Article
Open Access

A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
License
Access Rights
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
1973-2937
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Citation
European journal of legal studies, 2011, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 204-221
Cite
GUERRA-PUJOL, F. E., A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game, European journal of legal studies, 2011, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 204-221 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/20184
Abstract
Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes invited scholars to look at law through the lens of probability theory: ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law’. But Holmes himself, and few others, have taken up this intriguing invitation. As such, in place of previous approaches to the study of law, this paper presents a non-normative, mathematical approach to law and the legal process. Specifically, we present a formal Bayesian model of civil and criminal litigation, or what we refer to as the ‘litigation game’; that is, instead of focusing on the rules of civil or criminal procedure or substantive legal doctrine, we ask and attempt to answer a mathematical question: what is the posterior probability that a defendant in a civil or criminal trial will be found liable, given that the defendant has, in fact, committed a wrongful act?
Table of Contents
Additional Information
Published online: 01 February 2012
External Links
Geographical Coverage
Temporal Coverage
Version
Source
Source Link
Research Projects
Sponsorship and Funder Information