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State Fragility, the Peacebuilder’s Contract, and the Search for the Least Bad State
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1028-3625
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EUI RSCAS; 2010/14; European Report on Development
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BARNETT, Michael, State Fragility, the Peacebuilder’s Contract, and the Search for the Least Bad State, EUI RSCAS, 2010/14, European Report on Development - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/13537
Abstract
This paper develops two claims that follow from two general conclusions from recent re-search on
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The first is that international peacebuilders are fairly
good at ending violence and at producing stability, but are less talented at creating liberal states. In
order to understand why, Section I develops the concept of the “peacebuilders’ contract”, which is
intended to map the kinds of strategic interactions that are likely to unfold between peacebuilders and
local élites and capture why these interactions are likely to favour the status quo preferred by local
forces. Following on the general recognition that international peacebuilders are limited in what they
can produce, the second conclusion concerns the need for peacebuilders to be more strategic in their
thinking and to be satisfied with producing small victories that can sup-port the emergence of decent
governments which provide the foundations for future movements towards a positive peace. These
observations and their implications are applicable not only to post-war interventions, but also to the
broader international agenda of fixing states.