Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars

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dc.contributor.authorJACKSON, Matthew O.
dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-30T13:54:10Z
dc.date.available2010-03-30T13:54:10Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractWe study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve dove, hawk, and deterrent strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with differing armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. As it becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probability of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war becomes increasingly likely when negotiations break down.en
dc.identifier.citationQuarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, 4, 4, 279-313en
dc.identifier.doi10.1561/100.00009047
dc.identifier.endpage313
dc.identifier.issn1554-0626
dc.identifier.issn1554-0634
dc.identifier.startpage279en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/13656
dc.identifier.volume4en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofQuarterly Journal of Political Scienceen
dc.titleStrategic Militarization, Deterrence and Warsen
dc.typeArticleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.other33008
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationc4f394e3-acea-46a3-863c-d8259edde6d0
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc4f394e3-acea-46a3-863c-d8259edde6d0
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