The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities
License
Access Rights
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
0140-9883; 1873-6181
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Citation
Energy economics, 2019, Vol. 84, Art. UNSP 104518, OnlineOnly
Cite
DE MEIO REGGIANI, Martin C., VAZQUEZ, Miguel, HALLACK, Michelle, BRIGNOLE, Nelida B., The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities, Energy economics, 2019, Vol. 84, Art. UNSP 104518, OnlineOnly - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/66031
Abstract
Regulation is generally interpreted as a relational contract between governments and private companies. Besides, regulation plays either a positive or a negative role in infrastructure development. This article is intended to understand the hindrance to stable policies in the regulation of network infrastructures. An original model where governments have a conflictive relationship with regulated companies was developed. The governmental opportunistic behaviour, which undermines the regulatory independence, was introduced in an infinitely repeated game. By including this variation, the hold-up problem can be modelled since a time inconsistency may occur. The model was illustrated using past-decade events about the Argentinean transport network of natural gas, proposing a possible reason for the triggering of a sustained hold-up. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Table of Contents
Additional Information
Available online 9 October 2019
External Links
Publisher
Geographical Coverage
Temporal Coverage
Version
Source
Source Link
Research Projects
Sponsorship and Funder Information
Agencia Nacional de Promocion Cientifica y Tecnologica (ANPCyT, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Argentina) through Fondo para la Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (FONCyT) [PICT 2012-0691]