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Restraints on selective distribution agreements

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1011-4548
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World Competition, 2013, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 489-511
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MONTI, Giorgio, Restraints on selective distribution agreements, World Competition, 2013, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 489-511 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30839
Abstract
The application of competition law to selective distribution agreements has softened somewhat as a result of the new Block Exemption for Vertical Restraints; however the recent approach by the French Competition Authority to online sales, supported by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), reveals that there remain traces of the old regulatory approach, which rests on poorly worked out theories of harm that afford competition authorities the power to monitor closely the details of selective distribution contracts. While the episode discussed here may be driven by a policy of facilitating online sales, there is a risk that given the broad sweep of the ECJ's judgment, it risks widening the scope of application of Article 101, and the remedies available thereunder, to breaking point.
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