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Error Cascades in Observational Learning: An Experiment on the Chinos Game
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1725-6704
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EUI ECO; 2008/14
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FERI, Francesco, MELÉNDEZ-JIMÉNEZ, Miguel A., PONTI, Giovanni, VEGA-REDONDO, Fernando, Error Cascades in Observational Learning: An Experiment on the Chinos Game, EUI ECO, 2008/14 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/8085
Abstract
The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular
Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of
observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each
of whom wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins
lying in everybody’s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable
frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant.
And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player
position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a
mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we
rationalize by way of a simple model of “noisy equilibrium”.