The provision of private goods and the emergence of armed rebellion : the case of the Slovak National Uprising 1944–1945
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1408-6980; 1581-1980
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Journal of international relations and development, 2016, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 76–100
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ONDERCO, Michal, The provision of private goods and the emergence of armed rebellion : the case of the Slovak National Uprising 1944–1945, Journal of international relations and development, 2016, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 76–100 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/36695
Abstract
Can authoritarian leaders maintain support for their rule by providing private goods to selected individuals? Current theories disagree regarding this. While the selectorate theory argues that, in undemocratic regimes, leaders should provide private goods selectively to remain in office, civil war research suggests the opposite. Through a case study of the Slovak National Uprising, using both qualitative and quantitative evidence, this paper shows that the provision of private goods may fuel resentment against the regime and thus increase the risk of armed rebellion. This finding suggests that reliance on the selectorate theory may be fatal for regimes.
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Advance online publication 7 August 2015