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Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games
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2054-5703
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The Royal Society open science, 2021, Vol. 7, Art. 191567, OnlineOnly
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BATTU, Balaraju, SRINIVASAN, Narayanan, Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games, The Royal Society open science, 2021, Vol. 7, Art. 191567, OnlineOnly - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72179
Abstract
Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent’s donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent’s arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two populationlevel parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige. These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.
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First published online: 13 May 2021