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Ought implies can : counter-examples and intentions
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1973-2937
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European journal of legal studies, 2017, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 37-51
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FEIS, Guglielmo, Ought implies can : counter-examples and intentions, European journal of legal studies, 2017, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 37-51 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/46067
Abstract
The paper tackles Ought Implies Can (OIC) from a slightly different angle compared to the one that is often adopted in the contemporary OIC sub-debates. I am mainly concerned with the thought according to which, even if the action we ought to do is impossible, it is still possible to intend to do it. This possibility of intending is used as a strategy to rescue OIC from possible counter-examples. I explore two different ways to rescue the principle: (i) OIC rescue by implicating intending in action and (ii) OIC rescue by separation, and show they both face problems.
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Published online: 06 April 2017