Trust, reputation, and the value of promises in online auctions of used goods

dc.contributor.authorKAS, Judith
dc.contributor.authorVAN DE RIJT, Arnout
dc.contributor.authorCORTEN, Rense
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-16T16:12:57Z
dc.date.available2023-05-16T16:12:57Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractBuyers in online markets pay higher prices to sellers who promise a highquality product in auctions of used goods, even though they cannot assess quality until after the sale. The principal argument offered in prior work is that reputation systems render sellers’ ‘cheap talk’ credible by allowing buyers to publicly rate sellers’ past honesty and sellers to build a reputation for being honest. We test this argument using both observational data from online auctions on eBay and an internet experiment. Strikingly, in both studies we find that unverifiable promises are trusted by buyers regardless of seller reputation or the presence of a reputation system, and sellers mostly refuse to take advantage. We conclude that the prevailing conception of markets in economic sociology as made possible by opportunism-curtailing institutions is “undersocialized”: Reputation systems may be used to identify more reliable providers of a product, but that they would be needed to prevent otherwise rampant deceit relies on a cynical assumption about human behavior that is empirically untenable.en
dc.description.versionPublished online: 15 May 2023en
dc.identifier.citationRationality and society, 2023, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 387-419en
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/10434631231170342
dc.identifier.endpage419
dc.identifier.issn1043-4631
dc.identifier.issn1461-7358
dc.identifier.issue4
dc.identifier.startpage387
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/75585
dc.identifier.volume35
dc.language.isoenen
dc.orcid.uploadtrue*
dc.publisherSageen
dc.relation.ispartofRationality and societyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectReputation systemsen
dc.subjectTrusten
dc.subjectCommunicationen
dc.subjectSignalling theoryen
dc.subjecteBayen
dc.subjectOnline platformsen
dc.titleTrust, reputation, and the value of promises in online auctions of used goodsen
dc.typeArticleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-4208-3452
person.identifier.other43992
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationadc2f95d-84a8-46ae-a3af-389c05230d9e
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryadc2f95d-84a8-46ae-a3af-389c05230d9e
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