Regulatory competition and international co-operation
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1350-1763; 1466-4429
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Journal of European public policy, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 626-642
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GENSCHEL, Philipp, PLUMPER, Thomas, Regulatory competition and international co-operation, Journal of European public policy, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 626-642 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/65065
Abstract
Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's 'California effect' argument, this article shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international co-operation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which co-operation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardization of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonize interest taxation across EC member states.