Anti-Malthus : conflict and the evolution of societies

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dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.contributor.authorMODICA, Salvatore
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-11T16:52:19Z
dc.date.available2016-03-11T16:52:19Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractThe Malthusian theory of evolution disregards a pervasive fact about human societies: they expand through conflict. When this is taken account of the long-run favors not a large population at the level of subsistence, nor yet institutions that maximize welfare or per capita output, but rather institutions that generate large amount of free resources and direct these towards state power. Free resources are the output available to society after deducting the payments necessary for subsistence and for the incentives needed to induce production, and the other claims to production such as transfer payments and resources absorbed by elites. We develop the evolutionary underpinnings of this model, and examine the implications for the evolution of societies in several applications. Since free resources are increasing both in per capita income and population, evolution will favor large rich societies. We will show how technological improvement can increase or decrease per capita output as well as increasing population.
dc.identifier.citationResearch in economics, 2013, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 289-306
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.rie.2013.09.004
dc.identifier.endpage306
dc.identifier.issn1090-9443
dc.identifier.issue4
dc.identifier.startpage289
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/39761
dc.identifier.volume67
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofResearch in economics
dc.titleAnti-Malthus : conflict and the evolution of societies
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.other33687
relation.isAuthorOfPublication78af1bc3-5456-43f6-b57e-6c19ec2f665c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery78af1bc3-5456-43f6-b57e-6c19ec2f665c
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