Institutional logics and the EU’s limited sanctioning capacity under Article 7 TEU
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0192-5121; 1460-373X
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International political science review, 2021, Vol 42, No. 4, pp. 501-515
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CLOSA MONTERO, Carlos, Institutional logics and the EU’s limited sanctioning capacity under Article 7 TEU, International political science review, 2021, Vol 42, No. 4, pp. 501-515 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70264
Abstract
Several European Union (EU) governments have infringed the obligation to respect ‘rule of law’ as demanded by the European Union Treaty but, despite its supranational features, the EU has done little to sanction those violations. Why? The European Union’s institutional features paradoxically permit (and even encourage) logics that might be inhibiting its sanctioning capacity. Thus, a partisanship logic informs the European Parliament and this protects errant states. Then, the Commission, rather than acting assertively, anticipates the Council’s stance and adapts also its actions to anticipate a ‘compliance dilemma’ (i.e. compliance depends ultimately on the good will and cooperation of domestic authorities). The Commission prefers to channel its sanctioning activity via other softer instruments (e.g. infringement procedures). Finally, a distaste for increasing EU competence, ideological sympathy for illiberal governments, or fears of spillovers from sanctioning activity inform the action of governments within the Council. Those three institutional logics combine to explain the unexpectedly low sanctioning record for breaches of EU values.
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First published online: 22 April 2020