Open Access
Five shades of green : heterogeneous environmental attitudes in an evolutionary game model
Loading...
Files
s00191-023-00826-6.pdf (579.63 KB)
Full text in Open-Access
License
Attribution 4.0 International
Access Rights
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
0936-9937; 1432-1386
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
Journal of evolutionary economics, 2023, Vol. 33, pp. 1345-1363
[Florence School of Regulation]; [Climate]
Cite
ANTOCI, Angelo, BORGHESI, Simone, GALDI, Giulio, Five shades of green : heterogeneous environmental attitudes in an evolutionary game model, Journal of evolutionary economics, 2023, Vol. 33, pp. 1345-1363, [Florence School of Regulation], [Climate] - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75984
Abstract
An environmental policy to foster virtuous behaviour does not automatically establish a social norm in a population; that is, the policy might not be socially acceptable or enforceable. Some agents feel compelled to abide by environmental social norms and embrace them, but others do not. Some might want to imitate their peers, while others might prefer not to conform and play the role of a maverick. In this model, we describe the heterogeneity of preferences by proposing a taxonomy of five possible agent types that enrich the traditional triplet presented in the literature. We then employ a random matching model to study how a social norm spreads within a population when its composition changes. Considering three relevant population compositions (scenarios), we show that what is most important for the successful diffusion of social norms is not whether, but why agents abide by it.
Table of Contents
Additional Information
Published online: 07 August 2023