Franz Josef Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt in den sechziger Jahren
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2196-7121; 0042-5702
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Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1999, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 57-85
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ZIMMERMANN, Hubert, Franz Josef Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt in den sechziger Jahren, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1999, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 57-85 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/47027
Abstract
The widely overlooked agreement of October 1961 between German Defense Minister Strauß and the American Undersecretary of Defense Gilpatric became one of the most important international agreements the Federal Republic of Germany transacted in the 1960's. Essentially, the Strauß-Gilpatric Accord regulated the question of compensating for the foreign exchange deficit incurred by the stationing of US troops in the Federal Republic. Closer analysis reveals, however, that the real issues at hand were questions of international security and monetary policies, as well as the transatlantic alliance system. The compromise covered by the accord turned out to be one of the most important premises upon which German-American relations rested in the 1960's. American concessions in security policy corresponded to the mutually agreed upon German foreign-trade policy which foresaw a Fixed-Rate Dollar of exchange system. This agreement profoundly affected the transatlantic alliance, inasmuch as it, effectively prevented any further european cooperation in security and monetary policies.
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The article is a revised version of the author’s EUI PhD thesis, 1997