as well as horizontally between national and foreign law. In competition control, the latter type of horizontal overlap between US and EU jurisdictions is significant, but very few conflicts actually occur. Rather than solving the underlying issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, US and EU competition authorities have established a practice of cooperation which aims at preventing conflicts in the first place. Moreover, apart from conflict prevention, transatlantic cooperation significantly enhances the autonomy of competition authorities vis-à-vis politics, judges, and firms.