Open Access
The rise of central bank talk : essays in central bank communication and independence
Loading...
Files
Leek_2025_SPS.pdf (9.99 MB)
Full-text in Open Access
License
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
Florence : European University Institute, 2025
EUI; SPS; PhD Thesis
Cite
LEEK, Lauren Caroline, The rise of central bank talk : essays in central bank communication and independence, Florence : European University Institute, 2025, EUI, SPS, PhD Thesis - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/93757
Abstract
Both central bank independence and central bank communication have drastically expanded globally in recent decades. This thesis addresses a puzzling paradox: how do central banks reconcile their independent status with extensive public communication that goes beyond their narrow mandates? I argue that central bank communication is not merely a neutral tool for information transmission; it is dynamically shaped by and employed to address perceived challenges to their independence. This perspective conceptualises independence as an ongoing process, requiring continuous responsiveness to economic and societal realities beyond its formal institutional design. Central banks, therefore, consider more than just their statutory independence; they actively seek public support and macro-economic coordination to effectively fulfil their mandates. To examine the relationship between central bank independence and communication, I leverage Large Language Models to systematically uncover latent insights from an extensive dataset of speeches from 119 central banks worldwide (1997-2024). This significantly broadens the empirical scope beyond traditional studies focusing mainly on central banks in high-income democracies. The publicly available dataset, which includes novel metadata, is accessible at centralbanktalk.eu. The dissertation comprises three empirical chapters. Chapter 2 examines how central bank independence shapes communication in response to monetary and financial pressures. Chapter 3 explores how independent central banks - particularly within the multilevel framework of the Eurosystem - respond in communication to broader societal issues and regionally diverse political demands. Chapter 4 introduces a novel textual measure of central bank pressure on monetary policy, introducing a distinction between coordination and dominance in macroeconomic policy linkages. Together, these chapters offer new insights into the evolving political economy of central banking and the role of communication in sustaining an adaptive form of central bank independence.
Table of Contents
Additional Information
Defence date: 7 October, 2025
Examining Board: Prof. Simon Hix (European University Institute, Supervisor); Prof. Waltraud Schelkle (European University Institute, Co-supervisor) Prof. Kenneth Benoit (Singapore Management University); Prof. Ana Carolina Garriga (University of Essex)
Examining Board: Prof. Simon Hix (European University Institute, Supervisor); Prof. Waltraud Schelkle (European University Institute, Co-supervisor) Prof. Kenneth Benoit (Singapore Management University); Prof. Ana Carolina Garriga (University of Essex)
External Links
Publisher
Version
Chapter 2 'How Central Bank Independence Shapes Monetary Policy Communication: A Large Language Model Application' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as an article 'How central bank independence shapes monetary policy communication : a large language model application' (2025) in the journal ' European Journal of Political Economy'.