Political institutions and income taxes

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dc.contributor.authorANDERSSON, Per F.
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-21T13:29:23Z
dc.date.available2022-11-21T13:29:23Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractThe chapter analyses the link between political institutions and the adoption of income taxes. The main claim is that this link differs across different types of income tax. The personal income tax represents primarily an investment in fiscal capacity. Hence, its introduction depends crucially on political institutions that constrain executive power. The corporate income tax, by contrast, falls more heavily on the rich. As a consequence, its adoption depends critically on democratic institutions that allow for broad political participation. The chapter explores these predictions for a global sample of countries. The results support the contention that executive constraints facilitate personal income tax adoption, while corporate income taxes are more likely to be adopted by countries with broad suffrage rights.en
dc.identifier.citationPhilipp GENSCHEL and Laura SEELKOPF (eds), Global taxation : how modern taxes conquered the world, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 178–198en
dc.identifier.isbn9780192897572
dc.identifier.isbn9780191924019
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/75039
dc.language.isoenen
dc.orcid.putcode1814/79570:183661980
dc.orcid.uploadtrue*
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen
dc.titlePolitical institutions and income taxesen
dc.typeContribution to booken
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-0507-6931
person.identifier.other42480
relation.isAuthorOfPublication422301ef-347c-4762-8fca-4c185898d732
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery422301ef-347c-4762-8fca-4c185898d732
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