International jurisdiction over standard-essential patents
| dc.contributor.author | HORN, Henrik | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-14T15:09:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-01-14T15:09:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Standards often require the use of patented technologies. Holders of standard-essential patents (SEPs) typically commit to make their patents available on "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms. National competition authorities increasingly intervene against perceived FRAND violations. But which competition authority should regulate SEPs that affect more than one country? The paper uses a very simple economic framework to assess the impact of three main legal bases for allocating jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, and cross-border effects. The findings are negative: neither base will implement a jointly efficient outcome, and the relative performance of the bases depends on the particular circumstances at hand. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1028-3625 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/65723 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.orcid.upload | true | * |
| dc.publisher | European University Institute | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI RSCAS | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2020/02 | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Global Governance Programme-380 | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | [Global Economics] | en |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
| dc.subject | Standard-essential patents | en |
| dc.subject | International jurisdiction | en |
| dc.subject | Default rules | en |
| dc.subject.other | Transnationalism | en |
| dc.subject.other | Trade, investment and international cooperation | en |
| dc.title | International jurisdiction over standard-essential patents | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication |
