Interpersonal comparisons of freedom
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0266-2671; 1474-0028
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Economics and philosophy, 1995, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-23
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CARTER, Ian, Interpersonal comparisons of freedom, Economics and philosophy, 1995, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-23 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/41886
Abstract
This paper is about the relevance, to the definition of freedom, of values or goods other than freedom. In this respect,its subject matter is not at all new. However, I do believe that new light can be thrown on the nature of this relationship by paying more attention to another relationship – one which exists within the concept of freedom itself. There are two senses in which we can be said to possess freedom. Firstly, there is the sense in which we can be said to be free to do a certain particular thing. Secondly, there is the sense in which we can be said to possess a certain 'amount','degree' or 'quantity' of freedom, in some overall sense. I believe that most recent accounts of the relationship between freedom and other goods are inconsistent, because they see those other goods as affecting the truth value of claims about freedom in the second sense, but not in the first.
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Published online: 5 December 2008