Betting for and against EMU : who wins and who loses in Italy and in the UK from the process of European monetary integration
Loading...
Files
Talani_2000.jpg (14.27 KB)
Talani (2000)
License
Access Rights
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
Aldershot : Ashgate, 2000
Cite
TALANI, Leila Simona, Betting for and against EMU : who wins and who loses in Italy and in the UK from the process of European monetary integration, Aldershot : Ashgate, 2000 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/21676
Abstract
An analysis of the extent to which the outcomes of the process of European monetary integration and, particularly, of the development of the debate over the establishment of EMU, have been influenced by domestic politics and by domestic economic interest groups in Italy and in the United Kingdom. From an empirical point of view, the work provides an account of the development of Italian and British socio-economic interest groups towards the issue of European monetary union from the making of the EMS until the establishment of EMU. Argues in favor of the rational behavior of foreign exchange rate commitments within a structural definition of the credibility of exchange rate commitments which links together economic and political science perspectives. Analysis is conducted on the cases of Italy and the UK and their experience in the exchange rate mechanism of the European monetary system. The period considered ranges from the decision of the two countries to peg their currencies in the ERM of the EMS to their departure on September 1992.
Table of Contents
Additional Information
External Links
Publisher
Geographical Coverage
Temporal Coverage
Version
Published version of EUI PhD thesis, 1998