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Supranational agency and indirect governance after the euro crisis : ESM, ECB, EMEF and EFB
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1478-2804; 1478-2790
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Journal of contemporary European studies, 2020, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 114-127
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TESCHE, Tobias, Supranational agency and indirect governance after the euro crisis : ESM, ECB, EMEF and EFB, Journal of contemporary European studies, 2020, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 114-127 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/66119
Abstract
This article categorizes newly created and proposed Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions according to a new typology that broadens the well-established agent-trustee distinction to include cooptation and orchestration as two additional modes of indirect governance. Four empirical cases from the realm of EMU governance are discussed, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Central Bank (ECB), the proposed European Minister of Economics and Finance (EMEF) and the European Fiscal Board (EFB). Empirically, it shows that supranational actors like the European Commission can bypass states through enlisting existing authority to deepen European integration.
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First published online: 16 October 2019